Trends in Southeast Asia

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• Since the normalization of relations in 1991, Vietnam and China, two of the five remaining communist regimes, have established a robust framework for mutual learning and cooperation. This collaboration has primarily centred around party governance and cadre training.

• Vietnam has actively studied and adopted elements of China’s successful model, which combines economic reform with strict political control. This approach has allowed Vietnam to maintain communist rule in the face of increasing global pressure for democratic reforms.

• The process of learning from China involves two key dynamics: desirability versus capability, and effectiveness versus appropriateness. While Vietnam desires to achieve the same level of effectiveness as China in certain policy areas, it has been cautious in fully replicating the Chinese model, and shown consideration for its appropriateness to Vietnam’s unique circumstances and for China’s underlying motivations.

• Vietnam has adopted a mixed approach to learning from China, incorporating direct emulation, selective adaptation and drawing inspiration from China’s experiences. One notable example of this is the ongoing anti-corruption efforts of both regimes, which share some similarities but also have distinct differences.

• The learning relationship between Vietnam and China is not without its challenges. Historical animosities, maritime disputes and anti-China sentiment all play a role in shaping this partnership. As a result, Vietnam has had to employ innovative tactics to adapt Chinese lessons to fit its own circumstances.

Trends in Southeast Asia 2024/23, September 2024

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• Humanitarian Islam refers to the efforts of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) to promote peaceful coexistence among people of different faiths in the world, with a focus on rahmah (universal love and compassion).

• The main vehicles for promoting Humanitarian Islam have been North Carolina-registered non-governmental organizations (NGOs), namely Bayt ar-Rahmah (Home of the Divine Grace) and the Center for Shared Civilizational Values. Key advocates of this campaign include current Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) chairman Yahya Cholil Staquf and North Carolina native Holland Taylor.

• The Humanitarian Islam message promoted under Yahya Cholil Staquf’s leadership goes back to the philosophy of Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) and NU’s promotion of Islam Nusantara under Said Aqil Siroj’s chairmanship. It focuses on recontextualizing orthodox religious teachings through the establishment of various inter- and intra-religious partnerships globally.

• NU and Bayt ar-Rahmah leaders have witnessed early-stage successes in promoting the Humanitarian Islam vision to forge ties with other large religious organizations across the world such as the Imam Warith Deen Muhammad (IWDM) community and World Evangelical Alliance through utilizing universal vocabularies such as indigeneity, human dignity and humanitarian Islam.

• However, precisely owing to the broad, catch-all nature of this concept, NU faces, among others, three communications-related challenges in implementing the Humanitarian Islam concept—within NU, among the grassroots, and with its partners. Ethnographic work and interviews with NU leaders, Gerakan Pemuda Ansor members, NU’s partners and the grassroots reveal that the vision suffers from a lack of clarity and buy-in beyond a select few leaders.

Trends in Southeast Asia 2024/22, September 2024

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• Peatland ecosystems in Southeast Asia are globally important as carbon sinks, rich in terrestrial and aquatic fauna and flora, and important sources of livelihood for local communities. However, agribusiness-driven land-use change and drainage cause peatland degradation and peat fires, which generate “haze” air pollution and lead to significant economic losses and health impacts. Disturbed peatlands also become substantial sources of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.

• While the problems of haze and climate change are connected through peatlands, these issues have been treated largely separately in policy and governance. In this article we provide an overview of Southeast Asian peatlands, assessing opportunities and challenges for greater integration of policy and governance in addressing haze, climate change and other sustainability dimensions. We focus on Indonesia and Malaysia, the Southeast Asian countries with the largest peatland areas.

• We summarize key developments, along with evidence indicating that peatlands represent a large proportion of national GHG emissions in both Indonesia and Malaysia. Further, we trace the evolution of peatland policies at the national and regional levels, from focusing on conservation to addressing fire and haze issues, reflecting their complex relationship with national development and the corporate sector.

• Next, we highlight important and yet unrealized opportunities to better integrate carbon emissions reduction alongside fire and haze in the implementation of peatland Nature-based Solutions (NbS), which are interventions to protect, sustainably manage, or restore nature. Emerging financial and market instruments provide one such opportunity. Additionally, the creation of an enabling governance environment through peatland community participation presents an opportunity to improve the effectiveness of NbS across multiple sustainability dimensions.

• We found that for these two key countries, the most recent government-reported peatland emissions appear somewhat lower than is suggested by academic studies for Indonesia and substantially lower in the case of Malaysia. Further, we emphasize the complex challenge of integrating policies across multiple scales and issues, with international, regional and national actors, and in multiple industries, all active in peatland governance.

Trends in Southeast Asia 2024/21, September 2024

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• Myanmar’s economic trajectory has shifted across various governmental regimes, transitioning from socialist to democratic systems and from planned to market economy structures.

• The economic policies implemented by successive governments often lacked coherence and were characterized by ad hoc measures aimed at short-term solutions rather than addressing underlying issues.

• Policymakers since 1989 have endeavoured to guide Myanmar towards a market-oriented economy, characterized by what could be termed the “Burmese/Myanmar Way to Market Economy”, which includes significant restrictions and controls.

• Both the military-backed Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP) and civilian-led National League for Democracy (NLD) administrations made significant efforts to enhance liberalization and strengthen market economic principles, despite multidimensional challenges including inadequate capacities for policy formulation and over-reliance on past domestic experiences rather than international lessons.

• All these reforms and economic pillars, established through intellect and hard work to ensure liberalization and a market economy, collapsed under the State Administration Council regime following the military coup of 1 February 2021.

• Effective policy formulation and implementation are pivotal for Myanmar’s economic trajectory, and policymakers must navigate historical practices and global standards with discernment, fostering policies that promote transparency, accountability, and inclusivity while adapting to feedback and interconnected economic realities.

Trends in Southeast Asia 2024/20, August 2024

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• Amid political polarization, knowledge and understanding of Thailand’s history have also diverged radically. This divide is especially evident between younger and older generations.

• Driving this phenomenon is the growing rejection by students of the traditional history taught in public schools, which in the past had been a means for the Thai state to instil in the young a sense of nationalism, national pride and shared values. Poor pedagogy that emphasizes memorization, and that discourages discussions and critical thinking, has alienated many from the subject. Education professionals and student activists have also been critical of this development.

• Moreover, the democratization of information and the availability of alternative sources of historical knowledge have allowed young people to learn about history in ways that challenge the traditional narratives taught in classrooms. The alternative sources include social media, websites by historians and enthusiasts, as well as books printed by independent publishers.

• Young people have also begun to engage with history in new ways. They have organized themselves to commemorate aspects of history overlooked in school textbooks and have used history to legitimize their political activism.

• This diverging understanding and engagement with history has two main consequences. First, political polarization can deepen, with different sides utilizing their versions of history as legitimization for their political views. Second, it will be harder for the Thai state to instil communal values and a basic understanding of the nation among young people, which can have implications for the building of a shared Thai identity in the future.

Trends in Southeast Asia 2024/19, July 2024

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• The rapid development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies has been nothing less of awe-inspiring. Policymakers are put in a bind as debates over how the deployment of these AI systems is to be managed — with good governance and ethical considerations in mind, and without stifling innovation.

• ASEAN’s response has been the formulation of the ASEAN Guide on AI Governance and Ethics, or the ASEAN AI Guide. This Guide serves more as a “practical guide” for organizations involved in the development and deployment of AI for commercial and non-military or dual-use applications, as opposed to a policy playbook for governments. Though voluntary in application, it does have some positive attributes including laying out the groundwork for regionwide discussions around AI governance and ethics issues, promoting human involvement in AI system management and having an ecosystem approach to policy.

• For the implementation of the Guide to be effective, certain notable aspects should be taken into consideration. Firstly, the additional costs organizations will bear in putting into place the checks and balances premised by the guide should be reassessed, especially the disproportionate impact these will have on MSMEs. Additionally, labour availability for these suggested governance mechanisms may be lacking, with rising skills and human resource gaps in integral areas such as cybersecurity. Moreover, on a national level, policymakers should be wary of potential disparities between institutional and regulatory maturity for AI system implementation relative to business readiness for implementation on the ground.

• For the ASEAN AI Guide to translate into actionable outcomes, some public policy areas warrant additional consideration. Firstly, some focus will need to be redirected to ex-post regulations, such as legal recourse for AI-generated Intellectual Property (IP) infringement. Furthermore, how new technologies and human capital can be leveraged to better manage potential ill-effects of AI system deployment should be given more focus, along with keeping tabs on psychological changes among different segments of society with greater AI system usage. Lastly, the ASEAN AI Guide should be used as a basis for greater regional engagement in this integral area.

Trends in Southeast Asia 2024/18, June 2024

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• This article draws from a database of asset-level emissions to identify key methane-emitting coal, oil and gas facilities in Southeast Asia while taking stock of the methane commitments of their owners.

• Coal mines account for around a third of fossil fuel methane emissions globally, but in Southeast Asia, they make up more than half of tracked fossil fuel methane emissions.

• Over half of emissions from the coal mining subsector is traced to its top ten emitters, mostly in East Kalimantan, Indonesia; while some coal mines in North Vietnam have high emissions intensities.

• Though the global discourse on fossil methane focuses on oil and gas, coal mine methane remains crucial for Southeast Asia due to the region’s lack of decisive coal phaseout plans.

• As countries begin to tackle coal emissions at the power generation stage, a gap still remains when it comes to coal mining emissions. Methane monitoring and abatement actions are urgently needed for coal mines that will continue to operate, as well as those slated for closure.

• More clarity is needed on how private sector commitments in the oil and gas sector will translate to action under complex and changing ownership arrangements.

• These gaps and uncertainties in methane abatement are ripe opportunities for closer partnership in the region, including within the private sector.

Trends in Southeast Asia 2024/17, June 2024

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• Vietnam’s foreign policy towards China and the United States (US) involves a delicate process of reconciling and balancing competing perceptions, goals and interests within the country. This leads to foreign policy decisions that may respectively lean towards either China or the US, depending on specific circumstances and issues, while trying to maintain an overall equilibrium between the two powers.

• Vietnam’s foreign policy adopts the paradigm of “cooperation” and “struggle” in its relations with major powers, and defines “national security” as encompassing both national sovereignty and regime security.

• Given the common ideology and imperative of preserving political control of their respective communist parties, China may be a critical partner for Vietnam in terms of regime security but is often an “object of struggle” on national sovereignty. On the other hand, the US is Vietnam’s partner in the South China Sea but an “object of struggle” when it comes to regime security.

• The Vietnamese public’s favourable sentiments towards the US, contrasted with their distrust towards China, pose a challenge for the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) in mobilizing public opinion to bolster its legitimacy while preventing any potential threat to its political authority.

• A friendly relationship with China is essential for Vietnam’s favourable external environment, warranting Hanoi’s accommodation and deference to Beijing on non-critical issues. However, it has meticulously avoided dependencies and vulnerabilities to China through diversifying economic ties and engaging in “soft balancing” with other powers and through ASEAN. Party-to-party links provide China with powerful access to Vietnamese leaders, but the US is catching up by giving assurances to respect Vietnam’s political system, and strengthening “party diplomacy” with the CPV.

• In its relationship with the US, Vietnam prioritizes economic ties, addressing war legacy issues, leveraging US support to build capacities in traditional and non-traditional security, and avoiding geopolitical posturing that could provoke China.

• Vietnam-US relations are characterized by pragmatism, with both sides prioritizing shared geopolitical and economic interests over ideological differences. The sustainability of this approach is uncertain, given the CPV’s tightening of domestic control and the “securitization of the Vietnamese state” in the anti-corruption campaign.

• Vietnam has thus far benefited from the US-China rivalry but it faces substantial challenges ahead, including heightened vulnerabilities to an assertive China in the South China Sea and Lower Mekong, potential trade tensions if Donald Trump is re-elected as US president, and risks in balancing its ideological ties with Beijing while maintaining its strategic alignment with the US.

Trends in Southeast Asia 2024/16, June 2024

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• The People’s Justice Party (PKR) may in many ways be synonymous with its larger-than-life leader, Anwar Ibrahim, who, although only president for six of the party’s twenty-five years, has always been its de facto leader and adviser. However, PKR is much more than only about Anwar, and this paper traces the evolution of the party independently of Anwar as a person.

• PKR’s evolution can be broken down into four main periods: 1998–2004 (formative), 2005–13 (golden era), 2014–18 (all-in for power), and 2019–22 (lessons on restraints). From 1998 to 2022, PKR tended to adopt a big-tent approach (internally and externally), ideological synthesis to find a middle ground, and a loose organization led by a charismatic personality at the top and self-organization at the grassroots.

• PKR was born out of a major crisis when Anwar, then deputy prime minister, was sacked in 1998 and subsequently jailed twice in the following two decades. For the most part, the party operated with its figurehead in jail, thus learning how to rely on coalition strengths, working with civil society, mass movements, and political parties to survive and win power.

• The party’s loose organization became beneficial when it partnered with parties that are ideological opposites such as DAP and PAS (as part of Pakatan Rakyat in 2008), and expanded party enfranchisement via a one-person-one-vote system. This also allowed PKR to adopt a middle-ground approach in policies such as hudud and the New Economic Policy (NEP).

• However, openness and loose organization led to factionalism within the party, resulting in large-scale defections during the 2009 Perak crisis, the 2014 Selangor menteri besar crisis, and the 2020 Sheraton Move. Without pushing its big-tent approach to the limit and without working with arch-enemy Mahathir Mohamad, PKR would not have emerged victorious in the first-ever change in government in 2018 and Anwar Ibrahim would not have been pardoned and freed. Notwithstanding that, it also led to a fractious coalition and a loss of trust in the leadership during Pakatan Harapan’s term in government (2018–20).

• The post-election Unity Government with Anwar Ibrahim as the tenth prime minister marks PKR’s first “real” governing experience, and this would not have been possible without PKR’s core identity operating in full gear.

Trends in Southeast Asia 2024/15, May 2024