EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Analyses of the South China Sea (SCS) disputes often use the term “lawfare” to describe the greatly diverging activities of China, the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, and the US, obscuring the normative differences between these states’ policies.
- China’s lawfare strategy in the SCS aims to enforce its invalidated claims, whereas recent legal actions by Southeast Asian claimant states seek to clarify claims and incentivise dispute settlement based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
- Rather than promoting a comprehensive re-writing of the law of the sea, China tries to advance historically based particularistic claims. After many decades of disputes in the SCS, no alternative Chinese vision for the law of the sea beyond its particularistic claims has emerged.
- Traditional legal processes, especially the 2016 South China Sea arbitration ruling, helped provide clarification of the applicable law, thereby debunking any legal cover for the enforcement of China’s claims in the SCS.
- Explicit international support for China’s maritime claims in the SCS beyond the applicable zones as specified by UNCLOS is waning while explicit support for various substantive findings of the arbitration ruling is increasing.
- China has effectively changed the status quo through reclamation and building of outposts on some features in the SCS, but it has not succeeded in creating the presumption that Chinese enforcement of its invalidated claims is anywhere near legality.
*Guest writer, Christian Schultheiss, is Senior Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, research group European Security Revisited (ENSURE).
ISEAS Perspective 2023/51, 10 July 2023
INTRODUCTION
‘Lawfare’ is a popular term to generally describe different legal strategies of states to defend and promote their maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea (SCS). Dunlap originally defined ‘lawfare’ as “the strategy of using – or misusing – law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective.”[1] This definition notwithstanding, the literature has not produced a consensus on what types of activities qualify as lawfare and whether lawfare refers to a normatively negative, neutral or recommended practice.[2] In analyses of the SCS disputes, many types of activities have been labelled as ‘lawfare’, including China’s activities[3] and legal arguments to assert its maritime claims, the Philippines’ initiation of arbitral proceedings against China, Malaysia and Vietnam’s joint submission for an extended continental shelf, and US freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs). Such a liberal use of the term obscures the normative difference in the policies and practices of these countries, so much so that some legal experts have lamented that scholarship has “lost control of the concept of lawfare”,[4] and this applies to the SCS. This Perspective examines how China’s lawfare in the SCS is different from the legal actions undertaken by other countries, especially Southeast Asian claimant states. It also assesses the extent to which China’s lawfare has contributed to the realisation of its objectives in the SCS.
CHINA’S LAWFARE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
China’s excessive, yet ambiguous, claims in the SCS are illustrative of China’s instrumental use of legal language. China has adjusted the legal justification for its maritime claims even after the award of the South China Sea arbitration of 12 July 2016 invalidated the claims to maritime zones beyond the normal zones under UNCLOS. In a statement of 12 July 2016, China insisted on territorial claims to features, including the Paracel, Spratly and Pratas Islands and the Macclesfield Bank, and claims to a territorial sea, exclusive economic zone (EEZ), continental shelf (CS) and historic rights inside the Nine-dash line.[5]. In Notes Verbales to the Secretary-General of the UN of 2020 and 2021, China has then added a reference to “general international law” and “outlying archipelagos”.[6] Its Note Verbale dated 16 August 2021 says that “the regime of continental States’ outlying archipelagos is not regulated by UNCLOS, and the rules of general international law should continue to be applied in this field.” China now defends the alleged existence of “rights established in the long course of history” with reference to “general international law”. China’s argument relies on a provision in the Preamble of UNCLOS which states that “matters not regulated by this Convention continue to be governed by the rules and principles of general international law”.[7] In its Notes Verbales dated 29 July 2020, 18 September 2020, 28 January 2021 and 16 August 2021, China insists that “general international law” is the legal basis for drawing “territorial sea baselines” around China’s claimed features, including submerged reefs, in the SCS.[8] China’s reference to this provision ostensibly invokes an alternative legal basis for its claims.
Yet, the matters regarding the extent of maritime rights and baselines are comprehensively regulated by UNCLOS. Based on UNCLOS, the 2016 arbitral tribunal has clarified the types and the maximum extent of maritime zones that China can claim.[9] The tribunal discussed in detail the differences between an “island” that generates entitlement to an EEZ and CS, and a “rock” that generates entitlement to only a territorial sea.[10] UNCLOS also regulates the question of baselines, i.e., the “normal baseline” is the “low-water line along the coast” (Art. 5); “straight baselines” can be used where the “coastline is deeply intended and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity” (Art. 7 (1)); and only archipelagic states “may draw straight archipelagic baselines” subject to further provisions (Art. 47). China’s insistence on “territorial sea baselines” around “islands and reefs” based on a “long established practice” and “general international law”[11] is a slightly reframed version of positions that the South China Sea arbitral tribunal has already rejected. The arbitral tribunal did not accept the view that China can enclose the Spratlys within archipelagic or straight baselines – neither under UNCLOS nor under customary international law.[12] Several states, including the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, the US, Australia, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, and New Zealand, have therefore expressed their opposition to China’s insistence on invalidated claims, and stated their support for various aspects of the tribunal’s ruling.[13]
In China’s view, its Southeast Asian neighbours must make room for China’s historically based claims to maritime zones even after the arbitration ruling decided that these claims are inconsistent with UNCLOS and customary law of the sea. Some scholars see this assertion as an attempt to promote an alternative vision for the law of the sea.[14] However, this vision has arguably remained a quest for enforcing particularistic claims rather than promoting a comprehensive re-writing of the law of the sea. After decades of disputes in the SCS, no alternative Chinese vision for the law of the sea beyond its particularistic claims has emerged. In China’s reference to “rights formed in the long course of history”, there is no indication that China believes that other states can claim historic rights too. China’s use of legal language in defence of these claims does not engage in a quest for a universally accepted interpretation of the rule of law at sea. The scope of these particularistic claims, though, is such that they would upend fundamental balances underlying UNCLOS, especially the fact that no state is allowed to claim maritime rights beyond the normal limits or the balance between exclusive rights of coastal states and navigational rights of user states. Even though Chinese sources and documents repeatedly affirm China’s compliance with UNCLOS,[15] China’s claims are so excessive that they would multiply the normal entitlements provided for under UNCLOS.
What makes China’s lawfare activities distinctive from those of other states in the legal domain of the SCS?
First, the instrumental use of law is not peculiar to China’s activities. US FONOPs in the SCS have been called ‘lawfare’ based on the argument that these operations merely “instrumentalise law for furthering parochial political interests, including military objectives”.[16] According to this argument, FONOPs “ostensibly [serve] to further the rule of law over the rule of force” while in reality serving political and strategic interests. Granted, the idea of instrumentalising law is regularly evoked as a characteristic element of lawfare.[17] However, this view, which considers a certain practice as lawfare merely because it uses law as an instrument, sets the threshold for lawfare too low. An instrumental use of law – such as US FONOPs, which are allowed under UNCLOS (Art. 87 and Art. 90) – is neither inconsistent per se with an interest of acting within a legal order nor is it necessarily reproachable.
The Philippines’ decision to launch arbitral proceedings against China – supposedly an instance of the Philippine lawfare strategy – is another case in point. This type of lawfare reflects “the recognition…of the (actual or potential) utility of international law in shaping, constraining, and altering the behaviour of states”.[18] According to this argument, the Philippines’ initiation of arbitration deserves the label ‘lawfare’ because it served the Philippines strategically as the option of last resort. Yet, the Philippines’ recourse to arbitration under Annex VII of UNCLOS is entirely permissible and a right provided for under UNCLOS. According to the UN General Assembly’s Manila Declaration, “[r]ecourse to judicial settlement of legal disputes, particularly referral to the International Court of Justice, should not be considered an unfriendly act between States.”[19] It is therefore questionable whether the term ‘lawfare’ should be used for legitimate legal actions such as arbitral proceedings. The joint submission of Malaysia and Vietnam for an extended continental shelf to the Commission for the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) has also been characterised as lawfare.[20] The joint submission, however, is a normatively recommended practice which is within the exercise of the rights and obligations of coastal states under Art. 76(8) of UNCLOS. It is part of the legal processes that can indeed incentivise the settlement of disputes, since these legal processes are used to communicate claims, to clarify their legal basis, and to establish law as a framework for negotiations and interactions.[21]
China’s activities in the legal domain starkly contrast with those of the Philippines or Malaysia and Vietnam both factually and normatively. The former is a type of lawfare that obscures claims and insists on invalidated claims whereas the latter tries to clarify claims and incentivise dispute settlement based on UNCLOS provisions.
WHAT HAS CHINA’S LAWFARE ACHIEVED IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA?
A key objective of China’s lawfare in the SCS is to provide a rhetorical cover for its changes of the factual status quo.[22] However, the fact that China has effectively changed the status quo, for instance by building outposts on islands or increasing the frequency and reach of coast guard patrols, does not mean that China has succeeded in creating the presumption that the enforcement of its invalidated claims is anywhere near legal. This is especially the case where such changes of status quo contradict the 2016 arbitration ruling.
Assuming that China’s lawfare combines deliberate ambiguity surrounding its excessive claims and the enforcement of particularistic claims in the SCS,[23] it is still not clear what China’s lawfare has achieved in the legal domain in the last decade. It is often pointed out that the ambiguity of China’s claims, including its historic rights, is a deliberate policy choice that offers Beijing a degree of flexibility and room for manoeuvre.[24] Ambiguity about legal claims, the nature of disputes and the actors involved in disputes are certainly characteristic elements of grey zone challenges.[25] In this regard, ambiguity has been part of the attempt to maintain doubt about the excessiveness of China’s claim. This doubt, in turn, has served as a rhetorical cover for unilateral advancements of claims. While the exact scope and purpose of the ambiguity in China’s maritime claims may be debatable,[26] the arbitration ruling has put an end to the ambiguity about claims.[27] The ruling confirmed the Philippines’ point of view that China can only claim the normal entitlements under UNCLOS, which all other countries can also do.[28] The ruling established the types and the maximum extent of maritime zones that China can claim.[29] It thereby clarified that (i) if “historic rights” had existed, these “were superseded… by the limits of the maritime zones provided for by the Convention”;[30] (ii) no feature in the Spratly Islands or Scarborough Shoal can generate a claim to an EEZ or CS; and (iii) neither UNCLOS nor customary international law permits China to draw straight or archipelagic baselines around the Spratly Islands.[31] In other words, whatever the impression of plausibility regarding China’s maritime claims beyond the normal claims that may have resulted from China’s lawfare in the past, the arbitration ruling has put it to rest.
Importantly, this point is reflected in the growing international support for the arbitration ruling. Pre-ruling, 31 states objected to the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction or otherwise considered it to be illegitimate.[32] Yet, only six states have expressed opposition since the tribunal issued its award in 2016.[33] Crucially, there is a growing number of states officially backing substantive elements of the award in their respective Notes Verbales to the UN or in their public statements. These include the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, the US, Australia, Malaysia, France, Germany, the UK, Japan, New Zealand and India.[34] As of today, only China objected to the tribunal’s jurisdiction and award in its Notes Verbales to the UN.[35]
These reactions from states around the world demonstrate that there is no general, established practice accepted as law that would allow China to claim historic rights and draw straight baselines around different groups of features in the SCS as its lawfare has tried to argue. On this issue of the law of the sea where China’s claims are in dispute with its neighbours and other maritime nations, China is no closer to promoting an alternative vision for the law of the sea than a decade ago. Not even the states that China mentions as objecting to the arbitration ruling argue that states can generally claim historic rights under international law. Moreover, while China and several other states defend a restrictive view on the scope of navigational freedoms of warships and innocent passage, there is no sign of coalition-building among these states.
The analysis does not imply, though, that China has not made lasting achievements in asserting its presence and control in the SCS. Land reclamation and the building of outposts have allowed China to increase the frequency and geographic reach of its naval and coast guard patrols in distant parts of the SCS. But this improvement in de facto reach of state power cannot be attributed to any conception of lawfare. Quite the opposite. The progress China has made on the ground is commensurate with the gap between China’s leadership aspirations and the distrust Southeast Asian elites have towards China. In the 2023 State of Southeast Asia Survey by the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, regional trust in China to maintain rules-based order and uphold international law was very low, at 5.3%, well behind the US (27.1%), the EU (23%), ASEAN (21%) and Japan (8.6%).[36]
That said, the response of members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to China’s behaviour in the SCS remains ineffective. ASEAN-related fora are “strategically incompatible” to cope with the disputes.[37] Even Southeast Asian claimant states remain a fragmented mix. They do not share a strong consensus on precise and meaningful provisions for a code of conduct.[38] They lack a cohesive position on how envisioned regional ocean governance should be in line with the arbitration ruling. However, even where Southeast Asian responses to China’s activities remain underperforming, this cannot be attributed to China’s lawfare but to existing differences and disputes among Southeast Asian states as well as their cognition of the vast power asymmetry with China.
Despite years of lawfare in the SCS, China has not made gains in the legal domain. Traditional legal approaches to clarify the law, especially arbitration, have pulled away any legal cover that China’s lawfare in the SCS may have provided. What is left of China’s lawfare is the attempt to push through particularistic claims in contravention of the law of the sea as the arbitral tribunal and many states in the international community conceive it.
CONCLUSION
As the law of the sea is relatively well codified, at least in comparison to other international legal regimes, strategic interactions in the SCS take place “in the shadow” of the law of the sea. Analyses of the SCS disputes often use the term ‘lawfare’ to capture state choices surrounding the formulation of claims, the use of legal processes or naval operations that are subject to both legal and strategic considerations. Being used as a catch-all phrase for interactions between law and strategy in the SCS, this term obscures rather than reveals how the use of certain legal activities and processes is motivated by strategic considerations or how it can further them.
While China’s activities in the legal domain can be dubbed a lawfare strategy, China has not achieved much in the legal domain. To the contrary, traditional legal processes such as arbitration have resulted in a clarification of the applicable law, which pulled away any legal cover for changes of the status quo that lawfare may have provided. This is a lasting achievement of the South China Sea arbitration ruling. A good way to counter lawfare is the use of traditional legal processes. The fact that the ruling has witnessed increasing international support in the last few years lends credence to the idea that China’s lawfare in the SCS has been ineffective. Southeast Asian claimant states should build upon the momentum of the ruling by negotiating instruments of ocean governance in the SCS, i.e., fisheries management, marine protected areas and improved maritime law enforcement cooperation, that are consistent with and build upon the ruling. Consolidating the ruling in this way is certainly one avenue for countering China’s activities in the SCS.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- A pre-election survey among Malay voters in Selangor found that there is no significant vote transferability between Pakatan Harapan (PH) and Barisan Nasional (BN). This means that BN Malay voters may not necessarily transfer their votes to PH candidates in the state election, and vice versa, despite the two parties forming a coalition government at the federal level.
- With a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of RM343.5 billion, Selangor is the highest contributor to Malaysia’s GDP and the epicentre of its economic development. As such, the election in the resource-rich state of Selangor will be very competitive and keenly contested by all parties.
- The survey also found that there is greater likelihood that BN Malay voters will transfer their votes to Perikatan Nasional (PN) candidates instead, thus giving it the advantage in the election, especially in 39 Malay-majority seats in the state. A party must win at least 29 out of 56 seats in the state assembly to get a simple majority to form the next state government of Selangor.
- With this latest polling trend, winds of change are blowing in Selangor. Whether or not these winds can sweep PN to an electoral victory in the state depends on how much strength they gather leading up to polling day.
- The survey used a face-to-face interview method, and was conducted by Institut Masa Depan Malaysia from 1 March to 20 April 2023. It collected 1,200 samples across ethnic groups in 39 Malay-majority state seats in Selangor in order to explore the dynamics of voting behaviour with a special focus on vote transferability among Malay voters. This paper examines its sub-sample of 850 Malay voters.
* Guest writers, Marzuki Mohamad is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science, Abdul Hamid Abu Sulayman Kulliyyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences, International Islamic University Malaysia. He is also a trustee of Institut Masa Depan Malaysia (Institut MASA), a local think-tank focusing on social, economic, and political research. Khairul Syakirin Zulkifli is Researcher at Institut MASA. This article is written in both authors’ personal capacity.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/50, 5 July 2023
INTRODUCTION
One plus one in politics may not necessarily be equal to two. It could instead be one-and-a-half, or one, or even zero. This unwritten rule in politics applies to political coalitions too. It may not be accurate to assume that the formation of a coalition, especially among rivalled and ideologically incompatible political parties, will benefit those parties in an election. Instead, each party runs the risk of losing their core supporters should there be no vote transferability between them.
By vote transferability we mean that supporters of party A, which forms a coalition with party B, will transfer their votes to party B in an election, and vice versa. If there is full vote transferability, both parties will enjoy net gain in an election. But if there is no vote transferability, there is not much that the parties gain from the collaboration. Or worse, both parties may lose out should their supporters disagree with the coalition and transfer their votes to party C instead.
Political developments in Malaysia after the 15th general election witnessed the formation of a political coalition comprising rivalled and ideologically incompatible political parties to form a federal Unity Government led by former jailed Opposition Leader and Pakatan Harapan (PH) Chairman Anwar Ibrahim. The post-election arrangement between the leaders of two rival coalitions, PH and Barisan Nasional (BN), has paved the way for the appointment of Anwar as the Prime Minister and BN Chairman, Zahid Hamidi, as the Deputy Prime Minister.[1]
While party elites try to accommodate each other for the sake of forming the government and maintaining stability, the same cannot be said for party grassroots. Within UMNO, the leading component of BN, grouses have been simmering among the conservative Malay party grassroots who questioned the party’s ‘unholy alliance’ with its archrival secular Democratic Action Party (DAP), a leading component of PH, which UMNO has long been accusing of being an anti-Malay party.[2]
As PH and BN will participate in the upcoming state elections as coalition partners, the issue of vote transferability between the two parties has become a vital consideration. Will BN Malay voters transfer their votes to PH candidates, in the event of a straight fight between PH and PN in their constituencies? Or will there be a vote swing to PN candidates instead?
Seeking answers to these questions, we conducted a survey of eligible voters in the crown jewel state of Selangor, with special focus on Malay voters. Selangor is foreseen to be the main battleground in Malaysia’s 2023 state elections. With GDP of RM343.5 billion in 2021, Selangor is the largest state economy in Malaysia, and has been under PH’s rule (formerly Pakatan Rakyat) since 2008.
THE SURVEY’S METHODOLOGY
This survey began on 1 March 2023 and ended on 20 April 2023, and all in all, 1,200 samples were collected.[3] Voters’ demographic profile, spanning across age, ethnicity and gender, is based on the most recent fourth quarter Election Commission electoral roll data. Malays made up 54% of Selangor’s population, Chinese 32%, Indian 13%, and other races 1%. As the focus of this study is to explore the dynamics of Malay voters’ party choices, the ethnic composition for this study was re-adjusted to 69% Malays, 18% Chinese, 12% Indian, and 1% other ethnicities, which approximately reflects voter demography in 39 Malay-majority state constituencies.
The samples collected throughout the selected constituencies stood at 24% rural, 35% urban and 41% semi-urban areas. We also managed to reach out to respondents in the age groups that relatively reflect current voter configurations, i.e., 18-20 years old 8%, 21-35 years old 46%, 36-50 years old 15%, and above 51 years old 31%. We applied the face-to-face interview technique as our data collection method.
KEY FINDINGS OF THE SURVEY
To find out the extent of vote transferability among Malay voters, we asked our Malay respondents the party that they voted for in GE15 and the party that they will vote for in the 2023 state election. We found that 23% of them said they voted for BN, 22% for PH, 31% for PN and 24% refused to answer (See Figure 1).
This finding reflects Bridget Welsh’s GE15 estimate of Malay support for political parties in Selangor, i.e. 23% for BN, 24% for PH and 49% for PN.[4] The only difference is that the Malay support for PN shown in our study is lower than Bridget’s estimate. Taking her estimate as a reference point, we believe that many of our respondents who refused to reveal their party of choice in GE15 could be PN voters.
Figure 1: Parties the Malay respondents voted for in GE15.
The survey saw 39% of Malay voters in Selangor who voted for BN in GE15 saying that they will vote for PN in the upcoming state election if there is a straight fight between PN and PH in their constituency. Only 15% said they will vote for PH (See Figure 2).
This means that there is no significant vote transferability between PH and BN Malay voters in Selangor despite the fact that the two coalitions are partners in the Unity Government at the federal level. On the contrary, a significant percentage of BN and PH Malay voters are more inclined to vote for PN candidates, while many of them turned into “unsure voters”.
Figure 2: Among Malays who voted for BN in the November 2022 general election, how will they vote in a PN vs PH contest in the 2023 Selangor state election?
This means about seven out of ten BN Malay voters who have made up their minds on party choices clearly indicated that they will vote for PN, instead of PH. The survey also found that a whopping 46% of BN Malay voters have fallen into the “unsure voters” category, which indicates BN’s shaky support base at present.
Determining the voting preferences of these “unsure” BN Malay voters is a tricky business. However, historical data and past trends may shed some light on its likelihood. It is an unwritten rule of thumb for Malaysian pollsters to allocate to the opposition parties a greater percentage of those in the “unsure voters” category for a few reasons.
First, these voters might have made up their mind on their party of choice but refused to disclose it for fear of retribution, especially if they are supporting an opposition political party. Second, as these voters voted for BN in the last general election, being “unsure” this time round indicates a shift of support away from the party or its allies.
Therefore, based on historical data and past trends, we estimate that at least 60% of these “unsure” voters are more likely to vote for PN, instead of PH. Furthermore, cross-tabulation of data on party choice, perception of party leaders, government approval rating and agreement or disagreement with the formation of the PH-BN coalition government shows that the majority of the unsure BN Malay voters are pro-PN.
With 39% of the BN Malay voters clearly indicating that they would vote for PN and approximately 60% of those in the “unsure voters” category potentially doing the same, we therefore roughly estimate that at least 67% of BN Malay voters in Selangor will vote for PN in the upcoming state election.
A similar trend could also be observed among PH Malay voters. The study found that, in the event of a straight fight between PN and BN, 29% of Malay voters in Selangor who voted for PH in the last general election intend vote for PN, while 24% will vote for BN and as much as 48% have to be classed under “unsure voters” (See Figure 3).
Figure 3: Among Malays who voted for PH in the November 2022 general election, how will they vote in a PN vs BN contest in the 2023 Selangor state election?
While for PN, its support base among Malay voters remains almost solid. In a straight fight between PN and PH, 87% of Malay voters in Selangor who voted for PN in the last general election said they would vote for PN. Only 8% would vote for PH and 5% were unsure. Similarly, in a straight fight between PN and BN, 88% of them said they would vote for PN. Only 3% said they would vote for BN and 9% were unsure (See Figure 4).
Figure 4: Among Malays who voted for PN in the November 2022 general election, how will they vote in a PN vs PH and PN vs BN contest in the 2023 Selangor state election?
Should this trend continue until polling day, PN will gain more from the ‘swing votes’ it will get from BN and PH voters than the small number of votes it will lose out to those two parties. Furthermore, since quite a significant percentage of BN and PH Malay voters have become ‘unsure’ of their voting preferences, they too are potentially vulnerable to PN’s narratives in the upcoming election.
As a measure of party choices, we also looked at how the Malay voters considered the performance of the federal and state government as well as their perception of key political leaders. The survey found that only 44% of Malay voters in Selangor were satisfied with the performance of the federal Unity Government, and 48% were satisfied with the performance of the state government (See Figure 5).
On the Prime Minister’s approval rating, 43% said they were satisfied with the performance of Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim, compared to 60% who said they were satisfied with the performance of former 8th Prime Minister, Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin, who is also PN Chairman. BN Chairman and Deputy Prime Minister, Datuk Seri Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, received the lowest approval rating; only 17% said they were satisfied with him (See Figure 6).[5]
Figure 5: Satisfaction Towards the Federal and State Government
Figure 6: Perception of National Leaders’ Performance
On the economy, only 42% were satisfied with the way the federal government has managed the country’s economy, with 57% of them saying their personal income was worse than the previous year. Inflation and the cost of living topped the list of problems faced by the voters at 60%, followed by corruption 7%, infrastructure development 6%, economic development and job opportunities 4% each and political instability, racial rights, and welfare 3% each. On these specific issues, only 20% of Malay voters were satisfied with the way the government handled them (See Figure 7).
Figure 7: Perception of Government’s Effort to Solve Issues Raised by the Respondents
While low vote transferability may make it difficult for the PH-BN coalition to retain power in Selangor, the problem is further complicated by the lack of “performance legitimacy” that is much needed by the PH-BN coalition as an incumbent government. As the federal Unity Government has been facing intense criticisms for its lackluster performance in managing the country’s economy and addressing inflation and cost of living, incumbency can be a liability for PH and its ally, the BN.
WHY IS THERE NO FULL PH-BN VOTE TRANSFERABILITY?
The post-election arrangement between PH and BN to form a coalition government at the federal level, followed by similar arrangements at the state levels, was clouded with possible voter rejection from the very beginning. While PH and BN political elites who stand to gain from the coalition seemed to be comfortable with the arrangement, grouses among party supporters had already been detected long before the two former political archrivals sealed their post-election cooperation.
A national survey conducted by the Merdeka Center for Opinion Research prior to GE15 revealed that only 32% of Malay voters agreed to the formation of a coalition between BN and Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR), while 60% disagreed with the arrangement and 8% are unsure.[6] The findings were an early sign of non-transferability of votes between PH and BN Malay voters.
Malay voters’ rejection of such a coalition seems to be consistent with the findings of our pre-state election survey in Selangor, which shows that most of the BN Malay voters are persistent in their political choice by indicating that they will not transfer their votes to PH. Perhaps as protest against the formation of the coalition, they may transfer their votes to PN instead.
The outcome of the Padang Serai and Tioman by-elections held immediately after the GE15 was also an indication of low vote transferability between PH and BN. The by-elections were the first attempt by PH and BN to contest in an election as a coalition. The PH candidate lost by 16,260 votes to the PN candidate in the Padang Serai parliamentary constituency, which was previously a PH stronghold. The BN candidate won the Tioman state seat by a slim majority of 573 votes.[7]
We believe that negotiations for post-election cooperation had been ongoing between the leaders of the two parties prior to GE15. The decision not to conclude or announce the cooperation prior to the election was a tactical move to avoid the problem of non-transferability of votes between the two parties.
Should the cooperation be announced before the general election, both parties risked losing the support of their core voters and faced a possible electoral defeat. However, the problem that the leaders of the two parties avoided in the GE15 has now come to the fore and must be dealt with in the upcoming state elections. Given the negative Malay voters’ sentiment toward the PH-BN coalition, especially among BN Malay voters, convincing them to vote for PH is an uphill task.
The BN Malay voters’ negative attitude toward the PH-BN coalition is rooted in the dynamics of ethnic politics in Malaysia. As one of the authors of this article has argued in an earlier ISEAS Perspective, ethnicity remains the key factor in determining voting preferences in Malaysia.[8]
Since independence, UMNO has been the linchpin party of the Alliance and later the BN for six decades. UMNO’s narrative of Malay political supremacy against the threat of Chinese dominance in the economy, and subsequently in politics, has been very appealing to the majority of Malays. The Chinese-based Democratic Action Party (DAP), whose ideology is mainly shaped by the Setapak Declaration 1967, which promotes equality of all citizens and rejects the categorization of Malaysians into Bumiputera and non-Bumiputera groups, has been UMNO’s long-time archrival and bogeyman.
With strong Malay support for UMNO, BN won every general election and emerged as a dominant party in the past. However, Malay support for UMNO has gradually deteriorated since the 12th general election when it lost its customary two-thirds majority in the Dewan Rakyat followed by its loss of popular votes in the 13th general election, its electoral defeat to PH in the 14th general election and its dismal performance in the 15th general election in winning only 26 seats, the lowest number of parliamentary seats the party has ever won.
The deteriorating Malay support was mainly due to the party’s diminishing “performance legitimacy”. Having been the ruling party for more than five decades, the party was mired in allegations of corruption involving its leaders and failures to address pressing economic problems faced by the people. The 1MDB saga which led to the trial and conviction of former Prime Minister and UMNO President, Datuk Seri Mohd Najib Tun Abdul Razak, on corruption charges, as well as the ongoing corruption trial of the Deputy Prime Minister and UMNO President, Datuk Seri Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, diminished the Malays’ trust in UMNO leadership. To make it worse, internal UMNO politics have since revolved around defending its tainted leaders, which has in turn intensified the negative public perception toward UMNO, created splits among party elites, and weakened the party.
At the same time, the social and economic changes taking place in Malaysia since the 1990s, which marked the end of the New Economic Policy (NEP), eroded UMNO’s role as the sole Malay protector. More and more Malays from villages migrated to urban centers in search of a job, education, and business opportunities, hence uprooting and alienating them from the traditional UMNO’s patronage system.
From the 1990s onwards, the more liberal economic, education and cultural policies adopted by the government as a response to domestic political pressures and the need to compete globally in the age of global capitalism, has gradually reduced Malay dependency on UMNO. The new Malay middle class no longer enjoys the long list of “privileges” and “crutches” provided to the generations before them. They must now pay for their children’s higher education and compete with the non-Malays for government scholarships, entry into public universities is gradually being based on merits rather than race-based quota, and more and more Malays have to face intense competition in the private sector instead of the public sector for better jobs and better pay.
UMNO’s diminishing role in securing economic benefits to the Malays through a wide range of affirmative action policies and addressing their economic plights post-NEP, especially for those in the lower income bracket, has caused the party to gradually lose its performance legitimacy in the eyes of the Malay community. The diehard UMNO supporters who continue to support the party do so solely based on its “race legitimacy”, i.e. psychological and nostalgic reasons relating to a deep appreciation of UMNO’s past struggle for the Malays and the belief that UMNO was the last Malay bastion.[9]
For most UMNO Malays, the feat of non-Malay economic and political superiority is strong and UMNO has been their only hope against such a threat. Therefore, the “NO ANWAR, NO DAP” slogan sat deep in the conservative UMNO Malay psyche in GE15. Anwar represents the non-conservative Malay leader who rejects Malay supremacy as a political ideology, while DAP is UMNO’s long-time political foe whose ideology of racial equality runs counter to UMNO’s core struggle as a Malay party.[10] A recent statement made by former UMNO Secretary-General, Ahmad Maslan, “ordering” the party’s supporters to vote for DAP was internally conflicting and was rejected by several party leaders.[11]
At the very least, the “NO ANWAR, NO DAP” slogan kept the UMNO Malays loyal to the party up to GE15. However, with the party leadership’s decision to form a post-election coalition government with PH, in which its archrival DAP is a dominant coalition member, the conservative UMNO Malays’ trust in the party was crushed. For them, that was like the final nail in UMNO’s coffin. The party’s “race legitimacy”, to which the remaining diehard conservative UMNO Malays still clung, is completely gone.
But these conservative UMNO Malays do not stop there. In the upcoming state elections, they can still make their own choice as voters. Hence, as our survey found, seven out of ten BN Malay voters in Selangor who have made up their minds on party choices, have decided to vote for PN. It seems that PN, led by the pribumi-based BERSATU and the Islamist party PAS, is the natural alternative to BN for the conservative UMNO Malays. PN represents the imagery of Malay and Islamic conservatism that UMNO abandoned by virtue of its cooperation with DAP.
Apart from this, PN’s narrative of good governance, anti-corruption, and care for the people, as shown by the various fiscal and non-fiscal assistance given to the people through the eight economic stimulus packages rolled out during its 17 months in power, captured the imagination of Malay voters and convinced them that PN may be a better alternative to UMNO.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SELANGOR STATE ELECTION
This paper does not attempt to predict election results based on a pre-election survey held two months before the state assembly is dissolved. Instead, we believe that the upcoming state election in Selangor will be very competitive, and the actual results will depend on the campaign narratives of all the parties as well as the candidates and on other local factors.
What this survey can tell us is the general trend that can be observed at the time the survey was conducted. And the general trend is, the support base for PN among Malay voters remains solid, and the party may receive potential swing votes mostly from BN Malay voters and some from PH Malay voters. There is no significant vote transferability between PH and BN among the Malay voters in the crown jewel state of Selangor.
There are 56 seats in the Selangor state assembly, of which 39 are Malay-majority seats and 17 are non-Malay majority seats. The simple majority needed to form the state government is 29 seats.
A simple and straightforward simulation of the GE15 results expects the PH-BN coalition to win the state election by more than a two-thirds majority. However, this may only be true if there is full vote transferability between PH and BN voters. Our survey shows this not to be the case.
This survey suggests that there is a greater de-alignment between voters and UMNO which is primarily contributable to the BN Malay voters’ rejection of the PH-BN cooperation, clash of party ideologies and the existence of rival parties that shared identical ethno-religious roots. Furthermore, with the PH-led Unity Government lacking in visible efforts and policies to address the rising cost of living and to ease inflationary pressures, there is no feel-good factor that incentivizes voters to support the coalition in the election.
With this trend in mind and based on the GE15 election data for all the state constituencies in Selangor, we believe that PN is comfortable in at least 15 Malay-majority seats. We also assume that PH is safe in all the 17 non-Malay majority seats.
Which party will form the next state government in Selangor depends on the outcome of the contest in the remaining 24 Malay-majority seats. Should the swing of BN Malay voters towards PN be strong enough to tilt the balance in PN’s favour, PN will have an advantage over PH or BN in the contest for these seats. Thus, these seats will be keenly contested by all political parties.
CONCLUSION
Forming a workable and stable coalition requires not only elite accommodation, but also a certain degree of acceptance at the grassroots level. As this study shows, against the wishes of the BN party elites, its grassroots’ acceptance of the PH-BN coalition is still highly questionable at this moment. If left unchecked, it will destabilize the coalition in the long run.
With this latest polling trend, the winds of change are blowing in Selangor. Whether or not these winds can sweep PN to an electoral victory in the state depends on how much strength they gather leading up to polling day.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Move Forward party leader Pita Limjaroenrat’s quest for the Thai premiership has hit its first obstacle.
- The Election Commission is investigating whether he has been in violation of the election law. He has also been accused of unlawfully advertising liquor products on TV.
- If found guilty of either of these two alleged crimes, he can be disqualified from both the House membership and the premiership.
- If he survives the disqualification battles, Pita’s qualifications as an MP may still be challenged in the Constitutional Court.
- And finally, Pita also faces a seemingly insurmountable last obstacle: Not enough support in the Senate for him to gain the premiership.
- If Pita fails, new options for Pheu Thai, the second largest party, will emerge.
*Termsak Chalermpalanupap is Visiting Fellow and Coordinator of the Thailand Studies Programme, ISEAS -Yusof Ishak Institute.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/49, 22 June 2023
INTRODUCTION
Move Forward party leader Pita Limjaroenrat’s arduous quest for the Thai premiership has hit its first obstacle. The Election Commission on 9 June decided to set up a team to probe whether he had broken the election law.
The Election Commission’s decision – a unanimous one from all six commissioners – came with a new twist. At first it dismissed all three complaints against Pita for holding shares in a media business; but then, it formed a team to determine whether Pita violated Section 151[1] of the election law, by entering himself in the general election despite knowing that he had in his name 42,000 shares of iTV (a dormant TV station which stopped broadcasting on 8 March 2007, but which has not been dissolved as a media business entity).[2]
In order to stand for election to the House of Representatives, one of the qualifications of every candidate is not to own or to hold shares in a newspaper or any other media business. Penalties for violating this law – which is deemed a crime – include imprisonment ranging from one year to 10 years, a fine ranging from 20,000 baht to 200,000 baht, and worst of all, a suspension of the right to vote for 20 years. The suspension will automatically disqualify the violator from running for or holding the House membership and/or vying for the premiership.
The first of the three complaints against Pita was filed on 10 May, whereas Pita’s candidacy registrations (for both a party-list House seat, and as the MFP’s only candidate for the premiership) were done on 3 April. The two follow-up complaints came after 14 May, the election day. Therefore, the Election Commission considered them as having been overtaken by events, and coming too late to stop Pita from entering the polls.
However, based on information from the three complaints, the Election Commission found “manifested” fact to start a probe into whether Pita violated Section 151.
SMALL MISSTEP CAN RUIN EVERYTHING
The 42,000 shares in iTV originally belonged to Pita’s father, Pongsak, who passed away in September 2006. The shares, worth just about one baht each, became part of Pita’s family estate, of which Pita has been the trustee. However, records in iTV showed that the 42,000 shares were in Pita’s name, without stating that he held them in his capacity as the trustee.
At first, Pita’s line of defence was quite straightforward: iTV had stopped broadcasting since 8 March 2007; the 42,000 shares in question constituted only about 0.000035% of the public media firm which had more than 1,206.7 million shares[3] (and the Stock Exchange of Thailand delisted iTV on 24 July 2014); iTV has maintained its status as a media business entity only because of a pending lawsuit seeking 2,890 million baht of compensation from the Office of the Permanent Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Office for abruptly cancelling a service agreement between iTV and the Office following the coup on 19 September 2006; the case is now in the Supreme Administration Court, and iTV has won its case against the Office in the Central Administration Court.
More importantly, supporters of Pita and the MFP would point out that in this modern digital world, social media have been more effective than conventional TV broadcasting in election campaigns. And yet there is no law prohibiting election campaigning through social media.
On 25 May 2023, Pita transferred the shares in question to his younger brother, Pasin. He did so in the wake of what he suspected was a new movement to revive iTV.[4] At an online meeting of iTV shareholders on 26 April 2023, the meeting records state that iTV has remained in operation in accordance with the firm’s objectives. iTV has also continued to submit its balance sheet and file its business tax returns normally.[5]
It is common sense that Pita could not have used his shares in iTV to his advantage in the election campaign. But there is no denying the “manifested” fact that he had the iTV shares under his name when he applied on 3 April to stand for a party-list House seat and when he accepted his party’s nomination of him as its sole candidate for the premiership.
Nevertheless, as archaic as it may appear now, Section 42 (3) of the election law includes a prohibition for anyone wanting to stand in a House election not to own or hold shares in any newspaper or other media businesses. Violation of this prohibition will lead to a breach of Section 151 of the election law, punishable with a 20-year suspension of the voting right.
Losing the voting right, in turn, will disqualify oneself from standing for House election as well as from vying for the premiership, according to the 2017 Constitution’s Section 160 (6). This constitutional provision bars anyone whose voting right has been suspended from assuming any posts in a cabinet, including the premiership.
Undoubtedly, it is difficult to prove beyond any reasonable doubt in a criminal court whether Pita intentionally violated Section 151. He had completed his four-year term as a party-list MP without anyone raising any objection about his alleged lack of full qualifications.
If the Election Commission finds enough evidence against Pita, it can ask the Public Prosecutor Office to bring Pita to a criminal court. But it remains uncertain whether the Public Prosecutor Office will go further and prosecute Pita. It did not do so in the case of Pita’s predecessor, Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit, even after the Constitutional Court disqualified Thanathorn from the House membership in November 2020 for holding shares in an obscure magazine.
A spokesman for the MFP criticised the Election Commission’s move to accuse Pita of violating Section 151, describing it as part of the ongoing efforts of the conservative establishment to obstruct Pita from assuming the premiership and to stop the MFP-led coalition from forming a new government.[6]
MORE FORMIDABLE NEXT OBSTACLE
If Pita’s case of violating Section 151 goes to a criminal court, it will take months for the court to reach its verdict. After that, appeals can still be made against the verdict in an appeal court, and finally in the Supreme Court if necessary. This will take years for the case to reach its final conclusion.
Meanwhile, the Election Commission on 19 June confirmed[7] the election results of all 400 constituencies and allocation of the 100 party-list House seats. Pita is first on the MFP’s list of 92 candidates for party-list seats in the House of Representatives. He is going to return to the House for a second time as a party-list MP when the House opens in July.
After Pita returns to the House, he may face yet another challenge on his qualifications. One-tenth of the House membership (50 MPs) can submit a joint appeal to the House Speaker to examine Pita’s qualifications. Alternatively, the Election Commission can do the same.
In either case, the House Speaker is obliged to forward such a request to the Constitutional Court for a ruling. On its part, the Constitutional Court has the discretion to either accept or reject the case. If it accepts it for further consideration, the Constitutional Court may even suspend Pita’s House membership – like it did in the case of Thanathorn.[8]
ONE NEW FAUX PAS ON TV
Pita carelessly shot himself in the foot again during a recent TV interview in which he sang the praises of local liquors, and even mentioned a few of his favourite brands by name. This was part of his promotion of the MFP’s campaign to “demonopolise” the alcohol beverage industry.[9]
Inadvertently, he may have violated the law banning direct advertising of alcoholic beverages on TV. A complaint against Pita was lodged at the Office of Committee for Alcohol Beverage Control on 7 June.[10] Penalties for breaking this law include a jail-term up to one year, and a fine up to 500,000 baht.
Still worse are the legal implications of the violation: The Constitution’s Section 98 (6) bans from running in a House election anyone who has been convicted by a court of law. And the ban also disqualifies the violator from holding any posts in a cabinet, including the premiership, according to the Constitution’s Section 160 (6).
However, it will not be easy for the prosecutor to establish beyond any reasonable doubt in a criminal court that Pita intentionally broke the law. Pita has denied advertising any alcoholic beverage. He has insisted that he merely wanted to draw public attention to the plights of SMEs that cannot expand their distillery operations because of numerous restrictions put in place allegedly to protect the monopolies of a handful number of business breweries.
One of the structural changes advocated by his party is “Demonopolisation”:[11] Demolishing monopolies of big businesses – including those in the alcohol beverage industry – in order to promote the development and competitiveness of SMEs.
BARKING UP THE WRONG TREE
Deputy Prime Minister Dr Wissanu Krea-ngarm, the chief government jurist, dropped a bombshell in early June.[12] He wondered out loud whether Pita’s possible disqualification from being an MP could lead to his disqualification as party leader; and consequently to a need to hold by-elections in all 112 constituencies where MFP’s candidates have won.
The MFP’s party regulations prohibit anyone owning or holding shares in a newspaper or any other media businesses from serving on the party’s executive committee. By holding the iTV shares, Pita should have been disqualified from becoming party leader. Being an unlawful party leader, Pita’s signed endorsements of all MFP’s candidates to run in the general election could be deemed as null and voided.
On this legal question, the Lawyers Council of Thailand has issued a statement explaining its collective view that Pita’s alleged lack of qualification is a personal fault which should not hurt the party or harm the MFP’s candidates.[13] The Election Commission seems to agree with this line of reasoning and has dropped the complaint against Pita on this particular issue.
Also dismissed by the Election Commission was another complaint against Pita in which he was accused of omitting his bank guarantee liability from his formal declaration of assets and liabilities in his capacity as an MP. The National Anti-Corruption Commission has reported that Pita did include in his declaration some liabilities.[14]
Any MP or other holder of public office who has failed to make a full and complete declaration of assets and liabilities faces penalties ranging from months of imprisonment to a life-long ban from national politics.
INSURMOUNTABLE LAST OBSTACLE
Even if Pita manages to survive the disqualification battles, he will still face strong objections from a large number of the 250 Senators. The Senators, together with 500 MPs, select the next prime minister, and in order to win, a premiership candidate needs to receive at least 376 votes from the 750 participants in a joint parliamentary session. The MFP-led coalition of eight parties, which is going to put forth Pita as its premiership candidate, has only 312 MPs — still 64 votes short.
So far, intensive ongoing lobbying efforts of the coalition has reportedly won support for Pita from fewer than 30 Senators. This being the case, a stalemate looks inevitable if and when a joint parliamentary session is held (most probably in late July) to vote on the next premiership.
Most of the Senators are pro-establishment conservatives. They oppose the MFP’s initiative to reform the monarchy by, for example, amending the controversial Section 112 of the Criminal Code, the so-called “lese-majeste law”. The MFP has proposed reducing the penalties in Section 112 from 3-15 years of jail-term to no more than one year, and to allow only an authorised representative of the Royal Household Bureau to file a police complaint if and when there is a serious violation. At present, anyone can bring an alleged violation to the attention of the police.
One new complication was Pita’s acknowledgement that the MFP wants to “introduce accountability” to Thai national politics by subjecting outgoing Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-o-cha to legal scrutiny. Pita has insisted that he has no desire for any personal “revenge”. He and the MFP merely want to see the beginning of a new culture of political accountability in Thailand.[15]
General Prayut, while he was the army chief, led a coup to topple the Pheu Thai-led coalition government in May 2014. He then headed the National Council for Peace and Order. In the 2019, he accepted the nomination of Palang Pracharath Party as its only candidate for the premiership. He won the premiership, chiefly with the support of 249 Senators.[16]
Nevertheless, such a veiled threat of holding General Prayut accountable for alleged wrongdoings in the past will not sit well with the conservative Senators. All of the first batch of 250 Senators were chosen during the last few months of the military regime headed by General Prayut, in early 2019. Many of the Senators may feel they still owe some gratitude to General Prayut. One way to reciprocate is to block Pita from assuming the next premiership.
With potential court cases against Pita still lurking in the background, the Senators will have a good excuse to look beyond Pita for someone else to be the next prime minister of Thailand.
IF PITA FAILS…
General Prayut has never formally conceded election defeat. His United Thai Nation Party won only 36 House seats (23 constituency seats, and 13 party-list seats), compared with the MFP winning 151 House seats (112 constituency seats, 39 party-list seats). General Prayut has maintained a passive “wait and see” stance, waiting to see whether Pita will succeed in winning the next premiership.
If Pita is disqualified or if he fails to win the premiership, the MFP cannot put forth any new premiership candidate because the party registered only Pita as its sole premiership candidate. Then it will be the turn of Pheu Thai, with 141 MPs, the second largest, to put forth one of its three premiership candidates. Most probably, it will be 59-year-old real estate tycoon Srettha Thavisin.
Ms Paetongtarn Shinawatra, the youngest daughter of exiled former prime minister Thaksin, may have already dropped out due to an objection from her mother, Khunying Potjamarn. The matriarch of the Shinawatra family presided over a lunch meeting in a Bangkok hotel on 7 June, and after the meeting, news spread that the Shinawatra family had reached a conclusion that Paetongtarn, 37, is still too young, and that she should wait five more years before going for the premiership. In addition, the family also felt it might be unsafe for Thaksin to return to Thailand too soon.[17]
The former Thai prime minister has been in exile overseas for nearly 17 years. He faces a total of 10 years of imprisonment from three past convictions in cases of corruption and conflict of interest while he was the head of government in the early 2000s. On 9 May, Thaksin announced his latest decision to return to Thailand in July, before his 74th birthday on 26 July.
The other premiership candidate of Pheu Thai is former justice minister Chaikasem Nitisiri, 74, who has been unwell and hospitalised during the last few weeks before the voting day on 14 May.
If no one from Pheu Thai Party can win the premiership, then this second largest party may cross over to team up with some parties in the Prayut Administration to form a new coalition – without participation of Pita’s MFP. The MFP has vowed never to work with any parties from the Prayut Administration, dismissing them as the vestige of General Prayut’s dictatorship.
Given this scenario, the Shinawatra family may feel it not yet “safe” for Thaksin to return from his exile. Under these conditions, the next Thai prime minister could therefore be one of the following: Anutin Charnvirakul, leader of Bhumjaithai Party, which has 71 House seats; General Prawit Wongsuwan, leader of Palang Pracharat Party, which has 40 House seats; General Prayut, who is one of the two premiership candidates of his United Thai Nation Party, and finally; the other UTN premiership candidate, party leader Pirapan Salirathavibhaga.
If none of the above can win the premiership, the new coalition can propose going for an “outsider” who has not been nominated for the premiership by any party.
CONCLUSION
Pita is facing tough obstacles on his arduous quest for the Thai premiership. Even if he manages to overcome them, he will fail in the end if he cannot gain enough support from Senators. If Pita fails, new options for Pheu Thai Party and others will emerge.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- COVID-19 and the rise of the digital economy are excellent opportunities for ASEAN to accelerate its regional integration push.
- However, the ASEAN Digital Integration Index (ADII) shows that the area of digital skills and talent is ASEAN’s worst-performing indicator of the six digital integration benchmarks used to measure digital integration.
- ASEAN needs to enhance the digital skills and mobility of talents in the region.
- It can do this by leveraging the regional tech companies’ abilities to scale up the integration of its workforce to a regional-wide digital economy ecosystem, and adding digital workers to the ASEAN Mutual Recognition Arrangements (MRAs) to facilitate their movement in the region. These two measures are critical in ensuring that the demand for digital talents is met.
- ASEAN also needs to facilitate intra-ASEAN student mobility and digital skill advancement early through educational platforms such as the ASEAN University Network and other student mobility programmes.
* Melinda Martinus is Lead Researcher at the ASEAN Studies Centre, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. Farah Nadine Seth was formerly Research Officer at the ASEAN Studies Centre, ISEAS –Yusof Ishak Institute.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/48, 21 June 2023
INTRODUCTION
COVID-19 has intractably accelerated the digital economy in Southeast Asia. The interaction between the health crisis and the digital economy in the region has raised consumer dependencies on digital services such as telemedicine, video conferencing platforms, financial services, and e-commerce. According to Google, Temasek, and Bain’s annual E-Conomy SEA 2022 Report, ASEAN’s digital economy is on course to reach US$600 billion-US$1 trillion by 2030, with sustained long-term projections.[1]
The growth of the region’s digital economy will help ASEAN accelerate its regional integration. One excellent example is integration in the financial sector through digital payment systems. Currently, the central banks of five Southeast Asian countries—Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore—have linked up their digital payment systems, improving inclusivity, cross-border economic activities and efficiency.[2]
Recognising the potential for both growth and regional integration, ASEAN has been boosting its digital integration activities. For instance, the ASEAN Digital Integration Framework and Action Plan (DIFAP) serves as the overall blueprint for ASEAN’s digital integration efforts.[3] The ASEAN Agreement on Electronic Commerce, which entered into force in 2019, attempts to harmonise principles and rules to promote e-commerce in the region and to strengthen the capacity to implement them.[4] The COVID-19 crisis has also inspired ASEAN to double down on its agenda to accelerate digital transformation. The Bandar Seri Begawan Roadmap: An ASEAN Digital Transformation Agenda to Accelerate ASEAN’s Economic Recovery and Digital Economy Integration outlines a multi-year roadmap to deepen ASEAN digital integration and connectivity against the backdrop of COVID-19.[5]
The digital economy will undoubtedly become an enabling factor in ASEAN’s growth journey. However, it creates an unprecedented demand for digital workers equipped with in-demand technical skills. Singapore needs 1.2 million additional digital workers by 2025 – a 55 per cent increase from today’s levels – to remain competitive.[6] For Indonesia, an additional 600,000 digital talents annually are needed to service its digital transformation pipeline until 2030.[7] Meanwhile, a digital talent survey conducted by a Malaysian think tank, the Social and Economic Research Initiative (SERI), found that only 4.8 per cent of Malaysian private sector respondents feel that the existing labour market can fully meet their digital talent needs.[8]
The baseline study of the ASEAN Digital Integration Index (ADII),[9] which serves as a benchmark for ASEAN digital integration efforts, indicates that among its six digital integration components: ASEAN is currently performing the poorest in Digital Skills and Talent. This Perspective offers some analysis of the underlying causes of this dismal performance and identifies three opportunities to enhance digital skills.
ASEAN DIGITAL INTEGRATION: SKILL AND TALENT PILLAR REMAINS DISMAL
ASEAN has made efforts to monitor integration initiatives across the region through the ASEAN Digital Integration Index (ADII) which provides an evidence-based analysis of the state of implementation in priority areasof the ASEAN Digital Integration Framework (DIF)for member countries. The report categorises digital integration initiatives according to six pillars, namely (i) Digital Trade and Logistics; (ii) Data Protection and Cybersecurity; (iii) Digital Payments and Identities; (iv) Digital Skills and Talent; (v) Innovation and Entrepreneurship; and (vi) Institutional and Infrastructural Readiness. An overview of the ADII pillar scores for the region ranked by level of integration can be found below:
Table 1: ADII Pillar Scores
| ADII Pillars | Score (out of 100) | Rank |
| Institutional and Infrastructural Readiness | 62.85 | 1 |
| Data Protection and Cybersecurity | 62.81 | 2 |
| Digital Payments and Identities | 58.84 | 3 |
| Digital Trade and Logistics | 55.27 | 4 |
| Innovation and Entrepreneurship | 49.32 | 5 |
| Digital Skills and Talent | 48.21 | 6 |
Source: ADII
While all elements of digital integration are vital to regional integration efforts, the ADII report highlights the need to prioritise human capital development with regards to digital skills (and innovation), given that a digitally trained workforce would form the backbone for regional digitalisation. Moreover, knowledge-intensive sectors within the growing digitally-driven industry – such as ICT and e-commerce – not only require skilled labour to manage and continually innovate increasingly complex digital tools, but also entail ordinary consumers having the requisite digital skills to competently utilise and tap into digital platforms and technologies for their business needs and day-to-day activities.[10]
The urgency of developing a digital talent base is underscored by the fact that the ‘Digital Skills and Talents’ pillar fares the worst in the ADII assessment. Below is a breakdown of the indicators used to compute the scores of the Digital Skills and Talent pillar. Each indicator is scored against 20 with a total score of 100 for the entire pillar.
Chart 1: Breakdown of indicators for Digital Skills and Talent
Source: ADII
The report noted that the indicator for Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) graduates is low; its score of 5.82 is less than half of that for university graduates with business-relevant skillsets (12.67). However, the indicator for the overall population with digital skills fares best (13.11), with the report noting that the general population already exhibits adequate digital skills (e.g. basic computer skills and digital reading), likely self-taught through day-to-day activities and work requirements. Meanwhile, the proportion of employment in knowledge-intensive services is the lowest (4.48), and the level of multi-stakeholder collaboration in research and development is still unsatisfactory (12.13).
It is challenging to compare the performance of digital skills and talents highlighted by the ADII with other economies because of different methodological assessments. Be that as it may, the talent indicator in the World Digital Competitiveness Ranking 2022 by the International Institute for Management Development (IMD) can serve as a benchmark to compare ASEAN countries with other major economies in Asia and the Pacific (Table 2).[11]
Table 2 ASEAN Countries and Asia and the Pacific Economies’ Talent Ranking 2022
| Countries | Talent Ranking (63 global countries) ** |
| ASEAN Countries* | |
| Indonesia | 51 |
| Malaysia | 33 |
| Philippines | 54 |
| Singapore | 12 |
| Thailand | 45 |
| Asia and the Pacific Economies | |
| China | 40 |
| Hong Kong SAR | 14 |
| India | 52 |
| Japan | 41 |
| Republic of Korea | 38 |
| Taiwan (ROC) | 19 |
Source: The World Digital Competitiveness Ranking 2022 by the International Institute for Management Development (IMD)
*Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam were not assessed in the ranking
** The talent ranking was assessed by the indicators of talent readiness, investment and development, and appeal to the global community.
According to the ranking, four ASEAN countries—Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines—appear in the bottom 50 per cent (out of 63 countries assessed). Singapore is the only regional country that ends up in the top 20 per cent of the list. Leaving Singapore aside, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines do not fare much worse than other developing economies such as China and India. Even Japan only fares marginally better than China. This indicates that ASEAN digital talents are still competitive enough to attract digital economy investments.
Developing digital skills is a common focus area for various ASEAN digital and connectivity initiatives.[12] The ADII report makes two key recommendations for boosting the digital talent base: (1) Prioritisation of the development of digital capabilities and formal employment opportunities to enhance digitalisation. Its proposals include channelling educational resources towards STEM courses and ensuring inclusive access to digital upskilling initiatives, and (2) Collaboration with the private sector to identify, develop and grow relevant digital skillsets.
MANAGING DIGITAL TALENTS AND SKILLS
To manage this challenge, there are at least three opportunities that can be exploited by ASEAN.
Leveraging the Growth of Regional Technology Companies
ASEAN can explore leveraging the rise of regional technology companies to integrate the workforce into digital platforms. Not only are these companies able to facilitate digital access for users and service providers, they also have the resources to provide skills training, thus accommodating new entrants into the digital workforce.
The three largest digital companies in the region – GoTo, Grab and SEA – valued at over US$10 billion,[13] have initiated a variety of digital enhancement skills for different purposes but with the ultimate aim of increasing the digitally-ready citizenry and integrating more people into the digital workforce and ecosystem. Their tech-oriented workplace requires individuals to have intermediate or work-related digital skills in critically assessing data and developing original digital content. Such skills include digital marketing, digital graphic design, and the increasingly important skills of data management and business analysis.
Grab is making inroads in improving basic digital skills, with “improving digital inclusion and digital literacy in Southeast Asia” as one of its key goals to be achieved by 2025 under their “GrabforGood” social impact programme.[14] Microsoft, in turn, embarked on a regional skills training and digital literacy partnership in 2019, providing Grab drivers and merchant-partners the opportunity to tap on a Microsoft Digital Literacy certification programme[15]via GrabAcademy, Grab’s online training platform. In 2021, over 780,000 partners benefitted from this scheme.[16]
Grab is also focused on improving digital literacy among the general public. In Singapore, it partnered with the Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) to facilitate the running of more than a hundred digital clinics for senior citizens to foster greater digital literacy, with a targeted reach of 10,000 senior citizens within a year.[17] In Indonesia, the company supported the government’s digital literacy campaign by running two programmes for merchant-partners and the general public to foster both basic (through ‘Siberkreasi’) and intermediate digital skills (through the ‘Digital Talent Scholarship’). The programmes have helped upskill more than 12,000 MSMEs to date.[18]
Similarly, GoTo places considerable focus on talent development programmes such as its GO-Academy talent incubator[19] as well as its Generasi GIGIH programme[20] under its non-profit Yayasan Anak Bangsa Bisa. Through engineering bootcamps, tech competitions, and internship opportunities, GoTo focuses on harnessing young digital talent and integrating them into the larger Indonesian tech ecosystem. Not to be outdone, Grab and Microsoft partnered with selected regional universities to train students with in-demand technical skills through provision of Microsoft’s industry-recognised certification programme as well as applied learning opportunities through Grab-facilitated industry-relevant projects, competitions and internship stints.[21] Grab also runs other talent development programmes across the region such as the Grab Unicorn Apprentice programme in Vietnam, as well as the Grab Campus Apprenticeship programme in Indonesia.[22]
The regional tech companies’ roles in integrating people with digital platforms and scaling up initiatives for digital education have been quite promising. It demonstrates that the burden of providing formal and informal digital education can be shared by governments with private sector players who have the ability to mobilise at scale. However, policies must ensure the enabling conditions for the private sector to pursue workforce training sustainably. The recent mass layoffs of digital workers in the region have shown that the regional tech companies are still operating under capital spending, and thus global disruptions like rising interest rates amid high inflation easily necessitate them to restructure their workforce.[23]
Adding Digital Workers to the ASEAN Mutual Recognition Arrangements
The key to successful digital integration is to ensure an adequate supply of digital workers to grow a digital ecosystem in the region. At this time when ASEAN governments are shaping their digitalisation roadmaps, ensuring the mobility of digital workers is critical for meeting the demand and distribution of digital talents across the region.
One of the key features of ASEAN economic integration is the free movement of skilled workers under Mutual Recognition Arrangements (MRAs), a set of policies that enable the qualifications of service suppliers recognised by authorities in their home country to be mutually recognised by other countries who are signatories to the MRA. ASEAN MRAs can arguably help to facilitate an increase in the number of skilled workers across ASEAN countries so that industries across the region can efficiently find the appropriate talents quickly.[24] Currently, the arrangements only recognise eight categories of highly skilled occupations such as engineers, nurses, architects, surveyors, dentists, medical practitioners, tourism professionals, and accountants but not digitally skilled talents. However, the implementation of ASEAN MRAs has been hampered by domestic rules and regulations on employment and licensing requirements.[25]
ASEAN countries like Singapore and Thailand have begun to pursue their own labour immigration policies. For instance, Singapore’s Overseas Network and Expertise Pass and Thailand’s Long Term Resident (LTR) visa for highly skilled professionals are intended to pull global and high-income top talents into specialised industries. To an extent, it is the slow implementation of ASEAN MRAs that pushes these countries to pursue their labour policies rather wait upon the ASEAN-led mechanism.
To be sure, the full operationalisation of the ASEAN MRAs is politically challenging. Employers often raise their demanded educational credentials and validity, due to the fact that their confidence in the region’s educational quality is low.[26] There are also considerable gaps among ASEAN countries in assuring standardised educational quality across the region. In addition, the ASEAN MRAs have faltered because the regional governments often raise new barriers in response to pressure from domestic lobbies to protect domestic employment and wages.
But it should be noted that the rise of the digital economy has created uniform demand for digital workforce with similar skillsets. Given the rising demand in digital workforce across the region, adding digital workers might look politically feasible in the future. Having digital workforce on the ASEAN MRAs will also facilitate cross-pollination of knowledge, information, and inventions across the region. The challenge remains on the effective operationalisation of the arrangements.
Facilitating Intra-ASEAN Students and Young Workforces’ Mobility Early
While it is true that ensuring the digital skills of the young workforce is vital for the region to fully tap into the digital economy, ensuring the mobility of young talents is relevant too. Giving them the opportunity to travel across the region for work-study practices, internships, apprenticeships, and traineeship will ensure that businesses and industries can absorb them quickly.
Currently, ASEAN countries’ workforce demographics vary greatly. Singapore, Brunei, Thailand, and Vietnam are starting to face an aging population. By 2050, more than 25 per cent of the population in those countries will be over 60 years old.[27] Meanwhile, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Indonesia are entering a period of demographic bonus where the number in productive age groups is currently greater than the number in non-productive age groups. Getting young members of the workforce to move easily across borders to fill labour gaps cannot but be beneficial.
ASEAN has an opportunity to revive its various educational programmes under its Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint which still lacks a strategic mandate to optimise greater mobility of people within the region. One such opportunity is through the ASEAN University Network (AUN) whose current scope is to provide a network of cooperation among universities and to harmonise higher-education outcomes in the region. The Network’s role can be strengthened and expanded by utilising ASEAN Dialogue Partners’ Assistance, the private sector, and ASEAN countries’ contribution to facilitate student internship and traineeship in emerging digital industries. Other initiatives under the ASEAN umbrella such as the ASEAN Foundation can serve as a platform for industries and young talents to explore digital industries and operations.
Exposing young talents to opportunities to work regionally at an early stage is key to build a stronger regional economy. No single ASEAN economy can efficiently rely on its domestic workforce to tap the digital economy maximally. There are double benefits to be gained if ASEAN can facilitate the mobility of the young workforce early in their career. First, ASEAN has an opportunity to harmonise human capital standards needed by the regional digital economy. Young members of the workforce should be exposed to regional job market requirements that can help them make a career jump in the future. Second, ASEAN countries can ensure their digital talent gaps are met and their young utilised efficiently across national borders.
CONCLUSION
COVID-19 and the rise of the digital economy have provided an excellent opportunity for ASEAN to accelerate its regional integration push. The ecosystem of the digital economy can be sustained in the long run if the demand for digital skills and talent can be met. There are three key opportunities for ASEAN. First, ASEAN can collaborate with regional technology companies on digital education efforts to scale up the integration of the digital workforce regionally. Second, ASEAN must consider adding digital workers to the ASEAN MRAs to facilitate the mobility of professionals in the region and to make sure that its policies are operationalised. Third, ASEAN needs to facilitate intra-ASEAN student mobility and digital skill advancement early through educational platforms such as the AUN and other student mobility programmes.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Since 2016, the Vietnamese government has tightened its grip on traditional media, the online sphere, and civil society.
- This tightening of the public sphere is part of the effort by the conservative faction within the Communist Party of Vietnam to increase the Party’s control over the state and society. This has been made possible by the Vietnamese state’s improved capability in managing cybersphere and its increased leverage in negotiations with Western partners.
- The weaponization of laws and regulations has become the strategy of choice for Vietnamese authorities, who have become increasingly adept at exploiting economic leverage to strong-arm Big Tech into compliance.
- The intensified crackdown has created an increasingly subservient and fear-filled atmosphere around both mainstream media and cyberspace, unnerving the civil society community.
- This trend is likely to persist until 2026, when a new generation of leadership emerges. However, if the Vietnamese leadership continues to suppress online discussions and curtail press freedom, they risk losing a vital channel of feedback. Over time, this could create a widening gulf between the public and its political leaders, leading to instability.
* Nguyen Khac Giang is Visiting Fellow at the Vietnam Studies Programme. He was previously Research Fellow at the Vietnam Center for Economic and Strategic Studies. Dien Nguyen An Luong is Visiting Fellow at the Media, Technology and Society Programme of the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. A journalist with significant experience as managing editor at Vietnam’s top newsrooms, his work has also appeared in the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Guardian, South China Morning Post, and other publications.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/47, 19 June 2023
INTRODUCTION
Since 2016, Vietnam’s public sphere has come under increasing scrutiny and control by the government, with traditional media, the online sphere, and civil society being the primary targets. This conservative shift in the one-party state is a departure from the relatively lenient period that followed the nation’s admission to the World Trade Organization in 2007 and until the 12th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) in 2016.
The tightening of civil society has been particularly evident in recent years, with various restrictions being imposed through both legal and extra-legal means on the activities of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and social movements.[1] This was made clear in 2022, when numerous prominent NGO leaders were charged and arrested.[2] The traditional media landscape has also been subject to greater controls, with journalists and editors cowed by increasingly comprehensive censorship and stricter regulations. As the new main platform for propaganda, the cybersphere has been subject to new restrictive regulations, more targeted punishments, and legions of pro-government trolls tasked with countering negative discussions about the regime.
This article explores three major factors contributing to Vietnam’s increasingly restrictive public sphere since 2016. First, we argue that this is part of an effort spearheaded by the conservative faction of the CPV to increase their control over the state and society after the 12th CPV Congress in 2016. Second, while Vietnamese officials started recognizing the potential for collective action against the regime in the late 2000s and early 2010s, it was not until the late 2010s that they had the necessary capacity to respond effectively. Finally, Vietnam’s growing significance in the context of great power competition has enabled Hanoi to withstand external pressure from the United States and European Union regarding human rights and democratic practices. The article concludes by discussing the implications of this trend for Vietnam’s future.
VIETNAM’S “HUNDRED FLOWERS” MOMENT
In the early 2010s, Vietnam’s public sphere was characterized by a sense of relative optimism. Traditional media were blossoming, and journalists were granted some freedom to perform their jobs. Although there were occasional setbacks, such as the unprecedented state-sanctioned crackdown on the press in 2008,[3] investigative journalism[4] and media coverage of official corruption[5] were largely tolerated by the authorities. The early 2000s saw the launch of online versions of established newspapers, with major tech companies entering the fray in the mid-2000s, accelerating the development of Vietnam’s online media space.[6]
The nascent civil society was also emerging, exemplified by the rise of non-state social organisations, such as Vietnamese NGOs (VNGOs), community-based organizations (CBOs), and independent movements connected via the Internet. Facebook became the preferred platform among Vietnamese netizens after its launch in 2008, enabling online activism to thrive.[7] After a series of failed attempts to exert greater control over social media, the Vietnamese government ultimately conceded to Facebook’s popularity in 2015.[8]
This more open public sphere created a positive feedback loop within the previously rigidly-controlled political system. This was a rare time when people could make their grievances heard and addressed through popular mobilisations, both online and offline. For instance, in 2015, a government plan to fell 6,700 trees in Hanoi spurred Vietnamese netizens to form an online movement on Facebook to protest it.[9] This backlash led the government to scrap the plan and punish the officials responsible.[10] A year later, environmental concerns unified Vietnamese Facebook users in a protest against a major marine pollution incident caused by a steel plant of Formosa, a Taiwanese investor, in Ha Tinh Province.[11] The newly established government after the 12th Congress felt the need to demonstrate responsiveness to public demands, forcing Formosa to accept responsibility and pay US$500 million in compensation to the affected fishermen.[12]
THE CONSERVATIVES STRIKE BACK
However, for the one-party state, particularly the conservatives, these effective cases of activism posed a great threat, especially in the wake of the Arab Spring uprisings in late 2010.[13] To them, the media, the Internet, and civil society had the potential to mobilise protests[14] and empower the public to challenge the legitimacy of the CPV.[15] Nonetheless, during the leadership of Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, who was in office from 2006 to 2016, economic development was prioritized over social controls, and the country was willing to loosen its grip on the public sphere in exchange for advantageous trade agreements with Western partners.
The crackdown only began after the 12th CPV Congress, when the conservative faction emerged victorious with the re-election of General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong while his main rival, Nguyen Tan Dung, retired. As a staunch communist apparatchik, Trong sought to address the ideological and moral decay of some elements in both the party and society, which had caused corruption and other social ills.[16]
In one of its earliest actions, the 12th Central Committee under the leadership of Trong issued Resolution 04 – NQ/TW, which identified what the CPV considered to be signs of “self-evolution” and “self-transformation” that could threaten the regime’s survival.[17] One such sign was the presence of civil society. According to CPV propagandist, the West employs “civil society” as a tool to weaken and ultimately destroy communist rule in Vietnam by instigating gradual and non-violent changes within the country.[18] This viewpoint explains the indefinite suspension of the long-awaited Law on Association in late 2016.[19] In 2018, the Politburo issued another important resolution, Resolution 35–NQ/TW, which focused on “strengthening the protection of the Party’s ideological foundation, combating and refuting erroneous and hostile viewpoints in the new situation”.[20]
These two resolutions laid the foundation for the creation of various institutions dedicated to managing and overseeing ideological work, as well as for establishing a regulatory framework to control the public sphere. In accordance with Resolution 35, a unified “steering committee” was established at all levels of the party hierarchy to “proactively counter hostile opinions” about the party and “closely monitor” the ideological beliefs of party members and citizens.[21] Although the party has not released the exact numbers of these committees, a report in Quang Ninh Province revealed that every government/party agency must appoint 5-10 cadres responsible for “combating wrongful views on cyberspace”.[22]
The CPV also instructed the establishment of new specialized agencies exclusively focused on fighting ideological battles in cyberspace. These include Force 47 (Lực lượng 47), estimated to have at least 10,000 personnel in 2017,[23] and the Cyberspace Operations Command (also known as Command 86), both under the Ministry of National Defense. The Ministry of Public Security, the one-party state’s main repressive institution, has also invested heavily in its cyber capabilities.[24]
STIFLING PUBLIC DISCOURSE
Mainstream media and cyberspace
Given the CPV’s long-standing concern about collective actions, it is unsurprising that the cybersphere is the first target of its intensified crackdown. Vietnam’s increased control of cyberspace has revolved around three main tactics: blocking and removing content that its authorities deem inappropriate; bolstering its monitoring of social media; and prosecuting online critics.
In tightening the screws in the cybersphere, Vietnam has employed a range of laws and regulations. Decree 72, enacted in 2013, has been widely seen as the legal basis for Meta’s Facebook and Google’s YouTube to limit or remove content at the request of Vietnamese authorities.[25] The full-blown weaponization of the decree became evident in 2017, when Google[26] and Facebook[27] reported the amount of material the Vietnamese government asked them to restrict access to. Growing concerns over social media culminated in the passage and implementation of the Cybersecurity Law in 2018. Said to bear striking similarities to its Chinese equivalent, the Vietnamese law is also characterized by broad and ambiguous provisions that allow officials to control its implementation while perpetuating self-censorship among Internet users. In October 2022, Vietnam enacted Decree 53 to guide the implementation of the 2018 Cybersecurity Law,[28] which further empowers Vietnamese authorities to censor online content they disapprove of and strengthen the state’s digital surveillance capability.
Vietnam ranks seventh among the top ten countries with the highest number of Facebook users,[29] with the company reportedly generating an annual revenue of more than US$1 billion from Vietnam’s market of nearly 70 million users.[30] According to DataReportal figures, YouTube has 63 million users in Vietnam, and TikTok around 50 million.[31] As such, by threatening to shut down any social platform deemed not compliant with local laws, Vietnamese authorities have become increasingly adept at exploiting their economic leverage to arm-twist Big Tech into compliance. In 2020, for instance, Vietnam threatened to block Facebook if it did not agree to remove anti-government posts on its platform.[32] This brinkmanship tactic seems to have been effective. According to the Vietnamese Ministry of Information and Communications, Facebook complied with 90% of Vietnam’s content removal requests during the first quarter of 2022, while YouTube went along with 93%.[33]
The post-2016 era has also seen Vietnamese authorities heavily invest in beefing up online monitoring efforts by mobilizing Force 47[34] in a bid to maintain “a healthy cyberspace” and to protect the regime from “wrong”, “distorting”, or “false news”.[35] Additionally, the authorities have enlisted members of society to act as pro-state opinion shapers, creating dossiers on online dissidents or critics who are accused of spreading “false news” about the regime and reporting any possible violations of Vietnamese laws to the authorities.[36]
State-orchestrated efforts to control the cybersphere have resulted in an increasingly submissive and fearful social media landscape. Big Tech firms have become accustomed to acquiescing to Hanoi’s censorship requests, hoping to appease regulators. Mai Truong argued that by filling the Politburo with staunch defence-security figures, Vietnam has been able to prevent online popular discontent from turning into real-life protests.[37]
The fear-cloaked dynamic has also permeated the mainstream media. Vietnamese authorities have appeared increasingly emboldened in threatening to revoke the license of news outlets that dare to go against the party line. Nowhere is this strategy more manifest than in a state-orchestrated blueprint enforced in 2019 that seeks to strengthen and centralize state control over the media by axing or merging hundreds of press organizations.[38] Accordingly, Hanoi aims to slash around 180 press organisations across the country by 2025,[39] citing the need to revamp the bloated bureaucracy and overlapping ownership that have plagued the news industry. While the plan is legitimate to some extent, critics have lamented that authorities are using it as a smokescreen to shepherd news outlets into churning out uniform coverage that promotes official narratives.[40]
Civil society
In a move that seems to be a copy of the Chinese approach,[41] the Vietnamese government has also been relying on weaponizing laws and regulations to crack down on civil society. According to advocacy groups, since 2016, Vietnamese authorities have used tax laws and the Penal Code to go after activists, charging them with “tax evasion”, “anti-state propaganda” or “abusing democratic freedoms”.[42] In April 2023, The 88 Project, a human rights group, released a report detailing how the “tax evasion” charge has been “arbitrarily applied for the purpose of political persecution”, citing the cases of four prominent Vietnamese environment activists as examples.[43] The latest casualty of Vietnam’s crackdown on civil society is Hoang Thi Minh Hong, another prominent environmental activist who headed the now-disbanded environmental NGO Change. Hong was arrested in June 2023, also for alleged “tax evasion”.[44]
In August 2020, a new decree superseding 2012 rules was passed, significantly tightening restrictions on foreign NGOs in Vietnam. The decree narrows the definition of permitted groups and retains expansive prohibitions against activities that violate Vietnamese “national interests”, “social order”, “social ethics”, “national customs”, “traditions”, or “national unity”, among other provisions.[45] The new decree has been mostly used to impede foreign NGOs’ registration process and narrow their operating space in Vietnam.[46] This has left the NGO community in the country in suspense, with several organisations having to shut down due to the new restrictions.[47]
The authorities have also targeted high-profile activists who could potentially influence public opinion. According to data compiled by The 88 Project, Vietnam had arrested 361 “activists” between 2016 and the first quarter of 2023[48] — more than triple the number of arrests (106) made from 2015 to 2003, when the project began collecting data. The most widely reported case was the detention of Nguy Thi Khanh, Vietnam’s best-known environment advocate and the nation’s first recipient of the esteemed Goldman environmental prize in 2018.[49] Khanh was arrested in February 2022 for alleged tax evasion, a charge that her supporters have dismissed as fabricated. In June 2022, a Vietnamese court sentenced her to two years in prison, which was reduced on appeal to 21 months. Although Khanh was granted early release in May 2023,[50] the case caused deep concern among Vietnam’s civil society organisations, prompting more than 50 Goldman laureates from 41 countries to sign a letter urging the United Nations Human Rights Council to reject Vietnam’s bid to be elected to the body in October 2022.[51]
But such pressure did not suffice to prevent Vietnam from getting elected to a three-year term at the UN body.[52] Indeed, with Vietnam playing an increasingly significant role amidst the great power rivalry, the CPV has enjoyed better leverage in weathering external pressures on its human rights record, particularly from the United States and European Union partners. This dynamic is another crucial factor that has enabled the CPV to continue tightening the public sphere without having to worry about international repercussions.
GEOPOLITICAL LEVERAGE
Both the US and EU have notably softened their approach to human rights issues in recent years, likely due to geopolitical and economic considerations. As the US-China rivalry intensifies, Hanoi has become an increasingly important partner for Washington in Asia. Vietnam has sought to safeguard its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence against China’s growing strategic ambitions, particularly in the South China Sea, making it a natural security partner for the US in its efforts to contain China’s rise. Additionally, Vietnam’s emergence as a regional manufacturing hub has been well-received by Washington, given its desire to diversify its international economic ties and reduce its trade dependence on China.
While US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Hanoi in mid-April this year included some symbolic gestures of support for freedom of religion,[53] no public remark was made in response to the Vietnamese court’s sentencing of a prominent blogger to six years in prison hours before his visit.[54] Vietnam arrested another dissident blogger while Blinken was still in Hanoi, yet the US response was muted.[55] Ultimately, Blinken’s visit was the latest testament to Washington’s willingness to go the extra mile to upgrade ties with Hanoi in order to counterbalance China’s growing influence.[56]
Meanwhile, apart from the shared security concern about China, trade has been another key driver of EU’s relations with Vietnam.[57] Most recent data show that Vietnam has been the EU’s most important trading partner in Southeast Asia after Singapore.[58] Vietnam and Singapore are also the only two countries in the region that have concluded a free trade agreement with the EU.[59] Even though differences over human rights have caused temporary setbacks, the EU seems to have prioritized economic considerations over human rights issues.[60] Such pragmatism was on full display in the Union’s ratification of the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement in 2020.[61]
CONCLUSION
A month before being installed as Vietnam’s president in March, Vo Van Thuong stressed the importance of respecting and listening to critical feedback from the intelligentsia.[62] However, the current conservative trajectory of Vietnamese politics suggests that the public sphere is likely to remain restricted until at least 2026, when the 14th CPV Congress will be held and a new leadership elected. This trend will likely deprive the Vietnamese state of an invaluable online feedback loop.
For a country that prizes political stability above all else, silencing all avenues for the public to express their grievances could cause more instability in the long run. As political scientist Martin Dimitrov aptly noted,[63] any regime should be wary when its citizens cease voicing their complaints, as it is indicative of a widespread lack of faith in that state’s legitimacy.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The Cambodia-China Free Trade Agreement (CCFTA), which came into force in January 2022, has provided Cambodia with renewed impetus to enhance trade facilitation and expand its trade portfolio. This is in line with the objectives of its Rectangular Strategy (2018-2023) and the economic diplomacy initiative that it launched in January 2021.
- Cambodia has been striving to mitigate economic and political risks stemming from the economic sanctions and pressures from the European Union and the United States by deepening its engagement with China.
- Cambodia stands to gain significantly in exporting its agricultural products to China under the CCFTA. The potential for growth in that area is massive. Cambodia’s tariff reduction and elimination offer is 90%, while China’s is 97.53%.
- To make the most of the opportunities provided by the CCFTA, Cambodia requires assistance in terms of improving sanitary and phytosanitary measures, conducting research and development to improve its export capacity and competitiveness, and establishing public-private partnerships to facilitate trade.
* Vannarith Chheang is President of the Asian Vision Institute and was formerly Visiting Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/46, 12 June 2023
INTRODUCTION
The CCFTA, signed in October 2020 and effective since January 2022, was rapidly negotiated in just eight months amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Cambodia initiated the agreement with the aim of broadening its trade relations and export markets in China in response to the economic fallout caused by the pandemic, local flooding, and economic pressures and sanctions from the European Union and the United States. The year 2020 was a challenging period for the country.[1] Cambodia’s economy contracted by 3.1% in 2020, before rebounding by 3.0% in 2021 and 5.1% in 2022. Economic growth is expected to reach 6.2% in 2023. This paper aims to shed light on the driving forces and key content of the CCFTA and its implications on Cambodia’s economic diplomacy.
TRADE PRESSURES ON CAMBODIA
Cambodia’s economic policies are relatively liberal for the region, and its investment and trade regimes remain attractive. However, being a small and open economy, Cambodia is susceptible to external changes and shocks. Global trade growth slowed in the second half of 2022 and further deceleration is projected for 2023. With the global growth outlook appearing gloomy, Cambodia’s economy is facing various challenges. The manufacturing sector – particularly the garment industry – is heavily reliant on export markets, and the economic slowdown in Cambodia’s two primary markets, the United States and Europe, has impacted it badly.[2]
As a country classified as a least developed country (LDC), Cambodia has received several Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) programmes that have provided benefits. Due to the duty-free market access that Cambodia has been granted to various export markets via different trade preference programmes,[3] Cambodia’s trade volume nearly doubled between 2017 and 2021, increasing from US$25.44 billion to US$48.01 billion. However, due to concerns over human rights and democracy issues in Cambodia, the European Union (EU) reduced approximately 20% of its “Everything but Arms” preferences for Cambodia in August 2020. The United States also suspended its GSP preferences, imposing various economic sanctions on Cambodia, including the “Cambodia Democracy Act” bill, the Magnitsky Act targeting several senior Cambodian leaders, and sanctions on the Union Development Group, a Chinese company operating in Cambodia. These sanctions and suspensions have negatively impacted Cambodia’s trade with the world.
Furthermore, Cambodia’s export potential to regional markets is limited. Only a small portion of total exports go to such markets, and the country’s businesses are as yet not adequately integrated into regional value chains.[4]
Along with the reduction in GSP preferences by the US and EU, Cambodia’s trade activities require optimisation and streamlining. According to the UN’s evaluation in 2021, Cambodia received a score of 78.5% for its trade facilitation, with identified weaknesses being in paperless trade and cross-border paperless trade. Cambodia has not yet implemented an authorised economic operator (AEO) system to streamline cross-border trade. Moreover, the statistics database management system of the General Department of Customs and Excise does not generate timely and precise statistics.[5] Thus, under such dire conditions, the CCFTA is expected to stimulate increased diversification and facilitation of trade, as well as improve institutions and capacity-building for trade promotion and facilitation. From a geopolitical perspective, Cambodia apparently intends to use its relationship with China to mitigate the impact of the economic sanctions imposed by the EU and the US.[6]
Despite the challenges posed by the pandemic, China and Cambodia managed to exceed their bilateral trade volume target by reaching $11.1 billion in 2021, achieving the $10 billion goal two years ahead of schedule. In 2022, China was Cambodia’s largest export market, with exports totalling US$1.24 billion, representing 5.5% of Cambodia’s total exports. During the same period, Cambodia’s imports from China amounted to US$10.4 billion, accounting for roughly 34.1% of Cambodia’s total imports. The main products that Cambodia exported to China included milled rice, bananas, mangos, cassava, fishery products, and apparel. Cambodia’s imports from China mainly consisted of raw materials for the garment industry, machinery, vehicles, foodstuffs, electronics, and medicines.[7]
The negotiation of the China-Cambodia Free Trade Agreement (CCFTA) was completed relatively quickly, taking only eight months to finalise. The first round of negotiations took place in January 2020, with both sides engaging in significant discussions on trade in goods, customs procedures, trade facilitation, rules of origin, trade in services, transparency, economic and technical cooperation, cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative, e-commerce, and related legal matters. The second round of negotiations took place virtually in April 2020, and both sides reached a broad consensus on the agreement’s content, finalising consultations on cooperation in investment within the Belt and Road Initiative, e-commerce, economic and technological cooperation, and legal issues. The negotiations were concluded in July 2020, and the agreement was signed in October 2020 and went into effect in January 2022. Notably, 2020 marked the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between China and Cambodia, and this prompted both countries’ leaders to direct their FTA negotiators to conclude the negotiations that year.
KEY CONTENTS OF THE AGREEMENT
The CCFTA encompasses 16 chapters that cover various aspects of trade and economic cooperation.[8] The agreement is expected to bring benefits to Cambodia such as increased market access to China for agricultural products, improved efficiency in the application of rules of origin, strengthened customs and trade facilitation, and more investment opportunities.[9]
Cambodia and China have agreed to a tariff reduction and elimination scheme under the CCFTA. Cambodia will offer a 90% reduction and elimination of tariffs, while China will offer a 97.53% reduction and elimination of tariffs. Compared to the ASEAN-China FTA, China increased its tariff reduction and elimination rate by 3.16% under the CCFTA. The tariff reduction and elimination scheme are divided into four categories: Category A, which includes 8,328 tariff lines that enjoy zero tariffs; Category B, which will enjoy zero tariffs after five years; Category C, which will enjoy tariffs after 10 years; and Category D, which will enjoy tariffs after 20 years. The products included in Category A are pepper, mango, banana, longan, dragon fruit, cashew nuts, fish, meat, processed meat, honey, vegetables, grains, processed foods, alcohol, beverages, vinegar, textiles, footwear, electronic parts, bicycles, cables, engines and electronic motors.
Transparency
The measures outlined in the CCFTA to promote transparency in customs procedures and trade policies will help to facilitate cross-border trade, and align Cambodia’s trade facilitation measures with international best practices. The publication of laws, regulations, and administrative procedures relevant to trade-in goods and services, as well as the designation of enquiry points to address questions from interested persons, will also help to promote transparency and ensure that businesses have access to the information they need. This will be particularly important for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which may not have the resources to navigate complex trade regulations and procedures. Overall, the measures outlined in the CCFTA to promote transparency will help to create a more open, predictable, and efficient trading environment for businesses in Cambodia and China.
Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Low sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS) are the main barriers for Cambodia’s export, especially of agricultural goods.[10] The study by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 2019 found that the main obstacles to entering the Chinese market are tariffs and SPS requirements. In the context of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the SPS Committee was established to provide a forum for discussion and exchange of information.[11] Under the framework of CCFTA, Cambodia and China agree to explore further cooperation opportunities on sanitary and phytosanitary issues and facilitating bilateral trade. This is a positive development as sanitary and phytosanitary measures are critical in ensuring the safety and quality of agricultural products traded between countries. Cooperation in this area can help reduce trade barriers and increase market access for Cambodian agricultural products to China. The establishment of a committee on sanitary and phytosanitary measures shows the commitment of both countries to enhancing mutual understanding and technical cooperation on this issue. It also provides a mechanism for monitoring the implementation and operation of these measures.
Cooperation on the Belt and Road Initiative
This is a special cooperation agreement under the framework of FTA. Cambodia has embraced the China-proposed Belt and Road Initiative since its inception.[12] Under the CCFTA, Cambodia and China agree to strengthen the role of the Belt and Road Initiative as an important instrument and further strengthen high-quality Belt and Road cooperation by promoting policy coordination, facility connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-to-people bond.
Technical Cooperation
The CCFTA also includes provisions for technical cooperation and capacity building, particularly in agriculture. This will help Cambodia improve its export capacity and competitiveness in the Chinese market, while also promoting sustainable development in its agriculture sector. Personnel exchanges between research institutions will also build stronger links between the two countries and foster innovation in agriculture. The establishment of platforms for agricultural enterprises will further facilitate trade and investment in this sector, and streamline import-export procedures. Overall, these measures will strengthen economic ties and support the long-term growth and development of both countries.
Furthermore, the private sector plays a crucial role in promoting the quality of Cambodia’s agricultural goods. In late 2021, the China Firm for Global Business (CFGB) built a working relationship with Cambodian government agencies in research and development to promote Cambodia’s export of agricultural goods to the Chinese market.[13] Both sides will enhance planning and interconnection in industrial cooperation, and develop and implement potential projects and industrial development policy. They will also provide support to enterprises in the areas of start-ups incubation, innovation development of SMEs and the establishment and operation of industrial parks to enable them to leapfrog towards Industry 4.0.
In relation to electronic commerce, both sides will cooperate in the areas of joint studies, legal framework establishment and enforcement, experience sharing in policy making and government management of e-commerce as well as capacity enhancement for suppliers to directly access to the marketplace. Concerning transport and logistics, the agreement will simply harmonise cross-border transport and trade regulations, improving physical infrastructure and the quality of logistics services, and supporting the Greater Mekong Subregion Cross-Border Transport Agreement (CBTA).
IMPLICATIONS FOR CAMBODIA’S ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY
The government’s Rectangular Strategy Phase IV (2018–2023) recognises the global economic shift to East Asia as a ‘golden opportunity’ for Cambodia[14] to develop and modernise its manufacturing industries and services. Integrating Cambodia’s production network with the region, developing infrastructure connectivity and facilitating the cross-border flow of goods, services, capital and data are crucial foreign economic policy instruments. Indeed, ASEAN, China, Japan and South Korea are Cambodia’s key economic partners.
In January 2021 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation introduced ‘economic diplomacy’ to promote trade, investment, tourism and develop Cambodian cultural identity. The economic diplomacy strategy of 2021–2023 is instrumental in enhancing Cambodia’s international integration, diversifying its economic partners, expanding its export markets, and attracting foreign investors and tourists.
Under the pillar of international trade, the strategy stresses advancing and diversifying exports and export markets, identifying and capitalising on new opportunities for Cambodian products and services, and strengthening international economic cooperation and partnership with a focus on bilateral and multilateral FTAs. The conclusion of the Cambodia–China Free Trade Agreement in late 2020, as well as the Cambodia–South Korea Free Trade Agreement in early 2021 and being part of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) demonstrate Cambodia’s economic diversification strategy at play. Particularly, CCFTA will boost the export of Cambodia’s agriculture products to China.
The Cambodia Diagnostic Trade Integration Study 2019-2023 posits that China cannot replace the European Union and United States as markets of destination for garments, bicycles and shoes. However, China could be a potential market for agricultural products and processed foodstuffs.[15] The CCFTA can lead to productivity gains while offering Cambodia new export opportunities, especially in agricultural goods and products.
China has emerged as the world’s biggest importer of Cambodian milled rice, now accounting for more than half the market share – versus just 3% a decade ago – and is expected to further strengthen its dominance going forward. Insiders point out that traders who ship to Chinese shores pay relatively large sums for the grains. In the first half of 2022, China bought 168,280 tonnes or 51.4% of Cambodia’s total milled-rice exports of 327,200 tonnes. Milled-rice sales to China have reached about 200,000 tonnes year-to-date, or the equivalent of half the official annual tariff-free quota allowance of 400,000 tonnes for Cambodian milled rice.[16]
In 2019, Chinese authorities granted import permission to Cambodian bananas, making them the first Cambodian fresh fruit to receive market access to China. The growth has been driven by more Chinese companies investing in plantations and in the banana production and export infrastructure in Cambodia. In the first half of 2022, reportedly all of Cambodia’s banana exports were sent to China.[17]
In early 2022, China completed the risk assessment of Cambodian Pra fish, sweet corn, and longan in addition to banana and mango. These products can now be shipped directly to China. Currently, 74 longan plantations and eight longan packing plants have been registered and recognised by the Ministry’s General Department of Agriculture and the General Administration of Customs of China.[18] So far, Cambodia has exported 27 kinds of agricultural products to China.
The National Policy on Cassava 2020-2025 is a significant step towards developing Cambodia’s cassava industry and expanding its export market. Cambodia has already made progress in exporting cassava, with Vietnam and Thailand as the top buyers, and China’s emergence as a key export market for Cambodian cassava is a positive development. The new agreement between Cambodia and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region to export 400,000 tonnes of dried cassava from March 2022 to March 2023 has been a good opportunity for Cambodia to further increase its cassava exports to China. [19] However, it is important for Cambodia to continue developing its cassava industry and addressing any challenges that may arise, such as ensuring quality standards and improving productivity and efficiency in the process.
Peppercorn is another key Cambodian agricultural product. In 2021, the country exported over 28,074 tonnes of the item. The total land area of pepper cultivation is about 6,000 hectares nationwide. In November 2022, The General Administration of Customs of China (GACC) gave the green light for Cambodian peppercorn exports to China after the Protocol of Phytosanitary Requirements for Export of Peppercorns from Cambodia to China was signed by the Cambodia’s Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries and the General Administration of Customs of China. The direct exports to China would effectively end Cambodia’s reliance on Vietnam or other neighbouring countries acting as middlemen in China’s import of Cambodian peppercorn.[20] Cambodia has been exporting peppercorn to markets such as Vietnam, Europe, the US, South Korea, Japan, Chinese Taipei, and the Middle East, and it has been affirmed that some of the product shipped to Vietnam end up in China.[21]
To fully utilise the benefits of CCFTA, there is a crucial need to promote strengthen public-private partnerships. By working closely with the government and related authorities, firms, businesses and export companies can ensure that they understand and comply with the preferential access and rules under the agreement. This will enhance their export competitiveness and capacity. In addition, the setup of a team of experts at the Department of Export-Import to assist Cambodian exporters on rules of origin and Certificate of Origin is a positive step towards facilitating trade. The simplification and automation of rules of origin can reduce export costs, which will make Cambodian products more competitive in the Chinese market.
Notably, the law on rules of origin, once passed by the National Assembly, will provide a more solid legal framework for determining the origin of goods and promoting compliance with the rules of origin under CCFTA. This will further enhance the transparency and predictability of trade between Cambodia and China, making it easier for businesses to take advantage of the preferential treatment offered under the agreement.
CONCLUSION
The CCFTA can provide Cambodia with an opportunity to deepen economic ties with China. However, to fully benefit from the agreement, Cambodia needs to address some of its trade barriers, particularly in the area of sanitary and phytosanitary measures. Technical support from China and other partners can help Cambodia improve its institutional capacity and automate and digitalise trade facilitation. In addition, public-private partnerships can enhance Cambodia’s export capacity and competitiveness.
The CCFTA reflects the present trend in South-South trade, offering new growth opportunities for developing countries such as Cambodia. To promote industrialisation and export diversification, developing countries need to adopt an integrated industrial-trade-investment strategy. China, as a global trading power, can play a significant role in this process.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Almost three decades after the signing of the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty, none of the five recognised Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) has acceded to its Protocol.
- The NWSs have problems with the expansive and indeterminate geographical coverage of SEANWFZ, the issue of port visits and transit of foreign ships/aircraft in the zone, and the extensive scope of their nuclear security assurances in the Protocol.
- Since 1999, China has expressed its readiness to sign the Protocol and is the only NWS willing to do so without reservations, though on the condition that the Treaty and Protocol shall not affect its territories and relevant maritime zones.
- China adopts a favourable approach towards SEANWFZ because the Treaty fits in with its national security strategy and self-defensive nuclear doctrine, which includes the unconditional No First Use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states.
- The expansive geographic coverage of SEANWFZ – if implemented – would undercut the deployment of foreign powers’ nuclear assets in a large swathe of the maritime area in China’s vicinity, which would enhance China’s strategic security.
- China could instrumentalise SEANWFZ as a regional arrangement to delegitimise the military presence of foreign powers in the region, thereby contributing to the Chinese anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy in normative terms.
- China has highlighted its readiness to sign the Protocol to prove itself a responsible nuclear-armed state and claim the moral high ground in criticising the nuclear policy of the US and its allies, especially their nuclear power projection in China’s near neighbourhood.
* Hoang Thi Ha is Senior Fellow and Co-coordinator of the Regional Strategic and Political Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/45, 5 June 2023
INTRODUCTION
The Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) or Bangkok Treaty[1] was signed on 15 December 1995 by the ten Southeast Asian states[2] and entered into force on 28 March 1997. The States Parties to the Treaty are therewith obliged to ensure peaceful use of nuclear energy, and not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons, test nuclear explosive devices, or dump radioactive wastes within the zone. The Treaty includes a Protocol[3] that is open to accession by the five recognised Nuclear Weapon States (NWS or P5), namely China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US), whose support and recognition are critical to the efficacy of SEANWFZ. The NWSs’ accession to the Protocol would entail their obligation to respect the Treaty, refrain from acts that may violate the Treaty, and provide negative security assurances (NSA), i.e., not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the SEANWFZ States Parties and within the zone.
SEANWFZ is one of five nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZ), which are seen as providing “the regional pathway” towards the ultimate goal of a nuclear weapon-free world.[4] SEANWFZ was also considered an interim measure towards achieving the 1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). Spearheaded by Malaysia, ZOPFAN aimed to achieve a Southeast Asia “free from any form or manner of interference by outside powers”[5] but its realisation has been elusive, given that Southeast Asia is historically and geographically intertwined with the major powers’ strategic interests, and some regional states still maintain security alliances or close security ties with external powers. ZOPFAN’s ahistorical idealism was embedded in SEANWFZ’s key provisions regarding its expansive geographical coverage and the extensive scope of the NSA. This is the underlying reason for the lack of progress in getting the P5 – except China – to sign its Protocol up to now.
China has been an outlier among the P5 in that it has expressed its intent to sign the Protocol since the late 1990s, shortly after the Treaty’s entry into force. The regional security environment has since deteriorated drastically with the intensification of US-China strategic tensions. Yet, China’s interest in SEANWFZ remains strong, and arguably has even increased as it sees itself as the target of a US-led strategy of “containment, encirclement and suppression”.[6] This Perspective examines the legal and geopolitical intricacies of SEANWFZ that underlie China’s longstanding willingness to sign its Protocol in contrast to other NWSs. It argues that beyond non-proliferation considerations, supporting SEANWFZ serves China’s security interests amid its heightened tensions with the US and its allies.
THE LONG JOURNEY OF GETTING THE P5 TO SIGN THE PROTOCOL
The SEANWFZ States Parties – which are also the ten ASEAN member states – have held many consultations with the NWSs to persuade the latter to accede to the Protocol. The NWSs have objections and concerns regarding some substantive provisions of the Treaty and its Protocol (Table 1).
- Expansive geographical scope
Article 2 of the SEANWFZ Treaty states that the Treaty and its Protocol shall apply to the territories, exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and continental shelves (CS) of its States Parties. The inclusion of EEZ and CS is a unique feature of SEANWFZ that exceeds the standard coverage of only territories as in other NWFZs. It also goes beyond the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which prescribes the sovereign rights of a coastal state only with respect to the living and non-living resources in its EEZ and CS. The legal regime of EEZ and CS under UNCLOS is a delicate balance between the rights of coastal states and the freedoms of ocean user states. It remains a subject of contention between the majority of UN members, which hold that all states have the right to conduct military operations in any EEZ, and a minority of around 20 states (including China and some Southeast Asian states such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand), which impose restrictions on military operations by foreign powers in their EEZ.[7] The inclusion of EEZ and CS in the geographical coverage of SEANWFZ is even more problematic due to the unresolved competing territorial and maritime claims in the South China Sea (SCS) among some Southeast Asian states and China.
- Port visits and transit rights
Article 3.2 of the Treaty forbids a State Party from developing, manufacturing, possessing, having control over, stationing, transporting, testing or using nuclear weapons. The US, UK and France[8] maintain that there is a conflict between this article and Article 7 on the prerogative of a State Party to allow visits by foreign ships/aircraft to its ports/airfields or their transit in its territorial sea. These NWSs want to ensure that the Treaty would not impinge on their port visits and transit rights in the region (since these NWSs maintain the policy to neither confirm nor deny [NCND] the presence of nuclear weapons at a given location, the possibility that their visiting/transiting ships/aircraft in the region are nuclear-armed cannot be entirely ruled out). They insist on a clarification to ensure that Article 7 takes precedence over Article 3.2.
- Extensive negative security assurances
The NSA clause in the SEANWFZ Protocol requires that the NWSs commit not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any SEANWFZ State Party and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons within the zone. The latter part – “within the zone” – is problematic to the NWSs on two levels. First, the geographical application of SEANWFZ is not only expansive (involving the EEZ and CS of its States Parties) but also indeterminate (because of the territorial and maritime disputes in the SCS). Second, it would mean that an NWS cannot use nuclear weapons against another NWS within this expansive and indeterminate zone and cannot use nuclear weapons from within this expansive and indeterminate zone against targets outside the zone.[9] This is well beyond the NSA that the NWSs traditionally extend to other NWFZs, which is limited to not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against the territories of the zonal countries.
- China’s sovereignty and maritime interests
Unlike France, Russia, the UK and the US (the P4), China rarely stakes out its position with regard to the above-mentioned outstanding issues. China’s only stated concern vis-à-vis SEANWFZ is that the Treaty and its Protocol might contradict or undermine its territorial and maritime rights and interests in the SCS. To address this concern, during the consultations in 2010-2012, the SEANWFZ States Parties and China agreed that they would sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) stating that the Treaty and its Protocol shall not affect their respective territories, EEZ and CS.
Table 1: Outstanding Issues Regarding NWS’s Accession to the SEANWFZ Protocol
| Outstanding issues | Extraordinary terms compared to other NWFZs?[10] | Solutions Agreed Upon by the NWSs and SEANWFZ States Parties (as of 2012) |
| Geographical scope | Yes – Inclusive of EEZ and CS | Revised Protocol stating that in the EEZ and CS of SEANWFZ States Parties, P5 shall adhere to only Article 3.3 of the Treaty that bans dumping of radioactive wastes in the zone. |
| Nuclear security assurances | Yes – Not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons within the zone | Revised Protocol limiting NSA to not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against SEANWFZ States Parties |
| Port visits and transit rights | No – Some NWSs also have concerns over the issue of port visits/transit rights in other NWFZs (Tlateloco, Pelindaba, Rarotonga). | Revised Protocol asserting the prerogative of SEANWFZ States Parties in allowing port visits and transit by foreign ships/aircraft |
| Sovereignty and maritime jurisdiction | Some NWSs also make reservations to exclude their own territories that are covered within some NWFZs. But SEANWFZ is rather different because it covers territories and maritime zones under dispute between its States Parties and China. | An MoU between China and SEANWFZ States Parties stating that the Treaty and its Protocol shall not affect their territories, EEZ and CS |
Despite several consultations between the SEANWFZ States Parties and the P5 held in the late 1990s and early 2000s, these outstanding issues were not resolved, and the matter was put on the backburner. The momentum to get the P5 to sign the Protocol was revived in 2010-2011, in part due to the importance that the Obama administration accorded to strengthening the international non-proliferation regime.[11] To address the outstanding issues, the SEANWFZ States Parties and the P5 negotiated a revised Protocol to the effect that: (i) in the EEZ and CS of the SEANWFZ States Parties, the P5 shall adhere to only Article 3.3 of the Treaty that bans the dumping of radioactive material/wastes; (ii) the SEANWFZ States Parties shall retain the prerogative to allow port visits and transit of foreign ships/aircraft pursuant to Article 7; and (iii) the P5’s NSA commitment shall be limited to not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against the SEANWFZ States Parties.
The scheduled signing of the revised Protocol by the P5 in July 2012 was forestalled by the reservations lodged at the eleventh hour by France, Russia and the UK. Some reservations by France or the UK state that accession to the Protocol shall not impair a NWS’ right of self-defence; a NWS can retract/review its obligations vis-à-vis a SEANWFZ State Party that ceases to be a party to the NPT, or breaches its non-proliferation obligations under the SEANWFZ Treaty, or develops other weapons of mass destruction. The most controversial reservation was made by Russia, which stated that it would not consider itself bound by the Protocol if a Southeast Asian state allowed foreign ships/aircraft carrying nuclear weapons to enter its territorial waters/airspace or to visit its ports/airfields.[12] Given the NCND policy of some NWSs, the Russian reservation would put undue pressure on the SEANWFZ States Parties and challenge their prerogative to exercise their rights under Article 7.[13] Due to the objection of some SEANWFZ States Parties to some or all of these reservations, the P5’s accession to the Protocol was put on hold, and the issue has been in hiatus since 2012.
CHINA’S POSITION AND INTEREST VIS-À-VIZ SEANWFZ
China’s readiness to sign the Protocol is a longstanding position that was registered as early as 1999.[14] Beijing has indicated on various occasions that it is willing to be the first NWS to sign the Protocol,[15] and to do so without reservations.[xvi] The Chinese intent was reiterated by Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang during his meeting with the ASEAN secretary-general in March 2023.[17] This article argues that China adopts a favourable approach towards SEANWFZ because the Treaty fits in with its nuclear doctrine and national security strategy, and accession to the Protocol could provide both geostrategic and diplomatic dividends for China.
China’s No First Use policy
China’s nuclear doctrine has been evolving in keeping with its growing nuclear capabilities and the changes in its external security environment. Yet, it still retains the self-defensive posture and the policy of unconditional No First Use (NFU) of nuclear weapons, which is reiterated in China’s 2019 Defence White Paper: “China is always committed to a nuclear policy of no first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, and not using or threatening to use nuclear weaponsagainst non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones unconditionally (emphasis added).”[18] To China’s credit, it is the only P5 country maintaining an unconditional NFU policy, which makes the Chinese nuclear doctrine less aggressive than those of other NWSs. Since China’s NSA commitment to Southeast Asian countries is well within the bounds of its NFU policy, its accession to the Protocol is more straightforward than that of the P4.
China’s sea-based nuclear force
China’s self-defensive nuclear policy seeks to maintain a “lean and effective” nuclear deterrence based on first-strike survival and second-strike capabilities.[19] In the nuclear triad of an NWS – i.e., land-based nuclear missiles, strategic bombers, and ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) – SSBNs are considered “the primary guarantor of second-strike capabilities” given their advantages in stealth and survivability.[20] However, noisiness is the Achilles’ heel of Chinese SSBNs – from the Type 092 Xia-class in the 1970s-1990s to the newer Type 094 Jin-class – which makes them vulnerable to anti-submarine warfare and limits their ability to navigate far beyond the Chinese shores.[21] It should be noted that the Chinese submarine fleet is home-ported at Yulin Naval Base on Hainan Island in the SCS; given its expansive claims in the SCS, China could justify the presence and operations of its SSBNs in these waters as falling well within its sovereignty and jurisdiction. Meanwhile, if the P4 respected the expansive geographic coverage of the SEANWFZ Treaty and the extensive NSA in the original Protocol – which is extremely unlikely, if not impossible – it would significantly undercut the deployment of their nuclear assets – particularly SSBNs – in a large swathe of maritime area in China’s southern vicinity, which would in turn enhance China’s strategic security and the defence of its sea-based nuclear deterrence.[22]
China’s anti-access/area-denial strategy
China’s support for SEANWFZ is rooted in the strategic assessment that such an extended zone – if implemented – would contribute to the country’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy which is aimed at denying the military power projection of superior adversaries in China’s near neighbourhood.[23] Apart from investing in anti-ship, anti-air, anti-ballistic weapons and anti-submarine capabilities for its A2/AD system, China has also fostered regional arrangements and agreements that could be leveraged to delegitimise or discredit the military presence of foreign powers in the region. These include the SEANWFZ Treaty, as well as China’s proposal for a treaty on good neighbourliness, friendship and cooperation with ASEAN,[24] China’s attempt to prevent Southeast Asian countries from conducting military exercises with foreign powers through a code of conduct in the SCS (COC), and its recent Global Security Initiative that embraces the ‘indivisible security’ concept.
China’s sovereignty and maritime claims in the SCS
Theoretically, if all NWSs accede to the SEANWFZ Protocol, they would be bound by the same legal obligations therein. However, the strategic security effect for the P4 and China would be significantly different because only the latter is located within the region. While the P4 are concerned about the undefined geographical scope of the zone due to the ongoing territorial and maritime disputes in the SCS, such ambiguity may work to China’s advantage. China has excessive sovereignty and maritime claims within its Nine-Dash Line that covers around 90% of the SCS.[25] The coverage of China’s claims has been extended further with its ‘Four Sha’ concept whereby China asserts all maritime zones, including internal waters, territorial seas, contiguous zone, EEZ and CS, based on the so-called “four outlying archipelagos” in the SCS (Pratas, Paracels, Spratlys and Macclesfield Bank), which it is not allowed to do under UNCLOS as a continental state.[26] China has demanded that an MoU be signed to ensure that neither the Treaty nor the Protocol shall affect its territory and maritime entitlements. This would effectively guarantee China’s free hand in defining the geographical scope of SEANWFZ in a flexible and selective manner that best serves its interests. For example, China may challenge nuclear deployments of other NWSs in the zone as violations of SEANWFZ but it can justify the presence of its nuclear assets in the zone on the grounds that such deployment takes place within China’s (claimed) territory and jurisdiction.
Responsible nuclear weapon state discourse
Since France, Russia, the UK and the US do not accept the extraordinary terms of the SEANWFZ Treaty and its original Protocol regarding the inclusion of EEZ and CS and the NSA commitment within the zone, SEANFWZ has no legal effect in preventing these countries from deploying their nuclear assets in regional waters beyond the territories of its States Parties. However, by signalling its readiness to sign the Protocol first and without reservations, China can turn SEANWFZ into a discursive and political weapon to project itself as a responsible nuclear power and claim the moral high ground in criticising the nuclear policy of the US and its allies as well as their nuclear assets in regional waters.
Hence, SEANWFZ – and China’s interest in signing its Protocol – has gained greater salience in China’s regional diplomacy after the launch of the Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) tripartite security partnership in 2021, which aims to provide Australia with nuclear-powered (but conventionally armed) attack submarines. The Chinese government believes that AUKUS would “form an underwater military encirclement against China”.[27] It has also argued that AUKUS violates the nuclear non-proliferation regime[28] and has invoked SEANWFZ to criticise the deal. In March 2023, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson said that AUKUS “undercuts ASEAN countries’ effort to establish SEANWFZ and seriously undermines the ASEAN-centred regional cooperation architecture in East Asia”.[29] Chinese commentaries state that China’s willingness to sign the Protocol is a manifestation of its “due responsibility as a major power that seeks peaceful development” and contrasts its position with the “irresponsible behaviours of the AUKUS countries”.[30]
CONCLUSION
The SEANWFZ States Parties maintain a longstanding position that all outstanding issues with the NWSs should be resolved in a ‘package deal’ so as to enable their accession to the Protocol concurrently.[31] Therefore, China has not been able to sign the Protocol despite its express intent to do so for decades. However, the rapidly deteriorating global strategic environment may warrant a rethink by the SEANWFZ States Parties on the ‘package deal’. The US and Russia – the two largest nuclear powers – have taken steps to walk back from their arms control obligations, including US withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and Russia’s suspension of its participation in the New START. Closer to home in East Asia, the race to develop nuclear capabilities is gathering pace. China is expanding and upgrading its nuclear arsenal and may become an atomic peer of the US and Russia by the 2030s, according to the US’ 2022 Nuclear Posture Review.[32] America’s withdrawal from the INF raises the concern that Washington may introduce short-range ballistic and cruise missiles in Asia.[33] The US’ Asian allies, while stopping short of developing nuclear weapons, are re-arming themselves to deal with nuclear threats (Australia with nuclear-powered attack submarines, Japan with counter-strike capabilities, and South Korea with submarine-launched ballistic missiles and its public debate on the need to acquire nuclear weapons). They are also seeking to consolidate the US’ nuclear deterrence umbrella in the region.[34] Most ominously, Russia’s nuclear blackmail in its war against Ukraine draws home the vulnerabilities of non-nuclear-weapon states in the face of great-power bullying.
Against this backdrop – and with China’s diplomatic activism – the SEANWFZ States Parties may drop the ‘package deal’ approach to pave the way for China’s accession to the Protocol. After all, it is a common practice that NWSs accede to other NWFZs’ protocols at different points of time.[35] Apart from China’s NSA – which is already covered under its NFU policy – China’s accession would add a legal guarantee that it would not dump radioactive wastes in the zone, exert political pressure on other NWSs to follow suit, and raise the profile of SEANWFZ at a time when “the risk of nuclear weapons use is higher than at any time since the Cold War”.[36]
Yet, China’s accession would raise several legal and policy questions for the SEANWFZ States Parties. First, should China sign the original Protocol or the revised Protocol? Since the original is a non-starter for the remaining NWSs, using the revised Protocol would minimise legal complications when the SEANWFZ States Parties re-negotiate with them in the future. It is also important to ponder the implications of the above-mentioned MoU which would give China a free hand in defining the geographical scope of SEANWFZ in ways that serve its interests, possibly at the expense of those of SEANWFZ States Parties and other NWSs. Last but not least, China’s accession to the Protocol would be a strategic and diplomatic win for Beijing in its enduring quest to displace external military power from the region. In the final analysis, China values SEANWFZ not only because it is a regional non-proliferation regime per se but because its terms serve China’s strategic security in discrediting the nuclear forward deployment by foreign powers in China’s near neighbourhood. Now, as before, SEANWFZ States Parties remain confronted with the chasm between their nuclear weapon-free aspirations and their security interests from a balance of power in the region. This is as much a problem of strategic incoherence among the States Parties themselves as it is about their substantive differences with the NWSs.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- In the past five years, a new genre of Chinese drama, xianxia (仙侠), has been rising in popularity in Southeast Asia. This genre combines Chinese mythology and culture with fantasy and action and has been very well-received by Southeast Asian audiences.
- While xianxia finds its roots in wuxia (武侠), the distinctive differences between the two require that xianxia be regarded as a genre of its own. However, the interchangeable use of the two terms on drama ranking sites has led to criticisms that xianxia is unable to live up to wuxia’s legacy. Nonetheless, the phenomenal popularity of xianxia should not be underestimated.
- Two reasons for its popularity in Southeast Asia are xianxia’s status as a hybrid cultural product constructed to appeal to regional audiences, and the recent foray of Chinese streaming services into Southeast Asia.
- However, the popularity of xianxia is threatened by domestic restrictions in China, such as crackdowns on online literature websites – from where many xianxias were adapted – and tighter regulations in 2021 on how men should be portrayed on-screen.
- Nonetheless, the continued popularity of xianxia in Southeast Asia has led to further China-Southeast Asian collaborations in entertainment and in other East-Asian countries picking up on the trend. Thus, it appears that China’s foray into regional popular entertainment will only continue to grow.
*Gwendolyn Yap is Research Officer under the Regional, Social & Cultural Studies Program at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/44, 29 May 2023
INTRODUCTION
On 21 September 2019, a 9,000-strong crowd eagerly watched the stage of IMPACT Arena, Bangkok, Thailand.[1] They were not there for K-pop stars or for Japanese celebrities. Instead, they were awaiting the leading cast of The Untamed (陈情令), a Chinese xianxia (仙侠) drama. Earlier in 2019, this 50-episode Chinese xianxia was released on Chinese online streaming site, Tencent Video. It swept domestic and regional markets, ranking first in popularity among 631 web dramas from 2019 to 2020 at the 8th China Internet Audio and Video Convention.[2] The wildfire of The Untamed did not leave Southeast Asia unscathed, having garnered 106 million views in the region.[3] Due to its popularity in Southeast Asia, a world tour for the cast of The Untamed was announced, with Bangkok being the first stop, followed by Vietnam, Singapore and Malaysia. Unfortunately, this was derailed due to the pandemic.[4]
By 2021, two years after its initial release, The Untamed had acquired 9.8 billion views on Tencent Video.[5] The success of The Untamed heralded a new wave of Chinese xianxia dramas, with the genre producing 13 new dramas in the second half of 2022, and 16 drama releases projected for release in 2023.[6] These new dramas have been made available on regional streaming sites such as Netflix, Disney+, WeTV and iQiYi, to feed the demand.[7] Like the Korean wave of the 2000s that has now translated into a tool of soft power for the Korean government[8], this surge in xianxia’s popularity represents a potential source of soft power for China. Specifically, xianxia dramas were born out of China’s push to globalise its entertainment industry, following in the footsteps of Korea’s success[9]. However, with the Chinese state moving to regulate xianxia’s production domestically, complications regarding the spread of Chinese soft power arose.
Xianxia’s popularity in Southeast Asia raises two important questions: First, how and why did xianxia reach this level of popularity in Southeast Asia? Second, what does this sudden popularity bode for China’s regional soft power?
WHAT EXACTLY IS XIANXIA?
Xianxia derives its name from two words, shenxian (神仙) and xia (侠). Shenxian broadly refers to gods, demons and immortals in the Chinese mythological realm, while xia refers tales of wuxia (武侠),the hero-warrior figure. Xianxia merges the characteristics of the two terms in its literature, broadly positioning the immortal as the hero-warrior who overcomes difficulties to save the world. However, it is not necessary for the titular character of xianxia to be a god or an immortal. Many xianxias feature humans who go on to attain god-like spiritual powers – and even immortality – through ‘cultivation’ (修炼 xiulian).
Sharing the root concept of a hero-warrior triumphing over evil, xianxia and wuxia are often conflated on drama ranking pages, making it difficult to distinguish between them.[10] However, xianxias carry distinctive differences from wuxias and should be viewed as a separate phenomenon of its own (see Table 1). Indeed, its predecessor, wuxia, has been highly popular in Southeast Asian markets since the 1930s, carrying a long and rich tradition that cannot be easily subsumed under the more recent phenomenon of xianxia.[11]
Table 1: Differences between Xianxia and Wuxia [12]
| Characteristics | Wuxia | Xianxia |
| Focus | Physical action | Magic and fantasy action |
| Characters | Working-class descent | Noble/deity descent |
| Dramatisation | Historical realism | Historical aestheticism |
| Thematic Concerns | Violence/loyalty/brotherhood | Romance/beauty/loyalty |
| Authors | Dominated by men | Dominated by women |
From the table above, one could say that xianxia is an extension from, not a continuation of wuxia. Despite the differences in content, the interchangeable labelling of the two genres has led to criticism that xianxia is unable to live up to the legacy of wuxia. Critics declare the jianghu（江湖） – the alternate realm that wuxia novels are set in – dead,[13] regarding xianxias to not be worthy enough to continue the complex world-building that the wuxia classics embarked so elegantly upon. Others bemoan the superficiality of xianxia, either in its overly romantic storytelling or its hyper-focus on good-looking actors.[14] Despite these criticisms, the explosive popularity of xianxia reflects an appeal that cannot be taken lightly. The next section will look at the possible reasons for the regional attractiveness of xianxia.
THE RISE OF XIANXIA IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
The popularity of xianxia in Southeast Asia can be attributed to two factors. First of all, xianxia is a hybrid cultural product that appeals to regional audiences. Secondly, the recent foray of Chinese streaming services into Southeast Asia coincided with the heightened attention paid to the xianxia phenomenon.
As mentioned, xianxia is a product of “cultural mixing”, and this cements its appeal to Southeast Asian audiences. “Cultural mixing” is a term used to denote how different cultures merge through the processes of production and adaptation to generate new products that transcend national borders.[15] In xianxia’s case, it originated through a blend of Japanese and Chinese cultural influences to be later translated on-screen through Korean-influenced production processes.
In the previous section, it was mentioned that xianxia originated from web novels. These web novels are published on online literature websites such as Jinjiang (now partially owned by Tencent) and JJWXC. These websites often featured fan fiction written in the danmei (耽美) style that originated in Japan as yaoi (Boys’ Love). Featuring homoerotic relationships between men, the genre spilled over into China from Japan as early as the 2000s.[16] Danmei, meaning “indulgence in beauty”, features the leads as aesthetically beautiful and desirable,[17] and displaying traits contrary to traditional expectations of gender. The web novels reinterpreted Chinese classics and wuxias into danmei novels for a dominantly female readership. Over time, it was this combination of influences that gave birth to the aesthetic-focused hybrid, xianxia.
Xianxia combines the elements of aesthetic beauty sought by danmei writers and the tales about loyalty, the triumph of good over evil, and justice as modelled by wuxia. In fact, The Untamed is one such homoerotic xianxia adapted from the online web novel, Grandmaster of Demonic Cultivation (魔道祖师). In contrast to its origins, however, xianxia is not exclusively confined to homosexual relationships, and often features heterosexual couples in storytelling. TV adaptations of xianxias featuring heterosexual couples include Love Between Fairy and Devil (苍兰诀) and Eternal Love (三生三世十里桃花). Both have garnered high viewership domestically and regionally.
If the xianxia web novel is a mixing of Chinese wuxia and Japanese danmei, then the drama adaptation is a product formed through the addition of Korean production aesthetics. Following the success of the Korean drama My Love from the Stars (2013) in China, the Chinese media industry sent delegates to Korea to learn from the “‘success story’ of the Korean Wave”, sparking a tide of collaboration between Korea and China on production know-how.[18] This led to the globalisation of drama production in China, aimed at attracting external audiences and bolstering Chinese soft power. Through these collaborations, many Chinese studios began not only to adapt dramas from Korea for their local audiences but to produce original stories for global consumption. The xianxias is a result of this.
Indeed, the ability of xianxia to introduce traditional Chinese culture and mythology to a global audience aligns with the ambition of the state to increase the reach of its soft power.[19] Love Between Fairy and Devil, a xianxia that garnered 1st place in global popularity rankings four hours after its release,[20] had 32 intangible cultural heritage traditional crafts presented, and 27 intangible cultural heritage craftsmen working on the show.[21] Thus, through cultural mixing, xianxia not only makes itself palatable to Southeast Asian audiences but provides enough uniqueness to set it apart from dramas produced by Japan and Korea.
Secondly, the accessibility and affordability of Chinese streaming services in the region contribute to the popularity of xianxia. From 2019 to 2020, Tencent – one of China’s biggest tech companies – rolled out WeTV in Southeast Asia. WeTV is the international streaming arm of Tencent Video, the service responsible for releasing The Untamed to critical success. It is unsurprising therefore that The Untamed saw a surge in popularity in Southeast Asia in the same duration, reportedly achieving 250% growth for Tencent after the drama was made accessible through WeTV.[22]
During its initial entry into the Thai market, WeTV only offered original Chinese content with Thai dubbing.[23] After acquiring iFlix, the second biggest regional streaming service next to Netflix,[24] Tencent expanded to include Thai, Vietnamese and Indonesian subtitles to cater to regional audiences.[25] This expansion indicates that the reach of the Chinese streaming market has gone beyond that of the ethnic Chinese community to non-Chinese audiences in Southeast Asia.
To date, WeTV is one of the Top 3 OTT service providers in Southeast Asia,[26] taking up 10% of viewership regionally and coming in third to competitors Disney+ and Netflix.[27] On regional streaming services, 13% of content across all platforms are Chinese. It is worth noting, however, that Netflix – the largest viewing site regionally – also contracted popular Chinese xianxias for viewing, hence reducing the incentive for audiences to cross streaming platforms to view Chinese dramas.
OBSTACLES TO THE POPULARITY OF XIANXIA
While the Chinese state has largely encouraged the export of Chinese dramas to Southeast Asia, the xianxia genre has suffered domestic restrictions that threaten its status as a viable cultural product in Southeast Asia. The sanctions slapped against it include crackdowns on online literature websites – from which many xianxias were adapted – and tighter regulations in 2021 on how men should be portrayed on-screen.
The online literature websites from which xianxia dramas are drawn are highly popular in China, and in 2020 registered altogether over 460 million readers.[28] In 2019, tightening online regulation by the Chinese government called for these websites to remove obscene literature from their platforms. Obscene literature refers to materials with sexual or LGBTQ content.[29] This meant that many xianxia stories built around homoerotic relationships are now inaccessible through these websites. While it can be argued that many xianxia novels remain permissible due to the fact that what they depict are heterosexual relationships, the ban effectively limits the pool of inspiration that xianxia dramas are adapted from. The irony is not lost on commentators who have observed that queer content are proven successful money-makers for streaming giants. However, its heavy reliance on the capital provided through adaptation means that these contents are now often swept under the rug as state regulations kick in.[30]
The second obstacle to xianxia’s popularity is the portrayal of men on-screen. In 2021, China’s National Radio and TV Administration released a series of guidelines targeted the entertainment industry. The third clause states that artists are not allowed to be ‘sissy’ (娘炮), and have to adhere to a ‘proper beauty standard’ (正确审美导向).[31] While the terms remain vague, the statement suggests that effeminate portrayals of men are discouraged. These include having men having delicate or graceful mannerisms or acting in any manner not regarded as stereotypically masculine.[32] This further limits the production ability of xianxia dramas, which now have to factor in the effeminateness of their costumes, actors and mannerisms. This poses a problem as xianxia’s main draw are good-looking, delicate-featured actors preferred by the dominantly female audience. Directors of xianxia dramas even acknowledge that good looks are of priority over the skillset of the actors when it comes to casting.[33]
However, the extent of these restrictions on xianxia production for a global audience remains uncertain. As streaming companies host differing applications for their domestic and international audience – for instance, Tencent Video caters to Chinese audiences while WeTV is internationally directed – what may impact the domestic market may not affect the international market. Nonetheless, as China’s cultural image heavily relies on its portrayal through international channels, this image cannot stray too far from what is presented domestically, making the future of xianxias uncertain.
THE SHOW GOES ON
While domestic restrictions remain a central concern for xianxia adaptations, exported xianxia dramas have recorded a spike in production in the past and upcoming years. This indicates that the continued demand for xianxia outweighs the problems brought on by domestic censorship, reinforcing the notion that soft power is often societally driven and not state-motivated. Indeed, xianxia dramas have opened doors for China-Southeast Asia collaboration in entertainment. After WeTV’s success in establishing itself in the region using xianxia, it has moved to draft partnerships with production companies in Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines to produce local content under WeTV Originals. It has also begun to open doors for regional advertisers on their streaming app.[34]
iQiyi, a rival Chinese streaming service, inked a collaboration with Singaporean company G.H.Y Culture to produce short drama series for Singaporean viewers[35] and has signed with Astro Malaysia to stream Chinese dramas for Malaysian viewers. These collaborations might allow production companies to sidestep Chinese restrictions and offer certain content – such as those relating to LGBTQ+ and other sensitive issues – for a global audience. With the increasing number of collaborations between regional production companies and their Chinese counterparts, it will not be surprising if examples of Southeast Asian xianxia appear in the near future.
The genre’s popularity is also not lost on other East Asian countries, and Korea has released its own xianxia-esque drama on Netflix, titled Alchemy of Souls.[36] Though it represents a relatively new genre for Korea, it has been very well-received by Korean and Southeast Asian audiences, ranking Top 10 on Netflix for an average of 25 consecutive weeks across Southeast Asian countries.[37] This suggests that Chinese production companies face competition from their better-established East Asian counterparts, and should not take their recent popularity for granted.
While xianxias gain more attention in the region, how it will benefit China and Chinese policymakers remains unclear. However, from the continued growth of Chinese TV shows in the region and the increased demand for new xianxias, it appears that China’s rise in popular entertainment in the region will only continue.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Move Forward Party (MFP) scored a surprise victory in the Thai general election on 14 May. It has announced the formation of an eight-party coalition with 313 MPs, a very comfortable majority in the 500-member House of Representatives.
- However, at least 376 votes are needed to win the premiership for the leader, 42-year-old Pita Limjaroenrat. His coalition is thus short of 63 votes.
- The premiership race will be convened in a joint parliamentary session attended by 500 MPs and 250 Senators. Most of the Senators are conservatives and pro-establishment, and will be very reluctant to support Pita, especially since his party advocates reforming the monarchy and cutting military spending.
- Pita also faces a serious legal issue concerning his possession of 42,000 shares in an inactive television firm, the iTV. The Constitution prohibits anyone holding shares of newspaper or other mass media from running for a parliamentary seat or holding the premiership.
- If found guilty, Pita will be disqualified from holding an MP seat in the House of Representatives, as well as contesting for the next premiership.
- If Pita falls, Pheu Thai, which came second in the general election, will have a golden opportunity instead to lead a new coalition, perhaps even working with some parties from the Prayut Administration under the guise of national reconciliation.
*Termsak Chalermpalanupap is Visiting Fellow and Coordinator of the Thailand Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/43, 25 May 2023
INTRODUCTION
After his Move Forward Party (MFP) scored a surprise victory in the Thai general election held on 14 May, party leader Pita Limjaroenrat quickly announced his readiness to be the next prime minister of Thailand. He may have spoken too early and too fast.
Coming first in the general election is a remarkable achievement for his young party, winning a tough battle against all odds with fearless but under-armed volunteers. Securing the premiership, however, is a more daunting challenge, a larger war in which Pita looks vulnerable, and might fail.
Teaming with its chief ally, Pheu Thai (PT) Party, the MFP is leading a coalition of eight parties[1] with 313 MPs in the 500-member House of Representatives. While this gives it a comfortable majority, it is still not strong enough to win the premiership for Pita.
Selection of the prime minister, expected to take place on 3 August, will be done in a joint parliamentary session of 500 MPs and 250 Senators. Here, at least 376 votes of support are needed to win.
Pita thus needs at least 63 supporting votes from outside his coalition. Since he and the MFP do not want to include any parties from the Prayut Administration, they will have to pin their hope on persuading enough Senators to support Pita.
Most of the Senators are conservatives and pro-establishment, chosen in early 2019 by the military regime headed by coup leader General Prayut Chan-o-cha.[2]
One misstep of the MFP is to nominate only Pita as its premiership candidate. Should he fail to gather enough votes to win the premiership, the MFP cannot put forth another premiership candidate of its own.
In that case, the PT can then step in to offer one of its three candidates[3] for the next round of the premiership race. It may be Paetongtarn Shinawatra, 36, daughter of exiled former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, or real estate tycoon Srettha Thavisin, 59. The PT’s third candidate is former justice minister Chaikasem Nitisiri, 75, who has been unwell and hospitalised.
Should no one from the PT get enough votes to win the premiership, the PT may seize the opportunity to lead a new coalition by ditching the MFP, and turning to work with some government parties in order to attract support from the Senators. Such an alternative coalition can have up to 290 MPs, sizeable enough to rule as a majority coalition government.[4]
If no one wins the premiership even then, such a new PT-led coalition can propose looking for an “outsider”[5] who is acceptable to most Senators to come in as its new choice for the premiership.
In the end, the MFP will be isolated for not wanting to be in any coalition that includes government parties from the Prayut Administration. Consequently and ironically, instead of becoming the 30th Thai prime minister, Pita may end up being the Opposition Leader.
PITA’ S QUALIFICATION QUESTIONED
Before he can win the premiership, Pita will have to defend his qualification to be an MP first.
The Election Commission has been examining a complaint against Pita for allegedly failing to dispose of his holding of 42,000 shares in iTV, a television station which has stopped broadcasting since 8 March 2007. But iTV has not been dissolved as a media business entity due to a pending lawsuit to seek compensation of 2,890 million baht from the Office of the Permanent Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Office for cancelling their broadcasting agreement.[6]
Section 98 (3) of the Constitution prohibits anyone owning or holding shares in any newspaper or mass media business from running for election to the House of Representatives. If the Election Commission finds enough evidence against Pita, it will send the complaint to the Constitutional Court for a ruling. If found guilty, Pita will be disqualified from holding an MP seat in the House of Representatives, and from contesting for the next premiership. Pita’s predecessor, Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit, leader of Future Forward Party, was disqualified from the House membership after the Constitutional Court ruled in November 2019 that he had failed to properly dispose of his shares in V-Luck Media, an obscure variety magazine.
By mid-July, after certifying the election of all 500 MPs, the Election Commission is then expected to announce its consideration on the complaint against Pita. MFP supporters are now concerned that Pita might suffer a fate similar to Thanathorn’s.[7]
Thanathorn’s party was subsequently dissolved in February 2020 for illegally borrowing about 191.2 million baht from Thanathorn, a motor spare parts business tycoon. The Constitutional Court deemed such borrowing unlawful, since the party then exposed itself to financial control by Thanathorn. After the dissolution of Future Forward, the MFP was set up as a successor party, with Pita as its new leader.[8]
THE RUNNER-UP IN CONTROL
All opinion polls had consistently predicted that the PT would win the largest number of House seats. This emboldened the PT to campaign for a big “landslide victory” of winning up to 310 House seats, which would have allowed it to form a single-party government on its own.
Being beaten by the MFP came as a shock to many in the PT leadership. PT leaders have started doing an urgent soul-searching exercise in order to “rebrand” the party.
However, the PT, with 141 House seats, is actually in a better position than the MFP, which has 152 MPs. The PT has the flexibility of working with some parties in the Prayut Administration; whereas the MFP has rejected working with all parties in the previous government coalition.
If Pita fails to win the premiership, he and his MFP will have no other viable option, except to accept defeat and spend the next four years leading the opposition in the House.
In contrast, the PT can explore more options, including working with General Prawit and his PPRP, which has 41 MPs. General Prawit is known to have good connections in the Senate.[9] And the PT has never ruled out working with Public Health Minister Anutin Charnvirakul’s Bhumjaithai (BJT), which won 70 House seats, making it the third largest party.
Some of these government parties’ MPs, including Anutin, are friends of PT’s senior members. They used to serve Thaksin in his popular Thai Rak Thai Party[10] (1998 -2007).
Even if neither Thaksin’s daughter Paetongtarn nor Srettha wins the premiership, a new PT-led coalition can still look for an “outsider” who may want to step in for the sake of national reconciliation. Most of the Senators would have no objection if the “outsider” is capable and non-partisan.
Being by far the largest party in such a PT-led coalition, the PT can claim a lion’s share of the 35 Cabinet posts as well as the House Speaker post. This is certainly a much better deal for it than staying with an MFP-led coalition, in which the MFP, with 152 MPs, 11 more House seats than the PT, would want to get the House Speaker[11] post, as well as a larger share of the Cabinet posts than the PT.
WHAT ELSE COULD GO WRONG?
The Election Commission has 60 days to certify the outcome of each of the 400 constituencies. After that, it will determine the final allocation of the 100 party-list House seats, based on the total of second ballots each part has received.
In the meantime, the Election Commission will also have to deal with the complaint against Pita, as well as numerous cases of alleged wrongdoings in the election campaign. This will take months.
The House of Representatives can convene its opening session only after up to 475 MPs have been certified by the Election Commission. At the inaugural session, a new House Speaker will be elected by a majority of the MPs.
Here, a competition between the MFP and the PT is expected to take place. The PT wants the crucial parliamentary post for its party leader, Dr Cholnan Sri-kaew. But the MFP needs the post for its own MP to be in control in the House.[12]
One new nightmare of the MFP is a rumour about a “power play” by General Prawit. Under this rumour, General Prawit will dissolve his PPRP and resign. This will enable PPRP’s 41 MPs to join either the PT or the BJT. If only 12 of these 41 MPs join the PT, the PT will become the largest party with 153 MPs – one more MP than the MFP’s 152.[13]
Under this “power play”, the PT can easily team up with the BJT and other government parties to form a new majority coalition. In this case, the MFP will become the opposition leader. This could explain why General Prawit and incumbent PM General Prayut have never formally conceded defeat.
SENATORS AT THE BARRICADE
After the House Speaker has been appointed, the premiership selection can follow suit, after the 250 Senators have been notified.
If the MFP-led coalition falls short of the 376 votes needed to win the premiership for Pita, the House Speaker need not be in a hurry to convene the joint parliamentary for the premiership selection.
On the other hand, the MFP may want to force the issue and proceed with the premiership race in order to compel the 250 Senators to show their hands. Voting for the premiership will be on a roll call, and televised nationwide.
Senator Chalermchai Fuerng-kon, an “independent” representing the government retirees, has cautioned against putting too much pressure on the 250 Senators. From his own estimate, there are fewer than 20 in the Senate who would vote for Pita. When it comes to actual voting in parliament, there may be fewer than 10 – including he himself and a few like-minded Senators, who will support Pita.[14]
Senator Chalermchai’s advice to Pita and the MFP is for them to try to win support from MPs in the government parties. This will be much easier than trying to win the support of Senators. Many Senators have been offended by sharp criticisms from the MFP over the past four years, and many of them also strongly oppose the MFP’s initiative on monarchy reform, which include amending the controversial Section 112 of the Criminal Code, the so-called lese-majeste law.[15]
One of the continuing policy initiatives of the MFP is to amend the law and reduce its penalties, from 3 to 15 years of jail term down to 6 months to 1 year.[16] Most other parties, including the PT, do not want to touch this highly sensitive issue.
As a compromise, the MFP agreed to exclude Section 112 from the list of key common policies under the MOU signed on 22 May by leaders of the eight parties in the MFP-led coalition. But Pita reaffirmed the MFP’s intention to continue as its own party’s initiative to amend Section 112 in the House of Representatives. [17]
The PT has at least one good reason to play safe and avoid touching Section 112 for fear of upsetting pro-establishment conservatives: It wants to facilitate Thaksin’s return to Thailand, after nearly 17 years in exile overseas.
Thaksin announced on 9 May his new “decision” to return to Thailand before his 74th birthday, which will be on 26 July 2023.[18] Thaksin has 10 years of jail term from three convictions of conflict of interest cases awaiting his return. He can first go to jail and request a temporary release on bail while appealing the convictions. Or, better still, he can apply for a royal pardon.
Thaksin has reiterated that he and his Shinawatra clan have always respected the monarchy. And if the PT and the MFP are in government together, he believes the PT would disagree with any PT policy initiatives that could hurt or undermine the monarchy.[19]
‘ZERO PERCENT’ OF ANOTHER COUP
Army Commander General Narongphan Jitkaew-thae has dismissed as “zero percent” the possibility of another coup after the general election.[20] He is however due to retire at the end of September. The political situation in Thailand may heat up later, especially if and when there is a deadlock on the premiership selection.
Even if there is a breakthrough and Pita becomes Thailand’s 30th prime minister, his premiership will face strong resistance in the Senate. Legislation work will slow down if a majority of Senators refuse to cooperate. Without support in the Senate, any attempt at passing a special amnesty law to free all those who have been convicted or arrested for violating Section 112 will fail. Street protests by anti-monarchy groups will then emerge.
On the other hand, if Pita fails and someone else assumes the premiership, his supporters may also take to the streets to vent their frustration. Chaos, clashes, bloodshed, crackdowns, and arrests may be inevitable.
When the country slips into unrest and violence, another military takeover cannot be ruled out. Should unrest in Thai society threaten to undermine the monarchy, then pro-establishment conservatives and royalists would also retaliate. Or worse still, some military leaders might want to take some drastic action to defend the monarchy.
CONCLUSION
The victory of the MFP is an unexpected political earthquake.
But it confirms the known widespread discontent of Thai voters unhappy with the Prayut Administration. And it is also a clear rejection of any return of either of the “Two Uncles”: General Prayut,69, and General Prawit, 78.[21]
However, it is still uncertain whether the new generation of young and idealistic MPs and politicians, led by Pita of the MFP, will be able to govern successfully and peacefully.
In fact, Pita still has to prove that he is fully qualified to hold public office. His possible disqualification will be a serious political after-shock.
The PT is confidently waiting for its turn to lead in forming a coalition, and going for a deal that can guarantee a happy return for Thaksin.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Data trends from the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute’s State of Southeast Asia annual survey carried out between 2019 and 2023 suggest an enduring tendency among the respondents in ASEAN member states to underestimate the United States’ power and influence in the region. The respondents have overwhelmingly identified China not only as the most influential economic power in Southeast Asia, but also as the most influential politically and strategically. Other indicators suggest a more nuanced picture.
- The trends also suggest that ASEAN countries have remained ambivalent about the US’ regional leadership role on multiple fronts. The majority of ASEAN member states generally do not look to the US to champion the global free trade agenda. The US fares slightly better regarding perceptions of its leadership role in upholding a rules-based order and international law but this confidence in the US is not decisive. The European Union is most often looked to as an alternative to US leadership on this front.
- Among the ASEAN6 economies – Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines – confidence in the US as a reliable strategic partner and provider of regional security has been steadily declining since 2021. The decline has been sharpest in Singapore, Vietnam and Indonesia.
- But when forced to choose between China and the US, the region in general has expressed a growing preference to align with the US. However, it is significant that in 2023, respondents from the three Muslim-majority states – Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei – picked China over the US.
- These indicators suggest that there is still a reservoir of goodwill towards the US in the region, but this is being depleted in some countries and cannot be taken for granted. Secondly, many ASEAN countries probably still hope that the US would exercise stronger leadership in the region especially amidst growing anxieties about the rise of China, but there is a clear undercurrent of pessimism and some disillusionment even amongst some of the US’ closest partners about its willingness and commitment to do so.
*Lee Sue-Ann is Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Regional Strategic and Political Studies Programme, and editor at Fulcrum, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. She also directs the Media, Technology and Society Programme at the Institute.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/42, 22 May 2023
INTRODUCTION
Every year since 2019, the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute has been publishing its State of Southeast Asia (SSEA) survey report. This seeks to capture the perceptions of experts and opinion-makers across Southeast Asia on strategic matters. The survey employs a random purposive sampling of over 100 respondents in each of the 10 ASEAN member states – constituting a sample size of around 1,000 respondents ASEAN-wide. A 10% weighting average is then applied to each country’s responses to calculate the regional average to ensure that each country is equally represented, similar to ASEAN’s decision-making process.
Having polled respondents for their perceptions of major power rivalries and the pressing challenges facing the ASEAN region over the last five years, some trends have emerged.
This paper focuses on the data trends surrounding the region’s attitudes towards the United States. It crystallizes some key takeaways on the region’s perceptions of US power and influence in contrast to those that it has on China, views on US leadership on the economic, strategic and political fronts, and levels of trust and confidence in the US. The data used in this paper are drawn from the forthcoming report from the ASEAN Studies Centre at ISEAS on the 5-year data trends from the 2019-2023 SSEA survey reports.
POWER PERCEPTIONS ON THE UNITED STATES AND ON CHINA
Data trends from the SSEA annual survey between 2019-2023 suggest that Southeast Asian countries have a chronic tendency to underestimate the extent of the United States’ power and influence in the region in comparison to China’s. Put differently, the perceptions of China’s overarching dominance in the region appear overblown when more objective indicators are taken into consideration.
Economic Power Perceptions
In the SSEA surveys carried out from 2019 to 2022, more than 75% of ASEAN-wide respondents consistently identified China as the region’s most influential economic power; this figure dipped significantly in 2023 to 59.9% (a clear consequence of China’s extended Covid-19 lockdown). At the same time, the US has consistently polled low scores in this regard, with the percentage of respondents who said the US was the region’s most influential economic power hovering in the single digits — a mean of 7.4%. In 2023, however, that figure rose slightly to 10.5% (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Percentage of survey respondents who identified China or the United States as the region’s most influential economic power
These perceptions should not be surprising, given how often mention of the region’s dependence on China for its economic future is made. It is often reiterated that China is the largest trading partner for the region as a whole, with total trade reaching US$669.2 billion in 2021, and also the top trading partner for all of ASEAN’s member states, save Brunei, whose top trading partner is Singapore.
But it is less often noted that the region runs a widening trade deficit with China. As Stewart Paterson from Hinrich Foundation points out, while ASEAN exports to China have grown, the propensity of China to import from ASEAN remains very low. The natural consequence of this asymmetry has been the widening of ASEAN’s goods trade deficit with China, which grew from US$15 billion in 2011 to US$82 billion in 2020.[1] In contrast, the US, despite having a smaller trading volume with the region (US$364.5 billion in 2021), is still a vital export market for ASEAN goods. In 2021, ASEAN’s goods trade surplus with the US was US$145.9 billion, compared to its goods trade deficit with China of US$107.7 billion that same year.[2] In fact, since 2013, trade with the US has consistently generated the largest surpluses for ASEAN from among its trading partners.
On the FDI front, China’s overall FDI stock in the region, while on the uptrend, still lags that of the US by far. In 2020, the US’ FDI stock in ASEAN was US$328.5 billion.[3] In contrast, China’s outward FDI stock in ASEAN countries as of 2021 was US$140.28 billion.[4] According to statistics from the ASEAN Secretariat, the cumulative value of US FDI investment between 2012 and 2021 was US$198.7 billion, compared to US$98.7 billion for China over the same period. To be sure, while US investments in the region are heavily concentrated in a few countries, with Singapore taking the lion’s share, China’s are spread more widely across the region – contributing to perceptions of China’s outsized influence.
According to data drawn from the Lowy Institute’s Power Index, China has now become the top FDI investor in seven of the ten ASEAN member states. (Table 1) But when considering only the larger economies of the ASEAN6, China is the top FDI investor for three of them – Indonesia (making up 20% of FDI inflows into the country cumulatively from 2012 to 2021), Malaysia (28.5%) and the Philippines (22.2%). For the remaining three countries, the largest FDI source is Japan (for Thailand at 38.8%), the US (for Singapore at 26.8%) and South Korea (for Vietnam at 22.9%).
Table 1: The top FDI investor in each ASEAN member states
(Cumulative FDI inflows from 2012 to 2021)
Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook Database (April 2023) and Lowy Institute Asia Power Index 2023
Political and Strategic Power Perceptions
While regional experts and opinion makers may be excused for exaggerating China’s economic influence in the region, what is more surprising is the region’s pick for the country with the most political and strategic influence in Southeast Asia. Over the past five years, an average of 49% of ASEAN-wide respondents chose China, compared to the mean of 28.1% who recognized the US as the most politically and strategically influential country in Southeast Asia. (Figure 2).
The latter perception is clearly at odds with more objective measures of political and strategic measures of power. According to the Lowy Institute’s Asia Power Index 2023 Edition, the US remains on top in the rankings of Comprehensive Power.[5] In terms of military capability (which takes into account defence spending, armed forces and organization, weapons and platforms, signature capabilities and Asian military posture), the US is ranked first, with an index score of 90.7. China comes second with a relatively low index score of 68.1. Where defence networks and partnerships are concerned, the US is also ranked first, with an index score of 84.6 compared to China, which is ranked 7th with an index score of 23.7. However, in the category of diplomatic influence, China has pipped the US for the top spot with a score of 91.5, compared to the US’ 89.3. This is consistent with the findings of the SSEA surveys which suggest that regional countries think China’s influence is greater than its actual might. As the Lowy Institute Power Index report puts it, the US has been an “underachiever”, seeing how its actual resources and capabilities exceed the extent of its influence.
Figure 2. Percentage of survey respondents who identified China or the United States as the region’s most politically and strategically influential power
TRUST AND CONFIDENCE: PERCEPTIONS OF US LEADERSHIP
The trends from ISEAS’ SSEA survey offer some clues as to why the US has been “underachieving” in regional influence. In general, the region has been ambivalent and unconvinced about the US’ leadership role on multiple fronts.
A majority of ASEAN member states generally do not look to the US to champion the global free trade agenda. Over the past four years, ASEAN respondents have, on average, tended not to consider the US as the country in which they have most confidence in upholding the global free trade agenda (except in 2022) – preferring instead to pick the EU and ASEAN for that spot. (Table 2) In 2023, the only countries whose respondents cited the greatest confidence in the US’ leadership on this issue were Myanmar (53%), the Philippines (30.3%) and Vietnam (33.8%). The erosion of confidence in US leadership on the trade front is most likely driven by its clear protectionist turn over the years. The US’ longstanding tussles with the WTO Appellate Body and Washington’s efforts to limit the scope of its jurisdiction in ruling on trade disputes are seen as clear instances where the US privileged its national interests over global trade rules.[6] The US’ tightened investment screening regimes in critical technologies (as reflected in its CFIUS regulations and CHIPS Act) will probably also intensify concerns that US trade and investment flows into the region would increasingly be driven by its own national security and ‘friend-shoring’ considerations.
Table 2: Percentage of survey respondents who had the most confidence in the following countries and/or regional organizations to champion the global free trade agenda
The US fares slightly better regarding perceptions of its leadership role in upholding a rules-based order and international law – but the region’s confidence in the US on this matter is not decisive. The European Union is most often looked to as an alternative to US leadership on this front. In 2020 and 2021, respondents across ASEAN tended most often to cite the European Union as the entity in which they had most confidence in upholding the global rules-based order. In 2022 and 2023, it was the US that was most often cited – though its average score saw a large dip from 36.6% in 2022 to 27.1% in 2023. (Table 3) In 2023, only five of the 10 ASEAN members states had the most respondents indicating confidence in US leadership on this front – these were Cambodia (48.5%), Myanmar (52.2%), the Philippines (36.4%), Singapore (31.3%) and Vietnam (39.7%). Quite evident in the trends are the ‘Trump effect’ and ‘Biden effect’ which saw confidence in US leadership plunge during the Trump years and spike upwards following the election of Joe Biden.
Table 3: Percentage of survey respondents who had the most confidence in the following countries and/or regional organizations to provide leadership in maintaining the rules-based order and upholding international law
However, data also suggest that the pessimism about US leadership cannot just be attributed to the disruptive impact Trump had. The latest SSEA survey results suggest that the Biden effect has been short-lived. Confidence levels in the US have generally dipped sharply from their peak in 2022. In 2023, only three of the ten ASEAN member states had a majority of respondents having either full confidence or confidence in the US as a strategic partner and provider of regional security – these were Cambodia (76.9%), Myanmar (53%) and the Philippines (62.2%). Significantly, among the ASEAN6 countries – Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines – there has since 2021 been a steady decline in confidence in the US as a reliable strategic partner and as provider of regional security. The declines have been sharpest in Singapore, Vietnam and Indonesia (Figure 3).
Figure 3. Percentage of respondents who had full confidence or confidence in the US as a strategic partner and provider of regional security
IF FORCED TO CHOOSE: US LEADERSHIP STILL PREFERRED
But when forced to choose between China and the US, the region in general has expressed a growing preference to align with the US, a clear reflection of the growing anxieties regional countries have over China’s rise and perceptions of its growing assertiveness. In the SSEA 2020 edition which first posed the question “If ASEAN were forced to align itself with one of the two strategic rivals (the US or China), which should it choose?”, the answers were fairly evenly split – with 50.2% of the ASEAN-wide respondents choosing the US, and 49.8% choosing China.
Over the years, the region’s preference to align with the US has steadily strengthened – and in 2023, 61.1% of respondents said that ASEAN should align with the US, while just 38.9% chose China. (Figure 4)
Figure 4. Percentages of ASEAN-wide survey respondents who say ASEAN should choose the US or China if forced to align with one of the two strategic rivals
However, what is particularly significant about the 2023 survey is that only the Muslim-majority states in ASEAN picked China over the US – 53.7% of respondents from Indonesia said ASEAN should align with China, while among the Malaysians and Bruneians, 54.8% and 55% respectively indicated likewise. (Figure 4 a, b, c) Several factors probably account for this result. Firstly, the preference to align with China is likely a clear reflection of the perceptions of China’s growing economic influence in their respective countries. China has become the top FDI investor for all three countries. But also salient are the strong undercurrents of anti-US and anti-West sentiments in these countries, which are probably also shared among the elites and policymakers. These are driven by longstanding perceptions of the US bias against the Muslim world on hot-button issues like the Palestinian cause and resentment against US exceptionalism and perceived double-standards in global affairs.
Figure 4a. Percentages of survey respondents from BRUNEI who say ASEAN should choose the US or China if forced to align with one of the two strategic rivals
Figure 4b. Percentages of survey respondents from INDONESIA who say ASEAN should choose the US or China if forced to align with one of the two strategic rivals
Figure 4c. Percentages of survey respondents from MALAYSIA who say ASEAN should choose the US or China if forced to align with one of the two strategic rivals
WHAT SHOULD THE US DO?
These indicators telegraph a particular message to the US. They suggest that while there is still a reservoir of goodwill towards the US in the region, this is being depleted in some countries and cannot be taken for granted. The data also suggest that many ASEAN countries probably still hope that the US would exercise stronger leadership in the region especially amidst growing anxieties about the rise of China – but there is a clear undercurrent of pessimism and some disillusionment even amongst some of the US’ closest partners about US willingness and commitment to do so.
Over the years, when ASEAN respondents were asked whether they are confident that the US would “do the right thing” for global peace, security, prosperity and governance, more respondents in most countries would say that they were confident in the US rather than not confident. But it is clear that among the ASEAN6 countries, there have been significant drops in confidence in all six countries except the Philippines, where confidence in the US seems to be steadily rising (Figure 5).
Figure 5. Percentages of respondents who believe that US will “do the right thing” to contribute to global peace, security, prosperity and governance
Figure 6. Reasons why survey respondents who had indicated confidence in the US trust the US
Source: The State of Southeast Asia 2023 Survey Report, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, p. 53
When asked why they trust the US, it is significant that ASEAN respondents in the 2022 and 2023 surveys overwhelmingly refer to the US’ power and resources, and not to the US’ political culture or worldview (Figure 6). It is also significant that the topmost reason why ASEAN respondents say they have little confidence in the US is their concern that the US is too distracted with its internal affairs and thus cannot focus on global concerns.
This suggests that one of the most important things the US can do to improve its credibility and stature in the region is to get its domestic house in order. And until it does, the US should also recognize which buttons not to press – values-driven foreign policy rhetoric cuts little ice, not least because it elicits cynicism and a backlash of criticisms about hypocrisy and double-standards. As the data suggest, the region is looking to US leadership not because it believes in US culture, values and worldviews but because of nagging anxieties about China’s rise and a hope that the US would still be able to bring its political, economic and military resources to bear and provide a balance of power in the region. Evidently, many in the region still want to see the United States strong again.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |