2023/97 “Malaysia’s Return to Mining: Redeveloping Rare Earth Elements (REE)” by Tham Siew Yean and Neo Hui Yun Rebecca
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Increasing scrutiny of mineral resources at the global level has led to greater domestic interest in Malaysia’s mineral resources. The Malaysian government has called for a return to mining, focussing especially on the development of a sustainable non-radioactive rare earth element (NR-REE) industry that aims to shift from upstream to downstream activities.
- The history of REE development in Malaysia has been dogged with environmental, health and safety concerns, as exemplified by public concerns over the disposal of radioactive waste generated by Lynas’s operations in the country since 2012.
- Concerns over deforestation have also emerged; REE appear to be located at or are close to high-carbon stock areas. The government is suggesting an alternative method for extracting NR-REE, i.e. through in-situ leaching which reduces land clearing and tree felling, but this risks polluting surface water in mining areas.
- The conversion of radioactive waste to non-radioactive waste has been experimented at the laboratory level, with the aim of creating a sustainable solution for the disposal of radio-active waste materials.
- While the government is considering an export ban on NR-REE to attract foreign direct investment for the development of downstream activities, there is as yet no discussion over the use of mineral rents, be it at the state and federal level.
- Countries and companies cannot be expected to abandon the exploitation of mineral resources as a viable economic activity, however, and a more balanced approach is to subject the exploitation of these resources to stronger governance, greater transparency, and better accountability.
* Tham Siew Yean is Visiting Senior Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and Emeritus Professor at Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia. Neo Hui Yun Rebecca is Research Officer at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/97, 13 December 2023
INTRODUCTION
Mining—especially of tin—was historically an important activity on the Malay Peninsula, from the time the mineral was first discovered in the late 19th century till industrial development took off in Malaysia in the late 1960s.[1] As manufacturing expanded, mining became less important.
Global developments since then have changed the world demand and supply of critical minerals in the world. Critical minerals, defined by the Energy Act of 2020, are mainly non-fuel minerals or elements identified to have a high risk of supply chain disruption but which have an essential function in one or more energy technologies.[2] Projections from the International Energy Agency (IEA),[3] indicate that the rush for clean energy and the attendant demand for electric vehicles (EVs) and batteries needed to power the EVs have driven up the demand for critical minerals such as aluminium, nickel, tin, rare earth elements (REE) etc. Geopolitical tensions have also spurred a proliferation of new industrial policies seeking to reduce overdependence on limited sources of supply. Supply is however concentrated to a few economies, with the share of the supply in the top three economies in 2022 remaining the same or even larger, seen over the last three years (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Share of top three producing countries in processing of selected minerals, 2022[4] (Last updated 11 Jul 2023)
Sources: See endnotes
Developing countries that are resource-rich in critical minerals are therefore keen to seize this high-demand opportunity to join the emerging new supply chain and to use these resources as a new source of growth. Likewise in Malaysia, interest in mining activities has revived in line with the rise in global interest. This article traces new interest in the development of mining activities, the types of minerals available, and their location in Malaysia. Current policies and challenges to develop the rare earth industry is used as a case study.
A RELOOK AT MINERAL RESOURCES IN MALAYSIA
Malaysia’s National Mineral Industry Transformation Plan 2021-2030 (NMITP), launched in 2021, aims to develop the mineral industry sustainably, and along the entire value chain, as a new source of growth for Malaysia. It maps the mineral resources in the country, which include metallic and non-metallic minerals. Figures 2 and 3 show their extensive presence in every state of Malaysia.
The plan reveals that Malaysia possesses mineral resources potentially worth RM 4.11 trillion (approximately US$982 billion); these include both metallic and non-metallic minerals. The estimated value of metallic minerals alone is RM1.03 trillion, with critical minerals possessing a potential estimate value of up to US$182 billion.[5] Metallic minerals such as nickel, manganese, copper, and aluminum are used in EV battery production. While Rare Earth Elements (REE) are also used for the development of electric vehicles (EVs), they are not used in lithium-ion batteries. Instead, they are necessary for the magnets that form the main propulsion motors.
The plan considers five minerals (with estimated value of deposits) to be strategic: non-radioactive rare earth elements (NR-REE) such as lanthanide elements[6] (RM747.42 billion); bauxite (RM20.3 billion); tin ore (RM140.4 billion); silica sand (RM27.9 billion); and kaolin (RM25.5 billion).
Figure 2. Mineral Resources in Peninsular Malaysia, 2023
Source: Authors
Figure 3. Mineral Resources, East Malaysia, 2023
Source: Authors
Of the five strategic minerals identified, NR-REE[7] has the highest estimated value and hence is the focus for the current administration’s strategic interest. The following section explores the exploitation of NR-REE and the outstanding challenges involved.
Case Study: Redeveloping the Rare Earth Element (REE) industry
There were two companies producing REE in the 1970s, namely, Malaysian Rare Earth Corporation (MAREC) and Asian Rare Earth (ARE) in Perak. These were sister companies with Japanese equity partners.[8] ARE mainly produced intermediate mixed RE products which were exported to RE purification plants in Japan and Europe to produce high-purity individual REEs for use in high-tech applications. MAREC, on the other hand, mainly focused on the export of yttrium oxide concentrate to countries like Japan, USA, United Kingdom and Norway, where the mineral was further purified to produce valuable Heavy Rare Earth Elements (HREE) commonly used in clean energy technology.[9] Both companies were closed down in 1992 due to public protests and conflicts over the dangers associated with the disposal of radioactive waste materials.[10] Apart from that, the high maintenance cost of the plants, worsened by the 14-month suspension issued by the High Court to curb environmental dangers, was another factor that attributed to the plants’ eventual closure.[11]
In 2008, Lynas Malaysia Sdn Bhd (Lynas), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Lynas Corporation Ltd of Australia, was given a manufacturing license to produce rare earth oxides and carbonates at Gebeng Industrial Estate in Kuantan, Pahang. Setting up the Lynas Advanced Material plant (LAMP) in Malaysia was an expansion by the company to strengthen its rare-earth’s supply chain, following a significant investment of $304 million (AU$450 million) pledged through an equity-raising initiative.[12] Lynas used this location in Malaysia to develop a facility to process mineral concentrates imported from its mine in Australia. In 2011, in response to public concerns over health and safety issues over the radioactive waste associated with the processing of REE, the government called for a third-party assessment by a team of experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), on Lynas’ compliance with international safety standards and good practices and radiation safety.[13] The team found that Lynas complied with the radiation safety standards imposed by the regulatory authorities, and their findings were made public. The plant then restarted operations in 2012 by refining and processing rare earth oxides mined from Mount Weld into high-quality separated rare earth materials for export to manufacturing markets in Asia, Europe and United States.[14] The plant has since boasted an annual production capacity of 22,000 tones, helping the company to double its total production. It also provided 450 jobs for locals, making the east coast of Malaysia an attractive place for other investors interested in the rare-earth supply chain.[15] Despite this, each renewal of the operating license of Lynas remains contentious amid public protests over radioactive waste materials from the plant.[16] The tussle over the extension of its operating license and the disposal of radioactive waste materials continued until the latest episode when it was up for renewal again in 2023. The license was subsequently extended till March 2026.[17]
REE development continues to be championed by certain segments of Malaysian society. In 2014, Akademi Sains Malaysia (ASM), together with the Ministry of Science, Technology, and Innovation (MOSTI), produced a Blueprint for the establishment of REE industries in the country as a new source of growth. A critical component of this plan was the call for development of midstream and downstream activities, rather than a mere focus on upstream extraction alone; this was to increase value-added activities in the country (Figure 4). Midstream refers to the transformation of minerals into refined products through separation and purification while downstream activities input these refined products into manufacturing.
Figure 4. Value Chain Activities for Developing NR-REE
Source: Tham 2023[18]
Although the suggested blueprint was not adopted, the government came up with the NMITP in 2021. Like the blueprint, this latter plan also emphasized downstream development as the way forward for mineral resource development. The New Industrial Master Plan 2030 (NIMP 2030), launched in September 2023, also calls for downstream development by using mineral resources to manufacture advanced materials, with the types of advanced materials being left to be determined by the market players.
The government subsequently announced a plan to prohibit the export of raw NR-REE,[19] a move reminiscent of Indonesia’s shift towards resource nationalism in its ban of nickel exports for furthering downstream activities. The reason behind both bans is to encourage the establishment of production plants within the country; this would hopefully create jobs for locals and raise national incomes through higher-value processed materials being exported instead of raw metals. Malaysian Investment Development Authority (MIDA) also provided incentives to attract investments for the development of downstream activities such as Pioneer Status (which includes five-year partial income tax exemption) and Investment Tax allowance.
KEY CHALLENGES IN THE REDEVELOPMENT OF REE
Environmental Concerns
As noted by IEA,[20] local and regional development are affected by mineral exploitation in three significant ways. The first is the use of the land where the unmined minerals are found. Deforestation is a key concern. For example, the spurt in nickel mining in Indonesia since 2019 has led to a loss of 76,301 hectares in the country,[21] escalating the loss in biodiversity and the habitats of some endangered species.
Likewise, NR-REE in Malaysia appear to be located near or at high-carbon stock areas (see Figures 5 and 6 below). A deeper investigation of these locations also revealed the great extent to which surrounding areas have been deforested over the last 10 years (2012 to 2022). Although the causes of the deforestation are not known, this connection highlights forested areas can be encroached upon once a certain area is identified for future NR-REE mining.
Figure 5. Deforestation around NR-REE locations and High Carbon Stock Areas in Peninsular Malaysia, 2012-2022[22]
Source: Authors
Figure 6. Deforestation around NR-REE locations and High Carbon Stock Areas in East Malaysia, 2012-2022
Source: Authors
A difference in attitude toward sustainability is also evident between federal and state governments, where state governments are keen to pursue economic interests for REE mining over federal attempts to preserve national carbon stock. Beginning with the 2019 Budget, the federal government has used Ecological Fiscal Transfer (EFTs) to facilitate state government efforts to protect rainforests. However, since land use is controlled by state governments, there have been instances of individual states diverging from the original sustainability goals set by the federal government. The Kelantan state reportedly revealed plans in October 2023, to remove the status of “environmentally sensitive area” (ESA) for up to 88% of its total protected area; this is to free up land for development, albeit the types of development involved are not specified.[23] Similarly, Kelantan had in 2022 estimated that NR-REE mining can boost the state’s economy by RM125 billion, thereby indicating that this is possibly part of the state’s development plan.[24]
To mitigate deforestation due to mining, in-situ leaching has been proposed as an alternative to open cast mining. This method mainly entails the extraction of REE via the injection of chemicals such as ammonium sulfate into hills containing REE deposits. The minerals are then dissolved into a liquid form before being extracted at the surface. This method is known to avoid destruction of vegetation and removal of topsoil, essentially resolving the risk of deforestation. There are other potential pitfalls, however, even if less land clearing and tree felling problems are encountered with in-situ leaching as compared to open cast mining. There is, for example, a possibility of leakage from the leaching ponds which contain pollutants, to underground water or other waterways.[25]
The possibility of contamination remains a contested issue currently. Studies on the impact of in-situ leaching practices in China, which has used this technology since the late 1960s,[26] have shown that there is REE pollution of surface water in mining areas.[27] The Department of Minerals and Geoscience, Malaysia, countered this claim in October 2023, based on findings at an in-situ leaching pilot project for mining non-radioactive rare earth elements (NR-REE) in Mukim Kenering, Hulu Perak, Perak.[28] It remains to be seen if the public is convinced by the findings of one pilot project, as opposed to the evidence available on China’s experience in using this method.
Waste generation from mineral development and processing is another concern. The Lynas tussle over radioactive toxic waste has been momentarily resolved by a proposal to convert radioactive waste to non-radioactive waste. Although the technology is available in Malaysia, it is still at the laboratory level, and is not yet ready for commercial application.[29]
Use of Mineral Rents for Development
Mineral rents can be a good source of income for fostering development. Perak, for example, was reported to have received RM1.66 million in royalty payment for the production of Rare Earth Carbonate (REC) from its rare earth pilot project; the product was then exported to China. The prospects of making a quick buck from selling REE has led to reports of illegal REE mining in Negeri Sembilan and Malacca.[30]
Unfortunately, there has been no disclosure on royalty payments, except when queried in parliament. Neither is there any disclosure on the division of mineral royalty payments between the federal and state governments. More importantly, how the mineral rents are used, be it at the federal or state level remains unknown. The debate as well as the suggested plans and the government’s response through the media have taken a firefighting approach; it has focused mainly on public environmental concerns and safety issues, while the use of mineral rents has not been discussed. For natural resources, which are limited in supply, the conversion of this type of natural capital into physical capital that can drive development is critical, but the road towards capturing mineral rent for this use is paved with governance issues and the political economy of a country.
Although the NIMTP has included governance as one of the important pillars for the development of the mineral industry, there is no discussion on accountability for the revenue received and for these revenues being invested to benefit public welfare for the immediate and the distant future. Accountability requires proper disclosure of revenues paid by the companies involved in mineral development, and much greater transparency in communications with the public.
The government is currently developing a NR-REE business model in conjunction with ASM and Sunway University.[31] It remains to be seen if the use of mineral rents is included in the business model or if the business model merely includes a computation of the rate of return to investment for the investors, without any further discussion on the cost and benefit of mining incorporating the social costs involved.
CONCLUSION
The renewed interest in mining in Malaysia coincides with the rising global interest for greater use and diversification of sources of critical minerals. Yet mining activities face considerable environmental challenges. Mining companies applying for mining rights need to comply with the environmental laws of the country, which includes robust and comprehensive environmental and social impact assessments. More importantly, environmental challenges require that there be strong enforcement as well as monitoring mechanisms for compliance.
Exploiting mineral resources also requires effective cost-benefit analysis of the extraction and use of mineral resources throughout the production and supply chain. This includes careful computation of the social costs of mining and not just the economic returns from down-streaming mining activities within Malaysia.
Since mineral resources are finite in supply, it is equally important that the mining rents collected, be it at the federal or state level, are channelled for development purposes such as investments in tangible public goods such as education and health, or in infrastructure needed by the respective states. Greater transparency and accountability are clearly needed to guarantee that the mineral resources of the country are not exploited for the gains of a few, but for the greater good of the country.
Hence, the government, be it at the state or federal level, must ensure that mining projects are executed with stronger governance, clear transparency, and better accountability so that the mistakes of the past or in other countries that have traversed the same route, will not be repeated.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
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2023/96 “Vietnam’s Quest for Enhanced Maritime Domain Awareness” by Bich Tran
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Maritime domain awareness (MDA) is crucial to Vietnam’s defence of its territorial integrity and safety of navigation as well as its economic interests and marine environment.
- Vietnam has been enhancing its underwater, surface, and coastal domain awareness by modernising its sea, air, and space assets through both self-help efforts and external assistance.
- Vietnam also partakes of international cooperation and information sharing to improve collective MDA capabilities.
- To have adequate MDA to monitor its long coastline and vast maritime area, however, Vietnam needs to accelerate its adoption of advanced space technologies, further embrace multilateral maritime security cooperation, and invest in grassroots solutions.
*Bich Tran is Postdoctoral Fellow at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in Singapore and Adjunct Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington DC.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/96, 8 December 2023
INTRODUCTION
Vietnam is a maritime nation with a long coastline and a vast Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).[1] As such, maritime domain awareness (MDA) is essential for the country to protect its maritime security. Since setting the goal in 2006 of turning itself into a strong regional marine economy,[2] the country has improved its MDA through both self-help efforts and external assistance. This article discusses Vietnam’s perspective on maritime security and MDA; its modernisation of sea, air and space assets to enhance MDA; and the additional steps the country can take to boost its MDA.
MARITIME SECURITY AND MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS
Vietnamese authorities have yet to provide an official definition of “maritime security”.[3] However, an article on the Vietnam Border Guard’s website defines the concept as “a state of stability, safety, and freedom from sea-based or land-based threats that may impede the normal activities of countries, organisations, and individuals at sea, or sea-based threats to the normal activities of countries, organisations, and individuals on land.” [4] This definition implies that Vietnam’s notion of maritime security is comprehensive in nature, taking into account both traditional and non-traditional aspects.
Vietnam places tremendous importance on maritime security for several reasons. First, the country is involved in territorial disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. Protecting its sovereignty and asserting its sovereign rights over these contested areas are the top priorities in Vietnam’s maritime strategy. Second, Vietnam’s export-oriented economy relies on the safety and freedom of navigation in its waters and the wider maritime region. Third, Vietnam depends on maritime resources for many economic activities, such as fishing, aquaculture, and offshore oil and gas exploration. Safeguarding these interests is therefore essential to Vietnam’s economic wellbeing. Lastly, protecting marine biodiversity and coastal habitats is crucial for Vietnam’s sustainable development.
As with the concept of “maritime security”, the concept of MDA has not been officially defined by Vietnamese authorities either. However, existing definitions are applicable. According to the International Maritime Organization, MDA is “the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact security, safety, the economy or the marine environment.”[5] Meanwhile, Transport Canada offers an expansive definition of MDA, which encompasses accurate and up-to-date information about “everything on, under, related to, adjacent to, or bordering a sea, ocean or other navigable waterway,” including any and all activities, structures, individuals, goods, vessels, and transportation methods.[6] It means MDA entails underwater, surface, and coastal domain awareness.
Thus, MDA serves as the “engine room” for maritime security governance at both national and international levels.[7] With a comprehensive awareness of the maritime domain, coastal states like Vietnam can better detect, deter, and respond to maritime security threats. Furthermore, with robust MDA, coastal states can understand maritime patterns, anticipate maritime security threats, and deal with them in an effective manner before they escalate. For example, knowing where threats are most likely to occur or where illegal activities often take place allows for more efficient deployment of patrol vessels, aircraft, and personnel.
At the national level, the main actors in Vietnam’s MDA are the Vietnam People’s Navy (VPN), the Vietnam Coast Guard (VCG), and the Vietnam Fisheries Resource Surveillance (VFRS).
The VPN is the core force in defending Vietnam’s sovereignty, sovereign rights, and territorial integrity in its seas and islands. It also participates in natural disaster prevention and control, search and rescue, and protects marine economic activities in accordance with Vietnamese and international laws.[8] The VPN contributes to Vietnam’s MDA by deploying its naval assets, including ships, submarines and aircraft, for surveillance and reconnaissance missions over vast and critical maritime areas.
The VCG is a part of the People’s Armed Forces and serves as the state’s maritime law enforcement agency. It is responsible for protecting Vietnam’s sovereignty, sovereign rights, and national jurisdiction in its maritime regions; ensuring maritime security and order; and upholding both Vietnamese laws and international treaties to which Vietnam is a party. The VCG is equipped with ships, aircraft, weapons, explosives, support tools, and technical equipment to perform its functions, tasks, and powers.[9] By maintaining a consistent presence at sea, the VCG can detect, monitor, and address activities that may threaten Vietnam’s maritime interests.
The VFRS is a state agency that enforces Vietnam’s laws and international treaties related to aquatic resources. Its responsibilities include patrolling, inspecting and acting against violations; educating about fishing laws; protecting Vietnamese maritime sovereignty; and promoting international cooperation in fisheries surveillance. The VFRS has the authority to request relevant information, manage weapons and equipment for surveillance purposes, and chase or arrest non-compliant individuals or vessels.[10] An important aspect of the VFRS relates to its ensuring the legal implementation of aquatic exploitation and protection, including preventing illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing.
Depending on specific issues, collaboration and coordination among VPN, VCG and VFRS might be handled through inter-agency mechanisms. For instance, the VFRS has closely coordinated with the VPN, the VCG, and other authorities to combat IUU fishing, aiming at lifting the European Commission’s “yellow card”—an official warning issued by the European Union to Vietnam for falling short in tackling IUU fishing.[11] However, there is no singular central agency solely dedicated to the coordination of all maritime activities.
VIETNAM’S EFFORTS TO IMPROVE ITS MDA
Vietnam’s need to bolster its MDA stems from an array of evolving traditional and non-traditional security challenges affecting its national security and economic vitality. Chief among these is China’s increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea, including the construction and militarisation of artificial islands, and frequent naval patrols, all of which reinforce China’s expansive territorial and maritime claims. Vietnam also faces the persistent issue of IUU fishing, which not only threatens the economic wellbeing of local communities but also the country’s international reputation. Moreover, Vietnam grapples with the complex issue of smuggling, including drug trafficking, human trafficking, and the transportation of contraband. This further complicates its security environment. In response, Vietnam has been making an effort to enhance its underwater, surface, and coastal domain awareness, by modernising its sea, air, and space assets.
Underwater Domain Awareness
Vietnam has significantly enhanced its underwater domain awareness through the deployment of submarines. In 2009, the country placed an order for six Project 636 Kilo-class submarines from Russia, which were delivered between 2013 and 2017. These Kilo-class submarines are specifically designed for anti-submarine warfare and anti-surface-ship warfare, but are also capable of general reconnaissance and patrol missions. Regarded as one of the world’s most silent diesel submarines, they possess remarkable stealth capabilities. Equipped with advanced MGK-400EM digital sonars, their capacity to detect enemy submarines exceeds their own detectability range by three to four times. They can detect targets in sonar listening mode and engage in telephone and telegraph communication in both long-range and short-range modes. Moreover, they are equipped with radar that operates in periscope and surface modes, providing valuable information on underwater and air situations, radar identification, and navigational safety.[12]
Before acquiring the Kilo-class submarines, Vietnam had been operating two Yugo-class midget submarines obtained from North Korea.[13] The Yugo-class submarines, with their compact size, serve as cost-effective options for coastal operations and limited missions.[14] However, the Kilo-class submarines offer superior range, endurance, and versatility. Their larger size, advanced propulsion systems, and greater crew capacity enable them to undertake a wider array of missions and establish a more formidable maritime presence. This allows Vietnam to patrol its territorial waters and EEZ more effectively.
Surface Domain Awareness
Between 2011 and 2018, Vietnam made significant progress in enhancing its surface domain awareness by expanding its fleet of vessels, predominantly sourced from Russia. The VPN acquired four Project 10412 Svetlyak patrol crafts,[15] which can be deployed to various missions, including safeguarding coastal lines of communications. During this period, Vietnam also purchased four Gepard-3 frigates from Russia as part of its naval expansion. The first two frigates were ordered in 2006 and were successfully delivered in 2011, followed by two Gepard-3.9 versions which were delivered between 2017 and 2018. The Gepard 3.9 class frigates are well-equipped for convoy operations and patrols, and for safeguarding the maritime border and EEZ.[16] In addition, Vietnam constructed four FC-54 patrol crafts, known as TT400TP in Vietnamese, between 2012 and 2014 based on a design purchased from Russia. These ships were constructed at the Hong Ha Shipbuilding Plant under the supervision of the Defence Industry General Department.[17]
Vietnam has also increased the number of its vessels with the help of its foreign partners. In 2022, India handed over the 12 high-speed patrol boats built under the US$100-million line of credit extended to Vietnam in 2014.[18] In June 2023, India further announced it would provide Vietnam with an active-duty missile corvette–the first time India has ever granted a warship to another country.[19] Japan provided the VCG and VFSR with seven second-hand marine vessels (along with maritime safety equipment) in 2015, and six new patrol boats in 2017.[20] In 2020, Tokyo loaned Hanoi US$348.2 million to build six more patrol vessels, which are expected to be delivered to the VCG by 2025.[21] The VPN received two Pohang-class corvettes from South Korea in 2017 and 2018.[22] Meanwhile, the United States delivered 24 new Metal Shark patrol boats and two used Hamilton-class cutters to the VCG between 2017 and 2020.[23] In 2022, Washington promised to transfer another cutter to Hanoi.[24]
In addition, Vietnam has utilised airborne resources to enhance its surface domain awareness. In 2010, the VPN ordered three DHC-6 (Guardian-400 version) maritime patrol aircraft from Canada, which were delivered in 2014. These are used for surveillance as well as search and rescue missions across Vietnam’s coastal areas.[25] Additionally, in 2018, the VPN procured from Israel three Heron unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with medium-altitude long-endurance capabilities, which were delivered in 2021. The Heron system is equipped to handle up to six diverse mission payloads simultaneously. This allows for complex intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance operations across various terrains, including at sea.[26]
Vietnam further augments its surface domain awareness using space-borne resources. In 2013, Vietnam achieved a significant milestone in its space programme with the launch of its first Earth observation satellite, VNREDSat-1, constructed by Airbus. The satellite has remained operational in orbit for ten years, double its anticipated lifespan. Throughout this extended period, VNREDSat-1 has played a vital role in tackling various challenges, including water resources management and coastal management.[27] Currently, Vietnam is exploring the development of the successor programme, VNREDSat-2; however, progress has stalled due to the pending finalisation of the procurement process, and the selection of the launching agency.[28]
In 2020, Vietnam commissioned the LOTUSat-1, a Japanese-built Earth observation satellite system funded by Official Development Assistance, from the Japan International Cooperation Agency. The system includes a satellite, a ground system, and training programmes. The satellite, equipped with Synthetic Aperture Radar, was initially slated for a 2023 launch, but the target has been shifted to 2024. The ground-based infrastructure comprises a parabolic antenna, a control hub for satellite operations, a centre for utilising mission data, and an interface for users. The LOTUSat-1 will be key in Vietnam’s efforts to combat natural disasters and address climate change issues.[29]
Vietnam has made use of its partners’ space assets to enhance its surface domain awareness. In 2018, Hanoi reached an agreement with New Delhi to set up the Data Reception and Tracking and Telemetry Station (DRTTS) in Ho Chi Minh City. The DRTTS allows India to track and receive data from its Earth observation satellites as they pass over Southeast Asia. In return, India provides Vietnam and its regional partners with satellite imagery, which is instrumental in monitoring China’s activities in the South China Sea.[30]
Vietnam’s surface domain awareness is also enhanced with SeaVision,[31] an advanced web-based maritime situational awareness tool promoted by the U.S. Navy and managed by the U.S. Department of Transportation. With its user-friendly interface, SeaVision allows users to view and analyse maritime data based on user-defined rules, facilitating better decision-making and response coordination. In November 2019, instructors of the U.S. Naval Information Warfare Center Pacific offered a training course in Hanoi for 16 members from different maritime authorities of Vietnam on how to use SeaVision to identify different situations at sea and to protect national sovereignty. In April 2021, the U.S. Office of Defence Cooperation and the Bureau of Drug Prevention and International Law Enforcement provided a similar online training course for various Vietnamese maritime agencies including the Vietnam Maritime Administration, provincial and municipal port authorities, the Maritime Search and Rescue Coordination Center, and the Directorate of Fisheries.[32]
Coastal Domain Awareness
To enhance its coastal domain awareness, Vietnam has strategically installed radar stations along its extensive coastline, from Quang Ninh Province and Hai Phong in the North to Phu Quoc Island in Kien Giang Province in the South. One example is the domestically produced VRS-CSX medium-range maritime radar built by Viettel High Technology Corporation.[33]
Another pillar of Vietnam’s coastal domain awareness is the vigilant monitoring of ports and other coastal facilities. In 2013, the Vietnamese General Department of Customs issued Regulations on Customs Supervision by Camera System, which mandated the installation of identification cameras, and CCTV operating 24/7 to monitor ports.[34] Since then, local authorities have instructed relevant agencies to install these surveillance cameras to look out for suspicious cargo and illicit activities.[35]
Additionally, Vietnam keeps a close watch on its coastal ecosystems with support from the Australian government. Notably, under Australia’s Marine Resources Initiative (MRI), which was launched in 2020, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Geoscience Australia, and the Australian Institute of Marine Science (AIMS) have utilised leading-edge satellite imaging and modelling technology to assist marine spatial mapping and coral reef monitoring in Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries.[36] Geoscience Australia has arranged two educational trips to Australia for Vietnamese officials and scientists to improve their understanding of seabed morphology, as well as data collection and processing techniques. Moreover, AIMS signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Institute of Oceanography in Vietnam to collaborate on coral reef monitoring.[37]
ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT
While the modernisation of sea, air, and space assets has significantly bolstered Vietnam’s MDA, there is still much room for improvement.
First, there is an urgent need for the country to accelerate its space programme. Even with an increased number of vessels, Vietnam struggles to adequately cover its extensive waters, making reliance on satellites and emerging technologies inevitable. The technology of Vietnam’s first earth observation satellite, VNREDSat-1, has become outdated due to technological advancements in the past decade. Moreover, with the rapid surge in data volume, there is a pressing need for artificial intelligence integration to detect anomalies and facilitate advanced data analysis.
Second, Vietnam needs to further embrace multilateral maritime security cooperation. Vietnam has actively participated in some regional multilateral capacity-building programmes, such as the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP),[38] Australia’s Maritime Consultancy 1.0 and 2.0 programs,[39] and the Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training exercise.[40] However, Vietnam has been reluctant to join the Critical Maritime Routes Indo-Pacific (CRIMARIO),[41] a maritime capacity-building initiative by the European Union. Officials from CRIMARIO have invited Vietnam to join the Indo-Pacific Regional Information Sharing (IORIS) platform, a secure web-based maritime coordination and information-sharing tool that can complement SeaVision to enhance Vietnam’s MDA capabilities. CRIMARIO has also offered a series of virtual training courses to Vietnamese officials. However, Vietnam has neither joined IORIS nor clearly communicated its intentions, leaving potential collaborators uncertain about its stance.[42]
Vietnam should also consider joining the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA), a technology and training initiative announced by the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue member states (Australia, India, Japan and the United States) in 2022. IPMDA employs cutting-edge technology, including commercial satellite radio frequency, to provide regional partners with almost real-time information on activities taking place within their respective maritime zones.[43]
Finally, while Vietnam has predominantly adopted a top-down approach in bolstering its MDA, there is untapped potential in harnessing bottom-up initiatives. A viable strategy could involve equipping mariners from coastal communities with internet-connected smartphones, which allows the utilisation of free crowdsourced mobile applications like SeaWatch to combat IUU fishing. By actively documenting illicit activities they encounter at sea, these mariners would be able to provide valuable assistance to maritime authorities.[44] Such grassroots solutions are cost-effective ways to enhance the reach and efficiency of Vietnam’s maritime law enforcement.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2023/95 “The Prabowo-Gibran Pairing: Wise or Foolish?” by Burhanuddin Muhtadi and Kennedy Muslim
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Prabowo Subianto has officially picked Gibran Rakabuming Raka, President Jokowi’s son, as his running mate for the 2024 Presidential Election. While this has generated controversies regarding a Constitutional Court (MK) ruling to facilitate this initiative and the issue of dynastic politics, the electoral benefits for the Prabowo-Gibran team appear substantive.
- President Jokowi’s endorsement of the move seems to have already severely harmed the prospects for Ganjar Pranowo, PDIP’s candidate. The growing rift between Jokowi and PDIP/Megawati has become more evident, and some of Jokowi’s non-PDIP supporters are switching over to the Prabowo-Gibran camp. Prabowo’s electability should rise substantially once Gibran is officially confirmed as his running mate.
- The latest Indikator poll shows a significant increase in support for Prabowo among youth voters (Gen-Z and millennials), after the announcement and registration of the Prabowo-Gibran presidential ticket at the General Elections Commission (KPU).
- Anies Baswedan was initially trailing last, but is now emerging as Prabowo’s main rival. Anies seems to have benefited from Prabowo’s selection of Gibran as his running mate, because some of Prabowo’s traditional supporters in the previous two elections are unhappy with Prabowo’s teaming up with Jokowi’s son.
* Burhanuddin Muhtadi is Visiting Fellow of ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and Associate Professor at State Islamic University, Jakarta; and Kennedy Muslim is Senior Researcher at Indikator Politik Indonesia.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/95, 6 December 2023
INTRODUCTION
The decision of the coalition of parties supporting Prabowo Subianto (Gerindra, Golkar, Demokrat, PAN and others) made on October 22 to advance Gibran Rakabuming Raka, the son of President Jokowi, as Prabowo’s running mate is an electoral gamble that has captured much media attention. The dramatic process at the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi or MK), which issued its ruling to pave the way for Gibran to run as a vice-presidential candidate has created controversy. The MK ruling triggered nationwide criticism on TV and social media, and the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) alleged that there was intervention by powerful actors to influence MK’s decision. This storm of criticisms led the Constitutional Court Honorary Assembly (MKMK) to dismiss Anwar Usman, President Jokowi’s brother-in-law, from his position as the Chief Justice of MK.
But from the point of view of Prabowo’s coalition, Gibran is an asset in the upcoming 2024 presidential election. This essay shows the competitive electoral landscape among the three presidential contenders, based on the most recent poll after the MK ruling and the official registration of the Prabowo-Gibran pair at the General Elections Commission (KPU).
Gibran is like a double-edged sword for Prabowo’s coalition. On the one hand, many parties believe that Gibran will boost support for Prabowo in Central Java and East Java. Prabowo lost badly in 2014 and 2019 in these two big provinces, which are Jokowi’s stronghold electoral bases. Prabowo has calculated that by running with Gibran, Jokowi’s support base would shift to his camp in the 2024 elections. Moreover, Prabowo’s coalition of parties assumes that Gibran represents the young generation, thus having the potential to attract the support of voters aged under 40 years old. According to the 2020 BPS census, Generation Z, born in the 1997-2012 period, reached 75.49 million people, equivalent to 27.94% of the total population. The millennial generation born in the 1981-1996 period reached 69.90 million people or 25.87% of the general population.[1] Taken together, young voters (Gen-Z and millennials) will make up around 52% of the whole electorate in the 2024 elections.[2]
Another driving factor is the fact that the Indonesian public still shows a high level of support for Jokowi’s government. At the elite level, there are expectations that Gibran’s appointment as Prabowo’s running mate will secure President Jokowi’s full support and lead to the mobilization of the state apparatus under the President’s control in support of Prabowo. Some prominent civil society activists have already sounded the alarm on the lack of neutrality in the national army and police (TNI-Polri)[3] apparatus and among over 271 acting regional heads (at the level of district head, mayor, and governor) directly appointed by the Ministry of Interior.
There is a further counter argument that instead of being an asset, Gibran could actually become a liability for Prabowo’s coalition. The issue of political dynasty and nepotism emanating from the MK’s ruling to allow Gibran to run has been widely echoed by civil society coalitions both in mainstream mass media and on social media. However, past surveys show that presidential votes are driven mainly by presidential candidate figures, not their vice-presidential candidate. Moreover, Gibran is not Jokowi. Jokowi rose to the apex of power from the bottom. Meanwhile, Gibran has only been mayor of Solo for two years. His father served two terms as mayor in the same city. Before entering the presidential election arena, Jokowi had also served as Governor of DKI Jakarta.
The public also believes in the argument that Gibran is not experienced enough for the position, and is too young. This was confirmed in the Indikator’s survey in early October (47% agreed with this statement vs 29% who disagreed. The rest did not answer). The controversial MK ruling, along with the political dynasty issue, were seen by many observers to have the potential to be an election matter for the anti-establishment movement. The net effect on Prabowo-Gibran electability will depend on future turns of events.
THE POLLING SIMULATION DATA SO FAR
Below are details from the latest electability poll done by Indikator after the MK’s controversial ruling and after the registration of the Prabowo-Gibran pair at the General Election Commission (KPU). The data presented are consistent with many other credible pollsters’ findings conducted during similar survey periods, such as Poltracking[4] and Populi Center.[5]
Figure 1: Three Presidential Contenders Simulation
Source: Indikator Survey October 2023
A nationally representative survey conducted from October 27 till November 1, 2023,[6] covering 1,220 respondents, found that support for Prabowo Subianto was at 40.6% while that for Ganjar Pranowo was at 27.8%, showing a difference of 12.2%. Anies Baswedan came last with 23.7%, 4.1% after Ganjar Pranowo.[7] Prabowo’s electability slipped somewhat, although not significantly, after his pairing with Gibran. Conversely, the electability of Ganjar-Mahfud pair had increased after Mahfud MD was chosen.
Figure 2: Electability Trends of the Three Presidential Candidates
Source: Indikator Survey October 2023
Interestingly, after the registration of the Prabowo-Gibran as Presidential-Vice Presidential candidates, the poll shows a sharp drop in support for Ganjar by around 7%, from 34.8% to 27.8%. Some voters switched to Prabowo, while some remained indecisive. Meanwhile, some of Prabowo’s supporters shifted to Anies when they learned that Gibran would be Prabowo’s running mate.
Figure 3: Three-way Presidential Pair Electability Trends among 2019 Presidential Election Self-identified Voter Base
Source: Indikator Survey October 2023
Previously, surveys had shown that the majority of Prabowo’s voters had lower approval for Jokowi’s performance. This was because Prabowo was Jokowi’s main rival in the last two presidential elections.[8] When Gibran became Prabowo’s running mate, some of them decided to switch their votes to Anies, who is ideologically closer to them. Prabowo’s supporters from 2019 shifted away after the Prabowo-Gibran official registration. Meanwhile, the support for Anies increased significantly among Prabowo’s traditional voter base. The potential additional votes for Anies can be greater if Prabowo cannot exploit Gibran to solidify support in Jokowi’s stronghold voter bases.
Be that as it may, Prabowo’s declining support among his traditional voter base is more than compensated for by the significant increase in support from among Jokowi-Maruf Amin’s 2019 supporters. The number increased from 29.6% to 34.9%. In contrast, Ganjar’s support from the same set of voter groups declined from 51.1% to 44.4% compared to the previous poll. An initial assumption had been that Gibran would not instantly become an electoral asset because of the issue of political dynasty, but the latest poll seems to contradict this. Interestingly, Gibran has instead accelerated the shift of Jokowi’s 2019 supporter base to Prabowo’s camp.
GIBRAN EFFECT ON YOUNG VOTERS
In various media publications and appearances, Prabowo’s coalition campaigners have been drumming up the potential of winning the majority of young voters (Gen-Z and millennials) given their decision to pick Gibran as his running mate. But what do the latest poll data tell us about this assumption?
Figure 4: Presidential Poll Trend among Gen-Z and Millenials
Source: Indikator Survey October 2023
A few days after Prabowo-Gibran registered at KPU, Indikator’s late October poll found a significant boost in support for them, especially among Gen-Z (under 26 years old). Interestingly, Prabowo already has a solid support base among young voters, especially Gen-Z and millennials. The negative campaign in the media and social media portraying Gibran as an inexperienced and privileged son of President Jokowi seems not to bother young voters.
Prabowo-Gibran’s support jumped from 38.1% to 52.4% (see Figure 4) among Gen-Z voters within a week after officially registering at KPU.
Figure 5: How Potent is the Issue of Political Dynasty?
Source: Indikator Survey October 2023
Table 1: Three-Candidate Vote Choices Based on Perception of Political Dynasty
Source: Indikator Survey October 2023
The Indikator poll in October found that around 39.2% of respondents worried about political dynasties. This number dropped from 47.6% in the previous poll. At the same time, 42.9% of respondents perceived political dynasties as normal, and 9.6% were not worried. Concerns about political dynasties seemed to have waned within a few weeks. Ganjar and Prabowo’s supporter bases dominate among respondents who perceive political dynasties as normal or not worried about it. This is especially true for Prabowo-Gibran’s supporters. In contrast, Anies’ supporter base is dominated by respondents concerned about political dynasties.
CONCLUSION
Prabowo’s electoral strategy from the beginning has mainly rested on getting Jokowi’s full endorsement. This climaxed in his decision to choose Gibran as running mate. This strategy has lots of upside from an electoral standpoint as Jokowi’s approval is still very high, hovering around 75% in various polls and at one point even reaching 82%.[9] But this strategy also has its downside since Prabowo’s 2019 voter base is prone to switch to Anies’ camp over his decision to choose Gibran. This is important to note because the increase in Gerindra and Prabowo’s votes in the early October survey correlates with decreased votes for PDIP, Ganjar, and President Jokowi’s approval rating.[10] This may indicate that Prabowo inadvertently maintained his old electoral posture as a vessel for some anti-Jokowi votes. The latest Indikator poll has clearly shown the tendency in Prabowo’s traditional support base to shift towards Anies’ camp. At the same time, Gibran holds positive potential since non-PDI-P Jokowi supporters are likely to switch their votes to Prabowo-Gibran pair due to the growing rift between Jokowi and PDIP.
Based on our latest poll, Gibran has been an electoral asset for Prabowo. Gibran’s decision to run with Prabowo has weakened Ganjar’s support base across different segments of voters, especially among young voters and Jokowi’s non-PDIP 2019 voters. The benefits for Prabowo in picking Gibran to attract Jokowi’s supporters has been substantive so far. This presents a challenge for Ganjar to reverse the decline in support that he enjoys, and made evident in the latest poll; this drop was due to the exodus of Jokowi’s non-PDIP supporters. Ganjar, along with PDIP and its political patron Megawati, have triggered a democratic movement similar to the Reformasi movement of 1998 to challenge the MK’s decision. The goal is to question Gibran’s nomination process as well as the lack of neutrality among state actors, including President Jokowi, in the next election.
Perhaps it is too early to conclude that Gibran is an electoral asset. Central Java and East Java will be the testing ground. So far, according to the latest poll, Prabowo is still trailing far behind Ganjar in Central Java; he has however overtaken Ganjar in East Java. In Central Java, the PDIP is still dominant, despite fierce contestation between the party and Jokowi’s supporters. In East Java, Jokowi’s own popularity and his closeness to NU elites will give Prabowo a boost in this second most populated province after West Java. Even if Gibran succeeds in eroding Ganjar’s support base in these two provinces, Prabowo is still not guaranteed to win the presidential election in the first round. A run-off scenario is more likely to transpire, judging from the current poll. This is because the influx of new supporters from Jokowi’s base has been counteracted by the departure of Prabowo’s traditional support bases in West Java, Banten and Sumatra; Gibran is disliked as vice presidential candidate in these places.
Anies seems to be the beneficiary of the recent announcement of Gibran as Prabowo’s running mate. Some of Prabowo’s supports who disapprove of a Jokowi dynasty tend to shift to Anies’ camp. If this pattern continues, Anies and Prabowo could advance to the second round of the presidential election, after defeating Ganjar. Should PDIP then blame Jokowi and Gibran for their failure, that will open up the opportunity for groups opposing Jokowi-Prabowo to unite in the second round (involving embittered PDIP supporters and elites and the rank and file of coalition groups supporting Anies).
Ultimately, the decision to choose Gibran as running mate remains debatable. Ganjar might be the candidate who will suffer the most setbacks due to the growing rivalry between his PDIP party and Jokowi. It may mean that non-PDIP diehard supporters of Jokowi will flock to the Prabowo-Gibran pair. Anies, meanwhile, will benefit if Prabowo fails to stop his old support based, which tends to be anti-Jokowi, from switching to the opposing camp.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2023/94 “UMNO’s Prospects: Oblivion, Survival or Recovery” by Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) was founded to be the protector of Malay rights and interests. The party carried that mantle for many decades, but its decline over the past two decades reached new lows in its recent losses to the opposition Perikatan Nasional (PN).
- UMNO failed to rally its members and supporters to vote for candidates from Pakatan Harapan (PH) and Barisan Nasional (BN), the core Peninsula-based coalitions of the Unity Government. Many factors accounted for PN’s gains at UMNO’s expense, but one of the main contributors was the heightening of 3R (Race, Religion and Royalty) issues and the “Malays being under threat” propaganda.
- The party presently realises that it must utilise its opportunities in the Unity Government to win back Malay voters. Its future can follow three main scenarios: i) UMNO fades into oblivion as internal infighting continues. Its partnership with PH particularly the Democratic Action Party (DAP) is rejected, and party president Ahmad Zahid Hamidi continues to fail in gaining trust and support from UMNO members and from Malays in general. ii) UMNO enters into survival mode by reviving the “Muafakat Nasional” (National Consensus) and collaborating with PN. UMNO is then no longer dominant and is geographically confined to the south of the Peninsula, conceding the Peninsular northwest, northeast, and centre to PAS and to the Malaysian United Indigenous Party (BERSATU). iii) UMNO recovers by staying with the Unity Government, and with Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim giving full backing for UMNO to regain Malay support through allocating it Malay-majority seats. UMNO members and supporters may be persuaded to support the PH-BN partnership if they believe in the Unity government and its Madani agenda.
- UMNO-BN in the Unity Government will boost Malaysia’s political stability, economic prosperity, and integration, while also moderating polarisation. In order to remain relevant, UMNO will need to appeal to progressive and moderate Malays.
* Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani is Professor of Politics and International Relations from School of International Studies, Universiti Utara Malaysia. He is also Visiting Adjunct Professor at the School of Liberal Arts and Sciences, Taylor’s University Malaysia.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/94, 4 December 2023
INTRODUCTION
The United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) retained the Pahang state assembly state seat of Pelangai in a by-election on 7 October 2023.[1] The Menteri Besar of Pahang, Wan Rosdy Wan Ismail argued that Pahang BN would stop the “Green Wave” of Perikatan Nasional (PN) — which started during the November 2022 general election and continued through the six state government elections in August 2023. In the August elections, UMNO won a woeful 19 out of 108 seats contested.[2]
Pelangai has been a stronghold for UMNO-BN, and while UMNO did win the seat, the result holds broader implications for the party’s future. UMNO’s candidate Amizar Abu Adam secured 7,324 votes to beat his Perikatan Nasional (PN) opponent Kasim Samat, who received 4,375 votes. The 2,949 majority, however, was smaller than the 4,048-vote difference UMNO secured in the November 2022 general election, when Johari Harun won 7,308 votes while Kasim, then also PN’s candidate, garnered only 3,260.[3]
Non-Malay voters, comprising a sizeable 28 per cent of Pelangai’s registered voters who overwhelmingly favoured Pakatan Harapan (PH) in recent elections, apparently transferred their support to BN – given that BN won in ethnically-mixed voting districts.[4] However, the Malays remain divided, with lower support for UMNO in August 2023 as compared to November 2022. UMNO must continue doing some soul-searching if it hopes to regain its standing as protector of the Malays.
There are two big questions to be answered here. First, what happened to UMNO during the August 2023 state government elections which led to its poor performance and significant loss of Malay support, which continued through to Pelangai? Second, can UMNO still be considered as the protector of Malays, a status that they claim?
This Perspective analyses the performance of UMNO in the August 2023 state elections and the Pelangai by-election, and assesses the drivers that will determine whether UMNO continues to fade, remains a reduced regional party, or recaptures its past glory as the protector of the Malays. The party’s strategic decisions, leadership, and participation in the Unity Government will determine which of these three scenarios transpires.
UMNO AS PROTECTOR OF THE MALAYS
Since its foundation in 1946, UMNO has presented itself as the protector of Malay interests. For decades, the community remained loyal to the party on these grounds. Syed Hussein Alatas, the eminent professor of Malay Studies, once observed that although the institutional and judicial system of feudalism gradually disappeared in the peninsular Malay states during the latter part of the 19th century, the psychological traits of feudalism have remained, particularly in UMNO. He calls this ‘psychological feudalism’, meaning an attitude or relationship characterised by personal attachment to the leader, in which the subordinate is expected to be loyal under all circumstances.[5]
Fellow social scientist Chandra Muzaffar supports Alatas’ view. In his noted book Protector?, Muzaffar explores the ‘Malay protector-protected relationship’,[6] whose origins he traces to the Melaka Sultanate, and as something practised by the party, UMNO.
This relationship between the ruler and the ruled, which has been particularly strong within the Malay community, has been reinforced by a deep psychological need for a ‘protector’ to look after the community’s interests in the face of competition from the economically better-off Chinese minority. Invariably, it was the UMNO President and Prime Minister who donned the mantle of ‘protector’. Loyalty to the protector was, however, not just a product of feudal psychology. As in other political systems, what assured the protector of the loyalty of his followers were the perks and positions he could provide.
UMNO’s latest electoral defeat must be placed in the context of a longer trend of declining Malay support. A majority of Malays did not vote for UMNO in the 1999, 2008, 2013 and 2018 general elections. The 2004 elections, when UMNO secured its biggest win in history, was an exception. For 25 years since the reformasi movement began in 1999, the Malay vote has tended to be split between UMNO and PAS and, in recent years, PH-member parties. What made 2022 exceptional was not only the extent of UMNO’s loss of Malay confidence, but the arrival of new and dominant Malay parties, notably the PN alliance of the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) and the Malaysian United Indigenous Party (BERSATU).
The results of the November 2022 general election emphatically showed BN’s diminished status; the coalition only won 30 seats compared to 79 seats in GE14. In contrast, PN won 74 seats in GE15. Not only did PAS increase its number of seats from 18 in GE14 to 49 in GE15, the best performance ever, it has become the biggest winner of GE15, and is the dominant party in PN. Furthermore, PN captured Perlis, rolled over other Malay states such as Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu, and made further inroads into Selangor, Pahang, Perak, Melaka and Penang.
THE 2023 STATE ELECTIONS: A FURTHER STEP IN UMNO’S DECLINE
BN is no longer in the driver’s seat for forming a government. Instead, it is allied with PH in the Unity Government which includes a total of 19 parties. The new configuration saw PH and UMNO — with BN’s other ethnic parties dropping out — contending head-to-head against PN in the August 2023 elections.
UMNO recorded its worst performance, with an estimation that only 27 per cent of Malay voters supported the BN-PH coalition. PN, in federal opposition and now the incumbent state government in Kelantan, Kedah and Terengganu, made electoral gains from further increases in Malay support. The popular vote for PN reached 49.3 percent, almost on par with the Unity Government which won 49.5 percent. PN gained 146 out of 245 seats, especially in Malay-majority areas. Preliminary analyses indicated that the opposition coalition, with an estimate gain of 19 percentage points, won an overwhelming 73 percent of the Malay vote. Former Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob said that this result marked a stunning rejection of UMNO.[7] PN’s gains in the Malay vote are uneven across the different states, and were highest in Kedah and lowest in Negeri Sembilan.[8]
How has PN gained such a momentous surge in Malay support? The so-called “Green Wave” — for the colour of PAS’ banner and recognising that the party’s brand and machinery made the difference, particularly in Kedah and Penang — saw PN “absorbing” a majority of UMNO votes.[9]
The “Green Wave” that swept across the northern states and parts of Penang and Selangor had several drivers. First, UMNO was split ahead of the elections into two camps: one in favour of the party president, Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, who preferred to be part of the Unity Government; and the other siding with Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaacob who favoured working with PN. This was followed by the purging of leaders such as Khairy Jamaluddin, Annuar Musa and Shahidan Kasim by the party’s apex body, the Supreme Council. This took place prior to the party elections of March 2023 during which the top two posts, President and Deputy President, were not contested. Due to these controversial measures, UMNO lost more ground among the Malays.
BN retained only a slim majority of its voters, and failed to rally its base for the Unity coalition.
In a survey done by the Nusantara Academy for Strategic Research (NASR), only an estimated 55 percent of BN voters in the states governed by Pakatan Harapan namely Penang, Selangor, and Negeri Sembilan, who voted for the BN in November 2022 then also voted for the Unity Government in August 2023.[10] The much hoped-for massive transfer of UMNO votes to PH did not happen, leading to coalition partner parties, namely the People Justice Party (PKR) and National Trust Party (AMANAH), losing various seats to PN. In the case of Kedah, Kelantan, and Terengganu, most seats were lost due to UMNO supporters voting for PN candidates.
Second, the failure of PH and UMNO-BN to win Malay votes was partly due to the short timeframe between the November 2022 general election and August 2023 state elections. People had not yet felt the benefits of the Unity Government’s policy, and thus were unconvinced of their manifestos. At the same time, PN’s manifestos were uneven, with some, such as that for Selangor, presenting an array of promises while others did not make extensive commitments.[11] In general, while the economic factor cannot be ignored it should not be overstated. In addition, overly negative campaigning might have put off some voters, especially Malays seeking more security and positive messaging. As argued by the economist K. Kuperan Viswanathan: “PN is wrong in saying the economy is in bad shape. However, getting the support of the Malays will require more time as the Malays are only now getting used to a political scenario without a dominant Malay party to lead the nation”.[12]
Third, the support for PN was influenced by the rhetoric of “Malays under threat from the non-Malays”, particularly the Democratic Action Party (DAP).[13] Leading the charge was PAS President Abdul Hadi Awang who blamed non-Muslims for corruption in Malaysia and expressed sympathy for the Taliban in Afghanistan.[14] PN was using polarisation of Malaysian society for the purpose of gaining Malay votes.
PAS managed to attract Malay votes across the spectrum, from the more overtly nationalist and Islamist to the less ideological Malay who perceive UMNO as corrupt. PAS was able to tap into this anger by referring to the 1MDB case and the corruption charges then facing Zahid and UMNO leaders, and portraying PH as “DAP-led”. UMNO failed to counter the narratives coming from those perceptions especially when disseminated through social media platforms like TikTok. Through substantial spending on political advertisements especially on race and religiously sensitive narratives, PN managed to dominate social media in the run-up to the August election. This success reflects how PAS and other right-wing groups have successfully propagated the sentiments of “Malay-Muslim insecurity.”[15]
The results of the August 2023 elections show a significant polarisation between ethnic groups, with the majority of non-Malays supporting PH-BN and the majority of Malays voting for PN.[16] For UMNO, this threatens its role as the Malay protector. UMNO needs to respond quickly to regain its position before it loses out to PN or PAS.
FUTURE SCENARIOS FOR UMNO
As a party protecting the interests of the Malays, the August 2023 results were a blow for UMNO. UMNO must now strategise quickly to regain ground. Much uncertainty remains, and the party’s future lies in the hands of its leaders, members, and vote base, and their respective strategies and responses. One of three scenarios now await the once powerful party.
Scenario 1: Oblivion
In this worst-case scenario, UMNO continues losing support and descends into further internal crisis. Internal conflicts have caused UMNO to lose all seats in Northern (Perlis and Kedah) and East Coast states (Kelantan and Terengganu), with one exception in Kelantan. While UMNO has historically been weak in Selangor and Penang, the party is relatively strong in Melaka, Johor, and Negri Sembilan. Although the states were taken by PH in 2018, BN has subsequently managed to wrest back control of the first two states, and is in a coalition arrangement in Negri Sembilan. Following this, UMNO managed to form governments in Perak and Pahang together with PH. But, UMNO realises that if it loses more support, PN could well also capture these states in future.
To avoid further decline, UMNO must address the reasons it has been rejected: its collaboration with DAP; and members’ disappointment with Zahid’s presidency. So far, Malay voters are clearly not convinced of UMNO’s decision to work with DAP, which is viewed as undermining Zahid’s ability to fight for Malay interests. UMNO has still not had programmes or activities to allay anxieties surrounding DAP and to convince supporters particularly at the grassroots level about the benefit of collaborating with PH. If UMNO remains divided and fails to convince Malay voters about DAP, and if PN, particularly PAS, still utilises the 3Rs as campaign material, it is very difficult to foresee UMNO regaining Malay support.
Zahid Hamidi, who is highly unpopular but powerfully entrenched as party president, is a specific concern and a potential pivot. Zahid, who is also Deputy Prime Minister I, became the target of criticisms after he was released on 4 September 2023 from 47 charges, including criminal breach of trust, corruption, and money laundering, in the Yayasan Akalbudi trial.[17] The release can give UMNO room to focus on strengthening itself rather than having their leaders continuously dealing with court charges. However, if the public is still not convinced about the DNAA and Zahid’s ability to lead UMNO, then the party could face further leadership tussles which would split the party. However, with no mass migration of UMNO members to BERSATU or PAS, and no looming party elections, Zahid still has a chance of regaining the Malays’ confidence, and of convincing them that working with PH, including DAP, will make UMNO strong, stable and dominant again.[18]
Scenario 2: Survival
UMNO may survive, without necessarily thriving again, if it ventures to regain Malay support by playing along with the “Malays under threat” narrative and reviving the “Muafakat Nasional” (National Consensus]) (MN).[19] However, its MN partners will not just be PAS, as before, but PN which includes BERSATU. Former Prime Minister Ismail Sabri’s assessment of the August 2023 results is that this setback served as a poignant illustration of Malay voters’ disillusionment, and highlighted the departure of UMNO from the founding ideals that once galvanised its supporters. Ismail said that “Even worse, the UMNO leadership destroyed the MN, which was the hope of the Malays for the unification of the Ummah (all Muslims). It is worse when the top leadership drags UMNO to join DAP and even urges the machinery to work and vote for that party”.[20] Ismail believes that UMNO has a good chance to win if it collaborates with PN to face PH rather than be part of the Unity Government. This option would mean UMNO accepting to become minor partner in PN, and also jointly sharing the Malay-protector mantle with BERSATU and PAS.
This mode of survival, if executed between general elections, may come at the expense of the government and even the country. BN’s withdrawal from the Unity Government would trigger another political crisis. This will also lead to further political polarisation in Malaysia’s multiracial society. Breaking from the Unity government also hinges on UMNO’s leadership, specifically the removal of Zahid who has been instrumental in getting UMNO to join PH in government.
PN believes that if Zahid is no longer the president of UMNO, it can be persuaded to revive MN. That is why PAS President Abdul Hadi Awang proposed negotiation with UMNO without Zahid in order to revive the pact.[21] If UMNO-BN revives MN and later joins PN, the best UMNO-BN can hope for is a regional deal with PAS and BERSATU, in which UMNO retains its control in Southern Peninsular states such as Johor, Melaka and Negeri Sembilan, and perhaps Pahang. UMNO-BN would in turn surrender Perak because PAS has the highest number of seats there among the three Malay-based parties. PAS would want to hold all four states that it now controls, namely Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah and Perlis, plus Perak. BERSATU would probably want Selangor to be under its control. If this were the scenario, UMNO would be known as just a Southern party plus Pahang and potentially irreversibly lose its stature among Malays. UMNO would survive by accepting PAS or PN replacing it as the Malay protector.
Scenario 3: Recovery
The best hope for UMNO-BN’s recovery, having suffered huge losses when going it alone in GE15, is to stay with the Unity Government. This is the best option if UMNO does not want to become a minor partner by joining PN and wishes to avoid collaborating with BERSATU. UMNO also wants to continue championing Malay interests, and is fully cognisant that PAS wants to be the more dominant party for Malay-Muslims.[22] In fact, UMNO was clearly unhappy with PAS’ alliance with BERSATU under the PN umbrella, rather than with UMNO under MN.[23] This was the reason for UMNO abandoning and dissolving MN.[xxiii] It is quite clear that UMNO will not collaborate with PN — at least until the next general election.
Unlike the opposition PN, UMNO is in the federal government and has the advantage in terms of policymaking and power – if given a full term until 2027 – to strengthen itself.[24] It has ample time to persuade supporters to accept PH, especially DAP, a former opponent which is now more embracing of UMNO. Ahmad Zahid Hamidi attended the 2023 DAP Congress on 10 September 2023, becoming the first serving UMNO President to do so after decades of rivalry.[25] Earlier, on 10 June 2023, DAP Secretary General Anthony Loke had attended UMNO’s General Assembly. Loke explained that the political conflict between UMNO and DAP ended when they came together to form the Unity Government.[26] PH supporting UMNO in the Unity Government gives UMNO space to win the hearts and minds of as many Malays as possible.[27] Should UMNO visibly champion Malay causes within that context, its esteem as the Malay protector might yet be revived.
Ultimately, UMNO will need to win parliamentary and state assembly seats. By collaborating with PH in the Peninsula, UMNO could continue to be allocated more Malay-dominant seats to contest than would be the case if it were part of PN; in the latter case, UMNO would need to share seats with PAS and BERSATU. The realpolitik calculations should incline UMNO to stay with the Unity Government in order to remain relevant and to enjoy a better deal within its coalition. If Malaysia’s economy improves and the Unity Government remains stable and performs to the liking of the people, there is a distinct prospect that PH-BN can continue to form the nucleus of government for another term.
This is subject to BN’s willingness to continue working with PH in the next general election.[28] Now, the Malays still distrust the Unity Government’s ability to serve their interests. That is why UMNO’s role is essential to lead an effort to regain Malay trust in itself and the Unity Government. UMNO Deputy President Mohamad Hasan has argued that UMNO must rebrand and position itself as a party that is more progressive in championing the rights of the Malays; it would appear that the party needs to formulate a new Malay-agenda blueprint that is relevant to the country’s development.[29] If it manages that, then UMNO can tap into its storied history and legacy to persuade the Malays to trust it again, and to trust the Madani Government.
CONCLUSION
Between the worst case of UMNO’s descent to oblivion, its survival in a reduced form, and the possibility of recovery by building on its partnership in the Unity Government, the third scenario seems the most practical and likely. UMNO will have to work hard nevertheless to win back Malay voters; being in the federal government affords them the opportunity. Should PN fail to provide alternative policies, the Unity Government’s relevance may be enhanced in its contention against the narrow narratives of race and religion that PN will likely maintain.
UMNO’s prospects are foreseeably tied to the success of the Unity Government in maintaining a solid coalition and bringing economic opportunity and prosperity. In order to triumph in the next general election, political parties must also be able to win the perception contest, especially on social media. Malaysia’s politically dynamic state demands continual engagement with the people, and the maintenance of narratives and incentives to support incumbents. It is difficult now to predict the perception of people and political dynamics in two or three years’ time. UMNO now with the Unity Government appears committed to performing well and to cultivating a favourable public perception. There is no easy way to win elections, but for a start, the one-year-old Unity Government must perform well—and capture the public imagination.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
“The Evolution of Madani: How Is 2.0 Different from 1.0?” by Mohd Faizal Musa
“Post-Islamism Battles Political Islam in Malaysia” by Mohd Faizal Musa
2023/93 “The August Poll in Penang: A Perspective on Pakatan, its Partners and its Prospects” by Francis E. Hutchinson
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- In the August 2023 state election in Penang, Pakatan Harapan (PH) and its former foe Barisan Nasional (BN), secured a much-needed win for the Unity Government (UG).
- The UG won 29 of the state’s 40 seats, which was slightly below its target of 30-32, but enough to secure the psychologically-important two-thirds majority in the assembly.
- While the UG retained Penang, its victory was partial. The results show that the UG’s hold on Malay-majority seats was significantly eroded, leaving it almost exclusively dependent on non-Malay voters for support.
- PH’s campaign also exposed internal fissures and questionable candidate choices within its component parties – notably the Democratic Action Party (DAP).
- PH’s former foe and current campaign companion, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), also underperformed. The UG’s new-found cooperation did not bear fruit, with UMNO winning a mere two seats – one by a whisker.
- Despite internal fissures, the opposition coalition Perikatan Nasional (PN) performed well, securing an unprecedented 11 seats. These were mostly in the northern and rural Malay-majority part of the mainland, but also included a vital foothold on the island.
- The pattern in Penang shows that, as with the country at large, the Unity Government has a good grip on the tiller, but the vessel is listing to one side. Unless concerted action is invested to right the ship, keeping a straight course will be challenging.
* Francis E. Hutchinson is Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Malaysia Studies Programme at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. The author would like to thank Rebecca Neo for drafting the maps used in this Perspective, as well as Xinying Chan, James Chai, and Lee Hwok Aun for their comments.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/93, 23 November 2023
INTRODUCTION
Penang, like five other states in Malaysia, headed to the polls on August 12. Rather than holding their elections in November 2022 in tandem with parliamentary polls, three states helmed by Pakatan Harapan (PH) and three led by Perikatan Nasional (PN) decided to go to their full terms. This cluster of elections was billed as a crucial barometer for the Anwar Ibrahim administration.
The state is one of PH’s electoral heartlands, which the coalition has held since 2008. As with Selangor, Penang has been vital for PH, serving as a showcase for policy initiatives as well as a platform to prepare aspiring party members for national office.
With a population of 1.8 million, Penang is one of Malaysia’s smaller states. It is highly urbanized and wealthy, with a per capita income 25 per cent above the national average. Penang is diverse, with large Bumiputera (45.2 per cent), Chinese (44.5 per cent), and Indian (9.7 per cent) communities.[1]
Of PH’s component parties, the Democratic Action Party (DAP) has the strongest connection with Penang. National leaders such as Lim Guan Eng (Bagan) and Steven Sim (Bukit Mertajam) have parliamentary constituencies in the state, and Lim Kit Siang (Tanjong) and the late Karpal Singh (Jelutong and Bukit Gelugor) served as MPs for Penang in the past. The state is also important for Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) – particularly Anwar Ibrahim who has a four-decade association with the Permatang Pauh parliamentary seat.
Despite PH’s incumbency in the state and its dominant performance in the 2013 and 2018 elections, results from the 2022 parliamentary election showed that the coalition was vulnerable in Malay-majority seats, particularly in the northern part of the mainland. BN and its lead party, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), were in an even more precarious position with scant prospects of winning more than one or two seats.
Given the short interval between the 2022 parliamentary and 2023 state polls, observers expected a broadly similar performance on August 12. While the UG was expected to retain Penang, what was in question was the size of its majority in the state assembly. Party leaders also looked for indications that PH’s partnership with UMNO translated into increased Malay support. And observers sought to establish whether PN’s momentum from November 2022 would allow it to make inroads in the state.
Drawing on trends in voting behaviour as well as fieldwork during the campaign period, this Perspective will examine the results of the August 2023 elections in Penang.[2] After this introduction, the second part will set out key aspects of the state’s political context. The third will look at the campaigns and electoral strategies employed by the UG and PN. The fourth will analyse the results, and the final section will look at the implications.
BACKGROUND
Over the past decades, Penang’s urbanized and diverse population has been open to political competition. Indeed, Penang fell to an opposition party, Gerakan in the 1969 election. However, the party subsequently joined BN in 1972 in the wake of the 1969 racial riots.[3] This alliance enabled BN to recapture the state and retain control until 2008. Despite its hold on power, BN usually tracked about 10 percentage points lower in Penang than the national average during this period (Figure One).
Figure One
In 2008, the swing away from BN in urban and ethnically-mixed seats saw PH’s precursor Pakatan Rakyat securing 29 out of 40 seats in the state assembly.[4] Following that, Pakatan Rakyat and then PH went from strength to strength, securing 30 seats in 2013 and 37 in 2018.[5]
However, the coalition’s 2018 results turned out to be its electoral pinnacle as, following the Sheraton Move, it lost four seats.[6]
Six parliamentary and 19 state seats are on the island, while seven parliamentary and 21 state seats are on the mainland (Figure Two). With one exception, every parliamentary constituency contains three state seats.[7] Reflecting Penang’s ethnic diversity, there are 25 non-Malay majority state seats, of which 15 are in the northeastern aspect of the island in and around the capital George Town. The other ten seats are on the mainland in the larger urban centres of Perai and Bukit Mertajam, and then in a strip southwards along the coast.
There are five Malay-majority and ten Malay super-majority seats. The Malay-majority seats are in three locations. Two seats, Batu Maung and Bayan Lepas are on the more rural southern coast of the island. The other three are on the mainland, with two (Sungai Bakap and Sungai Acheh) on the border with Perak in the south, and another, Teluk Ayar Tawar, in the north. The remaining ten Malay super-majority seats are grouped in two locations. Eight are clustered in the northern aspect of the mainland, and two are on the westernmost aspect of the island.
Figure Two. State Seats by Ethnicity (2023)
The DAP has performed strongly in Penang, running in and continuously securing strong majorities in the same 19 seats since 2008. These include seats in and around George Town, as well as on the mainland in urban centres such as Bagan and Bukit Mertajam.
PKR has also had a consistent presence in the state. First securing nine seats in 2008, the party then won 10 seats in 2013 and 14 in 2018. PKR is present in a more diverse range of constituencies than DAP, with some ethnically-mixed seats in urban areas as well as Malay-majority seats on the mainland and the island.
The third PH component party, Amanah, made its debut in Penang in 2018, securing two rural, Malay-majority seats.
UMNO has had a consistent presence in Penang – usually securing 10 to 12 seats in each election. These include the state seats within the Kepala Batas parliamentary seat, associated with Abdullah Badawi, Malaysia’s fifth prime minister. UMNO has also performed well in the state seats within Tasek Gelugor parliamentary constituency, as well as on the western aspect of the island. However, following its electoral drubbing in 2018, UMNO was left with only two state seats in Tasek Gelugor (Sungai Dua and Permatang Berangan).
Conversely, PAS has traditionally had little electoral traction in the state. It won one seat in each election from 1999 to 2018, usually in the central (Permatang Pasir) and northern part (Penaga) of the mainland. Bersatu won its first two seats, Bertam and Telok Bahang, in 2018. These seats are also Malay-majority and more rural in character.
In the November 2022 parliamentary election, PH did well, retaining 10 out of its 11 parliamentary seats. PN secured three parliamentary seats, all in the northern part of the mainland, including UMNO’s Kepala Batas and Tasek Gelugor, as well as Permatang Pauh, that had been held by Anwar Ibrahim’s daughter, Nurul Izzah.
Looking at voting patterns at the state seat level, PH prevailed in 29 seats – of which 26 were by more than a 5,000-vote majority. Assuming similar voting patterns in the August 2023 polls, PH was comfortably on course to retain power. However, the coalition looked vulnerable in Malay-majority seats such as Seberang Jaya, Bayan Lepas, and Pulau Betong. The results also indicated that UMNO was in dire straits, with this once-dominant party only securing a majority of votes in one seat – Bertam.
Figure Three
Conversely, these results indicated that PN would have won 10 state seats, largely at the expense of UMNO and PKR.[8] However, not all wins were convincing, and PN prevailed in four seats by margins of less than 1,000 votes.
THE COALITIONS AND THEIR CAMPAIGNS
PH leaders dissolved the Penang state assembly on June 28. The Election Commission then set July 29 as nomination day, with the election scheduled for August 12.
Despite being a state government election, its framing as part of a referendum on the Anwar Ibrahim administration meant that the campaigns in Penang blended local and national issues, with senior political figures from both coalitions heavily involved in events.
The Unity Government
The UG’s manifesto and candidate line-up were announced on August 1 in Butterworth on the mainland. High-profile PH leaders attended campaign events in the state, not least Anwar Ibrahim and Nurul Izzah from PKR, Mujahid Yusof Rawa from Amanah, and Anthony Loke from DAP.[9]
Several key themes permeated UG ceramahs and campaign events, including:
- The PH government’s track record of economic management of the state, notably attracting an estimated RM 200 billion in approved manufacturing investment since 2008.[10]
- The desirability of continued political stability in the state and country, which would enable continued foreign investment – with recent investments by Tesla and Infineon cited as examples.[11]
- The importance of having the same coalition in power at the federal and state levels, which would facilitate the funding of key projects, such as Penang’s Light Rail Transport.[12]
The Unity Government’s manifesto focussed on the state’s economic competitiveness, as well as large-ticket infrastructure projects in the pipeline such as the LRT, high interchanges, and a cable car (Table One). The Manifesto also stressed livelihoods, cost-of-living issues, housing, and allocations for both Muslim and non-Muslim communities.
Given its incumbency, but cognizant of PN’s momentum, PH’s target was 30-32 seats in the assembly.[13] The apportionment of seats between PH component parties was straightforward. Both the DAP and Amanah retained the same 19 and 2 seats, respectively, and PKR kept 13 out of its 14 seats.
However, discussions between PH and BN prior to the campaign were fraught. Given PH’s haul of 37 seats in 2018, there were few seats to cede to BN. UMNO’s original intention was to secure seats for itself first, before discussing possibilities for its BN partners, MCA and MIC. UMNO initially sought ten seats for itself but PH offered four.[14] The end result was that UMNO would be allocated six seats, and MCA and MIC declared that they would not contest the elections.[15]
The seats that UMNO was allocated included its two, plus the three seats that PAS and Bersatu won in 2018. In addition, PKR ceded Sungai Acheh, which it won in 2018 but subsequently lost following the Sheraton Move. UMNO also wanted one state seat within the Permatang Pauh parliamentary seat, arguing that its membership base in the area would be an asset for campaigns in all three state seats.[16] However, this request was not granted. Despite the intense negotiations, there appeared to be little overt dissatisfaction on either side after this, with joint walkabouts and grassroots meetings beginning in June.[17]
Surprisingly, the Penang state election raised a considerable degree of tension within the DAP, belying its reputation as a disciplined party.[18] There were rumours whether the incumbent Chief Minister Chow Kon Yeow would seek a second term or if his predecessor, Lim Guan Eng, would seek to return. The second possibility was precluded by a 2018 amendment to the state constitution that barred any assemblyperson from seeking a third term as CM.[19] Consequently, the focus shifted to whether Lim would seek to topple Chow or stack the incoming state cabinet with his supporters. Chow’s confirmation as the CM candidate came rather late – only in mid-July after the state assembly had been dissolved.[20]
This tension affected the candidate selection process. The DAP fielded eight new candidates in its line-up. Five of those dropped were members of the previous state cabinet, and included three veteran assemblypersons, notably: P Ramasamy (Deputy Chief Minister); Chong Eng (Social Development and non-Islamic Religious Affairs); and Phee Boon Poh (Welfare and Environment).[21]
The official argument was that the party was seeking to field younger candidates.[22] However, two of the state cabinet members that were dropped, Yeoh Soon Hin (Tourism and Creative Economy) and Soon Lip Chee (Youth and Sports) were relatively young. Furthermore, a one-term state assembly person, Satees Muniandy (Bagan Dalam) was also dropped, and a local councillor tipped to replace Ramasamy in Perai was bypassed.[23] Eyebrows were also raised by Lim’s decision to retain his Air Putih state seat, despite his previous three terms as an assemblyman and his concurrent status as MP for Bagan.[24]
Perikatan Nasional
Cognizant of the state’s ethnic diversity as well as Gerakan’s long tenure in Penang, PN approached the election somewhat differently. There was less airtime given to national-level figures such as PAS President Hadi Awang and Bersatu Chairman Muhyiddin Yassin, or direct comparisons to the states under PN.[25] Much of the messaging was by Gerakan party president, Dominic Lau, and kept a clear focus on economic issues as opposed to religious and cultural ones.
Key themes included the following:
- PH’s administration of the state, notably the degree to which economic policy benefited investors and foreign workers at the expense of locals, as well as the disparity in development between the island and the mainland.[26]
- Governance issues, with PH’s commitment to anti-corruption being questioned, given its alliance with UMNO, as well as the degree to which Malays had positions of responsibility in the state cabinet.[27]
- The PN manifesto for Penang had 33 pledges across eight areas, but was noticeably silent on religious issues, instead devoting considerable attention to livelihood and environmental issues (Table One).
Given PH’s long hold on the state, expectations of PN’s performance were modest. PN Chairman Muhyiddin Yassin targeted some 20 seats, but other estimates were more circumspect, normally around 10-12 seats.[28]
Inter-party negotiations were complex. Gerakan was allocated 19 seats for its candidates. While this was the most among PN member parties, they were almost all in very hostile terrain, namely non-Malay majority seats. Questions were raised by Bersatu and PAS about Gerakan’s capacity to manage the campaign and field sufficient candidates of electable quality – with party president Dominic Lau being a notable exception.[29] Bersatu ran in 11 seats, of which three were contested by representatives from their non-Malay supporter’s wing. PAS contested in 10 seats, and also fielded 3 non-Muslim candidates. Relative to Gerakan, the other two parties were on much more favourable terrain, running in Malay-majority seats.
Conscious of Gerakan’s limited electoral viability and reluctant to name a Bersatu or PAS member who could potentially alienate voters, PN did not name a candidate for Chief Minister. This allowed PH and UMNO to attack PN for its ambiguity and also ask if Gerakan was really the lead party in the coalition and if it would be able to control PAS.[30]
The pertinence of these questions was raised by tensions between PAS and Gerakan. Dominic Lau requested Bayan Lepas, a Malay-majority seat on the island, whose demographic composition made it more electorally viable. However, grassroots PAS leaders in the area strenuously objected, arguing that their party should have the seat.
Gerakan ultimately prevailed, but subsequently spilled out. Lau attended a PN campaign event to pay his respects to PAS president Hadi Awang, but was turned away.[31] PAS leaders ultimately apologized,[32] but still did not commit to helping Lau campaign in his seat.[33] PH leaders argued that PN’s commitment to multiculturalism was not genuine and Gerakan was not a fully-fledged member of the coalition.[34]
RESULTS
Despite fears that the turnout would be low, an estimated 72.7 per cent of eligible voters went to the polls in Penang. PH secured 27 seats and UMNO, 2. While slightly below the pre-election target, this was still above a two-thirds majority in the assembly.
Of the PH parties, the DAP did the best, retaining all of its 19 seats. Most of these larger urban seats were retained with majorities above 7,000, and three (Payu Terubong, Batu Lancang, and Sungai Puyu) won by some 20,000 votes or more. With this, the party cemented its stronghold on the state’s urban and mixed seats.
PKR did not fare so well, losing 6 out of its 13 seats. As with DAP, it did very well in ethnically-mixed seats such as Machang Bubuk, Batu Uban, and Bukit Tambun, which it secured with majorities above 15,000. However, it fared markedly less well in Malay-majority seats such as Pinang Tunggal, as well as its two seats within Permatang Pauh (Seberang Jaya and Penanti), where it was swept from power. Amanah also had a middling performance, retaining only one of its seats (Bayan Lepas) against Gerakan and losing the other (Permatang Pasir) to PAS.[35]
For UMNO, the polls were borderline disastrous. The party won just two seats, Bertam and Sungai Acheh – the second by a mere 124 votes. UMNO’s hold on its northern redoubt was hollowed out, and its performance in Bertam was arguably due to Reezal Merican’s stature as a former cabinet member and extensive personal networks in the seat. The other high-profile candidate, Sheik Hussein Mydin, was beaten in Sungai Dua by the PAS Penang leader, Fauzi Yusoff by more than 5,500 votes.
Given its low base, PN’s performance was strong, with the coalition netting 11 seats. PAS and Bersatu accounted for seven and four seats respectively, with Gerakan losing all its contests. Most of PN’s seats are located in the mainland’s north in the parliamentary seats of Kepala Batas, Tasek Gelugor, and Permatang Pauh. However, in contrast to the voting patterns seen in November 2022, PN secured two seats on the island (Pulau Betong and Telok Bahang), indicating a more pervasive presence of PAS’s grassroots network in that area than previously thought.[36]
There was very little traction for third-party candidates, with none registering more than 1,000-1,500 votes and having little to no influence on the outcome.
Figure Four. Penang State Election – Seats by Winning party
THE OUTLOOK
Although it witnessed an important decrease in the size of its majorities in the respective assemblies, PH ultimately retained control of its three states in the August 2022 election. Coupled with the UG’s sizeable majority in parliament, it is likely that the Anwar Ibrahim administration will last a full term.
In Penang, a refreshed state cabinet has been sworn in, including two new Deputy Chief Ministers, Mohamad Abdul Hamid (PKR), and Jagdeep Singh Deo (DAP).[37] UMNO was brought into the cabinet through offering one of its assemblymen, Rashidi Zinol, the trade, entrepreneurial, and rural development portfolio.
That said, there are several lingering issues facing the re-elected state administration.
First, the doubts pertaining to Chow Kon Yeow’s hold on the Chief Minister’s position kindled by the campaign have persisted. Despite PH’s victory, rumours about Chow being replaced by the party leadership have continued, sapping his political capital.[38]
Moreover, the fallout for the DAP from the candidate selection process has rumbled on. Three of the dropped candidates came out publicly to criticize the internal workings of the party, particularly the centralisation of power. The former DCM, P. Ramasamy, has since quit the DAP and taken up quite a critical stance vis-à-vis the party as well as PH’s commitment to reform.[39] His departure was followed by other DAP members, some of whom have questioned the degree to which the needs and concerns of Indian voters are adequately dealt with.[40] Over the long-term, this could provide ammunition for opposition-led campaigns vis-a-vis Indian voters.
More widely, the UG is vulnerable to charges that it is not sufficiently representative. Of its 29 seats, 25 are non-Malay majority. PKR and Amanah secured but one Malay-majority seat each, namely Batu Maung and Bayan Lepas. UMNO has also not been able to significantly bolster the UG’s stable of seats. Conversely, the UG’s hold on the state is underpinned by PN’s non- performance in non-Malay majority seats – of which all remain with PH.
More widely, PH’s strategic compact with BN is a mixed bag. Beyond the scant electoral terrain and the nominal boost to representativity afforded by the alliance, the association with UMNO left PH vulnerable regarding issues pertaining to corruption and good governance.
While the UG’s hold over Penang, Selangor, and Negri Sembilan looks secure for now, the Anwar Ibrahim administration’s honeymoon is now over, and the Prime Minister and his coalition remain vulnerable regarding issues as they pertain to Malay voters. He will need to invest political capital decisively in the months ahead.
APPENDIX
Table One. Highlights of the UG and PN Manifestos
| Unity Government | Perikatan Nasional | |
| Welfare and Socio-Economic Wellbeing | Social Development Fund for needy groups financed by a levy on medical tourism | RM60 million in payments for vulnerable groups |
| Public Transport | Light Rail Transit (LRT) Newly-launched ferry service Highway interchanges Cable car system in Bukit Bendera. | Against the LRT, proposing an Autonomous Rail Transit |
| Economic Development | Scaled-down Penang South Island to house high value-added industries High Tech Park in Bertam Medi-tech Centre in Batu Kawan Global Business Services Centre | Against Penang South Island due to its potential impact on livelihoods RM3.5 million to promote tourism Develop a Penang Medical City Promote traditional and alternative medicine |
| Livelihoods | Payments to delivery and taxi drivers Microcredit scheme for small-scale entrepreneurs | RM10 million in microcredit for SMEs RM5 million for upgrading equipment and boats for fishermen Payments to delivery, taxi, and trishaw drivers |
| Education | RM60 million for government-aided schools Scholarships and laptops for B40 members | RM14 million in funding for religious and vernacular schools, Payments and scholarships for students RM1 million for parent-teacher associations |
| Skills Development | Establish a technical and vocational education institution to train 20,000 workers | RM1.5 million for industrial training |
| Housing | 220,000 affordable houses 100,000 of these for low-income families 22,000 rent-to-own units | Increasing the supply of houses under RM100,000 |
| Governance | Digital Service Centre to improve customer service in state government constituencies | Development of apps to improve service delivery in state government constituencies Youth leadership programme |
| Religion | Assistance to B40 members to perform the Hajj RM20 million for religious schools RM10 million for non-Islamic places of worship (up to 2028) | |
| Civil Society | RM2 million annual grant to NGOs | |
| Environment and Water | RM100 million for flood mitigation RM1 billion for water supply | RM5 million for upgrading reservoirs RM5 million for rehabilitating rivers Planting 1 million trees |
Table Two. Seats that Flipped
| State Code | State Name | Ethnic Composition | Winning Party 2018 | Winning Party 2023 |
| N02 | Bertam | M(68.9) C(21.8) I(8.7) | Bersatu | UMNO |
| N03 | Pinang Tunggal | M(78.8) C(17.1) I(3.7) | PKR | PAS |
| N04 | Permatang Berangan | M(86.7) C(6.3) I(6.6) | UMNO | PAS |
| N05 | Sungai Dua | M(81.1) C(16.0) I(2.4) | UMNO | PAS |
| N06 | Telok Ayar Tawar | M(64.8) C(23.8) I(10.1) | PKR | Bersatu |
| N10 | Seberang Jaya | M(68.5) C(18.3) I(12.1) | PKR | Bersatu |
| N11 | Permatang Pasir | M(75.4) C(22.1) I(2.1) | Amanah | PAS |
| N12 | Penanti | M(79.8) C(17.8) I(1.7) | PKR | Bersatu |
| N20 | Sungai Bakap | M(59.4) C(22.5) I(17.4) | PKR | PAS |
| N21 | Sungai Acheh* | M(63.8) C(27.7) I(7.6) | PKR | UMNO |
| N39 | Pulau Betong | M(66.3) C(28.4) I(4.3) | PKR | PAS |
* This seat was ceded from PKR to UMNO.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2023/92 “Myanmar-Russia Relations Since the Coup: An Ever Tighter Embrace” by Ian Storey
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Myanmar-Russia relations have strengthened considerably since Moscow acknowledged the Tatmadaw’s seizure of power on 1 February 2021, and the junta endorsed the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022.
- Coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing views Russia as the ruling State Administration Council’s (SAC) preferred major power partner.
- Russia is now Myanmar’s largest source of military assistance. The Tatmadaw relies heavily on Russian-made aircraft to suppress anti-SAC forces.
- Myanmar is the only Southeast Asian country to transfer military supplies to the Russian armed forces for use in occupied areas of Ukraine.
- Naypyidaw seeks cooperation with Moscow to resolve the country’s energy crisis by importing Russian oil and partnering with Russian energy companies to exploit the country’s hydrocarbon reserves and develop renewable energy sources including wind, hydro and nuclear.
- The SAC wants Russia to provide Myanmar with nuclear power by transferring small modular reactors. Naypyidaw’s atomic power ambitions have renewed fears that the junta seeks to acquire nuclear weapons, despite the absence of solid evidence.
- While China remains Myanmar’s most important source of trade and investment, the SAC and the Kremlin have agreed to boost commerce and tourism.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/92, 21 November 2023
* Ian Storey is Senior Fellow and co-editor of Contemporary Southeast Asia at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.
INTRODUCTION
In February 2023, Myanmar and Russia marked the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties. For most of that period, relations have been insubstantial. It was only in the 2010s that the two countries began to move closer together, primarily due to the Myanmar military’s (Tatmadaw) growing preference for Russian-made arms over Chinese-manufactured equipment. Since the Tatmadaw seized power in a coup on 1 February 2021, and Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the two countries have entered into a much tighter embrace. In the face of international disapprobation and Western sanctions, Naypyidaw and Moscow have forged closer diplomatic and political ties and moved to deepen military and economic cooperation.
Nearly three years on from the coup, Myanmar has become the second most important country for Russia in Southeast Asia after Vietnam. For Myanmar, although China remains its largest source of trade and investment, Russia is the junta’s preferred major power partner. Significantly, Russia was the only major power to acknowledge the Tatmadaw’s 2021 power grab, while Myanmar was the only ASEAN member state to endorse Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine and to send military supplies to Russia’s armed forces.
This article focuses on the four main areas of Myanmar-Russia cooperation since the coup: diplomatic validation; defence; energy; and commerce and tourism.
MUTUAL DIPLOMATIC VALIDATION
On 1 February 2021, the Tatmadaw ousted the democratically-elected government of the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi. Senior NLD leaders were detained on trumped up charges and a state of emergency was declared. Coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing appointed himself chairman of the State Administration Council (SAC) and later prime minister of a provisional government. The junta used violence to suppress anti-SAC protests, which ultimately escalated into a civil war that has engulfed every part of the country.
The coup elicited international condemnation. Western countries denounced the takeover and imposed sanctions on SAC leaders. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) also condemned the coup. Min Aung Hlaing attended a special ASEAN leaders’ meeting in Jakarta where he reluctantly accepted a Five-Point Consensus (FPC) designed to end the escalating violence and encourage political dialogue among all parties. However, the SAC refused to take the initiative seriously, leading ASEAN to ban SAC officials from attending the organisation’s high-level meetings. China, which had established close ties with the Tatmadaw following an earlier coup in 1988, was taken aback by the putsch and did not immediately recognise the SAC’s authority. Although Beijing has sought to protect its sizeable economic interests in Myanmar, politically, it has kept the SAC at arm’s length. Min Aung Hlaing himself appears to view China with distrust, especially its close relations with several Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) which have been in conflict with the central government for decades. Since seizing power, the SAC Chairman has not visited China nor met with any senior Chinese leaders. When Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Bagan to attend a foreign ministers’ meeting of the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Forum in July 2022 he pointedly did not travel to Naypyidaw to see the SAC chairman.[1] Beijing did not invite Min Aung Hlaing to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Summit in Beijing in October 2023, even though China has financed a number of major BRI projects in Myanmar.[2] The SAC’s relations with Beijing have deteriorated since a coalition of EAOs launched a sustained military offensive against the Tatmadaw in late October in northern Shan State, blocking trade routes to China.[3]
In sharp contrast, the Kremlin viewed the 2021 coup as a golden opportunity to advance Russia’s interests in Myanmar, particularly arms sales which have fallen in other Southeast Asian countries, particularly Vietnam.[4] Moscow moved quickly to consolidate relations with the SAC by utilising strong personal connections between the two countries’ military leaders. After his appointment as commander-in-chief of the armed forces in 2011, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing visited Russia on several occasions, during which he forged a good rapport with Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and his deputy Colonel-General Alexander Fomin. A few weeks after the coup, Fomin travelled to Myanmar and was the highest-ranking foreign dignitary to attend the Armed Forces Day parade in Naypyidaw on 27 March.[5]
In a clear indication of the position Russia occupies in the hierarchy of the SAC’s foreign relations, three of the four overseas trips Min Aung Hlaing has undertaken since the coup have been to Russia: to Moscow, Kazan and Irkutsk in June 2021;[6] Moscow again in July 2022;[7] and Vladivostok and Irkutsk in September 2022.[8] Min Aung Hlaing has used these visits to convey the impression that Myanmar is not internationally isolated, to cement relations with the Kremlin leadership (though he has only met President Vladimir Putin once, on his third trip[9]) and to promote bilateral cooperation in areas such as defence, energy and trade. The SAC chairman has repeatedly praised Putin as a leader,[10] and expressed his gratitude to the Kremlin for its assistance since the coup, including the supply of Russia’s Sputnik COVID-19 vaccine.[11] In a media interview during his first trip to Moscow as SAC chairman, he pointedly referred to Russia as Myanmar’s “forever friend”, relegating China and India to the rank of “close friends”.[12]
To reciprocate the Kremlin’s solidarity following the coup, the SAC immediately endorsed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, significantly the only ASEAN member state to do so.[13] However, as Myanmar’s NLD-appointed ambassador to the United Nations was able to retain his position due to support from the United States (with no objection from China or Russia), Myanmar has consistently voted for UN General Assembly resolutions condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The exiled National Unity Government (NUG) – composed of ousted NLD parliamentarians and representatives from various ethnic groups – has also denounced Russian aggression.[14] Kremlin leaders have repeatedly expressed their appreciation for the SAC’s criticism of Western sanctions and for “understanding” its rationales for invading Ukraine.[15] Moscow agrees with Naypyidaw that anti-SAC resistance fighters are “terrorists” while Naypyidaw accepts the Kremlin’s narrative that Ukrainian forces are “terrorists” (leading some of ASEAN’s dialogue partners to boycott meetings of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus experts working group on counter-terrorism, which is co-chaired by Myanmar and Russia).[16]
Russia has helped provide Myanmar with other opportunities to break out of its diplomatic isolation. As Myanmar’s relations with ASEAN have soured due to the SAC’s failure to implement the FPC, the junta has looked to associate itself with other multilateral forums, especially those in which Russia (and China) play key roles. These include the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), to which Myanmar became a dialogue partner in September 2022.[17] The Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) grouping agreed this year to accept new members starting from 2024, and Myanmar is expected to submit a formal membership application soon. The SCO and BRICS not only provide Myanmar with alternative diplomatic options to ASEAN, but are also viewed by the SAC as potentially important avenues of economic cooperation. Myanmar has courted investments from SCO members in its energy sector and seeks access to financial loans through the BRICS’ New Development Bank.[18] Myanmar has also expressed an interest in forging closer ties with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), presumably with a view to negotiating a free trade agreement (as Vietnam and Singapore did in 2015 and 2019, respectively).[19]
Russia and Myanmar have also initiated cooperation in areas that support each other’s authoritarian rule. Moscow has voiced support for the SAC’s plans to hold legislative elections (probably in 2025), which Western countries have already derided as a sham.[20] In May 2023, the election bodies of Myanmar and Russia signed an MOU on electoral cooperation.[21] In an effort to counter negative reporting about Myanmar and Russia in the international press, in September 2023 Russia’s state-owned news agency Sputnik signed a content-sharing agreement with the SAC’s mouthpiece The Global New Light Of Myanmar.[22]
THE DEFENCE NEXUS
In the 1990s, China became Myanmar’s main weapons supplier. Under Western sanctions, and with Russia’s defence industrial sector in disarray following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Tatmadaw had few other choices. However, by the early 2000s the junta had moved to diversify its arms imports away from China, both because of dissatisfaction with the quality and reliability of Chinese-made equipment and as part of an overall policy aimed at reducing the country’s dependence on Beijing. Russia was the main beneficiary of this policy. In the 2000s, Myanmar purchased Russian-made MiG-29 Fulcrum multi-role jet fighters, Mi-35 attack helicopters and Mi-17 transport helicopters.[23] These formidable aircraft enabled the Myanmar Air Force (MAF) to step up attacks on EAOs along the country’s periphery, including in the Kachin, Kayin, Shan and Chin States that had been in conflict with the central government for decades.[24]
Myanmar’s defence ties with Russia moved into a higher gear following the appointment of General Min Aung Hlaing as commander-in-chief of the armed forces in 2011. He not only considers Russian weapon systems to be superior to Chinese equipment but also distrusts Beijing’s intentions in Myanmar, especially its close ties with several EAOs. Between 2013 and 2020, Min Aung Hlaing visited Russia four times, forming close personal bonds with the Russian armed forces’ senior leadership. Even during the NLD’s six years in office (2015-21), defence cooperation remained the mainstay of Myanmar-Russia relations. Between 2017 and 2021, the Tatmadaw placed orders with Russia for a significant quantity of military hardware, including 22 Yak-130 light-combat aircraft, six SU-30MK Flanker fighter jets, 20 BRDM-2 armoured reconnaissance vehicles, Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missiles and Orlan-10E surveillance drones.[25]
Since the military takeover, Myanmar’s defence cooperation with Russia has become even more vital. As civil war has engulfed Myanmar, and conflict has spread from the periphery to the Burmese heartland, the SAC has lost control over large parts of the country and suffered heavy combat losses. In response, the Tatmadaw has been forced to become more reliant on air power to counter anti-SAC resistance forces, including the armed wing of the NUG, the People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) and various EAOs. MAF fighter jets have targeted NUG-aligned administration centres and local service providers, including schools, clinics and displaced persons camps. Air strikes against civilian targets have led to numerous atrocities.[26] For example, on 11 April, the MAF attacked the opening ceremony of an NUG administration office in Pazigyi village in the Sagaing region, killing 170 civilians including 40 children.[27] According to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights Situation in Myanmar, Tom Andrews, and various NGOs that monitor the conflict in Myanmar, the majority of MAF air strikes have been carried out using military aircraft from Russia and China, especially the former.[28] In particular, the MAF has relied heavily on its Yak-130s and Mi-35s, including in the attack on Pazigyi village.[29] Andrews has accused Russia and China of being complicit in probable war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated by the SAC.[30]
Both Russia and China have resisted calls to impose an international ban on arms sales to Myanmar. On 18 June 2021, Russia joined with China in abstaining from a vote on a non-binding resolution at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) calling for member states to cease all arms transfers to Myanmar.[31] The SAC rejected the vote (adopted by 119 countries) as interference in its internal affairs. To underscore his scorn for the UNGA resolution, a few days after the vote, Min Aung Hlaing travelled to Russia and visited the headquarters of the state-run arms exporter Rosoboronexport in Moscow, the production facilities of the Kazan Helicopter Company in Kazan, and the United Aircraft Corporation in Irkutsk, the makers of Sukhoi fast jets.[32] Over the past two years, Myanmar and Russia have exchanged numerous high-level defence delegations.
Since the coup, Russia has displaced China to become the largest provider of military assistance to Myanmar. According to the Swedish think tank SIPRI, between 2021 and 2022, Russia provided Myanmar with US$276 million in military supplies, compared to US$156 million from China.[33] The UN estimates that during the same period, Russian commercial entities transferred US$406 million in defence supplies to Myanmar, with China in second place at US$267 million.[34] It should be noted, however, that the SAC and Russia have not signed any new big defence contracts since the coup.
The SAC has shown its appreciation for the Kremlin’s military support in two ways. First, and most importantly, the junta has returned the favour. In early 2023, the head of Ukraine’s military intelligence, Lieutenant-General Kyrylo Budanov, revealed that Moscow had requested military supplies from a number of countries using Russian-made weaponry, including Myanmar, to make up for equipment shortfalls which were hampering its combat operations in Ukraine.[35] A few months later, it was reported that Russian tank manufacturer Uralvagonzavod had imported optical targeting systems from Myanmar to upgrade T-72 tanks which had been taken out of storage, refurbished and sent to the frontline in Ukraine to make up for the Russian army’s huge tank losses.[36] The spare parts had been provided by Uralvagonzavod to the Myanmar army for its own T-72 tanks which it had purchased from Ukraine in the early 2000s.[37] In July, reports emerged that Russian forces were using 120mm mortar rounds manufactured in Myanmar.[38] While the SAC’s transfer of munitions and spare parts will not have a decisive impact on Russia’s war efforts in Ukraine, they underscore how close relations between the two countries’ armed forces have become since 2021. No other country in Southeast Asia has responded positively to Moscow’s request for military assistance, including Vietnam, its closest partner in the region. Second, the SAC has bestowed personal honours on officials in the Russian government who have played a key role in promoting defence ties between the two countries. Thus, in November 2022, the SAC awarded honorary titles to three Russian defence officials: Defence Minister Shoigu was awarded the title Sithu (the lowest order awarded to people who are deemed to have done ‘great work’ for the country); Colonel-General Fomin was named Thiri Pyanchi (for ‘outstanding performance’); and Alexander Ostrovsky from the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation was awarded an ‘excellent administrative performance’ medal.[39]
ENERGY COOPERATION
The coup turned Myanmar’s existing electricity generation problems into a full-blown energy crisis. The country’s power infrastructure has been damaged in fighting between the Tatmadaw and PDFs, resulting in rolling blackouts in major towns and cities. Rising global oil prices and the falling value of the currency have created fuel shortages for the population, while the withdrawal of Western energy companies from offshore gas fields has halted upstream production.[40]
To find solutions to the country’s energy crisis, the SAC has turned primarily to Russia.
As a short-term measure, Myanmar has begun importing Russian crude oil which Moscow is offering to non-sanctioning countries at discounted prices. Between March and June 2023, Russian oil exports to Myanmar jumped from almost nothing to 8.36 million barrels of oil.[41] A proportion of that oil is likely to have been jet fuel for use by MAF aircraft to conduct air strikes. However, not all Russian oil shipped to Myanmar is for domestic consumption. According to Energy Intelligence, from February 2023 Russia began delivering an estimated 70,000 barrels of oil per day to China using a Chinese-funded oil pipeline from the port of Kyaukphyu in Myanmar to Kunming in Yunnan Province.[42]
As a longer-term solution to the problem, the SAC seeks to achieve a higher level of energy self-sufficiency by exploiting hydrocarbon resources and developing renewable energy sources. The junta has requested technical assistance from Russian energy companies to develop inland and offshore oil and gas fields – presumably including those from which Western and Japanese companies have withdrawn – and the construction of additional oil pipelines and oil refineries.[43] For renewable energy sources, the SAC has partnered with Russia’s state-owned energy giant Rosatom to develop hydro, wind and, controversially, nuclear power.[44]
In the early 2000s, the previous junta signed a series of MOUs with Rosatom to develop nuclear power capabilities. The NLD government shelved those plans but after the coup, the atomic power option was urgently revisited. In 2022, the SAC and Rosatom signed three MOUs[45] with the ultimate aim of providing Myanmar with a small modular reactor (SMR). SMRs are much cheaper, more mobile and reputedly safer than conventional nuclear power plants.[46] In February 2023, the first concrete outcome of these MOUs was the opening of a Nuclear Technology Information Centre in Yangon.[47] A fourth MOU on nuclear cooperation between Myanmar and Rosatom was signed during Russia Energy Week in Moscow in October 2023.[48]
In December 2022, SAC spokesman Zaw Min Tun predicted: “We expect construction of a small-scale nuclear reactor to start within a few years.”[49] However, achieving that goal is an ambitious target for Myanmar. Questions include who would run the nuclear facilities (Myanmar or Russian technicians, or both?), how would a cash-strapped Myanmar pay for such a costly programme, and whether a Russian-supplied SMR would be subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.[50] The SAC’s quest for atomic power has also rekindled speculation that the Tatmadaw has ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons,[51] despite no solid evidence that a ‘Burmese Bomb’ is indeed the SAC’s ultimate goal.[52]
COMMERCE AND TOURISM
In addition to arms sales and energy projects, Myanmar and Russia have sought to circumvent Western sanctions and strengthen commercial ties. Myanmar’s economy is in a dire state. The coup effectively wiped out a decade of GDP growth as Western companies pulled out, exports plummeted, energy costs rose, trade revenue fell, inflation soared and the value of the kyat collapsed.
Since the coup, Myanmar and Russia have regularly held government-to-government talks on how to promote closer trade and investment ties and exchanged high-level business delegations. Myanmar business people have attended the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum and the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok. In late 2022, in an effort to evade Western financial sanctions on both countries, the Russian and Myanmar central banks agreed to direct ruble-kyat payments to facilitate commercial transactions, presumably including arms sales. Economic ties between Myanmar and Russia should be kept in proportion. Commerce between the two countries is minuscule. According to the International Monetary Fund, in 2020, two-way trade amounted to a mere US$58.3 million before falling to US$34.5 million in 2021.[53] In 2022, it had risen to US104.4 million. In the same year, however, Myanmar-China trade was worth US$11.5 billion.
Myanmar has been keen to attract Russian tourists, especially to its beach resorts in areas such as Rakhine State.[54] Post-coup, Russian visitors have been offered visa-free travel to Myanmar and allowed to use Russian-issued Mir credit cards, one of only a handful of countries to do so.[55] During 2022, the two sides discussed establishing direct air links between Yangon and Mandalay and several Russian cities including Moscow, St. Petersburg, Novosibirsk and Vladivostok. In August 2023 it was announced that from September, Myanmar Airways International (MAI) would fly twice a week from Yangon and Mandalay to Novosibirsk.[56] Located in Siberia, Novosibirsk is Russia’s third largest city and appears to have been given priority over Moscow and St. Petersburg because it is home to the company that manufactures the SU-34 fighter-bomber (which the MAF appears keen to acquire due to its central role in suppressing anti-Assad forces in Syria since 2015) and a Rosatom facility that processes uranium and fabricates nuclear fuel.[57] Direct flights between Yangon and Moscow with MAI are expected to start in 2024.
CONCLUSION
The Tatmadaw’s ouster of the NLD government in February 2021, and the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine a year later, have pushed Myanmar and Russia much closer together. The Russian government has taken advantage of the coup to promote its arms sales and other economic interests in Myanmar. Wary of becoming dependent on China, coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has looked to Russia as his preferred major power partner, and has sought Moscow’s assistance to resolve two major problems: defeat anti-SAC resistance forces and solve the country’s energy crisis. Russia’s military assistance is prolonging the conflict in Myanmar and its estrangement from ASEAN, and Moscow may be complicit in SAC war crimes. So long as the SAC holds power, and the conflict in Europe drags on, the Myanmar-Russia embrace will grow ever tighter.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2023/91 “The Challenge of “Halal Lifestyle” and Occupational Preferences in Indonesia” by Iim Halimatusa’diyah and Wahyudi Akmaliah
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The concept of “halal lifestyle”, which is considered to be aligned with Islamic principles, is highly popular in Indonesia today. Proponents of the concept argue that it encompasses a range of practices that adhere to ethical and religious guidelines. Studies on halal lifestyles tend to focus on the development of the halal industry as an economic consequence of the growing adoption of halal practices.
- The extent to which the halal lifestyle has affected individuals’ occupational preferences remains largely unexplored. By focusing on the movement of middle-class Muslims in Indonesia leaving their current occupations for jobs perceived as halal, this article examines the conditions supporting the emergence of this trend.
- We argue that since the fall of the authoritarian Suharto regime in 1998, Indonesia has witnessed a rise in social conservatism. This encouraged not only the emergence of Islamic revivalist groups, but also an emphasis on personal piety. Our observations indicate that three specific employment industries—entertainment, finance, and Multi-Level Marketing (MLM)—are considered contentious, with varying interpretations of their alignment as a “halal occupation”.
- Finally, the growing social and economic vulnerability of Indonesian Muslims at the individual and community levels may contribute to religious intolerance within Indonesian society.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/91, 15 November 2023
* Iim Halimatusa’diyah is Visiting Fellow at the Regional Social and Cultural Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Senior Lecturer at Islamic State University (UIN) Syarif Hidayatullah, and Deputy Director for Research at the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) UIN Jakarta. Wahyudi Akmaliah is Ph.D. candidate in Malay Studies at the National University of Singapore and a Researcher at BRIN (National Research and Innovation Agency), Jakarta.
INTRODUCTION
The concept of “halal lifestyle” is gaining prominence in Indonesia. While halal means permissible in Islam, halal lifestyle, a relatively new terminology, refers to how a person lives in accordance with Islamic principles. The concept follows the Quranic verse that maintains Islam as ad-deen, a way of life, and that the religion regulates behaviours, habits and interests. The halal lifestyle discourse has contributed to the development of the halal industry—which offers halal products to satisfy Muslim consumers globally. Today, the halal industry encompasses food and beverages, finance, travel, pharmacy, cosmetics, fashion, education, healthcare, wellness, recreation, and music. The global growth of the Muslim population, which directly leads to higher demand for halal products, is driving the halal industry. While this industry is a global phenomenon, Indonesia is leading the way.[1] The Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) has played a significant role in shaping the halal industry by promoting sharia compliance in the public sphere.[2]
In response to the global trend, the Indonesian government, particularly during the Jokowi administration (since 2014), has devised a strategy to support the halal industry’s potential economic contributions. This strategy materialised as the “Indonesia Islamic Economic Masterplan 2019–2024,” developed by the Ministry of National Development Planning (Bappenas). Subsequently, the government established Bank Syariah Indonesia (BSI), the nation’s largest state-owned Sharia-compliant bank, to create a conducive environment for the rapid development of the Islamic economy.[3]
While many studies on the halal lifestyle often focus on the development of the halal industry as an economic consequence of the growing adoption of halal practices, the extent to which the halal lifestyle affects individuals’ occupational preferences remains largely unexplored. Shifting from one job to another is a common phenomenon and a respected right of every individual. However, turning from well-established, stable jobs to uncertain, low-paid ones on religious grounds is a trend that needs looking into. This article addresses why shifting to ‘halal’ occupations is gaining ground among middle-class Muslims. What jobs are in line with a halal lifestyle, and does this movement impact Indonesians in general?
POPULARISING ‘HALAL’ OCCUPATIONS
While no official statistics are available on the matter, people leaving a well-established job for a so-called ‘halal job’ is becoming more prevalent among middle-class Muslims in Indonesia. The end of the Suharto authoritarian regime saw the growth of Islamic revivalist groups that had long been suppressed under the New Order regime, and these now seek to revive the “authentic” tenets and teachings of Islam as they imagine these to have been developed by the first Muslim communities.[4] This rise in Islamic conservatism coincides with the growing emphasis among Indonesian Muslims on rigid personal piety as the ideal mode of thinking vis-à-vis other orientations of Islam such as communitarian spirit and progressive rational sciences. The reinforcement of the halal and haram dichotomy in all aspects of Muslim life, including occupational preferences, is one apparent example of this rigid interpretation of Islam.
Since the end of the Suharto authoritarian regime in 1998, democratisation has allowed various Islamic groups to articulate their previously suppressed views and ideologies. At the same time, media and digital technologies have also amplified conservatism in offline and online spaces. A study by the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) UIN Jakarta, which extracts social media data from 2009 to 2019, shows firstly, that religious narratives during the ten years were dominated by conservative religious narratives (67.2%); and secondly, these narratives were heavily echoed by conservative figures active on social media.[5] Many of these figures were the initiators of the “hijrah movement” (hijrah means migration) which encourages Muslims to shift to a more Islamic way of life. This movement covers the hijrah of occupation.[6] The term “hijrah” was initially used to describe the movement of the Prophet and his Companions from Mecca to Medina in 622. While the original meaning of hijrah referred to the physical movement from one location to another, a moral meaning of the term later developed, referring to Muslims’ spiritual upliftment. The rise of Islamic conservatism has encouraged a narrow moral interpretation of hijrah that refers only to the virtues acclaimed by certain groups and that marginalises other groups who have different interpretations.[7]
The hijrah movement is vocal in expressing their views online and offline. The personalities associated with it are likely to have sizable followers and social media engagement. Their ideas relating to occupational hijrah gain much traction and are quickly and widely circulated among their followers. Syafiq Riza Basalamah is one of the figures who actively motivates Muslims to embark on occupational hijrah, and he has more than two million followers and subscribers on his social media platforms. Responding to one of his followers who was thinking of leaving his current job but doubting if that would be economically sustainable, Basalamah said:
“Hijrah is something that entails a struggle and the struggle requires sacrifice. When the Prophet’s companions hijrah from Mecca to Habasyah, they had no relatives, home, or job. All of them left Mecca for the sake of Allah. They believed that it was Allah who provided their livelihood. It is not the company, the workplace, or the boss. It is not a matter of resigning and then you would lose your livelihood.” [8]
Other hijrah movement groups also helped articulate occupational hijrah among the Indonesian Muslim middle class. They include, among others: the Shift of Pemuda Hijrah in Bandung, Kajian Musyawarah, Yuk Ngaji, Strangers Ghuraba, and Terang Jakarta in Jakarta, and Better Youth in Surabaya.[9] Interestingly, most of these religious networks employ hybrid methods, combining social media platforms and Islamic teachings and packaging these with pop culture in order to attract urbanised Muslims.
TYPOLOGIES OF ‘HALAL AND HARAM’ OCCUPATIONS
Distinguishing between halal and haram occupations remains difficult, given that between the permissible and non-permissible poles are sub-categories such as subhat (doubtful) and makruh (permissible but discouraged). Islamic law is usually a generic guidance allowing room for multiple interpretations previously dominated by established Islamic organisations such as Muhammadiyah, NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), and MUI. Our observation indicates that three specific areas of employment—entertainment, finance, and Multi-Level Marketing (MLM)—remain contentious.
Indonesian Muslims pursue various professions in the entertainment scene. A number of them became prominent musicians and artists, or play supporting roles. However, due to their work, some have to frequent nightclub environments, where they may be exposed to what Muslims consider ‘immoral behaviour’ (maksiat), such as alcohol consumption, and free intermingling between unmarried men and women. Musicians particularly are faced with this moral dilemma. Even if these musicians do not consume alcohol—considered sinful in Islam—their line of work may be seen as encouraging alcohol consumption in others (called subhat).
Due to the lack of clear boundaries in Islamic law for categorising the entertainment industry as halal or haram, Indonesian celebrities working in this field find themselves in a liminal state, hovering between these two classifications. This liminality creates uncertainty and doubt among many of them, prompting questions about the ethicality of their profession. Amid this uncertainty, new Islamic resurgence movements, particularly those led by Salafi preachers, have emerged to provide their versions of clarity. They offer black-and-white categorisations within Islamic law, and provide definitive answers for these Indonesian celebrities. Notably, these preachers excel in employing digital platforms and pop culture products, and are effectively reaching a broad audience. Consequently, their teachings have profoundly impacted many Indonesian celebrities, motivating them to embark on an occupational hijrah.
Those working in the banking and finance sectors are posed with other distinct sets of challenges. There is consensus among the Islamic organisations of Muhammadiyah, NU, and MUI that usury (riba) is forbidden (haram). Nevertheless, these organisations differ on whether bank interests constitute riba; some argue that interest is doubtful (subhat) while others allowed for it (mubah).[10] Muhammadiyah and NU contend that it is permissible for individuals to work in banks as wage earners but not participate directly in usurious transactions. The critical consideration is that the source of income is halal, but they should refrain from facilitating usury transactions.[11] MUI, however, is stricter in its interpretation, and consider the transactions and wages earned in these banks as haram because bank interests are strongly related to usury. While this may already be considered rigid, resurgence groups such as HTI and Salafi are even more exclusivist and categorise such employment as clearly haram.
Consequently, those affiliated with the hijrah movement leave their jobs in banks and pursue alternative careers that are deemed halal. This shift is often motivated by a desire to adhere more closely to these groups’ anti-riba (anti-usury) principles.
Another industry that is affected by this change is the multi-level marketing (MLM) business. This type of business revolves around a distributor organisation that conducts multi-level product sales. It is commonly referred to as network marketing because group members involved in selling a specific product increase in number, eventually forming a network. This network becomes their marketing system, comprising many individuals working to introduce and sell particular products. With certain requirements and careful consideration, Muhammadiyah, NU, and MUI agree that MLM business is halal.[12] A new trend, however, suggests that MLM businesses selling certain products are haram. While this trend is still relatively small, it is significant for some who work in the industry. Those arguing that this business is haram often include former leaders who once held top positions in their MLM careers, and their influence contributes to a significant shift within the MLM business community.
The primary reason why the hijrah movement considers the MLM business haram is that it lacks a clear definition of samsarah—trade intermediary or intermediaries between sellers and buyers—in Islamic law, particularly the direct intermediary transaction between buyers and sellers. This movement argues that MLM business instead establishes an indirect intermediary between buyers and sellers, meaning that the person occupying the highest hierarchical position in the business will earn income from product sales, even though another seller of a lower rank performs the work. This movement perceives this reality to be unjust, although those at the top argue that they provide guidance and consultancy services to their subordinates. This latter argument, according to this movement, does not align with the requirements of samsara in Islamic law.[13]
THE IMPACT OF HALAL OCCUPATION
The decision to work, to change jobs, or to quit remains an individual right. However, when many decide to leave their steady jobs to pursue jobs with uncertain levels of stability in the name of religion, then a deeper dive into the reasons this, and whether this aligns with true Islamic principles becomes necessary.
At a personal level, a shift in employment may affect the economic stability of any individual and their families. Among the professions promoted as halal, or which are deemed to be following the sunnah of the Prophet, are those of traders or entrepreneurs. For example, we encountered some who had embarked on occupational hijrah ending up selling Islamic books near mosques where they studied Islam. Some offered perfumes said to be Prophet Muhammad’s favourites, engaged in culinary ventures, or specialised in Muslim apparel.[14] Some shift to informal sectors such as small and medium enterprises. In Indonesia, the informal economy still dominates. Data from the National Bureau of Statistics (BPS) in 2022 showed that 59.31% of Indonesia’s working population are engaged in the informal sector, which is likely to have relatively high job risks such as income uncertainty, low wages, and lack of social protection.[15]
As with any business, entrepreneurship comes with the risk of failure. For those who are fortunate and have good entrepreneurial skills, hijrah may provide them with better economic security than what they received from their previous jobs. However, those who do not have enough entrepreneurial skills—and the majority do not—become economically vulnerable without any steady source of income, and they tend to become part of an already saturated Islamic business market. Additionally, it will be difficult for them to grow their business if they furthermore refuse to use conventional banking services—the most skeptical among them even reject sharia banking.
Despite the possibility of failure, hijrah leaders commonly motivate people by framing hijrah as a big decision and not an easy one. The term is always made synonymous with risks, sacrifices, challenges and tribulations. Syafiq Riza Basalamah, for example, emphasises that when trying to leave a “haram” job, there is no guarantee that the person will be wealthy. These individuals might experience hardships such as poverty, ostracism and hatred. However, he highlighted that there would be God’s assurance for those who wish to hijrah for the sake of the divine.[16] Such framing often encourages people to embrace hijrah regardless of the economic insecurity and uncertainties involved.
Recognising the potential setbacks of hijrah, some hijrah groups have been expanding the functions of mosques as work-training centres. Currently, some mosques managed by conservative groups, such as the Jogokariyan Mosque and United Mosque in Yogyakarta, and the Mosque of al-Latief in Bandung, are being used not only as places of worship and Islamic learning, but as centres for training Muslim youths to engage in halal businesses and to equip them with the skills needed to become Muslim entrepreneurs.
Since a considerable number of Muslims collectively pursue this occupational hijrah, economic insecurity may not only be experienced at the individual level but also increase the Muslim community’s collective economic insecurity, thus increasing their sense of being threatened by other groups. A survey conducted by PPIM Jakarta in 2020 showed that perceived threat is associated with religious intolerance.[17] It indicates that the more individuals feel that their group is under threat, particularly economically, the lower their level of religious tolerance would be. The survey also showed that compared to other religious groups, Muslims—in this case, Indonesian Muslim youth—have the highest perception of threat compared to other religious groups, as shown in the figure below:
Figure 1. Indonesian Youth Threat Perception by Religious Affiliations
Figure 1 shows that Muslims are more likely to have a greater perceived threat than other religious groups—and the variation in the perception of threat among Muslims is relatively small. In other words, perceived threat among Muslims in general is relatively similar. Protestants and Catholics have a smaller perceived threat than Muslims, although their belief interval is larger. Hindus and Buddhists have a lower average sense of danger than Muslims, even though their belief interval is the largest. Beyond that, the perceived threat of the Confucian and Aliran Kepercayaan (local belief) groups is difficult to interpret since they are only represented by one respondent per group.
CONCLUSION
Given the drawbacks of occupational hijrah, society and the Indonesian state should proactively prevent further deterioration of social and economic conditions. The ulama and scholars need to provide the public with a better understanding of the advancement of occupations from a religious standpoint that is compatible with the rapidly changing economic and technological systems. Such a comprehensive understanding will significantly help individuals to adapt to the needs of the workforce while complying with religious teachings. They must also educate Muslims that the religion does not draw a sharp distinction between what jobs they can enter into, as long as they do not deviate from the broader principles of social justice and welfare. Moreover, there is no hierarchy of knowledge in Islam. The fact that religious subjects such as theology, Quranic studies, and Islamic jurisprudence are deemed by the Muslim resurgence to be of higher value than science, social sciences, humanities, and technology does affect what parents choose as the field of study for their children. This prioritisation of religious fields versus secular ones—in itself a problematic division—affects the career options of young Muslims.
The government should improve the quality of its social protection policies to minimise inequality in society and mitigate the adverse effects of job loss or the transition from one type of employment to another. For example, the government’s pre-employment card programme should be optimised to upgrade prospective workers’ skills. Additionally, the government should provide better training options than those offered by conservative groups, which would inevitably incorporate the ideological aspects of their movements. In all, the state and religious elites must work together to halt negative perceptions of “secular” occupations and prevent low take-up rates for important sectors of the economy, such as the arts, banking and financial sectors, simply because these are deemed by some to be non-halal. Moreover, adults who venture into low-paying but Islamic compliant jobs could put an unnecessary burden on their families and trigger other social problems.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2023/90 “Negeri Sembilan Emerges as PH-BN’s Steadiest Stronghold” by Kevin Zhang and James Chin
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The Pakatan Harapan-Barisan Nasional (PH-BN) alliance retained Negeri Sembilan in the August state election, losing only five seats in the 36-seat state assembly to Perikatan Nasional (PN). PH-BN performed the best in Negeri Sembilan among the six states which were up for grabs, even better than Penang and Selangor which are long considered as PH’s bastions.
- BN had ruled Negeri Sembilan up till 2018, when it was defeated by PH. The PH-BN alliance was expected to boost the fortunes of both coalitions, with BN drawing support from rural and semi-urban seats while PH capitalised on its urban base.
- BN retained its grassroots machinery in rural seats while PH was almost unassailable in urban seats, contributing to the overwhelming victory in terms of seats won for BN-PH. Nonetheless, PH-BN experienced a sharp fall in vote share from Malays, compared to last year’s General Election, while support from non-Malays remained rock solid.
- PN circumvented the lack of credible leadership and grassroots machinery, and instead campaigned mainly through social media, focusing on winning Malay voters. In addition, PN was handicapped by negligible support from non-Malays.
- Both PH and BN need each other to remain in power, since neither coalition fulfils the simple majority of 19 seats in the state assembly. The ability of PH and BN to formulate a mutually satisfactory relationship is crucial for the state administration, and to the federal government moving forward.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/90, 8 November 2023
* Kevin Zhang is Senior Research Officer at the Malaysia Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. James Chin is Professor of Asian Studies, University of Tasmania. The authors would like to thank Tindak Malaysia for the database of GE2023 (parliamentary election transposed onto state constituencies) and ethnic composition in Negeri Sembilan, Rebecca Neo for her cartographic work, and Francis E. Hutchinson and Lee Hwok Aun for their comments on an earlier draft.
INTRODUCTION
Compared to Penang and Selangor, Negeri Sembilan receives far less media and scholarly attention due to its small population size and less-than-stellar economic development.[1] Nonetheless, the state deserves much greater understanding since, in contrast to other states governed by the Pakatan Harapan (PH) and Barisan Nasional (BN) alliance, PH-BN had the most success there fending off the “Green Wave” during the recent August elections involving six Malaysian states. In addition, unlike Penang and Selangor where PH is dominant with BN in the back seat, PH and BN are in approximate parity in Negeri Sembilan.[2] The roughly equal footing has created constructive and dynamic relations between PH and BN, when faced with the threat posed by Perikatan Nasional (PN). Conversely, PN was least able to make inroads into Negeri Sembilan during the 2023 state election, also known as Pilihan Raya Negeri in Malay (PRN 2023). This piece analyses BN’s long presence in Negeri Sembilan, the rise of PH since 2008, and recent attempts by PN to penetrate the state.
Barisan Nasional (BN) ruled Negeri Sembilan uninterrupted since Malaysia’s independence in 1957 and was virtually impregnable in the state until the 2008 General Election. The east-west differences within Negeri Sembilan enabled PH to rise as a formidable opposition since 2008, while BN retained the state government until 2018, when the Negeri Sembilan state administration witnessed a change of power for the first time, and BN was defeated. The alliance between PH and BN – former long-time nemesis – in the aftermath of the 2022 General Election (GE2022) propelled PH and BN to contest as a joint force in PRN2023 against PN. Many predicted a complete victory for both PH and BN, with PN facing the possibility of a complete wipeout in Negeri Sembilan.[3] Yet in PRN 2023, PN managed to win five seats with the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) obtaining three and Malaysian Indigenous United Party (PPBM) securing two. PN managed to make some inroads into Malay majority seats as BN faced declining popularity, but the latter retained some of its historical advantages. Together with rock solid support for PH among non-Malays, PH-BN achieved a trumping majority in terms of seats won. The results analysis section compares PRN2023 against GE2022 voting patterns in the 36 state seats, supplemented with fieldwork conducted in the second week of the campaign period. Together with regression analysis, the piece constructs a picture of how voting patterns have changed among Malays, further segregated into urban, semi-urban and rural state seats.
BACKGROUND
Negeri Sembilan broadly mirrors the national racial demographic with Malays/Bumiputra forming more than half of the state’s 1.1 million residents.[4] Malays in Negeri Sembilan however possess unique Adat Perpatih heritage which originated from the Minangkabau Highlands in Sumatra, Indonesia.[5] Much like other west coast states on the Peninsula, the Chinese form a significant percentage at 23 per cent. The state has the highest share of Indians across all Malaysian states, which at 15 per cent is double the national average. Since non-Malay majority seats comprise only 13 of the total 36 state seats, coalitions must win at least a sizeable number of Malay-majority seats to gain control of the state government.
There are eight parliamentary seats in Negeri Sembilan, with the population spread out rather unevenly. (Map 1) The state has seven administrative districts, with district boundaries closely mirroring their respective parliamentary seats (of the same name) apart from Seremban district.[6] Rural and semi-urban seats, located in the eastern and central parts of the state, are sparely populated and have a large land area. Compared to urban seats, rural and semi-urban seats contain far less population per elected assemblyperson due to malapportionment – thereby increasing their political weight.[7]
Agricultural activities remain an economic mainstay with palm oil plantations dominating the landscape. In addition, a sizeable population in rural seats are outstation voters working in larger cities.[8] On the other hand, the western half of Negeri Sembilan is urbanised with its economy closely intertwined with Kuala Lumpur given its geographical proximity. Apart from being where the state capital is located, Seremban also has the highest economic development and population among all the seven administrative districts. Many Seremban residents travel daily to work in Kuala Lumpur.[9] In terms of demographic distribution, non-Malays comprise an absolute majority (more than 50 per cent) of total electorate in Seremban, Rasah and Port Dickson parliamentary seats while Malays are dominant in the remaining five seats. The intra-state variation in terms of economic development and racial distribution hold crucial political impact.
Map 1: Negeri Sembilan parliamentary seats and size of electorate
BN AND PH POLITICAL CONTESTATION UP TO 2018
Negeri Sembilan has historically been a BN stronghold, with the coalition ruling the state uninterrupted from 1957 when Malaysia obtained independence to 2018.[10] Up to 2004, the coalition achieved almost a clean sweep by winning 34 out of the 36 state seats. In the 2008 political tsunami which swept through much of the Peninsula’s west coast, the opposition Pakatan Rakyat (PR) – predecessor of PH – made unprecedented inroads into Negeri Sembilan when it won 15 state seats (Table 1).[11] The bulk of the PR victories were in urban state seats located within Seremban and Port Dickson districts, on the western flank of Negeri Sembilan (Map 2). Even though the bulk of seats captured by PR were non-Malay majority, it did capture urban Malay supermajority seats (Ampangan and Paroi) located in and around Seremban as well.[12] This indicates that the 2008 tsunami against BN was an urban rather than a racial (non-Malay) wave, with the western half of Negeri Sembilan being an extension of the political sentiments in Klang Valley.[13] Meanwhile, the central-to-eastern half of Negri Sembilan remained solidly under BN.
Table 1: BN and PH electoral performance in Negeri Sembilan since 2004
Map 2: 2008 state election in Negeri Sembilan
Unlike in Selangor or Penang, the large number of rural and semi-urban state seats in Negeri Sembilan meant that PR could not wrest the state government from BN. This 2008 trend largely persisted in the 2013 general election, though BN managed to claw back urban Malay majority seats while PR gained a rural non-Malay majority seat. (Map 3)
Map 3: 2013 state election in Negeri Sembilan
The nail in the coffin for BN came in 2018, when Malay-majority seats in Seremban district voted against BN – some for the first time – due to widespread anger and disappointment over corruption and the outbreak of 1MDB scandal. For the first time, PH achieved a clean sweep on the western front stretching from Chennah to Sri Tanjong. (Map 4) BN retained their traditional stronghold, albeit with reduced majorities. The crucial swings propelled PH across the simple majority threshold as they won 20 out of the total 36 state seats, forming a new state government.
Map 4: 2018 state election in Negeri Sembilan
SEAT ALLOCATION AND CAMPAIGN FOR THE 2023 STATE ELECTION
By the time the 2023 state election was held, the political scenario had changed completely. BN and PH were now allies as part of the “Unity Government” at the federal level.
After protracted rounds of seat negotiations up to the eleventh hour before nomination day, BN and PH agreed that each coalition would be given the right to contest in the seats which they had previously won in 2018. An exception was made for Lenggeng where PH ceded the seat to BN.[14] The final allocation had PH contesting in 19 seats and BN in 17 seats. The seat negotiation outcome was more favourable for PH component parties than for BN. Since each of the three PH component parties managed to win some seats in 2018, they could contest in the state election. On the other hand, all except one of the 16 seats which BN won in 2018 belonged to UMNO (United Malays National Organisation). The remaining seat (Jeram Padang) was held by a BN component party. With the Chinese and Indian component parties of BN deciding not to contest in the election, Jeram Padang was ceded to UMNO.[15] With UMNO as the sole party contesting under the BN banner, the election signified the death knell of the multi-racial BN which had once represented the three major racial groups in Malaysia.
PN’s strategy for Negeri Sembilan was to divide the core seats between PPBM and PAS, with the “candidate” factor as the most important criterion. Seat allocation was largely based on the principle of “most winnable” candidate.[16] The Malaysian People’s Movement Party (Gerakan) was on a “suicide” mission since PN receives negligible support among non-Malays, with Gerakan given the ticket to contest in urban non-Malay majority seats.[17] The final division was PPBM contesting 15 seats, PAS 13 seats and Gerakan six seats.
The quest for PN to take over Negeri Sembilan was dampened by the fact that Ahmad Faizal Azumu, PN state chief for Negeri Sembilan, did not stand as a candidate.[18] Normally, the state chief is also the lead candidate and Chief Minister designate. By not standing as a candidate, voters may have perceived PN as not being serious about capturing the state.[19] The main target of PN’s electoral strategy was the Malay-majority seats held by UMNO, with PN being most familiar with the Malay ground, considering that Bersatu brought in sizeable former UMNO members. The theme was largely similar to the national PN theme “Save Islam” and “Save Malays”.[20]
Like the other five states, campaign issues in Negeri Sembilan were largely overshadowed by national issues. Most voters perceived this election as one of national implications relating to the future of Malay and non-Malays rights.[21] Nevertheless, both sides presented their manifesto. The PH-BN “Negeri Sembilan Unity Aspiration” manifesto, was driven by five targets, 10 main thrusts and 70 initiatives, which included building 4,000 affordable homes within the next five years. PN’s manifesto was based on eight pillars: driving economic resilience and addressing the rise in the cost of living; creating sustainable future for the youth; establishing people-centric education and empowering outstanding women; elevating social welfare; strengthening infrastructure and security network; accelerating eco- and culture-based tourism; and enhancing the effectiveness of good governance.
From the manifestos, it was clear that both sides were targeting the young, or first time, voters. The free money promised by PH/BN to the young voters was substantial.
Table 3. Comparison of cash handouts: PH/BN Vs PN[22]
| PH/ BN | Perikatan Nasional |
| RM150 voucher for youths aged 16-21 from B40 families to obtain motorcycle licenses RM100 contribution to the National Education Savings scheme for all newborns between 2023 and 2027 RM300 one-off assistance for students enrolling in government boarding schools One-off university enrolment assistance: RM1,000 (degree); RM750 (diploma); RM500 (certificate) RM5,000 one-off award for first-class graduates from public universities RM500 marriage assistance for the first wedding RM200 annual donation for single mothers with an income of less than RM2,000 a month RM200 annual donation for senior citizens aged 70 and above | 20 percent school bus fare subsidy. 10 percent birthing cost subsidy or a maximum of RM300 for firstborns under a new Ibu Prihatin Nismilan initiative. RM300 subsidy for youths to apply for a B2 motorcycle license Up to RM15,000 grant under a million-dollar Young Agropreneurs Fund RM1mill incubator grant for female entrepreneurs |
RESULTS ANALYSIS
Overview
Consistent with the general perception that Negeri Sembilan was a tough nut to crack for PN, the media only identified three “hot seats”- Rantau, Klawang, and Juasseh.[23] Other than these three seats, the general consensus was that Negeri Sembilan would be the one state that PN would have difficulty gaining traction.[24] After all, there were no PN representatives in the state assembly. In GE2023, Negeri Sembilan was the only state in Peninsula Malaysia where PN had failed to capture even one parliamentary seat. PN also lacked a credible grassroots machinery in Negeri Sembilan and any real state-wide machinery, relying extensively instead on social media for campaigning.[25] The two most widely cited opinion polls prior to the PRN, conducted by Merdeka Centre and Ilham, gave PH/BN support at 59% and 47% respectively as the preferred coalition in Negeri Sembilan.[26]
PH-BN retained 31 of the 36 state seats, while PN won five. None of the “hot seats” saw a change. Rather the five seats that changed hands were: Serting, Labu, Paroi, Bagan Pinang and Gemas. Paroi and Labu were previously held by PH while the remaining three were held by UMNO.(Map 5) All the five seats which PN wrestled from BN or PH had Malays making up close to or more than three-quarters of electorate.
Map 5: 2023 state election in Negeri Sembilan
* Grey shaded areas represent the seats which PH-BN won with more than 1,000 margin of vote
In terms of vote share, PH-BN garnered 60.9 per cent while PN obtained 37.7 per cent.[27] With PH and BN joining forces, the alliance avoided a repeat of GE2023 three-cornered fight where the Malay vote was split between PH, BN and PN. With Chinese voters solidly behind PH-BN and PN receiving a negligible share of non-Malay votes, PN’s vote of 37.7 per cent came almost exclusively from the Malays.[28] Even though it gained more than a third of total votes casted, PN was severely penalised by the first-past-the-post system with its share of seats (14 per cent) being smaller than its share of votes.
Malay voting patterns in the 2023 state election
Prior to PRN2023, there were predictions being made on the extent of vote transferability between BN and PH supporters for the new PH-BN alliance.[29] Considering the deep animosity and contestations, analysts disagreed on the predicted share of BN supporters who would throw their weight behind BN-PH.[30] Since non-Malays were solidly behind PH in previous elections, the focus was on Malay voters who had a choice between PN or BN; both these coalitions share similar narratives of championing Malay rights and Islam, with PN portraying itself as a “clean” alternative. The three-corner fights between BN, PH and PN in GE2022 provide a baseline to measure the extent of vote transferability for BN voters, since BN and PH agreed to support each other in their campaigns for PRN2023.[31] While admitting that considerations may vary for parliamentary elections (GE2022) versus state elections (PRN2023), the August state election was framed by both PH-BN and PN as a referendum on the popularity of the Anwar’s administration and the PH-BN federal government.[32] National-level concerns overshadowed state issues, with the state elections being seen as a rerun of GE2022. The turnout for PRN2023 in Negeri Sembilan was also broadly comparable to GE2022, declining by around five percentage points.[33]
Since PH and UMNO joined forces in the state election, the vote share for PH and BN in GE2022 were combined as a reference point against PRN2023. There was a significant decline in the combined vote share of BN-PH, with the decline being steeper in state seats with a larger share of Malays. (Chart 1) The combined vote share for BN and PH voters is estimated to have fallen by around 25 per cent from GE2022 to PRN2023. In PRN2023, the vote share for PH-BN among Malays was estimated to be lower than 50 per cent, indicating that PN was more popular among Malays than BN-PH.
Chart 1: Scatter plot and regression values for PH-BN combined vote share in 2022 and 2023 against the share of Malay electorate
* Each dot represents a state seat in GE2022 (blue) and PRN2023 (forest green). Both regression lines are statistically significant at 0.01 per cent P value.
Nonetheless, ethnicity was not the sole determinant for Malay support for PH-BN since there were significant variations even among seats with a high percentage of Malays. In seats where Malays comprised more than 70 per cent of electorate as indicated by the yellow arrows, support for PH-BN ranged from 40 per cent to more than 60 per cent in PRN2023.
To understand variations in voting patterns among the Malays, the following section concerns state seats where Malays comprise more than 50 per cent of the electorate – known as Malay seats for ease of reference. The dot box plot compares PH-BN and PN median vote share in rural, semi-urban and urban Malay seats for PRN2023.(Chart 3)
Commentators have argued that the opposition PN drew its support from the lowest strata of Malaysian society, due to economic discontent with the PH-BN administration.[34] With uneven rates of economic growth, rural areas are generally less developed, with PH-BN posited to perform worse in these Malay-dominated areas. However, Negeri Sembilan confounds the notion that PH-BN struggles in rural seats but tends to perform better in semi-urban and urban seats. Instead, BN-PH performed best in rural Malay seats in Negeri Sembilan, with close to a 10 per cent lead over PN, reflected in the gap in chart 3. This was because rural seats have traditionally been the bastion for UMNO, with numerous rural seats in Negeri Sembilan containing large FELDA settlements. Nonetheless, compared to past performance where BN was almost invincible in rural or FELDA seats, BN underperformed.[35] According to the author’s fieldwork observation, BN relied on its traditional campaign methods of small-scale get-together events and mini-rallies (ceramah) to mobilise support rather than on selling a narrative – in contrast to PN which champions Malay rights and clean governance but lacks machinery and a human touch on the ground. PH-BN had a narrow lead over PN in urban Malay seats, reflected in the small distance in median values. Nonetheless, this remained sufficient to get PH-BN across the finishing line in straight fights against PN. PH-BN performed the worst in semi-urban Malay seats, where PN has almost a 10 per cent lead over BN-PH. Contrary to the trends argued by many commentators, PN’s inroads in Negeri Sembilan were in semi-urban and (to a lesser extent) urban Malay seats. None of the five seats PN won were rural; four were semi-urban while one was urban and located within Seremban town.
Chart 2: PH-BN and PN median vote share in Malay seats for 2023 State Election
IMPLICATIONS
While PN – especially PAS – scored a “Green Wave” of unprecedented scale in Kelantan, Terengganu, and Kedah, it failed to capture Selangor, Penang and Negeri Sembilan. PH-BN performed best in Negeri Sembilan with PN only capturing five state seats in PRN2023. Nonetheless, this opens a foothold for PN to challenge PH-BN in the next state and parliamentary elections. With careful allocation of resources and early deployment of “winnable” candidates to seats which PH-BN hold on a narrow majority, PN can be expected to pose a serious challenge in the next round (Map 5). Nonetheless, as seen in 2018 and 2023, national-level sentiments can play a critical role in deciding the outcome of an electoral contest.
The performance of the Negeri Sembilan government – where state cabinet positions are allocated somewhat evenly between BN and PH – will be closely scrutinised. The state will be a test case for whether PH-BN can collaborate successfully. Should the results be positive, there may be pressure for Johor to similarly include PH assemblypersons into the state cabinet, which at present comprises only BN members. Should the collaboration be less than successful however, this will provide ample ammunition for PN in the next state election. Some of the pressing issues concern the lack of development in large parts of the state outside of Seremban, and the absence of affordable and reliable transport options for Seremban residents who commute daily to the Klang Valley.
REFERENCES
Khairy Jamaluddin. 2023. Malaysia’s 2023 Elections: A Coming Clash of Coalitions in Selangor. ISEAS Perspective 2023/61. Singapore: ISEAS.
Ong Kian Ming. 2023a. Malaysia’s 2023 State Elections (Part 1): Projections and Scenarios. ISEAS Perspective 2023/52. Singapore: ISEAS.
Ong Kian Ming. 2023b. Malaysia’s 2023 State Elections (Part 2): Campaign Strategies and Future Implications. ISEAS Perspective 2023/66. Singapore: ISEAS.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |