Commentaries

“US-China Tensions Spill over into South China Sea” by Ian Storey

 

2018/92, 11 October 2018

China’s more robust response to America’s most recent freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) in the Spratly Islands is a clear demonstration of how the intensification of Sino-US rivalry is increasingly being played out in the heart of maritime Southeast Asia.
Over recent months, it has become clear that US President Donald Trump has decided to follow through on his campaign promise to get tough with China on a range of economic, political and strategic issues. His administration has sparked a trade war with China by imposing tariffs on US$250 billion worth of Chinese imports, placed sanctions on China’s armed forces for buying weapons from Russia, renewed arms sales to Taiwan, and criticized Beijing’s oppressive policies in Xinjiang and Tibet.

 

 

“What to Expect from Vietnam’s Consolidated Power Structure?” by Le Hong Hiep

 

2018/91, 4 October 2018

On 3 October 2018, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) unanimously nominated General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong to be the candidate for the state president position that has been left vacant after the recent passing of the late President Tran Dai Quang. The National Assembly will officially elect Mr Trong to the state presidency at its forthcoming session to be opened on 22 October 2018.

 

 

“Philippine Federalism: Not by Popular Demand” by Malcolm Cook

 

2018/90, 1 October 2018

The most recent Pulse Asia opinion poll suggests, again, that President Duterte should desist in his push for a federal Philippines through constitutional revision (called charter change in the Philippines).

Charter change finished last among the list of 15 “urgent national concerns” his administration should address. Only 1% of respondents chose it as the most urgent concern while 96% failed to choose it among their three most urgent concerns. In sharp contrast, 31% opted for controlling inflation as the most urgent concern and 63% included this in their list of three.

 

 

“The Sudden Passing of President Tran Dai Quang and Its Implications” by Le Hong Hiep

 

2018/89, 24 September 2018

The sudden passing of Vietnamese President Tran Dai Quang on 21 September 2018 was a shock to many Vietnamese. Although Mr Quang was known to have been ill for some time, he was still seen receiving foreign leaders and engaging in various political and social activities until recently. Official reports, however, revealed that he was found to be infected with a “rare” and “incurable” virus in July 2017, and had since undergone six treatments in Japan.

 

 

“China Criticizes Presence of Foreign Warships in South China Sea” by Ian Storey

 

2018/88, 21 September 2018

Operations by Japanese and British warships to assert freedom of navigation rights in the South China Sea have been criticized by Beijing as destabilizing and provocative.

On 13 September, three Japanese surface warships and a submarine took part in a training exercise in an undisclosed area of the South China Sea. It was the first time that a Japanese submarine had conducted such activities in the disputed waters. In response, China’s foreign ministry called on non-claimant countries to “refrain from doing anything that will undermine peace and stability” in the area. China’s jurisdictional claims within its expansive nine-dash line—including the right to regulate the passage of foreign military vessels—are not consistent with the United Nations Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and are therefore not recognized by the international community.

 

 

“Spike in Chinese Tourists Presents New Challenges for Vietnam” by Le Hong Hiep

 

2018/87, 11 September 2018

Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister Vuong Dinh Hue has recently instructed the State Bank of Vietnam, the Ministry of Finance and relevant government agencies to crack down on the use of Chinese electronic wallet services, such as WeChat Pay and AliPay, as well as illegal points of sale devices at travel hotspots frequented by Chinese tourists. The government is concerned that the use of such payment methods, through which the transactions, conducted between Chinese bank accounts of Chinese tourists and business owners, can circumvent Vietnam’s banking system and national regulations, leading to loss of tax revenues and other potential problems.

 

 

“PM Morrison’s Visit: A New Era for Indonesia-Australia Relations?” by Siwage Dharma Negara and Leo Suryadinata

 

2018/86, 4 September 2018

The newly elected Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison visited Indonesia from August 31 to September 2. It is his first foreign trip a week after his inauguration.  The visit indicates Australia’s foreign policy priority to improving bilateral relations with Indonesia.

Traditionally, new Australian leaders have always visited Jakarta as part of their first overseas visit. This latest visit seems to continue this tradition and serves as a signal that PM Morrison would further build cordial relations with Indonesia, which has been orchestrated by his predecessor, PM Malcolm Turnbull.

 

 

“The Northeast Asian Exception” by Malcolm Cook

 

2018/85, 24 August 2018

It has long been an article of conventional wisdom that the lack of strategic trust between China, Japan and South Korea undermines economic cooperation between the three Northeast Asian trading powers and undercuts their ability to set regional and global rules and standards.

 

 

“Vietnam’s North-South High-speed Rail Project: A Renewed Opportunity for Japan?” by Le Hong Hiep

 

2018/84, 21 August 2018

In June 2010, Vietnam’s National Assembly voted to reject a proposal to build a North-South high-speed rail line connecting Ha Noi and Ho Chi Minh City. This proposal, backed by Japanese companies, failed to win the legislature’s approval due to its high price tag of USD56 billion, which was about half of Vietnam’s GDP in 2010.

However, the proposal has been revived recently. The Ministry of Transport (MOT) and a consortium of 3 local consulting companies are currently working with 20 provincial governments to gather inputs, especially regarding the location of the rail track and stations, for a project proposal to be submitted to the government within this year.

 

 

“Jokowi’s New Candidate for Vice-president and the Rise of Conservatism” by Norshahril Saat

 

2018/83, 11 August 2018

Ending weeks of speculation, Indonesian President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) officially declared cleric Ma’ruf Amin as his running mate for the 2019 presidential elections. The declaration only came one day before the deadline for parties to shortlist potential names for the race. Divisions within the coalition that backs the president’s bid for his second term might have caused the delay. The coalition backing Jokowi—known as the Indonesian Working Coalition—includes parties PDI-P, Golkar, Hanura, PKB, PPP, Nasdem, PSI, Perindo, and PKPI. Another name rumoured to be Jokowi’s running mate was Mohammad Mahfud Mahmodin (also known as Mahfud M D) who is also an Islamic scholar. Mahfud was former Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court and widely seen as a “moderate” leader.