Commentaries

“Stand-off at Vanguard Bank: A Test of Vietnam – China Relations” by Ha Hoang Hop and Lye Liang Fook

 

2019/62, 22 July 2019

According to the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, a Chinese coast guard vessel, the Haijing 35111, has since 16 June been patrolling an area about 190 nautical miles off the coast of southeastern Vietnam that is adjacent to the oil and gas Block 06-01, that is situated to the northwest of Vanguard Bank on Vietnam’s continental shelf. The block is key to the Nam Con Son project which provides up to 10 percent of Vietnam’s total energy needs. In May 2019, Russian Rosneft contracted the Hakuryu-5, a rig owned by Japan Drilling Company, to drill a new production well in 06-01 at a second gas field called Lan Do. There were two previous incidents in July 2017 and March 2018 where Chinese threats forced Vietnam to stop drilling in nearby oil and gas blocks by Spain’s Repsol. But in the most recent case, Rosneft went ahead with the drilling at Lan Do and at another field, Phong Lan Dai, in Block 06-01. Haijing 35111 was reported to have been operating in a threatening and intimidating manner near Vietnamese vessel that were servicing the Japanese rig.

 

 

“A Mindanao Test for China-Philippine Relations” by Malcolm Cook

 

2019/61, 18 July 2019

For the last three decades, successive Philippine governments have considered but not started constructing a Mindanao Railway System to link the urban centres of the country’s poorest and most troubled major island. Under President Duterte, the first president from Mindanao, this massive but commercially doubtful 1500km project has gained much greater political backing and urgency. It has become a test for both China and the Philippines of their new-found “friendship” as the Duterte administration expects China to provide the majority of financing for this project and 80-85% of its first $83 billion peso stage covering about 105 kilometres.

 

 

“The Post-Sovereign Philippines” by Malcolm Cook

 

2019/60, 12 July 2019

What matters to international policy analysts is often largely immaterial to voters. Much has been written by analysts criticizing the Duterte administration’s deference to China, particularly in the West Philippine Sea. Yet, the latest Social Weather Stations’ quarterly survey provides a humbling reality check.

 

 

“Thai Politics without Thaksin(?)” by Termsak Chalermpalanupap

 

2019/59, 10 July 2019

Former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra made headlines in Thailand with a tweet last Sunday announcing his intention to  celebrate his upcoming seventieth birthday on 26 July quietly with his family.  No friends, and no political supporters, will be invited to mark the occasion with him in Dubai, his home in exile since 2008.  After all, Dubai is rather hot, Thaksin reasoned; it would be inconvenient to do any outdoor partying when the temperature was almost 50 degrees centigrade.

 

 

“China’s Raised Threat Level for the Malacca Straits Causes Puzzlement” by Ian Storey

 

2019/58, 9 July 2019

On 2 July, China’s Ministry of Transport (MOT) raised the threat alert for Chinese-flagged ships transiting the Straits of Malacca (SOM) to Security Level 3, the highest security setting under the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS).  Security Level 3 applies when there is credible information that a security incident is probable or imminent and requires vessels to strengthen security measures.

 

 

“China’s Ballistic Missile Tests in the South China Sea Stoke Sino-US Tensions” by Ian Storey

 

2019/57, 8 July 2019

Reports that China conducted one or more ballistic missile tests in the South China Sea in early July highlights the growing strategic rivalry between Washington and Beijing in maritime Southeast Asia. The tests run counter to China’s narrative that the situation in the South China Sea is stable and calm.

 

 

“Philippine Sovereign Limits” by Malcolm Cook

 

2019/56, 8 July 2019

On 9 June, a much larger, steel-hulled Chinese fishing vessel hit a Filipino one near Recto Bank in the Philippine exclusive economic zone. Recto Bank is roughly 100 nautical miles from Palawan and 600 nautical miles from Hainan Island. The Chinese vessel abandoned the 22 Filipino fishermen to their fate in the dark night. A nearby Vietnamese fishing vessel, in accordance with customary maritime law, rescued the 22.

 

 

“Revised Title ‘ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific’ Hints at Ambivalence” by Hoang Thi Ha and Glenn Ong

 

2019/55, 28 June 2019

The original title of ASEAN’s official response on the Indo-Pacific was reportedly the “ASEAN Indo-Pacific Outlook”, which was revised at the eleventh hour to the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” (AOIP). This modification appears ordinary at first glance, but a closer look at the wording reveals the underlying ambivalence that ASEAN and some of its member states might still have with embracing the concept.  

 

 

“ASEAN, Myanmar, and the Rohingya Issue” by Moe Thuzar

 

2019/54, 25 June 2019

In the weeks leading up to the recently concluded 34th ASEAN Summit under Thailand’s chairmanship, the question of ASEAN credibly engaging Myanmar on the Rohingya issue was among key topics for discussion in Bangkok.

 

 

“The Return of Ma Ba Tha to the Political Scene in Myanmar” By Nyi Nyi Kyaw

 

2019/53, 20 June 2019

Ma Ba Tha, or the Organization for the Protection of Race and Religion, has returned to the political scene with an open call to the people of Myanmar not to vote for the incumbent National League for Democracy (NLD) in the 2020 elections.