EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The “Three ‘Por’ Group” of three former army chiefs, which seized power in the 2014 coup, is falling apart.
- Two of the three, Palang Pracharat party leader General Prawit Wongsuwan and Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-o-cha, are vying for the premiership in a cut-throat competition.
- The rivalry between the two generals is intensifying, and this will make the upcoming general election in Thailand more tenacious, and its outcome less predictable.
- General Prawit has the political edge because his party, the largest in the ruling coalition, has many experienced MPs who can win re-election with their strong political networks. He also has more powerful allies and fewer political enemies.
- General Prawit’s new selling point is to move Thailand beyond the existing political polarisation. He has tried to distance himself from the 2014 coup and from General Prayut, whom his party successfully nominated to capture the premiership after the last general election.
- After breaking up with General Prawit, General Prayut joined a new party, United Thai Nation. That party is trying to woo MPs from other parties, but lacks a clear potent selling point to attract support.
- The end of the political domination of the “Three ‘Por’ Group” augurs well for Thai democracy. Now, two of the three strongmen from this group are appealing for support from Thai voters, instead of holding onto power through political machinations.
* Termsak Chalermpalanupap is Visiting Fellow and Coordinator of the Thailand Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/14, 27 February 2023
INTRODUCTION
Political dominance by the group of three former army chiefs – the so-called “Three ‘Por’ Brothers”[1] – in Thailand is coming to an end. This augurs well for the political future of the country where parliamentary democracy has been faltering since the end of the Siamese absolute monarchy in 1932.
The main cause of the continuing failure of Thai democracy was and still is the delusion entertained by a handful number of army generals who think that they can run a government administration better than their civilian compatriots. The Thai military has little tolerance for the chaos of parliamentary politics, and no respect for most politicians, whom they see as mostly corrupt and self-serving.
Big Brother General Prawit Wongsuwan, a deputy prime minister and the leader of Palang Pracharat Party (PPRP), the largest government party, now wants the premiership for himself. He and his PPRP will no longer support Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-o-cha in the upcoming general election.
However, General Prayut feels he still has some significant unfinished business to finish, and thus he wishes to stay in power for at least another two years, until the end of his 8-year eligibility to hold the premiership, in mid-2025. Therefore, he has joined a new party, United Thai Nation (UTN), as its chief strategist, and will be its No.1 candidate for the premiership.
The rivalry between these two former army chiefs is a crucial change for the better in Thai politics. The two strongmen are now courting voters’ support to return to power, instead of seizing it with military force and holding onto power through political machinations.
Meanwhile, the middle brother in this triumvirate, Interior Minister General Anupong Paojinda has claimed that he has had enough of Thai politics, and intends to retire to a quiet peaceful life when his time in the current Prayut Administration is over. He has dismissed speculations of him joining the UTN, saying that he considers himself “unsuitable” to continue in Thai politics.[2]
Whether or not General Anupong will actually wash his hands of politics remains to be seen. He has accepted his recent appointment to the 5-member Committee on National Strategy, which is led by Deputy Prime Minister Dr Wissanu Krea-ngam.[3]
THE MAY 2014 COUP
General Prayut, when the army chief, led the coup on 22 May 2014 to seize power from the civilian government of the Pheu Thai-led coalition.[4] Fifteen days prior to the coup, Prime Minister Yingluck Sinawatra had to step down following a decision against her in the Constitutional Court for abuse of power.[5] Yingluck is a younger sister of exiled former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who had also been toppled in another coup on 19 September 2006.[6]
The coup in 2014 saw the emergence of the Three “Por” Generals to control both the Thai polity and the Thai military. They established the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), with General Prayut as the head of the junta, and General Prawit as the deputy head.
Political parties were banned from undertaking any political activity. Critics and protest leaders were either arrested, or summoned to army barracks to listen to NCPO’s reasons for the coup and its promises of an early return of happiness to the Thai people.
Under the 2014 Interim Constitution, a new National Legislative Assembly (NLA) was set up with 250 members handpicked by the NCPO. It was chaired by Dr Pornpetch Wichitcholachai, a law professor, who in 2019 became president of the new Senate.
General Prayut also assumed the post of prime minister in September 2014. General Prawit became a deputy prime minister and defence minister; and General Anupong took over the post of interior (home affairs) minister, which supervises all of Thailand’s provincial governors.
Before long, the three generals realised they would need much more time to create real “happiness” for the Thai people. Thus, a new constitution had to be designed to enable them to continue holding onto power by constitutional means.
NEW CONSTITUTIONAL FOR POWER SUCCESSION
At first, a new comprehensive draft constitution was formulated by a group led by Dr Borwornsak Uwanno, a respected jurist and a deputy president of the NLA. Unfortunately, the NCPO disliked the draft and signalled the NLA leadership to scuttle it in September 2015. Dr Borwornsak later lamented that his draft constitution could not ensure a “long stay” of those in power, and thus it was rejected.[7]
A new smaller group was formed to draft a new constitution. Led by Dr Meechai Ruchupan, another senior jurist and a former acting-prime minister, its new draft was finally accepted by the NLA on 7 April 2016.
For a national referendum on the new draft constitution on 7 August 2016, the NLD laid down a set of guidelines, which included banning public rallying to oppose the draft constitution. The NLA also included for the national referendum a subsidiary question on whether or not 250 senators appointed to the Senate should be empowered to join elected MPs in the House to vote for a new prime minister after each general election during the Senate’s first five-year term.
The NPCO urged voters to accept the draft constitution as it was only a temporary measure, so that a general election could be held sooner. After that, the new elected civilian government could amend the constitution to make it more palatable to all parties concerned.
The national referendum approved the draft constitution with a vote of 61.35% (from about 16.8 million voters); and agreed with a vote of 58.07% (from about 15.1 million voters ) to let the 250 appointed senators join MPs in voting for a new prime minister.
However, after the draft constitution went into force on 6 April 2017, it quickly became clear that amending the new constitution would be more difficult than previously assumed. In order to approve a proposed constitutional amendment, the support of at least a majority of the combined membership of the House and the Senate is required; and the majority vote must include at least one-third of the existing senators, as well as 20% of MPs from parties whose members do not hold any cabinet posts or the posts of House Speaker and Deputy House Speaker.[8]
2019 GENERAL ELECTION
Pheu Thai (PT) Party came first in the general election on 24 March 2019, but it failed to win the subsequent premiership race in parliament. The PT was handicapped by the NCPO’s two political innovations: the single ballot election designed to hobble large popular parties, and the involvement of the 250 senators in the premiership selection.
In the 2019 general election, each voter cast only one ballot to elect a constituency candidate. All votes collected by all candidates of a party went to determining the party’s share of the 150 party-list seats in the House of Representatives. Crucially, the allocation also took into account how many House seats a party “deserved” to have, based on the total of its candidates’ collected votes as a percentage of the total votes cast in the general election.
The PT’s candidates won 136 constituency seats with a total of about 7.88 million votes – which constituted about 22.16% of the grand total of votes. Based on this number, the PT “deserved” to have only 110 MPs in the House (22% of 500 House seats). Since its candidates had already won altogether 136 Houses seats – 26 more than the party deserved to have – the PT did not get any share of the 150 party-list House seats.
One dire consequence of this unexpected outcome was the failure of the entire PT top leadership on the party-list to enter the House as MPs.
The PT-led coalition[9] of seven parties had only 246 MPs, five seats short of a simple majority in the House, while the PPRP-led coalition of 19 parties had 254 MPs.[10] When it came to the premiership race, the PT-led coalition could muster only 244 votes[11] for the opposition’s candidate Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit. General Prayut, who was nominated by the PPRP, easily won with 500 votes – including 249 of the 250 senators’.[12]
The Three “Por” Generals came up with a new division of power-sharing among them: General Prawit would manage the PPRP and control MPs in the ruling coalition; General Anupong would, from his post as the interior minister, supervise all provincial governors and local government administrations; and General Prayut would do the heavy-lifting of running the government administration, including choosing his own appointees to the defence, the home affairs, the finance, and the energy ministries.
However, two crucial flaws in this new arrangement soon soured ties between General Prawit and General Prayut. General Prawit lost to General Prayut both the defence minister post and the job of supervising the national police force.
Moreover, politicians in the PPRP have been griping about their party not getting a fair share of plum cabinet posts despite being the largest in the ruling coalition.[13] And they also resented the alleged indifference of General Prayut to their tedious and thankless job in parliament. Indeed, General Prayut has kept at arm’s length all government MPs, since he himself is neither a member of the PPRP nor an MP.
WIDENING RIFT LED TO MUTUAL DISTRUST
The widening rift between General Prayut and General Prawit’s PPRP came to a head in early September 2021. PPRP secretary-general Captain Thammanat Prompao and his followers were caught planning to join opposition parties in voting out General Prayut from the premiership in a no-confidence debate.
However, Captain Thammanat’s secret plan was leaked, and General Prayut managed to foil the conspiracy and prevail in the no-confidence vote. He quickly retaliated by removing Captain Thammanat from the post of deputy agriculture minister.
Subsequently, in January 2022, Captain Thammanat was “expelled” from the PPRP, together with 20 MPs who chose to join him in a new party, Thai Economic, and to serve as an “independent opposition”. The main charge for the expulsion was a serious breach of the party’s regulations in creating internal disunity.[14]
The expulsion was apparently done by mutual consent between Captain Thammanat and party leader General Prawit. It allowed Captain Thammanat and his followers to leave the PPRP to join a new party without losing their House membership. If they simply resigned from the PPRP, they would have automatically lost their House membership in the process.
Under mysterious circumstances, the PPRP joined the PT to change the election system to increase the number of election constituencies from 350 to 400, and to reduce the number of party-list House seats from 150 to 100. Another crucial change was the return to using two ballots: one for electing a constituency candidate, and another for choosing a party. Second ballot votes will go to determining the allocation of the party-list House seats, but this time the allocation will be by way of a simple direct proportion, i.e. if a party receives 10% of all second ballot votes in the next general election, then the party will get 10 party-list House seats, regardless of how many constituency seats it has won.
These changes will benefit large and well-funded parties like the PPRP and the PT which have resources to field competitive candidates in all the 400 constituencies in the next general election.
One explanation gaining attention in the Thai media is that General Prawit and Thaksin have struck a “secret deal”. After its “landslide victory” in the next general election, the PT will team up with the PPRP to support General Prawit for the next premiership. In return, General Prawit will, for the sake of national reconciliation, help Thaksin return to Thailand after 15 years in exile overseas.[15]
The talks about the “secret deal” sometimes also included Bhumjaithai, the second largest government party. But its leader, Deputy Prime Minister and Public Health Anutin Charnvirakul, has denied having any deal with any other parties. He intends to lead the next government coalition with himself as the prime minister if his party wins 120 House seats or more.[16]
Likewise, leaders of the PPRP and the PT all have publicly denied any such “secret deal”. Nevertheless, it is common knowledge that many senior politicians in the PPRP, the PT, and Bhumjaithai (including Anutin) all used to belong to Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai Party,[17] until the coup in September 2006.
By early January 2023, the widening rift between General Prawit and General Prayut worsened beyond repair. General Prawit announced in an “open letter” posted on his Facebook on 13 January confirming that General Prayut would separate from the PPRP, and join a new party, the UTN.
General Prawit described his mixed feelings as follows: “I had stated [the slogan] “3 ‘Por’ Forever”. I still have the same old feeling without change. …But I just cannot describe my current feeling into words now, except to congratulate him for his decision and to wish him success in his new political path which he has chosen. …”[18]
Nevertheless, General Prawit dropped one bomb shell in his “open letter”. He stated that it was General Prayut who wished to continue doing political work in order to finish what he had started after staging the 2014 coup. Therefore General Prawit had to set up the PPRP to support General Prayut and to nominate him for the premiership.[19]
Earlier, General Prawit had also claimed during a no-confidence debate on 22 July 2022 that the 2014 coup was the brainchild of General Prayut. Neither he nor General Anupong were involved.[20]
TWO GENERALS, ONE PREMIERSHIP
The rivalry between General Prawit and General Prayut for the next premiership will intensify in the upcoming general election. For the time being, General Prawit has the clear advantage of having more MPs in his PPRP, while General Prayut’s UTN is new and untested.
The UTN is frantically trying to woo MPs from other parties, including those in the PPRP – much to the chagrin of the PPRP leadership. So far, Labour Minister Suchart Chom-klin and PM’s Office Minister Anucha Nakasai of the PPRP have shown clear intention to join the UTN.
At the same time, the PPRP has welcomed the return of Captain Thammanat and 10 MPs from his group. Also returning to the PPRP are Dr Uttama Saowanayon and Sonthirat Sonthijirawong. Dr Uttama was the first PPRP leader and a former finance minister while Sonthirat was the first PPRP secretary-general and a former energy minister.
These two political heavyweights had given up on their two-year-old Sarng Anakot Thai Party, partly because of their failure to work out a merger with Thai Sarng Thai (TST) Party led by Khunying Sudarat Keyurapan.
Khunying Sudarat was the PT’s No.1 candidate for the premiership in the 2019 general election. When it was clear that there was no chance of beating General Prayut, the PT turned to endorse the nomination of Future Forward party leader Thanatorn to enter the race for the premiership.
Subsequent power struggles inside the PT eventually forced Khunying Sudarat and her followers to quit the PT, and to join the TST. Khunying Sudarat has had some success in attracting support, especially in north-eastern provinces, at the expense of the PT. One of her potent selling points is to offer the TST as an open-minded new party to overcome the old political polarisation between the PT’s pro-Thaksin camp versus the pro-General Prayut conservative establishment.
Undoubtedly, the PPRP is also going with the same selling point. This was why General Prawit has tried to distance himself from the 2014 coup and coup leader General Prayut, as well as from the feud between General Prayut and Thaksin. Now, General Prawit is avoiding dismissing the possibility of his PPRP collaborating with the PT in forming the next government coalition.
On the other hand, the mutual distain between General Prayut and Thaksin is well-known. General Prayut finds it hard to tolerate the PT’s pro-Thaksin inclination, whereas Thaksin and the PT have ridiculed General Prayut as a usurper and as the enemy of Thai democracy. The possibility of General Prayut’s UTN working with the PT in a new government coalition is nil.
For many politicians who are looking for a sure winning bet, jumping on the political bandwagon of General Prawit and his PPRP is a no-brainer choice. General Prawit clearly has more friends than enemies, unlike General Prayut who has many enemies and few friends.
Worse still, at the UTN, it is still doubtful whether the new party will be able to win up to 25 House seats in order to qualify for putting forth General Prayut’s name in the race for the premiership in parliament after the general election. The party has no new selling point beyond maintaining the status quo of political polarisation and continuity.
It is also unclear how most of the 250 senators will vote, knowing that General Prayut’s eligibility to hold the premiership will end in mid-2025.
CONCLUSION
The end of the “Three ‘Por’ Group” is a welcome change for the better in Thai politics.
The rivalry between General Prawit and General Prayut for the premiership will make the next general election a crucial turning point in Thailand. The outcome of the election will be less predictable, and the formation of the new government coalition will be more complicated.
General Prawit may be enjoying a clear political edge, but it is still premature to jump to the conclusion that he will be the next Thai prime minister.
Uncertainties remain in Thai politics, because General Prayut is determined to soldier on, both in the general election and in the Senate, to hold onto the premiership.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The 15th General Election (GE 15) on 19 November 2022 followed eleven months after the Sarawak state election (SSE), which took place on 18 December 2021. Concerns over the costs of living, education, endemicity of Covid-19, and employment were among the uppermost thoughts of Sarawakians when GE 15 was announced.
- What resulted from GE 15 was a hung parliament at the federal level. In a strange turn of events, BN, with its 30 seats became the kingmaker for Pakatan Harapan (PH). Sarawak also became crucial in providing 23 seats to the unity government.
- The Gabungan Parti Sarawak (GPS) initially pledged its support to Perikatan Nasional (PN) but eventually joined Pakatan Harapan (PH), making Anwar Ibrahim the 10th Malaysian Prime Minister under the decree and suggestion of the Malaysian Agong. Currently, many benefits under the unity government are flowing to Sarawak following its relative increase in importance in federal politics.
- Sarawak is now allowed to use English along with Bahasa Malaysia as its official language. The unity government has also empowered both the Sabah and Sarawak state governments to directly manage federally-funded projects worth RM 50 million and below. The number of ministerial and deputy ministerial positions has also been raised.
- Sarawak Premier, Abang Johari, is now standing on much firmer ground, especially after the victories in SSE 2021 and this election.
* Lee Poh Onn is Senior Fellow and a member of the Malaysia Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. He would like to thank Francis E. Hutchinson and Lee Hwok Aun for comments on an earlier version and Rebecca Neo for producing the map of Sarawak and its constituencies.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/13, 23 February 2023
INTRODUCTION
The 15th General Election (GE 15) on 19 November 2022, followed about one year after the Sarawak state election, which took place on 18 December 2021. Political fatigue was widely expected among voters in this election in Malaysia and in Sarawak. Politicking at the federal level in the past four years, including the Sheraton move that toppled the Pakatan government, had undermined political confidence in the country.[1] In Sarawak, when GE 15 was announced, concerns over the costs of living, education, endemicity of Covid-19, and employment were at the top of voters’ minds.[2] An additional deterrent were the seasonal monsoon rains.[3] These factors eventually dampened voter turnout in GE15 in Sarawak.
What resulted from GE15 was a hung parliament. PN won 73 seats, PH won 82, and BN won 30 out of the total of 221 seats.[4] For a simple majority, a minimum of 112 seats was a prerequisite. PH just needed BN to work with it in order to form this simple majority, but PN needed both BN and Gabungan Parti Sarawak (GPS) to fly past this simple majority.[5] No single coalition had secured enough seats and in a strange turn of events, BN, with its 30 seats became the kingmaker for PH, which had won 82 seats. Sarawak then became crucial in providing additional stability with its 23 seats, and a building block towards the 148 seats needed for a two-thirds supermajority in the Malaysian Parliament.
This perspective will analyse the election outcome in Sarawak and, at the same time, also quickly retrace what immediately happened in Peninsular Malaysia after GE 15. It also provides some observations of the election results in Sarawak. How did GPS and its opposition parties perform? What are the implications of this victory? It then examines developments that took place immediately after GE 15, when no coalition was left with a majority in government. After that, the new dynamics under the unity government are examined.
PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS: GE 15 IN SARAWAK
The 2022 general election (GE15) in Sarawak was a pivotal one for Abang Johari. First, this was watched to see if it would replicate the solid showing of the Sarawak State Election in 2021 (SSE 2021). In SSE 2021, GPS won 76 out of the 82 contested state seats, the opposition Parti Sarawak Bersatu (PSB) won 4, while DAP Sarawak won two seats.[6] There was an expectation that GPS would perform similarly well for GE15 by capturing around 25 of the 31 parliamentary seats. Second, Abang Johari has since 13 January 2017 held the office of Chief Minister of Sarawak – renamed Premier in March 2022.[7] A reduction in the number of seats won in GE15 compared to the number of seats in GE 14 would mean that GPS was losing ground.[8] GPS performed well, however, and secured 23 out of the 31 seats (Table 1 below). This was less than the expected 25 seats but a good indication that GPS had strengthened its electoral position compared to GE 14.
TABLE 1: GE 15 Outcome of GPS Component and Opposition Parties
| Party | Political Party/Component | Seats Contested | Seats Won |
| Gabungan Parti Sarawak (GPS) | PBB (Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu) | 14 | 14 |
| PDP (Progressive Democratic Party) | 4 | 2 | |
| PRS (Parti Rakyat Sarawak) | 6 | 5 | |
| SUPP (Sarawak United People’s Party) | 7 | 2 | |
| GPS Total | 31 | 23 | |
| Pakatan Harapan (PH) | DAP Sarawak (Democratic Action Party – Sarawak) | 8 | 5 |
| PKR (Parti Keadilan Rakyat) | 16 | 1 | |
| PBM (Parti Bangsa Malaysia) | 1 | 1 | |
| PH Total | 25 | 7 | |
| Perikatan Nasional (PN) | Bersatu (Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia) | 3 | 1 |
| PN Total | 3 | 1 | |
| Other Parties and Independents (PSB, PBK, PBDS, Independents) | PBS (Parti Sarawak Bersatu), PBK (Parti Bumi Kenyalang), Sedar, PBDS (Parti Bansa Dayak Sarawak Baru) PBM (Parti Bangsa Malaysia) Independents | 33 | 0 |
| Other Parties and Independents Total | 33 | 0 |
Source and Notes: Compiled from Borneo Post Online, Sabah and Sarawak Results, https://ge15.theborneopost.com/results/index.html. The Star, GE 15, https://election.thestar.com.my/sarawak.html. Both accessed on 28 December 2022. See Appendices 1 to 9 for a detailed breakdown of seats contested by the various candidates.
The average turnout for SSE 2021 was 60.67 percent[9] with 9 out of the 82 seats having a voter turnout of less than 50 percent. Historically, election turnouts in Sarawak have averaged 68 percent.[10] In the recent GE15, turnout in Sarawak was 61.7 percent;[11] lower than the turnout of 72 percent in GE 14 and the long-term average turnout of 68 percent. This was in spite of the 1.943 million registered voters in the state, understood to be around a 59 percent increase over GE 14.[12] In rural constituencies like Kapit, Baram and Limbang, the turnout was 49.9 percent, 50.8 percent and 47.9 percent respectively (Appendices 2 and 3).
The increase in the number of voters with automatic registration and the inclusion of youths 18 years and above did not manage to raise turnout rates in Sarawak. The survey done by Merdeka Study Centre before GE 15, which indicated that only about 40 percent of eligible youths would actually vote[xiii] had proven correct.[14] Generally it is understood that a low turnout would give an edge to GPS, with its established election machinery in getting/transporting voters to the voting centres even in rural areas.[15]
In Sarawak, 15 constituencies had three contesting candidates (three-cornered fights), five had four candidates, and one had five candidates (see Appendices 1 to 9). Out of the 31 seats, seven were marginal victories. From Appendices 1 to 9, it can be seen that multi-cornered fights did dilute the results in some constituencies, notably in Sri Aman (GPS), Kanowit (GPS), Sibu (DAP Sarawak), Miri (PKR), Lubok Antu (GPS) and Julau (PBM).
Out of the seven marginal seats[16] in this election, three belonged to the PRS component of GPS (Sri Aman, Kanowit, and Lubok), two to DAP Sarawak (Stampin and Sibu), one to Parti Keadilan Rakyat (Miri), and one to PBM (Julau). PRS therefore represents the weakest component in GPS. The entry and victory of the PN candidate, Ali Biju in Saratok, is a worrying concern on one level, but this should be placed in context, in that he was a PKR candidate in GE 14 who switched sides to Bersatu in GE 15. The worry however is that he will continue to remain in Bersatu and allow the party to make further inroads into Sarawak.
Abang Johari has maintained the Sarawak parties’ established stance that UMNO not be allowed to not enter the state. In that vein, Bersatu’s decision to contest GE 15 in Sarawak also subverted the norm in Sarawakian politics. Not only would Peninsular race and religion politics be entering into the state through Bersatu, which is a breakaway component of UMNO, but these parties would also be contesting directly against GPS. For example, in this election, Ali Biju of Bersatu contested against Giendam Jonathan Tait of GPS. PAS was however visibly absent in Sarawak this time; Hamdan Sani from PAS who contested in GE 14, now contested under the PN banner in Batang Lupar in GE 15 (see Appendix 1). How this can translate into a less visible entry by PAS into Sarawak (through the PN backdoor) is a matter that should be tracked in future state and general elections.
On the surface, the opposition appears not to have lost too much ground; retaining eight seats in GE15 compared to twelve in GE 14 (see Figure 1 below).[17] However, out of these eight seats, four are marginal. Chong Chien Jen (Stampin seat – DAP – indicated in red) only had a marginal victory against his SUPP opponent, Loh Khere Chiang. Oscar Ling (Sibu seat – DAP – indicated in red) also only had a marginal victory against Clarence Ting of SUPP. The Sarawak-based party PSB did not win any seats despite fielding Wong Soon Koh (in Sibu) and Baru Bian (in Lawas), strong candidates in PSB’s fold. PSB has lost its earlier footing gained during the Sarawak state election a year earlier. Larry Sng (Julau seat – PBM – indicated in green) also only won marginally, his victory diluted in a four-cornered fight.
FIGURE 1: General Election and Winning Party in Sarawak
POLITICAL JOSTLING IN FEDERAL POLITICS AND A RELUCTANT GPS BRIDE
Abang Johari on 23 October 2022 stated that GPS would support the party that can form a strong federal government to ensure political stability and prosperity for Malaysia.[18] Stability was important, Abang Johari pointed out, and a weak administration would only slow down progress and the implementation of projects. This was witnessed in developments which unfolded after the 2018 general election where there were three changes of governments within one parliamentary term. Abang Johari also stated that GPS would support any prime minister candidate who is fair to Sarawak, one who will understand and protect the state’s rights as enshrined in the Malaysia Agreement 1963. Sarawak was fortunate, he added, in that it does not follow the “culture of Malaya” (specifically Peninsular Malaysia’s culture of race and politics), and it will not allow Malayan culture to come into the state. Thus, Sarawak does not want UMNO and Bersatu to come into the state.[19] The drama unfolded in the five days after polling day.
– 20 November 2022
One day after GE 15, Abang Johari announced that GPS had agreed to form a coalitional Federal Government with PN, BN, and Gabungan Rakyat Sabah (GRS). GPS also agreed to support Muhyiddin Yassin as the 10th Prime Minister.[20] The establishment of this coalition government was of course premised on the Federal Constitution, the Sarawak State Constitution, and the sovereignty of laws as enshrined in the Malaysia Agreement 1963 and Inter-Government Committee (IGC) Report.[21] PN, however, needed more than GPS to form a simple majority of 112, as opposed to PH which just needed 30 seats from any party. In retrospect, this announcement by GPS was made on the understanding that BN would also support the PN coalition.
On the same day (20 November), Zahid Hamidi came out to say that BN had not made a decision and had yet to hold any formal talks with GPS on forming a coalition. There had also been no negotiations with PN which could lead to “any understanding on forming a federal government with the coalition.”[22]
– 21 November 2022
BN subsequently held separate meetings with PN and PH. PN did not agree in writing to conditions laid down by BN, including not identifying the unity government to the name of a particular party, the formation of the cabinet, the issue of Islam, Malays and Bumiputera, the royal institution, and the Malay language.[23] PN stated that they were ready to consider the points brought forward by BN while PH agreed to these conditions by BN in writing. PN also rejected the Agong’s suggestion to form a unity government with PH. Muhyiddin also claimed that he had the support of 10 MPs from BN to support his PN government, which Zahid likened to treason as the decision of these 10 MPs was not in line with the party’s stance.
The decision for BN to join the unity government headed by PH, was also in line with the Agong’s decree to form a unity government, and was also not unilaterally made by Zahid Hamidi, as UMNO Supreme Council had agreed to back Anwar as the Prime Minister.[24] In this instance, BN with its 30 seats, effectively became kingmaker in the formation of the Unity Government. Under these fluid circumstances, GPS then came out again to say that it would wait before deciding on who to partner to form a coalition government.[25] It was prudent for GPS to keep out of the political impasse in Malaysia as BN was still undecided on PN or PH as its coalition partner. GPS was still inclined to support Muhyiddin as the new Prime Minister.
– 23 November 2022
On 23 November, GPS was advised by the Agong to consider forming a unity government to end this political crisis and break the deadlock, as PN had refused to join PH to form a unity government. Senior Vice-President of Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu (PBB) Fadillah Yusof who represented GPS for an audience with the King, then conveyed this message to GPS Chairman Abang Johari.[26]
– 24 November 2022
On 24 November 2022, one day after the meeting Fadillah Yusof had with the Agong, GPS Chairman, Abang Johari, announced that GPS had accepted the Agong’s advice on the formation of a unity government at the Federal Level, with Anwar as the 10th Prime Minister.[27] The open apology made personally during a visit by DAP Secretary-General Anthony Loke to the residence of Abang Johari on 24 November 2022 may have worked towards GPS softening its stance towards PH. Following Loke, DAP Chairman, Lim Guan Eng also offered his apology via Facebook.[28] Both apologies were accepted by GPS but DAP Sarawak nevertheless remains an opposition party in the state assembly.[29] Indeed the DAP element in PH was a strong deterrent for GPS to support the unity government under Anwar. It is also understood unofficially that GPS would only support the unity government if no Cabinet positions were given to MPs in DAP Sarawak.[30] The years of being in parties that opposed one another in Sarawak has made it very “complicated” for both parties to now be in coalition in the unity government. This will remain an important issue that needs to be closely followed in the months ahead.
Naturally, mixed feelings were expressed in Sarawak on the proposed move by Abang Johari to join PN. This came from both local social activists and politicians.[31] Abang Johari’s decision to support PN which only had 73 seats as opposed to PH which had 82 seats ran contrary to the principles of majoritarian democracy, according to Denis Hang Bilang. Reservations were also expressed by state assemblyperson and PSB secretary-general Baru Bian on the proposal by GPS to form a coalition with PN (and PAS). Sarawak has a multiracial and multi-religious society which has existed harmoniously and which has to be preserved.[32] The ethnic composition of Sarawak is also distinct from West Malaysia as only 30 percent of the population are Muslim, while 44 percent are Christian.[33] Another social activist however felt that Abang Johari’s decision to support PN was not an individual but a unanimous decision by the four component parties in GPS. GPS as a party wanted to support a strong and stable coalition government, which it felt only PN could deliver. Elsewhere, concerns were also expressed by several retired SUPP politicians on the proposed coalition government with PN (and PAS), as sentiments against PAS in Sarawak are very negative.[34] Moving into digital space, there were three online petitions launched on Change.Org to persuade GPS to reject PN and particularly PAS.[35] These three petitions accounted for more than 50,000 signatures.
Currently, a unity government is in place comprising Pakatan Harapan (82 seats), Barisan Nasional (30 seats), Gabungan Parti Sarawak (23 seats), Gabungan Rakyat Sabah (6 seats), Warisan (3 seats), Parti Bangsa Malaysia (1 seat), Social Democratic Harmony Party (2 seats), and an independent backer from the Kudat Constituency in Sabah (1 seat).
NEW DYNAMICS UNDER ANWAR’S UNITY GOVERNMENT
At the federal level, GPS is in the unity government with DAP Sarawak. At the state level, however, DAP Sarawak remains in the opposition. There is also no formal cooperation inked between GPS and DAP Sarawak under this unity government structure. However, it is understood that at the state assembly level, DAP Sarawak and PH would still take on the task of monitoring affairs of the state.[36] How DAP Sarawak adopts a more conciliatory approach towards GPS at the parliamentary level but remain in the opposition at state assembly meetings will be an interested development to observe. Any untoward or unreasonable behaviour towards GPS at the state level may strain the support given by GPS to the unity government at the parliamentary level. From the stance of GPS, Fadillah Yusof[37] also took pains to remind Sarawakians that GPS is part of the unity government and is not part of the PH government.[38] He also said that GPS has the right to pull its support from the national unity government if state rights were challenged, though it recognises the current support given by Prime Minister Anwar in resolving outstanding issues in the Malaysia Agreement 1963. Anwar has also given the full mandate to Fadillah Yusof to sort out the outstanding claims under this agreement.[39] GPS also only supported this move because it was vital to have a strong and stable national administration, especially now with the appointment to many ministerial and deputy ministerial positions of Sarawakians and GPS in particular.
This time around, GPS managed to secure five ministerial and six deputy ministerial positions under the unity government, in addition to Fadillah Yusof being appointed a Deputy Prime Minister (see Table 2 below). GPS thus has two more positions than it had in Ismail Sabri’s cabinet. Then, GPS only had four ministerial and five deputy ministerial positions. Under the Muhyiddin Yasin cabinet, the party’s position was even weaker. GPS had only four ministerial and four deputy ministerial positions then.
TABLE 2: Ministerial and Deputy Ministerial Cabinet Positions for GPS and its Component Parties
| Component Party/Constituency | Position | |
| Fadillah Yusof | GPS – PBB – Petra Jaya | Deputy Prime Minister and also Minister of Plantation and Commodities |
| Alexander Nanta Linggi | GPS – PBB – Kapit | Minister of Works |
| Nancy Shukri | GPS – PBB – Santubong | Minister of Women, Family and Community Development |
| Tiong King Sing | GPS – PDP – Bintulu | Minister of Tourism, Arts and Culture |
| Aaron Ago Dagang | GPS – PRS – Kanowit | Minister of National Unity |
| Wilson Ugak Kumbong | GPS – PRS – Hulu Rajang | Deputy Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department |
| Hanifah Hajar Taib | GPS – PBB – Mukah | Deputy Minister of Economy |
| Habibillah | GPS – PBB – Limbang | Deputy Minister of Transport |
| Lukanisman Awang Sauni | GPS – PBB – Sibuti | Deputy Minister of Health |
| Rubiah Wang | GPS – PBB – Kota Samarahan | Deputy Minister of Rural and Regional Development |
| Huang Tiong Sii | GPS – SUPP – Sarikei | Deputy Minister of Natural Resources, Environment and Climate Change |
Currently, under the unity government, many benefits are flowing to the state. Sarawak is now allowed to use English along with Bahasa Malaysia as its official language.[40] The unity government has also empowered both the Sabah and Sarawak state governments to directly manage federally-funded projects worth RM 50 million and below. This would mean that around 70 percent of projects in Sarawak can be fully managed and decided over without referral to the federal government.[41] Projects within this range would include schools, clinics, fire stations and other rural projects. The return of autonomy in education and health has already also been agreed to in principle with the details currently being worked out by the federal government.[42] In 2023, Sarawak would also be receiving an increased annual special grant of RM 300 million (previously this only amounted to RM 16 million), and Sabah would be receiving RM 260 million as opposed to RM 26 million previously (Article 122D of the Federal Constitution). It was also reported that a clearer formula will be finalised to calculate the amount of these special grants.[43]
CONCLUSION: WHAT LIES AHEAD?
Post GE 15, Sarawak’s position in federal politics has been strengthened by the appointment of the unity government by Malaysia’s Agong. Abang Johari is now standing on much firmer ground, especially after the victories in SSE 2021 and in this election. A present worry for GPS is PN’s further entry into Sarawak. Sarawak has already been gaining visible benefits from the unity government, for example, larger funding and greater autonomy in managing projects below RM 50 million. It will be interesting to track what further benefits will come to the state and how federal-state dynamics will evolve to benefit the state and raise its investment potential for outside investors.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
APPENDICIES
For appendicies (Appendix 1 to 9), please also refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- While Thailand enjoys self-sufficiency in many of the vaccines it needs, when COVID-19 hit, the country’s R&D preparedness and response were not strong enough to develop vaccines in a timely manner. And amid supply shortages after COVID-19 vaccines were developed, Thailand, like the rest of ASEAN, initially relied on vaccines produced elsewhere.
- Thailand ranks high among ASEAN countries in many indicators of R&D inputs and outputs. However, its R&D and innovation systems are not yet sufficiently developed to translate vaccine R&D inputs into patents that can then lead to new vaccines.
- Public and private pharmaceutical firms in Thailand conduct vaccine R&D in the national immunisation programme in collaboration with universities and research institutes in Thailand and abroad. Thailand is also home to many international and domestic contract research organisations.
- ASEAN has launched several initiatives to strengthen its biomedical R&D infrastructure and human resources, build a network of research centres across the region, and promote cooperation in R&D among ASEAN members, ASEAN’s Dialogue Partners, the United States, and the European Union.
- Thailand and ASEAN can strengthen their vaccine security by pooling and coordinating their financial and scientific resources to address diseases of regional concern.
* Antonio Postigo is Associate Fellow in the Thailand Studies Programme, ISEAS –Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore, and a Visiting Fellow in the Department of International Development, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).
ISEAS Perspective 2023/12, 23 February 2023
INTRODUCTION
Although non-communicable diseases are now the main drivers of mortality and morbidity rates in Thailand, some infectious diseases still have high levels of incidence and prevalence.[1] In most circumstances, particularly when no therapeutic drugs are available and in low-income settings, vaccines are a cost-effective public health intervention in controlling the spread of, and reducing mortality and morbidity from infectious diseases.[2]
Thailand not only self-procures many of the vaccines in its Expanded Programme on Immunisation, but it is also ASEAN’s second-largest vaccine exporter after Indonesia, mainly of influenza vaccines to other ASEAN countries.[3] Still, in 2020, Thailand reported more than 60,000 cases of vaccine-preventable diseases.[4]
KEY INDICATORS IN THE THAI BIOMEDICAL AND VACCINE R&D SYSTEM
Developing effective vaccines rapidly requires strong vaccine research and development (R&D) preparedness and response. As illustrated by the rapid development of vaccines for COVID-19, R&D preparedness and response necessitates not only adequate financial and scientific resources, but also a policy and regulatory R&D environment that fosters innovation, public-private partnerships, and international cooperation.
Vaccine R&D is also essential for achieving the UN’s Sustainable Development Goal 3 (SDG 3: Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all ages), and other SDGs that depend on healthy people and populations.[5] In fact, some SDG targets include indicators related to biomedical R&D.
The diversity in economic development within ASEAN is mirrored by variability in terms of R&D intensity. Thailand ranks among the ASEAN countries with higher inputs and outputs indicators in biomedical R&D. In 2017, gross expenditures on R&D relative to GDP (SDG indicator 3.b.2) in Thailand stood at 1.0%, only behind Singapore (1.9%) and Malaysia (1.4%).[6] In countries with total R&D spending above 1%, the private sector tends to be a major, often the largest, contributor to R&D expenditures (Table 1). The private sector accounts for 80.8% of total R&D expenditures in Thailand, the largest in ASEAN. In 2018, Thailand had 1,350 researchers per million inhabitants in full-time equivalents (SDG indicator 9.5.2), the third largest in ASEAN.
Regarding R&D output indicators, the picture is mixed (Table 2). On the one hand, Thai researchers are among the most productive in ASEAN in terms of the number of academic publications and clinical trials, but they lag in the number of patents. Thailand trails Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore in the number of articles published in peer-reviewed journals in the broad field of biomedicine, but when it comes to the specific topic of vaccines, Thai researchers published more articles than their peers elsewhere in ASEAN countries, and were only behind China, Japan, India, the Republic of Korea and Iran in all of Asia. [7]
A bibliometric analysis of the articles published in 2019 by ASEAN scientists indicates that Thai researchers collaborate more with scientists from the United States and Australia than with colleagues from other ASEAN countries.[8] The Southeast Asian office of the WHO established as one of the objectives of its 2016-2020 Vaccine Strategic Plan the participation of all countries in vaccine clinical trials.[9] As of March 2022, the Asia-Pacific region had conducted 24.1% of all vaccine clinical trials in the world, led by China with 571 trials. Thailand, with 200 vaccine clinical trials, ranked first in ASEAN (36.5% of all vaccine clinical trials in ASEAN) and fourth in Asia Pacific.[10]
However, research does not necessarily generate economic value if it does not create new products, services, and/or processes. Thailand has still to translate its investments, publications, and clinical trials into patents, which is a good proxy of a country’s ability to innovate. As of March 2022, Thailand had 41 patents in the field of biotechnology and 47 in pharmaceuticals, 7 times fewer than Malaysia and 20 times fewer than Singapore.[11]
MAIN PLAYERS IN THE THAI VACCINE R&D SYSTEM
As in other middle-income Asian economies, vaccine R&D and production in Thailand is centred on traditional technology vaccines included in its Expanded Programme on Immunisation. Thai vaccine manufacturers do not yet have the technological capacity to produce mRNA vaccines. As the R&D and production capabilities of Thai and ASEAN vaccine manufacturers improved, many of their vaccines had been exported to developing countries within Asia and beyond.
The policy process and government agencies involved in establishing vaccine security policy, deciding which vaccines should be included in the National List of Essential Vaccines as well as creating the regulatory framework for licensing and marketing of vaccines have been described in detail elsewhere.[12] The main government agencies that participate in setting the R&D agenda and allocating research funds are the Thai National Institute of Health (TNIH, Department of Medical Sciences, Ministry of Public Health, MoPH), the National Research Council of Thailand, the National Science and Technology Development (NSTDA), the National Science Technology and Innovation Policy Office, and the Thailand Centre of Excellence for Life Sciences. The TNIH is one of only five Asia Pacific R&D funding organisations included in the Global Research Collaboration for Infectious Disease Preparedness (GLOPID-R), an international coalition of funders of R&D to combat infectious diseases with pandemic potential. Regarding vaccine R&D, various organisations within the MoPH regulate and fund early preclinical research stages; namely, the Food and Drug Administration, the National Vaccine Institute (NVI), and the Department of Disease Control. Among its institutional goals, the NVI aims to strengthen R&D infrastructure, including training and capacity building, and technology transfer through its training vaccine centre.
The main pharmaceutical firms involved in vaccine R&D and manufacturing are the state-owned Government Pharmaceutical Organisation (GPO), the Queen Saovabha Memorial Institute-Thai Red Cross (QSMI), and the private firm BioNet Asia. The GPO conducts vaccine R&D and accounts for a significant share of Thai vaccine manufacturing, and it also exports vaccines to other ASEAN countries.[13] The QSMI packages and distributes serums and rabies vaccines. Both companies are members of the Developing Countries Vaccine Manufacturers Network (DCVMN), which encompasses 41 public and private pharmaceutical firms in developing countries.[14] BioNet Asia is one of the most active and innovative ASEAN firms, and the only Thai firm that produces vaccines prequalified by the WHO for procurement by UN agencies and governments.[15] Bionet has developed low-cost vaccines for Haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib) using traditional technologies and, in collaboration with the NSTDA and several Thai research institutes, has patented processes for the development of a dengue vaccine.
Several Thai public and private pharmaceutical firms and universities have engaged in collaboration with foreign organisations for R&D and production of vaccines. For instance, BioNet has developed a pentavalent vaccine covering diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, hepatitis B, and meningitis in collaboration with the Thai NSTDA and with South African scientists.[16] Bionet also partnered with the NSTDA and Mahidol and Chiang Mai universities, to develop a dengue vaccine, which was later improved through a partnership with the Sanofi Pasteur Institute and the biotech firm In-Cell-Art in France. Sanofi Pasteur has also established a joint venture with the GPO (GPO-Merieux Biological Products, GPO-MBP) to conduct process development and finish-and-fill for new vaccines for ASEAN countries. Under the arrangement, Sanofi Pasteur supplies the vaccine in bulk and the GPO-MBP formulates and releases finished forms. The Thai Armed Forces Research Institute of Medical Sciences also conducts R&D on vaccines for enteric diseases, malaria, and HIV-AIDS. The MoPH has partnered with the USA’s NIH and the United States Military HIV Research Program to conduct clinical trials for an HIV vaccine. And Siam Bioscience was selected by Astra-Zeneca to produce its COVID-19 vaccine for ASEAN countries, and obtained the WHO’s approval.
Although the development of vaccines using the newest mRNA technologies still remains concentrated in a handful of American and European companies (Moderna, Pfizer/BioNTech, Curevac), some of them have plans to open manufacturing plants in developing countries.[17] In Thailand, the Chula Vaccine Research Centre at Chulalongkorn University and the King Chulalongkorn Memorial Hospital have joined forces with BioNet to develop and manufacture the first Thai-made mRNA vaccine for COVID-19, the ChulaCov19 BNA159 vaccine. Stages 1 and 2 of clinical trials for this vaccine have been conducted in Australia.[18]
The offshoring by global pharmaceutical firms of R&D activities to developing countries can potentially lead to technology transfer and enhance the R&D and manufacturing capabilities of domestic biotechnology firms. Many of the global pharmaceutical firms with a presence in Thailand conduct late manufacturing stages for vaccines and therapeutic drugs. However, they have chosen other Asian countries (mainly China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Singapore) in which to establish regional R&D centres. Many of these global pharmaceutical firms have outsourced some of their R&D, initial clinical trials but increasingly other tasks as well (preclinical research, applications for ethical committees, and regulatory authorities) to so-called contract research organisations (CROs). Thailand is home to several of the largest global CROs (Covance, ICON, IQVIA, Novotech, Parexel, PPD, Synchron, and Syneos Health) but also to local firms such as Aclires and Asia Global Research.[19]
VACCINE R&D COOPERATION IN ASEAN AND BEYOND
The COVID-19 pandemic has shown how international cooperation can accelerate vaccine development. It has also exposed how beggar-thy-neighbour policies, such as export restrictions on medical protective equipment and vaccine nationalism, can leave many developing countries at the expense of donor countries to secure vaccines for their most vulnerable populations.[20]
In the context of a pandemic, vaccine production may not be sufficiently elastic, opening the debate about whether or not countries should strengthen their vaccine security by developing their vaccine R&D and manufacturing capacity. Most developing countries lack the financial and technological resources to invest in vaccine R&D. In addition, it is not sensible to replicate R&D capabilities in each country. Instead, international agreements to facilitate unimpeded trade and global/regional cooperation should ensure vaccines for countries without R&D and vaccine production capabilities.
During the 2003-2004 SARS epidemic, the ASEAN Secretariat issued recommendations to contain the epidemic.[21] ASEAN has also been very active during the COVID-19 pandemic with multiple initiatives, including the establishment of the ASEAN Centre for Public Health Emergencies and Emerging Diseases, and the ASEAN Public Health Emergency Coordination System programme to coordinate national and regional preparedness and response to health emergencies. The ASEAN Committee on Science and Technology (COST), a committee to promote cooperation in science, technology, and innovation (ST&I) among ASEAN members, formulated the 2016-2025 ASEAN Plan of Action on ST&I (APASTI 2016-2025). TheAPASTI 2016-2025aims at intensifying R&D collaboration between the public and private sector, strengthening ST&I infrastructure and human resources, networking research institutes and centres across ASEAN, and promoting closer cooperation in R&D with ASEAN’s Dialogue Partners.[22]
The ASEAN Secretariat has also established international collaborations in R&D. Thus, in 2020, the United States launched the US-ASEAN Health Futures Initiative to strengthen public health in ASEAN through the development of R&D infrastructure, human capital, and health system capacity. As part of the Initiative, there are now more than 300 joint projects between ASEAN members and the US NIH. The Initiative includes US$ 30 million over the last 10 years in grants to research institutions in ASEAN, and technical support for clinical trials for treatment of infectious diseases.[23] Likewise, the United States Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) established the US-ASEAN Infection Prevention and Control Task Force.[24]
Meetings among key stakeholders in vaccine R&D in ASEAN (health policymakers, biomedical researchers, and the pharmaceutical industry) sponsored by the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organisation (SEAMEO) Tropical Medicine Network identified dengue, HPV, HIV, malaria, Japanese encephalitis, leptospirosis, and influenza as the key regional R&D priorities.[25] Likewise, expert group meetings convened by the WHO have identified key areas for ASEAN collaboration and integration in vaccine R&D; namely, vaccine security and self-reliance, human resource capacity building, pooled vaccine procurement, and communication and coordination.[26]
Regional cooperation in vaccine R&D has also taken place outside the framework of supranational and intergovernmental organisations. Three of them deserve to be noted here. First, the Association of Academies and Societies of Sciences in Asia (AASSA), which comprises 32 ST&I societies from 30 Asian countries, including two from Thailand: the Thai Academy of Sciences, and the Science Society of Thailand.[27] In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, AASSA organised webinars but, compared to similar organisations elsewhere, AASSA has played a relatively low-key role. Second, the Southeast Asia Infectious Disease Clinical Research Network (SEAICRN), a partnership between hospitals and research institutions in Thailand, Viet Nam, and Indonesia, which promotes clinical research collaborations on emerging infectious diseases of public relevance.[28] SEAICRN receives financial and technical support from the NIH in the USA, the Wellcome Trust in the UK, and the governments of Thailand, Viet Nam and Indonesia. Third, the ASEAN Network for Drugs, Diagnostics, Vaccines and Traditional Medicines Innovation (ASEAN-NDI), which has the support of the WHO, maps the overall research capacity of ASEAN countries in vaccines, drugs, traditional medicines, and diagnostic tools.[29] The ASEAN-NDI aims inter alia at strengthening cooperation between ASEAN countries in health R&D, sharing information on infectious diseases, transferring knowledge and/or technology, and facilitating collaboration in R&D initiatives.
CONCLUSION
As an upper-middle income country, Thailand has the financial and technological capabilities, in cooperation with other ASEAN countries, to ensure its national and regional vaccine security. Still, there are several actions at the national and regional levels that can enhance incentives for pharmaceutical firms to invest in vaccine R&D.[30] On the supply-side, Thailand and other ASEAN governments can incentivise vaccine R&D by mobilising financial and scientific resources for R&D on vaccines for diseases posing a domestic or regional public health threat. Thailand can also use other supply-side mechanisms, such as regulatory, policy, tax, and direct subsidies to reduce investment risks for pharmaceutical firms. On the demand-side, Thailand can strengthen policies and regulations to increase the uptake of vaccines through public information campaigns.
Partnerships between universities and the pharmaceutical industry are key sources of innovation. Thailand can promote new alliances and strengthen existing ones through a series of actions. Some of them require increasing financial resources for R&D; for example, such as the establishment of start-up incubators or the financing of joint projects between universities and public research institutes, and pharmaceutical firms. However, others involve regulatory and legislative reforms; for example, better defining the intellectual property rights of pharmaceutical companies and academic institutions for knowledge sharing and technology transfer, allowing academic researchers to carry out projects in pharmaceutical firms, or facilitating cross-participation of academic researchers and industry leaders on corporate and university boards.
Finally, at the regional level, ASEAN as a group, rather than Thailand alone, can pool financial resources to establish advanced purchase commitments with pharmaceutical firms for the R&D and manufacturing of vaccines against diseases of regional concern.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The Global Security Initiative (GSI) – launched by President Xi Jinping in April 2022 – contains broad general principles that reiterate China’s previous foreign policy and security statements.
- The GSI is the latest expression of China’s international discourse that seeks to challenge the Western-led global governance system, and especially to de-legitimise the US role in Asia and advocate an exclusivist approach to Asian security governance.
- According to the State of Southeast Asia survey 2023, the region’s overall reaction to the GSI is rather ambivalent and cautious as they fear that the GSI will increase US-China tensions and intensify pressure on regional states to take sides.
- Judging by their official statements, mainland Southeast Asian states, except Vietnam, appear to be more accommodating towards the GSI while maritime Southeast Asian states are more cautious.
- There is a gap between the GSI’s moralistic posturing and the manifested reality of China’s nationalistic foreign policy, especially in situations where China’s interests collide with those of its neighbouring states, such as the South China Sea disputes.
- Southeast Asian countries’ caution towards the GSI, in contrast to their support for China’s Global Development Initiative, indicates the dichotomy between their reservations about China’s role as a security provider and their appreciation of China’s role as an economic partner.
The GSI can still gain traction in non-traditional and non-military areas, for example in law enforcement cooperation that cuts across the need to protect China’s overseas interests and to provide political/public security in some mainland Southeast Asian states.
* Hoang Thi Ha is Senior Fellow and Co-coordinator of the Regional Strategic and Political Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/11, 22 February 2023
INTRODUCTION
Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed the Global Security Initiative (GSI) at the Boao Forum for Asia annual conference on 21 April 2022. The GSI is encapsulated in “six commitments”: (i) pursuing common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security; (ii) respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries; (iii) abiding by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter; (iv) taking the legitimate security concerns of all countries seriously; (v) peacefully resolving differences and disputes between countries through dialogue and consultation; and (vi) maintaining security in both traditional and non-traditional domains.[1]
On 21 February 2023, China released the GSI concept paper which elaborates on the “six commitments” and identifies priorities areas of cooperation. According to the concept paper, the mechanisms for the GSI implementation include various Chinese initiatives at the UN system and Chinese engagement with the Global South via multiple multilateral platforms over which China has strong ownership and influence, namely the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), BRICS cooperation, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), and the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC), among others.[2] As China’s near-abroad and being situated at the heart of the Indo-Pacific region, Southeast Asia is arguably one of the most critical constituencies of the GSI. It is listed as the first region in the GSI concept paper’s priorities of cooperation, followed by the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Pacific island countries. This article examines the strategic rationale behind the GSI and how it has been received and perceived in Southeast Asia.
WHAT DOES THE GSI STAND FOR?
The GSI with its “six commitments” is contained within only one paragraph but its strategic rationale is organically linked to other parts of Xi’s entire speech, especially those promoting “Asian cooperation”, “Asian unity” and “Asian family”. This, coupled with the fact that Xi chose the Boao Forum to launch the GSI, suggests that China’s strategic gaze remains intensely focused on Asia where it is locked in a contest for primacy with the US. The GSI is in large part an extension of China’s New Asian Security Concept introduced by Xi himself at the 2014 Boao Forum which appeals to non-Western sentiments, de-legitimises the US role in Asia and advocates an exclusivist approach to Asian security governance.[3]
The “six commitments” of the GSI are long embedded in China’s national and international security discourse. It consolidates the basic norms of modern China’s foreign policy codified in the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, including respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference. The GSI also replays the terms “common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security” from the New Asian Security Concept. The only new addition to the GSI is the commitment “to take the legitimate security concerns of all countries seriously” which derives from the ‘indivisible security’ concept. This concept was first coined in the Cold War-era 1975 Helsinki Final Act and then the 1990 Charter of Paris for New Europe which stated that “security is indivisible and the security of every participating State is inseparably linked to that of all the others.”[4] The Charter, however, also “fully recognize[s] the freedom of States to choose their own security arrangements”, a key principle that both China and Russia wilfully overlook.
While the logic of ‘indivisible security’ – i.e. the pursuit of one’s security should not be at the expense of others’ security – seems straightforward, its interpretation and application are highly subjective, especially in terms of defining the threshold of “at the expense of other’s security”. This concept has become particularly controversial after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022 using the pretext that NATO’s eastward expansion jeopardised Russia’s security interests. Although China stops short of endorsing Russia’s action, Beijing is aligned with Moscow in attributing the cause of the war to NATO and the West, and has actively propagated this narrative. A couple of weeks before Russia’s invasion, Moscow and Beijing signed the 4 February 2022 joint statement, evoking ‘indivisible security’ to oppose NATO’s expansion and vowing that both countries would “stand against attempts by external forces to undermine security and stability in their common adjacent regions”, namely Europe for Russia and Asia for China.[5] As such, ‘indivisible security’ would potentially become a new sound bite and normative device for China to advance its longstanding geopolitical end goal, namely to dismantle the US’ alliance system and security partnerships which Beijing sees as detrimental to its own security and hegemonic ambitions in the region.
The GSI should also be perceived in the broader context of China’s push to reform the global governance system to better suit its interests and values, alongside the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Global Development Initiative (GDI), among others.[6] The GSI now becomes the overarching framework for multiple Chinese security initiatives at the UN and in the Global South that seek to challenge the Western-led global system and project itself as a leader in the global governance and security architecture.[7] Xi’s speech at the 2022 Boao Forum and subsequent Chinese commentaries on the GSI are full of tropes framing China as a responsible actor – e.g. in enabling the world’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic, poverty reduction and economic recovery – versus the US and its allies that engage in “exclusive, bloc politics”, “decoupling”, “supply chain disruption” and “maximum pressure”. The most common refrain is that the GSI reflects “true multilateralism”, advocates “democracy in international relations”, and offers “a new type of security path of dialogue rather than conflict, forming partnerships rather than alliances, and win-win rather than zero-sum outcomes”.[8] Of note, the GSI has also been used to undermine US-led efforts to rally international punitive measures against Russia, including what China views as “the wanton use of unilateral sanctions and long-arm jurisdiction”.[9]
Another angle that needs further examination is the nexus between the GSI and China’s Comprehensive National Security (CNS) concept. Introduced in 2014, the CNS reflects Xi Jinping’s thinking about national security that aims to realise the “unity of political security, people’s security and national interests”.[10] Under this concept, national security covers multiple types of security, with “political security” at the top as well as other areas of consequence to international security such as “security of overseas interests”, “resource security”, “space security”, “polar security” and “deep-sea security”.[11] In April 2022, China and the Solomon Islands inked a security agreement that allows China, upon the Solomon Islands’ request, to send its “police, armed police, military personnel and other law enforcement and armed forces to Solomon Islands to assist in maintaining social order”; such Chinese forces can also be used “to protect the safety of Chinese personnel and major projects in the Solomon Islands”.[12] The agreement is a clear example of the convergence between the protection of Chinese overseas interests and the imperative to ensure regime security of the host country, which provides a perfect condition for China to expand its military footprint in this strategic location.
SOUTHEAST ASIA’s AMBIVALENT AND CAUTIOUS RESPONSE
Southeast Asians Are Cautious and Ambivalent about the GSI
While receptions of the GSI vary across Southeast Asian countries, the overall reaction has been rather muted and cautious. According to the State of Southeast Asia 2023 survey, 44.5% of respondents express little or no confidence that the GSI will benefit the region versus 27.4% who feel confident or very confident. The sense of ambivalence and uncertainty is also palpable as 28% choose the ‘no comment’ option.[13] Respondents from Brunei, Cambodia and Laos are most supportive of the GSI while those from Myanmar, Vietnam, Indonesia are most cautious, followed by the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore.
Table 1: How Confident Are You in China’s Global Security Initiative
to Benefit the Region?
(State of Southeast Asia survey 2023)
The above results largely mirror the official responses from most Southeast Asian governments to the GSI (except for Myanmar[14] and Thailand). The outcome documents of Xi’s recent meetings with the Vietnamese, Indonesian, Singaporean and Philippine leaders suggest the latter’s cautious position vis-à-vis the GSI, in contrast to their warm embrace of the GDI. The Chinese read-out of Xi’s meeting with Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong in November 2022 said that both sides would pursue the GDI but made no reference to the GSI.[15] Speaking at an international conference in May 2022, Lee voiced Singapore’s support for the GDI but refrained from any mention of the GSI.[16] Like Singapore, Malaysia has stayed silent on the initiative – the read-outs from both Malaysia and China regarding the Wang Yi-Saifuddin meeting in July 2022 did not mention the GSI and focused mainly on economic cooperation.[17] As for Vietnam, according to the joint statement on the occasion of Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) general secretary Nguyen Phu Trong’s visit to Beijing in October 2022, Vietnam recognises China’s GSI only on the basis of the goals and principles of the UN Charter while expressing its support for and readiness to participate in the GDI.[18] Likewise, the joint press statement during Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo’s visit to China in July 2022 simply stated that Indonesia “takes note of the Global Security Initiative” but said much more about bilateral cooperation to implement the GDI, including development-oriented financing, cooperation in health, agriculture, poverty alleviation, food security, green development and digital economy.[19]
Typical of the Southeast Asian hedging position, the GSI is mentioned in their high-level joint statements with China but with certain qualifications. First, Southeast Asian countries are willing to consider the GSI so long as it conforms to the principles of the UN Charter and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) to which China is a party. Second, further details and communication on the GSI are needed to explore future cooperation, as reflected in the Indonesia-China joint statement in November 2022[20] and the Philippines-China joint statement[21] during President Marcos Jr.’s visit to China in January 2023. The ambivalent and non-committal attitude by these major ASEAN member states has been extrapolated to the ASEAN level, as reflected in the chairman’s statement of the 2022 ASEAN-China summit which “took note of the GSI proposed by China… and looked forward to further details of the GSI”.[22]
Except for Vietnam, other mainland Southeast Asian countries appear to be more supportive of the GSI. The joint statement during Prime Minister Hun Sen’s visit to China in early February 2023 says that “Cambodia supports China’s proposal of GSI, and stands ready to work with China on global security governance towards common, comprehensive , cooperative and sustainable security.”[23] According to Chinese sources, Thailand and Myanmar respectively expressed support for the GSI and GDI at the meeting between Xi and Thailand’s Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha in November 2022; and at a working-level meeting with Myanmar’s ambassador to China in January 2023.[24] In an interview with Global Times in September 2022, the Lao ambassador to China also stated that her government attaches importance to and welcomes the GSI, alongside the BRI and GDI, because they “embrace the expectations of the countries to promote peace, development and win-win cooperation”.[25] It is argued that Southeast Asian countries that do not have territorial and maritime disputes with China and that lean towards China strategically tend to hold more favourable views about the GSI.
The GSI as a Public Good: Rhetoric and Reality
Southeast Asian countries generally subscribe to the GSI principles, especially the pursuit of comprehensive and cooperative security, respect of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, sanctity of the UN Charter, peaceful settlement of disputes, and security in both traditional and non-traditional domains. The GSI concept paper’s affirmation of support for ASEAN-centred regional security architecture and adherence to the ASEAN way of consensus-building also sounds assuring. What then explains Southeast Asians’ hesitance to embrace the GSI wholesale?
The devil is in the practice because there is a yawning gap between China’s high-sounding moralistic posturing and the manifested reality of its nationalistic foreign policy. It boils down to the question of how China would interpret and apply these principles in specific security situations where its interests collide with those of its neighbouring countries. Although the principle of sovereign equality is pre-requisite to friendly inter-state relations and in accordance with the UN Charter,[26] China’s policy and behaviour in the South China Sea disputes indicate the “winner takes all” approach. China’s preaching about these principles falls flat given its excessive claims that violate the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and its constant encroachments, intimidations and harassments against other claimant states. For all the Chinese talk about making the South China Sea “a sea of peace, friendship and cooperation”, Southeast Asians’ top two concerns in these waters are (i) China’s militarisation and assertive actions and (ii) China’s encroachments in the maritime zones of other littoral states.[27] Likewise, China’s support for the purposes and principles of the UN Charter does not square with its decision not to criticise Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and instead lend propaganda support for Moscow’s justification for waging its war?[28]
Southeast Asian reservations about the GSI are also rooted in their growing anxiety about the US-China rivalry. The fear that the GSI will increase US-China tensions and intensify pressure on regional states to take sides is the biggest reason for their doubts about the GSI, according to the SSEA survey 2023.[29] Of particular concern is the ‘indivisible security’ concept which serves as China’s new normative device to discourage Southeast Asian countries from closer security ties or alliances with Washington. Beijing can be expected to fully exploit this concept in order to emphasise its sense of insecurity over the strategic autonomy of its neighbouring states to choose their own security arrangements.
In practice, the point that “security is indivisible” is so nebulous and subjective that it is of little help in addressing the deepening mistrust and security dilemma in the region. For example, although China criticises the US military presence and alliance/coalition building with its Asian partners as hurting Chinese national security, China’s own military build-up and power projection have been alarming to the South China Sea littoral states as well. The annual SSEA survey among foreign policy-security establishments in Southeast Asia consistently ranks China as the most distrusted major power (although the degrees of distrust may vary across regional countries). This distrust is rooted in their fear of losing sovereignty, territorial integrity and strategic autonomy in making their own foreign policy choices in the face of a strong and assertive China (Table 2). It is doubtful that the moral high ground that China claims in the GSI would help alleviate these concerns.
Table 2: Why Do You Distrust China and What Can China Do to Improve Ties?
(State of Southeast Asia survey 2020-2023)
Where Can the GSI Gain Traction?
Since the GSI adopts an encompassing definition of security, it stands a good chance to gain traction in non-military and non-traditional areas. Given the proximity and expanding connectivity between China and the region, law enforcement cooperation to address transnational crimes is a major area where China’s capacity and resources can be brought to bear. Apart from cooperation at the bilateral and ASEAN levels, one noteworthy minilateral arrangement in this respect is the Mekong river joint patrol by China, Thailand, Laos and Myanmar, with 125 joint patrols being carried out thus far since its start in 2011.[30] While such cooperation is mutually beneficial and necessary for practical reasons, it may have long-term strategic implications in enabling the extraterritorial reach of China’s law enforcement in some mainland Southeast Asian states.[31]
There is also a growing nexus between the need to ensure political/public security in those countries that have weak state capacity and their policing cooperation with China in the name of strengthening local law enforcement capabilities and protecting China’s overseas interests. The China-Solomon Islands security agreement stands as a clear example. Elements of this nexus are emerging in some mainland Southeast Asian states. At a meeting with his Cambodia counterpart in 2021, Chinese Minister of Public Security Zhao Kezhi called for “enhanced cooperation in preventing political security risks, implementing drug control and strengthening law enforcement capabilities to promote the building of a community with a shared future between the two countries.”[32] In Myanmar, following the coup in 2021, the junta regime has sought China’s assistance to step up its policing of internet use, including to obtain information on political dissidents and protestors.[33] In Laos, where China is the largest foreign investor with multiple special economic zones and the recently launched Vientiane-Kunming railway, both countries have agreed to strengthen security cooperation for major Belt and Road projects, safeguard national security and address transnational crimes, including through China’s equipment transfer and personnel training.[34] Seen from this angle, the GSI could effectively serve as a purveyor of China’s state-centred and all-encompassing approach to security and “market globally the instruments of China’s security state”.[35]
Another area where the GSI will draw international applause is its affirmation that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”.[36] While this is a longstanding policy of China, this affirmation holds a significant meaning at this juncture as President Putin of Russia – China’s “no-limits” partner – has been using nuclear blackmail in his war against Ukraine. In this respect, China can also take the moral high ground as it is the only nuclear weapon state that agrees to sign on to the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty without any reservation.
Last but not least, the GSI has been rolled out in conjunction with the GDI, reflecting the integration of security and development in China’s global outreach that sees “development as the basis for security, and security as the condition for development”.[37] China has already made its mark in terms of supporting Southeast Asian countries in pandemic response, vaccine support and economic development, and has leveraged its positive impact in these fields to further its geopolitical goals in the region. It is in these non-traditional, non-military areas that China is better positioned as a leader and provider of regional public goods.
CONCLUSION
There are some paradoxes that China – in its push to become a provider of regional security – should take notice of. First, China has become “more militarily capable than ever”, according to the latest Asia Power Index 2023 report.[38] Yet, few Southeast Asians in the foreign policy-security establishment think that China’s military is an asset for global peace and security, as found in the SSEA annual survey.[39] Military cooperation also ranks as the lowest option in foreign policy preferences towards China, according to a recent public opinion survey in Indo-Pacific states, including Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.[40] Second, while Southeast Asian countries would, in principle, agree with China that development guarantees security, their explicit support for the GDI and caution towards the GSI indicates the dichotomy between their appreciation of China’s importance as an economic partner and their reservation about China’s role as a security provider. As noted by Evelyn Goh, China’s hegemonic bargain towards the region may have gained significant headway in the economic domain, but in the security domain, China still needs “to demonstrate credible self-restraint for reassurance”.[41] To persuade regional states that it is a net contributor to regional security and stability, China should exert more efforts to match its words with its deeds.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The hajj ritual (pilgrimage to Mecca) is mandatory for Muslims who are physically and financially able. But the number of hajj pilgrims is capped at about 2.5 million yearly, and Muslims worldwide thus have to wait their turn to perform Islam’s fifth pillar.
- The Saudi Arabia government is committed through Saudi Vision 2030 to transforming the organisation of the hajj and improving the quality of hajj services. However, this ongoing transformation has significantly increased the cost of the pilgrimage; this was obvious in 2022, and further increases are likely.
- However, on a positive note, the transformation drive to expand and upgrade hajj facilities and services presents a promising investment opportunity as the Saudi Arabia government has opened the sector to global strategic investors. Muslims residing in ASEAN countries can therefore gain from investing in hajj-related infrastructure development in Saudi Arabia. The area of focus for investments includes the Masyair, which comprises the sacred sites of Arafah, Mudhzalifah and Mina in Mecca. Other investment opportunities involve accommodation building (such as hotels), fast food restaurants, transportation and logistics, provision of non-cash services and Muslim tours.
- The relevant Islamic authorities and institutions in ASEAN countries have to grapple with the short-term challenges of helping their respective constituencies understand and cope with the rising costs and long waiting times for the hajj. At the same time, they will also need to organise themselves to take advantage of the investment opportunities arising from the Saudi transformation programme. They will have to convince their respective Muslim communities about the prudence and sound management of these investments, and the long-term dividends which can be passed on to future cohorts of pilgrims.
* Anggito Abimanyu is Head of the Economics and Business Department, Vocational School, Gadjah Mada University UGM Yogyakarta, Indonesia. He is also the Former Deputy at the Ministry of Finance, DG Hajj and Umrah, Ministry of Religious Affairs, and Head of the Hajj Financial Management Agency, Republic of Indonesia. Currently, he is Associate Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/10, 21 February 2023
INTRODUCTION
Pilgrimage to Islam’s holiest city of Mecca in Saudi Arabia is the dream of all Muslims. This hajj ritual is the fifth pillar of Islam. However, the demand for places to perform the hajj every year exceeds the supply. With quotas imposed by the Saudi Arabia government on the number of pilgrims it can accommodate, Muslims have to wait their turn to perform the pilgrimage. Consequently, Muslims, including those from Southeast Asia, are increasingly making multiple umrah trips (minor hajj). On average, a hajj trip takes approximately 30 to 40 days, and can only be performed during the hajj season (the month of Dzulhijah, or the twelfth and final month of the Islamic calendar). Conversely, umrah trips are shorter—lasting approximately between one week and 15 days—but these can be carried out any time of the year.
At present, because there are long queues or restrictions due to the hajj quotas imposed on all Muslim states and nations worldwide, many Muslims cannot carry out the pilgrimage during their preferred timing even though they are physically and financially able to do so. For example, the average waiting time for pilgrims in Malaysia is 100 years, and in Indonesia, it is 20 years.[1] The long waiting time explains why the umrah market is booming since pilgrims are allowed to make that trip to Mecca at any time on tourist or umrah visas.
Moreover, for many who feel they may not be able to perform the hajj during their lifetime, umrah trips serve as the best opportunity to visit these sacred places. Hajj and umrah pilgrimages are principally private trips, but do not replace each other. Performing the umrah, however, does not mean that the Muslim’s obligation to perform the hajj is ceded.
The countries that currently send the largest number of hajj pilgrims are Indonesia, Pakistan, India, Turkey, Egypt, Bangladesh and Nigeria. Indonesia and Pakistan are also the largest sources of umrah pilgrims. Among ASEAN countries, many hajj and umrah pilgrims come from Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines. Currently, the number of pilgrims in the world is 2.5 million,[2] and more than 5 million umrah pilgrims visit the two holy cities, Mecca and Medina annually.[3]
Ultimately, the costs of performing the hajj have increased multiple times, increasing the burden for ordinary pilgrims. The Saudi Arabian government is however calling for investments to upgrade facilities in the holy land, which will enable them to host more pilgrims at any one time in future. Southeast Asian countries can take advantage of these investment opportunities, though the challenge lies in how benefits reaped from these projects can trickle down to benefit ordinary pilgrims who are waiting their turn to perform the hajj, and are facing an exponential rise in expenses.
THE COSTS REMAIN HIGH
A large portion of pilgrims hajj expenses consists of round-trip airfare and accommodation in Saudi Arabia. Other expenses include inbound transportation costs, payments for guides to perform key rituals (tawaf, saii, and wuquf), and food. Costs are also incurred for pilgrims entering the Masyair worship areas (Arafah, Muzdhalifa and Mina), renting tents, buying ready-to-eat food, and patronising the shuttle buses at the height of the hajj season.
The Muslim world is entering an era of high hajj costs. In 2022, the average regular pilgrimage fee in Indonesia increased from Rp. 75 million or US$5,357 to almost Rp. 100 million or US$7,142 per pilgrim. This increase was not due to the Covid-19 pandemic, or even the modernisation efforts recently announced by the Saudi Arabian government. The increase in costs was announced long before the Saudi Arabian government introduced the Saudi Vision 2030.[4]
In 2020 and 2021, the hajj pilgrimage for those living outside Saudi Arabia was halted due to the Covid-19 pandemic. In 2022, the Saudi Arabia government announced that the hajj would resume, and at the pre-pandemic level; the news was greeted with joy by Muslims all over the world. A few days after the announcement, the Saudi Arabian government invited the Ministers of Hajj from a large number of countries to the country to discuss the new hajj policy. Two major decisions were presented: the 2022 hajj season would welcome pilgrims from outside Saudi Arabia, but the numbers were still limited to 50% of the normal 2.5 million quota; and the Saudi Muasassah hajj guidance group would be privatised, making it more professional and accountable when serving the hajj pilgrims.
However, the promise to improve hajj services came with the shocking news that hajj costs would triple.[5] Although in the end the costs were reduced, pilgrims still had to pay a 30% increase in fees on average. Pilgrims around the world protested, and the governments of Indonesia, Pakistan, Turkey, Nigeria and other countries submitted their objections to Saudi Arabia. The answer from Saudi Arabia was that the outcome was non-negotiable; all countries sending pilgrims including private haj travel agents finally relented.
ASEAN countries utilise various strategies to overcome the unprecedented sharp increase in hajj expenses for pilgrims. Indonesia and Malaysia sent pilgrims by providing subsidies covered by investment returns from hajj funding schemes. The two countries considered the opportunity costs of not sending pilgrims would mean the waiting time for other pilgrims to be even longer. Other ASEAN countries dispatched their pilgrims in accordance with the 50% quota. Last year, pilgrims also had to pay additional costs due to the implementation of the Covid-19 health protocol. To make matters worse, they also had to absorb the exchange rate depreciation against the US dollar.
INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY
Despite this price increase, the Saudi Arabian government is providing lucrative investment opportunities for Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore and the other ASEAN countries. In January 2023, at the World Hajj and Umrah Forum held in Jeddah,[6] the Saudi Arabian government announced strategic investment opportunities related to hajj and umrah projects to global investors. All regulations, institutions, human resources, patterns of cooperation and investment objects in Saudi Arabia have been prepared, and the Saudi Arabia government has also carried out detailed approaches, showcases and campaigns by inviting its strategic investor partners.
Expectedly, Muslim-majority countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Pakistan, Nigeria and Turkey have already begun assessing this invitation. Non-Muslim majority countries are also enthusiastic about this development, including the United States, Germany, Brazil and China. These have already submitted proposals based on their respective investment focus. The Saudi Arabian government does not seem to give any privileges to certain investors, and the criteria for selecting investors are solely based on competition, competence, and the ability to complete projects quickly.
With Vision 2030 in place, Saudi Arabia is expected to house waves of hajj and umrah pilgrims and tourists, with the government targeting 100 million visitors per year or 10 times the current numbers.[7] Tourism is a very lucrative business for Saudi Arabia, and tourism is not only related to holy sites in Mecca and Medina, but also to their neighbouring cities such as Jeddah, where an international airport is located. The city of Jeddah is also being transformed into a modern Muslim tourist destination on a par with Dubai in United Arab Emirates (UAE). The capital of Saudi Arabia, Riyadh, is designated as a world financial centre on par with Abu Dhabi, the capital of UAE. Airports are also scheduled to be built outside Jeddah, Medina and Riyadh. This means that a pilgrimage trip can be condensed into shorter periods, and pilgrims can explore Saudi Arabia beyond Mecca and Medina. Moreover, buildings in traditional holy sites in Mecca, such as Arafah and Mina, will be upgraded, and the Grand Mosque (Masjidil Haram” and the Prophet’s Mosque (Masjid Nabawi) will continue to be expanded.
The scale of development means that investment opportunities will multiply exponentially. Already, world-class giant travel agents, Agoda and Airbnb have collaborated with Saudi Arabia, and are expected to dominate online bookings for hajj and umrah. They also helped build and develop the GDS (Global Distribution Systems) online system, Saudi Arabia’s global travel network.
How can these strategic investment opportunities benefit Southeast Asian countries? What is urgent is expanding the Masyair area—specifically the space used during the peak hajj season—with multi-storey buildings. The upgrading projects include repairing permanent tents, developing accommodation in the vicinity, catering ready-to-eat food and providing Masyair buses. The upgrading of factories that provide catering services for pilgrims is no less important. Other possibilities include improving transportation and logistics services through inter-city buses, and developing hotels in Mecca and Medina, hospital services and others. The service sector is no less important, namely the financial services for hajj and umrah pilgrims, including provision of non-cash financial services, hajj insurance and other financial services. Likewise, with tourism services actually including the construction of historical Muslim tourist attractions, from those carried out by tourism services in the Taif mountains to the ancient heritage site of Al Ula and others, Southeast Asian investors are encouraged to play a role.
The Saudi Arabia government plans to form dozens of subsidiary companies through the institutional transformation of muasasasah, which will then be offered to strategic investors. At the exhibition, strategic investors signed an investment assessment in these fields. Investors from Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines are also exploring this opening. To be sure, proposals will be accompanied by feasibility studies and legal due diligence, and these have to be carried out by credible and world-class consulting firms.
ASEAN STRATEGIC INVESTOR READINESS
The commercialisation of hajj and umrah services will increase the cost of hajj further. Since 2022, Masyair’s service fees have increased by three times, resulting in an increase in the cost of hajj for pilgrims to 30%. In 2023, this cost is expected to remain high. This increase is indeed burdensome especially given the conditions of global inflation and the domestic exchange rate depreciating against the US dollar and the Saudi Riyal.
If Indonesia, Malaysia and other Islamic countries who send pilgrims can take advantage of these investment opportunities, then the benefits can be returned to the pilgrims. This also means strengthening, developing and tapping into existing institutions and schemes that manage the hajj pilgrims. For example, Malaysia has a strong and established Sharia hajj investment institution, the Tabung Haji (TH), which it can draw on, while Indonesia has the Hajj Financial Management Agency (BPKH). Both are potential strategic hajj fund investors. In 2022, TH’s total assets amounted to around US$ 20 billion and BPKH’s to around US$11 billion. Brunei has Taib (Tabungan Amanah Islam Brunei), while Singapore has SWF (Sovereign Wealth Funds) such as GIC (Government Investment Corporation). Interestingly, Taib and GIC have an investment unit that addresses sharia needs.
Hajj funds managed by Malaysia and Indonesia can appropriately be invested in these haj-related projects because they are deposited for the long term to suit the long waiting time for hajj pilgrims. With a long-term tenor, Malaysia and Indonesia haj funds can be invested in hajj projects in Saudi Arabia which also have a long-term duration. Even though these projects carry risks, these can be mitigated by the hajj and umrah pilgrims who continue to increase and thus help maintain a low to medium risk profile.
The rate of return on hajj investment funds is relatively high, estimated at a minimum of 200 to 300 basis points above the yield on corporate sukuk. With such a high rate of return and low to moderate risk, the hajj funds will attract the interest of prospective pilgrims, umrah and even other people’s funds. ASEAN countries with institutional funds, such as Brunei from the provision of surplus oil products, and Singapore from insurance and pension funds, also have long-term financing funds that can be invested in Saudi Arabia. The Philippines is also interested to invest because of the high management of remittance funds from Filipino citizens in Saudi Arabia. Banks in the Philippines are also experienced in offshore financing, and some even have branches in Saudi Arabia. Likewise in Thailand, several banks have branches in Saudi Arabia and can immediately explore project financing in Saudi Arabia. It is conceivable that each investment institution in the ASEAN region can become a strategic partner for Saudi Arabia.[8]
So, even though the cost of hajj increases, this can be compensated for by increasing investment returns in various sectors offered by state-owned investment institutions. If investment opportunities can be implemented optimally and the benefits returned to the pilgrims, then you have a profitable long-term investment strategy. The investment proceeds will also circulate in the respective countries. The question now turns to how countries can manage the expectations of pilgrims in the short-term.
CONCLUSION
Undeniably, hajj’s strategies, policies and financing have undergone significant changes with the introduction of Saudi Vision 2030. The Saudi Arabia government, which has the mandate to manage hajj and umrah, has provided clear directions that in the future, hajj investment will play a key role in improving hajj and umrah services. The hajj capacity will be increased three times in the next ten years, to serve more than 10 million hajj pilgrims per year. This means the services and infrastructure need massive upgrading and improvements.
The service upgrade financing must thus come from investments from within Saudi Arabia and from global strategic investors. The strategic investment for hajj and umrah is expected to obtain returns that can later benefit pilgrims. Ultimately, investors and pilgrims expect transparency in investment management, a subsequent increase in the hajj quota and a reduction in waiting time for pilgrims.
In 2023, the quota for pilgrims has returned to pre-Covid-19 levels, and is to be gradually increased in the next few years. This year, umrah pilgrims from outside Saudi Arabia have exceeded the number before the Covid-19 period by around seven million. The number of hajj and umrah pilgrims will be increased since the area for performing hajj and umrah is now also significantly expanded. The increase in the quotas is encouraging news for Muslims worldwide, especially pilgrims who have waited for an average of more than 20 years in Indonesia,[9] and 100 years in Malaysia.[10]
If Indonesia and Malaysia succeed in becoming strategic partners for investment in Saudi Arabia, pilgrims can get optimal financial benefits from their hajj funds deposits. Besides benefiting from the value of the investment, the results of managing the investment funds can return to their respective countries. Meanwhile, ASEAN countries such as Singapore and Brunei, which also have significant institutional investment funds, can also become Saudi Arabia’s strategic partners. For example, Singapore investors can be an important part of the digital transformation for hajj and umrah pilgrims with cashless transactions for living costs, transactions for consumption needs and purchases of tourism needs. With 10 million umrah pilgrims coming from outside Saudi Arabia, and if each of them spends at least US$1,000 per person during their stay in Saudi Arabia, the number of transaction fees that can be obtained is lucrative. Umrah pilgrims also benefit from cashless facilities and digital transactions that make them practical and safe when spending money for their daily needs or shopping. ASEAN banks that have also been operating in Saudi Arabia, such as those based in Thailand and the Philippines, can also serve various financing needs for hajj and umrah projects—independently or jointly with Saudi Arabian banks.
Brunei can join Indonesia and Thailand in investing in supplying “ready-to-eat” food products; or building hotels with Malaysia and Saudi Arabia via joint venture companies. Investments can also be made in the form of financing or buying shares in companies owned by Saudi Arabian investors. Thailand has expertise and know-how in halal ready-to-eat food, while Malaysia has experience managing long-term rental hotels in Mecca and Medina.
The cost of traveling and carrying out the pilgrimage is no longer low, but with the investment of hajj funds in Saudi Arabia already having permanent buyers or off-takers and is quite secure, the development of Islamic finance in the world will increase significantly. Islamic finance has the characteristics of non-ribawi—lawful, fair, non-speculative and inclusive.[11]
Nevertheless, while these investment opportunities can benefit Southeast Asia in the long run, the challenge now is for the governments in Southeast Asia to communicate these opportunities to their domestic audience, and explain why the increasing hajj costs are happening. They still have to manage pilgrims’ expectations of long waiting times and address the concerns of sub-standard services. Moreover, ASEAN countries need to explain that by carrying out a joint investment strategy with Saudi Arabian investors, pilgrims can hope that the capacity of hajj and umrah quotas will increase, and the waiting time for hajj pilgrims, especially from ASEAN countries, reduced.
The 2023 hajj season will be from May and peak at the end of June or early July. Each country has now begun preparing prospective pilgrims physically, religiously and financially. Intensive communication with the pilgrims regarding the current conditions must be carried out concurrently.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The Global Development Initiative (GDI) consolidates China’s international development cooperation agenda and seeks to bolster its role as a development partner for the Global South.
- Following the Belt and Road Initiative pattern in furthering the domestic-global nexus in China’s economic statecraft, the GDI seeks to synergise with its domestic pivot towards sustainable and innovation-driven growth in order to secure markets for Chinese goods, services and technologies in these new sectors.
- Southeast Asian countries unanimously support the GDI in the hope that it will contribute towards addressing their development deficits and that China will up its economic game more broadly in the region.
- The state-centric approach to development embedded in the GDI finds strong resonance among Southeast Asia’s ruling elites who embrace the ‘right to development’ and focus on delivering economic progress in their governance ethos.
- The GDI also serves as a diplomatic and discursive tool to discredit the US’ security-centric approach to the Indo-Pacific and tap into the discontent among developing countries who feel that the US and Europe devote too much attention and resources to the war in Ukraine at the expense of the Global South’s development needs.
* Hoang Thi Ha is Senior Fellow and Co-coordinator of the Regional Strategic and Political Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/9, 21 February 2023
INTRODUCTION
As China rises to great power status, Beijing has been pushing to reform the global governance system to better suit its interests and values. Multiple Chinese initiatives of a global scale have been rolled out, including the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Community of Shared Destiny, Global Security Initiative (GSI) and Global Development Initiative (GDI). Together, they seek to project China as a provider of global public goods by offering Chinese wisdom, solutions and resources to address global development and security challenges.
Launched by President Xi Jinping at the United Nations General Assembly in September 2021, the GDI aims to put “development high on the global macro policy agenda”.[1] Its main constituency is the Global South that involves mostly developing and less developed countries. To show that China is committed to the GDI’s “results-oriented actions”, in 2021 Xi pledged US$3 billion of international assistance for developing countries in the following three years.[2] In 2022, he announced China would upgrade the South-South Cooperation Assistance Fund with a replenishment of US$1 billion, and increase China’s support for the China-UN Peace and Development Fund.[3] Thus far, the GDI remains largely a declaration of intent and principles[4] and its funding scale through Chinese foreign assistance is rather modest compared to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) members. However, the GDI has been well received among developing countries, including in Southeast Asia. This article seeks to understand what the GDI represents and why it has gained broad support in Southeast Asia. In doing so, it argues that the GDI is not simply a refurbishing of China’s international development cooperation agenda; its significance – and implications – should be perceived in the broader context of China’s economic statecraft and in how its developmentalist approach serves China’s domestic political, economic and foreign policy agenda.
UNDERSTANDING THE GDI BEYOND CHINA’S DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION
According to Xi’s vision, the GDI aims to address “unbalanced and inadequate development among and within countries”, thus shifting beyond the model of untrammelled growth associated with environmental degradation and socio-economic inequalities that characterised the Chinese economy and much of the developing world in the past decades, towards promoting development that is “people-centred”, “high-quality”, “green” and “innovation-driven”.[5] This vision is translated into eight GDI priority areas, namely (i) poverty alleviation, (ii) food security, (iii) Covid-19 and vaccines, (iv) financing for development, (v) climate change and green development, (vi) industrialisation, (vii) digital economy, and (viii) connectivity.
The GDI seeks to bolster China’s role as a global development actor and a “responsible major developing country”.[6] It “frames China’s existing and new development cooperation efforts, repackaging, harmonising and synergising them for both China’s own internal coordination and articulation to the world”.[7] Projects officially designated under the GDI are funded by China’s development assistance channelled through the China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) or Chinese contributions to international initiatives/programmes. CIDCA – the GDI’s main implementing body – was established in 2018 as a vice-ministerial level agency under the State Council with the mandate of supporting South-South cooperation and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. CIDCA has set up the Global Development Promotion Centre to facilitate GDI implementation.[8]
The GDI launch is in line with the upward trend in China’s international development cooperation in the last decade which saw China’s discretionary contributions to multilateral development institutions and funds more than quadruple.[9] The total of Chinese foreign assistance in grants, interest-free loans and concessional loans between 2013 and 2018 were around US$40 billion.[10] The Chinese leadership increasingly attach importance to development cooperation in their statecraft, as reflected in the 2021 White Paper on China’s International Development Cooperation in the New Era. The paper broadly defines ‘international development cooperation’ as “China’s bilateral and multilateral efforts, within the framework of South-South cooperation, to promote economic and social development through foreign aid, humanitarian assistance, and other means”. Since China considers itself a developing country, its development cooperation is viewed as “a form of mutual assistance between developing countries under the South-South cooperation” rather than as a North-South donor-recipient relationship.[11]
Although China’s official statements and bureaucratic arrangements mainly cast the GDI through the lens of development cooperation, the GDI should be assessed in the broader context of China’s economic statecraft towards developing countries. As noted by Anthea Mulakala, “China anchors its [development cooperation] approach in South-South cooperation, which has broader parameters than Official Development Assistance (ODA), and includes investments, diplomacy and other modalities, such as those implemented through the Belt and Road Initiative.”[12] As such, the GDI is seen as a parallel and complementary track to the BRI. Both initiatives seek to align China’s financial, technological and human resources (supply-driven) with the economic and development needs of recipient countries (demand-driven). The BRI exports China’s infrastructure-building capacity surplus to fill infrastructure deficits in other developing countries. In the same vein, the GDI is propelled by the need to synergise China’s global engagement with its domestic economic agenda which increasingly shifts towards sustainable, inclusive and innovation-driven growth under Xi’s ‘common prosperity’ brand.
While the growth-oriented BRI involves big-ticket, capital-intensive projects in hard infrastructure, the GDI is development-oriented and relies on smaller-sized projects in such areas as public health, poverty reduction, green and low-carbon economy, digital industry and innovation.[13] This signals China’s “slow shift from mega infrastructure” to “small and beautiful projects”,[14] a move necessitated by the BRI’s decelerating momentum. After years of excessive overseas lending, China has become more cautious in infrastructure financing due to its own economic woes, repayment problems and the low economic returns on its foreign loans, and accumulative complaints about the BRI adding to socio-environmental risks, unsustainable debts and governance and corruption issues in partner countries.[15] According to a study by the Boston University Global Development Policy Center, China’s overseas development finance through the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China peaked in 2016 and shrank to only US$10.5 billion in 2020 and 2021.[16]
Following on the BRI, the GDI is the latest expression of China’s developmentalist approach to international relations, which views “economic development as the foundation for stability, security and peace” – a key guiding principle for China’s domestic and foreign policy since its opening-up and reform since the 1970s.[17] According to Evelyn Goh, these developmentalist principles “are deeply shared among post-colonial, developing countries.”[18] China therefore sees the Global South as a critical constituency where its extensive economic engagement alongside its developmental discourse would help Beijing win more friends and partners than Washington in their global contest. That is why the South-South cooperation is increasingly important in China’s grand strategy, and the Global South is often framed as being in one family and sharing a common destiny with China.
To fully grasp the implications of the GDI for international politics, one should look beyond the lens of Chinese development assistance and examine how effectively and robustly Beijing will pitch the GDI as a diplomatic and discursive device to propagate Chinese norms of governance, rally other countries in broad and flexible coalitions that support China’s global vision and agenda, and undermine American (and Western) normative influence and leadership in the global governance system. As noted by Joseph Lemoine and Yomna Gaafar, “[W]ith the GDI, China wants to lead what it hopes is a new era in development – not only by investing money, but also by leading the conversation.”[19] It is in this broader context that this article looks at how the GDI has been received in Southeast Asia and what implications it may have for the Sino-US strategic competition in the region.
THE GDI IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: A MEETING OF MINDS AND INTERESTS
Addressing Development Deficits
Most Southeast Asian countries are developing countries with huge development deficits. This makes the GDI an attractive offer to their governments. Southeast Asian countries have unanimously expressed their support for the GDI. The leaders of Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand attended the High-level Dialogue on Global Development hosted by Xi in June 2022. All ten ASEAN countries have joined the Group of Friends of the GDI at the UN. They also stand to become the largest regional group to benefit from this initiative, with 14 out of a total 50 projects (28%) in the GDI Project Pool’s first batch.[20] These projects focus on poverty reduction, pandemic response, food security, climate change and green development. Mainland Southeast Asian countries have a larger share of projects than the maritime ones. Singapore – the most advanced economy in ASEAN – has but one project on digital border information connectivity.
At the ASEAN level, the ASEAN-China foreign ministers meeting in August 2022 “welcomed the Global Development Initiative (GDI)… and encouraged participation in the GDI priority areas”.[21] This was followed by the adoption of the ASEAN-China Joint Statement on Strengthening Common and Sustainable Development at the 25th ASEAN-China summit in November 2022, which affirmed both sides’ “commitment to development” and “priority to development undertakings”.[22] Xi pledged in 2021 that China will provide US$1.5 billion in development assistance for ASEAN countries in the next three years. In 2022, China offered to set up a special loan for ASEAN’s and China’s common development.
The GDI builds upon the existing ASEAN-China development cooperation agenda. During recent years, this agenda has increasingly focused on public health, green transition and digital development – three priority areas of the GDI. The Covid-19 pandemic has driven closer ASEAN-China cooperation in public health. As of August 2022, China had donated US$6 million to the ASEAN COVID-19 Response Fund and provided over 600 million doses of COVID-19 vaccines to Southeast Asian countries (in both donations and sales). In green transition, both sides adopted the 2021 Joint Statement on Enhancing Green and Sustainable Development Cooperation “to promote climate change mitigation and adaptation” through energy transition and energy resilience, forest management, climate smart agriculture, and knowledge sharing on climate change tackling. In digital transformation, the ASEAN-China Partnership on Digital Economy is being implemented through its 2021-2025 five-year action plan; policy exchanges are conducted through the annual ASEAN-China Digital Ministers Meeting starting from 2021; and an ASEAN-China Digital Trade Centre will be established in Guangxi, China.
Apart from these new priority areas, the GDI’s poverty alleviation component would be of great interest to Southeast Asian countries, given that their development goals have been seriously undermined by the Covid-19 pandemic. According to the Asian Development Bank, the pandemic pushed an additional 4.7 million people in Southeast Asia into extreme poverty in 2021 and caused 9.3 million job losses, compared with a baseline no-COVID scenario.[23] Meanwhile, China has lifted 800 million out of poverty over the past four decades and declared in 2021 that it had eliminated absolute poverty (at the threshold of below US$1.90 per day). Building upon its success story, the Chinese government has made poverty reduction a highlight of its development cooperation agenda, calling for the achievement of a “Global Community of Shared Future Free from Poverty”.[24] Mainland Southeast Asian countries are among the largest recipients of Chinese development aid targeted at poor communities. Together with Vietnam, these countries accounted for 74% of China’s aid to the region between 2000 and 2014.[25] More importantly, China’s role in enabling poverty reduction in Southeast Asia is channelled through economic opportunities from its enhanced trade and investment ties with the region.
Going forward, it is also important to follow ASEAN-China cooperation in the sharing of development knowledge, which is driven by China’s efforts to legitimise and promote the ‘China Model’ internationally. One manifestation of this is the rise of international development studies in China, focusing on China’s developmental path and promoting it as a model of development in Global South–South relations.[26] China has established the Center for International Knowledge on Development (CIKD) which actively promotes the GDI and concurrently serves as the Secretariat of the China-ASEAN Knowledge Network for Development launched in May 2022. Under the 2021-2025 plan of action to implement the ASEAN-China strategic partnership, both sides have agreed to enhance policy communication and promote sharing of experiences on governance, including e-governance, public sector reform, local administration capacity building, environmental governance, and digital governance.[27]
Confluence of Economic Interests
There are economic motives beyond development cooperation that make the GDI an attractive value proposition for both Southeast Asia and China. On the Chinese side, the GDI is arguably driven less by altruistic motives than by the need to synergise China’s global engagement with its new development stage characterised by Xi’s development philosophy of “innovative, coordinated, green, open and shared development”.[28] As such, China’s domestic economic agenda has increasingly pivoted towards sustainability and innovation-driven growth, which entails the need to secure export markets for Chinese goods, services and technologies in these new sectors. At the 2022 ASEAN-China Summit, Chinese premier Li Keqiang highlighted five areas of strengthened cooperation between China and ASEAN economies, namely (i) trade and investment liberalisation and facilitation, (ii) new-type industrialisation, (iii) digital transformation, (iv) low-carbon development, and (v) agricultural modernisation.[29] These areas overlap with the GDI priorities, and they signal China’s coming of age as an economic heavyweight, a technological powerhouse, and a global development actor.
On their part, Southeast Asian countries embrace the GDI not only because they anticipate larger Chinese development assistance but more importantly, they expect China to up its economic game in the region. Most Southeast Asian countries, except Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, have moved from recipients of aid to providers of development cooperation.[30] Rather than counting on Chinese aid, they would look towards greater development opportunities through extensive economic ties with China.
There are ample development needs and new drivers of growth in Southeast Asia, making the region a prime destination for China’s investment, collaboration and assistance in new areas. For example, Chinese big techs have deep stakes in the region’s digital economy to tap into its growth potential which is estimated to reach US$363 billion in 2025.[31] Alibaba-owned Lazada is the largest e-commerce platform in the region, operating in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. Alibaba and Tencent are major investors in most promising tech start-ups in the region such as SEA, Tokopedia, and Go-Jek. Chinese tech titans, notably Alibaba, Tencent and Huawei, are building multiple data centres in Southeast Asia since this region is assessed to be “indispensable for growth” of Chinese cloud companies.[32]
In terms of the sustainability agenda, China’s ongoing innovation drive towards green development has had positive spill-over effects to other countries. For example, its 80% market share for all manufacturing stages of solar panels has reduced the cost of solar PV by over 80% in the past decade, which helped to accelerate worldwide clean energy transition.[33] At the same time, China needs a global market to upscale and export its manufacturing capacity for greater cost efficiency, including in Southeast Asia where the green economy sectors will potentially generate US$1 trillion economic opportunities by 2030 if climate action is seriously pursued.[34]
Meeting of Minds
The GDI is not only an instrument of Chinese economic statecraft but also a normative vessel to promote China’s state-centric approach to development to serve its domestic political and geopolitical agenda. At the heart of this approach is the belief that ‘development’ – understood by China as economic progress in material terms – is “the master key to solving all problems”, from poverty to conflict and turmoil, in line with the Chinese traditional philosophy that “the essence of governance is livelihood; and the essence of livelihood is adequacy.”[35] The GDI’s normative significance therefore lies in its intent and effect to “reframe narratives around governance and human rights” to counter the Western discourse that places emphasis on civil-political and individual rights.[36] This Chinese approach finds strong resonance among Southeast Asian ruling elites who embrace the ‘right to development’[37] in the 2012 ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and prioritise the delivery of economic prosperity over the realisation of civil-political rights in their governance ethos.
The GDI also serves as a diplomatic and discursive tool to discredit what China views as the US and its allies/partners’ security-centric approach in their Indo-Pacific strategies. It pitches China-led win-win economic cooperation versus US-led zero-sum alliance-building. This simplistic framing glosses over China’s own military build-up as well as efforts by the US and its allies/partners to compete with China in delivering global public goods from Covid-19 vaccines to clean energy. However, this narrative resonates with many Southeast Asian leaders whose current top concerns are to have their economies recover from the pandemic, overcome economic fallouts from the war in Ukraine, and avoid entanglement in great power conflict. Chief among them is Indonesian president Joko Widodo who is well-known for his preoccupation with bread-and-butter issues rather than geopolitics. Under his watch, Indonesia’s 2022 G20 presidency prioritised three issues, namely inclusive health management, digital-based transformation and transition towards sustainable energy, all of which fall under the GDI’s ambit. Xi’s speech at the Bali G20 summit focusing on global development dovetailed well with Jokowi’s preference.[38]
Some pundits have criticised Jokowi for his parochial foreign policy, but his stand is not without public support. According to the State of Southeast Asia 2023 survey, the majority of Southeast Asian respondents view the increase in energy and food prices as the most serious impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine for the region (58.3%), well above the second-ranked concern over the erosion of the rules-based order and violation of national sovereignty (25.9%).[39] Against this backdrop, China could leverage the GDI to tap into the discontent among developing countries who feel that the US and Europe devote too much attention and resources to the war in Ukraine at the expense of the Global South’s development needs. Even India – a strategic opponent of China and a member of the Quad – has voiced similar grievances. In December 2022, Indian foreign minister S. Jaishankar highlighted two big divides in the world: “One is the East-West divide centering around Ukraine and the other is a north-south divide centering around development.”[40] In the same vein, Chinese media decried Washington’s US$150 million in development assistance pledged at the special ASEAN-US summit in May 2022, saying that it is “just a drop in the bucket if compared to US support for Ukraine” (US Congress approved a US$40 billion aid package for Ukraine in the same month) and also a meagre amount compared to Xi’s pledge of US$1.5 billion in 2021.[41]
CONCLUSION
The GDI signals China’s intent to be a global leader in development cooperation on its own terms. Its focus on poverty reduction, healthcare, green transition and digital transformation corresponds to the global trends of sustainability and innovation as well as the prevailing needs for pandemic response and the economic recovery of many countries. The GDI, however, is not simply a package of development projects supported by Chinese foreign aid. Its significance – and its implications – should be perceived in the broader context of Chinese statecraft that seeks to synergise China’s domestic economic shift towards sustainability and innovation-driven growth with its international engagement. It also serves as a discursive weapon to legitimise the Chinese developmentalist approach to domestic and global governance as well as to discredit the US’ security-centric approach in the Indo-Pacific and US’ role as the provider of security goods in the region.
Since ‘development’ is an encompassing and positive-sounding concept, the GDI has become China’s new rallying cry to deepen its comprehensive ties with Southeast Asian countries and ASEAN as a whole, from education to health, green transition to digital transformation, social security to economic integration. Southeast Asian countries support the GDI as they expect material benefits out of it as well as normative alignment around the ‘right to development’. However, it is premature to infer that they consent to China’s “hegemonic bargain”, i.e. enjoyment of China’s economic rewards in exchange for acceptance of China’s hegemony.[42] China’s expectation is that confluence of economic interests would trump disagreements on security issues. Judging by the enduring distrust towards China among Southeast Asian foreign policy elites, their doubts about China’s Global Security Initiative, and their abiding interest in deepening ties with other major powers,[43] China has a long way to go to convince Southeast Asians that looking towards Beijing is their best hope.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- A recent conflict between Indonesian workers and Chinese workers in North Morowali Regency brings into focus several issues concerning Chinese investments in Indonesia, poor working environments, and bad treatment of local workers.
- Three factors underlie the escalation of labour discontent into violent conflict: Ethnic and cultural differences, poor governance in labour relations and the role of external actors in using the situation to undermine the government’s policy.
- The conflict in North Morowali, if left unresolved, may deter Chinese investors from coming, and this would hinder the government’s plan to build the world’s largest nickel industry on the island.
- Authorities must carefully manage the issue of migrant workers and balance national policy goals with local communities’ interests. It needs to pay attention to some cultural and political factors that have complicated industrial relations in some Chinese-managed companies in Indonesia.
- The most immediate issue to tackle is the enforcement of labour regulations, specifically the improvement of workers’ safety and their working environment, as well as adjustment of workers’ salaries. Such measures would significantly reduce the potential for future industrial conflict.
* Leo Suryadinata is Visiting Senior Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. Siwage Dharma Negara is Senior Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. Both authors would like to thank Manggi Habir, Tham Siew Yean, and Max Lane for their comments and suggestions in the early draft.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/8, 17 February 2023
INTRODUCTION
A recent conflict between Indonesian workers and Chinese workers in the Gunbuster Nickel Industry (GNI) Smelter Company, located in North Morowali Regency, Central Sulawesi Province, has highlighted several issues concerning Chinese investment in Indonesia. It started with local workers’ demand for a better and safer working environment. The demonstration then became violent and resulted in the burning and looting of part of the factory on 14 January 2023. Two people died, one Chinese worker and one local worker, and many were injured.[1] In fact, this is not the first conflict in the Morowali smelter nickel industry, but to our knowledge, this is the first one where there have been casualties.[2]
This violent industrial conflict drew national attention after being reported widely on social media. While the authorities managed to control the situation, the tension is not yet over. What is at stake is the future of Chinese investments in Indonesia in general and in Sulawesi in particular.
This essay looks at the origin of the conflict and presents different views about it. It argues that cultural and political factors tend to complicate industrial relations in some Chinese-managed companies in Indonesia. The authorities must carefully deal with the issue to balance national policy goals with local communities’ interests.
ORIGINS OF THE CONFLICT
The incident started from the demand of local workers for GNI to improve the safety, working environment, and salary of local workers. The local workers were represented by Serikat Pekerja Nasional (National Trade Union or SPN). On 13 January, the negotiations between the GNI management and the trade union had agreed on most of the workers’ demands. Management, however, did not approve the request to restore the dismissed workers because of their involvement in the leadership of SPN. As a result, the SPN urged workers to strike on 14 January.[3]
According to a newspaper report, local workers decided to stage a strike and asked all workers inside the company, including their Chinese counterparts, to join in, but the latter refused.[4] Meanwhile, the SPN reported that one Chinese worker attacked an Indonesian worker using an iron stick, turning what was, heretofore, a peaceful strike into a violent conflict.[5]
The demonstrators began to burn the company’s properties, including heavy machinery, vehicles and other facilities. The police were called in and soon restored order. However, in the evening, some “demonstrators” raided and looted the female workers’ hostel inside the company’s compound. SPN’s leaders denied workers’ involvement in the raid as the demonstration had already ended. There is suspicion that the perpetrators were outsiders who wanted to prolong the conflict.[6]
What triggered the workers’ strike and developed into violence is still under investigation. There were at least three factors at play in the escalation. These are ethnic and cultural differences; poor governance and unequal treatment of Chinese migrant workers vs local workers; and external actors seeking to undermine Jokowi’s ambitions regarding the development of the nickel industry.
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NICKEL INDUSTRY
Indonesia is one of the largest nickel producers in the world. According to data from the United States Geological Survey, nickel production in the country reached around one million metric tons in 2021, contributing 37 per cent of world nickel production.[7] Morowali itself contributes about 60 per cent of the total value of the nickel industry in Indonesia.[8]
In the past, nickel was exported as raw materials such as nickel ore, which is an important metal for steel, battery and electric car industries. The Joko “Jokowi” Widodo administration, especially in his second term, began to implement a stringent downstream policy, i.e., requiring mining companies to process mineral ore domestically to increase domestic value add. Indonesia started banning nickel ore export in early 2020, and withdrawing the export permits for mining companies that did not build smelters.[9]
Since 2015, Indonesia has invited foreign investors to build nickel smelters to support its downstream policy.[10] While Western investors were reluctant to invest in this “energy-intensive” sector, mainland Chinese investors were eager to enter the industry as they badly needed the semi-processed nickel supply. As a result, most of these nickel smelter companies operating in Indonesia now are from mainland China.[11]
Figure 1 shows that foreign investments, mainly from China, have increased significantly since 2015. These are concentrated in the nickel processing industry. Ferronickel and derivative products, such as iron and steel, are also exported, mainly to China.[12]
Figure 1: Foreign investment, Morowali (US$ million)
Source: Indonesia Investment Coordinating Board
The presence of Chinese nickel companies and skilled Chinese workers has driven the rapid development of the ferronickel smelting industry in Sulawesi. Chinese investments in Morowali have contributed to the local economy, increasing the output (GDP) (Figure 2) and local government tax revenue (Figure 3). These investments have also led to more job opportunities for the locals and indirectly contribute to the local economy, through spillover effects to many small businesses, including mom-and-pop shops, and room rental businesses.
Figure 2: Real Gross Domestic Products, Morowali (Rp billion)
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics
Figure 3: Local Government Revenue, Morowali (Rp billion)
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics
President Jokowi said that Indonesia would continue implementing the downstreaming policy even though Indonesia lost the WTO lawsuit on the export ban.[13] This policy is believed to have successfully increased Indonesia’s manufacturing export competitiveness and boosted the state revenue collection from taxes. Before having smelters, Indonesia’s nickel ore exports only earned around US$ 1 billion per year, but after having smelters, the gains from the export of nickel-processed products jumped to US$ 20.9 billion in 2021. This is expected to increase to US$ 30 billion in 2022.[14] In addition, the president believed Indonesia would also gain from technology transfer in the nickel processing industry. His ambition is that Indonesia would become a global hub for nickel-based material production.
Given this ambition, Indonesia is interested in attracting more Chinese investments in the sector. Nevertheless, the violent conflict in Morowali, if not resolved completely, would deter Chinese investors from coming, and adversely affect Jokowi’s ambition to build the world’s largest nickel industry.
ELITE’S VIEWS ON CHINESE WORKERS
The Indonesian elites are divided in opinion on the presence of Chinese foreign workers. This division is reflected in dialogues between Luhut Pandjaitan, the current coordinating minister of investment and maritime affairs, and Jusuf Kalla (JK). The latter is a former Vice President of Indonesia (2004–2009 and 2014–2019) and used to be one of the leaders of the Golkar Party. He is also a businessman from Sulawesi. His business group is influential in eastern Indonesia, where the Morowali project is located.
In October 2022, JK made a statement that he did not wish to invest in Morowali as the Chinese workers dominated all the projects. He added that in Morowali, even welders were imported from China. JK said he tried to use only Indonesian workers, not Chinese workers. His company, Bukaka, an infrastructure and metal construction industry, only used Indonesian workers, according to him.[15] Subsequently, in November 2022, Luhut responded to JK’s comments on the Chinese workers in Morowali. [16] Luhut said that the nickel industry in Morowali was initially dominated by Chinese workers as there were no skilled workers in the area. This was because Indonesia had no school on smelter technology, and it was impossible to hire all Indonesians to work in smelter-related operations, given it takes time to train the local workers. However, Luhut said that the situation had changed today. “In Morowali, you would discover that most workers are Indonesians.”[17]
Regardless of the debate, the large number of Chinese workers in Morowali have caused negative sentiment against Chinese investment in Indonesia. According to deputy Manpower Minister, Afriansyah Noor, the government only recorded 547 foreign workers from China in the GNI. Yet, according to the company figure, there were 1,312 workers. He said this discrepancy was due to different ways of classifying workers, and these should therefore be verified by the authorities.[18]
DIFFERENT VIEWS OF THE CONFLICT
The Indonesian elites have different views concerning Chinese companies in general and the GNI in particular. Former Secretary of State Owned Companies (BUMN) Ministry, Said Didu, was one of the strongest critics of Chinese investment.[19] He said that the government had sold the country to China, and argued that Chinese smelters companies eventually gained most of the profit and brought it back to China while Indonesia gained very little.
Another Jokowi Critic, Shahganda Nainggolan, who got a PhD. from the University of Indonesia on Indonesian labour history, equates Chinese mining companies to the Dutch VOC (Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie, Dutch East Indies Company, 1602-1799). He accused Chinese companies of exploiting Indonesia’s resources and enslaving Indonesian workers, ignoring workers’ rights. He added the Chinese companies ignored the safety and welfare of the local workers amd exploited the workers worse than their Western counterparts.[20] He added that the Chinese companies do not feel comfortable with SPN and do not know how to deal with them as there is no Trade Union in China. They are therefore ignorant of human rights.
Nainggolan blamed the Joko Widodo government for being too lenient with Chinese companies. He argued that there were too many Chinese workers and they did not understand the local language and culture. This has therefore caused cultural conflicts.[21] He compared them with the Japanese, Korean, and American workers who could speak Indonesian or at least understood the language and were willing to learn the local culture.
Kat Saing, the Morowali workers association leader, noted that they were not anti-Chinese workers. But he did not deny there was friction between local and Chinese workers. Nevertheless, he was critical of the Chinese company management for not being responsive to the workers’ demands, especially on safety and welfare issues. They did not observe the regulation on occupational health and safety regulations (Kesehatan dan Keselamatan Kerja or KKK), which stipulated that the company should provide workers with a healthy and safe working environment.[22] He also raised the issues of salary and contracts for being detrimental to the welfare of local workers.
Daeng Wahidin, president of the Indonesian Muslim Workers’ Brotherhood, PPMI (Persaudaraan Pekerja Muslim Indonesia), blamed the GNI management for discriminating against “pribumi” workers. He claimed that the local workers who did the same jobs were only paid Rp 5 million (US$ 334), while their Chinese counterparts were paid more than three times that. Yet, there is no hard evidence for this claim. He blamed Luhut Pandjaitan, who “endorsed” the permit to the Chinese companies in Morowali to “exploit Indonesian workers” and “to sell the country to foreigners”.[23]
However, Maman Abdurrahman, the deputy of Committee 7 (Komisi VII) in the Indonesian Parliament, offered a more balanced picture. He noted that Indonesia needed foreign investment, including Chinese investments, and argued that not all Chinese companies were like the ones described by the critics. He acknowledged that there were problems between the management and the local workers in the GNI case, but that the problem had to be resolved by both workers and the company; they were two sides of one coin, and had a symbiotic relationship.
Yet, he also noted a striking difference between Chinese workers and local workers, in terms of working attitudes and social values. Chinese workers could tolerate harsh working conditions and long working hours, which were unacceptable to Indonesian workers. Therefore, Chinese companies should be aware of Indonesian culture, they needed to communicate with the local workers, and this required some knowledge of basic Indonesian language.
Nevertheless, regarding the poor safety and working condition of the workers in some Chinese mining companies, Maman argued that these needed to be corrected and the authorities should act immediately. He was also concerned that the demonstration had led to violent conflict, and that the worksite was destroyed. This, he said, should not be tolerated.[24]
The poor safety and working conditions of the workers in the GNI are, in fact, not a secret. On 22 December 2022, two Indonesian workers died in the smelters in work accidents. This incident triggered workers’ demands that led to the 14 January conflict. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the GNI is not a good reflection of other smelters in Indonesia. Many companies operate with safer and better working conditions. The government should nevertheless supervise these companies and ensure strict implementation of work-safety regulations.[25]
Afriansyah Noor, the deputy Manpower minister, presented the government position. He mentioned that the government had paid attention to foreign companies, including Chinese companies. The big Chinese companies often operate with several sub-companies, and the latter, in some cases, do not do the job properly. The work accident that occurred on 22 December 2022 at the GNI smelter, needed to be investigated and resolved. He urged the local authorities to address the problem seriously before it got worse.
Interestingly, on 30 January, in an entrepreneurs’ meeting, JK made a speech mentioning the conflict in North Morowali. He noted that it was important to prevent the recurrence of the conflict, and this could be done with the locals and local authorities taking over the smelter nickel projects in Sulawesi.[26] He went on to say that Indonesians had nothing to be proud of with foreigners managing the smelters. He claimed local entrepreneurs had the capability to operate the business, and supported the plan of the South Sulawesi provincial government and entrepreneurs to take over the Luwu Timur nickel mining project from PT Vale.[27] He urged that other smelter nickel projects in Sulawesi also be returned to the locals and local authorities. JK was clearly using the Morowali incident to play up Indonesian nationalism.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Reviewing what has happened in the GNI and beyond, one can see three factors at work in relation to China-managed companies in Indonesia. Firstly, there was a cultural conflict between the local Indonesian workers and the Chinese workers. Language and cultural differences had caused misunderstandings and triggered physical tensions. Secondly, the conflict could have been avoided or lessened if companies would implement good governance concerning safety working and living conditions for all workers. Thirdly, there is a clear division of views concerning Chinese investment and Chinese corporate operations among the Indonesian elites. One group is against the presence of Chinese companies and see the Chinese companies as exploiters. But some members of this group may also have their own vested interests as they are also investing in a similar business. The other group welcomes the Chinese companies, as no other country has the capital and willingness to invest in Indonesia on such a scale.
The above factors contributed to the violent conflict in North Morowali, but the most immediate issue to tackle is the enforcement of labour regulations, specifically the improvement of worker safety and their work environment, and adjustments of worker salaries. This improvement would reduce the potential for future industrial conflict, if not eliminate it. Reducing foreign worker numbers and improving communication between the Chinese and local workers are also needed. Identifying the perpetrators[28] is also an immediate issue to be resolved, not only to protect the industry but also to prevent this issue from being exploited to undermine the government’s policy.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Three major shifts are underway in the international order today: from unipolarity to multipolarity, from alliances to alignments, and from multilateralism to minilateralism.
- As the world becomes more multipolar, many countries are likely to prefer flexible alignments over fixed alliances, creating a far more complex web of relationships.
- This rise of more flexible alignments will incentivise the creation of smaller, issue-specific minilateral groupings over larger multilateral arrangements with broader remits.
- Together, these shifts are leading to one major change in international relations: the rise of coalitions. This will have profound effects on countries, both large and small.
This era of coalitions poses a particular challenge for Southeast Asian states, which have heretofore sought to avoid such alignments to maintain ASEAN unity and centrality.
* Zack Cooper is Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and adjunct faculty member at Georgetown University and Princeton University. He was previously Visiting Senior Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/7, 10 February 2023
INTRODUCTION
The era of coalitions is upon us. In recent years, the world has witnessed the growing importance of coalitions like the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, and the United States), AUKUS (Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), Chip 4 (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the United States), and many more. The rise of coalitions might seem to be a blip in the historical record, but it is no accident. Instead, coalitions are the natural response to three shifts in the international order: from unipolarity to multipolarity, from alliances to alignments, and from multilateralism to minilateralism.
This essay explains how these three changes incentivise coalition-building and why this new era of coalitions will present opportunities for some countries while confronting others with serious strategic challenges.
UNIPOLARITY TO MULTIPOLARITY
It has been clear for many years that the world is moving away from the age of American unipolarity that has existed since the end of the Cold War.[1] Some reasons are structural and longstanding, such as population growth and economic development, which have raised the importance of India, China, and others. Other reasons have to do with a crisis of confidence in the United States, and international concern about the direction and reliability of the United States has risen substantially in recent years. As a result, the unipolar moment is now ending.
What will replace unipolarity remains less clear. Taken together, the United States and China hold half of the world’s total wealth.[2] Some have therefore predicted that Washington and Beijing will build competing blocs and construct a bipolar system akin to that which existed during the Cold War. But this now seems unlikely. To the extent that American and Chinese leaders are increasingly seen as unpredictable and inward-focused, they are encouraging the creation of a multipolar world with a larger number of poles and competing power centres.
For its part, the United States is viewed by many around the world as an increasingly erratic superpower. Donald Trump detested alliances. Joe Biden embraces them.[3] Washington once championed free trade. Now bipartisan majorities support protectionist policies.[4] Meanwhile, questions about the health of America’s democratic institutions undermine U.S. standing abroad.[5] The result is that few countries—including many longstanding U.S. treaty allies—are willing to bet their future entirely on the United States.[6]
China was in prime position to benefit from the erosion of trust in the United States, but Beijing has undermined its own global standing in recent years. The Chinese Communist Party’s mismanagement of its economic situation is leading many to question whether China will continue to be an engine of global growth and whether it will ever surpass the United States economically.[7] At the same time, Xi Jinping’s centralisation of power has created a more brittle political system. And the rise of “wolf warrior” diplomacy has done damage to China’s diplomatic standing from Australia to Lithuania, and from South Korea to India.[8]
In short, whereas a decade ago many countries looked to the United States for security and China for economic growth, neither appears to be a sure bet today. As a result, countries are looking for new security arrangements and sources of economic growth. While some in Beijing and Washington talk of a “new Cold War,” many reject the simplistic concepts of bandwagoning and balancing.[9] Instead, they are seeking greater autonomy or looking to tie themselves together with other countries beyond the world’s two largest powers.[10]
This emerging multipolar world will be far more complicated that anything that existed in the recent past simply because there are likely to be many more power centres. India is carving out its own unique position. So too is the European Union, and some of its individual member states. All the while, powers like Brazil, Nigeria and Indonesia are growing in importance. The complexity of this world goes far beyond anything from the last century, and it will challenge policymakers in every capital to come up with new approaches and strategies.
ALLIANCES TO ALIGNMENTS
The shift from unipolarity to multipolarity will make fixed alliances less attractive to many countries around the world. After all, multipolar systems tend to be less static, leading to more frequent changes in alignment.[11] Alliances tend to be highly formalised, requiring long, laborious, and legalistic negotiation processes.[12] But as leaders seek greater flexibility in their international arrangements, the attractiveness of new alliances is likely to wane.
This does not imply that fixed treaty alliances will disappear. Path dependency makes alliance relationships sticky – it is no small thing to tear up a treaty commitment, particularly when the treaty is multinational.[13] Indeed, some alliances outside Asia, like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), are even expanding with the admission of historically non-aligned Sweden and Finland. This is logical given Russian aggression and the tendency of countries to balance together against clear threats. But in the years ahead, this is likely to be the exception and not the rule.
One major difference between alliances and alignments is their scope. Alliances tend to be broader than many imagine. Although alliances are typically thought of as focused on military cooperation, the truth is that numerous alliances explicitly include economic, technological, and diplomatic components. As a result, alliances often represent a whole-of-government or even whole-of-society commitment by one country to another. Alignments, however, are more likely to shift from issue to issue. The issue-specific nature of alignments implies that countries can align with different sets of countries on different topics. India, for example, is maintaining its close economic alignment with Russia while increasing its security alignment with the United States and continuing its policy of non-alignment in other areas. Similarly, many European countries are maintaining their security alignment with the United States but adopting more independent approaches to economic and technology issues.
One implication of the shift toward alignments is that a subset of existing alliances built on weak foundations may come under serious pressure, and potentially even collapse. The most obvious candidate for collapse in Asia is the U.S. alliance with Thailand.[14] The two sides no longer share a similar set of threat perceptions. Whereas the United States increasingly sees China as the greatest challenge to its interests, Thai leaders are much more comfortable with Beijing.[15] Furthermore, differences in governance present a real risk to the alliance. For example, the U.S. Congress has applied restrictions that prevent foreign assistance funds from being directed to governments in power due to coups, which has hampered U.S.-Thai relations.[16] Similar differences in threat perception and domestic governance exist with several longstanding U.S. partners in the Middle East, which could signal that realignments are just around the corner there as well.
For the most part, new alignments will coexist with alliance networks, complicating regional and global arrangements. For example, China and Russia may not be formal allies, but they are clearly aligned in many areas.[17] So too are Japan and Australia, despite the lack of a formal treaty alliance. As these more flexible alignments materialise, they will often be overinterpreted, since experts too frequently conflate issue-specific alignments with all-encompassing alliances. Despite calls, including from a U.S. Senator, for a “Pacific NATO”, nothing of the sort is in the cards.[18]
MULTILATERALISM TO MINILATERALISM
As the world becomes more multipolar and alignments become more flexible, the form of many countries’ international engagement is likely to change. Large multilateral groupings including many states with varied interests and objectives will become more difficult to manage. Smaller, more issue-specific groups will offer more rapid progress toward specific objectives. In short, minilateralism is likely to displace multilateralism, offering more return on investment.
Minilateral groups are likely to be appealing for several reasons. First, minilaterals tend to have a more defined topic or objective, so they are better tailored to make progress on specific issues. Second, since they include fewer countries, minilaterals make it easier to bring together only those countries or leaders with similar agendas and objectives. Third, since minilaterals tend to be more flexible, they can meet and evolve as situations demand, rather than having to wait for predetermined yearly meetings and slow-moving institutions. All these factors make it easier to forge agreements and implement initiatives in minilateral than multilateral settings.
Existing multilateral institutions—like formal treaty alliances—will not disappear. Defunct international organisations are seldom discarded outright but tend to slowly fade into irrelevance.[19] Outdated multilateral institutions will instead find themselves competing for time, attention, and resources with their newer minilateral counterparts. Less frequent meetings and the delegation of attendance to more junior officials will be the first signs of trouble for many multilateral groups. The multilateral groupings that survive will need to demonstrate real value beyond simple “talk shops” on the yearly calendar of senior leaders.
Some experts have described the resulting combination of minilateral and multilateral groupings as hubs and spokes, webs, or latticework. These types of network concepts correctly portray how new minilateral architectures will be layered over existing multilateral groupings. The result will be not one order dominated by a single hegemon, nor a duo of competing blocs, but rather a far more complicated set of interlocking arrangements, with different coalitions working together to further objectives on different issues.
EMERGING COALITIONS
Taken together, the shifts from unipolarity to multipolarity, alliances to alignments, and multilateralism to minilateralism are leading to one major change: the rise of coalitions. Although the exact nature of these groupings will be highly dependent on decisions by individual countries and leaders, coalitions are already forming around four basic issues: security, economics, technology, and governance.[20] Each is emerging with a different set of countries and objectives, therefore generating diverse coalitions with unique characteristics.
Security coalitions tend to be the smallest and most deeply integrated. After all, countries cannot simply fight alongside one another overnight, they need to have clear roles and missions as well as some degree of combined planning, training, and interoperability to be effective. Security is therefore the area in which fixed alliances remain the most beneficial – NATO and most U.S. alliances in Asia are unlikely to go away anytime soon. But where there is a common security threat, as China is perceived to be by Australia, Japan, India, and the United States, new coalitions are already forming. Although the Quad often describes itself as a non-security grouping, the reality is that it represents Asia’s most important emerging security coalition.[21]
In the economic domain, multiple coalitions are emerging. The G7 is increasingly operating as the organising coalition for some of the world’s advanced industrial economies. It has negotiated and coordinated the new global minimum tax as well as a range of economic penalties on Russia in the wake of its invasion of Ukraine. In Asia, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), and Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) are all in play. Since economic cooperation does not require the same level of political and strategic alignment as military cooperation, the emerging economic coalitions are larger and less formalised than those in the security domain.
In the technology space, there are multiple minilaterals, but no over-arching coalition has yet taken shape. The United States and the European Union have a Trade and Technology Council. The Biden administration is pushing for greater coordination on semiconductor supply chains through the Chip 4 alliance with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.[22] The Quad has its own supply chain working group, which is also focused on technology issues. It is possible that all of these groups—or new concepts like a grouping of leading “techno-democracies (T-12) —will flourish in the years ahead.[23] But it seems more likely that policymakers will look to combine some of these related coalitions to simplify the increasingly complex task of coordinating technology policy with a large number of countries with varying interests and objectives.
The most diffuse coalitions tend to focus on governance issues, whether they be domestic or international. The Biden administration has attempted to build a democratic coalition, but its early efforts via the Summit for Democracy have largely stalled.[24] International issues like climate change have been able to build larger and more stable coalitions, but there too, progress has been slower than many hoped or expected. The larger the coalition gets, the more unwieldy it is, so governance-focused groups that include many countries are by their nature more difficult to organise and to drive toward consensus.
GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS
Many observers think about alignments the same way they did during the Cold War, as fixed and all-encompassing alliances. Yet, for all the reasons described above, coalitions tend to be smaller, more flexible, and more issue-oriented than the blocs that characterised the second half of the 20th century. So how will this new era change the choices and fortunes of countries around the world?
For the United States, the growth of coalitions brings with it a new era of uncertainty. Washington has long benefitted from a host of alliances and multilateral arrangements that have generally been centred around the United States. But as America transitions into one hub of many, it cannot simply dictate its terms; U.S. diplomacy has to invest more in building common ground and forging consensus with allies and partners. Friendly coalitions of like-minded states could reinforce many U.S. aims, but they will also decrease U.S. control. As a result, many American policymakers are likely to regard a coalitions-based construct with some degree of skepticism. In fact, some U.S. experts have to date rejected this development and hoped instead for the emergence of a single, large coalition to balance China across a number of issue sets.[25] But this is the way of the past, not the reality of the future (or even the present).
For powers like China and Russia, which do not have large pre-existing alliance networks, the shift toward coalitions also opens up new opportunities to reach out to their like-minded partners. China, Russia, and others are building their own minilateral groups, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Their success will depend, however, on whether they can articulate shared objectives, particularly having to do with the provision of public goods. Much Sino-Russian engagement today, however, is defined less by a positive vision of the future than it is by a rejection of the “Western” model. This will make it hard to work with some of the more capable potential partners, since they may not want to align against American or European approaches. Indeed, America’s existing alliances will not go away overnight, and it is becoming clear that belligerent actions by Beijing or Moscow are likely to accelerate coalition-building and tighten alignments around them.
For powers currently allied to the United States, such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Canada, and others, the emergence of coalitions provides more options. U.S. allies can maintain alignment with the United States in the areas in which it suits them, but will now have greater space to pursue independent and/or complementary policies in other areas. Consequently, if relationships with the United States worsen, current U.S. allies will have more exit options since they can decrease reliance on Washington without forgoing alignment altogether by pursuing greater autonomy or closer integration with other international players. For example, Japan is working more with Australia, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and others in ways that do not directly undermine its alliance with the United States, but provide ballast against the possibility of worsening U.S.-Japan ties under a future American administration.
For powers that are not clearly aligned today—India, Indonesia, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, South Africa, etc.—the rise of coalitions presents many benefits. As these countries grow and multipolarity becomes more apparent, they may emerge as heavyweights in the international order in their own right. Regional networks will centre around many of these countries and the other powers will increasingly look to them as important actors. Few, if any, of these players will want to consider formally allying with other great powers. Instead, creating flexible alignments will present opportunities for winning support and cooperation from other powers without having to sacrifice significant amounts of autonomy.
There is a last set of countries though, which are likely to find this new coalitions-based world more difficult: smaller states, including in Southeast Asia, that face impediments to joining new alignments. Some countries, such as South Korea, have become so dependent on a single ally, e.g., the United States, that building coalitions with third countries does not come naturally.[26] Other countries, including the members of ASEAN, are part of existing multilateral organisations that will constrain their ability to organise in smaller and more flexible constructs. Still others, like Switzerland, continue to be attached to strict non-alignment policies for strategic, political, or historical reasons, and could therefore struggle to take advantage of the opportunities provided by more flexible coalitions.
ASEAN’S DILEMMA
What does this mean for Southeast Asia in particular? A shift toward a multipolar world and away from competing alliance blocs would seem to be ideal for many countries in Southeast Asia. But the reality is that Southeast Asian states are likely to find themselves in difficult positions in the years ahead. ASEAN understandably prizes unity and centrality, but the rise of coalitions is placing emphasis on an entirely different set of principles.[27] Rather than embracing long-standing institutions with set membership and strict procedures, new coalitions are arising that are able to respond more quickly to changing circumstances. Fixed multilateral groupings (like ASEAN) that cut across multiple issue areas appear to be the way of the past; flexible coalitions focused on specific issues appear the way of the future.
Southeast Asian states will have to ensure that they retain the many benefits of ASEAN membership without being hamstrung by its constraints. Individual ASEAN members, particularly the larger or more active diplomatic players, will be offered substantial incentives to join some of the emerging coalitions. But since other Southeast Asian countries are likely to be bypassed or forgo membership in coalitions, ASEAN unity could be put at risk (to say nothing of ASEAN centrality).
This will present Southeast Asian leaders with a difficult strategic choice: either adapt to the era of coalitions and put ASEAN unity at risk, or sit by as new alignments undermine ASEAN centrality. Businesses have long operated under the rule that companies “adapt or die” – the same will be true of many international institutions in the years ahead.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The Cianjur earthquake in November 2022 sparked a debate among religious elites in Indonesia regarding its cause. A similar process has occurred after almost every natural disaster in the country.
- This article examines sermons and writings by popular Islamic preachers widely available on social media, particularly YouTube, which provides a range of Islamic opinions on the causes of natural disasters in Indonesia.
- While one camp argues that disasters are divine punishments for the sins that Indonesian Muslims have committed, another refers to disasters as tests from the Almighty God, in which anyone—be they sinners or pious people—may be hit.
- Showcasing the views of preachers who have a wide following online and offline, such as Gus Baha and Buya Yahya, this article posits that there is a growing number of theologians who reject fatalistic explanations of natural disasters. They argue that explanations of natural disasters must go beyond blaming the community for their purported sins.
- In any case, both camps fall short of helping communities to prepare for disasters. They also fail to apply scientific explanations to assist communities to better understand the origins of disasters, or undertake measures to mitigate their impact.
*Ahmad Muhajir is Visiting Fellow at the Regional Social and Cultural Studies (RSCS) at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. He is a Lecturer at the Faculty of Syariah, UIN Antasari Banjarmasin.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/6, 6 February 2023
INTRODUCTION
On 21 November 2022, an earthquake hit the town of Cianjur, claiming 334 lives, injuring about 1,000 citizens, and displacing 114,000 people. Soon after, a divisive religious question on disasters emerged online and offline: is this punishment from God? This is a question that has been raised previously after every major disaster occurring in various Indonesian regions, be these tsunamis, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions or landslides. In 2009, Tifatul Sembiring, an Islamist Justice and Prosperous Party (PKS) leader, linked the huge earthquake in Padang, West Sumatera (7.6 on the Richter scale), to an array of sinful acts committed by Indonesians. This included adultery, the production and distribution of home-made porn videos, intra-family killings, corruption, and the wide circulation of TV programmes that did not comply with Islamic teachings on covering parts of female bodies (Kompas, 27 November 2009). The Minister of Communication and Information Technology made a point about the nexus between “moral decadence” and “natural disasters” while delivering the Idul Adha sermon in the Office of the Governor of West Sumatera about a month after the earthquake. In the same vein, during the 2014 volcanic eruption of Mount Sinabung in North Sumatera and of Mount Kelud in East Java, the online Islamic paper, Republika, published an opinion piece by an Islamic teacher named Ahmad Dzaki on the same topic, the relationship between sins and natural disasters. He wrote that “we can see vices everywhere… It is not surprising if Allah sends multiple disasters in the forms of earthquakes, floods and volcanic eruptions” (Ustadz Ahmad Dzaki, 25 Feb 2014). As for the Cianjur earthquake, numerous preachers have already appeared to explicitly mention divine punishment as its cause.
The whole notion of “divine punishment” provokes rigorous debate among Muslim preachers about the causes of disasters. With references to popular Islamic preachers whose sermons are widely circulated and reproduced on YouTube, this paper discusses the nature of these divisions and their impact. I argue that missing from these debates are scientific explanations on the origins of natural disasters and solutions to mitigate the impact of these disasters. Islamic preachers should engage in a religious discourse aimed at improving disaster management in disaster-prone communities, which to this day, remains sorely wanting.
In Indonesia, religious preachers remain important opinion makers apart from being providers of religious guidance. This is because almost all Indonesians, Muslims or otherwise, see the importance of religious knowledge and education.[1] Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI) reports that 8 in 10 Indonesians are attracted to religious issues, and about the same proportion consider religious perspectives when making life decisions.[2] But who do they refer to on religious matters? Most Indonesians (71.8 percent) rely on clerics and preachers.[3] Agreeing with this, LSI reveals that about three quarters of Muslims feel that they must follow religious advice from clerics and preachers.[4]
ARGUMENT I: SINS INVITE DISASTERS
There is a group of preachers who contend that the sins committed in society are the cause of natural disasters, including the recent earthquakes in Cianjur and Garut. A number of Muslim preachers ride on incidences of disasters to launch attacks on immorality. Central to their message is that the ubiquity of immorality is the main cause of all disasters. “God is mad at us,” they suggest, “because we continue to commit sins and break His laws, by consuming alcohol, practising sexual promiscuity, and spending time in night clubs.” They cite verses from the sacred texts, Al-Qur’an dan Hadits, underscoring the correlation between vices and doom. They have urged fellow Muslims to take spiritual lessons from previous disasters and warned that unless the people repent or become religiously obedient, the disasters will keep on coming.
“In Al-Qur’an, Allah repeatedly reminds us”, said Ustadz Khalid Basalamah, a very famous salafi preacher, “that He will not send any disaster except when there are continuous violations of God’s rules!”[5] One Quranic verse he quoted reads: “We would never destroy a society unless its people persisted in wrongdoing.”[6] On earthquakes specifically, the preacher pointed out that Muslims had been warned about 1,400 years ago by Aishah, one of Prophet Muhammad’s wives. “If extramarital sex is so common, if many people get drunk, and if they are drawn to music instead of remembering God, Allah will be jealous and tell the Earth to shake [causing earthquake]. If the people repent and stop the transgressions, then peace will return. If not, God will destroy the land and the people will perish with it.”[7]
Habib Bahar bin Smith, a younger preacher connected to the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), delivered the same religious message linking sins to natural disasters. In a sermon, he said that earthquakes happen “because there are too many people committing sins.”[8] He quoted a story about Prophet Muhammad asking people after an earthquake: ‘what sins have you committed?’ Therefore, the preacher said, when disasters hit, “ask not why Allah sends us earthquakes or tsunamis or floods. Ask ourselves what sins we have done.”[9]
More recently, the branch head of Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII) in Malang, Ustaz Andri Kurniawan, blatantly connected the Cianjur earthquake with the wide occurrences of sexually-related sins. DDII is one of the most prominent Islamic proselytising organisations in Indonesia.[10] From the pulpit, he said that “In Cianjur, the LGBT community has more than a thousand members. Men having sex with men. Women having sex with women. Then, Allah shook Cianjur up with an earthquake.”[11]
In 2019, Ustaz Khalid deplored that people had not learned from previous disasters. They took cover during a disaster, he said, but when it was safe to return to their homes, “they come back to their old habits and sinful acts. Therefore, disasters will occur again.”[12] Seeing the relevance of this sermon to the more recent natural disasters in Java, a YouTube content provider republished it a fortnight after the Cianjur earthquake.[13] The repost attracted 4.5 times more views than the original one posted on the preacher’s YouTube channel.
ARGUMENT II: ANY SOUL CAN BE A DISASTER VICTIM
The second religious view problematises the nexus between sins committed in society and disasters, and emphasises the “blessings” (or hikmah) behind every calamity. It proposes two other callings: the elevation of one’s spiritual rank whenever any disaster hits, and the returns on the Day of Judgement and huge rewards in the Afterlife for victims. Proponents of this view assert that one must apply these alternative explanations to disaster victims—this approach is about having the “good faith” or husnudzon, to consider every plight in a positive light. This argument holds that humans have limited knowledge of Allah’s objectives underlying disasters and misfortunes.
The proponents of this second view do not reject “sins-disaster” causality totally; instead, they present the idea somewhat differently. It is not that God wants to destroy the people because of their sins, but that He wants to wipe out their sins through misfortunes.
Buya Yahya, the spiritual leader of Al-Bahjah boarding school and Islamic propagation institute in Cirebon, is one religious personality who promotes this perspective. He holds that anyone can be a disaster victim and experience misfortune, regardless of their religious commitment or piety. He explained that when Allah tests believers with calamities, there are three possibilities: “It could be that He wants to erase their sins, or He wants to put them in higher spiritual positions, or He wants to give them the huge reward of forbearance in the Hereafter.”[14]
Buya Yahya noticed that there exists a tinge of arrogance among some people when they comment on disasters, demonstrating a dangerous malady in their souls. “How arrogant a person is when saying that ‘Jogja had many immoral people, hence the earthquake; or that Aceh was full of vices, and hence the tsunami. And Cianjur and Lumajang were no different’. Doesn’t this person commit sins too in life?!”[15] Buya Yahya advised that “if misfortunes or a tragedy befalls others, not ourselves, we must not say to them that this is because they had committed sins”. But if we are the one who experience the calamities, “we should humbly admit that we are sinful, that what we see, say and do are often in contrast to religious precepts.”[16]
The sermons of Gus Bahauddin Nursalim, a charismatic and young Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) cleric, on disasters are even more nuanced. The widely acclaimed Quran expert posited that no one can know for sure if disasters that befall any society result from Allah’s chastisements, unless He himself indicated this clearly in the Holy Book. One example that Gus Baha mentioned was the disaster that Allah sent to the congregation of Prophet Lut, the people of Sodom and Gomoroh. Alternatively, he posited that if one is so bold as to link any calamity to God’s chastisement, the person must have access to the Lauh al-Mahfuz, the divine and spiritual tablet that records every episode from the past, present and future. In Islam, this source is inaccessible to most humans and most other creatures, unlike the Quran. Outside these parameters, Gus Baha regarded any speculations that apply the ‘theory’ of divine torment to disasters as a presumptuous attitude that must be counteracted.[17]
Gus Baha further proposed that one must be wise enough to refrain from labelling natural disasters as divine torments. He identified two crucial patterns in the Quran. First, when the Quran talks about God’s power to punish, the verses apply the terms “potential”, describing it as something that could happen but without any definite time. As an example, he quoted a verse from Al-Mulk: “Do you feel secure that He Who is in heaven will not cause you to be swallowed up by the earth when it shakes (as in an earthquake)?”[18] Second, when the Holy Book talks about Allah’s grace and mercy, the verses demonstrate more certainty, a phenomenon that has already happened and will continue to happen anytime and anywhere. To illustrate, Gus Baha quoted a verse from the Al-A’raf chapter in the Quran: “My punishment – I afflict with it whom I will, but My mercy encompasses all things.”[19]
Gus Baha asserts that two interrelated lessons can be learned from these two perspectives. First, Muslims must keep in mind that Allah can destroy life anytime, but they also need to remember that in most instances, Allah shows mercy and compassion. Second, because torment is potential whereas mercy is certain, chances are that God hides mercy behind most calamities. Therefore, one should use mercy as the primary lens, and think that there are blessings everywhere including those disguised as misfortunes.[20]
Gus Baha gave another example of God’s compassion in calamitous events. He said that Islam honours the death of several groups of people, calling them syahid. Based on reports from Prophet Muhammad, syahid are not limited to the martyrs of holy wars. People who die from drowning or being struck by a collapsing roof or wall are also included in this category. Many victims of tsunamis, earthquakes and landslides also die in similar circumstances. Therefore, Gus Baha sees them as fitting well into the category of syahid, to whomAllah will give huge rewards in the Hereafter. As Muslims believe in the Afterlife, this is good news.
In the case of survivors, Buya Yahya also explained calamities as a form of ‘spiritual levelling up’. “If a Muslim is decent enough not to commit many sins, but at the same time, the person does not do many good either, and Allah wants to bring him or her closer to Him”, Buya Yahya illustrated, “Allah will give the person misfortunes. That way, his or her spiritual rank is elevated.”[21] Buya Yahya kept mentioning this message to the evacuees of Cianjur when he paid them a visit soon after the earthquake. He remarked: “Please, have good faith towards Allah. If you face this test from Allah with forbearance, everything will be beautiful in the end. He will open the door for a better life and replace the losses. We’ve been in school, right?! What’s coming after exams? We go up to the next grade!”[22]
Apparently, what these preachers have been trying to do is to ease the pain of fellow believers. In explaining disasters, they do not fill their sermons with threats of recurring calamities. Instead, they spread the hope of good outcomes, in spiritual terms, for the deceased and the survivors. Losses and misfortunes in life, they say, are not simply bad experiences that cause nothing but misery. All are tests from God. When faced with the right attitude, the tests will result in spiritual transformation and salvation. In so doing, the preachers teach people to be humble before God and empathetic with people. They cultivate positive thinking toward God and sow the seeds of solidarity among humans.
A DESIRABLE WAY TO GO
While appreciating these efforts, I argue that Islamic preachers need to go beyond divine and religious explanations. Furqan Aksa warns that religious perspectives, when misunderstood, increase “fatalistic attitudes toward disaster”, whereby people “ignore measures to reduce disaster risk”.[23] If the message is that “everything will be beautiful in the end”, and if what Buya Yahya said is given too much emphasis, there is little religious incentive to anticipate future disasters. But in fact, religion can enjoin believers to be prepared, without implying independence from God in any sense. Religious propagators can help raise awareness about the dangers of living in disaster-prone regions. During the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, Islamic teachings to protect faith, life and offspring were applied to support the health protocols and the vaccination process. The same discourse may be developed further for disaster risk reduction.
This notably entails an open mind on the part of religious propagators to the words of scientists. After all, while Islamic scholars identify many signs of God’s greatness, scientists study many signs from nature. Together, they can engage in science-based and religiously acceptable discourse for improving disaster awareness and mitigation.
The Cianjur earthquake can provide impetus for the promotion of the study of science alongside the study of religion. In many Islamic schools, pupils are already taught astronomy, through which they learn to determine the direction of Ka’bah, prayer times, and important dates in the Islamic calendar. It has now become crucial to also teach them what it is that produces earthquakes and tsunamis. In fact, young students should be made aware of climate change that hugely influences the world that they and future generations will live in. More broadly, society must continue to develop interest in science and geography, and disaster management, without having to alienate religious beliefs and practices.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the the pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Over a period of 40 years, NGOs and other activist organisations have emerged as social opposition to a political establishment largely embodied in parliamentary political parties.
- This social opposition, often still referred to as “civil society”, has developed around opposition to policies in different sectors. This has created the impression that such opposition is rather segmented, instead of being a united force.
- It can be characterised as a social opposition as it does not present itself as an alternative choice to form a government.
- During 2022, there have been more attempts by activists to coalesce in order to present more effective criticism. These have included attempts at forming political parties. The Workers Party (Partai Buruh, PB) has now succeeded in registering to stand for elections in 2024.
- As of the end of 2022, the social opposition has not grown in its capacity to mobilise as a serious alternative force. All of its campaigns for the repeal or amendment of policies and laws have failed.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/5, 1 February 2023
* Max Lane is Visiting Senior Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. He is the author of “An Introduction to the Politics of the Indonesian Union Movement” (ISEAS 2019) and the editor of “Continuity and Change after Indonesia’s Reforms: Contributions to an Ongoing Assessment” (ISEAS 2019). His newest book is “Indonesia Out of Exile: How Pramoedya’s Buru Quartet Killed a Dictatorship”, (Penguin Random House, 2022).
CIVIL SOCIETY IN INDONESIA
The term civil society has been present in social science literature for over 100 years, and became widely used in the 1980s to refer to institutions and networks that mediated or represented citizens vis-à-vis the state. Theoretical discussion of the relationship between the state and civil society was rife at that time. It has since then, and certainly in Indonesia, taken on a more concrete meaning instead of evolving as an analytical or theoretical concept. It has come to refer to all nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), trade unions, social movements, grassroots organisations, online networks and communities, and faith groups that form a specific political community.
The emergence and development of this understanding of civil society have a history very specific to Indonesia. Since 1965, but especially from the 1970s onwards, “civil society” has been increasingly used to describe NGOs that were voices of dissent under a very authoritarian government and political format. These NGOs espoused ideas and values that were excluded from representation in the very managed political party system that evolved during the New Order period. Discussion of this phenomenon was significant during the 1980s, which also saw the publication of a series of writings by the Australian academic Philip Eldridge culminating in the work Non-government Organizations and Democratic Participation in Indonesia, published by Oxford University Press in 1995.[1]
During the 1970s and 1980s, there were perhaps two vanguard NGO organisations that emerged as flagships of dissent. The first was the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia or YLBHI) that pioneered the idea of “structural human rights” and which was a prominent voice of dissent throughout the period. In 1985, the Indonesian NGO Forum on Development (INFID)[2] was formed on the initiative of prominent figures from this emerging civil society sector. These included K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), briefly president of Indonesia in 1999-2001, Asmara Nababan (a Human Rights activist), KH Ghaffar Rahman (from the Nahhdatul Ulama), Adnan Buyung Nasution (a founder of the YLBHI), Prof. DR. M Dawam Rahardjo (active in a dissident think tank), Fauzi Abdullah (a labour activist) Kartjono (active in the village development NGO Bina Desa), and Zoemrotin KS (a women’s rights activist). INFID still exists and is active today.
The key legacy from this earlier period is that what was called masyarakat sipil in the 1980s actually referred to the organisations and networks that were excluded from the formal political system, especially the electoral system, and which voiced a range of dissident perspectives – from moderate to radical. Furthermore, during the 1990s, as a movement developed aimed at dislodging the New Order regime, a wing of civil society developed which supported popular mobilisations, from labour strikes to mass street protests, as their fundamental strategy. Moderate and radical often came to be equated with a lobbying strategy, as compared to a mobilising strategy.[3]
Civil society does not merely refer to societal organisations that are apart from the state. In the Indonesian context, they are organisations coming out of a 40-year history of policy dissent expressed from outside or at the margins of the formal system, and which came into being due to the narrow ideological base of the institutions, mainly the political parties, operating within the formal political system established during a 32-year long period of tight authoritarian rule.
This is the fundamental starting point for understanding the phenomenon today.
CIVIL SOCIETY IN 2022
Indonesian political life no longer exists in the same authoritarian framework as during the New Order. This is despite the fact that the existing political parties, while reflecting a variety of cultural and political styles, remain very homogenous in terms of their outlook on economic development and political policies.[4] The low level of systematic repression of dissent, especially dissent on policy questions, has weakened that wing of civil society that has argued since the 1990s, of the necessity for a mobilisation strategy. Mass mobilisation was defended by that wing in the 1990s as necessary to confront New Order repression. The more liberal atmosphere, despite the narrow ideological spectrum represented by all the dominant parties today, has provided more space to the lobby wing of civil society, who have access to members of parliament at many different levels. These organisations are now seen as less alienated from the state.
An example of this wing of civil society is the “Civil Society Coalition for Sustainable Development Goals,[5] which also receives aid from the European Union and sometimes works with the government, often through the Office of the Vice-President, maintains an engagement with this quite sizeable spectrum of organisations.[6] INFID, which still brings together some of the oldest and most established NGOs, remains central to these lobby efforts.
The integration of these organisations into ongoing processes of dialogue with the government has meant that it is the activist, or mobilisational wing, of civil society that appears as an oppositional force. The dividing line between organisations that focus on lobbying government, and the parties and activist or campaign organisations is sometimes blurred, but in terms of general political discourse, the activist masyarakat sipil has become the active social opposition to the government and parliament – opposing and critiquing policies and advocating changes, but not presenting itself as an alternative government.
A feature of such a social opposition, not seeking to build a power base or a unifying outlook, is its sectoral fragmentation, with different organisations or segments concentrating on specific policy areas. Since the fall of Suharto in 1998, the key policy areas targeted by social opposition activity have been the environment and natural resources, land conflicts, corruption, human rights, women’s rights, migrant workers’ rights overseas, and labour rights.
Activist civil society groups have been carrying out ongoing campaigns in all these areas. In fact, there has been so much activity it is not possible to list them, especially given the sectoral fragmentation. Each area of activism is carried out by a range of organisations, including ad hoc action committees that crop up in response to specific issues, especially land conflicts.[7] Land conflicts, usually over compensation for farmers being forcibly removed from their land to make way for development projects, probably run into the thousands per year.[8] There are a number of farmers’ unions, sometimes local, who also become involved in these conflicts.[9] These include the Indonesian Farmers Union (SPI),[10] Indonesian Peasants Union (STI), Indonesian Farmers Alliance[11] and many others, especially at the local level. There has been no comprehensive survey of all these organisations and what they have been doing. However, in September, 2022, on National Farmers’ Day, over a hundred such organisations, including student, labour and human rights organisations, were able to unite to present a manifesto calling for the end of land seizures and for agrarian reform, and several other demands related to food sovereignty and environmental damage.[12] This was done under the banner of the National Committee for Agrarian Renewal (KNPA).
The extent of the activities can also be seen in how these are reflected on social media.[13] Surveys of social media often show that these channels are used to promote or report on aksi (street protest action) carried out by a wide range of activist groups.[14]
During 2022, trade unions have not been particularly active, despite only small increases to the minimum wage, although protests have continued against the Job Creation Law. One large segment of the trade union movement has been focused on establishing, and has now succeeded in achieving, electoral registration for a new Workers Party. This focus by that large segment, encompassing the two largest trade unions and several other organisations, has divided this sector into two factions which often campaign separately, even though there may sometimes be minor overlaps. Mobilisations might take place under the banner of the Workers party or under the banner of the Worker and Peoples Movement (Gebrak) which includes a majority of unions and organisations not associated with the Workers Party. The leading union in Gebrak is the Congress of Alliances of Indonesian Trade Unions (KASBI).[15] Gebrak took to the streets to protest fuel price rises earlier in the year.[16] Both the Workers Party and Gebrak have criticism of the Job Creation Law as a central focus. To be sure, during November and December 2022, the annual polemic around impending wage rise decisions also received attention.[17]
While single-issue campaigning is ongoing on a range of fronts, it has been responses to major government and parliament policy decisions that have elicited most visibility for the social opposition, especially at the national level, and using street protest actions as a key tactic.
Over the last three years, these actions have been in response to a law weakening the Corruption Eradication Commission, the Job Creation (Omnibus) Law[18] which weakened labour and environmental protections, and the new Criminal Code Law.[19] There have been demonstrations almost every month against these laws, sometimes targeting more than one law simultaneously. Apart from Gebrak, another alliance often issuing protest statements is the Civil Society Coalition. This coalition took a leading role in asking critical questions about the deathly tragedy in Malang’s football stadium in September.[20] There appear to be multiple variants of such a coalition, with a range of different organisations, participating in the issuance of press statements or delegations to meet officials. Such coalitions are also important for the more activism-oriented NGOs, who do not attempt to grow their own permanent membership base but who rely on joint actions with students and unions instead.
Student organisations and student-driven campaign coalitions have crucially partnered with the activist wing of the trade unions and with more activism-oriented NGOs. An alliance such as Gebrak, which is the leading coalition in spearheading frequent street protests, includes both students and workers. Outside of Jakarta, whether or not a Gebrak formation exists, local protest coalitions are also often spearheaded by students. Workers can only protest when off shift, while students have more flexibility. Some students’ organisations which are close to political parties may also demonstrate on some issues, usually separately. These do not always coincide with direct support for civil society-initiated campaigns; however, they do help reproduce an atmosphere where street mobilisation is seen as legitimate.
PARTIES, ALLIANCES, AND DEFEATS
A fundamental aspect of civil society functioning as social opposition, resisting and demanding change to key laws and policies, is that, on the whole, it has met with almost total failure when it comes to the major controversies of the law weakening the KPK, the Job Creation Law and the RKHUP. Not a single amendment being demanded by the social opposition, let alone a repeal of any law, has been gained. On the wages front, there has been no return to the high wage increases of 2011-2013 of 40% and above. Indeed, the annual tripartite negotiation mechanism was abolished. And land conflicts have not decreased in numbers.
One partial victory has been the passing of a new law criminalising sexual violence, which feminist NGOS and organisations supported. This law, however, threatened neither commercial or power interests nor any major cultural taboos.[21]
The total ineffectiveness of the last years of social opposition, despite a quantitative growth in activity, has provided an environment that has both encouraged as well as constrained new political initiatives. The growth in the number and the profile of trade union confederations, as well as the joint activity of farmers and other organisations, have no doubt been a significant encouragement in the initiative to establish a Workers Party.[22] The President of the Workers Party, and Chairperson of the All Indonesia Trade Union Confederation (KSPI), Said Iqbal stated explicitly at the time of the initial declaration forming the party in October 2021, that: “The crushing defeat of workers, farmers, fishermen, teachers, environmental activists, human rights activists with the passage of the Omnibus Law on Job Creation is one of the main factors why the workers’ party has been revived”.[23]
Discussion of a Workers Party among trade unionists began more than ten years ago. Inspired by the example of the Workers Party in Brazil, Indonesians returning from working in Brazil were active in NGOs promoting the concept of a party that is initiated by trade unionists but draws in and represents the various sectoral organisations which, in Indonesia, are considered civil society. This discussion faded away for a few years before 2000, but was revived after the opportunity arose to make use of an already existing registered party.
On 14 November, the newly formed Workers Party achieved final registration to stand candidates in 2024.[24]
The Workers Party has emerged out of a segment of Civil Society.[25] The initial groups included the Confederation of Indonesian Prosperous Trade Unions (KSBSI), Labour House Indonesia established by the Federation of Indonesian Metal Workers’ Unions (FSPMI) and the Confederation of Indonesian Trade Unions (KSPI), and the Indonesian People’s Organisation initiated by the Confederation of All Indonesian Trade Unions (KSPSI). Also among the initiators were the Indonesian Farmers’ Union (SPI), the Confederation of United Indonesian Trade Unions (KPBI), the Federation of Mining Energy Chemical Workers’ Unions, the Federation of Pharmaceutical and Health Trade Unions, the Private Educators and Honorary Personnel Forum and the Indonesian Women’s Movement.[26] Their 13 platform points show they are attempting to appeal across the civil society spectrum. They include employment guarantees, a living wage and safe working conditions, rejection of labour hire and contract employment, anti-corruption as well as a wide range of social guarantees, including for women and young people, as well as indigenous peoples and the disabled. It also covers the strengthening of small business and cooperatives.
As stated earlier, most of the social opposition organised in coalitions such as Gebrak have not joined the Labour Party. Some are still sceptical of it, especially as long as its primary platform documents holds no critiques of the records of the existing parties.[27] Two of the main union confederations involved, the KSPSI and KSPI, have in the past campaigned for the existing parties, PDIP and Gerindra, respectively. Another new party that was appealing to the social opposition, based on a faction of the Peoples Democratic Party (PRD) that played a leading role in the anti-Suharto movement, has failed to pass the verification process to stand candidates in the coming election.[28] The Indonesian Green Party[29] has not tried to register to stand candidates. The only party whose platform is clearly aimed to appeal to the social opposition which can participate in the 2024 elections is the Workers Party, yet its attitude to the other parties now in parliament is not yet clear. It passed verification on 14 December,[30] and will now be closely watched by the social opposition to see if it positions itself as opposition to the existing parties or as a “ginger group” ally.
The formation of the Workers Party has not been the only political development flowing from civil society dissent. The other main response has been the increasing frequency of statements and press conferences, some of which have been mentioned above. However, the reality is that actual mobilisations, including street protests, during 2022 have been smaller than those in 2021, although they have persisted despite not snowballing in size.
The trade union movement suffered a major defeat in 2014-15 when the Widodo government abolished the annual tripartite negotiations on minimum wage increases, stopping the sizeable wage increases of 2012-2013.[31] Between 2019 and 2022, the social opposition has had no wins on any of its demands for amendments or repeal of legislation, such as that weakening the Anti-Corruption Law, the Job Creation Law or the proposed Revised Criminal Code. The most convincing analysis of the reasons for these defeats is that this social opposition has neither been able to increase the size of its protest mobilisations nor gained representation in the electoral party system. For the labour sector of civil society, this may be connected to its abandonment of a mobilising strategy and it opting instead for an electoral one. For civil society apart from the labour sector, the NGO structures which are not based on spreading permanent grassroots membership, means that it has no solid campaigning base. It relies on joint actions with labour and students. The Workers Party’s successful registration, reflecting a significant consolidation of union and other NGO structures nationally, will certainly raise hopes among some of the critical sectors of society. However, it is not clear yet whether it can attract the level of support either from among unions or other civil society sectors to guarantee that it will make an impact. It may be that the social opposition – the critical civil society – has simply not grown enough to shift the balance in electoral politics, at least for now. The significance of the presence of the Workers Party, whose rhetoric has been oppositional so far, will be tested out over the next 12 months.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the the pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |