Commentaries

“Plans for the Natuna Fishing Zone are Unveiled” by Leo Suryadinata

 

2019/22, 28 February 2019

On 20 February 2019, three days after the second presidential election debate between Jokowi and Prabowo, Luhut Panjaitan, Indonesia’s Co-ordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs, unveiled plans that Jakarta intended to set up the Zona Penangkapan Ikan di Laut Natuna (Natuna Fishing Zone) facilities in the third quarter of this year. These facilities would include tanker ships to supply fuel for Indonesian fishermen, cold storage and boarding houses. Indonesian navy ships would also be used to safeguard Indonesian fishing boats.

 

 

“Confrontations and Looming Protests Over Constitutional Reform in Myanmar” by Nyi Nyi Kyaw

 

2019/21, 28 February 2019

Recent weeks have seen an unprecedented confrontation between Myanmar’s National League for Democracy (NLD) government and the country’s military over the issue of constitutional reform. The NLD and its supporters, both in the parliament and outside, have put increasing pressure on the military to agree to reform of the Myanmar’s 2008 constitution. The military has warned that this may cause political instability. The confrontation will not abate, but rather only deepen, in the months to come.

 

 

“Indonesia’s Second Presidential Debate 2019: Data Driven vs Rhetorical Nationalism” by Aninda Dewayanti

 

2019/20, 26 February 2019

On Sunday, 17 February 2019, Indonesia’s presidential candidates, Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and Prabowo Subianto, pitched their visions for infrastructure, energy, food, natural resources, and the environment during the second presidential debate. While strong nationalist narratives on the economy persisted, this debate appeared more substantial than the first.

 

 

“Sino-Philippine and Sino-US Tensions Persist in the South China Sea” by Ian Storey

 

2019/19, 14 February 2019

In late February, ASEAN and Chinese officials will meet in Naypyidaw, Myanmar to continue discussions on the Code of Conduct (CoC) for the South China Sea. As the CoC process (slowly) advances, however, at sea tensions continue to bubble between China and the Philippines, and China and the United States.

 

 

“Trump-Kim Summit: Why Vietnam?” by Ha Hoang Hop and Lye Liang Fook

 

2019/18, 13 February 2019

US President Trump has announced that the second Trump – Kim Summit will be held in Hanoi, Vietnam from 27 to 28 February. Why is Vietnam chosen as the venue?

Hanoi is an acceptable location to both the United States and North Korea. Vietnam has diplomatic relations with both countries which also have their respective embassies in Hanoi.

 

 

“The Princess Gambit Debacle in Thailand” by Termsak Chalermpalanupap

 

2019/17, 13 February 2019

As widely expected, Thailand’s Election Commission on 11 February excluded Princess Ubolratana from its list of 69 qualified candidates for the premiership proposed by 45 parties due to contest the country’s 24 March elections.
The decision of Princess Ubolratana – the elder sister of King Maha Vajiralongkorn – to accept the nomination of the Thai Raksa Chat Party as its candidate for the premiership is a matter of puzzlement and intrigue.

 

 

“The Significance of the Second Trump – Kim Summit for Vietnam” by Le Hong Hiep

 

2019/16, 8 February 2019

During his 2019 State of the Union Address, US President Donald Trump announced that he would meet with North Korean leader Kim Jung-un for a second time at a bilateral summit to be held in Vietnam on 27-28 February 2019. While many details of the summit have not been revealed, the Vietnamese government and public have warmly welcomed the decision for various reasons.

Speaking to the media about the decision, Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Le Thi Thu Hang stated that “Vietnam welcomes the United States and North Korea to hold their second summit. Vietnam strongly supports dialogues to maintain peace, security and stability on the Korean Peninsula”. In an interview with Bloomberg on 18 January 2019, when asked about the possibility of Vietnam being chosen to host the summit, Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc also mentioned that Vietnam “would be happy to host the meeting”.

 

 

“Ahead of 2020 Elections, Moves to Amend the Myanmar Constitution” by Ye Htut

 

2019/15, 7 February 2019

On 29 January 2019, Myanmar’s ruling party, the National League for Democracy (NLD) moved for the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (Union Parliament, combining upper and lower houses) to pass an emergency resolution on forming a Joint Committee for Constitutional Amendment. The military-appointed members of parliament objected to this move, pointing to the stipulation in the 2008 Constitution that constitutional amendments must be in the form of a bill submitted by 20 per cent of members of parliament, and not by a parliamentary committee. The emergency resolution was passed with the NLD’s majority vote in parliament.

 

 

“A Win-Win Scenario for General Prayut” by Termsak Chalermpalanupap

 

2019/14, 4 February 2019

Thai junta leader and Prime Minister General Prayut Chanocha has made up his mind. But he has only revealed this much: if he wants to stay on in power, he will allow the Phalang Pracharat Party to list him as a candidate for the premiership in the country’s 24 March 2019 elections.
Actually, General Prayut will surprise no one if he finally accepts the invitation of Phalang Pracharat to be its leading candidate for prime minister in the upcoming general elections. Each party can name up to three candidates for the premiership, with lists to be made public during the registration of election candidates during 4-8 February.

 

 

“Who Set the Parameters of Monastic Politics in Myanmar?” by Nyi Nyi Kyaw

 

2019/13, 31 January 2019

Monastic politics — Theravada Buddhist monks’ and by extension nuns’ participation in the electoral realm as voters, founders and members of political parties, or professional politicians — has been banned in Myanmar since the country’s independence in 1948. Each of its three constitutions has prohibited monks and nuns from voting and being elected to political office. The same restrictions also apply in Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos. Sri Lanka is the only Theravada-majority country in the world that is an exception, by allowing these activities.