EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- A call for increased minority representation in Malaysia’s civil service recently sparked another fierce public debate. Ethnic Malays, comprising 57 per cent of Malaysian citizens, account for 78 per cent of federal government staff — and 80 per cent of top decision-making positions.
- The lack of diversity, and minority groups’ sense of exclusion, are legitimate concerns. However, the debate remains polarised and deadlocked, with proponents of change decrying the problem in absolute terms of Malay “domination”, “racial policy” and discrimination, while opponents intransigently defend the status quo often through invoking “Malay rights”.
- The government’s muted response to this sensitive topic is understandable. At the same time, promoting diversity in Malaysia’s civil service might be possible with coherent and measured approaches, and critical appraisal of past efforts to increase diversity and current employment practices, including the authorities’ claim that meritocracy already applies in recruitment exercises.
- Policy dialogues can start by clarifying the underlying principles and practical scope for promoting diversity and by cultivating new grounds for facilitating equitable representation of all groups.
- Shifting a colossus like Malaysia’s civil service will be difficult, and progress must be slow and incremental for it to be sustained. Nonetheless, such efforts are worthwhile and perhaps even viable — provided the debate dispenses with habitual posturing that detracts from systematic solutions.
* Lee Hwok Aun is Senior Fellow and Co-coordinator of the Malaysia Studies Programme at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. The author thanks Francis Hutchinson, Ong Kian King, Kai Ostwald, Ooi Kok Hin, Adib Zalkaply, James Chai, Dina Zaman, and Azmil Tayeb for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/34, 26 April 2023
INTRODUCTION
The disparity between the ethnic composition of Malaysia’s civil service and the population is a constantly simmering issue that occasionally overflows into public debate.[1] A February 2023 commentary by P. Ramasamy, Deputy Chief Minister of Penang, appealed for the unity government to address the “domination of the civil service by one ethnic community” on the grounds that the underlying “racial policy cannot be defended anymore”.[2] The assertions hit raw nerves. A backlash ensued, and the government, eager for this storm to pass, has resolved to take no action.
Ethnic Malays comprise a majority of citizens, but a supermajority of the 1.6 million civil servants, and an overwhelming share of top management positions. The under-representation of minority groups is stark; they account for 42 per cent of the population but 22 percent of public service employees. The sense of exclusion and perception of unfair opportunity is particularly acute among Chinese and Indian Malaysians, as well as the indigenous peoples of Sabah and Sarawak who formally share preferential Bumiputera status with the predominantly Peninsula-residing Malays.
This Perspective provides some background to this polarised and deadlocked problem of ethnic disproportionality in Malaysia’s civil service. I then evaluate the debate from the perspective of moral and practical arguments, and Malaysia’s exceptional conditions. Increasing minority representation is desirable and attempted from time to time, but opposing sides of the debate tend to close ranks on strident terms. Referencing public services recruitment data and past experience with increasing minority representation, I consider some policy implications for Malaysia’s governing coalition, which for the first time is led by a multi-ethnic party. Malaysia’s civil service, in encompassing education, health, the military and law enforcement, is more sprawling and complex than that of most federal governments.[3] Conditions preclude drastic overhaul; however, incremental change might be possible.
EMBEDDED, COMPLICATED, AND SEEMINGLY INTRACTABLE
Policies addressing ethnic representation in the civil service are deeply rooted, but not indelibly planted. Article 153 of Malaysia’s Constitution provides for the King (Yang di-Pertuan Agong), “in such manner as may be necessary”, to safeguard the “special position” of the Malays and Bumiputera communities of Sabah and Sarawak by reserving for them a “proportion as he may deem reasonable of positions in the public service” and other institutions promoting socioeconomic mobility.[4] Article 8 expresses an analogous provision for the Orang Asli of Peninsular Malaysia.[5] In public discourse, these stipulations tend to be magnified beyond their meaning, particularly with the morphing of “special position” into “special rights”. Engaging the debate on these terms poses a steep and enduring challenge. The cause of defending “rights” continually resonates; invoking the word galvanizes sentiments and usually forecloses further conversation – since “rights” are non-negotiable. Nonetheless, as shown in the later discussion, there is scope for inclining the conversation toward more objective and substantive matters such as recruitment processes.
The civil service has been leveraged to promote a Malay professional and administrative class for many decades, stretching back to the British colonial era, but such efforts intensified when the New Economic Policy (NEP) was launched in 1971 (Khoo 2005). The civil service has been continuously criticised for its Malay-favouring disposition, whether through quotas or other forms of preferential treatment.[6] Accordingly, non-Malay representation in the civil service steadily decreased. The share of Chinese and Indians dropped from 18.8 per cent and 15.7 per cent in 1969-70, to 6.0 per cent and 4.3 percent in 2009, respectively, amid widespread and sustained perception that ethnicity factors into recruitment and promotion prospects (Woo 2015). Anecdotal accounts and academic surveys have found these sentiments widely regarded as a major reason that minority groups prefer private sector over public sector careers — along with other factors such as pay differences (Woo 2018). Indigenous peoples of Sabah and Sarawak, who formally share Bumiputera status with the predominantly Peninsula-residing Malays, have also raised displeasure at their under-representation, particularly in high-ranking positions.
Public sector recruitment has been subjected to procedural modifications, as well as specific remedial measures to induce minority interest. In 2009, the Public Services Commission, in partnership with Chinese non-governmental organisations, conducted a recruitment drive among the Chinese population, which is credited for an uptick in the community’s entry into the service, particularly in management and professional ranks.[7] In 2010, alongside a move to online platforms, the public services standardised and formalised selection criteria for recruitment based on qualifications and competencies (PSC 2017). Simultaneously, the Government Transformation Programme (GTP) was launched (Woo 2015) as part of Prime Minister Najib’s 1Malaysia campaign, which included post-2008 general election outreach to non-Malays. The GTP Roadmap committed to “[a]djust the ethnic mix of the civil service to be more representative of the population, in particular encouraging more Chinese and Indian personnel to join the civil service and upgrading officers of Bumiputera origins from Sabah and Sarawak” (PEMANDU 2010).
The precise mechanisms of this programme were not spelled out, nor was any progress appraised in the GTP Annual Reports. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the Chinese and Indian shares of new recruits inched up from 4.4 per cent and 4.5 percent in 2008, to 8.0 per cent and 5.4 per cent in 2011 (Woo 2015). The early 2010s’ reversal of the preceding decades-long decline in minority representation in the civil service was not sustained. However, the Public Services Commission recently explained that recruitment processes involve engagements with higher education institutions and Indian and Orang Asli development agencies, suggesting that mechanisms continue to be in place to increase awareness of public service opportunities and encourage applications.[8]
The stark disproportionalities appear in ad hoc data disclosures through parliament reply, which have provided snapshots of 2005 and 2022 (Table 1). In 2022, Malays comprised 77.5 per cent of the civil service (excluding the police and military), with Sabah and Sarawak Bumiputeras accounting for 12.1 per cent, followed by Chinese (5.7 per cent), Indians (3.8 per cent) and Orang Asli (0.2 per cent). Sabah and Sarawak Bumiputeras are rather proportionately represented, with their share of all civil service positions mirroring their share of the population. However, in top management — which constitute just 0.3 per cent of all civil service positions but confer influence, prestige and symbolic importance — East Malaysian Bumiputeras are acutely under-represented.[9] Their share has increased, but at a languid pace from 1.4 per cent in 2005 to 3.1 per cent in 2022. In contrast, Chinese and Indians have a larger relative presence in top management. The shares of Chinese and Indians have inched upward, but appear to be plateauing at around 10 per cent for Chinese and 6 per cent for Indians. The Orang Asli are under-represented across the board, and to a greater extent in top management. These patterns provide important context regarding the current state of the civil service, which informs the discussion of the next section.
Table 1. Ethnic composition of Malaysia’s citizen population and civil service (excluding police and military.
Sources: Parliamentary reply of June 2005 tabulated by CPPS (2006); Author’s compilations from FreeMalaysiaToday (2022).
Note: Management, professional and support staff (Grades 1-56); Top management (above Grade 56).
Table 2. Ethnic composition within top management, % of total (2022)
Source: Parliamentary written answer by Abd Latiff Ahmad, Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department, 18 July 2022 (https://www.parlimen.gov.my/jawapan-lisan-dr.html?uweb=dr&).
Two further breakdowns, within top management and by public service entity, are pertinent. First, top management, in turn, can be stratified into the highest ranking officials in the TURUS category (heads of staff, such as secretaries-general, directors-general, and vice chancellors) and JUSA (Premier Grades, which includes deputy secretary-general and deputy director-general posts, and professors). As shown in Table 2, Malay over-representation is greater in uppermost TURUS positions, where Sabah and Sarawak Bumiputeras are altogether absent. Second, some government bodies — notably, law enforcement and military, where Malay over-representation is exceptionally high — have sought to enlist more non-Malays.[10] In 2014, the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC)[11] and police force announced various outreach efforts to attract more interest among non-Malays, and specifically Chinese who are acutely under-represented.[12] The armed forces launched a similar initiative in late 2017.[13]
ARGUMENTS AND SENTIMENTS
The current debate sprang from a 10 February 2023 online column by the Democratic Action Party’s (DAP) P. Ramasamy, who is also Deputy Chief Minister II of Penang.[14] The article reproduced familiar objections to civil service employment practices, but was undone by conceptual imprecision and intemperate language that, predictably, triggered fierce reactions — notably, from both political foes and allies.[15] Media reports misrepresenting Ramasamy further inflamed the situation. Nonetheless, the counterproductive effects of that initial piece are underscored by his follow-up column of 15 March in which he reflected on the Penang state government’s experience while offering more sober and substantive policy thoughts.[16] Unfortunately, the backlash from the first article precluded attention to the second.
The debate demands a more methodical approach that critically engages with the arguments for preserving current practices and the arguments for pursuing change.
Keeping the status quo
A popular case for maintaining the status quo lays claim to the civil service as a domain of “Malay rights.” Islamist party PAS’ Perak chairperson Razman Zakaria was the latest to echo this line.[17] The cause of defending rights — without acknowledgement of the specific constitutional provisions and limits — continually resonates. Invoking the term is effective for galvanizing sentiments and pre-empting further conversation. These arguments are prosecuted more on sentimental than intellectual grounds. Nonetheless, their popular resonance is discernibly real and broad-based, stemming from both political rhetoric and personal conviction that Malay presence in the public services safeguards the community’s interests.
Another pre-emptive stance against civil service reform points to the subject’s political sensitivity or adverse reception in the Malay community. Radzi Jidin, opposition MP for Putrajaya, characterised Ramasamy’s view, or versions of it in the media, as insulting to Malays.[18] Sany Hamzan, MP for Ulu Langat and a leader of Parti Amanah, DAP’s partner in the Pakatan Harapan coalition, called for Ramasamy to be sacked as Penang’s Deputy Chief Minister for his supposed verbal indiscretions.[19] The DAP leadership resolved to handle the matter internally while distancing the party from the furore. Ramasamy had lamented that his words were twisted,[20] specifically that he had not condemned Malay monopoly nor called for an overhaul, but for change to take place “slowly”. At the same time, this proviso of gradual reform was cryptically worded and overshadowed by his strident claims of discrimination and domination.[21] The issue is undeniably emotive and baggage-laden, in ways that cross party lines. The challenge for all sides is to avoid spiralling acrimony.
A third defence of the status quo marks a newer development in the debate. This line of argumentation directly rebuts claims of discrimination by maintaining that civil service recruitment decidedly does not discriminate against non-Malays. On 12 February, the chairman of Cuepacs, the public service workers union, asserted that job applicants are evaluated on the basis of merit and competency, and admonished Ramasamy for his claim that minorities are discriminated against.[22] The Public Services Commission followed up two days later with a fuller explanation of the procedures for interview selection and job offer, stressing the absence of ethnic quotas. It should be clarified that these processes apply at the recruitment stage, not promotion.
No party has found grounds to dismiss the claim that the recruitment system operates without ethnic quotas. In this vein, the low presence of non-Malays derives from the small volume of applicants to civil service openings. However, this view is too narrow in omitting two inhibiting factors. The first pertains to social compatibility, or non-Malays’ disinclination toward work environments that they may struggle to fit into, due to culture, language and other differences. Second, perceptions or anecdotal evidence of constrained career prospects, together with the dearth of minorities visibly occupying decision-making and top management positions, likely influence non-Malays’ decisions at the entry point. Hence, assurances of “meritocracy” at recruitment will fail to attract sufficient numbers of non-Malay applicants to rebalance the ethnic composition.
Increasing minority representation
The case for a more representative civil service rests on a set of moral and pragmatic arguments, with some Malaysia-specific considerations. First, government offices, being funded by taxpayers and charged with serving society, should also reflect the population. This principle, which prescribes equitable representation at all levels, from front desks to backroom support, and professional and managerial positions, can be regarded as a “first-best” option.[23]
A second argument, premised on the importance of diverse groups being represented in policymaking, oversight and enforcement, underscores the benefit of equitable representation especially in high-level managerial and professional positions — and in key branches such as the police and military. This can be regarded as a “second best” solution, because it is focused on some but not all layers of the civil service. Broader inclusion based on cultural, regional and religious backgrounds is a worthwhile endeavour, nonetheless, because the conspicuous absence of a population group in the higher ranks of the civil service can adversely impact on governance and on public confidence toward the prospects for career advancement among all groups. Malaysia’s attempts at promoting non-Malay career interest in the police and army reflect the moral and strategic value of ethnic representation on the frontlines of law enforcement and national defence. Of course, the hurdles remain, as shown in research that goes beyond anecdotal reportage. Woo’s (2018) survey found that non-Malays on average perceive that ethnicity adversely affects their career prospects. It should be noted that they also express various reasons for not choosing the public sector, with survey respondents most frequently stating low pay as the main deterrent, followed by uninteresting jobs, poor promotion prospects, then discrimination.
The third argument, more pragmatically oriented, contends that hiring based on identity can compromise the quality of employees hired or promoted, to the detriment of the organisation as a whole. The argument applies across sectors, but carries weight in Malaysia’s public sector due to its history of majority-favouring practices. The issue is undeniably delicate and complex, and the civil service as a phenomenon is highly heterogeneous. It is imperative to avoid simplistic stances that attribute all shortcomings in the civil service to pro-Malay policies and to recognise that competitive selection and performance monitoring can sustain quality within a group-targeted and diversity-promoting system.[24]
Fourth, some grounds for increasing diversity in Malaysia’s civil service derive from country-specific factors, particularly related to past rationales that, the argument goes, are no longer valid. One major plank of this critique maintains that pro-Malay policies cannot be justified any longer because the NEP expired in 1990.[25] A closer reading of the NEP, however, will discern that its policy timeline was oblique and noncommittal and that, by and large, Malaysia’s mainstays of economic growth, poverty alleviation, and group-targeted, inter-ethnic redistribution have all endured to this day. These national objectives remain relevant and important, with variations in design and mechanism over time, including benefits targeted at the Orang Asli, Indian, and Sabah-Sarawak Bumiputera communities (Lee 2022). Denunciation of “racial policy”, which resounds in some echo chambers, fails to realize that group-targeted policies exist for multiple groups, and sows distrust when people demand the termination of Malay-targeted schemes while advocating minority-targeted assistance.
Another argument, forcefully articulated in Ramasamy’s February article, regards an initial justification for Malay dominance in the civil service — namely, to counter Chinese dominance in the private sector — as invalidated by economic footholds that government-linked companies (GLCs) have secured. This argument’s general thrust is more cogent than the specific framing of GLCs as the Malay community’s economic guardian. Broader socioeconomic developments, from higher education achievement to middle class expansion and economic empowerment, provide more authoritative reference for gauging the Malay community’s capability and confidence to undertake change.
The PSC’s statement on meritocratic appointment signals a willingness to engage more substantively beyond rhetoric, and may also reflect a readiness to consider incremental reforms. Such dispositions could provide a segue to more conciliatory dialogues. Moreover, campaigning for Malay “dominance” in the civil service to be dismantled because of GLC economic strength draws a misplaced equivalence between indirect Malay ‘ownership’ of GLCs – through government-linked investment – versus direct Chinese ownership and control of private enterprise. This contention, framed through the lens of implicit ethnic bargains, also risks being viewed askance by Malays who fear that conceding to a reduction of their presence in the civil service may amplify demands for the same change in the GLCs.
The demands for civil service reform based on NEP expiry or Malay GLC guardianship crack under the weight of critical scrutiny. Of course, changing tack is only the start. Fostering equitable representation through other approaches must surmount steep challenges, including Malays’ emphatic support for the perpetuation of “Malay rights”, which presumably includes civil service positions.[26] In light of these realities, Malaysia would do better to carve out space for group-targeted measures for all groups rather than duel over the termination of Malay-targeted policies.
IMPULSIVE REACTIONS, ELUSIVE SOLUTIONS
The interlocutors of the latest round of this debate demonstrate how the discourse repeatedly gets marred by impulsive reactions on both sides. If substantive and constructive exchanges are elusive, one reason might be the lack of novel and more conciliatory approaches. Ramasamy’s second, and apparently unread, opinion piece provides an illustration. On 15 March, one month after the first article, he wrote another commentary referencing the Penang state government’s experience in clarifying and consolidating recruitment procedures, from job advertisements to interviews and appointments. In sum, he advocated a “holistic perspective on civil service reforms” which is “not just balancing ethnic or religious interests, but about critically examining the needs of the service based on ethnic, gender, merit and social class considerations.”[27]
There is no guarantee that the debate would have transpired more productively had Ramasamy issued this perspective from the start instead of decrying “Malay dominance”, “overt and covert discrimination” and “racial policy”. What is clear, however, is the debate started out on a rancorous footing — and approaches more akin to Ramasamy’s second commentary might work better in the future.
It is also worthwhile probing a bit deeper into the post-2008 general election minority-hiring initiatives. Civil service ethnic composition information is incomplete and sporadic, but the Public Services Commission has disclosed data for the period 2011-17, from which we can observe ethnic patterns in applications, calls for interview, interview attendance, and appointments. Due to the volatility of year-to-year figures, the data are converted to three-year moving averages. We must register a caveat that these data merely show the final outcome of the stages of recruitment which we cannot conclusively trace to policy effects, quality of applicants, or amount and area of jobs offered. However, given the dearth of data, these empirical insights remain pertinent exploratory findings.
In general, we can observe a higher rate of call for interview and job appointment in the early 2010s for non-Malay minorities – which tapers off through the decade (Figures 1 and 3). The Orang Asli are rather exceptional, in that the rate of call for interview increases, while interview attendance and appointment per interview both decrease. The higher rates of call for interview and appointments per interview of Chinese and Indian are in line with the GTP’s commitment to facilitating minority recruitment. Importantly, interview attendance rates are high (around 70 per cent) and even across all groups during 2012-13 (Figure 2). These figures decline subsequently in all groups, but more steeply among Orang Asli – even as they are increasingly called for interview.
The same data, presented in Table 3 from the angle of the ethnic proportions of the application, interview and appointment stages, align with the possibility that efforts to increase Chinese, Indian, Sabah-Sarawak Bumiputeras were more effective in the 2011-13 period than the latter period — that is, the momentum flagged. Orang Asli recruitment efforts appear to be more sustained, with the group’s share of appointments greatly exceeding their share of job applicants.
Table 3. Ethnic groups’ share of applications, interviews and appointments (% total)
Source: Author’s calculations from Public Services Commission data obtained from data.gov.my.
Note: “Others” category omitted due to highly anomalous appointments reported in 2011 and 2012.
CONCLUSION
Can the conversation on ethnic diversity in Malaysia’s civil service, long a space for venting dogmas and grievances, break new ground? The ease and efficacy of rallying “Malay rights” confirm that the notion is deeply embedded and especially volatile today. At the same time, sweeping repudiation of “racial policy” and valorisation of “meritocracy” detract from constructive discourse. Arguably, there is much to be gained from exercising restraint in airing minority grievances while focusing on the contributions of Malay-targeted policies to the community’s advancement — as the basis for such benefits to be extended to other communities — and recognising the current merit-based recruitment system as a positive institution to build on. Policy discourses would do better to acknowledge that representation of all groups matter, and advocate selection policies that apply a blend of methods suited to majority and minority groups. Priority can also be placed on ministries and agencies where diversity can enhance the government’s domestic and international outreach, such as in policy-making, delivery of education and health services, and diplomatic ties especially with China and India.
Moving forward requires compromises and further investigations. While principally anchored to the moral arguments favouring a representative civil service, Malaysia’s quest for solutions may in the near future need to prioritise “second-best” options of increasing minority representation in the professional and managerial layers or particular ministries where their presence is relatively greater and the jobs more attractive to minority groups. Differences in ethnic composition across ministries and agencies, and in state governments besides the federal civil service, should also factor into analyses of current conditions and policy focus areas. The trade-off of job security in the public sector vs higher pay in the private sector will persist; the civil service should leverage on its advantages and focus on engendering more meaningful work to draw in talent. The presence of Sabah/Sarawak Bumiputeras and Orang Asli in top management warrants particular attention. The GTP’s commitment to increasing minority representation, which coincided with higher rates of their recruitment in 2011-13 but fizzled out thereafter and seemingly suffered political fatigue, should be researched with adequate empirical rigour to draw out lessons.
That experiment, albeit short-lived, suggests that discreet steps rather than conspicuous moves hold out better prospects for incremental progress, and also underscores the imperative of sustained political commitment. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim is studiously sidestepping the slightest provocation of Malaysia’s civil service. However, his administration, as the first ruling coalition helmed by a multi-ethnic party, could judiciously steer policy discourses and seek new grounds for fostering diversity.
REFERENCES
CPPS (2006) Towards a more representative and world class civil service. Kuala Lumpur: Centre for Public Policy Analysis (CPPS).
Khoo Boo Teik (2005) Ethnic Structure, Inequality and Governance in the Public Sector: Malaysian Experiences. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) Programme Paper number 20. Geneva: UNRISD.
Lee, Hwok-Aun (2021) Affirmative Action in Malaysia and South Africa: Preference for Parity: London and New York: Routledge.
PSC (2017) 60 Years of the Malaysian Public Services Commission 1957-2017 (Translated from Malay by the author). MPSC: Putrajaya. Malaysian Public Services Commission of Malaysia (PSC).
PEMANDU (2010) Government Transformation Programme – The Roadmap. Putrajaya: Performance Management and Delivery Unit (PEMANDU), Prime Minister’s Department.
Woo Kuan Heong (2015) Recruitment Practices in the Malaysian Public Sector: Innovations or Political Responses? Journal of Public Affairs Education 21(2): 229-246.
Woo Kuan Heong (2018). Public Employment: Attractiveness, Representativeness, and Performance, International Journal of Public Administration 41(8): 604-618
World Bank (2021) Aiming High Navigating the next stage of Malaysia’s development. Washington, DC: World Bank.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- South Korea’s participation in the Vietnam War was marked by various atrocities, including massacres and sexual violence against thousands of Vietnamese civilians.
- Despite South Korea’s refusal to acknowledge these atrocities, Vietnam’s peace diplomacy — which involves shelving historical issues to promote cooperative and peaceful interactions with former foes — allowed for bilateral relations to flourish.
- At the same time, Vietnam has allowed local commemoration of Korean massacres and, on rare occasions, challenged South Korea’s contentious historical narratives.
- Vietnam’s peace diplomacy towards South Korea is under strain, given Vietnamese victims’ growing demand for accountability and acknowledgement from the South Korean government.
- To encourage South Korea’s acknowledgement and rectification of past atrocities, Vietnam needs to frame the issue as an area for collaboration and establish an organisation to represent and support the victims.
* Phan Xuan Dung is a research officer in the Vietnam Studies Programme of the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/33, 25 April 2023
INTRODUCTION
In December 2022, Vietnam and South Korea agreed to elevate their 30-year-old ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership based on the spirit of “heading towards a bright future”.[1] However, this promise was soon tested when, on 7 February 2023, the Seoul Central District Court ordered the South Korean government to pay 30 million won (US$23,730) in compensation to Nguyen Thi Thanh, a Vietnamese woman who survived a massacre committed by Korean soldiers during the Vietnam War.[2] Thanh had previously filed a lawsuit against the South Korean government in 2020, testifying that Korean marine soldiers killed her family members and shot her in the stomach as they attacked the Phong Nhat – Phong Nhi village in Quang Nam Province in 1968.
This ruling is significant as it marks the first legal acknowledgement of Korean troops’ atrocities during the Vietnam War. However, South Korea’s Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup quickly denied that Korean troops committed massacres in Vietnam, and the South Korean government filed an appeal.[3] In response, Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed deep regret, calling on Seoul to respect historical truth and take practical steps to address the consequences of war.[4] Hanoi also stressed that its policy of “shelving the past and looking towards the future” does not mean denying “the truth or history”.
This policy of “shelving the past and looking towards the future” is a reflection of Vietnam’s long tradition of ngoại giao hòa mục, hòa hiếu (peace diplomacy). Despite a long history of wars with foreign powers, Vietnam has typically avoided humiliating defeated adversaries or politicising war legacies. Instead, it has prioritised restoring and maintaining peaceful and harmonious bilateral relations to foster conducive conditions for national development.[5] Such an approach undergirded Vietnam’s resumption of diplomatic ties with the United States and its allies, including South Korea in 1992.[6] But as the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ recent statement connotes, Vietnam has forgiven but not forgotten South Korea’s past aggression, trying to balance between moving beyond the past and pushing back against South Korea’s denial of past misdeeds. This predicament will likely worsen as the issue of Korean atrocities resurfaces in the wake of Thanh’s lawsuit.
This article first provides an overview of South Korea’s atrocities during the Vietnam War, followed by an analysis of Vietnam’s peace diplomacy towards South Korea and a discussion of Vietnamese victims’ quest for justice. It concludes by providing recommendations on how Vietnam can encourage South Korea’s cooperation in addressing this war legacy.
KOREAN ATROCITIES DURING THE VIETNAM WAR
Between 1965 and 1973, the Republic of Korea (ROK) deployed 320,000 troops to support the U.S.-backed South Vietnam in their fight against communist North Vietnam. Then, under President Park Chung-hee’s authoritarian rule, South Korea was motivated to demonstrate its commitment to the anti-communist cause in order to obtain American security assurances and financial aid to bolster the country’s economic development.[7]
Despite the South Korean government’s glorification of its participation in the war as a valiant defence against communist aggression, eyewitness accounts and historical materials have revealed a multitude of brutal acts committed by the ROK Army. In 1999, activist Ku Su-jeong and journalist Koh Kyoung-tae published a series of articles in Hankyoreh 21, a monthly South Korean magazine, that exposed the atrocities committed by Korean troops, including civilian massacres, sexual violence, and the burning of houses, through photographic evidence and survivor interviews. Ku Su-jeong also initiated the “Sorry, Vietnam” campaign, a grassroots movement that aimed to acknowledge and apologise for the harm caused by South Korea’s participation in the war.
South Korean activists and researchers have been striving to accurately identify the number of Vietnamese victims of the ROK Army. At the 2000 Jeju Human Rights Academic Conference, Ku Su-jeong reported that there were approximately 80 cases of civilian mass killings, resulting in around 9,000 deaths.[8] Two decades later, South Korean civil society’s search for more victims and Hankyoreh 21’s field reports released new figures, indicating 130 massacres and up to 10,000 deaths. Notable atrocities include the slaughter of 430 civilians in Binh Hoa Village (Quang Ngai Province), 74 in Phong Nhi – Phong Nhat villages (Quang Nam Province), and 135 in Ha My Village (Quang Nam Province).[9]
Additionally, there are accounts of Korean soldiers’ sexual violence, with up to 10,000 Vietnamese women and girls being abducted, sold, raped, and coerced into prostitution.[10] It is estimated that about 800 of them are still alive today, and tens of thousands of children were born as a result of these Korean sexual assaults. These children are referred to as Lai Đại Hàn (mixed Korean parentage).[11]
The South Korean government has long denied allegations of war crimes committed by its troops during the Vietnam War and has refused to investigate them. Moreover, the Ministry of Defense and the National Intelligence Service have repeatedly blocked access to records related to South Korean troops’ operations in the war.[12] Several South Korean liberal presidents have expressed regrets for the suffering caused by their country’s involvement in the war,[13] but have fallen short of acknowledging any Korean atrocities. Nonetheless, Vietnam’s peace diplomacy has prevented the issue from becoming a source of tension between the two countries.
VIETNAM’S PEACE DIPLOMACY TOWARDS SOUTH KOREA
With the onset of Đổi Mới economic reform in 1986 and the collapse of the Soviet-led communist bloc in the early 1990s, Vietnam recognised the need to diversify its external affairs in order to attract foreign investments for economic revitalisation. As such, Vietnam actively sought to normalise relations with former adversaries, with South Korea being a priority due to its impressive economic achievements and intention to expand to Southeast Asian markets.[14] During the negotiations for bilateral normalisation, some Vietnamese leaders voiced critical views of South Korea.[15] For example, in a visit to Seoul in 1991, then-Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Vu Khoan mentioned “the guilt of the South Korean army” in relation to the Vietnamese people.[16] However, these sentiments did not impede the negotiation process.
In fact, Vietnam’s urgent need to establish cooperation with South Korea to promote economic development led Vietnamese leaders to become more flexible with their demands. For example, in 1991, Vietnam demanded war reparations from South Korea during the first round of negotiations. However, when South Korea rejected this request, Vietnamese leaders softened their stance in the second meeting in 1992. Instead, they proposed that South Korea provide official development assistance (ODA) and increase economic cooperation to help alleviate the resentment of Vietnamese people hurt by Korean wartime actions.[17]
Since bilateral normalisation in 1992, Vietnam has put the issue of Korean involvement in the Vietnam War on the back burner. During a meeting with South Korea’s then-Foreign Minister Lee Sang-ok in 1992, Vietnam’s then-Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet noted the Vietnamese people’s animosity towards South Korea’s participation in the war, yet he also remarked that “[i]t was only a very short period of time and irrelevant to the will of the people.”[18] He therefore suggested that both countries focus on the future instead of dwelling on the past. In 2000, when asked about the alleged South Korean war crimes, Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded that “South Korean troops committed crimes against Vietnamese people. With humanitarian and peaceful neighbourly traditions, it is Vietnam’s policy to put the past aside.”[19]
As a result, South Korea was able to invest in Vietnam without facing the consequences of its wartime actions, while Hanoi received the much-needed financial aid for economic development. Over the past three decades, bilateral ties between the two former foes have flourished, with South Korea now being one of Vietnam’s top foreign investors and ODA providers. They recently set ambitious goals of increasing their bilateral trade turnover to US$100 billion by 2023 and US$150 billion by 2030.[20] South Korean chaebols such as Samsung, LG, Hyundai, and Lotte have a major influence on Vietnam’s economy. In northern Vietnam alone, Samsung has invested about US$20 billion into various projects, making up around 13.6% of Vietnam’s total industrial output value in 2022.[21]
Vietnam has also been receptive of South Korean humanitarian aid given to communities affected by war legacies. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) implemented a scheme to allocate significant resources towards assisting several provinces in central Vietnam.[22] By 2002, this initiative had resulted in the construction of around 40 new schools and multiple hospitals in regions where large numbers of civilians had been killed by the ROK Army, even though the aid was officially designated to serve any area in Vietnam in need of these facilities.[23] The KOICA-sponsored program could be seen as an attempt by South Korea to ease Vietnam’s lingering resentment about its atrocities without officially admitting responsibility.
More recently, from 2018 to 2021, KOICA provided approximately US$20 million under the Korea-Vietnam Mine Action Project (KVMAP) to remove unexploded ordinance (UXO) and support UXO victims in Binh Dinh and Quang Binh provinces.[24] In 2022, building upon the successes of KVMAP, KOICA partnered with the Vietnam office of the United Nations Development Programme to implement the Korea-Vietnam Peace Villages Project (KVPVP) in three central provinces — Binh Dinh, Quang Ngai, and Thua-Thien Hue.[25] KVPVP involves removing UXO, supporting UXO victims, and helping their communities attain sustainable development and climate change resilience. With a budget of US$25 million from KOICA, KVPVP will run from 2022 to 2026.
Although the Vietnamese government avoids revisiting South Korea’s past aggression, it does allow for local commemoration of massacres committed by Korean soldiers. Memorial monuments have been erected, and annual commemoration ceremonies are organised in the places where the atrocities occurred.[26] State media reports on these activities, as well as stories of South Koreans coming to Vietnam to pay respect to the victims.[27]
Vietnam has also occasionally rebuked Korean accounts of the war. For example, in 2017, Hanoi objected to South Korea’s then-President Moon Jae-in’s remarks honouring South Korean veterans who had fought in Vietnam.[28] More recently, in October 2022, Vietnamese authorities demanded that Netflix Vietnam take down the Korean drama series “Little Women”, citing historical inaccuracies, which had been criticised by Vietnamese netizens as an offensive glorification of Korea’s role in the Vietnam War.[29] However, in both instances, the Vietnamese government did not explicitly mention Korean atrocities or their victims. Vietnam’s objection to South Korean narratives seemed to be driven more by the desire to avoid humiliation than by concerns for the victims whom South Korea had never acknowledged.
This is further evidenced by two other lesser-known incidents, in which Vietnam quietly compromised in the realm of commemoration, in order to avoid upsetting South Korea. In 2000, a monument funded by South Korean veterans was built in Ha My village to commemorate victims of a Korean massacre in 1968. The monument initially contained a statement that incriminated Park Chung-hee’s troops. However, the ROK embassy in Hanoi requested its removal, and Vietnamese authorities acquiesced.[30] They invoked Vietnam’s official slogan of “shelving the past without forgetting it” in justifying the need to erase the statement to Ha My villagers.[31]
In 2016, the “Vietnam Pieta”, or “Last Lullaby”, a miniature version of a sculpture created by two South Korean artists to honour mothers and children killed by Korean soldiers, was donated to the Da Nang Museum. Initially, the sculpture was intended to be a memorial installation in Vietnam, but the Vietnamese government ultimately turned down the proposal, reportedly due to pressure from the South Korean government.[32]
Vietnam can be seen as struggling to balance between shelving the past and acknowledging the sufferings of its citizens during the war. Ultimately, due to its need for South Korea’s economic cooperation, Vietnam has largely refrained from confronting South Korea on its past atrocities. But such an exercise of peace diplomacy is becoming increasingly tenuous as certain Vietnamese victims continue their quest for justice.
VIETNAMESE VICTIMS’ QUEST FOR JUSTICE
In recent years, some survivors of Korean atrocities have asserted their agency in shaping memories of the war. One of them is Nguyen Thi Thanh, who had been fighting for justice even before the 2020 lawsuit. In 2018, Thanh and another survivor testified at the People’s Tribunal on War Crimes by South Korean Troops during the Vietnam War, which demanded that the South Korean government compensate the plaintiffs and launch a thorough investigation into the allegations.[33] A year later, 102 survivors joined Thanh in submitting a petition to the South Korean government, demanding a formal apology and reparations. However, the South Korean Ministry of Defence rejected the petition, claiming that there was no proof of any misdeeds committed by its troops.[34] Subsequently, Thanh sued the South Korean government in 2020 after exhausting all other options to get its attention.
In addition, survivors of sexual violence perpetrated by Korean troops have come forward to share their stories. One of them was Tran Thi Ngai, who was 24 when a Korean soldier stormed into her house and raped her. In 2015, eighty-one-year-old Ngai, along with other rape victims, wrote a letter to then-South Korean President Park Geun-hye, urging her administration to apologise and provide reparations.[35] That same year, another victim started an online petition on Change.org with the same demands, gathering more than 34,000 signatures.[36] Many Lai Đại Hàn descendants are also seeking justice from the South Korean government. Notably, Tran Dai Nhat, son of Tran Thi Ngai, founded the “Justice for Lai Đại Hàn” campaign to urge South Korea to acknowledge both the sexual violence experienced by Vietnamese women and the tens of thousands of children born as a result of rapes by Korean soldiers.[37]
All these victim-led movements share the common goals of recognition, truth-seeking, and restoration of the victims’ dignity. For decades, the Vietnamese government’s lack of support and South Korea’s refusal to accept responsibility have left these survivors with little recourse. But Thanh’s recent legal victory has created a legal precedent that might offer hope and inspiration for more victims to follow suit.
LESSONS FROM VIETNAM-U.S. RECONCILIATION
In light of Seoul’s continued denial of responsibility and the growing demand for justice from the victims, Hanoi needs to confront the issue rather than ignore it. However, taking a confrontational stance against its newest comprehensive strategic partner is not a realistic option, given Vietnam’s weaker bargaining position. Instead, Vietnam should channel its peace diplomacy towards encouraging South Korea to come to terms with the past.
Vietnam has a long history of successfully addressing complex war legacy issues, especially in its relations with the United States.[38] The U.S. has come to appreciate that resolving war legacy issues was critical for a complete and mutually beneficial relationship with Vietnam.[39] This was exemplified by America’s shift from denying the health effects of Agent Orange used in Vietnam to providing assistance to Vietnamese people with “disabilities that may be related to the use of Agent Orange”.[40] Persistent lobbying efforts by key Vietnamese and American actors from both the private and public sectors played a key role in changing Washington’s stance on the issue.[41]
Drawing from these lessons, two factors could help mitigate the bargaining power imbalance between Vietnam and South Korea. First, Vietnam should frame resolving historical issues with South Korea as an area for future-oriented cooperation. For instance, Vietnam could signal to South Korea that addressing war legacies is a prerequisite for a stronger bilateral defence partnership, as they have done vis-à-vis the U.S.[42] Additionally, Vietnam could point to the ongoing cooperation with South Korea in clearing UXO and providing support to UXO victims as an example of how addressing war legacies can be beneficial for the relationship.
Second, the establishment of a Vietnam Association for Victims of War Atrocities (VAVWA),[43] akin to the Vietnam Association for Victims of Agent Orange, is necessary for empowering the victims. By providing a platform for survivors to connect and share their experiences, VAVWA could raise domestic and international awareness of the issue, thereby indirectly putting pressure on the South Korean government. VAVWA could collaborate with victims’ allies in South Korea, such as Democratic Party lawmaker Kang Min-jung, who has been spearheading a bill with 24 other lawmakers to create a special investigation committee on the atrocities committed by the ROK Army against Vietnamese civilians.[44] Furthermore, cooperation with South Korean civil society groups involved in the matter is also crucial, as they have played a significant role in raising awareness in South Korea, fostering people-to-people reconciliation, and amplifying the voice of victims like Thanh.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace, Singapore 119614. Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Digital platforms, new media, and popular culture have diversified Muslims’ production and consumption of religious content, their forms of religious expression, and even their religiosity.
- Tech-savvy and proactive young Muslims who seek and reproduce religious knowledge outside traditional and institutional structures are at the core of this socio-religious transformation.
- This article examines young Bruneian Muslims’ production and consumption of religion-related content on social media sites. It elucidates how they, as new religious agents, are altering the lived socio-religious realities and landscapes in the country, which upholds the Melayu Islam Beraja (Malay Islamic Monarchy or MIB) ideology.
- Although new religious practices have emerged, and the young have become agents of religious transformation, this article contends that the role and significance of traditional religious authorities in Brunei society remain strong.
- When portraying their religious identity, the youths continue to observe self-restraint and be guided by the dominant state narrative. In that way, they avoid undermining the MIB and also suffering any backlash from a community that continues to practise ground-up surveillance.
*Siti Mazidah Mohamad is Visiting Fellow at the Regional Social and Cultural Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. She is an Assistant Professor and Director for the Centre for Advanced Research (CARe) at Universiti Brunei Darussalam, research Muslim youth culture and engagements with popular culture and new media in Southeast Asia.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/32, 24 April 2023
INTRODUCTION
The everyday digital practices of young Bruneian Muslims today are altering the country’s socio-religious realities in ways that are different from those of previous generations. Previously, religious knowledge was disseminated solely through physical means, such as in-person talks and publications. Today, the production and consumption of religious content occur on social media sites in the form of comics, images and short videos, and these are mainly produced by young Muslims (aged 18-35). Such digital practices are valuable to academics and relevant state agencies keen for understanding how digital technology and Muslim youth culture have transformed socio-religious practices. Their digital practices create new horizons and generate new expressions of piety, shaping the cosmopolitan socio-religious landscape in Brunei.
Highlighting the everyday digital practices of young Muslims in Brunei, this article reveals how they have been using digital technology to produce and consume religious knowledge and express their religiosity on social media. In this context, they become new agents for religious dissemination capable of shifting everyday lived socio-religious practices and upending traditional religious practices. However, this article argues that even when they are seen as challenging conventional practices and expectations, they are not challenging existing religious structure and authority.
RELIGIOUS SELF-EXPRESSION ON SOCIAL MEDIA
In this section, I demonstrate how religious knowledge was obtained in the past and how this process has evolved and been transformed with the arrival of social media as new engagement sites for young people. As with other aspects of life, social media were not originally meant for religious dissemination. However, the evolution of this daily means of communication has altered Bruneians’ socio-religious realities.
In Brunei, religious education is conducted through informal and formal schools. Before 1956, informal religious education was conducted at home, in balai (halls), and in masjid (mosques). On the other hand, formal education was carried out in Malay or English schools. To ensure that all Bruneian Muslims are proficient in both secular and religious subjects, the state established religious primary schools separate from the Malay and English schools.[1] The introduction of the Laws of Brunei, Chapter 215, Compulsory Religious Education Act further legalised religious education in the country, making it compulsory for Muslim children between the ages of seven and fifteen.[2] While formal religious education and other informal means—such as mass sermons at Friday prayers, religious books, and in-person ceramah (religious talk) or mass preaching organised by different agencies—remain the main sources of religious knowledge, young Muslims have now taken the lead in expanding into new forms of religious learning methods.
Undoubtedly, the rapid development of digital technologies has transformed religious practices. At the core of this are Muslim youths who are tech-savvy and proactive in seeking and reproducing religious knowledge and expressing their religiosity outside the confines of traditional and institutional structures. Personal and communal religiosities are now expressed through their behaviour and practices in digital space. Thus, youth religiosity and culture need to be analysed through these everyday interactions and alternative communication sites.[3]
Unlike the production and consumption of religious content, religious self-expression is now more complex due to the country’s existing sociocultural and religious norms. In Brunei, where Islam is institutionalised and practised in daily life, and where religious and ethnic identities are conflated, the state unequivocally sets the parameters for young Muslims’ online presence in the form of the MIB. Also, while young people have the freedom to produce and circulate religious content and express their identities, they are subjected to everyday communal surveillance that makes religious self-expressions a practice they must negotiate.[4]
Some of these young Muslims continue to be bounded by self-doubt, and by the belief that they do not have enough indepth knowledge of Islam to write about high-level Islamic theology and laws. Others also fear they are demonstrating riak[5] (arrogance)—a disvalue in Islam—by presenting themselves as pious Muslims. They also fear being judged for being unable to keep up with the religious expectations of living in a Muslim-majority country; therefore, there is a nagging feeling among some that they should not share their religious identity publicly since they are already living in a dominantly Muslim society. Young Bruneians thus prefer not to present themselves as pious, and mainly demonstrate the bare minimum of what is socio-culturally acceptable in their society. These complex communal surveillance and expectations explain why some young people are not keen on portraying their religious identity on social media, and this may have contributed to the emerging concern about young Bruneian Muslims being less pious than their forebears.
Working around these parameters, these young Muslims have been shaping their social and religious practices in two ways. First, they self-regulate their expressions of identity by supporting the country’s socio-religious expectations of citizens having good moral values. Second, they also join the bandwagon and act as religious “enforcers” on behalf of their community. Individually or collectively, they correct any transgressions, such as public displays of affection among unmarried couples, and Muslims uploading photos of themselves not covering their aurat (what Muslims interpret as meeting modesty standards).
THE SHIFTING SOCIO-RELIGIOUS REALITIES OF THE YOUNG
The number of religious content creators sharing religious knowledge on social media sites has increased exponentially over the last few years. They utilise YouTube, Facebook, Instagram and TikTok to share on Islam and its practices. Religious content taught in schools, such as the basic Islamic rituals, the dos and don’ts, and morality, are now reproduced, circulated and consumed in different digital formats. Nasihat4qalby, MattersOfChoice, and Muhammad Adam @ Chong,[6] are among the local social media users on Instagram that work individually and collectively to share religious content. The use of Muslim comics, Muslim memes, Dakwah-graphy (also available as hashtag #dakwahgraphy), religious quotes and images, supplication, and prayers, especially by young Muslims are now widespread.
To increase their content’s reach and to conjure a “Muslim narrative”, they apply hashtags #muslimlives, #islam, #muslimcomedy, #muslimmemes, #selfreminder and #selfreflection[7] in their captions (see Figure 1). Often, their content is reposted from other profiles and sources such as Islamify,[8] an Instagram profile focusing on Muslim news, reminders and quotes by well-known regional and global preachers. Religious videos created by the youths tend to include elements of fun and comedy, and leverage on the relatability to their peers. The Ramadhan content by MattersOfChoice on ‘5 THINGS TO AVOID in the REMAINING days of Ramadhan (see Figure 2) is an example of how these elements are combined, where young Muslims take it upon themselves the responsibility of reminding others of their religious obligations. This form of content is fun, non-obtrusive and easy to understand, and does capture the interest of young audiences.
Figure 1: Screengrab of #selfreminder hashtag on Instagram used by Muslim users including Bruneian Muslims.
Figure 2: Screengrab of MatterOfChoice Instagram Post[9]
Interestingly, for a Muslim-majority state, Brunei does not have many religious influencers or homegrown Muslim religious celebrities, unlike in Malaysia (such as Ustazah Asma Harun) and Indonesia (Habib Husein[10] or Abdullah Gymnastiar). This may be due to factors such as the formal certification needed to preach in the country online and offline, and the lack of interest among young Muslims to become religious influencers/preachers. To be a preacher in Brunei, one is required to apply for a certification from the Islamic Religious Council/Majlis Ugama Islam Brunei (MUIB).[11] There is at least one known officially “certified” young religious motivational speaker, i.e. Hanisah Othman,[12] who uses social media to share her religious knowledge, practices and daily reflections as a Muslim, a wife, and a mother. Her content is relatable for young people. She delivers her posts in English and her short religious talks are aired after the call to prayers (azan) by Kristal FM, one of the local radio stations.
More young Bruneians are producing and consuming religious content produced in English compared to their spoken language, Brunei Malay.[13] These young Muslims’ use of different platforms and strategies to disseminate religious knowledge can be considered Dakwah 2.0 which neighbouring Malaysia and Indonesia have already witnessed, although on a more advanced scale.[14] Regardless of their status as influencers, preachers, motivational speakers, or even ordinary individuals, everyone’s online presence contributes to building the country’s socio-religious reality and landscape.
Apart from local sources, Bruneian Muslims also consume content produced by preachers based in Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and Western countries. The more prominent ones are Ustazah Asma Harun,[15] a Malaysian preacher and motivator; Yasmin Mogahed,[16] an American educator and motivational speaker; and Ustaz Tarmizi Wahid (or Mizi Wahid),[17] a motivational speaker from Safinah Institute in Singapore. Through her social media presence and profiling, Ustazah Asma receives regular invitations to Brunei to give religious talks. In 2020 and 2023, she delivered a talk on ‘Keluargaku Pengorbananku 2.0’ and ‘Titian Akhir Zaman’. Over a thousand people attended a recent talk that she gave. In 2019 and 2022, Yasmin Mogahed delivered motivational lectures in Brunei based on her best-selling books, ‘Reclaim Your Heart: Personal insights on breaking free from life’s shackles’ and ‘Healing the Emptiness: A guide to emotional and spiritual well-being’. Ustaz Mizi Wahid delivered both virtual and in-person talks in Brunei with specific themes such as ‘Staying in Faith’ in 2020, and ‘Regain Your confidence, Pursue Your Biggest Dream’ at the National Youth Day Convention in 2022. These speakers focused on different discourses of Muslim lives such as emotion, grief, family, self-worth, happiness, and relationship, which Bruneian Muslims can relate to in everyday lives, regardless of whether they consider themselves devout Muslims or not.
The young can also shape the religious discourse online through subtle means. As social media sites enable self-expression through intense self-disclosure, different expressions of religious identity can be observed. The young Muslims’ identities are portrayed via sartorial presentation, Islamic quotes and images, and consumption of shariah-compliant products. One prominent group among Muslim social media influencers are the Hijabi influencers (hijabi refers to women who don the hijab, or headscarf). These Hijabi influencers are not necessarily preaching about Islam but their online sharing of everyday lives and struggles as Muslims are highly relatable for young Muslim women. Local Muslim social media influencers such as Ajeeratul Abdullah[18] and Sarah Mumtaz[19] incorporate Islamic quotes and daily reflections in their postings to make sense of their lives and struggles while keeping to a modest hijabi style. Ajeeratul never claimed her fashion to be modest or compliant with an Islamic lifestyle. Yet, her layering of different clothes showcases her ability to mix style, modernity and elegance while being shariah-compliant. Sarah, a modest clothing entrepreneur, uses her social media account to advertise her hijab brand, Mumtaz Collection, while exhibiting shariah-compliant fashion. In both cases, Muslim women in Brunei can easily emulate their everyday fashion to what they consider to be satisfying of the religious requirements or to be covering aurat.[20]
CONCLUSION: BRUNEI’S SOCIO-RELIGIOUS OUTLOOK GOING FORWARD
The religious practices examined in this article prove that Brunei is no longer solely relying on the mass-broadcasted and mass-produced religious information from religious institutions, and in a physical format. These digitally connected young Muslims behave as new religious agents via their seemingly banal production and consumption of religious content on digital platforms and self-expressions portraying Muslim identity and new socio-religious practices. Most importantly, socio-religious realities and landscapes are no longer shaped by physical interactions and engagements but have moved to another platform which Lily Kong calls ‘techno-religious spaces’[21]—new spaces of religious practice.
Bruneian Muslim youths’ digital practices indicate that they are modern and global in their outlook and in embracing different forms of Islamic knowledge. They shape the spiritual landscape uniquely adapted to Brunei’s context, where religious (Muslim) and ethnic (Malay) identities are conflated. They are moving towards a globalised Brunei anchored in Melayu Islam Beraja (MIB) and Negara Zikir. It remains imperative that both lived religiosities and macro-scale structural transformations be examined to understand the context and the social fabric of the everyday lives of Bruneian young Muslims today.
Youth religious practices are the epitome of this transformation that is not limited to digitalisation and mediatisation of religion but also their lived religiosities which shape the socio-religious realities and landscape of the country. As Brunei continues to develop economically, social realities will continue to shift. Changes are expected, which could be disruptive to the existing practices.
While Brunei has a plethora of sources and individuals speaking about Islam and emerging youth religiosities, they do not point to a decline in official religious authority. Although previous non-digital practices may have been upended to some extent, religious authority and structure remain as they were. The Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) and relevant agencies under it remain responsible for protecting the Islamic religion and all related matters, in addition to planning, implementing and evaluating programmes and activities for the benefit of Islam in Brunei.[22] These Muslim youths’ practices do, however, expand sources of religious information and expressions, which opens new challenges for both the state and society. There is a valid concern over the influx of religious information from resources that may have escaped the inspection and verification process. Different measures such as certification of religious preachers and scrutiny of physical documents such as religious books are no longer sufficient in this digital world. Controlling false or unverified information spread across various digital platforms remains to be answered in this new environment. At this juncture, the Brunei government, significantly MORA, would benefit by moving their practices to online spaces and encouraging more Bruneian preachers to utilise social media sites, following the current trends of consuming and producing religious knowledge online.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Aquaculture is key to Southeast Asia’s food security as the region contributes nearly one quarter of global seafood production. However, commercial aquaculture has often resulted in aquatic ecosystem degradation.
- Restorative aquaculture, particularly by growing seaweed and shellfish, promotes aquatic farming while having a rehabilitative impact on marine and estuarine ecosystems.
- There are opportunities in Southeast Asia to adopt restorative aquaculture, not only in rapidly declining fishery zones, but also in areas soon to feel the effects of rising sea levels.
- Policies to transition to climate resilient, restorative aquaculture include the promotion of environmental rehabilitation alongside fishery development, promoting collective action towards restorative aquaculture, facilitating investment, infrastructure, and R&D, adopting food safety and sustainability certification, and improving regional cooperation.
*Elyssa Kaur Ludher is Visiting Fellow with the Climate Change for Southeast Asia Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. Prior to joining, Ms Ludher contributed to food policy research at the World Bank, Centre for Liveable Cities Singapore, and the Singapore Food Agency.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/31, 20 April 2023
INTRODUCTION: TRANSITIONING TO RESTORATIVE AQUACULTURE
Fish protein is a key source of nutrition in Southeast Asia. On average, Southeast Asians consume 39.4kg/person/year, almost double the global average of 20.3 kg/person/year (2017 data).[1]
Southeast Asia is also a major contributor in fishery production. It produces 22% of the world’s products (approximately 46.2 million tonnes in 2020), contributing US$49 billion to the Southeast Asian economy.[2] Indonesia is the largest producer in the region (49.4%), followed by Vietnam (16.7%), and Myanmar (12.6%).[3]
Demand for fish is expected to increase by 15% between 2020 to 2030.[4] Yet, the fishing industry is facing strong headwinds and quantities have been stagnating or declining (see Table 1).
The last few decades of overfishing, in part due to illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, has resulted in 64% of the fisheries resource base in Southeast Asia being at risk of collapse.[5] Furthermore, the sector faces challenges of ageing fisherfolk, concerns over animal welfare, harmful chemical use, disease, parasites, and concerns over microplastic and heavy metal contamination. This is further exacerbated by climate change effects such as sea-level rise, ocean warming, acidification, change in sea-wave phenomena, and greater salinity.
An Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change report[6] has highlighted that Southeast Asia, along with Northeast Asia, will experience the largest declines in fish stocks as ocean warming forces fish to move pole-wards towards cooler seas.
Table 1: Fisheries production and value, by country, in Southeast Asia between 2018-2020, to note that 2020 decline may be due to COVID movement control orders
* Total fisheries include from marine fisheries, inland fisheries and aquaculture
(Source: SEAFDEC) [7]
Recognising this, some in the fisheries community and farmers have turned to aquaculture which has been growing faster than captured fisheries in the last few years, particularly in Brunei, Cambodia, Lao, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam. Yet commercial aquaculture practices have often had a deleterious impact on the health of marine and estuarine ecosystems, including water pollution, eutrophication, habitat degradation, harmful harvesting practices, impacts on wild fish stocks, and disease.[8] This in turn harms the long-term sustainability of the industry and food security of the region, unless the situation reverses.
One promising solution is restorative aquaculture, which can simultaneously improve the health of aquatic environments and ensure food security for the region. A transition to restorative aquaculture is key to food and livelihood security for the hundreds of millions living along Southeast Asian coastlines.
RESTORATIVE AQUACULTURE AND ITS BENEFITS
Aquaculture refers to cultivation of marine organisms. It can be carried out in netted environments or controlled environments, such as in ponds, tanks and open areas, for the purpose of food, pharmaceuticals and other products.
Aquaculture is already considered comparatively more environmentally sustainable[9] – it contributes only a tenth of the greenhouse gases (GHG) released, if measured against rearing terrestrial livestock farming. [10] Current estimates of annual emissions from global aquaculture are ~245-385 million metric tonnes (MT) of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) compared to 4-6 billion MT of CO2e a year from livestock.[11] It is considered one type of climate resilient agriculture (CSA) – which achieves the three foundational pillars of CSA – boosting productivity, enhancing resilience, and lowering GHG.
Aquaculture becomes restorative when it contributes to ecological and environment health. The Nature Conservancy, a non-governmental organisation promoting climate action and conserving biodiversity, defines restorative aquaculture as occurring “when commercial or subsistence aquaculture provides direct ecological benefits to the environment, with the potential to generate net positive environmental outcomes.”[12] It is one of the solutions under the umbrella of Nature-Based Solutions.
Among marine organisms, studies have found that seaweed and bivalves in particular, improve nearshore water quality and habitats. [13] [14] When combined with finfish production, it can result in the improved health of fish and production.[15] This has been proven in at least one study in northern Vietnam, when Tilapia, shrimp and seaweed were combined.[16] Other marine organisms with restorative potential include sea cucumbers, sponges, snails, abalone, and sea squirts; these have been found to play important environmental roles in natural ecosystems and could provide restorative benefits in farmed settings.[17]
A summary of the benefits offered by seaweed and bivalves is described in the table below:
| Environmental benefits | Carbon contributions | End products[18] | |
| Seaweed | Provides refuge for juvenile fish and invertebrates, and promotes greater biodiversity when designed to enhance nature[19] Biofiltration function removes nutrients (nitrogen, phosphorous and others) via uptake in tissues and cells Moderate ocean acidification[20] Co-culture with salmon and other finfish can reduce eutrophication risk[21] | If biomass is sunken into deep sea, carbon is sequestered (if harvested, carbon is released up the value chain). Potential sequestration of 0.05 to 0.29 Gt of CO2e annually, similar to restoring all the world’s mangroves[22] red macroalgae Asparagopsis spp in feed reduces methane from cattle.[23] Does not require feed inputs therefore no GHG emissions | Food/proteins (carrageenan, agar, iodine) Pharmaceuticals Animal feed Biochar Biofertiliser (Chlorella vulgaris) Biofuels (biogas, biomethane) Bioplastics |
| Bivalves | Provides refuge for juvenile fish and invertebrates, and promotes greater biodiversity when designed to enhance nature[24] Bivalve faeces act as fertiliser to enhance seagrass growth[25] Absorbs nitrogen and phosphorus [26] Filtration of organic and particulate matter to improve water clarity (mussels can filter 25 litres of seawater per day)[27] Lowers likelihood of eutrophication[28] | Can sequester carbon in shells, but due to respiration are net carbon emitters[29] can improve environments for health of blue carbon habitats. [30] When co-cultured with seaweed, it can be net carbon sink[31] | Food/ proteins Pharmaceuticals Shells can be pulverised for building material |
POTENTIAL FOR RESTORATIVE AQUACULTURE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Southeast Asia has 173,000 km of coastline[32] and has been identified as amongst the regions that have high opportunities for restorative aquaculture due to the need for rehabilitation. [33] According to the Nature Conservancy, all of Southeast Asia’s seas has opportunity for restorative aquaculture, and those with higher opportunity to rehabilitate based on current levels of degradation and future risk[34] include the seas surrounding the Philippines, the Malacca Straits, and the coasts of northern Vietnam, and opportunity to rehabilitate.
Figure 1: Nature Conservancy’s assessment of Restorative Aquaculture Opportunity Index for Seaweed (left) and Shellfish (right) [35] (© The Nature Conservancy based on research by Theuerkauf et al, CC BY 4.0 licence)[36]
Due to the benefits of restorative aquaculture, it should also be prioritised in areas experiencing localised effects of climate change. For example, increased dissolved CO2 will cause ocean pH to reduce by an average of 0.4-0.5, affecting fish embryo and larvae development.[37] [38] Studies in the US, China and Chile have shown that seaweed can reduce acidity in surrounding waters and moderate ocean acidification, thus improving fish reproduction success. [39] [40] [41]
Furthermore, restorative aquaculture can be adopted by farmers facing submergence of farmland as a result of sea-level rise. Some of the key regions in Southeast Asia facing severe sea-level rise are the deltas of the Mekong River (near Ho Chi Minh City), Red River (near Hanoi), Chao Phraya River (near Bangkok), Yangon River (near Yangon), Barito River (in South Kalimantan), and the Selangor coastline (near Kuala Lumpur) (see maps below). Seaweed and bivalves can potentially soak up the inevitable contaminants released as urban land, farmland and infrastructure are submerged.
Figure 2: Major regions (shown in red) projected to be below annual flood level in 2050, based on IPCC 2021 report that may benefit from restorative aquaculture practices (Source: Climate Central)[42]
Restorative aquaculture is potentially a market-based solution. Seaweed alone is a US$16.7 billion industry globally, and 98% of it is already farmed in Asia.[43] Initial costs and set up barriers, however, can be substantial. The key to successful restorative aquaculture is understanding the ecosystem enough to create localised solutions. Each site may require unique design and implementation strategies. Fortunately, with its long history in farming of seaweed and shellfish, Southeast Asia’s fishery communities, particularly within indigenous communities, may hold localised resource management experience and expertise. Institutionalising this knowledge and expanding it to a science-based approach would require facilitative policies, structures and capital support by governments, the civil sector, the private sector or the carbon markets.
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS TO ENHANCE RESTORATIVE AQUACULTURE
While restorative aquaculture practices have the potential to ameliorate or even reverse the ecological and biodiversity damage, more experience is needed to realize its projected benefits. The dividends from success, however, has the potential to reduce the number of livelihoods detrimentally affected by environmental degradation and climate impacts in coastal areas, while contributing to local, regional and global food security.
Some policies that can propel the region to reap the benefits of restorative aquaculture include
- Promotion of environmental rehabilitation alongside food production in the fishery sector.
The fishery sector’s development is a major development area for Southeast Asian nations. However, environmental rehabilitation policies are often carried out by different government departments. Integrated government departments need to shift focus from solely reducing the negative impacts and environmental risk management, to one that promotes environmental net benefits that can not only support lowering carbon emission goals, but also improving the health of aquatic environments. Combining food production with environmental rehabilitation would also identify and address the barriers and uncertainty in regulatory frameworks and guidelines. Aquaculture practices should also be paired with adequately resourced monitoring, management and enforcement programmes.
2. Promotion of collective action on restorative aquaculture through partnerships with multilevel stakeholders.
The sheer scale of the fishery problem in Southeast Asia necessitates the engagement and collective action of all stakeholders including communities (particularly indigenous communities), private, public, and civil sectors, and regional institutions. Public institutions could work together with communities and environmental organisations to develop the science, monitoring approaches and tools to measure and prove the benefits from restorative aquaculture. Investment could be made into sensors, technology and tools that can assist in the data collection and monitoring needs that can reduce the regulatory costs of newly growing aquaculture sector. Once known, clear and effective communication must be fostered among stakeholders on relevant tools and practices that can expand restorative aquaculture.
Furthermore, collaborative and in-field capacity building programmes would also build confidence in participants to adopt new solutions and help finetune management and monitoring practices. These need to be inclusive of women, who already play important roles in the processing phase (drying, packaging) of the aquaculture industry.[44] Such programmes can also promote solutions that reduce loss and waste.
3. Facilitate investment, infrastructure and R&D into restorative aquaculture interventions
Evidence of the economic and environmental value of restorative aquaculture is still in development. Proof depends on experimentation, having access to data, expert analysis, monitoring, and further solutions development. This requires investment in trials, research, and technology, which could be undertaken by the public sector, research institutions, the private sector (for example, through accelerator programmes and incubators). Carbon markets are an additional source of capital when combined with blue carbon projects, such as mangrove or seagrass rehabilitation initiatives.
Beyond establishing new programmes, support and extension services could contribute to success. Localised climate-smart and resilient seeding facilities, breeding programmes, hatcheries, disease management facilities, biorefineries or cold chain facilities are some enabling infrastructures that could significantly reduce the risk and cost of setting up and scaling up restorative aquaculture programmes.
4. Adoption of food safety and sustainability certification
Certification and labelling are key to distinguishing products resulting from restorative aquaculture practices from others, especially from fisheries resulting from IUU. Certification should not only be made available for food products, but also non-edible products such as for biofertiliser, biofuel etc. Without this, few are incentivised to adopt what may seem to be more onerous and risky restorative aquaculture practices.
Meeting the requirements for certification is often out of the reach of the millions of smallholders in the sector. It requires fees, access to facilities such as sensors and laboratories, and third-party assistance to facilitate the process. Public agencies and other stakeholders could invest in the technology and tools to assist in data collection and ameliorate costs and encourage greater participation for certification and monitoring.
5. Shore up regional cooperation on restorative aquaculture.
Southeast Asia has longstanding agreements and frameworks for protection of coastal and marine environments through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), its working groups and its technical centres. The ASEAN Working Group on the Coastal and Marine Environment (AWGCME), the ASEAN Sectoral Working Group on Fisheries (ASWGFi), the ASEAN Centre for Biodiversity and the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Centre (SEAFDEC) are among the crucial platforms and institutions promoting the sustainable management, conservation and economic development of the marine and fishery sector.
The policy frameworks that are associated with restorative aquaculture include the Regional Code of Conducts on Responsible Fisheries (RCCRF), the Resolution and Plan of Action on Sustainable Fisheries for Food Security for the ASEAN region Towards 2020, and the Resolution and Plan of Action on Sustainable Fisheries for Food Security for the ASEAN Region. Currently, the ASWGFi has been tasked to develop a common fisheries policy, named the ASEAN General Fisheries Policy (AGFP). It would be ideal if the AGFP could also adopt principles, frameworks and targets to promote restorative aquaculture to achieve region-wide cumulative benefits.
Southeast Asia has among the most biodiverse marine habitats on the planet. [45] With dedicated action, Southeast Asian nations could lead the way to identification of beneficial marine species to contribute to the global field of restorative aquaculture. However, time is short. Recent IPCC reports has reinforced that our marine biodiversity and its habitats are in rapid decline. [46] Rehabilitative actions are urgently needed to stay its degradation, and restorative aquaculture is one of the foremost tools for doing so.
Restorative aquaculture is not only an economic option that can support the millions reliant on fisheries for their livelihoods, in the long term it is also a more sustainable food-secure option. To do so requires not only dedicated efforts of governments individually and collaboratively throughout Southeast Asia, but also collaboration and engagement at all segments of the value chain. Only then can we keep the fishery sector afloat, through the rising tides ahead.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Since 2021, Malaysia has been seeing the emergence of millenarian movements promoting apocalyptic narratives, such as Gerakan Akhir Zaman (GAZA) and Perjalanan Mimpi Yang Terakhir (PMYT).
- Although millenarian movements are not new in Malaysia, their recent public presence is marked by savvy and creative social media strategies. Their content is easily accessible and well disseminated within and beyond national borders.
- Academics often examine millenarian groups through the security and theological lens. On the other hand, security agencies keep an eye out for any signs of violence, while religious authorities watch for potential promotion of deviant theology.
- However, we argue that the evolution of millenarian groups in the age of social media poses different sets of challenges to these conventional approaches. The lengthy processes involved when seeking cooperation from social media companies and sophisticated social media features have made it difficult for authorities to track and effectively clamp down on these groups.
- Hence, creative solutions beyond conventional approaches are needed. While there have been millenarian groups that spread misinformation and disinformation, greater sociological examination of these groups is necessary to better understand the various social conditions behind their popularity.
*Amirul Adli Rosli is Research Officer at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Media, Technology and Society Programme. Nur Syafiqah Mohd Taufek is a master’s student in the Department of Malay Studies at the National University of Singapore. She is a recipient of the ISEAS Tun Dato’ Sir Cheng Lock Tan Scholarship.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/30, 19 April 2023
INTRODUCTION
Millenarian movements, or movements promoting apocalyptic thought, uphold the following idea about the future: an “imminent, total, ultimate, this-worldly, collective salvation”[1] often through a messianic figure, who would come and “establish the reign of righteousness and justice on the earth”.[2] In Islam, this saviour is known as the Al-Mahdi. While the belief in eschatological narratives and figures including Al-Mahdi is part of the Muslim tradition, millenarian movements “seek to immanentize the coming of the “end”.[3] They anticipate the coming of Al-Mahdi to lead a new, utopian order.[4] Various Muslim millenarian movements have emerged throughout history in both the Sunni and Shiite communities. These include some Sufi orders such as Roshaniyya in Afghanistan and Naqshbandi-Haqqani.[5]
Millenarian movements have long existed in Malaysia, albeit in fragmented forms. In the past, several personalities have claimed to be Imam Mahdi and a number of organisations promote apocalyptic narratives. The Al-Arqam movement, for example, can be considered a millenarian group;[6] Headed by the late Ashaari Muhammad, it caught public attention and was banned in 1994.[7] Millenarian groups of the past disseminated ideas through closed-door gatherings, classes, and publications. More recently, the Malaysian Police uncovered online movements such as Perjalanan Mimpi Yang Terakhir (PMYT)[8] and Gerakan Akhir Zaman (GAZA).[9] These new millenarian groups have a wide audience.
In this paper, we argue that the evolution of millenarian groups in the age of social media poses a challenge to the effectiveness of existing approaches in dealing with millenarian movements. In the following sections, we first elaborate on how both state and religious authorities conventionally tackle millenarian groups. Then, we demonstrate how the use of social media poses various challenges to these approaches. We also discuss the limitations of current approaches. Lastly, we propose that millenarian groups be studied beyond these approaches to better understand the root causes of their emergence and popularity.
LIMITATIONS OF CONVENTIONAL APPROACHES
Generally, millenarian groups in Malaysia are tackled through security and theological approaches. They are subjected to state and religious authorities’ surveillance for being potential security threats and for spreading theological deviance from mainstream Sunni teachings. In 1994, the Al-Arqam movement was banned, and its leaders were arrested; allegedly over “plans to capture political power ‘through magic and violence’”.[10] A fatwa (religious edict) was also issued declaring that books promoted by the organisation contained teachings that contradict the Islamic creed and can potentially cause confusion among Muslims and lead them astray.[11] In September 2022, the founder of PMYT, Masitah Ab Jalar (also known as Sittah AnNur among her followers) was arrested for spreading “deviant teachings”.[12] Similarly, a fatwa was issued to declare PMYT deviant and that the movement posed danger to the nation.[13] Masitah later publicly declared her repentance and urged her followers to return to the correct teachings of Islam.[14]
So far, no fatwa has been made against GAZA. However, the group has been referred to as “sesat” (deviant) by the Islamic Religious Affairs Departments of Negeri Sembilan (JHEAINS)[15] and Selangor (JAIS),[16] as evident in interviews with local newspapers. As of February 2022, GAZA remained under the observation of religious authorities,[17] and no action has been taken against followers of the group. However, any report on the group’s online activities is forwarded immediately to the Malaysian Communications And Multimedia Commission for them to take action.[18]
Banning millenarian groups based on security and theology inaccurately places these in the same vein as radical terrorist networks such as Al-Qa’eda and Islamic State (ISIS), which are also millenarian.[19] Al-Qaeda and ISIS evidently weaponized apocalyptic narratives in their advertisements to recruit new members.[20] By painting a picture of an upcoming apocalypse, the organizations posit that change and social transformation can happen only through violence. Nevertheless, all millenarian groups in Malaysia are treated as potential security threats even when non-violent. The securitization of millenarian groups is not only adopted by state authorities but also by local religious authorities. Today, religious authorities label millenarian groups as deviant based on theology and the perceived threat they pose to the nation. During a Friday sermon issued by the Perak religious authority, it labelled groups promoting millenarian thinking as deviant and frame them as a security threat to the nation.[21]
THE CHALLENGES OF SOCIAL MEDIA: THE PMYT AND GAZA
Millenarian groups now utilise social media to disseminate ideas to a wider audience. PMYT’s and GAZA’s ability to utilise social media platforms, for example, renders conventional security approaches ineffective. Although PMYT’s online activities can be traced to June 2021, the movement started gaining public attention only in late August 2021. The movement centres around Sittah Annur who claimed to have met Prophet Muhammad and received prophecies about Doomsday and World War 3. Masitah went as far as to say that whoever stopped her from sending divine messages were infidels and would go to hell.[22] PMYT uses social media platforms such as Facebook, YouTube and Telegram. Content posted on these platforms is often standardized: screenshots of her Facebook posts and links to her YouTube videos are shared on Telegram. By the time of Masitah’s arrest in September 2021, PMYT had garnered between 2,000 to 3,000 followers from Indonesia and Brunei.[23] This shows how ideas spread through social media can quickly reach audiences beyond Malaysia and effectively create transnational networks without any physical meetings.
One challenge posed by social media is that these internationally-based platforms lie beyond the control of the Malaysian authorities. Content posted on social media platforms cannot be easily taken down upon the demand of the Ministry even when it is offensive or contravene certain social media standards set by the government. This issue has been acknowledged by Annuar Musa, the former Minister for Communications and Multimedia.[24] Seeking the cooperation of a social media company is a lengthy process that requires a preliminary investigation and the involvement of the Attorney General’s Chambers.[25] Even if these processes are carried through, the compliance of social media companies is not guaranteed.
Telegram, for instance, is known for its refusal to heed governments’ pressures in revealing information about potentially harmful and dangerous private groups and individuals. In Malaysia and Singapore, Telegram chat groups have become a marketplace for selling and exchanging illegal drugs, non-consensual recordings of sexual activities,[26] and child pornography.[27] Despite the severity of these issues, authorities cannot enforce social media platforms to remove the content when demanded but can only act against members of such groups involved in the content creation and its distribution if they are identified. The authorities can also investigate offenders under provisions such as Section 233 of the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 “for improper use of a network facility”.[28]This was the case for Masitah when she was arrested. She was also investigated under Section 298A of the Penal Code “for causing disharmony, disunity or enmity”.[29]
Although authorities do not have much power to take down online content, they may pressure offenders to do so. Following Masitah’s arrest, JAIS announced that they will monitor her activities and enforce measures against her if her activities once again contradict Islamic teachings.[30] It is unclear to what extent JAIS has been monitoring Masitah’s activities or if the relevant authorities have asked her to delete PMYT’s social media content. Following her declaration of repentance, PMYT’s Facebook page is no longer accessible to the public. This suggests that the page has either been deleted or set to private. Facebook’s privacy feature still allows new members to access these pages through invite links from existing followers. This privacy setting makes it complicated and tedious for these groups and pages to be tracked by the authorities. PMYT’s YouTube channel “S’ttah An-Nur PMYT”[31] and its videos remain accessible, although the account has not uploaded any new videos since 23 August 2021. These videos received an average of 17, 000 views.
Despite JAIS’ warning, the authors observe that Masitah continues posting on PMYT’s main Telegram channel.[32] The channel, however, has been set to private, which restricts newcomers from joining and limits sharing of posts only to Masitah, who administers the group. The group currently has 10,955 members.[33] At the time of the arrest, the police also found 22 other channels run by PMYT.[34] It remains unclear if these channels have been deleted or set to private. Such a feature makes it hard for authorities to track PMYT’s activities and followers’ responses. After the incident, Masitah posted similar content about her dreams and prophecies once to thrice a month, before going on a hiatus from December 2021 to March 2022. Since then, she has continued posting only once every few months. At the time of writing, Masitah remains active on her Telegram group which has over 10, 000 members. PMYT’s continued activities, though carried out in private, demonstrates how millenarian groups can thrive despite opposition from the authorities.
The Gerakan Akhir Zaman, or GAZA, is an offshoot of Muhammad Qasim Dreams, a millenarian group that originated from Pakistan, and is led by Muhammad Qasim. Like PMYT, the movement revolves around Muhammad Qasim who claims to receive divine dreams regarding World War 3 and doomsday.[35] He also claims to have met the Prophet Muhammad who wants him to relay messages to influential figures such as the Pakistani Prime Minister, as shown in Figure 1. With its messages mostly written in Indonesian and Malay, GAZA can be considered a Southeast Asian branch of Muhammad Qasim Dreams, which targets Malay-speaking individuals. Its biggest following comes from Indonesia, followed by Malaysia.
Figure 1: A screengrab of a video posted by a GAZA Twitter account. The video claims that there are four big signs signalling the end of times which Prophet Muhammad told Qasim through a dream.
The group centres their operation on platforms such as YouTube, Facebook, Telegram, and most notably, Twitter where its followers operate multiple accounts and utilise aggressive marketing techniques. One important aspect of such a strategy utilised by GAZA accounts involves replying to tweets and quote-retweeting[36] different types of tweets to garner attention. The type of content retweeted or quote-retweeted by the GAZA accounts stretches from the news posted by broadcasting companies to viral, humorous or informative tweets (see Figure 2). By responding to tweets that have already gone viral, the GAZA accounts seek to piggyback on the popularity of these tweets and direct some attention to their cause.
Figure 2: An example of how a GAZA account piggybacks on a trending tweet to spread its message. As multiple Twitter users open the tweet to see more information and the replies received by the original tweet, they will stumble across GAZA’s messages.
A second important aspect of their marketing strategy is the publishing of high-volume tweets and using different accounts to retweet them. This helps them spread their message to more Twitter users. Figure 3 below shows the volume of returns obtained from searching related keywords like “‘Muhammad Qasim’, #GerakanakhirZaman, ‘Gerakan Akhir Zaman’ and #MuhammadQasimDreams’. We found that these keywords were mentioned 368,000 times by only 7,630 accounts. Although the number of users may not be significant, these tweets have approximately reached 39.3 million unique Twitter users. Upon closer observation, we found that these keywords are posted by astroturfing accounts. These accounts were created to specifically tweet about GAZA and to convince followers of the urgent need to join its cause. Astroturfing refers to the practice of creating an online illusion that shows widespread grassroots support for a particular campaign. Such a practice is harmful as it “misleads the public into believing that the position of the astroturfer is the commonly held view”[37] and in turn, may influence followers to support a similar position – in this case, the ideas promoted by GAZA.
Figure 3: A graph exhibiting the volume of tweets that features the words: “‘Muhammad Qasim’ OR (GAZA NEAR Qasim) OR (#GerakanakhirZaman) OR ‘Gerakan Akhir Zaman’ OR #MuhammadQasimDreams’, from the period 1 January 2022 to 1 July 2022.
Twitter has evidently shown that it is unable to deal with spam, fake and bot accounts that continuously emerge in bulk on the platform.[38] While bot accounts and activities are easily identifiable, it is more difficult to distinguish an astroturfing tweet from a tweet posted by an actual supporter of GAZA. As such, Twitter has been unable to deal with astroturfing accounts consistently. In the case of GAZA-related accounts, some have been deactivated by Twitter for spam and bot-like activities, but many others remain active.
The above demonstrates that the modus operandi of contemporary millenarian groups has become more sophisticated with the rise of social media as compared to previous groups who disseminated ideas through gatherings and publications. Through social media, these groups have not only managed to spread their ideas beyond Malaysian borders and created a transnational network of followers in shorter periods of time, they can also thrive despite attempts by the authorities to thwart them. Several social media features have also made it more difficult for the groups’ activities to be tracked. The authorities can no longer effectively contain activities carried out by these groups simply due to changes in the way they operate. As social media features continue to grow more sophisticated, the effectiveness of existing approaches to tackle them continues to drop.
MOVING BEYOND SECURITY AND THEOLOGICAL LENSES
In the age of social media where millenarian groups can thrive despite being banned, more creative solutions are needed to tackle them. While it is important to remain vigilant of any potential threat posed by these groups—including the spread of misinformation and disinformation—it is also necessary to understand and address the root causes of their emergence and popularity. For a long time, the current approaches have only sought to clamp down on millenarian groups – which were sometimes successful but ignored the deeper social conditions that led them to appear in the first place.
The religious authorities in Malaysia have often cited ignorance and lack of proper religious education as factors that drive individuals to subscribe to millenarian groups or teachings. However, existing studies suggest that other sociological factors are at play. Throughout history, millenarian movements gained traction during periods of political, social, moral, and theological uncertainty.[39] Under this condition, belief in millenarian ideas gave followers a sense of relief. To be sure, Muslim societies were most receptive to such movements during the height of European colonialism.[40] Subscribing to millenarian beliefs to find relief remains the case today. A study by Luthfi Makhasin on followers of the Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia shows that millenarian ideas help “people comprehend the current world, their problems and possible future solutions”.[41]
Previous studies have also shown that subscription to millenarian ideas is related to individuals’ circumstances and environment. An anthropological study on a millenarian group led by Sheik Nazim in Lebanon found that one’s socio-economic status, upbringing, and religious orientation significantly influence the level of affiliation and adherence to the teachings of its leader.[42] Followers who religiously believe in and adhere to Sheik Nazim’s prophecies of the end times tend to come from the middle class who resided in a region that had gone through “a tumultuous age… torn apart by political and religious conflict”.[43] They also tend to come from a more religiously conservative background and to be feeling threatened by Western materialism. Their experience of living in an anarchic situation had left them “with a deep sense of despair and insecurity”.[44] Hence believing in the apocalyptical teachings of Sheik Nazim serves as a coping mechanism and gives a sense of protection “from physical danger”.[45] In contrast, Sheik Nazim’s followers who admire the figure but do not commit to his teachings tend to come from higher social groups, who have found ways to reconcile with Western culture, and who are more exposed to Muslim-Christian interactions.
Habibis’ findings, which were obtainable only through an anthropological study, are significant in showing how various factors relating to one’s social conditions influence one’s level of adherence to millenarian ideas. These findings also prove that ignorance and lack of proper education are not necessarily key factors in causing an individual to follow millenarian groups. Instead, religious conservatism and the inability to reconcile with Western culture can be more influential.
UNCERTAINTIES AND TURBULENT TIMES IN MALAYSIA
Given that social conditions influence one’s adherence to millenarian ideas, it is important that millenarian groups in Malaysia are studied sociologically and examined against the background of the country’s current political and economic climate. This is to better understand why such groups remain popular among certain sections of society. Since 2020, Malaysia has gone through tremendous development and periods of instability. This includes the COVID-19 pandemic and the multiple enforcement of the Movement Control Order, as well as a political crisis marked by the Sheraton Move that led to the downfall of the Pakatan Harapan government. Despite the rise of the Pakatan Harapan coalition government following the 15th General Election, long-term prospects of political and economic stability remain to be seen. Apart from that, Malaysia also went through unprecedented flood disasters in 2021, which killed almost 50 people.
Figure 4: A screenshot of Masitah’s post on 14 January 2022 sharing that there are “mysterious activities” in the ocean, causing floods in Selangor and Jakarta. She further mentions how many places in Indonesia and Malaysia are no longer liveable.
These developments have in many ways affected the lives of Malaysians and impacted their economic and psychological wellbeing. The uncertainty surrounding the pandemic and the political instability are valid causes of anxiety among the general population. Some of these anxieties are reflected in the narratives promoted by millenarian groups. For instance, during the flood disaster in 2021, Masitah posted that these floods, including those that took place in Indonesia, were a result of mysterious activities conducted in the sea by evil organisations (see Figure 4 above). Similarly, Muhammad Qasim Dreams also posted how the flood in Pakistan sought to cleanse the country of shirk and was a sign of end times. The movement justified this by pointing out how the area that flooded collectively spelt out the word “Muhammad” in Arabic as shown in Figure 5 below. Although these narratives are misinforming, they serve as explanations that may help to quell the fears and anxieties felt by their followers amid a situation filled with uncertainty and instability.
Figure 5: A screenshot of a video posted by one of the Muhammad Qasim Dream accounts positing that the flooded areas in Pakistan spell out Prophet Muhammad’s name in Arabic, proving the legitimacy of Muhammad Qasim’s dreams.
CONCLUSION
Malaysia will continue to undergo significant development and changes that affect various aspects of life. As the political and economic situation has yet to settle, anxiety and fear may remain prevalent among segments of society. Malaysia will also continue to face other issues including flood disasters caused by climate change.[46] Amid this uncertainty, its population will tend to adopt various coping mechanisms in search of relief, including subscribing to millenarian ideas and groups.
Like many other millenarian groups, the two case studies presented in this article may each not serve as an overt security threat. Nonetheless, these groups and their methods of using astroturfing and spreading sensationalised disinformation and misinformation show that measures need to be taken against them. Their methods, if persistent, may create an environment where false information becomes rampant. Promoting sensationalised “alternative” news also leads to the erosion of trust, an increase in cynicism, and disengagement from factual news and the current political landscape.[47] PMYT and GAZA can be seen as indicators that disengagement, cynicism and trust erosion are growing among certain society groups more than others.
It is undeniable that in the age of social media, millenarian groups and ideas can no longer be effectively contained through security or theological means. Hence, it is important to consider more creative, non-theological or security-related approaches. Regardless of the approaches chosen, it is imperative that authorities first recognise the root causes that drive individuals to subscribe to millenarian ideas. This can be achieved through more sincere engagements and interactions with existing groups to understand their social conditions. Such an effort is important in revealing the nuanced grievances and unmet needs of these individuals and, in turn, can help determine the kind of intervention required to tackle millenarian groups.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- To tackle climate change and promote just energy transition, Southeast Asian policymakers should look for ways to promote the use of renewable energy in agriculture. This is because the sector consumes a significant amount of fossil fuels annually.
- Since the expansion of renewable energy increases land-use competition with agrifood production, policymakers should support measures to reduce renewable energy’s land footprints, mitigate adverse effects on food security, and protect the livelihoods of vulnerable populations that might be affected by land-use changes.
- In Southeast Asia, there are now rural development projects that integrate renewable energy with agrifood systems. While they may have long-term environmental and economic benefits, renewable energy solutions in agriculture are more expensive compared to fossil fuel technologies. Therefore, governments should consider providing subsidies, grants, and low-interest loans to encourage agrifood actors to invest in such technologies. Alternatively, investments can be made through cooperatives, and farmers could be offered “pay-as-you-go” payment plans for renewable-powered services.
- Research from other regions suggests that agrivoltaic systems – where solar panels are integrated with farmlands – have the potential to increase land productivity in food-energy production, support rural electrification, generate employment opportunities, and diversify and increase the incomes of agrifood actors through the sale of electricity and ecotourism activities.
- To promote just transition, agrivoltaic projects can be organised as cooperatives where profits are shared among members. The energy and food produced can also be used to strengthen the energy and food security of low-income households. Research on agrivoltaic systems in Southeast Asia should also be strongly encouraged.
* Prapimphan Chiengkul is Associate Fellow with the Climate Change in Southeast Asia Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, Assistant Professor at Faculty of Political Science at Thammasat University in Thailand, and Honorary Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick in the UK.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/29, 18 April 2023
INTRODUCTION
The agricultural sector significantly contributes to climate change and should also be included in discussions about renewable energy transition. The current agrifood systems – the production, transportation and consumption of agrifood products – predominantly rely on fossil fuels and account for 30 per cent of the world’s energy consumption (IRENA and FAO 2021, 9) as well as 21-37 per cent of total greenhouse gas emissions (Mbow et al. 2019, 439). Moreover, transition to renewable energy will increase competition for land and water usage (FAO 2021, 29; IRENA and FAO 2021, 32; Weis 2010, 325), which could undermine agrifood production and lead to social conflicts (Sovacool 2021). One study suggests that Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) of countries that are Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) will require 1.2 billion hectares (ha) of land – the equivalent of the global cropland area – by 2060 to meet these goals (Dooley et al. 2022, 8-9). Half of these (633 million ha) will entail changes in land use that could adversely affect biodiversity, agrifood production and the livelihoods of indigenous peoples and small-scale farmers (Dooley et al. 2022, 8-9). The development of solar parks in India, for example, has led to deforestation and undermined some people’s access to common land that they rely on for energy resources and food production, such as biomass and cattle grazing land (Stock 2022, 171-172).
To tackle these issues, Southeast Asian policymakers should look for ways to promote the use of renewable energy in the agricultural sector, reduce land footprints in the production of renewable energy, mitigate adverse effects on biodiversity and food security, and protect the livelihoods of vulnerable populations that might be affected by land-use changes. Most of the energy used in Southeast Asia’s agriculture comes from fossil fuels (IRENA 2022, 7) and although the agricultural sector consisted of only 10.5 per cent of Southeast Asia’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2020 (ASEAN 2021, 26), the sector is a major source of employment in countries such as Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos (33, 50 and 45 per cent of employment respectively) (ASEAN 2021, 39). With examples from Southeast Asia, the following sections discuss how renewable energy can be integrated into agrifood systems, explore the potential of agrivoltaic systems in the co-production of energy and food, and provide policy recommendations which take social justice into consideration.
RENEWABLE ENERGY IN AGRIFOOD SYSTEMS
Renewable technologies can be used in the production, processing and storage of agrifood products to reduce reliance on fossil fuels, improve energy access in rural areas, as well as increase productivity, reduce losses and add value to agrifood products (IRENA 2022, 16-17). Solar pumps for irrigation, for example, have helped to increase the incomes of small-scale farmers in South Asia and Africa (IRENA and FAO 2021, 34-36). Globally, many farming groups have started to use solar, micro-hydro and geothermal energy to process agrifood products (IRENA and FAO 2021, 49-50). Solar- and biogas-powered cold storage units have also helped to lengthen the shelf-lives of agrifood products, which increases farmers and fishermen’s bargaining power vis-à-vis middlemen, and geographically extends their market reach (IRENA and FAO 2021, 42-46).
In Southeast Asia, there are now many rural development projects that integrate renewable energy with agrifood systems (IRENA 2022, 10-11). In Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam and Indonesia, there are programmes that promote the use of bioenergy derived from agricultural residues and wastes – both for household uses, such as for cooking and electricity generation, and for small-scale processing plants, such as rice and sugar mills (IRENA 2022, 11, 20-29, 35). As part of Vietnam’s biogas digester programme, more than 1,000 technicians and 1,700 masons have been trained and over 20,000 people have been employed since 2003 (IRENA 2022, 17, 28). Other examples include the Philippine’s I-PURE project (Integration of Productive Uses of Renewable Energy) that promotes technologies such as solar-powered water pumps and coffee and seaweed dryers (IRENA 2022, 31-32), and the SWITCH to Solar project in Cambodia that supports the use of solar-powered dryers of organic herbs and spices to reduce losses during transport (SEADS-ADB 2021). Solar-powered cooling technologies have also helped many small-scale fishermen in Indonesia to preserve fresh catches and increase their incomes (IRENA 2022, 12; IRENA and FAO 2021, 47). The next section further investigates the dual production of food and energy in farmlands through agrivoltaic systems.
THE POTENTIAL OF AGRIVOLTAIC SYSTEMS
To generate the same amount of energy, solar photovoltaic and wind turbines have much higher land footprints compared to nuclear and fossil-fuel power plants (Lamhamedi and de Vries 2022, 9-10; Walker 1995, 4). To maximise land usage, one possible solution is that of “agrivoltaic systems”, where solar photovoltaics are integrated with farmlands to produce both food and energy (IRENA and FAO 2021, 32). Ideas for agrivoltaic systems originated in Germany in 1982 and in Japan in 2003, and different names have been used such as agrophotovoltaics (Germany), photovoltaic agriculture (China), and solar sharing (Japan) (Brohm and Khanh 2018, 24). Large-scale agrivoltaic projects emerged in the 2010s, such as those in Germany, France, Japan, China and South Korea (Brohm and Khanh 2018, 6, 23-24, 31-38). France, for example, has integrated solar panels in vineyards, while the US and Australia have experimented with animal grazing in shaded areas under solar panels (Energy Watch 2021).
Aside from increasing land productivity, agrivoltaic systems can potentially increase the productivity of aquaculture and the yields of certain shade-loving crop species, such as leafy vegetables and herbaceous plants (Barron-Gafford et al. 2019, 848-851; Brohm and Khanh 2018, 29-30; Mamun et al. 2022, 9-10; Tajima and Iida 2021, 7). Agrivoltaic farming is also likely to be useful in water-scarce regions. A study of agrivoltaic in dryland areas in the US, for example, suggests “synergistic benefits” between energy and food production (Barron-Gafford et al. 2019). As solar panels reduce water evaporation from the soil and increase the productivity of chiltepin peppers and cherry tomatoes, growing crops underneath helps to lower the temperature of solar panels, which is good for their efficiency (Barron-Gafford et al. 2019, 848-851). Another project in Brazil called “Ecolume” has also found that, without the need for pesticides, agrivoltaic systems can help to increase agrifood production and restore degraded land in semi-arid areas that suffer from water shortages (Martinez 2022).
Agrivoltaic systems can also reduce greenhouse gas emissions, support rural electrification, generate employment opportunities, as well as diversify and increase the incomes of agrifood actors through the sales of electricity and ecotourism activities (Brohm and Khanh 2018, 29-30; Gonocruz et al. 2021, 14; Mamun et al. 2022, 10). In Japan, agrivoltaic is seen as a solution to rural economic decline and over 120 crops, including rice, can now be grown in agrivoltaic systems (Tajima and Iida 2021, 3). One study estimates that, if agrivoltaic systems were to be applied to rice paddies in Japan, the electricity generated would meet 29 per cent of total electricity demand in the country in 2018 (Gonocruz et al. 2021). Another good example is in Jiangshan, China, where a 200 Megawatt (MW) agrivoltaic project, situated on degraded land, has been generating incomes from energy and biodiverse food production and ecotourism since 2015 (Xiao et al. 2022, 2-6). It is expected to meet the annual electricity demand of 400,000 people in Jiangshan city for 25 years, and has so far employed over 1,000 farmers and over 200 locals and agricultural specialists (Xiao et al. 2022, 7).
Pilot agrivoltaic projects can also be found in Southeast Asia, but much more research and development are needed to evaluate and fully realise the potential of agrivoltaic systems. One report funded by Rosa-Luxemburg Foundation and GreenID (Vietnam) suggests that, based on a comparative study of international experiences, Can Tho city in the South of Vietnam has a high potential to develop agrivoltaic farming of rice, maize, soybean, sesame, vegetables, cassava, livestock, fish and shrimp, and that the electricity generated could exceed the city’s electricity demand (Brohm and Khanh 2018, 6-7). There is also now a pilot project in Vietnam – PV SHRIMPS – that applies solar photovoltaic to shrimp farming in Southern Bac Lieu province. Funded by the German GIZ Energy Support Programme, the project aims to study technical and economic viability of agrivoltaic systems in small-to-medium size aqua-farming units, with subsequent plans to promote knowledge diffusion in the Mekong Delta (Brohm and Khanh 2018, 39).
Pilot agrivoltaic projects in other Southeast Asian countries are also in nascent development stages. Examples include an eggplant-growing agrivoltaic project in Baron Technopark, South Java Island, Indonesia (Ahmad et al. 2022), an agrivoltaic project in Malaysia jointly operated by Universiti Putrajaya and PEKAT solar (Energy Watch 2021), and Citicore Power’s Agro-Solar initiative where the company works with local farmers and cooperatives to promote dual energy-food production (Manila Standard 2022). In Thailand, an academic study found that the yield of bok choy vegetable in a pilot agrivoltaic project in Chiang Mai is very low (Kumpanalaisatit et al. 2022). However, given the potential of agrivoltaic systems, the same study recommends further research on other shade-tolerant crops (Kumpanalaisatit et al. 2022).
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Policies to support just energy transitions usually focus on compensating and retraining workers in the fossil fuel industries, and on the creation of decent jobs in the green sectors – with wider goals to promote inclusive, sustainable and gender-sensitive development that takes into account difficulties facing vulnerable groups (Elliott and Rahman 2021). However, given that renewable energy requires large land footprints, policies to promote just energy transitions should also consider the potential effects of renewable energy expansion on land use, food security and other adverse consequences on the local populations. As this paper has discussed, agrivoltaic systems can potentially increase land efficiency, promote both energy and food security, and increase farm incomes. However, the design and implementation of agrivoltaic projects ought to consider social justice and distribution of economic benefits as well as technical aspects of energy-food production. Policy recommendations to promote renewable energy solutions in agriculture and agrivoltaic systems in Southeast Asia are further discussed below.
- Renewable energy solutions in agriculture are still more expensive compared to fossil fuel technologies (IRENA and FAO 2021, 37-38) so agricultural actors might be hesitant to take on such large investments, even though there are long-term environmental and economic benefits. Governments should incentivise large and financially secure agribusinesses to invest in renewable energy solutions. Additionally, governments and donors should provide subsidies and grants, coupled with low-interest loans, to help small-scale farmers (or their cooperatives) to invest in renewable energy equipment such as solar pumps and cold-storages. Alternatively, farmers may be offered “pay-as-you-go” payment plans for renewable-powered services (IRENA 2022, 16; IRENA and FAO 2021, 37-38, 48; Johnstone et al. 2022). For biogas projects in Vietnam and Indonesia, subsidies accounted for only 10 and 20 per cent of total investment costs (IRENA 2022, 26, 35). Since farmers bear most of the costs and the risks involved, there should be further studies into the long-term cost effectiveness of these projects and potential effects on rural debts. Projects can also be designed for women empowerment. The I-PURE project in the Philippines, for example, sets a target to specifically involve women’s groups in post-harvest agri-fishery activities (IRENA 2022, 32).
- To support agrivoltaic projects, expected financial returns from selling renewable power should incentivise investments. Due to high initial costs, external finance is likely needed to support farmers who want to invest in agrivoltaic systems (Brohm and Khanh 2018, 70). With regards to regulatory frameworks to balance food and energy production, Southeast Asia can learn a lot from Japan’s experience. After the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011, the Japanese government encouraged renewable energy investments by introducing a very generous electricity feed-in-tariff (FIT) rate and by allowing new entrants into the power sector (Spivey 2020, 1691, 1699). To an extent, food security is protected as farmlands are not allowed to be turned into mega solar parks, and the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries also requires that agrivoltaic systems in rice paddies still produce at least 80 per cent of the yield of conventionally-grown rice (Gonocruz et al. 2021, 14; Spivey 2020, 1702). Due to the protection of farmlands, large-scale investors have developed mega solar projects on forested and underutilised land in rural areas, causing local conflicts (Spivey 2020, 1702). On the brighter side, such regulatory change has encouraged rapid expansions of community-based renewable energy companies and agrivoltaic farms (Spivey 2020, 1702; Tajima and Iida 2021, 6). There are now over 1,992 agrivoltaic farms (560 ha in total) across Japan, and most of them are small-scale operations (less than 0.1 ha) (Tajima and Iida 2021, 2). Agrivoltaic farms generated only 0.8 per cent of total power of solar photovoltaics in Japan in 2019 (Tajima and Iida 2021, 2). However, if all of the abandoned farmlands (423,064 ha) were to be converted into agrivoltaic farms, these could produce another 280 gigawatt (GW) of electricity (Tajima and Iida 2021, 7).
- Publicly funded research on renewable energy solutions in agriculture and on agrivoltaic systems should consider the needs of smaller actors as well as larger ones. It has been noted, for example, that research is very much needed on renewable-powered agricultural equipment that are suitable for use in small-to-medium size farms (IRENA and FAO 2021, 51-52). As for agrivoltaic systems, more studies are needed on suitable crops, safe integrations with livestock grazing, the applicability of next-generation solar panels, long-term environmental effects of agrivoltaic systems (such as the effects on biodiversity), and the consequences of e-wastes from solar panels (Barron-Gafford et al. 2019, 852; Gonocruz et al. 2021, 15; Mamun et al. 2022). More research is also needed on the economic viability and socio-environmental effects of agrivoltaic systems on urban rooftops (Jing et al. 2022), and of “floatovoltaics” – where solar panels are used to cover water reservoir (Almeida et al. 2022).
- To promote just transition, the design and implementation of agrivoltaic projects should go beyond technical issues to include socio-economic considerations. Southeast Asia can learn from socially conscious agrivoltaic projects in other countries, such as Jack’s Solar Garden in Boulder County, Colorado in the US. This research and learning centre donates two per cent of its energy production to low-income households, and its agrifood products are distributed to food insecure people through farmers’ markets and the government’s Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Programme (SNAP) (Solar Power World 2021). Agrivoltaic projects can also be organised as cooperatives that share profits among members. Examples of such organisational models can already be found in well-established energy cooperatives in various parts of the worlds, such as in the UK (Rapid Transition Alliance 2021).
Given the potential of renewable energy solutions in agriculture and of agrivoltaic systems, further research on these topics should be supported by Southeast Asian governments. Although research on technical feasibility is important, there should also be research and pilot projects that investigate how these green technologies can be used to promote development goals such as women empowerment, universal energy access, food security and the reduction of economic inequality.
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Gonocruz, Ruth Anne, Ren Nakamura, Kota Yoshino, Masaru Homma, Tetsuya Doi, Yoshikuni Yoshida, and Akira Tani. 2021. “Analysis of the Rice Yield under an Agrivoltaic System: A Case Study in Japan.” Environments 8 (7). https://doi.org/10.3390/environments8070065.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- While anti-militarist sentiments have been pervasive among ordinary Japanese since World War Two, the country has not been stuck in the pacifist mould. In the ensuing decades after the war, Tokyo has been cognisant of new realities in its strategic environment.
- Japan’s historic reinterpretation of the Constitution in 2015 to allow the Japan Self-Defense Forces’ participation in collective self-defence missions was spearheaded by the late premier Shinzo Abe, who believed that such a step was necessary for Japan to deepen its contribution to regional peace and security.
- The recent recalibration of Japan’s security and defence policy was in part enabled by changes in the constellation of domestic politics, which gave the ruling Liberal Democratic Party a freer hand in policy discussions, enabling it to continue setting Japan on the course set by Abe.
- Recent survey data show that the Japanese public in general has warmed to the view that their country’s national defence capacity needs to be enhanced, given the changing security environment.
- There appears to be greater receptivity in the wider region for a more engaged and proactive Japan. However, Japan’s forging of a durable regional order is not without risks.
* Joseph Chinyong Liow is a Trustee of ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. He is Dean and Tan Kah Kee Chair and Professor of Comparative and International Politics, College of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University. William Choong is Senior Fellow at the Regional Strategic and Political Studies Programme and Managing Editor of Fulcrum at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/28, 17 April 2023
INTRODUCTION
Since its defeat in the Second World War, Japan’s role in the Asia-Pacific has been something of an enigma. A resurgent regional economic power by the early 1970s if not before, Japan had nonetheless demurred from making active contributions to foreign and security affairs beyond the realm of economic policies. This restraint was largely a response to residual concerns among its neighbours whose memories of the Japanese occupation remained fresh, and also due to Japanese reticence rooted in a strict interpretation of the 1947 Constitution. That document was written primarily by American authors to head off any prospect of resurgent Japanese aggression. The resultant narrative of constitutional constraint was deepened by domestic sentiments of anti-militarism, and came to govern post-war defence and security policies.
This is not to say that Japan has been stuck in the pacifist mould. Over time, as the regional strategic environment grew more complex, Japanese leaders had always been mindful of new realities, be it North Korea’s growing nuclear capabilities, Russia’s hold on the disputed Northern Territories and China’s accelerated military build-up.[1] Yet, corresponding national discussions about Japan’s development of its defence capabilities and participation in international security initiatives have always been deeply divisive affairs. In 2004, the question of the deployment of Japanese forces to Iraq for reconstruction and humanitarian operations was hotly debated in the Japanese parliament and media. According to polls conducted by Asahi Shimbun and the Kyoto News Agency at the time, approximately half of those surveyed opposed the deployment even though it was conducted under supposedly strict conditions, i.e. Japanese troops would only be deployed to “non-combat zones.”[2] More recently, efforts by the government to propose legislation in 2015 predicated on a reinterpretation of the Constitution to allow the Japan Self-Defense Forces to take part in collective self-defence missions (primarily in partnership with the US) even when Japan was not attacked were met with sizeable anti-war protests and demonstrations. It is against this backdrop that the release of three historic documents by the Japanese government last December assumes greater significance for the apparent absence of customary controversy.
THE LONG ARC OF NORMALISATION
It is worth noting that the reinterpretation of the Constitution in 2015 was spearheaded by the late premier Shinzo Abe, who believed it a necessary step to take to deepen Japan’s contribution to regional peace and security. It was Abe’s post-war predecessor, Shigeru Yoshida (1948-1954), who cynically used the aegis of the US-imposed pacifist Constitution to serve as a shield against collective self-defence, which the 2015 reinterpretation eventually wrought. But it was the same Yoshida who predicted that Japan could depend on Washington for its security for a time; Japan’s rearmament would in due course “come naturally” after its economy recovered from the ruins of the Second World War.[3] Therein, Japan embarked on a gradual but long arc of normalisation as a typical military power.
There have been a few notable milestones in this journey. In the landmark 1959 Sunagawa case, Japan’s Supreme Court established that Japan’s Constitution did not prohibit its acting in self-defence.[4] In 1997, revised guidelines for US-Japan defence cooperation stated that Japan could provide logistical and other types of non-combat support to the US. The two alliance partners also made it a point to note that military cooperation was ‘not geographic but situational’[5] – a statement that provoked concerns in Beijing[6]. (In April 2021, the two allies became more specific, saying that they underscored the “importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait”). In 2006, Japan elevated the Japan Defense Agency to become a full-fledged ministry, giving defence officials greater control in national policymaking and decisions over the budget.[7] In 2019, Japan revealed that its largest warships — the Izumo-class helicopter destroyers — would be retrofitted to carry F-35B fighters. This made the vessels in all senses and purposes light aircraft carriers – power projection tools which have long been the preserve of bigger military powers.
Yoshida and Abe’s vision of Japan as a more muscular power forms the foundation of Prime Minister’s Kishida’s new security strategy. On 16 December 2022, Kishida unveiled the National Security Strategy, the National Defence Strategy, and the Defence Build-up Program. Together, the three documents collectively articulated the strategic outlook of Japan for the coming years and outlined commensurate defence postures and policies. To some extent, these documents were but a culmination of what has been a gradual shift in thinking in Japanese security and foreign policy circles that goes back a number of years. Their discussion had been gravitating away from earlier reluctance to assume a conventional regional security role (and to revise defence plans and postures to accommodate that wider purpose) towards a more candid political debate on the need for piecemeal reforms that would facilitate a considered contribution to regional security. Indeed, cautious attempts had already been made to sharpen national security policy in consonance with a changing external environment, such as with former foreign minister Taro Aso’s “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” idea in 2006 and the 2015 Peace and Security Legislation, as Japan inched towards a review of its collective defence posture pursued under the auspices of its longstanding alliance with the US.
These three landmark documents are also pathbreaking for how they signal a shift away from reliance on US security guarantees as the first line of defence towards greater self-reliance predicated on a realisation that Japan needed to assume “primary responsibility” for its own security. Arguably the most profound expression of this shift is the intention to enhance capacity to perform this task through the acquisition of counterstrike missile capabilities, as indicated in the Defence Build-up Program.[8] The consideration of such putatively offensive capabilities would not have been possible without conflating the concepts of self-defence and pre-empting potential threats around Japan’s periphery.
WHAT PRECIPITATED THIS RETHINK?
This recent recalibration of Japan’s security and defence policy was at least in part enabled by changes in the constellation of domestic politics. The last general election in Japan, held in October 2021, saw the Liberal Democratic Party win a resounding majority in the Lower House. Meanwhile, left-leaning opposition groups such as the Japanese Communist Party and the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan continue to find themselves confined to the margins of Japanese politics. This changing constellation had at least two effects on Japanese foreign and security policy making. First, the strong majority paved the way for the LDP and Prime Minister Kishida to have a freer hand on standing committees and, by extension, greater influence in policy discussions leading up to the formulation of the new strategic documents. Second, this political leverage was parlayed by the LDP leadership for the continuation of the strategic direction set in motion by Abe when he was prime minister. In fact, even before the October 2021 general election, Prime Minister Kishida had already articulated plans to review the 2013 National Security Strategy, the 2018 National Defence Programs Guidelines, and the 2018 Mid-term Defence Plan.
Underpinning this need for change in Japanese strategic thinking was the transformation of Tokyo’s external security environment, which added a sharp new edge to old apprehensions. Foremost has been the rise of China, expressed not only in its expansion of economic influence into areas in the region where Japan has traditionally been dominant, such as infrastructure development, but also in its growing military capabilities that has caused Tokyo no small measure of concern. For Japanese security planners, this was acutely demonstrated in 2022, when the security situation in the Taiwan Strait deteriorated in the aftermath of the visit by then-US Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, to Taiwan. China responded with large-scale military drills which involved firing of ballistic missiles that landed near Japan’s southwestern islands and in its Exclusive Economic Zone. While Japan has always been cognisant of the fact that any conflict in the Taiwan Strait would invariably impinge on its security interests, the events of 2022 were another harsh reminder of that reality.
Much in the same vein, developments in the Korean Peninsula have also catalysed a deeper rethink in Tokyo about their strategic vulnerabilities. The North Korean regime has persisted in its conduct of repeated ballistic missile tests which have landed projectiles in the Sea of Japan on numerous occasions. Meanwhile the National Security Strategy also noted that “Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has easily breached the very foundation of the rules that shape the international order.” This echoed Prime Minister Kishida’s speech at the 2022 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, which put forth the point that the contemporary state of affairs in Ukraine could be “East Asia tomorrow.” These multiplying challenges are rendered more acute by two further realities: first, many of the powers that share Japan’s strategic space are in possession of nuclear weapons, and second, the regional order Japan had grown accustomed to was at risk of unravelling, with no certainty of what would be taking its place.
DOMESTIC AND REGIONAL RECEPTION
What has been striking about the release of the three strategic documents and the assumptions underpinning them is the lack of vocal domestic opposition in Japan. Long known for their pacifist stance, it appears that most of the Japanese public has warmed to the view that national defence capacity needs to be enhanced given the changing security environment. This has been evident from recent survey data, which show decidedly steady upward trends on this issue. A poll conducted by Nikkei Shimbun in December 2022 showed a majority of Japanese (55 percent) supporting efforts to strengthen defence capabilities, while another conducted by Asahi Shimbun that same month showed a majority (56 percent) supporting the acquisition of counterstrike capabilities.[9] This level of support is higher than what was recorded in earlier polls in 2015, when protestors gathered outside the Diet building to protest legislation related to collective self-defence. Likewise, a poll by Yomiuri Shimbun had 68 percent of respondents expressing the view that Japan should enhance its defence capabilities.[10] What is further notable is the fact that these views straddle the political spectrum: Asahi Shimbun is traditionally pacifist and left-leaning whereas Yomiuri Shimbun is conservative. Of course, securing popular support for plans to enhance national defence capabilities is only half the battle won. The other half, securing the necessary funds, is proving a more challenging proposition. To that end, the same surveys that show majoritarian support suggest that opinion is more divided over how to fund the purchase and development of counterstrike capabilities as part of a larger proposal to increase defence spending to 2 per cent of GDP, although the bulk of the spending will be targeted at improving readiness (i.e. ammunition, maintenance, better training, etc) and not changes to their force structure (i.e. purchasing more equipment). Another matter that will need to be resolved is the role that foreign defence companies can play in Japan’s relatively underdeveloped defence industry sector.
Of the two issues – securing funding for increased defence spending and the role of foreign defence companies in Japan – the former is more pressing. Japan’s debt at 232 per cent of GDP is the highest in the OECD, and debt servicing requires more than a fifth of the government budget annually.[11] Kishida has recommended that defence taxes be funded by corporate, income and tobacco taxes, which could rake in over 1 trillion yen annually. Due to rare and open dissent from his Cabinet colleagues, however, the prime minister has decided that such tax increases will not take place before 2024.[12] The decision to kick the can down the road has bought Kishida some time, but domestic opposition to higher taxes could affect political fortunes come Lower House elections later in 2023.
On the flip side, Japan’s defence tilt is not just a matter of domestic sentiment. There also appears to be greater receptivity in the wider region for a more engaged and proactive Japan. The annual survey on the opinion of foreign policy intellectuals in Southeast Asia conducted by the Singapore-based ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute consistently demonstrates positive trust levels towards Japan in the region.[13] These findings reinforce those of a Pew survey conducted in 2018 on perceptions of Japan. That survey included public opinion in the Philippines and Indonesia, both of which were very favourably inclined towards Japan (83 percent in the case of the Philippines and 68 percent in the case of Indonesia).[14] It stands to reason then that as far as Southeast Asia is concerned, the historical baggage of the Second World War no longer casts as foreboding a shadow over relations with Japan as it did in the past.
The recognition of Japan as a trusted regional power by Southeast Asian countries should not come as a surprise. It was Abe who saw that Japan’s security and prosperity hinged on a well-functioning rules-based order. It was also Abe who argued that the future of the region depended on the melding of the Indian and Pacific oceans (which eventuated in Tokyo’s ‘free and open’ Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy, later adopted by Japan’s partners in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), Australia, India, and the United States). Japan’s economic and investment linkages with Southeast Asia are well known, and in recent years, the country has played a major role in landmark trade agreements: the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). In fact, Tokyo played a major role in getting the then Trans-Pacific Partnership back on track to become the CPTPP, after the US withdrew from the agreement in 2017. Japan also pulled its weight in forging minilateral arrangements that sought to bolster regional peace and security: the Quad, and the FOIP strategy that underpins it. The strategy calls for a regional order based on freedom of navigation and overflight, connectivity, adherence to international law and restraint from the use or threat of force.
CONCLUSION
Japan’s foray into building a durable regional order is not without risks. For years, Japanese diplomats and scholars have called for the maintenance of maritime security in the Indo-Pacific, in particular, the South China Sea. Since 2019, Japan has on an annual basis deployed flotillas led by its Izumo-class carriers to train with regional navies to “contribute to peace and security of the region.”[15] The rhetoric and deployments have not gone unnoticed by China, whose nine-dashed claim covers about 90 per cent of the South China Sea area. While the South China Sea will remain a hotspot for years to come, developments in the Taiwan Strait would likely engender Japanese involvement. On this, Japan would need to communicate with Southeast Asian countries on the two-edged facet of its emerging counterstrike capabilities, which are meant not only to deter attacks on the home islands, but also to dissuade a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.[16] The latter would portend serious implications for Southeast Asian countries.[17] In a Taiwan Strait contingency, the Philippines would likely give access to US forces.[18] Unsurprisingly, ties between Japan and the Philippines, two US allies most likely to contribute to US operations during a conflict in the Strait, have grown. Between the two countries, there is now an increasingly enmeshed web of coast guard assistance, port calls and joint military exercises.[19]
The escalation risks in the region’s hotspots and Japan’s involvement remain hypothetical for now. What is more certain is that Japan is poised to significantly redefine its role in regional and international security, and commensurate with that, popular perceptions in the country towards national security are also changing. As Japan takes a bigger role in regional security, however, it behoves Tokyo to maintain a fine balance between deterrence and diplomacy. This will be a task which will require consistent effort and strategic nous. The former would dissuade potential adversaries from taking actions detrimental to regional peace and stability; the latter would keep channels of engagement open to lower the risk of escalation.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The three most significant economic concerns of Indonesians are inflation, unemployment and growth.
- Job layoffs are occurring in several industries at the moment, compounding the challenges faced by Indonesia’s policymakers.
- The use of higher interest rates to combat inflation is constrained by its impact in terms of burdening borrowers and hurting the country’s already weak economic recovery.
- Bank Indonesia may raise interest rates further to stabilise the Rupiah, especially if the US Federal Reserve continues to revise its rates upward.
- The Indonesian government may have to rely more on using costly subsidies and price controls on key items to control inflation, even though this is not sustainable in the long run.
- Economic challenges will affect the next presidential election scheduled for 2024.
* Manggi Habir is Visiting Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Independent Commissioner of PT ADIRA Finance. Siwage Dharma Negara is Senior Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/27, 14 April 2023
INTRODUCTION
The Indonesian economy grew by 5.3% in 2022, exceeding the 3.7% growth rate achieved in 2021 (Figure 1). With the Covid-19 pandemic reasonably under control and business activity returning to normal, the government remains optimistic about reaching a 4.5-5.3% growth target in 2023 and further to 4.7-5.5% in 2024.[1] Consumption is slowly picking up, and higher-than-expected commodity prices have raised Indonesia’s exports and generated windfall gains for the government’s fiscal revenues. While there is optimism about this year’s outlook, there remain considerable economic challenges ahead.
The three key economic challenges for the Indonesian government, highlighted by a recent ISEAS survey, are controlling inflation, providing job opportunities through investments, and maintaining growth. External events are creating additional pressure. The US Fed’s tight monetary policy, which forecasts a further interest rate hike, may put further pressure on Bank Indonesia to follow suit and to further increase its own benchmark interest rate to stabilise its exchange rate. A prolonged war in Ukraine will continue to put upward pressure on energy prices as well as domestic energy subsidies. Finally, should the current recovery in the country’s major export markets weaken, Indonesia’s exports could be adversely impacted.
Indonesia’s economic outlook, therefore, remains uncertain. This essay draws on ISEAS National Survey 2022 to provide a micro-level analysis of the population’s concerns about inflation, unemployment and growth. Insights from such a micro-level analysis are important given that these are likely to become critical issues in Indonesia’s election in 2024.
TWO PRESSING ECONOMIC ISSUES
In July 2022, ISEAS conducted an Indonesian National Survey Project (INSP), involving face-to-face interviews with 1,620 respondents across all 34 Indonesian provinces. The survey asked respondents to list their three most important economic concerns. With the country still recovering from the pandemic, economic issues dominated the public’s response. Unemployment tops the list (43.7%), followed by price stability and inflation (35.9%), as well as economic management and its impact on growth (33.0%) (Figure 2).[2]
Figure 1: Indonesian Growth, Inflation and Unemployment Trends 2015-2022
Source: Statistics Indonesia (BPS)
Figure 2: What are the three MOST important issues for Indonesia right now?
It is interesting to note that the majority of survey respondents agree that President Jokowi has developed better infrastructure (75%), dealt with the Covid-19 pandemic crisis successfully (66%), and improved the welfare of the poor (52%) (Figure 3). However, they disagree that prices are lower (70%) and that jobs are easier to find (47%).
Figure 3: How is President Jokowi handling economic issues?
Compared to the 2017 survey, there is a significant increase in unemployment and inflation concerns. This is likely due to the pandemic’s economic impact over the last 2-3 years.
INFLATION TRENDS AND POLICY RESPONSES
For 2022, Indonesia’s inflation (consumer price index) rose to 5.5% from 1.9% a year earlier (Table 1). This was driven in part by higher imported inflation from rising global food and fuel prices. The prolonged war in Ukraine is one factor behind the rising world fuel price trend. But ongoing tensions between China and the US, causing trade barriers, coupled with lingering Covid-19 restrictions, raised trade costs and limited trade volume of certain goods. Ultimately, this created supply chain disruptions and higher import costs across the Southeast Asian region. Food price increases were also driven by domestic distribution problems.
In addition, the government’s September 2022 fuel subsidy cuts raised fuel prices and added inflationary pressure on prices nationwide. After the fuel hike, CPI inflation increased from 4% in August to 6% in September (Figure 4). Rising inflation adversely affects people’s purchasing power, which puts economic growth at risk.
Higher inflation also adversely impacts poor and vulnerable communities, given that for lower-income households, food expenditure accounts for 64% of total income.[3] Based on recent Statistics Indonesia data, the number of people classified as poor has risen slightly to 26.4 million from 26.2 million between March and September 2022 due to higher food and fuel prices (BPS).[4]
In the second half of 2022, Bank Indonesia responding to a rise in inflation, began raising its benchmark interest rate (7-day Repo Rate) rapidly from 3.5% in July 2022, then to 5.5% in December 2022 (Figure 4) and further to 5.75% in January 2023. This was to dampen inflationary pressures, but it was also done to defend the weakening Rupiah with investors shifting to higher-yielding USD investments. Rupiah deposit rates have been the first to rise, with lending rates remaining flat. The lagging rise in Rupiah interest rates behind USD interest rates has resulted in a steady weakening of the currency from its previous level of Rp 14,500 per USD in early 2022 to Rp 15,592 per USD by December 2022 (Table 1).
Table 1: Banking Sector Interest Rate Trends vs BI Benchmark Rate
| (in %) | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 |
| Working Capital Lending Rate | 10.4% | 10.1% | 9.2% | 8.6% | 8.6% |
| 3-month Deposit Rate | 6.8% | 6.0% | 4.2% | 2.9% | 3.9% |
| BI 7-day Repo Rate | 6.0% | 5.0% | 3.8% | 3.5% | 5.5% |
| Inflation Rate | 3.1% | 2.7% | 1.7% | 1.9% | 5.5% |
| Rp per USD year-end | 14,481 | 13,901 | 14,105 | 14,278 | 15,592 |
Source: Bank Indonesia and Financial Services Authority (OJK)
Figure 4: BI policy rate and CPI Inflation (%)
Source: Bank Indonesia
Inflation rates peaked in September 2022 at 5.95%, and dropped to 5.47% in February 2023. On 16 March 2023, Bank Indonesia Governor, Perry Warjiyo, announced that the Central Bank’s benchmark Rupiah interest rate would remain at 5.75%. The Governor noted that the current BI rate remains sufficient to bring down the country’s inflation from its current 5.47% level to BI’s inflation target range of 2-4% in the second half of 2023.[5]
This decision brought some breathing room to businesses that were worried that their Rupiah loan rates would be adjusted upwards in line with BI’s upward benchmark rate trend. It was also a relief to those Indonesian banks that were carrying a sizable Indonesian government bond portfolio, which drops in value whenever the interest rate rises, thus keeping their unrealised losses from expanding further. Government bonds accounted for 15.7% of the banks’ earning assets by the end of 2022.
However, not long after Bank Indonesia kept its 5.75% benchmark rate, the US Federal Reserve raised its rate by another 25 basis points and with the coming of the seasonal inflationary month of Ramadhan, there remains a potential further rise in Bank Indonesia’s benchmark interest rate.
Aside from Bank Indonesia raising its benchmark interest rates to ease inflationary pressures, the government has also moved to control the price of critical food items, such as rice and cooking oil, by ensuring sufficient supply and market availability.
The government allocated a significant budget to subsidise fuel prices and electricity tariffs in response to higher international energy prices. These subsidies increased significantly in 2022, reaching Rp 551 trillion (US$ 48 billion), or 21% of state revenue, due to the surge in global energy prices. This has been critical to dampening inflationary pressures but it is not sustainable for a country with a tax-to-GDP ratio of only 10-11% of GDP.[6]
Arguably, the fuel subsidies helped to maintain political stability and the government’s favourable approval rating. Subsidies, however, remain a highly political issue, and with next year’s presidential election, they will continue to occupy the government’s fiscal space. The country’s fiscal deficit is currently at 2.7% of GDP, but during the 2020 pandemic year it widened to as high as 6.1% of GDP.
Longer term, market-driven prices will be important, on one hand, to limit energy demand and, on the other, to stimulate supply. Maintaining price controls, subsidies, or export bans will be fiscally costly, leading to excess demand and insufficient supply, thus leading to misallocation of resources. A case in point is energy subsidies in 2022, where the government spent Rp 555 trillion (US$ 37 billion), or about 21% of the state revenue, to absorb higher fuel and electricity tariffs.[7] It is preferable to protect the most vulnerable groups through more targeted and temporary money transfers as the economy recovers.
UNEMPLOYMENT TRENDS AND POLICY RESPONSES (BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER THE PANDEMIC)
Slowing global growth has affected certain industries more than others. Textiles, garments and footwear had to reduce production due to declining orders, resulting in sizable layoffs.[8] Even the promising technology sector has been affected. The country’s leading e-commerce group GoTo recently announced a second round of 600 layoffs following last year’s 1,300 job cuts.[9]
Likewise, some labour-intensive industries, such as textile, garment and footwear, also reported significant layoffs. According to the Indonesian Textile Association (API), almost 100 textile and garment factories laid off around 30,000 workers in November 2022. This was due to a weak export market resulting in decreased production volume.[10]
This grim reality is reflected in the 2022 survey, which highlighted concerns about unemployment. The issue of jobs is particularly salient among the country’s younger population, especially those aged 40 and below (Figure 5). The 2022 survey also found that more females (53%) than males (47%) reported difficulty finding jobs. About 54% and 46% of the urban and rural respondents have difficulty getting employed, respectively. Figure 5 further shows that the majority of high-school and lower-educated Indonesians reported difficulty finding jobs.
Figure 5: Who disagrees that it has been easy to get a job?
These findings reflect structural problems in Indonesia’s labour market, i.e., higher youth unemployment. Based on data from the BPS, those unemployed mostly come from the age group of 15-24 years, which accounts for 3.9 million people or 46% of the total national unemployment (Figure 6).[11]
Figure 6: Unemployment by age group (thousand)
Source: Statistics Indonesia
One reason behind the country’s high youth unemployment is that it takes a longer time for them to find suitable jobs at their preferred wage structures. Those coming from poorer families, with relatively lower educational backgrounds (below secondary school), cannot afford to be unemployed and so, most of them end up working in the informal sector, earning a lower income, working shorter hours and thus are less productive. In contrast, those coming from wealthier families tend to be relatively choosy and more willing to wait a bit longer to find their preferred employment. [12]
The demand for manual workers has also been adversely impacted by rising minimum wages, automation as well as digitalisation. As the jobs market tightens, many young workers have moved to lower-productivity services.[13] This shift has been accelerated because of the pandemic causing a slowdown in industrial activities.
Extended unemployment and under-employment, especially skill-based or skill mismatch, have become major labour market problems. Naturally, youth unemployment is always higher than older workers because they are just entering the labour market, or are more able and inclined to change jobs. Some youths are unemployed for long stretches, while some end up in jobs that do not match their skill. Both are critical issues for policymakers to deal with.
To address these unemployment issues, the government has come up with several policies. The job creation law passed by the government in October 2022, is one major step toward addressing the unemployment issue. It is meant to streamline investment procedures and improve the investment climate, thus creating more job opportunities. The law encourages the setting up of local industries including services related to Micro, Small and Medium enterprises (MSMEs).
Policies to support businesses, particularly MSMEs, which account for 96% of total employment in the country,[14] have also been introduced. These include credit guarantees, interest subsidies for MSMEs and targeted tax incentives for some businesses and industries.
Furthermore, the government has promoted education and skill training programmes to improve the quality of human resources. These include pre-employment cards (Kartu Pra-Kerja), one of President Jokowi’s flagship programmes. Kartu pra Kerja involves training assistance (amounting to Rp 3.5-4.2 million or approx. US$250) for those (18 years of age and above and not currently at school or college) who want to acquire or improve their skills, thus raising their likelihood of finding a better job. The programme is not only for those looking for a job but also for workers. During the pandemic, the programme has been redesigned as social assistance for those losing their jobs due to the Covid-19 pandemic. There has been some criticism concerning the effectiveness and transparency of the programme, however.[15] Nevertheless, preliminary evidence points out some benefits to programme recipients, including increased financial inclusion and a higher likelihood of them starting a business and finding a new job.[16]
Finally, the government together with the private sector, has regularly organised training, certification, and job fairs to provide job information and facilitate job seekers meeting with potential employers.
CONCLUSION: POLICY LIMITATIONS BEFORE AN ELECTION YEAR
With next year’s presidential election, 2023 will be a politically challenging year, which makes it difficult to implement unpopular, but necessary, government policies, for instance, raising interest rates further to stabilise the Rupiah and control inflation, or coming out with legislation that would make the labour market more flexible to stimulate investment and thus create jobs. There is also a government tendency to play a more interventionist role as opposed to a passive market approach, as this plays better politically.
On inflation, the challenge is for the government not to just focus on domestic price increases, but also to stabilise the Rupiah, as a weak Rupiah raises imported inflation. With USD interest rates and the USD-Rupiah interest rate differential rising, it is important to keep the Rupiah stable. So far, the 25 basis points rise in USD-Rupiah interest rate differential towards March-end has not impacted the Rupiah much, as it hovers around Rp 15,300 per USD. But should further USD interest hikes occur weakening the Rupiah and, should inflation remain high after Hari Raya in late April, then Rupiah interest rate hikes may need to follow.
Given the political sensitivities of fuel subsidies, the focus would be to change them from being a blunt instrument to one that is more targeted and thus has a better impact at a lower cost. The government is already moving in this direction, implementing direct money transfers to assist more vulnerable lower-income groups. The system is not perfect, with the list of deserving recipients needing much further accuracy improvements, but it is an important start and needs further fine-tuning to ensure that the government’s financial assistance reaches those who most need it.
Fuel subsidies are also now more targeted. Pertamina, the state oil company that distributes the subsidised fuel, Petralite, requires eligible lower-income motorists to register their national ID card and upload a photo of their vehicles, with their license plates, in its MyPertamina mobile application, and having to have this screened before being allowed to buy its subsidised fuel.[17]
On unemployment, the government early this year quickly came out with a regulation in lieu of law (Perppu) on job creation (Perppu No. 2/2022).[18] The new regulation replaces the Job Creation Law, which was declared conditionally unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court (MK) not long after the Job Creation Law came out. The court ordered the government to amend the law within two years, or it would be deemed unconstitutional.
Coordinating Economic Minister Airlangga Hartarto explained that the MK ruling had affected investors’ confidence domestically and abroad, which was why the government quickly issued the Perppu. [19] However, the Association of Indonesian Trade Unions (Aspek) still argues that the Perppu does not provide legal certainty for workers as the employment provisions reduce workers’ job security rights, wage guarantees and social security.[20]
Government initiatives on addressing unemployment through increased investment and growth are long-term in nature and will take some time to generate the desired impact. It is important to reevaluate the effectiveness of the pre-employment card programme, which was redesigned as a social assistance programme during the pandemic year. Ultimately, the public wants to know if the programme is effective or not in addressing unemployment and creating jobs, as initially promised by the government.
Given the Indonesian voters’ key concerns pertaining to unemployment and inflation, it will be interesting to see whether presidential candidates will come up with alternative and innovative economic policies to provide more effective solutions.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- R20 (G20’s Religion Forum) was proposed by the General Chairman of NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) as an occasion for religious leaders from around the world to discuss how religion could help resolve global problems.
- This was an ambiguous proposal, considering that religion remains both a negative and positive factor where peace and conflict in the world are concerned.
- The proposal could also be interpreted as an attempt at raising the relevance of religion in world affairs, as has been promoted by Muslim organisations such Ikhwanul Muslimin and Hizbut Tahrir who position Islam as the solution (al-islam huwa al-hall) to world issues.
- Whichever the case, it is expected that R20 will have some impact on Indonesian Islam. However, it may not be extensive as the R20 was only proposed by NU and not from all elements of Indonesian Islam. The absence of other players in the initiation of R20 created an image that R20 was also an event exclusively run by NU.
- The support of Saudi Arabia through the Muslim World League is one of NU’s organisational breakthroughs. NU has been hoping to establish a new relationship with Saudi Arabia, but has been hampered by the fact that anti-Wahhabism prevails among its ulama and grassroots.
* Lecturer and Director of Library and Culture of Indonesian International Islamic University and Visiting Fellow at the Indonesian Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/26, 12 April 2023
INTRODUCTION
R20 or Religion of Twenty was a specific forum held on the sidelines of the G20 to get religious leaders from around the world to talk about the role of religion in world affairs. It was an initiative proposed by Yahya Staquf (General Chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama [NU]) in anticipation of Indonesia’s G20 presidency from 30-31 October 2021 to end of December 2022. Staquf was able to convince President Jokowi Widodo, the holder of G20’s presidency, that Indonesia should be the home ground for world religious leaders to gather and discuss the future role of religion.[1] With NU being the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia, Staquf naturally assumed that NU would take the lead in this initiative. Apart from that, R20 was supported by both the government of Indonesia and the Muslim World League in Saudi Arabia.[2] With the presence of religious leaders as speakers from more than 40 countries, R20 was held successfully at both Bali and Yogyakarta in early November 2022.[3] Some points of communique were also successfully established.[4] However, while the R20 speaks about how religion can play the role as a panacea to global issues, the meeting held in Indonesia tended to swing to the role of Islam. This was not unexpected since the host is a dominantly Muslim country and the largest in the world.
This article highlights the R20 event and its relevance to the global development of Islam. It also investigates how religion can have an impact in world affairs. It also covers the impact of R20 on Indonesian Islam (NU). In view of the huge financial sponsorship received from Saudi Arabia for R20, this paper also looks at how R20 affects the relationship between NU and Saudi Arabia.
R20 AS GLOBAL MOVEMENT AND ITS CHALLENGES
R20 did gather world religious leaders in an open dialogue on problems and crises facing the world,[5] and participants had the opportunity to develop their vision on how religion could contribute in facing global challenges.[6]
The R20 theme was “Revealing and Nurturing Religion as a Source of Global Solutions: Global Movement for Shared Moral and Spiritual Values”.[7] With conflicts between the Muslim minority and the Hindu majority in India, tensions between Sunni and Shia in Yemen, and ISIS’s terrorism giving religion a bad name,[8] the participating religious leaders were thus expected to share and discuss both the weaknesses and strengths of their religions. However, most of those who presented at the Forum only focused on the good things in their religion.[9] This was not in line with the purpose of R20, which was set up as an alternative forum to the unsuccessful G20 Interfaith Forum[10] held annually as a side event of G20. In fact, R20 was designed to be an open platform for world religious leaders to discuss and deal with real world issues.
R20 agreed on the Communique of R20, however, which consists of important points about how religions can address issues such as identity-based conflicts, domestic and international security, the environment, and other matters.[11] Designed to be a global promise, R20 should have covered a range of challenges seen from the perspective of both mainstream religious groups and non-mainstream religious groups. For example, one criticism of R20 in Bali was that it did not focus on crucial issues such as religious minority rights and gender rights and injustices.[12]
Parking R20 under G20 was also problematic, in that it drew attention to the fact many challenges and threats involving religion had been created by members of G20.[13] Similarly, Saudi Arabia, the main sponsor of R20, is believed to have instigated the Sunni-Shia conflict in Yemen.
CAN RELIGION BE A GLOBAL SOLUTION?
Religion as a source of solutions for global problems was the core message of R20.[14] This ambition, however, compels religion to be placed at the centre of many world issues. Sociologists often debate whether religion should be given a maximum role in the public sphere or whether it should be placed only in the private sphere.[15] [16]
Since the early days of Indonesia, Islam had been proposed to play a central role in the country’s political system. The founding fathers, however, only agreed to have religion as a belief system in society, and not as the foundation for the country’s political system. Pancasila was eventually formulated as the state’s ideology, with the intention of accommodating all religions. This positioning of religion does not envisage it to play the role of a problem solver, especially not of world affairs.
Globally, religion’s role as a keeper of the peace, has been enigmatic, given that it is both inclusive and exclusive in essence. It has brought people together, as a cohesive factor, in many places of the world, but it is also non-cohesive factor; many conflicts and wars have been directly and indirectly instigated by it.
Wanting religion to be the solution to global problems is, in fact, not new. One could say that that ambition is often the reason for its popularity. In the context of Islam, seeing religion as the solution was common among those who championed political Islam, such as Ikhwanul Muslimin and Hizbut Tahrir. To be sure, their slogan is sal-islam huwa al-hall (Islam is the solution). Some groups like Jama’ah Islamiyah, Anshar al-Tawhid, NII (Negara Islam Indonesia) and many others, insist on applying the sharia system of law.
Indonesian moderate Muslim figures such as Abdurrahman Wahid, Nurcholish Madjid and Syafi’i Ma’arif were against any attempt to propagate this idea of Islam being the solution. They fought against religion having a central role in the legal and public sphere. However, this did not equate to their lack of belief in their religion. To them, looking to religion to solve global challenges is just a means to formalise religion in the political and public spheres.
INDONESIAN ISLAM
The domestic impact of R20, especially on Islam in Indonesia, is of great interest to scholars of the subject. It does seem that NU will reap the greatest benefits, mainly because there was zero involvement in R20 from Muhammadiyah and other Muslim organisations such as MUI, Persatuan Islam, and others. Vice President Ma’ruf Amin, a symbolic figure of MUI, was not present in the Forum at all, and R20 was very much viewed as NU’s programme, and as being legitimised by Jokowi’s government. Claiming R20 as the initiative of Indonesian Islam is therefore inaccurate, since it did not receive open support from most other major elements in Indonesian Islam.
At the national level, R20 was expected to seek a reduction in identity politics. The Communique of R20 does state that there should be a reduction in identity politics. However, in the last two decades, identity politics has become an inseparable part of Indonesian Islam, evident in its politics, its economic thought and even in the lifestyles practised within the NU community. A nationwide survey conducted by the Indonesia Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak showed that 37 % and 14 % agreed or strongly agreed respectively that Islam’s interests should be prioritised. Indonesian Muslims also want their ulama to have more influence in politics. This was evident in the score results from this survey where 10 % and 27 % either strongly agreed or somewhat agreed to Islamic leaders having more influence in the political sphere. This score was slightly higher than those who strongly disagreed (19 %) and somewhat disagreed (14 %) to this same question.
Saudi’s Support and NU’s New Approach to Wahhabism
As the biggest Muslim grouping in Indonesia, NU has long depicted Wahhabism and Salafism as its prominent and permanent foes. Rachel Rinaldo, for example, states that Fatayat NU (women’s wing of NU) is also against Wahhabism.[17] This only means that anti-Wahhabism has become a dominant idea among men and women in NU. Since its establishment in 1926, NU has been the only Muslim organisation critical of Wahhabism. Wahhabism is an ideological product of Saudi Arabia which refers to the thought of Mohammad bin Abdul Wahhab in the post-Ottoman era.[18] Since that era, Saudi Arabia has strictly adopted Wahhabism as its state-school of Islam. During the Ottoman empire, although the Hanafi Islamic law was the official school in Saudi, the other schools of Islam were allowed to be located there.[19] Because the main teaching of Wahhabism is Islamic purification, the kingdom of Saudi prohibited any sign indicating practice of polytheism among Muslims.[20] The Saudi government, at the time, destroyed many sacred shrines like the tombs of Prophet’s companions and Islamic saints, and many other places. NU has always protested against this advocacy of Wahhabism. Internationally speaking, this was what led to the establishment of NU in 1926.
For three or four decades, NU had not worked closely with Saudi’s government due to Wahhabism. When Gus Dur was general leader of this Muslim organisation, he did not consider Saudi his ally, and was working with European and international non-government organisations to promote human rights and democracy. However, the successor to Gus Dur, Hasyim Muzadi, through his forum ICIS (International Conference of Islamic Scholars) collaborated with all Muslim countries, including Iran and also Saudi Arabia.[21] When Said Aqil Siradj was the general chairman of NU, things were different again; he was very critical of Wahhabism. He, however, stated that he was not against Saudi Arabia as a country, but would continue to oppose Wahhabism,[22] despite it being the official Islamic school for Saudi. These three NU leaders were basically following in the footsteps of their predecessors.
Therefore, when the current leadership of NU accepted generous funding from Saudi for organising R20, the positioning of NU became ambiguous. Some have viewed this support as an indication of a new alliance with Saudi, and that NU was softening its established view on Wahhabism. This shift may be a breakthrough, but there may be unhappy consequences. Any criticism raised within NU on Saudi Arabia and even Wahhabism could be clamped down. This was evident from the cancellation of LDNU (Lembaga Dakwah Nahdlatul Ulama) which had recommended the abolition of Wahhabism; NU headquarters did not wish for LDNU to threaten Saudi’s support for R20.[23] This group consists mainly of NU’s grassroots and their kyais at the village level, and opposing Wahhabism and Salafism had been for them the reason for their being part of NU. They fear that the apparent change in attitude towards Saudi Arabia will weaken the traditional view of NU being against Wahhabism and Salafism.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Religion as offering a global solution, promoted through the establishment of R20’s Communique in Bali, can be interpreted as an attempt to deepen the use of religion in the public sphere. This has stimulated both negative and positive responses. Seeing religion as a global solution can be understood simply as a religionisation of world affairs. In the context of Islamic revivalism of Indonesia, it can become an argument for the Islamisation and shariatisation of the country, albeit that a progressive orientation is highly expected to result from R20.
Whether R20 will continue to be held at G20 gatherings remains a big question. Much depends on the capacity of NU as the main initiator of this event to convince all stakeholders of G20 and the world religious leaders of its importance. R20 was only successfully held in Indonesia due to the strong support of the Indonesian government and the Muslim World League of Saudi Arabia. R20 might continue as a global activity, but there is no guarantee that it will remain as an engagement platform at G20 in the long run, especially given the fact that most country members of G20 believe that religion should remain in the private sphere. However, it is rather safe to conclude that expecting the R20 initiative to survive beyond Indonesia’s chairmanship of the G20, especially if it passes on to a non-Muslim country is something not realistic to think of.
Last but not least, the impact of R20 and its aspirations on Indonesian Islam also relies on the capacity of NU, as R20 initiator, to convince Muslim organisations and groups in Indonesia to adopt its recommendations.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The growing trend of young employees choosing to withdraw their social insurance premiums early has been a major challenge to Vietnam’s social insurance system. Those who choose to do so give up their pensions and the accompanying free public health insurance when they retire in the future.
- Factors such as employees’ livelihood, job prospects, perception of social insurance benefits, and lack of trust in the state’s management of the social insurance fund all have an impact on their decision to withdraw their social insurance premiums.
- The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed the precarious living and working conditions of many factory workers in the export sectors, evidenced by the surging number of claims for social insurance withdrawals. With their low and unstable incomes, many of these workers view their social insurance premiums as a form of savings, and have no choice but to seek early access to this money during times of financial hardship.
- The government is revising the social insurance law to keep people in the social insurance system for longer; however, the potential effects of the revision remain unclear. Changes to the social insurance system should go hand in hand with labour relations reforms and improved social policies that empower workers and support their livelihood.
* Tu Phuong Nguyen is a member of the Stretton Institute, The University of Adelaide, Australia.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/25, 11 April 2023
EARLY WITHDRAWAL OF SOCIAL INSURANCE PREMIUMS
Article 3.1 of Vietnam’s 2014 Law on Social Insurance defines social insurance as “the guarantee to fully or partially offset an employee’s income that is reduced or lost due to their sickness, maternity, workplace accident, occupational disease, retirement or death”.[1] All employees with labour contracts are entitled to the compulsory social insurance scheme, whereby employers and employees must contribute a certain amount to employees’ insurance premiums. Social insurance, which is the largest component of these premiums, mainly covers pensions and maternity benefits. Employees are also entitled to unemployment and health insurance. The contribution is calculated based on the individual employee’s basic wage and other forms of regular monthly payments. All participants’ social insurance premiums are centrally managed through the state’s social insurance fund.
To be eligible for the pension, an employee must contribute to the social insurance fund for at least 20 years. People who have contributed to the scheme for less than 20 years do not qualify for the pension, but are entitled to access their social insurance benefits as a lump sum. The law stipulates certain conditions in which employees can withdraw their social insurance premiums early, including when they (1) move overseas, (2) are diagnosed with a life-threatening illness, and (3) resign and cease contributions to the social insurance fund for a period of one year. According to official statistics, the third condition has been cited in more than 98 per cent of all social insurance withdrawal requests.[2]
In 2014, the Vietnamese government attempted to implement an amendment to the social insurance law which would have required employees to wait until retirement (at age 55 for women and 60 for men) to receive their pension. This change, intended to provide welfare protection for employees in the long run, was met with protests from thousands of workers in industrial regions in southern Vietnam.[3] Following dialogues with workers and legislative debates, the government reversed the amendment and allowed employees to withdraw their social insurance premiums one year after they quit their jobs, as before.
Subsequent to this, the number of people choosing to withdraw their social insurance premiums has been steadily increasing. From 2016 to 2021, the system welcomed an additional 4.23 million participants, but it also had 4.06 million people leaving.[4] On average, the number of lodgements for social insurance withdrawal increased by about 9 per cent each year.[5] In 2021, a record number of more than 960,000 people lodged their claims for social insurance withdrawals. Those who claimed such money were mostly aged below 40 and work in non-state sectors.[6] Fifty-five per cent of the claims were made by women.
As pension is a key pillar of social insurance benefits, the growing opt-out rate from social insurance potentially puts a greater burden on the state to provide care and support for people who have no source of income in their old age. This growing trend poses a key challenge to Vietnam’s social insurance system.
EXPLAINING THE TREND
Several factors, such as employees’ livelihood, job prospects, perception of social insurance benefits, and lack of trust in the state’s management of the social insurance fund, have contributed to this trend.
Although official statistics are unavailable, media reports and previous research suggest that many who apply for social insurance withdrawals are factory workers employed in key export sectors such as garment, footwear, and other processing industries.[7] These workers, especially those with low incomes, need the money from the social insurance fund to help them overcome their financial hardship. A survey by Vietnam’s Institute of Workers and Trade Unions showed that 30 per cent of workers have no savings and often need to borrow money to pay for household expenses.[8] As a result, many low-income workers have come to view their social insurance premiums as a form of savings, and are more likely to seek early access to it when their income is reduced or when extra household expenses arise.[9] In most of the cases, the withdrawn funds are used to settle household debts and pay for children’s care and education, medical bills, and housing. Some workers, who are either exhausted from years of factory work or have lost their jobs, may use the money to help them start anew, switch to informal work, or invest in a family business or small-scale trading activities.[10]
Besides the individual living circumstances of workers, weak government regulation and lack of transparency in the management of the social insurance fund also explain why people choose to leave the social insurance system.[11] Reports of persistent legal evasion and violations of workers’ social insurance rights are common, with the most serious issue being employers failing to submit their and their employees’ contributions to the state’s social insurance fund, despite deducting employees’ contributions from their monthly wages.[12] For many years, the state-managed social insurance fund has had a deficit, reaching a record high of more than VND13 trillion (US$554 million) in 2016.[13] Sceptical of the state’s capacity to manage their social insurance money and to provide insurance and pension payments in the long run, workers who face financial difficulties prefer to withdraw their social insurance premiums and forgo their pension.
Following its failure in 2014 to pass a legal amendment that would prevent employees from withdrawing social insurance premiums early, the government has sought to raise awareness on the disadvantages of early withdrawal and the benefits of pension. Employees who choose to take out their social insurance premiums early are portrayed by government officials as “only thinking about their short-term needs”.[14] Plenty of news articles have included the catchphrase “short-term benefits, long-term disadvantages” (lợi trước mắt, thiệt lâu dài) to refer to the consequences of early withdrawal and its threat to employees’ future welfare.[15]
The media discourse on this matter has slightly shifted following the outbreak of COVID-19, coming to recognise how many workers’ precarious conditions had pushed them to withdraw their social insurance premiums. This was especially evident in 2022 when there were long queues of workers waiting outside social insurance offices in Ho Chi Minh City since dawn to lodge their claims.[16] Many had lost their jobs during the pandemic and had to resort to informal work to make ends meet. Even though the act of early withdrawal is still viewed in a negative light, the media discourse has demonstrated sympathy towards those who have no choice but to count on their social insurance money to cope with their financial burdens.[17] A union official suggested that more than 80 per cent of those who withdrew their social insurance premiums had no emergency savings for difficult times.[18]
Indeed, employment in some of Vietnam’s key export sectors has become increasingly precarious in recent years. As the country pursues an export-oriented policy, hundreds of thousands of jobs have been created each year in the garment, footwear, and other processing industries. This has allowed many people from rural areas to move to industrialising regions and cities, earning an income that can help them and their families escape poverty. However, these sectors are exposed to global market fluctuations and disruptions, which can lead to supplier factories closing down or cutting costs and reducing their labour force. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, there were cases of foreign-owned factories suddenly closing down and their foreign bosses fleeing Vietnam, leaving their workers unpaid and without their social insurance payments.[19] With weak bargaining power,[20] workers are increasingly vulnerable to reduced workplace benefits, short-term contracts, casualisation, and redundancies.[21] Certain groups, such as pregnant workers, those caring for young children, and elderly workers, are even more susceptible to discrimination due to assumptions about their declining productivity.[22]
In terms of living conditions, numerous reports have raised concerns about workers’ economic struggles.[23] The minimum wage in high-growth regions, such as Ha Noi and Ho Chi Minh City, currently stands at approximately US$200 a month, a 6 per cent increase from the 2020 minimum wage.[24] However, a former leader of the Vietnam General Confederation of Labour, the only trade union in Vietnam, suggested that the minimum wage still falls short of the minimum living needs of workers by 15 per cent.[25] In actuality, workers usually earn more than the minimum wage, but this discrepancy mostly comes from excessive overtime. In 2021, it was estimated that the average income in Ho Chi Minh City still fell short of a liveable income by 12 per cent.[26] The living conditions of rural-to-urban migrant workers are particularly difficult as they face extra costs such as rent and higher utility bills, while facing barriers in accessing services like healthcare, childcare, and their children’s schooling in the provinces and cities they move to.[27] Disruptions and uncertainties caused by the COVID-19 pandemic have made workers’ lives even more precarious.[28]
Although the Vietnamese economy has shown positive signs of recovery after the pandemic, many jobs in the export sectors, especially garment and footwear industries, have been severely impacted by weak consumer demand in key export destinations such as the United States and Europe.[29] This has led to the closure and downsizing of numerous factories in southern Vietnam, resulting in an estimated loss of 34,000 jobs and a reduction in working hours for 600,000 workers, leading to a decrease in their income.[30] If affected workers are unable to secure employment or a stable income within a year, it is likely that many of them will consider withdrawing their social insurance premiums to alleviate their financial stress.
PROPOSED CHANGES TO SOCIAL INSURANCE LAW
Early withdrawal of social insurance premiums is currently a critical issue in the Vietnamese government’s reform agenda regarding the social insurance law. The government has proposed several measures to limit early withdrawals and encourage more employees to accumulate their contributions towards their pension. The first proposal reduces the amount of money that a person can withdraw early: only their own contribution would be available, while the employer’s contributions would remain with the state.[31] In case an individual is unable to re-join the social insurance system in the future, the employer’s contributions would be used to partially cover their pension. This proposal seeks to discourage early withdrawals and keep people in the social insurance system for longer. However, it does not take into account the precarious situation of many factory workers who have come to view social insurance money as their savings, and who may be desperate to access the money to sustain themselves and their families. Even though this proposal does not strip employees of their right to withdraw social insurance money, as was the case with the overturned legal amendment in 2014, it could still be met with resistance from workers if passed into law. The draft law,[32] circulated for public consultation in March 2023, includes this proposal while retaining the current regulation as an alternative.
The second proposal lowers the eligibility requirement for the pension.[33] Evaluating the potential effects of this proposal is more complicated, considering that workers’ circumstances vary. Currently, an employee is eligible for the pension if they have contributed to the social insurance fund for at least 20 years and have reached the legal retirement age (55 for women and 60 for men). This proposal lowers the minimum requirements from 20 years to 15 years, and eventually to 10 years in the long term, with the intention of making pensions more attainable.
To those employees who join the social insurance system at a later age, this proposal would give them a better chance of being eligible for the pension. It also acknowledges the reality that the total employment time of factory workers in certain manufacturing sectors is often not long. For instance, companies in the garment and footwear industries have been known to find ways to lay off elderly workers (meaning those over 35 years old),[34] leaving them disadvantaged in the labour market and struggling to find new employment. Because it is difficult for workers in these industries to accumulate 20 years of social insurance contribution, lowering the minimum requirements for social insurance contribution would enable more people to access the pension, and make pensions more appealing overall.
This proposal nonetheless overlooks other issues concerning workers’ circumstances and their lack of trust in the social insurance system. Many workers choose not to wait for the pension not just because of the requirement regarding the minimum years of contribution, but also because they must wait until their retirement to access their money. A typical female worker in the garment industry, for example, can start working in her early 20s, if not before. If she keeps on working and contributing to the social insurance fund, she will reach the minimum years required for the pension in her 40s, yet she has to wait until she is 55 to receive the pension. In reality, many workers do not plan to work in the factory until their retirement, as their health and productivity tend to get worse after years of intensive and hard labour. A union official at Pou Yuen, the largest footwear company in Ho Chi Minh City, has observed that about 500 to 600 senior workers, especially those who are 40 years old and above, quit every year.[35] According to the current regulation, once an employee’s social insurance contributions have exceeded the threshold of pension eligibility, they are not able to withdraw social insurance premiums as a lump sum and have to wait until their retirement to receive the pension. At Pou Yuen, some workers have resigned from their jobs a few months before the total period of their contributions would have reached 20 years, in order to avoid having their social insurance premiums “locked” in the system.
The draft law reduces the minimum period of pension eligibility from 20 years to 15 years. However, employees would still be able to withdraw social insurance premiums if the total period of their contributions is less than 20 years. This means that those who have accumulated from 15 to 20 years of contributions are eligible for the pension and still able to withdraw their social insurance premiums if they wish to. It is unclear whether the legal amendment will keep people, especially factory workers, in the system for longer. Given that violations of social insurance law are still common, and factory workers generally remain sceptical of the state’s ability to manage the social insurance fund, workers with precarious conditions would still choose to withdraw their social insurance premiums when necessary.
Since industrial workers are the key targets and beneficiaries of social insurance law, it is important that any future reforms take into account their views and circumstances, particularly their precarious working and living conditions. Strengthening law enforcement and ensuring better protection of workers’ social insurance rights will be crucial to raising workers’ trust in the state’s management of the social insurance fund. Future reforms of the social insurance system should be coupled with improved social policies and labour relations reforms that support workers’ livelihoods and grant them a greater voice in the collective bargaining process.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |