2024/58 “Deepfakes and Selective Belief: How Partisanship Affects Voters’ Exposure and Susceptibility to Deepfake Content” by Burhanuddin Muhtadi and Maria Monica Wihardja
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- During Indonesia’s 2024 election campaigns, many AI-generated deepfake images, videos and audio recordings went viral, among which were a video featuring an audio recording of the National Democratic Party’s General Chairman, Surya Paloh, reprimanding presidential candidate Anies Baswedan, and another portraying President-elect Prabowo delivering a speech in Arabic.
- Preliminary evidence shows the prevalence of selective exposure and selective belief among Indonesian voters in relation to deepfake content. Selective exposure and selective belief refer to the phenomena of how voters’ likelihood to hear/read/watch and to believe certain disinformation and election propaganda narratives depend on their partisan beliefs and alignments.
- The selective belief phenomenon is even more evident when we assess respondents’ exposures to and beliefs regarding other disinformation or election propaganda narratives which were not AI-generated. Our paper suggests that AI-generated deepfakes could be as polarising as non-AI-generated disinformation and election propaganda narratives.
- The partisanship biases shown in this paper can be explained by the fact that inherent biases prompt voters to select political circles, friendships and information sources that share the same alignment, thereby intensifying polarisation along various political cleavages. Moreover, our data also supports the confirmation bias theory that suggests that voters tend to exercise greater critical discernment in consuming and accepting information originating from outside their trusted political network and circles while being more trusting of any information originating from their own circles regardless of its accuracy.
- Even in the context of Indonesia’s weak party system – low levels of party identification and loyalty – it is personality-based partisan sentiments that exert the stronger influence on numerous aspects, including voters’ susceptibility to and acceptance of certain disinformation and election propaganda.
* Burhanuddin Muhtadi is Visiting Senior Fellow in the Indonesia Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, and a Senior Lecturer at Islamic State University (UIN) Syarif Hidayatullah. Maria Monica Wihardja is Visiting Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and Adjunct Assistant Professor at the National University of Singapore.
ISEAS Perspective 2024/58, 26 July 2024
MOTIVATION
This paper studies the prevalence of selective exposure and selective belief among Indonesian voters in relation to the circulation of deepfake content during Indonesia’s 2024 election campaigns. During this period, a video featuring an audio recording of the National Democratic Party’s General Chairman, Surya Paloh, reprimanding presidential candidate Anies Baswedan went viral.[1] This deepfake was supposedly intended to undermine Anies’ candidacy by portraying him as a puppet of Paloh. Another deepfake video that went viral during the election campaigns portrayed President-elect Prabowo delivering a speech in Arabic. In contrast to the first video, this deepfake, which appealed to Muslim voters, was supposedly intended to boost Prabowo’s popularity.[2]
For the purposes of our study, selective exposure refers to the phenomenon where loyal supporters of a presidential candidate actively seek out information that aligns with their preconceived notions about their candidate, while consciously avoiding or filtering out contradictory information. Selective belief refers to the phenomenon where individuals who encounter disinformation about various presidential candidates either accept or reject it depending on their beliefs and loyalties towards a presidential candidate (Neyazi and Muhtadi, 2021).[3]
By employing a two-wave, nationwide representative panel survey carried out in 34 provinces in Indonesia before and after the 2024 legislative and presidential election campaigns, we show preliminary evidence of selective exposure and selective belief. This paper contributes to literature in selective exposure and selective belief in two areas: the use of AI-generated deepfake videos/audios to test for selective exposure and selective belief instead of using the fake news/propaganda narratives that have been created and circulated via more conventional means, and the use of a two-wave, panel survey to better address the endogeneity bias issue that is often associated with a cross-sectional survey.
Empirical Context and Method
In a world where social media and chat messaging apps are omnipresent, avoiding disinformation and election propaganda is extremely difficult. Mere exposure to disinformation or election propaganda, however, does not automatically imply that individuals will agree with its veracity. Despite the fact that social media and chat messaging apps can expose users to political propaganda and numerous falsehoods, the acceptance of such information may not be solely the result of exposure. Belief is a more complex phenomenon than exposure. Why people believe a particular piece of information is influenced by a number of factors including cognitive biases and the intensity of exposure to media and messages.
Indonesia, the world’s third-largest democracy, is an interesting case study for examining the extent to which disinformation and election propaganda (including those generated with deepfake technology) spread via social media and chat messaging apps influence electoral politics. Around 67 percent of Indonesians had Internet access in 2022, 74 percent of whom used the internet for social media purposes.[4] Indonesians spent an average of 7 hours 42 minutes per day online in 2023,[5] with 3 hours 18 minutes spent on social media. At the same time, Indonesia ranks fifth in the world for spreading hoaxes and disinformation.[6]
To understand the impact of disinformation and election propaganda in Indonesia’s 2024 presidential elections, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute in collaboration with Lembaga Survei Indonesia conducted a two-wave, nationally representative panel survey. The first wave (Wave 1) was carried out before the start of the official election campaign period (28 November 2023 – 10 February 2024) from 17 to 27 November 2023, and the second wave (Wave 2) was carried out towards the end of the election campaigns from 2 to 9 February 2024. Both waves were conducted through face-to-face interviews with 2,020 respondents, 1,919 of whom were interviewed in both waves. Respondents, spread across 34 provinces, were eligible Indonesian voters, who were 17 years old of age or older, or married, when the surveys were conducted. They were selected through multistage proportional and random-sampling methodology with “village” as the primary sampling unit. Both stages preserved the composition of the true population in terms of gender, rural-urban, age group, religion, ethnicity, and provincial location.
The questionnaire in each wave was about 45 minutes long and consisted of questions on the main variables of interest including voting behaviours, access to social media and chat messaging apps, access to mediums for election-related information, perceptions on presidential candidates, exposures to and beliefs about general and specific disinformation and election propaganda narratives. These main variables of interest were asked in both stages.
Low Exposure, Low Impact
In both Wave 1 and Wave 2, we asked respondents about their likelihood – indexed from 0 to 10 – to vote for each presidential candidate (see Annex 1) and used the data from Wave 1 as our independent variable in our analysis. To determine the extent to which voters were exposed to the various deepfake videos that emerged during the election campaign, our questionnaire in Wave 2 included an additional section in which respondents were shown two deepfake videos and all respondents were asked the questions about their exposures and their beliefs, regardless of whether they had prior exposure to the fake content (see Annex 2).
A mere 23.2 percent of respondents reported having seen or heard the video containing an audio recording in which Surya Paloh purportedly reprimanded Anies Baswedan (Figure 1a). Only 17.6 percent of survey participants believed that the conversation truly occurred regardless of whether they had seen or heard the video before (Figure 1b).
Figure 1: Surya Reprimands Anies (% of all respondents)
Source: ISEAS-LSI Indonesia’s Disinformation and Election Propaganda Survey 2023-2024, authors’ calculation.
The percentage of respondents who were exposed to the video of Prabowo purportedly speaking in Arabic was slightly lower (18.6 percent) (Figure 2a). Nevertheless, a significantly higher percentage of participants (28.2 percent) believed that Prabowo genuinely delivered his speech in Arabic, regardless of whether they had seen or heard the video before (Figure 2b).
Figure 2: Prabowo’s Speech in Arabic (% of all respondents)
Source: ISEAS-LSI Indonesia’s Disinformation and Election Propaganda Survey 2023-2024, authors’ calculation
SELECTIVE EXPOSURE, SELECTIVE BELIEF
We are interested to know whether respondents’ exposure to and beliefs about the veracity of these deepfake videos are associated with certain biases such as their likelihood to vote for a certain candidate. By using the likelihood to vote for each of the presidential candidates in Wave 1 as a determinant to deepfake exposures and beliefs in Wave 2, controlling for respondents’ profiles, we are able to rule out the reverse causality of exposures to/beliefs in deepfakes that were measured after the election campaign causing voting behaviour that was measured before the election campaign.
Our hypothesis is that those who were more inclined to vote for Anies were less likely to have been exposed to and to believe deepfake video 1 which portrayed Anies in an unflattering manner; and conversely, those inclined to oppose Anies (i.e., those supported Prabowo and Ganjar) were more likely to have been exposed to and believe the same video. Similarly, for deepfake video 2 which portrayed Prabowo positively with his purported ability to speak in Arabic, those who were more inclined to vote for Prabowo were more likely to have been exposed to and believe deepfake video 2; while those inclined to support other candidates were less likely to be exposed to and believe the video. We follow a similar empirical methodology used in Neyazi and Muhtadi (2021) and use an odd-ratio, logistic regression on the panel respondents (1,919 respondents), controlling for respondents’ age, gender, income level, education, and religion, to analyse whether respondents are more likely to have been exposed to and to believe the deepfake videos that favour their choice of presidential candidate or disfavour the opponents of their choice of presidential candidate, compared to the control group (see Annex 3). An odds ratio on exposure or believability of greater than 1 means respondents are more likely to have been exposed to or to believe deepfakes compared to the control group. An odds ratio on exposure or believability of lower than 1 means that respondents are less likely to have been exposed to or to believe deepfakes compared to the control group.
Evidence of Selective Exposure and Selective Belief
Before we investigate the regression results, Annex Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the control variables namely gender, age, income level, education, and religion of our panel respondents. Table 1 shows respondents’ likelihood to vote for each candidate in Wave 1:
Table 1: Likelihood to Vote in Wave 1
| Likelihood to vote (0-10) | Number of obs.= 1,876 | |||
| Mean | Std. Err. | [95% Conf. Interval] | ||
| Anies-Muhaimin | 5.39 | 0.07 | 5.26 | 5.52 |
| Prabowo-Gibran | 6.79 | 0.06 | 6.67 | 6.91 |
| Ganjar-Mahfud | 5.61 | 0.06 | 5.48 | 5.73 |
Source: ISEAS-LSI Indonesia’s Disinformation and Election Propaganda Survey 2023-2024, authors’ calculation
Note: Excluding those who answered “Don’t Know” or “Not Applicable”
Our analysis shows evidence of selective exposure and belief. Figures 1a and 1b show the odds ratios of having been exposed to deepfake video 1 (Surya Paloh reprimanding Anies) and deepfake video 2 (Prabowo speaking in Arabic). Although Figure 1a shows that none of these results are statistically significant within a 95 percent confidence interval,[7] Figure 1b shows that those who were more inclined to vote for Ganjar-Mahfud pair were the less likely to have been exposed to deepfake video 2 and the finding is statistically significant within a 95 percent confidence interval.[8]
We could make an argument here that since Ganjar-Mahfud’s voters, whose profiles are more aligned with PDI-P nationalist voters and lean more towards the pluralist camp instead of the Islamist camp in the ideological spectrum of Indonesian voters, have a lower probability of having been exposed to deepfake video 2 due to the “echo chamber” theory. In this environment, the theory argues, an individual is exposed only to beliefs or opinions that are similar to their own, so that their existing views are reinforced and views that contradict prior beliefs are rejected. We argue that more pluralist Ganjar-Mahfud’s voters may be engaging in a somewhat exclusively separate information system than Anies-Muhaimin’s and Prabowo’s voters, and hence were less likely to have been exposed to videos that primarily appealed and were targeted to Muslim voters.
Source: ISEAS-LSI Indonesia’s Disinformation and Election Propaganda Survey 2023-2024, authors’ calculation
Note: The middle line marks the coefficient of interest (the odd ratio) and the lower and upper lines mark the 95% confidence interval.
The evidence for selective belief is more compelling. Figure 2a and 2b show the odds ratios of believing deepfake video 1 and 2. Figure 2a shows that those who were more inclined to vote for Anies-Muhaimin were less likely to believe the deepfake video of Surya Paloh reprimanding Anies and this finding is statistically significant within a 95 percent confidence interval. Figure 2b shows that those who were more inclined to vote for Anies-Muhaimin and Ganjar-Mahfud pairs were less likely to believe the deepfake video of Prabowo speaking in Arabic, albeit within slightly less than 95 percent confidence interval (weaker statistical power; significant at 85 percent confidence interval). Those who were more inclined to vote for Prabowo-Gibran were neither more likely nor less likely to believe deepfake video 2.
Source: ISEAS-LSI Indonesia’s Disinformation and Election Propaganda Survey 2023-2024, authors’ calculation
Note: The middle line marks the coefficient of interest (the odd ratio) and the lower and upper lines mark the 95% confidence interval.
These findings show some evidence of partisanship and selective belief on voters’ susceptibility in believing the veracity of the deepfake videos being consumed during the campaign period. When our respondents displayed higher propensity to vote for a certain candidate, their likelihood of believing in the veracity of the deepfake videos denigrating their preferred candidate decreased, as in the case of the deepfake video of Anies being reprimanded by Surya Paloh. The same dynamic in reverse also occurred. When the deepfake video appeared to boost an opposing candidate’s appeal, such as the deepfake video of Prabowo delivering a speech in Arabic, the propensity to believe in the veracity of the content among Anies’ and Ganjar’s staunch supporters decreased.
There are also biases in both exposures and beliefs associated with respondents’ education background profiles. For example, for both deepfake video 1 and 2, those with upper secondary and college/university education were less likely to believe, compared to those respondents with no education (defined as less than primary school education).
EXTENSION
We checked the robustness of our analysis by using Wave 2 instead of Wave 1 data on the likelihood of voting for a candidate. By using this model specification for robustness check, the evidence for selective exposure and belief is even stronger with more significant statistical power. First, those who were more inclined to vote for Prabowo-Gibran were more likely to have been exposed to deepfake video 1 (Anies being reprimanded) and deepfake video 2 (Prabowo speaking in Arabic) within a 95 percent confidence interval (Figure 3a and Figure 3b). Second, those who were more inclined to vote for Anies were less likely to believe deepfake video 1 (Figure 4a). As for deepfake video 2 which portrayed Prabowo speaking in Arabic, those who were more inclined to vote for Anies had a lower likelihood of believing the video while those who had a higher inclination to vote for Prabowo-Gibran were more likely to believe the video (Figure 4b). All findings are significant at a 95 percent confidence interval.
Source: ISEAS-LSI Indonesia’s Disinformation and Election Propaganda Survey 2023-2024, authors’ calculation
Note: The middle line marks the coefficient of interest (the odd ratio) and the lower and upper lines mark the 95% confidence interval.
Source: ISEAS-LSI Indonesia’s Disinformation and Election Propaganda Survey 2023-2024, authors’ calculation
Note: The middle line marks the coefficient of interest (the odd ratio) and the lower and upper lines mark the 95% confidence interval.
We also extend the analysis by including access to the internet as a control variable to the original model specification. This did not change the original results. Those who access the internet have a higher likelihood to get exposed to deepfake video 1 and 2 but access to the internet does not affect the likelihood of believing deepfake video 1 and 2.
Lastly, we include in the original model specification the respondents’ behaviour in using social media as a source for election-related information. We take TikTok as an example. This has not changed the result except in the believability of deepfake video 2. Although more staunch supporters of Anies and Ganjar were still less likely to believe deepfake video 2, the coefficients are no longer significant when we add TikTok. The correlation between engagement in various social media/chat messaging apps and exposures and believability in certain deepfakes could be explored further in future research.
FURTHER EVIDENCE OF SELECTIVE BELIEF
This phenomenon of selective belief is even more evident when we assess respondents’ exposures to and beliefs regarding other disinformation or election propaganda narratives that were not AI-generated. In the ISEAS-LSI survey, we also tested respondents’ exposures and beliefs to various common political disinformation and election propaganda narratives.[9] A political disinformation narrative refers to a false narrative intentionally created to discredit opponents and has been confirmed to be fake by a fact-checking website, whereas an election propaganda narrative is not necessarily false but is used to discredit the opponents.
Although the overall level of awareness and belief in the disinformation or propaganda narratives varied, the pattern is consistent: partisanship is strongly associated with belief in disinformation and election propaganda aimed at candidates (see Annex Table 2). People’s beliefs in disinformation and election propaganda varied depending on whether it was targeted against their own candidate or the opposing candidates.
For example, we asked respondents if they had ever heard or seen news that the Constitutional Court’s ruling that paved the way for President Jokowi’s son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, was influenced by nepotism due to Gibran’s familial relationship with the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court, who is also his uncle. Although 48 percent of those polled were exposed to such news, only 31 percent believed it. When we run the same regression specification for deepfakes on these disinformation/election propaganda narratives, we find that those who were more inclined to vote for Anies were more likely to believe that the Constitutional Court decision was influenced by nepotism. Those who were more likely to vote for Prabowo-Gibran were less likely to believe it.
Another example is that those who were more inclined to vote for Anies were less likely to believe a disinformation narrative where Anies had been implicated in a corruption case involving the 4G base transceiver station (BTS) infrastructure procurement. Anies supporters were also less likely to believe an election propaganda narrative that Anies is the father of identity politics and is close to radical Islamic groups that threaten the state ideology Pancasila and Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity). Those who were more likely to vote for Anies on the other hand, were more likely to believe a disinformation narrative that Gibran spent 500 million Rupiah from the state budget on a fake university degree in Australia. Those Anies supporters were also more inclined to believe the narrative that there was massive and organised electoral fraud that helped Prabowo-Gibran’s victory in one round, compared to Prabowo supporters who tended to disbelieve the narrative. Similarly, strong supporters of Ganjar were less likely to believe the fake news stating that Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) had been preparing Ganjar to be a president, and less likely to believe in election propaganda that Ganjar was not an independent presidential candidate and would only be Megawati’s (PDIP) puppet if elected. On the other hand, Anies’ supporters were more likely to believe the latter narrative. The full results of selective exposures and belief on disinformation and election propaganda narratives are given in Annex Table 2.
CONCLUSION
We show preliminary evidence of selective exposure and selective belief phenomena in the case of two AI-generated deepfake videos during Indonesia’s 2024 presidential elections. Individuals’ susceptibility to and acceptance of these deepfake videos is contingent upon whether the disinformation favours their preferred candidate or undermines the opposing candidate. Although the findings on selective belief to AI-generated deepfakes may not be as overwhelming as the findings on selective belief regarding other sources of disinformation and election propaganda narratives, presumably due to the rudimentary nature of AI-generated deepfake technology so far,[10] it does not mean they are any less threatening or polarising, especially since this deepfake technology will only become more sophisticated. On the contrary, our paper suggests that AI-generated deepfakes could be as polarising as other sources of disinformation and election propaganda narratives.
Our finding supports the selective belief theory found in Neyazi and Muhtadi (2021),[11] which is based on research on selective exposure, selective sharing, and partisan-motivated reasoning to demonstrate that people’s actions in consuming and believing in disinformation are influenced by their ideological alignment in Indonesia’s 2019 national elections. Our paper advances Neyazi and Muhtadi (2021) in two ways. First, this paper exploits a two-wave panel survey to show stronger evidence of causality of partisanship on susceptibility to and acceptance of disinformation. Second, this paper uses AI-generated deepfake videos instead of other more conventional sources of disinformation and election propaganda narratives.
The biases shown in this paper can be explained by the fact that intense polarisation prompts voters to select political circles or friendships that share the same alignment. When they express opinions, their circle promptly agrees without any form of critical examination. An echo chamber can be perilous as it stifles objectivity due to the conformity of ideas resulting from the homogeneous group of like-minded people. Consequently, they exercise critical discernment in consuming and accepting information originating from outside the political network while trusting any information originating from their own group regardless of its accuracy.
Our findings also confirm the greater salience of personality-centric partisanship versus party-centric partisanship. Indeed, with low levels of party identification and loyalty, it is personality-based partisan sentiments that exert the stronger influence on numerous aspects, including voters’ susceptibility to and acceptance of certain disinformation and election propaganda.
REFERENCES
Detik.com. 2024. “Viral Video Percakapan Surya Paloh Marahi Anies, NasDem Buka Suara,” 23 January, available at https://www.detik.com/bali/berita/d-7156114/viral-video-percakapan-surya-paloh-marahi-anies-nasdem-buka-suara
Hicken A, Aspinall E, Weiss ML, Muhtadi B. 2022. “Buying Brokers: Electoral Handouts beyond Clientelism in a Weak-Party State. World Politics, Vol.74(1):77-120.
KOMINFO. 2023. “[Hoaks] Menhan Prabowo Subianto Berpidato dalam Bahasa Arab,” 9 November, available at https://www.kominfo.go.id/content/detail/52826/hoaks-menhan-prabowo-subianto-berpidato-dalam-bahasa-arab/0/laporan_isu_hoaks
Kompas TV. 2020. “Indonesia Peringkat 5 Produsen Hoax di Dunia,” 22 August, available at https://www.kompas.tv/talkshow/103346/indonesia-peringkat-5-produsen-hoax-di-dunia-rosi
Muhtadi, B. 2019. Vote Buying in Indonesia: The Mechanics of Electoral Bribery. Singapore: Springer Nature
Neyazi, T. A. & Muhtadi, B. 2021. “Selective Belief: How Partisanship Drives Belief in Misinformation.” International Journal of Communication, 15, 23
Shidiq, A. R., Muhtadi, B., & Yusuf, A. A. 2024. “Social Media and Religious Intolerance in Indonesia.” Unpublished manuscript.
Statista. 2024. Average Daily Time Spent Using Various Media and Devices in Indonesia in 3rd Quarter, 2023, by activity. Available one: https://www.statista.com/statistics/803524/daily-time-spent-using-online-media-by-activity-indonesia/
Thornhill, J. 2024. “The danger of deepfakes is not what you think,” Financial Times, 20 June 2024, available at https://www.ft.com/content/bcbbe8af-90c3-48bc-8b16-c9ec57c3abf3
ENDNOTES AND ANNEXES
For endnotes and annexes, please refer to the original pdf document.
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2024/57 “Bhumjaithai Party Reaps Windfall Benefits from Astonishing Outcome of Thai Senate Election” by Termsak Chalermpalanupap
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Thailand’s complicated senate election has produced an outcome full of surprises and irregularities.
- While the election system was designed to let candidates from 20 major occupation groups choose among themselves, organised movements managed to mobilise candidates to vote for a chosen few.
- One huge surprise is that a majority of the elected 200 candidates appears to belong to the Blue Camp, with close ties to Bhumjaithai, the second largest government party.
- At the same time, several big names from the Red Camp, with links to Pheu Thai, the largest government party, failed to win seats. One of them is former prime minister Somchai Wongsawat, a brother-in-law of former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra.
- Another big surprise is the large-scale failure of candidates from the Democracy Camp who support reforms proposed by the embattled Move Forward Party. Fewer than 40 of the 200 elected candidates can be considered “pro-democracy reformists”.
- One intriguing outcome is that candidates from Buriram, the home base province of Bhumjaithai in the lower Northeast, won 14 senate seats, the largest number, surpassing Bangkok which won only nine seats.
- With a large number of allies in the Senate, Bhumjaithai’s political fortune, as well as bargaining power is on the rise, elevating it to be on par with Pheu Thai and Move Forward Parties.
* Termsak Chalermpalanupap is Visiting Fellow and Coordinator of the Thailand Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
ISEAS Perspective 2024/57, 24 July 2024
INTRODUCTION
Thailand’s complicated senate election has brought many surprises, some of which hold significant political implications. More surprises are in store as a slew of complaints about irregularities and organised manipulations continue to emerge.
The Election Commission (EC) has quickly acknowledged that its officials have indeed encountered some of these irregularities; and have considered them as merely “inappropriate” but not criminally unlawful.
Several defeated prominent candidates disagree with the EC’s optimistic assessment. They have demanded an urgent nationwide systematic probe. Others have even threatened to petition the Constitutional Court to declare the election null and void.
Should the senate election be nullified, there will be no new set of elected 200 senators to replace the infamous 250 senators appointed under the previous rules laid down in the Constitution. The latter’s five-year term and mandate – which included participation in the selection of every new prime minister – expired on 11 May. If there are no new elected senators to replace them, the 250 appointed senators will continue to operate, albeit without the authority to join MPs in selecting any new prime minister.
Most probably, the senate election outcome will stand,[1] with just a few of the elected candidates being eventually caught for breaking laws and disqualified. In that case, the largest group of new senators, perhaps numbering more than 100, appears to belong to the Blue Camp, which is reputed to have close ties to Bhumjaithai (BJT), the second largest party in the ruling coalition of 12 parties led by Pheu Thai (PT).
Another big surprise is the poor showing of candidates from the Red Camp with ties to the PT. Several prominent candidates from this group unexpectedly failed, including former prime minister Somchai Wongsawat, a brother-in-law of former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, and former acting prime minister Niwatthamrong Bunsongphaisan, who headed the PT-led coalition government before the May 2014 coup.
Yet another surprise is the widespread failure of candidates from the Democracy Camp under the political influence of the reformist Thanathorn Jungroongruerngkit, leader of the Progressive Movement, and of the dissolved Future Forward Party that preceded the Move Forward Party (MFP). The earlier fear that a groundswell of support for drastic reforms would see a majority of pro-MFP senators being elected turned out to be unfounded.
Even though the MFP came first in the May 2023 general election with more than 14 million votes, most of the candidates from the Democracy Camp did not enjoy much support for being “pro-democracy”. This was due chiefly to the fact that only those who were at least 40 could apply to stand in the senate election. A candidate must have at least 10 years of working experience in one of the 20 occupation groups prescribed in the Organic Act of 2018 on the Installation of Senators.[2] And voting was done only by the candidates. Therefore young voters under 40 – they constitute the main support base of the MFP – did not have any role in the senate election.
UNIQUELY COMPLICATED SENATE ELECTION
Meechai Ruchupan, the chairman of the committee drafting the 2017 Constitution, explained in a book about the drafting exercise that he envisaged a new Senate which would be filled with elected members from different walks of life, instead of elitist politicians. He believed such a new Senate would be able to better present grievances from a wider spectrum of Thai society. He did not want a new Senate full of experts, retired generals, and senior intellectuals who would likely be linked to and influenced by political parties.[3]
Initially, there were real concerns that too many would apply and overload the election verification and logistic system. Much to the relief of the EC, only about 48,200 eventually applied to stand in the senate election. Each had to pay the candidacy fee of 2,500 baht (US$70). In the first round of election in 878 districts on 9 June, the number of candidates was whittled down to 23,645.
In the provincial round in 76 provinces and Bangkok on 16 June, the number was further cut to 3,000. Finally, only 2,995[4] showed up for the final national round on 26 June.
On 27 June, the EC announced a tentative list of 200 elected candidates (10 from each of the 20 occupation groups) who will serve a non-renewable 5-year term, and a waiting list of 100 others (five from each of the 20 occupation groups).[5] If and when an elected senator is disqualified, resigns, or dies, then the first on the waiting list in the same occupation group is promoted to fill the vacancy.
Dr Nantana Nantawaropas, one of the elected candidates in Group 18 (Mass Media and Creators of Literature), labelled the one who designed the senate election system as a “sadist”; the system puts candidates in a cut-throat situation, like in a combination of “Squid Game + Survival + Gladiators” video games in which candidates must be ruthless, betraying, and making secret deals in order to survive and advance to win a senate seat.[6]
Dr Nantana, who is the dean of the College of Political Communication of Krirk University, lamented that fewer than 30 of the elected 200 candidates could be consider pro-democracy reformists like her.
SIGNS OF IRREGULARITIES
Signs of irregularities and organised movements to win the senate election have been widely reported in the Thai media. They include: candidates staying in same hotels; candidates wearing similar colours of clothes; circulated lists of recommended candidates to vote for in each occupation group; and candidates who did not vote for themselves, etc.
Other irregularities include: eight provinces[7] in which BJT had won House seats in the 2023 general election gained 52 senate seats; the largest number of elected candidates, 14,[8] came from Buriram where all 10 MPs are from the BJT,[9] and which is the base of the BJT in the lower Northeast.[10]
One of the elected candidates in Occupation Group 16 ( Arts, Culture, Music, Entertainment, and Sports) is Praneet Gayrum, a 61-year-old driver for former House Speaker Chai Chidchob. Chai was the deceased father of Newin Chidchob, the influential mastermind behind the BJT. Praneet finished only secondary school. In his self- introduction, he describes himself as a senior footballer from 1984-2004.
More significantly, coming first in Occupation Group 1 ( Government and Security) is General Kriangkai Srirak, the chief advisor to BJT leader Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior Anutin Charnvirakul. General Kriangkai, who is a retired former assistant army commander, has emerged as the new frontrunner to head the Senate, replacing former prime minister Somchai who failed in the final national round.
Senator Somchai Sawaengkan, one of the most outspoken members of the current Senate, faulted the EC for failing to more vigorously verify whether candidates truly belonged to the occupation groups that they applied for.[11] The EC’s rules allowed candidates to show merely a letter of guarantee of qualifications by someone else from the same occupation group. This opened a huge loophole for enterprising candidates to hire supporters to stand for election in order to put them in place to vote for “recommended” candidates. Many of these hired hands conspicuously did not vote for themselves.
However, EC Secretary-General Sawaeng Boonmee described as “orderly” the overall senate election. Nevertheless, he reported receiving (as of 27 June) 614 complaints of alleged wrongdoings.[12]
He conceded there were organised movements to win the senate election for certain candidates; there were even lists of “block votes” circulating among candidates in some movements. But he cautioned that these were merely “inappropriate” actions, which did not directly break any election law or EC’s rules for the senate election.[13]
Quite expectedly, BJT leader Anutin has insisted[14] that his party had nothing to do with the senate election – because that is forbidden. Candidates in the senate election must not be members of any political party, and according to Section 113 of the Constitution, elected senators shall not be guided or influenced by any political party.
BHUMJAITHAI IN NEW POLE POSITION
Notwithstanding Anutin’s denial, the emerging consensus among Thai political commentators is that a majority of the elected 200 candidates, perhaps as many as 120, are pro-BJT, or belong to movements organised by skilful operators with close secret ties to the BJT. Such public perception will undoubtedly enhance the bargaining power of the BJT in the PT-led ruling coalition.
One immediate benefit for the BJT is in having a louder say in the strenuous process to amend the Constitution. In the 500-member House of Representatives, the BJT has only 71 MPs in the ruling coalition comprised of 315 MPs. But now the BJT can count on support from a large number of allies in the Senate to control the constitutional amendment process. Any proposed bill to amend the Constitution requires the support of at least one-third (67) of the 200 Senators for further consideration, as well as for approval of the final amendments.
Moreover, the Senate can delay by at least 180 days any legislation that it dislikes. Twenty Senators may also petition the Constitutional Court to strike down any unpalatable bill of the House of Representatives.
The BJT opposes existing efforts of the MFP to include in a new general amnesty bill, those convicted of or charged for lese-majeste under the Criminal Code Section 112. Since Thaksin is being prosecuted for alleged lese-majeste as a result of his interview with a South Korean media group in 2015, the PT is seriously considering supporting the MFP in pushing for a comprehensive amnesty bill.[15]
Moreover, the Senate is directly in charge of vetting applicants and proposed nominees vying for prestigious posts on the EC, the (three) Ombudsmen, the National Human Rights Commission, the State Audit Commission, and the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC). The head of the NACC, Pol Gen Watcharapol Prasarnrajkit is due to retire on 9 September.
Most importantly, a majority of Senators can block or approve the nomination of proposed appointees to the powerful Constitutional Court (CC). CC chief justice Nakarin Maketrairat and justice Panya Utchachon are due for retirement at the end of their 7-year term this November. Four other CC justices are going to retire in April 2027, and another CC justice in August 2027. Therefore, within the first three of its five years in office, the new Senate will select seven of the nine CC justices.
Undoubtedly, whoever is in the driver’s seat of the Senate could also exert influence on the CC.
BHUMJAITHAI’S NEW ATTRACTIVE AURA
Pending a crucial hearing in the CC is a case against the MFP in which the EC has accused the reformist party of attempting to undermine Thailand’s rule of constitutional monarchy during its election campaign in early 2023, in wanting to reform the monarchy, and to amend the lese-majeste law. In January, the CC ruled against the MFP on this issue, and ordered it to stop abusing its political freedom and liberty when talking about monarchy reforms outside of the parliament.
Now the EC has asked the CC to punish the MFP with a party dissolution and a ban from national politics against the party’s executive committee members, including Pita Limjaroenrat, the MFP’s sole premiership candidate.
The hearing is expected to receive a final ruling in September. Should the MFP be eventually dissolved, its 138 MPs will have 60 days to join another party without losing their House membership. In this regard, several of these MPs may be drawn into the BJT’s embrace. When the Move Forward (the predecessor of the MFP) was dissolved in February 2020, 10 of its 76 MPs joined the BJT.
The BJT hopes to attract more MPs from all other parties in order to strengthen its prospects to win the next general election, and to make party leader Anutin the next prime minister.[16] It is positioning itself as a high potential third choice in the ongoing struggle between the MFP and the PT. The surprise outcome of the senate election will further enhance the BJT’s reputation, elevating its status to be on par with both the MFP and the PT. In the past, the BJT had been largely overlooked as merely an Isan regional party of opportunists without national appeal or the support of Bangkok voters.
WHAT WENT WRONG IN RED CAMP?
When former prime minister Somchai applied to stand in the senate election in Chiang Mai, speculations quickly followed that he was being positioned by Thaksin to take over the Senate leadership post. Few doubted that he would fail.
Somchai, who is married to Thaksin’s younger sister Yaowapa, did well in both the district and provincial levels of senate election in Chiang Mai, Thaksin’s hometown and powerbase of the PT. But he failed to win enough votes even to get into a reserve list at the national level, largely because he lacked supporting organised movements, unlike those successful candidates from the Blue Camp. Another reason for Somchai’s failure is his alleged over-confidence in his political experience and connections to Thaksin and the PT.[17]
Thaksin, on the other hand, blamed it on the “legacy of the authoritarians” in putting in place a complicated senate election system which completely “distrusts the people”.[18] He prefers direct election of all senators.[19]
Weera Theerapat, an influential political commentator, stated on a TV programme on 28 June that according to one reliable PT insider, it was Somchai’s own initiative to enter the senate race; and thus received no support from either Thaksin or the PT machine.[20]
SETBACK FOR THANATHORN AND REFORMISTS
Also a big surprise is the widespread failure of candidates from the Democracy Camp with support of Thanathorn and his Progressive Movement. Initially, it looked entirely plausible that a majority of the elected candidates would be reformists inspired by Thanathorn. He and his colleagues on the Progressive Movement[21] had conducted seminars and training workshops to recruit candidates for the senate election.
MFP leader Chaithawat Tulathon saw fewer than 20% of the elected candidates as reformists belonging to the Democracy Camp. He believes a majority of the elected candidates have secret connections to politicians.[22]
He also suspects that many of the elected candidates do not truly belong to the occupation groups to which they claimed to belong. In his opinion, such widespread shortcomings have defeated the stated purpose of electing senators based on their occupations.[23]
The senate election outcome could dampen the optimism inside the MFP. In the past, the thinking was that even if the MFP might be eventually dissolved, its successor party could and would continue to thrive on strong support from reformist voters.
Now, however, the new political landscape looks more complicated with the rising political fortune of the BJT. Formidable foes in the next general election now include the BJT and Anutin, with support of their allies in the Senate, in addition to the PT and Paetongtarn Shinawatra with support of her father, Thaksin.
CONCLUSION
The surprise victory of the candidates from the Blue Group in the senate election has enhanced the political fortune of the BJT. This will lead to changes in the political landscape in Thailand and intensify competition in the general election in 2027.
It has also upset the political foes of the BJT, especially those in the PT and the MFP, so much so that some even call for an urgent constitutional amendment to “improve” the senate election system, perhaps by abolishing the 20 occupation groups, introducing direct election of all senators, or abolishing the Senate altogether.
However, no major political parties are expected to invest energy and manpower to change the senate election system for the time being.
The Thai public is now watching to see how effective the EC can be in catching cheaters and removing them from the new Senate.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2024/56 “Russian President Putin’s Visit to Hanoi: Vietnam’s ‘Bamboo Diplomacy’ In Action” by Ian Storey
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- President Vladimir Putin visited Vietnam on 20 June 2024 in a bid to show that Western efforts to isolate Russia have been unsuccessful.
- The Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) welcomed Putin’s visit as it provided further validation of its ‘bamboo diplomacy’ whereby Hanoi strives to keep its relations with all the major powers in balance.
- Putin’s visit did not undermine Vietnam’s relations with the United States as Hanoi did not offer any support for Russia’s military campaign in Ukraine.
- Vietnam and Russia did not discuss defence cooperation. This suggests Vietnam has no immediate plans to resume Russian arms purchases.
- Vietnam and Russia agreed on various measures to strengthen economic engagement. But Russia is destined to remain a minor player in Vietnam’s economy.
- The prospects for cooperation between Vietnamese and Russian energy companies are brighter, especially in Vietnam’s offshore oil industry and meeting the country’s demand for natural gas. Whether Vietnam agrees to partner with Russia to develop a civilian nuclear energy industry is much less certain.
* Ian Storey is Senior Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak and co-editor of Contemporary Southeast Asia.
ISEAS Perspective 2024/56, 22 July 2024
INTRODUCTION
On 20 June 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin paid a state visit to Vietnam. It was Putin’s first trip to Southeast Asia since visiting Singapore in November 2018. It was also his first visit to the region since Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022.
Putin’s one-day stop in Vietnam was his fifth visit to the country as President and the sixth by a Russian head of state since 2000.[1] Putin has visited Vietnam more than any other country in Southeast Asia because it has long been Moscow’s closest partner in Southeast Asia. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union provided Hanoi with extensive military and economic assistance. After the Cold War, Vietnam found new economic partners in the West and East Asia, but Russia remained its main supplier of arms until the late 2010s.
Despite its close relationship with Moscow, Hanoi adopted a neutral position when Russia invaded Ukraine.[2] Vietnam’s neutrality was in keeping with its current practice of ‘bamboo diplomacy’: balancing Vietnam’s relations with the major powers by refusing to take sides in their disputes, thereby maintaining the government’s strategic autonomy and protecting the country’s economic and security interests.
This Perspective assesses Putin’s visit to Hanoi and its implications for Vietnam-Russia relations. The first part examines the rationales for his trip and the perceived benefits each side gained. It argues that the Russian leader’s presence in Hanoi was congruous with the Communist Party of Vietnam’s (CPV) bamboo diplomacy and did not impair Vietnam’s relations with the West, primarily because Hanoi did not lend its support to Russia’s military campaign in Ukraine. The second part assesses the prospects for two areas of bilateral cooperation at the top of Putin’s agenda: economic ties and energy collaboration
THE GEOPOLITICS OF PUTIN’S VISIT TO VIETNAM
Symbolism undoubtedly played a key role in President Putin’s trip to Vietnam. By visiting Hanoi, Putin could claim that the West’s attempts to isolate Russia since February 2022 had failed, and that Moscow still had friends around the world, including China, which he visited in May, and North Korea prior to his arrival in Vietnam. But his visit also had important pragmatic aims. In the face of a cascade of Western financial sanctions and export controls, Moscow is seeking to strengthen economic and security ties with its closest Asian partners.
For the CPV, Putin’s visit was a chance to show that Vietnam continues to be grateful for Soviet assistance during the Cold War and that it still values Russia as a friend. In the run-up to his trip, Vietnam was careful not to upset Russia: it postponed a meeting with EU officials to discuss the implementation of European sanctions against Russia, and did not send a delegation to attend the Ukraine Peace Summit in Switzerland.[3] In Hanoi, Putin was given the full red carpet treatment, including a 21-gun salute, and met with all of Vietnam’s top leaders: CPV General-Secretary the late Nguyen Phu Trong, President To Lam, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh and Chairman of the National Assembly Tran Thanh Man.
In the current context of an increasingly contested international environment, Putin’s visit was also viewed by the CPV as further validation of its bamboo diplomacy. Hanoi has refused to take sides in the Russia-Ukraine War, and in so doing has managed to keep on good terms with all the major players and stakeholders in the conflict. Most significantly, over the past nine months, Vietnam has played host to the leaders of the ‘Big Three’: US President Joe Biden in September 2023; Chinese President Xi Jinping in December 2023; and President Putin in June 2024. Since the outbreak of the conflict, no other country has achieved this impressive feat.
Putin’s visit was also a success for Vietnam’s bamboo diplomacy in another important aspect: it proved that relations with one country need not come at the expense of others.
When Putin was in Pyongyang, military cooperation was centre stage. The two countries signed a Cold War-style mutual defence pact and held discussions on North Korea’s support for Russia’s war effort in Ukraine, including the provision of further military assistance.[4] These developments proved of great concern to the United States and its allies in both Europe and East Asia, and possibly even China.[5]
With Vietnam, however, it is a very different story. Vietnam has been very careful not to undermine its relations with the United States and Europe by providing any kind of military assistance to Russia. Unlike other customers of Russian arms such as Iran, North Korea and Myanmar, Vietnam has refused to re-export military equipment and munitions to Russia which its armed forces could use against Ukraine.[6] While Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un condemned America’s support for Ukraine, during the Russian leader’s stay in Hanoi the conflict was barely mentioned. The only reference to the war was in an article written by Putin and published in the CPV’s official newspaper Nhan Dan in which he praised Vietnam’s “balanced stance” on the conflict.[7]
Although their joint statement acknowledged that defence cooperation occupied a “special role” in Vietnam-Russia relations, it does not appear to have been discussed at all.[8] Tellingly, Russia’s new defence minister, Andrey Belousov, who had travelled to North Korea with Putin, did not accompany him to Hanoi and returned to Moscow. This suggests that Vietnam is not ready or willing to resume major arms purchases from Russia. Vietnam’s last major defence order from Russia was in 2019. After the West imposed sanctions on Moscow following its seizure of Crimea in 2014, Vietnam began to question Russia’s reliability as a defence supplier and started shopping for military equipment from other countries.[9] Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has reinforced that trend. Speculation continues, however, that Vietnam plans to use the profits from a joint venture with Russia in Siberia to fund up to US$8 billion in military sales.[10]
Putin’s visit did not impede Vietnam’s relations with its Western partners. Just days before he arrived, President To Lam met with US Ambassador Marc Knapper and called for stronger ties between the two countries.[11] Although the Biden administration was clearly unhappy with Putin’s visit, it limited itself to a rebuke from a low-level official at the US Embassy in Hanoi who stated that “No country should give Putin a platform to promote his war of aggression and otherwise allow him to normalise his atrocities” because “If he is able to travel freely, it could normalize Russia’s blatant violations of international law”.[12] At a press briefing at the US State Department in Washington D.C., the spokesperson was more nuanced, acknowledging that Vietnam and Russia had long-standing ties but that the United States expected that “any country, when it engages in conversations with the Government of Russia and especially when it hosts leaders from the Government of Russia, will make clear their respect for the principles of the UN Charter, including sovereignty and territorial integrity, and convey that those principles must be upheld across the world.”[13]
The day after Putin’s visit, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Daniel Kritenbrink, was in the Vietnamese capital to discuss ways to advance the bilateral relationship.[14] At a press conference afterwards, Kritenbrink said strategic confidence between the two countries was “at an all time high” and, in an oblique reference to Putin’s visit, “We very much respect Vietnam and only Vietnam can decide the best way to protect its sovereignty and promote its interests.”[15]
On 25 June, Vietnamese and US officials held talks in Washington on trade, investment and energy cooperation.[16] EU officials did not even comment on Putin’s visit.
Vietnam also had self-interested reasons for inviting Putin to visit.[17] It is not in Vietnam’s interests to see Russia become isolated on the world stage, as this would deepen its dependence on China. The Vietnamese leadership is concerned that if Russia becomes too dependent on China, Beijing could use its leverage with Moscow to coerce it into ending its arms sales to Vietnam or drawing down its commercial operations in Vietnam’s offshore oil and gas industries in the South China Sea where Vietnam and China have overlapping maritime claims.[18] Moreover, Vietnam is as keen as Russia is to strengthen core areas of their Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, including economic engagement and energy cooperation.
VIETNAM-RUSSIA ECONOMIC TIES
In Vietnam, as in the rest of Southeast Asia, Russia is an economic minnow among whales. It is highly unlikely that this situation will change in the foreseeable future.
In 2015, in an effort to increase trade between the two countries, Vietnam signed a free trade agreement with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). This led to a 28 per cent increase in two-way trade between Vietnam and Russia－from US$2.75 billion in 2016 to US$3.52 billion in 2022－ but it was still well below their agreed target of US$10 billion by 2020.[19] In his Nhan Dan article, Putin was pleased to note that in 2023, bilateral trade had increased by 8 per cent year-on-year to reach US$3.6 billion.[20] Yet these figures pale in comparison with Vietnam’s other major trade partners. In 2022, Vietnam’s trade with China was US$175.6 billion, followed by the United States at US$124 billion, South Korea at US$86.4 billion and Japan at US$47.6 billion.[21] The United States is Vietnam’s largest export market, with exports worth US$109.4 billion in 2022. In the same year, Vietnam’s exports to Russia were a meagre US$1.56 billion.[22]
Two-way investment is also relatively small. By the end of 2023, Russia was the 28th largest investor in Vietnam with cumulative investments worth US$985 million.[23] Vietnam’s cumulative investments in Russia are valued at US$1.63 billion, mainly in the energy and agricultural sectors.[24]
Tourism was once a bright spot in Russia-Vietnam relations but has since faded. In 2019, 650,000 Russians travelled to Vietnam for leisure activities, but this number plunged in 2020 due to travel restrictions imposed during the COVID-19 pandemic.[25] Since the end of the pandemic, the number of Russian arrivals has failed to recover. Russia’s largest airline, Aeroflot, stopped flying to Vietnam during the pandemic and did not resume direct flights until January 2024. Vietnam Airlines also halted direct flights to Russia, resumed them in January 2022, but suspended them again shortly after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine War because the conflict had resulted in costly detours to avoid Russian airspace.[26] As a result, in 2023 less than 70,000 Russian tourists visited Vietnam. In contrast, last year 1.48 million Russians visited Thailand (the largest number of non-Asian tourists) and 160,000 travelled to Indonesia.[27]
At the top of Putin’s agenda in Hanoi was finding ways to increase economic engagement between Vietnam and Russia. To that end, they agreed on a number of measures. First, to increase the settlement of business transactions using their national currencies. This practice was already underway, partly as a means to bypass Western financial sanctions but also in a push by Russia to de-dollarise the international economy (in his newspaper article Putin obliquely referred to the US dollar as a “widely discredited currency”).[28]According to the Russian leader, business settlements using the Vietnamese and Russian currencies were used in 40 per cent of bilateral trade transactions in 2023, increasing to 60 per cent in the first quarter of 2024.[29] Second, to establish a high-level working group to identify priority investments in each other’s countries. Third, to increase the number of scheduled and charter flights between Vietnam and Russia.
Whether these measures are successful or not remains to be seen. But even if they do succeed in growing bilateral trade and investments, Russia is destined to remain a minor player compared with Vietnam’s other major economic partners. Russia’s largest exports include crude oil and foodstuffs, of which Vietnam is largely self-sufficient. Vietnam can buy cheaper and better quality manufactured goods from countries other than Russia (especially from China). In terms of FDI, due to the country’s economic problems caused by the war, Russia simply cannot compete with Asian investors.
ENERGY COOPERATION
Strengthening energy cooperation between Russia and Vietnam was also high on Putin’s agenda. In this area the prospects are somewhat brighter given Russia’s long-standing participation in Vietnam’s oil and gas sector.
Russia’s state-owned energy companies have been active players in Vietnam’s offshore energy industry for decades. In the early 1980s, the two countries’ state-owned energy companies, Zarubezhneft and PetroVietnam, established a joint venture, Vietsovpetro (VSP), to drill for oil in Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). According to VSP, by the end of 2017 the company had exploited 228 million tons of crude oil, 32.5 billion cubic metres of gas and generated a turnover of US$77 billion, of which US$48 billion went to the Vietnamese government.[30] However, the oil and gas reserves in the VSP’s blocks are running low, and both Vietnam and Russia are keen to expand operations in new fields.
In their joint statement, the two sides agreed to continue cooperation in “existing and new oil and gas projects”.[31] Among the 11 agreements signed during Putin’s trip, one granted Zarubezhneft a license to develop hydrocarbons in Block 11-2 off the Vietnamese coast. This is highly significant because Block 11-2 falls within China’s nine-dash line which Beijing uses to demarcate its sovereignty claims in the South China Sea, including natural resources such as oil and gas. Since President Xi consolidated power in 2012-13, Russia has come under increasing pressure from China to scale-down its operations in Vietnam’s EEZ. The Kremlin is loath to do so as Russia’s Vietnamese operations are profitable and because they give Russia an important foothold in Vietnam. Hanoi would also like Russian companies to continue operating because their presence validates its sovereign rights in its EEZ. The agreement on Block 11-2 shows that Russia continues to resist pressure from China to end its operations in the South China Sea.
Nuclear energy was also discussed during Putin’s visit. As with Vietnam’s oil and gas industry, Russia has played a central role in the country’s plans to generate nuclear power since the Cold War. In the 1960s, the Soviet Union provided Vietnam with a research reactor. As Vietnam’s economy expanded in the 1990s and 2000s, the government identified nuclear power as one way to meet rising energy demands. In 2010, Russia agreed to build a nuclear power station consisting of four reactors in Ninh Thuan Province.[32] A year later, Russia said it would finance 85 per cent of the costs of the power station with an US$8 billion loan.[33] At the same time, Vietnam and Russia signed an agreement to establish a Centre for Nuclear Science and Technology (CNST) in Vietnam consisting of a research reactor, laboratories, and multipurpose irradiation and nuclear medicine centres. Hundreds of Vietnamese students were sent to Russia to study nuclear power at Russian universities.[34] In 2016, however, the Vietnamese government abruptly suspended plans for the construction of nuclear power plants due to cost and safety concerns in the wake of the 2011 Fukushima accident in Japan.[35]
Since the end of the pandemic, and prompted by rising energy prices and Vietnam’s commitments to reduce greenhouse gases, the government has revisited the nuclear option.[36] In June 2022, Minister of Industry and Trade Nguyen Hong Dien went so far as to tell the National Assembly that nuclear power was an “inevitable trend”.[37] In Hanoi, Putin told Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh that Russia was ready to help Vietnam establish a national atomic energy industry.[38] However, beyond agreeing to complete the CNST,[39] Vietnam remained non-committal. Conventional nuclear power plants are extremely costly, and Vietnam, like other Southeast Asian countries, is considering cheaper options such as small modular reactors (SMRs) and floating nuclear power plants (FNPPs).[40] Russia is also offering SMR technology. But whether Vietnam chooses to partner with Russia, or nuclear energy companies from the United States, Europe or Japan, remains to be seen. The Russia-Ukraine War has complicated matters. As Bangladesh discovered, Western sanctions have made it difficult to pay for Russia’s nuclear expertise.[41]
The prospects for Russian exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Vietnam, which Putin said Moscow was keen to initiate, look much brighter. Currently, Russia sells LNG to Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore but wants to increase exports to other Southeast Asian countries as the EU works to phase out all Russian energy imports. Vietnam wants LNG to play a bigger role in the country’s energy mix over the next few decades as it is cleaner than coal and oil and would help the country meet its pledge to reduce carbon emissions.[42] A memorandum of understanding between PetroVietnam and Novatek, Russia’s second largest natural gas company, was one of the 11 agreements signed on 20 June.[43] Exports of Russian LNG to Vietnam could start later this year or next.
Another promising area of energy cooperation is hydropower, a renewable energy source that Vietnam is keen to expand. Putin said that RusHydro, the world’s second-largest hydroelectric company, was interested in increasing its participation in Vietnam’s hydropower projects.[44]
CONCLUSION
President Putin’s visit to Vietnam was a qualified success for both countries. The Putin regime was able to show that despite Western efforts to isolate it, Russia is not without friends. By hosting the Russian leader, Vietnam was able to honour an old friend and highlight the merits of its bamboo diplomacy. Putin’s presence in Hanoi did not derail the forward momentum in US-Vietnam ties as evidenced by meetings between US and Vietnamese officials in the immediate aftermath of Putin’s visit. While Washington disapproved of Putin’s visit, it also appreciates that Hanoi has not provided material support to Russia’s armed forces and that Vietnam-Russia defence ties remain in abeyance.
Vietnam and Russia discussed ways to strengthen bilateral relations, especially economic engagement and energy cooperation. While the agreed measures may raise two-way trade, investment and tourism, Russia will continue to play a relatively minor role in Vietnam’s economic relationships.
Next year marks the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Russia and Vietnam. To celebrate the occasion, Putin invited Vietnamese leaders to visit Russia and issued a personal invitation to President To Lam to attend the annual Victory Day parade in Red Square on what will be the 80th anniversary of Nazi Germany’s defeat.[45] A visit to Moscow by the Vietnamese President will provide another opportunity for the CPV to extol the benefits of its bamboo diplomacy.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
“Generational Divides in Understanding Thailand’s History Grow Amid Political Polarization” by Panarat Anamwathana
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• Amid political polarization, knowledge and understanding of Thailand’s history have also diverged radically. This divide is especially evident between younger and older generations.
• Driving this phenomenon is the growing rejection by students of the traditional history taught in public schools, which in the past had been a means for the Thai state to instil in the young a sense of nationalism, national pride and shared values. Poor pedagogy that emphasizes memorization, and that discourages discussions and critical thinking, has alienated many from the subject. Education professionals and student activists have also been critical of this development.
• Moreover, the democratization of information and the availability of alternative sources of historical knowledge have allowed young people to learn about history in ways that challenge the traditional narratives taught in classrooms. The alternative sources include social media, websites by historians and enthusiasts, as well as books printed by independent publishers.
• Young people have also begun to engage with history in new ways. They have organized themselves to commemorate aspects of history overlooked in school textbooks and have used history to legitimize their political activism.
• This diverging understanding and engagement with history has two main consequences. First, political polarization can deepen, with different sides utilizing their versions of history as legitimization for their political views. Second, it will be harder for the Thai state to instil communal values and a basic understanding of the nation among young people, which can have implications for the building of a shared Thai identity in the future.
Trends in Southeast Asia 2024/19, July 2024
2024/55 “Governance and Power Consolidation under Nguyen Phu Trong: An Analysis of Four Strategic Tools” by Tran Le Quynh
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong has used four key tools to reshape the country’s political landscape: a rigorous anti-corruption campaign, comprehensive regulatory reforms, strategic adjustments in regional representation, and a nuanced blend of personal ties with formal party rules.
- The anti-corruption campaign has led to the unprecedented removal of high-ranking officials, consolidating power into Trong’s hands and enforcing party discipline. Regulatory overhauls, including Decision 244 and Regulation 80, have centralized power and standardized leadership selection processes.
- Under Trong’s leadership, qualifications and party loyalty have been prioritized over regional considerations. The dynamics of personal ties and party rules, as seen in the case of former Chairman of the National Assembly Vuong Dinh Hue, highlights the importance of adherence to regulations.
- The four strategic tools are interconnected and build on one another. This approach aligns with Trong’s vision to strengthen the Party’s integrity and stability, while setting the groundwork for future leadership transitions.
* Tran Le Quynh is a Researcher at Amnesty International, London, and a former Senior Journalist at BBC Vietnamese Service.
ISEAS Perspective 2024/55, 19 July 2024
INTRODUCTION
Vietnam’s political landscape has been rocked by an unprecedented wave of high-level departures, driven by Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong’s uncompromising anti-corruption agenda. Since the 13th Party Congress in 2021, seven Politburo members—Nguyen Xuan Phuc, Pham Binh Minh, Tran Tuan Anh, Vo Van Thuong, Vuong Dinh Hue, Truong Thi Mai and Dinh Tien Dung—have been forced out. These dramatic dismissals exemplify Trong’s multi-pronged strategy to reshape the CPV, which centres around four interconnected tools that he has persistently employed since first becoming party chief in 2011:
- A sweeping anti-corruption campaign, which has led to the unprecedented removal of high-ranking officials;
- Regulations to centralize power and standardize leadership selection processes;
- A nuanced approach to regional representation that prioritizes qualifications and party loyalty over strict geographic quotas;
- A strategic blend of personal ties and adherence to formal party rules.
As of 18 July 2024, Trong’s health had reportedly deteriorated, leading to the temporary appointment of To Lam, a Politburo member and State President, to oversee the Party’s central operations. This unexpected transition raises questions about the continuity of Trong’s leadership strategies and brings about a new period of uncertainty in Vietnam’s political landscape.
This essay will examine each of the four tools to see how they have functioned over the course of Trong’s unprecedented three terms in office.
THE ANTI-CORRUPTION DRIVE
Since 2016, the Vietnamese government has been actively cracking down on corruption. This has become a defining aspect of Nguyen Phu Trong’s leadership and earned him respect and legitimacy within the Party. His re-election for a third term in 2021 was largely due to his success in leading this campaign and making it an integral part of Vietnamese politics.
What is particularly remarkable is Trong’s ability to coordinate his comprehensive anti-corruption strategy involving key party and state institutions. The Ministry of Public Security (MPS), the Central Internal Affairs Committee (CIAC), and the Central Inspection Commission (CIC), the three key organizations involved in implementing the campaign, all work closely under the direction of the Party.
While the MPS has been involved in high-profile corruption cases, they operate under the centralized leadership and strategic direction of the Party’s anti-corruption efforts. In fact, the campaign is not driven by a single institution, but is rather a coordinated effort led by the Party’s Politburo and Trong himself.
The CIAC, which advises the Anti-Corruption Steering Committee chaired by Trong, plays a significant role in this campaign. They also have formal collaboration with the CIC, as mandated in Decision 243 issued by the CPV Secretariat in 2014.[1] Furthermore, they work with provincial party committees to develop and execute a unified anti-corruption strategy. This partnership involves sharing information and aligning regional efforts with national goals.
The CIC is responsible for investigating and punishing party members for corruption, and works alongside the MPS who enforce the law. A notable instance of this collaboration is the investigation into the “Dai Ninh eco-urban area”, which involved both the MPS and the CIC.[2] This joint effort resulted in the arrest of several prominent figures, including Mai Tien Dung, the former Chairman of the Government Office, and Tran Duc Quan, the Secretary of the Lam Dong Provincial Party Committee.[3]
The coordination between these key party institutions has been crucial to the success of the anti-corruption campaign. However, the stringent measures taken in this campaign, while promoting ideological unity and alignment with Trong’s vision, have also had unintended consequences. Recent reports have raised concerns from foreign governments and donors that Vietnamese officials may be hesitant in their decision-making due to fear of being scrutinized.[4] To maintain both effective governance and economic progress, a balanced approach that allows for decisive decision-making while upholding anti-corruption principles will be crucial for the Party.
INSTITUTIONALIZING POWER BY STRATEGIC REGULATIONS
Alongside the anti-corruption campaign, new regulations were introduced under Trong’s tenure, rewriting the rules of the game in Vietnamese politics.[5] These regulations form a comprehensive framework for selecting, managing, and dismissing party leaders and cadres.
One of these regulations, Decision 244, was issued by the Party Central Committee in 2014 and set guidelines for nominating party leaders through internal electoral processes.[6] In 2020, Instruction 03 was issued by the Party Secretariat and an amendment was introduced that held nominators accountable for the qualifications and suitability of their nominees.[7] This change raised the stakes for nominating candidates outside the formal framework, arguably leading to fewer unexpected nominations at the 13th Party Congress in 2021. In addition, Regulation 41 was issued in 2021 which outlined the principles, authority, and procedures for dismissing or accepting resignations from party leaders and officials.[8] It clarified the grounds for removal, such as disciplinary issues or poor performance, and specified conditions for voluntary resignations. These regulations, introduced between 2014 and 2022, show Trong’s consistent efforts to refine and tighten control over the Party’s human resources, from candidate selection to dismissal and post-resignation arrangements. They also give central party organs, particularly the Politburo, more power in personnel decisions, giving Trong and his supporters greater control over key leadership positions.
Moreover, the process by which new Politburo members were selected at the latest 9th Plenum in May 2024 indicates the centralization of power and the strategic use of formal party mechanisms under Trong’s leadership. Four new members were appointed to the Politburo following a vetting process that highlights the application of democratic centralism in the Party. According to private sources, the Politburo first conducted a vote among themselves to shorten a long list of nominees which included candidates from various branches of the Party and the state, such as two nominees from the MPS. The four individuals who made it through this initial vetting—Le Minh Hung, Nguyen Trong Nghia, Do Van Chien, and Bui Thi Minh Hoai—were then put forward for the Central Committee to vote into the Politburo.
Notably, all four successful candidates were previously Secretariat members, suggesting a preferential pathway from the Secretariat to the Politburo. This pattern, which also occurred in 2021 when all 2016 Secretariat members were promoted to the Politburo, reflects a consolidation of influence and a new norm in leadership transitions favouring established insiders.
These developments demonstrate how Trong uses formal party structures to reinforce his vision, ensuring that those promoted to the highest ranks align with his ethos. The elevation of Secretariat members to the Politburo, even amid a depleted leadership due to recent purges, underscores the structural changes Trong is promoting to solidify his control over the Party’s direction.
SHIFTING REGIONAL DYNAMICS
Over the past decade, there has been a notable shift in the representation of different regions in the highest echelons of the CPV. An examination of the Politburo and Central Committee shows a gradual decrease in the number of members from the southern regions of the country.
From 2001 to 2006, the South had five members in the Politburo, making up about one-third of the total. This number increased during the leadership of Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung from 2006 to 2011, to six, or 40 per cent of the Politburo. This level of representation remained steady until 2016.
However, there has been a significant shift under the leadership of General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong from 2016 to 2021. During this period, the South’s representation in the Politburo decreased to four members, accounting only for 21 per cent of the total. This trend has continued during Trong’s third term, with the South now having only three seats, or approximately 17 per cent of the Politburo.
Some see this as a deliberate effort to promote northern dominance. However, Trong’s approach focuses on selecting candidates based on their qualifications, ideology, and loyalty to the Party rather than adhering to strict regional quotas. The decline in southern representation can be seen as a result of this emphasis on broader criteria, with the anti-corruption campaign and new regulations providing a means to remove problematic officials regardless of their regional affiliations. This strategy seems designed to strengthen control over leadership selection while deflecting concerns about regional imbalances.
Nevertheless, the Party under Trong recognizes the importance of having some regional diversity. The example of former President Vo Van Thuong, a southerner who briefly gained prominence, suggests that regional balance is still a consideration, even if it is not the primary factor. The current composition of the Politburo also reflects this balancing act.
While northern members like Le Minh Hung, Bui Thi Minh Hoai, and Do Van Chien have been added, the elevation of Tran Thanh Man to the National Assembly chairman position and the inclusion of Nguyen Trong Nghia maintain some representation from the southern region. These moves highlight a strategic approach that values regional identities while prioritizing ideological alignment and qualifications.
PERSONAL TIES AND PARTY RULES: THE DUAL ROUTES TO LEADERSHIP ROLES
In Vietnamese politics, personal relationships and networks have always played a significant role alongside the formal system of the Party in developing leaders. General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong has deftly combined these two aspects to strengthen his influence and shape the future direction of the Party.
Trong’s approach is notable for his ability to exercise control over the leadership selection process from multiple angles. As mentioned above, through the introduction of new regulations, he has shaped the formal criteria and procedures for selecting leaders. These regulations pave the way for promoting individuals who align with his vision and meet the desired qualifications.
At the same time, Trong has leveraged his position as the top leader to cultivate personal relationships and mentor rising figures who support his agenda. By nurturing and supporting specific candidates who share his ideological commitments and policy goals, Trong can directly influence the leadership line-up and ensure that his preferred candidates are promoted. This is evident in Regulation 214, which outlines the requirements for the position of general secretary. The regulation states that the general secretary should have “the ability to lead and build a team of strategic-level cadres, especially successors and key cadres”.[9] This implies that those in the top leadership position, like Trong, have both the interest and the capacity to prepare and nurture the next generation of leaders.
This dual approach of utilizing both formal party rules and personal relationships is important because it allows Trong to create a framework that supports his broader vision for the Party’s future. By linking informal networks to formal party structures and regulations, he can control the leadership selection process in a way that goes beyond simply relying on connections.
The careers of former National Assembly Chairman Vuong Dinh Hue and former Permanent Member of the CPV Secretariat Tran Quoc Vuong, whose rise through the ranks coincided with Trong’s tenure as general secretary, exemplify this dynamic. They advanced through the Party’s evaluation process based on qualifications and performance, while their personal ties to Trong also played a significant role. However, Vuong Dinh Hue’s resignation in April 2024, amid allegations of serious violations, highlights the nuanced application of the Party’s disciplinary measures. His exit underscores a critical point: close relationships with top leadership do not guarantee immunity from the Party’s enforcement of anti-corruption standards. This incident demonstrates that Trong’s strategic tools operate regardless of an individual’s status or connections, although unseen political developments, such as his or her involvement in a corruption scandal that is previously unknown to the Party’s leadership, might also play a role.
THE INTERCONNECTEDNESS OF THE FOUR TOOLS
The four tools appear to have been intentionally designed to work together in order to influence the power structure and succession planning within the Party. The recent high-level personnel changes demonstrate how Trong’s efforts to combat corruption, centralize power through new regulations, balance regional dynamics, and blend personal relationships with party rules have all played a role in reshaping Vietnam’s political landscape.
The anti-corruption drive remains the most visible tool, evidenced by the forced resignations of high-ranking officials, particularly presidents Nguyen Xuan Phuc and Vo Van Thuong, and National Assembly Chairman Vuong Dinh Hue.The centralization of power through new regulations has also played a significant role in streamlining leadership processes and changing expectations regarding the stability of top officials. The large number of dismissals has now become a “new normal”, as codified by these regulations. Additionally, a balanced approach towards regional dynamics has been strategically utilized to maintain northern dominance while ensuring that regional diversity is respected. The blend of personal relationships and party rules has allowed Trong to shape the Party’s leadership, but does not guarantee that those close to him are immune from disciplinary actions.
The recent dismissals of high-ranking officials such as Phuc, Thuong and Hue demonstrate how these four tools reinforce each other. The anti-corruption campaign provided the justification for their removal, while the new rules and regulations set the standards they were found to have violated. These actions highlight that regional affiliations cannot be invoked as a safeguard against serious evidence of corruption. The blend of party rules and personal relationships underscores the expectation that officials adhere to party priorities and maintain a good public image. This application of the four tools seeks to strengthen the Party by elevating integrity standards, which is distinct from Western democratic models. Instead of relying on institutional checks and balances, public elections, and competition between political parties, Trong’s approach focuses on maintaining internal Party discipline and ideological unity, as well as centralized control, top-down accountability and internal mechanisms to combat corruption and maintain the CPV’s legitimacy.
CONCLUSION
By utilizing the four leadership tools, Trong has aimed to ensure the Party’s stability by tackling corruption and promoting capable leaders. While Trong’s initiatives have started to change the Party’s leadership framework, the cases of high-ranking officials who were purged or forced to resign, even after being elected to top positions, highlight the mixed results of his reforms and the persistence of informal power structures.
With Trong’s health reportedly deteriorating and the temporary appointment of To Lam to oversee the Party’s central operations, Trong’s strategic approach is facing an unexpected and critical test. This turn of events may significantly impact the ongoing anti-corruption campaign, the centralization of power, the regional representation strategy, and the balance between personal connections and party regulations.
As the 14th CPV National Congress in early 2026 approaches, the situation has become even more complex. The recent high-profile exits have already thinned the Politburo’s ranks, and now the uncertainty surrounding Trong’s health adds another layer of complication to the planning of leadership transitions. The short timeframe, combined with the unexpected developments surrounding Trong’s health conditions, further challenges the process of identifying and training potential leaders who can continue Trong’s agenda while addressing Vietnam’s evolving needs. These needs remain pressing: finding a balance between fighting corruption and promoting efficient governance and economic growth, meeting the changing expectations for transparency and accountability in the Party’s operations, and navigating the intricacies of leadership succession within the party structure.
The future of Vietnam’s political landscape will be influenced not only by how the Party navigates this period of temporary leadership, but also by the ability of Trong’s eventual successor to maintain their authority and the integrity of the reforms. It remains to be seen whether future leaders will continue to follow Trong’s approach or chart a new direction in tackling the country’s evolving challenges.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2024/54 “Japan, the Courteous Power, Bares Some Teeth for Regional Stability” by William Choong and Joanne Lin
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The establishment of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) between ASEAN and Japan during the 50th anniversary of their partnership in September 2023 reaffirms Japan’s role as a trusted partner in Southeast Asia.
- Among ASEAN dialogue partners, Japan has been recognised as a “courteous power” that aligns well with Southeast Asian cultural norms and values. Beyond that, Japan has emerged as the most trusted and strategically relevant middle power to ASEAN in the 2024 State of Southeast Asia survey.
- Japan’s trusted status has enabled it to play a greater security role in the region, including through the new Official Security Assistance (OSA) introduced in 2023 to strengthen the security capabilities of like-minded regional countries.
- Japan’s engagement in the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy and its active role in various minilateral configurations demonstrate its strategic intent not only to foster a rules-based international order but also to enhance interoperability among regional militaries.
- Japan has recently enhanced its alliance with the United States and deepened collaborations with the Philippines, Australia, and the UK, effectively transforming the traditional “Hub and Spokes” framework into a robust network of aligned partners. This strategic evolution positions Japan to effectively bridge QUAD and ASEAN nations, facilitating the creation of a comprehensive regional security network.
* William Choong is Senior Fellow at the Regional Strategic and Political Studies Programme and Managing Editor of Fulcrum, and Joanne Lin is Associate Senior Fellow at the ASEAN Studies Centre at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
ISEAS Perspective 2024/54, 18 July 2024
INTRODUCTION
ASEAN and Japan celebrated five decades of partnership in a Commemorative Summit in December 2023,[1] with the theme “Trusted Partners”. This aptly encapsulated a relationship built on Japan’s respectful diplomacy and ASEAN’s preference for mutual respect and shared values. Amidst the diverse challenges and opportunities in the region, Japan’s role as a trusted partner remains pivotal in shaping regional partnerships across Southeast Asia. The establishment of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) between ASEAN and Japan in 2023[2] underscores this strategic role.
Among ASEAN’s dialogue partners, Japan has distinguished itself as a “courteous power”[3] that aligns well with the cultural norms and values of Southeast Asian countries. Beyond its status as one of the region’s top economic, security and diplomatic partners,[4]Japan has earned the reputation of being the most relied-upon partner in the region.
Japan’s reputation in the region was reaffirmed in the State of Southeast Asia 2024 Survey,[5] where it not only maintained its position as the most trusted power but also emerged as the most strategically relevant middle power to ASEAN. While other middle powers such as Australia, the EU, India and the United Kingdom (UK) experienced a decrease in their perceived influence, Japan saw a doubling of its perceived political and strategic influence in Southeast Asia.
This Perspective delves into Japan’s status as a beacon of trust and growing influence in the broader regional multilateral framework. It is argued that Japan can leverage its stock of trust in Southeast Asia to play a bigger security role in the region. Japan’s enduring role as an all-weather friend to Southeast Asia[6] over the past five decades is reaffirmed in the survey.[7] The report continues to underscore the region’s confidence in Japan as the most trusted among five key powers, including the US, EU, China and India. When asked if Japan will “do the right thing” to contribute to global peace, security, prosperity and governance, the majority of respondents (58.9%) expressed confidence, a 4.4% increase from 2023.
Trust and Distrust Rankings of Major Powers
Source: State of Southeast Asia 2024 Survey
Among those who trust Japan, the largest group of respondents (36.5%) believe Japan is a responsible stakeholder that respects and champions international law. The second biggest reason for trust in Japan (27.7%) is its vast economic resources and its political will to provide global leadership. Approximately one-fifth of respondents (21.1%) trust Japan because they admire its civilisation and culture.
In the ranking of dialogue partners by strategic relevance to the region, Japan is the frontrunner among all the middle powers, behind only China and the US. Japan surpasses all other middle powers including the EU, South Korea, UK, Australia, Russia, India, Canada and New Zealand.
Dialogue Partners’ Strategic Relevance to ASEAN
Source: State of Southeast Asia 2024 Survey
Southeast Asian perception of Japan’s growing influence in the region is also evident in other survey responses. When asked which country is the most influential political-strategic power in the region, the number of respondents ranking Japan at the top nearly doubled from 1.9% last year to 3.7% this year. Although Japan ranks far behind China, US and ASEAN, its perceived growing influence sets it apart from other middle powers like Australia, the EU, India, and the UK, which witnessed a decline.
GROWING SECURITY ROLE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Southeast Asians’ trust in Japan has been conducive for Tokyo to play a bigger security role in the region. Since the 1990s, Japan has shouldered increased responsibility for maintaining security in the Asia-Pacific region.[8] During the tenures of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (2007-2008, 2012-2020), Japan assumed a more assertive stance in both military and diplomatic spheres, largely driven by the resurgence of China.[9]
According to Abe, Japan would make a “proactive contribution to the peace”. To this end, Japan has demonstrated its resolve to build a regional security framework, based on shared principles of international law, no recourse to the use of force, and a rules-based order in both words and deeds. In 2016, Abe introduced the concept of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP), aiming to capitalise on emerging opportunities and challenges across Asia and Africa. This vision is rooted in a commitment to a rules-based international order, peace, stability and economic prosperity.[10] Further refining this vision, Japan unveiled its “New Plan for a FOIP” in March 2023, acknowledging evolving global dynamics, including the rise of emerging and developing countries as well as pressing global challenges such as climate change and technology advancements.[11]]
In April 2023, Japan introduced the Official Security Assistance (OSA) programme,[12] which provides material equipment and infrastructure assistance to meet the security needs of recipient countries especially in Southeast Asia and South Asia.[13] The defence equipment provided under the OSA is limited to areas such as rescue, transport, warning, surveillance and minesweeping.[14] Japan’s rationale for the OSA was straightforward: to strengthen the security of like-minded states by improving their “deterrence capacities”, particularly in the face of “China’s growing attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force”.[15] This serves to bolster the security capabilities of ASEAN countries, including by provision of radars and satellite systems, and reinforces Japan’s strategic engagement with the region, representing a tangible demonstration of Japan’s commitment to regional security.
The OSA is a continuation of a long-standing trend whereby Japan sought to bolster the security capacities of like-minded regional countries. While Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) can only be used for social and economic development, Japan used a “sleight of hand” to send vessels, aircraft and radar systems to help Southeast Asian claimant states in the South China Sea bolster their maritime capabilities.[16] In 2013, Japan delivered 10 multi-role patrol vessels to the Philippines Coast Guard, and dispatched another two patrol boats in 2022. Tokyo has dispatched six second-hand fishery patrol ships to Vietnam. Another six will be sent by 2025.
In April 2024, Japan upgraded its alliance with the US – arguably the biggest elevation of the alliance since 1951. For the first time, the two militaries would be put under the command of a US four-star general, thus resembling the US-South Korea alliance setup, which is structured under an expeditious “fight tonight” deterrent posture.[17] The two allies plan to enable “seamless integration of operations and capabilities for interoperability.” Speaking in April 2024, Joe Biden and Fumio Kishida singled out China, saying the two allies would “respond to challenges by China through close coordination”.[18]
Within the same week, Japan and the US also incorporated the Philippines into a first-ever trilateral arrangement, which, according to Kishida would “bolster a free and open international order based on the rule of law”. President Biden reaffirmed US defence commitments to Tokyo and Manila – a clear signal to China, which had been involved in an altercation with Philippine forces in the South China Sea.[19] While Manila and Tokyo are not formal military allies with each other, the institutional linkages between the US, Japan and the Philippines are expected to grow. This would serve as a deterrent to assertive Chinese actions in disputed areas such as the South China Sea.[20]
At the same set of meetings, President Biden and Prime Minister Kishida also announced that Japan will join the second pillar of the Australia-United Kingdom-US (AUKUS) trilateral security arrangement. The second pillar would involve the development of advanced capabilities such as cyber assets, artificial intelligence and quantum capabilities.[21]The US and Japan also announced a regular series of US-Japan-UK exercises, which are slated to begin in 2025.
This underscores the thickening web of US allies and like-minded partners to uphold the regional order. Japan is already emerging as a key player in emerging minilateral arrangements, involving US allies and like-minded partners. In August 2023, the leaders of Japan, South Korea and the US inaugurated a new trilateral partnership, which would enable the three countries to consult and coordinate, on an annual basis, at various levels of their governments concerning common security and other related challenges.[22] A new multi-domain exercise, to be held annually, is also in the planning stages.[23]
Japan is also playing a role in other minilaterals. In early May, the defence ministers of Australia, Japan, the Philippines and the US met at the US Indo-Pacific Command headquarters in Hawaii to affirm their shared vision for a “free, open secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific” The meeting was apposite, given that both the US and the Philippines had just finished their annual US-Philippine Balikatan exercises (with Japan and Australia as observers), which are aimed at deterring China in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.[24] In Hawaii, the defence ministers of Australia, Japan and the US also met for the 13th time to deepen cooperation to promote regional security. They announced additional trilateral exercises, such as F-35 training in the three countries, and the conduct of a first-ever combined live-fire air and missile defence exercise in 2027.
WHEN A SPOKE BECOMES A HUB
The trifecta of Southeast Asia’s growing trust in Japan, Tokyo’s willingness and ability to play an increased security role, and the thickening of a minilateral security network in the face of growing Chinese assertiveness puts Japan in a position to enhance defence cooperation with ASEAN, and also to integrate individual Southeast Asian countries into a framework involving some (or all) members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad).
Defence Cooperation with ASEAN
Japan already plays an active role in the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus), which spans various domains including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, maritime security, military medicine, counterterrorism, peacekeeping operations, and cybersecurity, and has been positively received by the region.[25] In November 2023, Japan introduced a new Japan-ASEAN Ministerial Initiative for Enhanced Defense Cooperation (JASMINE).[26] JASMINE seeks to elevate ASEAN-Japan defence cooperation amid a dynamic security landscape by focusing on four key aspects, namely: (i) ensuring a security environment that does not allow unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion; (ii) expanding ASEAN-Japan defence cooperation; (iii) pursuing further friendship and opportunities between ASEAN-Japan defence officials; and (iv) supporting defence cooperation between ASEAN, Japan and the Pacific Island countries. JASMINE mirrors Japan’s vision as laid out in Japan’s Vientiane Vision in 2016. Tokyo said it wanted practical defence cooperation with ASEAN countries based on capacity building, the transfer of equipment, and joint participation in exercises.
Maritime security has emerged as a central focus for Japan, driven by escalating concerns over China’s naval activities.[27] In this context, Japan can serve as a bridge to facilitate ASEAN’s utilisation of the Quad’s Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness,[28] leveraging innovative technology to provide real-time information on maritime activities. Collaboration in this regard will be instrumental in combating illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and addressing humanitarian crises. Coordination with existing maritime centers in the region, such as the Information Fusion Centre in Singapore and the Thai Maritime Enforcement Coordinating Centre, will enhance the effectiveness of such endeavours.
Furthermore, Japan should prioritise providing regular updates to ASEAN on developments in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly regarding minilateral initiatives like the Quad and other trilateral groupings. These updates could be shared on the sidelines of events such as the ADMM-Plus or security forums like the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, fostering greater trust and confidence-building between ASEAN and Japan. Such dialogues will not only enhance functional cooperation but also facilitate a clearer articulation of their respective strategic roles in the region.[29]
Quad-lite Minilaterals
By virtue of its deep linkages with the US and its San Francisco alliance network and growing defence connections with ASEAN countries, Japan is in a strategic position to link the Quad and ASEAN countries into a wider security network. Broadly speaking, the Quad and ASEAN share a common goal of ensuring regional stability and security, as well as common principles, such as the promotion of an open, inclusive and rules-based regional architecture. The point of divergence lies in what is perceived to be the Quad’s potential to undermine the centrality of ASEAN, and the consequent effects of ASEAN or its member countries working closer with the Quad (i.e. China’s opposition to such activities, given Sino-US rivalry and competition for power and influence in the Indo-Pacific). For many ASEAN countries, Quad membership is out of the question. That said, however, many Southeast Asians have become increasingly receptive to working with Quad countries to strengthen regional stability. In the 2024 State of Southeast Asia Survey, 40.9% of respondents deemed that the Quad would be beneficial to the region — up from 31% in 2023.[30]
The Quad’s ‘flexible’ and ‘nimble’ character can be expressed in what Hoang and Choong term as “Quad-lite” configurations among members of the Quad, as well as between Quad members and Southeast Asian countries. While such Quad-lite collaborations do not carry the Quad “brand” (and thus do not heighten Chinese perceptions of threat), they provide building blocks for bolstering strategic coherence and interoperability among members.[31] This thickening web includes defence and security cooperation, but also other functional domains such as economics, supply chains, and technologies.[32]
In August 2023, navies from Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and the US conducted a multilateral exercise in the South China Sea. This included the helicopter destroyer JS Izumo and destroyer JS Samidare, the US Navy Littoral Combat Ship USS Mobile and the Royal Australian Navy amphibious assault ship Canberra and frigate HMAS Anzac.[33] In April 2024, the four countries carried out joint air and naval drills, again in the South China Sea.[34] A joint statement issued by the Defence Chiefs of the four countries highlighted their “collective commitment to strengthen regional and international cooperation in support of a free and open Indo-Pacific”, and to stand with all countries “in safeguarding international order based on the rule of law”.[35]
In August 2023, the Talisman Sabre exercises involved not just Australian and American soldiers, but also soldiers, marines and aviators from Japan, South Korea and the UK. Military personnel from the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand attended as observers.[36] In September 2023, Singapore and Japan were part of a large-scale Super Garuda Shield exercise carried out by Indonesia and the US. Brunei, Malaysia and the Philippines participated as observers.[37]
Such Quad-lite interactions are not restricted to the defence/security domain. Australia, Japan and the US have offered their support for clean energy and decarbonisation projects in Vietnam. The US-Japan Mekong Power Partnership, which seeks to facilitate clean energy deployment and electrical connectivity, involves Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam.[38] The US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework comprises all four Quad countries and seven Southeast Asian countries.
These working Quad-lite arrangements do not constitute an overly anti-China defence network, but this network can serve as a potential deterrent to assertive Chinese behaviour. It also means Southeast Asian countries can pursue flexible and timely arrangements with the US and its allies in the pursuit of their national interests and regional stability. The fact that Japan takes a more nuanced approach to China helps it gain traction in the region. As opposed to the US, which at times has used megaphone diplomacy to castigate China, Japan tends to take a more low-key approach, engaging with China in the realm of economics and working with Beijing even in more sensitive political and security matters. In 2018, for example, Mr Abe forged 52 memorandums of understanding with China to facilitate bilateral cooperation in third-country markets. In May 2024, there was a trilateral summit involving China, South Korea Japan. The summit discussed economic issues, as well as regional and global issues such as the Korean peninsula, the war in Ukraine and war between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip.
Given Japan’s thickening linkages with the US and within the Quad, its deep relationships with Southeast Asian countries and their high level of trust in Tokyo, Japan is best placed to act as a bridge between the Quad and ASEAN countries in defence of the regional order. Going forward, Japan can encourage Southeast Asian countries to participate in military exercises involving some, if not all, Quad member countries. This could involve repeated and scheduled participation of Southeast Asian countries in the aforementioned exercises, namely, Garuda Shield, Talisman Sabre and even future iterations of the August 2023 military exercises involving Australia, Japan, the Philippines and the US in the South China Sea. In addition, Japan can consider involving more Southeast Asian countries in its Indo-Pacific Endeavour series of annual naval deployments involving its light carriers and escorting destroyers. These deployments typically involve other Quad countries. The 2022 and 2023 editions saw two ASEAN countries taking part,[39] while 2019 had seen Japanese interactions with five ASEAN countries, namely Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam.[40]
Japan’s involvement in such Quad-lite arrangements would act as an incentive for Southeast Asian countries to do likewise. This would be beneficial to the regional order on two counts. First, the sustained participation of ASEAN countries in Quad-lite exercises will help to form patterns of cooperative norms and habits between Quad nations and Southeast Asian countries, and thus increase interoperability and coordination for future contingencies. Second, the participation of ASEAN countries in such a Quad-lite network could potentially deter Chinese behaviour that may upset the regional status quo. China has taken notice of such thickening linkages between Quad countries and ASEAN states, stressing that it opposed the “practice of bloc parties” by relevant countries.[xli] Put differently, China is keenly aware of such arrangements, and they could have some deterrent value vis-à-vis assertive Chinese behaviour.
CONCLUSION
Japan is in an advantageous position to link up the Quad and various Southeast Asian countries. By leveraging on its long-standing trust capital in Southeast Asia and its linkages to minilaterals such as the Quad, Japan can help to build a sustainable regional order based on shared principles that deter potential aggressors. In other words, the “courteous power” can bare some teeth in the pursuit of regional stability. To paraphrase Ciorciari and Tsutsui, the “courteous power” can facilitate through its growing strategic weight rather than a strong fist to nudge Southeast Asian countries towards the path Japan wants them to take – for the sake of regional security.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
“Politics, Pandemics and Economics: Malaysia’s Post-Covid Election” by Cassey Lee
2024/53 “Digital Autocratisation and Electoral Disinformation in the Philippines” by Aries A. Arugay & Maria Elize H. Mendoza
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The Duterte administration (2016-2022) propagated securitised narratives (such as the war on drugs and the threat of communist insurgency) to justify draconian policies, including extrajudicial killings and arrests of government critics. These narratives were reinforced through online disinformation campaigns mostly spewed by organised ‘troll’ farms.
- This trend towards “digital autocratisation” continued in the 2022 elections. The presidential campaign of Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr., son of the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos Sr., capitalised on a tide of misplaced nostalgia for the authoritarian rule of his father.
- Electoral disinformation in that Philippine elections contained two sources of digital autocratisation: Duterte’s assaults on the liberal democratic opposition through securitised narratives, and Marcos Jr.’s nostalgic narratives that glorified the country’s autocratic past.
- Pervasive disinformation in the Philippines complemented the autocratic policies of Duterte, benefited the Marcos Jr. campaign, and continues to negatively affect the fragile state of Philippine democracy.
- Policy interventions to counter electoral disinformation are necessary for the 2025 midterm elections especially to address attacks on democratic norms and institutions. Also needed are reforms that can anticipate and address future manifestations of disinformation in the Philippines.
* Aries A. Arugay is Visiting Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Philippine Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, and Professor of Political Science, University of the Philippines-Diliman. Maria Elize H. Mendoza is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of the Philippines-Diliman.
ISEAS Perspective 2024/53, 16 July 2024
INTRODUCTION
The Philippines under the Duterte administration (2016-2022), witnessed two political trends: an erosion of democratic institutions and norms through deliberate autocratic acts of the government and the rise of electoral disinformation.[1] Autocratisation is defined as the decline of democratic traits or “any move away from [full] democracy.[2] Duterte’s anti-drug and anti-crime campaign resulted in thousands of extrajudicial killings and cases of human rights violations. His strongman approach attacked democracy on different fronts: there were assaults on press freedom, pervasive tagging of government critics and opposition figures as communist sympathisers, and extensive use of the military to implement draconian policies.[3] These securitised narratives were amplified in the digital sphere and used to justify Duterte’s policies.
It is not coincidental that the popularity of Duterte’s strongman politics helped in securing victory in the 2022 presidential elections for Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr., son of the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos Sr.. Social media likewise played a critical role through what we call digital autocratisation – a process in which democratic norms and institutions are undermined through the extensive use of digital technologies such as social media. During the 2022 elections, social media platforms became saturated with the voice of supporters of Marcos Jr.. They were capitalizing on nostalgia based on memories of the late dictator and on the myth of the Philippine ‘golden age’ during the rule of Marcos Sr., and the ‘strong’ sense of discipline that Filipinos were supposed to have had during the martial law period.[4] These narratives complemented extant securitised narratives such as the need to cleanse the country of drug addicts. The latter were the hallmark of Duterte’s rhetoric and came to form the basis for his national policies.
This paper argues that digital autocratisation was manifested in the disinformation witnessed in the 2022 presidential elections. Duterte’s securitised narratives were undermining Philippine democracy’s commitment to human rights, while Marcos Jr.’s campaign through nostalgia was repudiating the imperative of democratic accountability for past atrocities. Without concrete policy interventions countering disinformation, digital autocratisation is likely to persist in the 2025 midterm elections. Measures such as new legislation, collaborative partnerships, innovative fact-checking, and anticipating the evolution of disinformation with artificial intelligence and changes in the political influencer industry, require the intervention of governments, independent media, the digital industry, civil society, and external actors.
SECURITISED NARRATIVES AND DIGITAL AUTOCRATISATION UNDER DUTERTE
Filipinos’ vulnerability to disinformation is facilitated by their heavy consumption of social media and their reliance since the 2016 elections on these platforms when making voting choices. Duterte’s campaign made use of both grassroots and online support and mobilised the first cyber-armies or ‘troll farms’.[5] The extensive use of social media in the 2016 elections led Facebook executive Katie Harbath to label the Philippines the “patient zero” of global disinformation.[6]
The Duterte administration effectively carried out disinformation strategies to achieve its political goals, in ways similar to that of other governments in Southeast Asia. In Malaysia, the ruling party Barisan Nasional was found to have hired private individuals and groups collectively known as ‘cybertroopers’ to spread disinformation during the 2018 elections.[7] The ruling military junta in Thailand treated ‘fake news’ as a national security issue that required the involvement of the military.[8] And in Indonesia, the Jokowi government weaponised its online defamation law to punish government critics.[9] While digital autocratisation can be state-sponsored, it can also be ‘outsourced’. As with the use of ‘cybertroopers’ in Malaysia and ‘buzzers’ in Indonesia, the Philippines under Duterte shared the experience of utilising paid ‘trolls’ and online influencers to manufacture and spread online disinformation in favour of the incumbent regime.
Duterte’s main campaign promise was to exact profound sociopolitical change with an emphasis in restoring law and order mainly through highly securitised public policies against perpetrators of illegal drugs and communist ideology in the country.[10] His violent war on drugs resulted in a spate of extrajudicial killings estimated by human rights groups and investigative journalists at 1,000 fatalities per month, and in total at more than 30,000 individuals.[11] Amidst public backlash over the lack of due process and the violent extrajudicial nature of these police operations, pro-Duterte social media pages attempted to justify the entire war on drugs policy by posting about heinous crimes allegedly committed by drug addicts. One instance involved Duterte’s former campaign spokesman who posted a photo of a rape supposedly committed by a drug addict. This was reposted and circulated by various pro-Duterte pages which raised sentiments that drug addicts deserved to be killed. The post was eventually proven to be false; the photo had originated from another country and did not involve rape.[12]
Second, Duterte targeted journalists, media personalities, and entire media outlets that were critical of his administration, effectively threatening the healthy functioning of press in the country. Prominent among these targets was Nobel Laureate and Rappler chief executive officer Maria Ressa who was attacked by online trolls following critical commentaries by her about the Duterte administration.[13] The impact of these online attacks and the reinforcement of narratives against ‘biased’ media outlets is reflected in the results of a Pulse Asia September 2022 nationwide survey in which television was ranked as the second biggest source of fake news about politics, and journalists were considered to be among the top spreaders of false information about the government.[14]
Finally, opposition figures and government critics also became the target of Duterte’s crass criticism, and victims of online disinformation. Prominent among these was former vice president Maria Leonor “Leni” Robredo, the leader of the opposition who disagreed with Duterte on matters of policy, particularly on the war on drugs. Other government critics, including legislators coming from the progressive blocs of Congress and left-wing activists, were also not spared from the barrage of online attacks. A key Duterte narrative, both reflected in his speeches and in the posts on pro-Duterte social media pages, was to tag government critics as communist sympathisers or members of the communist movement.[15]
MARCOS JR. AND AUTHORITARIAN NOSTALGIA IN THE 2022 PHILIPPINE ELECTIONS
Duterte embarked on an autocratisation campaign that had a significant digital component. This focused on perpetuation of “influence peddling, content ‘seeding’, and outright disinformation” on social media.[16] Come the 2022 presidential election campaign period, it was already apparent that social media messaging was an important factor for an electoral victory, more so if it was boosted by ‘cyber-armies’. A research report found that different candidates spent an overall amount of approximately 600 million to 1.5 billion Philippine pesos (approximately USD 10.9 million to 27 million) on political influencers during the 2022 campaign (Gaw et al., 2023).[17]
The power of social media was particularly clear to Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr., son of the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos Sr. whose two-decade rule constituted one of the darkest periods in Philippine history, encompassing massive corruption, human rights violations, economic decline, and the breakdown of democratic institutions. Three decades after the Marcos family went into exile after the 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution, the son of the late dictator won the presidential election with more than 50 per cent of the votes. He ran in tandem with Sara Duterte, Rodrigo Duterte’s daughter and successor as mayor of Davao City. Their tandem, called the “UniTeam”, called for national unity to solve the country’s problems, then exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic.
Apart from reaping the benefits of Duterte’s legacy of distorting the [online] information landscape and emphasising the need for strongman rule to maintain law and order in a crime-stricken country, the Marcoses also put in a lot of work in their decades-long project to rehabilitate their family name. Marcos Jr.’s campaign narratives, anchored on authoritarian nostalgia, complemented Duterte’s narratives and benefited from them. To demonstrate, Marcos Jr.’s narratives focused on the following: (1) the myth of the Philippine ‘golden age’ during the rule of dictator Ferdinand Marcos Sr.; (2) the idea that Filipinos were more disciplined during the rule of Marcos Sr.; and (3) democratic disillusionment, wherein all post-EDSA presidents significantly failed to improve the lives of the Filipino people and that Marcos Sr. was the ‘best president’ the Philippines had ever had. Common among these narratives was the glorifying of strongman rule similar to the late dictator’s. By tapping into the people’s “misinformed nostalgia about an imagined golden era” the Marcoses planted the idea that it was strongman rule that ushered in a political and economic “golden age” in the country and enforced a strong sense of discipline among the people.[18]
Social media played a crucial role in disseminating the Marcoses’ chosen nostalgic narratives. After Marcos Jr. narrowly lost in the 2016 vice-presidential elections, he started to establish his social media presence by posting regular content on Facebook and YouTube. In 2019, Rappler published a comprehensive report on the Marcoses’ “networked propaganda” involving a web of Facebook and YouTube pages engaged in denying Marcos Sr.’s atrocities and spreading exaggerated and false narratives on his accomplishments. Social media became saturated with contents about the Marcoses before and during the campaign period for the 2022 elections. Apart from Facebook and YouTube, the Marcoses also became the most popular political family on TikTok, a video-sharing social media platform that skyrocketed in popularity during the COVID-19 pandemic.[19]
These online narratives contained falsehoods and disinformation about a “golden age”, the strong sense of discipline in society during martial law, and the failures of post-Marcos Sr. presidents to uplift the country. The way that Duterte and his fervent crowd of online supporters have made social media highly susceptible to manipulation made it easy for Marcos Jr. and his supporters to spread these narratives online. Because Duterte resembles Marcos Sr. in terms of his strongman approach, the presidential successor was expected to also have the same qualities. This sentiment is reflected in the results of a 2021 BOSES Pilipinas survey which showed that Filipinos value “strong leadership” as the most important character trait when choosing the next leader.[20]
Independent fact-checkers such as VERA Files (2022) reported that the opposition candidate Robredo was the biggest target of election-related disinformation while Marcos Jr. benefited the most from such disinformation in 2021 and in early 2022. Social media platforms became rife with online bickering between Marcos’ supporters and anti-Marcos groups and individuals, particularly Robredo supporters. Rappler’s analysis of election-related data on different social media platforms indeed showed that Marcos Jr. and Robredo dominated online discourse (Macaraeg and Hapal, 2022), much to the benefit of Marcos Jr.[21]
CONCLUSION
The 2022 Philippine elections showed how strongman leaders and other autocratising entrepreneurs weaponised digital technology, especially social media, for their political interests. Autocratisation reinforced by online disinformation, termed “digital autocratisation”, started with Rodrigo Duterte in 2016 and continued until the election of Bongbong Marcos Jr. in 2022. Digital autocratisation under Duterte perpetuated securitised narratives on social media that were reinforced by disinformation and were used to justify his autocratic policies including the war on drugs, attacks on press freedom, and repression of critics. The massive social media efforts of Marcos Jr. and his supporters to spread narratives anchored on authoritarian nostalgia proved to be successful.
Pervasive disinformation amplified and justified the autocratic policies of Rodrigo Duterte which in turn benefited the Marcos Jr. campaign. This continues to negatively affect the fragile state of Philippine democracy at the moment. Efforts to stem the spread of electoral disinformation through fact-checking faced tremendous challenges, given their limited reach and impact. Moreover, such initiatives were in the mainstream political discourse only at the tail end of the electoral cycle. By then, the virtual sphere in the Philippines was already flooded with disinformation narratives that proved too formidable to repudiate.[22]
Policy interventions to counter electoral disinformation are necessary given the upcoming 2025 midterm elections. That the Marcos Jr. administration has recognised that disinformation is a grave sociopolitical problem is a crucial first step in mitigating the continuous impact of digital autocratisation.[23] Efforts to counter electoral disinformation requires innovative and anticipatory approaches, given the rapid evolution of digital technologies and the increasing use of artificial intelligence. Fact-checking must evolve to catch up with the digital evolution but also needs to be heavily supported by the government, civil society, media, and the digital industry. Other efforts such as new legislation buttressed by institutional mechanisms, resources, and external partnerships will be critical as the Philippines starts a new electoral cycle next year.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
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2024/52 “Causes and Effects of Pheu Thai’s Grand Compromise: The Lurking Instability of Thailand’s Post-2023 Party System” by Mathis Lohatepanont and Napon Jatusripitak
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- After the 2023 general election, the Pheu Thai Party agreed to a grand compromise with the conservative parties, allowing Pheu Thai candidate Srettha Thavisin to take office as prime minister.
- A new strategic triangle of progressives, conservatives, and Thaksinites has locked Pheu Thai and the former members of the conservative Prayut Chan-o-cha coalition into a marriage of convenience.
- Mapping Thailand’s political parties based on their stance on the status quo and the extent to which they successfully mobilised votes through nationally programmatic or localist strategies, makes it possible to illustrate the nature of Pheu Thai’s shift in political position.
- Thailand’s party system is likely to remain destabilised as the shift in Pheu Thai’s political brand may produce major changes in voter linkages to the party.
* Mathis Lohatepanont is a Ph.D. student at the Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, and Napon Jatusripitak is Visiting Fellow in the Thailand Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
ISEAS Perspective 2024/52, 12 July 2024
INTRODUCTION
After the 2023 general election, the Pheu Thai Party formed a government coalition with several conservative parties that excluded the election-winning Move Forward Party from the government. This led to a major realignment in Thai politics, with Pheu Thai discarding its long-held anti-establishment position and becoming a party upholding the status quo.
This article analyses the causes and consequences of Pheu Thai’s grand compromise with Thailand’s conservative parties. We argue that the 2023 general election has produced a strategic triangle comprised of progressives, conservatives, and Thaksinites, whose varying strengths and weaknesses have facilitated a marriage of convenience between the latter two camps. However, as tensions escalate between Pheu Thai and conservative elites, jeopardizing the grand compromise, growing dissatisfaction with Pheu Thai among the electorate could further destabilise an already brittle party system.
BACKGROUND
The party system has been in a state of flux throughout much of Thailand’s turbulent political history. Before 1973, competition between parties seeking a popular base was largely suppressed during intermittent periods of military rule. When elections were permitted, such competition was frequently overshadowed by narrow, patronage-driven rivalries among networks of bureaucratic elites and political dynasties.[1] These institutional legacies left most political parties in Thailand without deep societal roots, a clear ideology, or a commitment to representing specific groups of voters through coherent platforms.[2] Instead, they typically served as makeshift alliances prone to splintering, merging, disbanding, or reviving based on their leaders’ whims and in response to shifting dynamics and changing institutional environments.
By the late 1990s, this party system, which had largely failed to reflect stable divisions in party positions and voter preferences, was disrupted by a new institutional paradigm brought about by the 1997 Constitution and the emergence of Thaksin Shinawatra’s Thai Rak Thai Party (TRT). The TRT’s innovative and popular policy platform spurred the development of a strong linkage with its supporters, particularly among the rural and grassroots population. This challenged the role of traditional electoral gatekeepers.[3] By 2005, partisan ties had begun to crystallise along class and regional lines, with the TRT securing strong support among the working class in the North and Northeast, while its opposition, the Democrat Party, drew support from the more conservative South and more affluent voters. Despite numerous attempts to curtail Thaksin’s influence and “turn back the clock” after the 2006 coup, whether through judicial interventions or constitutional engineering, these political divides persisted and hardened as Thaksin-affiliated parties continued to win the most seats in every election up to 2019.[4]
However, Thaksin’s status as the primary fulcrum in Thai politics, around which political parties and movements aligned themselves, was not impervious to change. The 2014 military coup, followed by five years of military rule under the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), created a new political fault-line around the role of the military in politics. The institutional arrangements established by the junta-drafted 2017 Constitution, such as a junta-appointed Senate that could participate in the selection of the prime minister, ignited both fervent support for and opposition to the prospect of allowing the NCPO and coup leader, General Prayut Chan-o-cha, to continue as prime minister.[5] Emerging on one side of this divide in the 2019 election was the military-backed Palang Pracharath Party (PPRP). The PPRP sought to combine post-coup institutional advantages with support from conservatives who saw Prayut as an embodiment of peace, order, and continuity. The party became the new face of the conservative status quo, displacing the Democrat Party. On the other side of the divide, the Future Forward Party, led by Thanathorn Jungroongruengkit, championed a reformist agenda and captured the hearts and minds of a new generation of voters drawn by a bolder, more ideologically progressive alternative to Pheu Thai. Although Thaksin did not fade away from the political scene, for the first time in two decades, Thai politics was no longer revolving solely around him.
After the 2019 election, these generational and ideological divides became even more pronounced, as youth-led protests in the aftermath of the dissolution of Future Forward brought the role of the military and the royal institution into sharper focus. The conservative camp fractured further, into parties formed around Prayut and Prawit, such as the United Thai Nation Party (UTN), which had been founded to support Prayut for a third term as prime minister, and the PPRP, as well as more pragmatic conservatives like the Bhumjaithai Party and traditional conservatives such as the Democrat Party.[6] All vowed to uphold the conservative status quo, but only the UTN succeeded in making this its ideological centrepiece in the May 2023 general election. On the other side, an ideological gap had formed between Pheu Thai and Move Forward, rooted in Move Forward’s bold pledge to amend the lèse-majesté law[7] and Pheu Thai’s failure to unequivocally renounce the possibility of forming a coalition with parties associated with Prayut and Prawit.[8]. Move Forward prevailed in the election, seizing the historical moment created by a convergence of growing backlash against the “Uncles,” readiness to move beyond Thaksin, and a vague yet profound desire for structural reform among the 14 million voters who overwhelmingly supported the party.[9] However, Move Forward failed to form a government due to opposition from the junta-appointed senate and a newly forged alliance between Thaksin and conservative forces.
THE GRAND COMPROMISE AND THAILAND’S TRIANGULAR DYNAMICS
While there is no concrete evidence to confirm the existence of the widely speculated deal that underpins the alliance between Pheu Thai and conservative forces or specify its exact terms beyond an official coalition agreement on cabinet quotas and policy priorities,[10] its broad contours can be inferred. In July 2023, all the major parties in the former Prayut coalition visited the Pheu Thai headquarters to demand the exclusion of Move Forward from the coalition. This was officially due to their disagreement over amending Section 112 but also likely a result of incompatibility on a host of other structural reforms that Move Forward would have wanted to impose. In addition, the two sides likely negotiated for joint stewardship of constitutional reform to ensure that the constitution would not be amended in a way that was detrimental to conservative interests. Most importantly, the negotiations likely involved some form of agreement on leniency in applying the Ministry of Justice’s regulations on former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra when he returned.[11]
Regardless of the specific details, we know that three outcomes were realised: 1) Move Forward was kept out of power, 2) Thaksin was allowed to return to Thailand while facing minimal jail time, and 3) Pheu Thai candidate Srettha Thavisin became Prime Minister with the endorsement of military-backed parties and a sizeable number of junta-appointed senators.[12]
As a result of this grand compromise, Thai politics is now characterised by dynamics with three main camps: 1) progressives, represented primarily by Move Forward; 2) Thaksinites, represented primarily by Pheu Thai; and 3) establishment-aligned conservatives, led by parties affiliated with Prayut and Prawit, supported by their strategic alliances with other former members of the Prayut coalition. In the first year of the Srettha administration, each of the camps retained an advantage that has ensured a certain parity in power (See Table 1).
Table 1. The Three Camps of Thai Politics
| Camp | Key Strength |
| Progressives (Opposition members which have remained in opposition) Key parties: Move Forward | Democratic legitimacy: Move Forward won the largest number of seats at the 2023 election. Opinion polling since the election has consistently favoured the party, and its solid support amongst younger demographics provides a sense that its support will only grow. |
| Thaksinites (Former members of the opposition which switched to the government) Key parties: Pheu Thai | Powerbroker status: As the second-largest party in parliament, neither Move Forward nor the conservatives (which are ideologically too distant to collaborate) are able to form a majority government without Pheu Thai. Thaksin Shinawatra also retains a level of personal popularity that provides his affiliated party with a base of support. |
| Conservatives (Former members of the Prayut government) Key parties: Palang Pracharath, United Thai Nation, Bhumjaithai[13] | Institutional privileges: Although the weakest in parliamentary strength, the conservative parties benefit from the legacy of nearly nine years of appointments made under Prayut, including the Senate which threw its weight behind Srettha. This faction also enjoys the leadership of figures aligned with the military, such as Prawit Wongsuwan. |
Source: Authors’ creation
The grand compromise and the varying advantages of the three camps created a new “strategic triangle” in Thai politics, a concept which we borrow from the field of international relations. Lowell Dittmer (1981) defined a three-way relationship in which two players have mutually beneficial relations, and thus choose to ostracise a third player, as a “stable marriage.” As illustrated in Figure 1, the Thaksinites and the conservatives are now partners, forcing Move Forward into the position of outcast. In this strategic triangle, Dittmer argues, the excluded player should try to establish a friendship with one of the partners in order to escape from exclusion, but “it may not be easy to establish such links, inasmuch as both of the other players may have acquired a vested interest in the existing pattern, which is premised upon mutual hostility to the ostracised third party”.[14]
Defying initial predictions of a fragile alliance between the Thaksinites and the conservatives, this coalition remained intact throughout the first year of the Srettha administration. Several factors contributed to this stability. Firstly, the conservatives needed Pheu Thai’s numbers to secure a government that could exclude Move Forward. Secondly, the conservatives’ institutional advantages, including sway over the Senate and potential influence over court proceedings involving Thaksin and other critical issues, prevented Pheu Thai from cooperation with Move Forward. Furthermore, Move Forward’s consistent lead in public polling minimised the desire for any destabilization to the coalition that could lead to an early election that neither Pheu Thai nor the conservatives are ready for. Finally, the highly public nature of Pheu Thai’s divorce from Move Forward provided little incentive for the party to accept a renewed partnership with Pheu Thai during this parliament even if it were offered, as that would damage the image of ideological purity that the party enjoys.
Figure 1. Strategic Triangle
Source: Authors’ creation
EFFECTS OF THE GRAND COMPROMISE: A DESTABILISED PARTY SYSTEM
While the power-sharing arrangement between the Thaksinites and the conservatives was stable through its first year, there is reason to speculate that it may become increasingly fragile due to evolving political circumstances. Previously, Pheu Thai needed to accommodate the powerholders within parties affiliated with Prayut and Prawit to ward off potential challenges from the junta-appointed Senate during the prime minister selection process. Now that the Senate can no longer participate in selecting the prime minister alongside the House, Pheu Thai’s reliance on these parties will primarily depend on their numerical contribution in terms of parliamentary seats—unless the threat posed by these parties’ leaders or stakeholders to Thaksin proves credible.[15] This heightens the likelihood of infighting within the coalition, especially considering that the door to cooperation between Pheu Thai and Move Forward is unlikely to have been closed for good.[16]
Yet, regardless of whether the grand compromise endures, it has already demonstrated its destabilizing effect on the party system. When a party as electorally significant and deeply ingrained in society as Pheu Thai undergoes drastic changes to its ideological stance, the repercussions extend beyond the party itself—it can create ripple effects that disrupt the entire party system. To illustrate Pheu Thai’s realignment and the corresponding party system that has emerged, we use a classification system that maps Thai parties along two dimensions: 1) their stance on the political status quo, and 2) the extent to which their electoral appeal depends on a programmatic national offering versus a more locally-driven, constituency-focused strategy.
1) Stance on the status quo. Previously, Thailand’s partisan divide was centred around support for or opposition to Thaksin Shinawatra. Since 2019, a new divide emerged in Thai politics across several key issues, including the Prayut government, the institutional legacies of the 2014 military coup, the pace and nature of constitutional reform, and, most importantly, the role and status of the monarchy. We argue that this divide now stands as the most pivotal fault line among major parties and between government and opposition due to Pheu Thai’s brokering of a grand compromise with the former Prayut coalition parties. In essence, parties became defined less by their stance on Thaksin and more by their positions on whether to uphold the political status quo or advocate for reform.
We use three proxies to assess the party’s stance on the status quo: their position on amendment of Section 112 of the criminal code, or the lèse-majesté law (indicating their stance on reform of the royal institution), membership of the Srettha coalition (indicating their current comfort with the political status quo), and their membership of the previous Prayut coalition (indicating their comfort with the legacy of the 2014 military coup in general).
Table 2. Parties’ Stance on the Political Status Quo[17]
| Currently opposes any amendment Section 112 of the Criminal Code (proxy for stance on reform of the monarchy) | Member of the Srettha coalition (proxy for stance on current status quo) | Member of the previous Prayut coalition or who has vocally or vocally supported Prayut for PM (proxy for stance on legacy of the 2014 military coup) | |
| Move Forward | |||
| Thai Sang Thai | ✓ | ||
| Democrat | ✓ | ✓ | |
| Pheu Thai | ✓ | ✓ | |
| Prachachart | ✓ | ✓ | |
| Bhumjaithai | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Palang Pracharath | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| United Thai Nation | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Chart Thai Pattana | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Chart Pattana | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
Source: Authors’ creation
Table 2 maps neatly with our previous discussion of the three camps in Thai politics: the conservative parties are most comfortable with the status quo,[18] the Thaksinite parties were previously opposed but have adapted, while Move Forward is the most differentiated from the other parties.
2) Level of national appeal. While many parties adopted acute ideological stances in 2023, their connections to voters are not always anchored solely in these stances. This is because political parties often need to tailor their strategies to appeal to voter segments for whom ideological cues are secondary to, or complemented by, other factors such as candidates’ personal charisma or specific promises that address local concerns.[19]
We argue that this provides us with two ways to classify parties based on their level of national appeal. Parties that appeal nationally based on their ideological or programmatic commitments are usually described as competing by relying on krasae, which refers to “the ebbs and flows of voter sentiments”[20] towards a party, independent of how well a party has fared in constructing a local support base. In contrast, parties that prioritise building and mobilizing local support typically rely on candidate-centred campaigns, patronage, vote-canvassing networks, and krasoon, which translates to “bullets,” a metaphor for cash handouts offered to voters to generate support.[21]
We measure the extent of support political parties receive from national versus constituency-focused appeals by calculating the difference between the share of party-list votes and constituency votes each party receives (Table 3).
Table 3. Percent Difference Between Party List Vote and Constituency Vote Share
| Party | % Difference |
| Move Forward | 12.49 |
| Pheu Thai | 4.11 |
| Bhumjaithai | -10.77 |
| Palang Pracharath | -9.83 |
| United Thai Nation | 3 |
| Democrat | -3.66 |
| Chart Thai Pattana | -1.06 |
| Prachachart | 0.71 |
| Thai Sang Thai | -1.44 |
| Pheu Thai Ruam Palang | -0.07 |
| Chart Pattana Kla | -0.23 |
| Teachers for People | 0.46 |
| Thai Counties | 0.54 |
| New Democracy | 0.69 |
| Fair Party | 0.46 |
| Social Power | 0.42 |
| Thai Liberal | 0.2 |
| New Party | 0.67 |
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data obtained from the Election Commission of Thailand
We map out these two dimensions in Figure 2. As a result of the grand compromise, Pheu Thai is the only major nationally-oriented party to have made the transition from opposing to supporting the established status quo.[22]
Figure 2. Typology of Political Parties
Source: Authors’ creation
Pheu Thai’s switch of affiliation is poised to have a major impact on the party’s trajectory, aligning with Noam Lupu (2016)’s argument that it is the formation of unexpected alliances that often lead to crises in party brands and a collapse in supporter attachment to the party.[23] The crucial question now is how voters will respond to Pheu Thai’s break from its pledge to uphold a pro-democracy alliance with Move Forward, opting instead for an alliance with conservative and military-backed parties. Specifically, will Pheu Thai’s supporters punish the party for this decision, and if so, how? Conversely, will conservative voters, who were previously opposed to Pheu Thai, reward the party for this decision and begin to see it as a viable party to represent their interests?
We predict that Pheu Thai’s ambiguous stance on the status quo will alienate more progressive voters, among both new generations of voters and former Pheu Thai supporters who seek accountability from the party, leading them to support Move Forward. Meanwhile, conservatives who opposed Pheu Thai previously will continue to do so due to their stance on Thaksin, leaving the party in a political no man’s land in terms of its ideological appeal to Thai voters. As a result, Pheu Thai will lose support from ideologically committed voters and struggle to gain the support of conservatives, even as it shifts to a pro-establishment position. This will lead to a significant decline both in its vote share and ability to compete by making ideological pledges to its supporters. To compensate, Pheu Thai will be forced to adopt a more locally-oriented election strategy, especially if its economic platform fails to resonate, like in 2023, with the broader electorate. The crisis in Pheu Thai’s brand is thus likely to affect all three characteristics of party system stability identified by Mainwaring, Bizarro, and Petrova (2017): 1) stable main parties, 2) stable vote shares, and 3) stable party linkages (in terms of whether parties mobilise voters through programmatic or clientelist ties).[24]
CONCLUSION
Our predictions regarding Pheu Thai and the future of the Thai party system will hinge on two crucial factors: whether the divide between supporters and opponents of the conservative status quo remains the dominant voting cleavage, and the extent of political learning that takes place.
First, the 2023 general election could be seen as representing a unique critical juncture, influenced by circumstances and events that are unlikely to converge in the same manner in the near future. The 2023 general election followed unprecedented pro-democracy movements that brought issues concerning the role and status of the monarchy to the fore, including the possibility of amending the lèse-majesté law. The election was also shaped up to be a contest that would potentially determine whether the military leaders associated with the 2014 coup would continue their rule. In the next election, although the voting cleavages formed around these issues are likely to persist, the intensity and focus of these issues might shift due to ongoing political events. Firstly, the possible resurgence of the anti-Thaksin movement could re-center tensions around Thaksin’s personality in a manner more reminiscent of the pre-coup landscape. Thaksin’s image as a source for sound economic stewardship could also come under attack given Pheu Thai’s ongoing difficulties with implementing its policy priorities in the face of continued economic stagnation. Additionally, parties may avoid taking explicit stances on the establishment due to new legal constraints[25] or a tacit understanding that such actions could jeopardise their chance of forming a government as it could alienate potential coalition partners.
Second, substantial political learning will likely occur for both political parties and voters. It was previously anticipated that the return to a two-ballot parallel voting system would disadvantage parties with a nationally-focused appeal, such as Move Forward.[26] However, the results of the 2023 election clearly demonstrate that national appeal can translate to success in constituency elections, even if this success was more apparent in urban than in rural constituencies.[27] Parties will adopt new electoral blueprints to respond to Move Forward’s unexpected inroads into their stronghold constituencies and the tendency among voters to view both constituency and party list ballots as support for a political party. Whether parties develop strong party labels and effective social media-based campaigns to cultivate national support, or double down on traditional vote-canvassing tactics and candidate-centered, localised appeals, will depend on whether the system changes and the extent to which they have something compelling to offer voters. In Pheu Thai’s case, however, the path it chooses will not only shape its own trajectory but also redefine the broader dynamics of party competition and voter alignment in Thailand for years to come.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2024/51 “Holding Social Media Companies Accountable for Enabling Hate and Disinformation” by Nuurrianti Jalli
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Social media platforms, while connecting billions and amplifying marginalised voices, have become tools for spreading hate, disinformation, and extremist ideologies due to these business models prioritising engagement and ad revenue.
- Engagement-driven algorithms incentivise the spread of harmful content, since inflammatory and divisive posts often garner the most attention, creating a cycle that prioritises profits over societal well-being.
- Social media companies have often been seen as hesitant to enforce their policies against misleading political ads due to the substantial revenue these ads generate. The challenge is further compounded by the high cost of effective content moderation in non-English languages, which creates additional barriers to maintaining platform integrity.
- Voluntary self-regulation by social media companies has been inadequate. Governments and international organisations need to step in to enforce meaningful standards for content moderation. Potential approaches include substantial fines for repeated failures, mandatory investment in content moderation, regular third-party audits, and re-examination of legal frameworks to hold companies accountable for algorithmic amplification of harmful content.
- The power of social media companies, if unchecked, poses a danger to democratic institutions. The failure to moderate online content can fuel real-world violence, deepen societal divisions, and erode public trust in democracy. Coordinated regional and global efforts are crucial to ensure consistent and effective standards for social media governance.
*Nuurrianti Jalli is Assistant Professor of Strategic Communications at Oklahoma State University and a Visiting Research Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore.
ISEAS Perspective 2024/51, 11 July 2024
INTRODUCTION
The rise of social media has transformed the way we communicate, share information, and engage with the world around us. Platforms like TikTok, Facebook, and X have connected billions of people across the globe, enabling unprecedented levels of interaction and exchange. These platforms have given a voice to the voiceless, empowered activists and marginalised communities, and facilitated the spread of knowledge at an unparalleled scale.
However, as these platforms have grown in size and influence, they have also become powerful tools for spreading hate, disinformation, and extremist ideologies. The business models of these companies, which prioritise user engagement and advertising revenue above all else, have created a toxic online environment that is having devastating real-world consequences. From fueling ethnic violence and political polarisation to undermining public trust in democratic institutions, the unchecked power of social media giants poses an existential threat to our societies.
PLATFORMS APPROVING PROBLEMATIC CONTENTS
The real-world impact of social media companies’ failure to effectively moderate their platforms can be seen in recent examples from India and Malaysia. In India, an investigation by India Civil Watch International (ICWI)[1] found that Meta had approved a series of political ads containing blatant anti-Muslim hate speech, conspiracy theories targeting opposition leaders, and calls for violence during the recent election on its platform, Facebook. These AI-manipulated ads featured slogans like “let’s burn this vermin” and false claims that an opposition leader wanted to “erase Hindus from India.” Despite Meta’s public commitment to crack down on hate speech and disinformation, these ads were allowed to run and reach millions of users. This scandal is not an isolated incident for Meta. In 2022, a similar issue arose in Norway, where political ads containing far-right content and misinformation[2] were discovered on the platform. More recently, a report by The Bureau of Investigative Journalism[3] revealed that for several months in 2024, more than 8,000 ads featuring AI-manipulated videos and false information about politicians had circulated on Facebook. These incidents highlight a persistent problem with Meta’s content moderation practices, which have consistently failed to prevent the spread of hateful and misleading content during sensitive political events.
In Southeast Asia, a similar lack of urgency in moderating problematic content has been observed. During the 2022 Malaysian election, TikTok, a platform owned by ByteDance, became a hotbed for inflammatory content promoting an ultra-Malay nationalist agenda. Posts and videos calling for a repeat of the tragic “May 13” racial riots of 1969,[4] which claimed hundreds of lives, gained traction on the platform. These provocative messages, often accompanied by hashtags like #bangsamelayu (Malay race) and #13mei (May 13), were primarily created by seemingly Malay users using local languages and dialects.[5]
The spread of such content raised serious concerns among Malaysians, who feared that the hateful narratives could lead to real-world violence and threaten the country’s fragile multi-ethnic harmony. The Malaysian government summoned ByteDance representatives to explain why such content was allowed on their platform. Following this meeting, TikTok removed thousands of offending posts and videos. However, despite the government’s demands for a comprehensive crackdown, some problematic posts from the election period remained accessible on the platform[6] months after the election ended, highlighting the challenges in effectively moderating harmful content.
In a separate study conducted by Global Witness and the Cybersecurity for Democracy team at New York University in 2022,[7] researchers found that TikTok failed to catch 90 percent of ads featuring false and misleading messages about elections, while YouTube and Facebook identified and blocked most of them. The test involved submitting 10 ads in English and 10 in Spanish to the social media services using dummy accounts, without declaring the ads as political in nature or submitting to an identity verification process. Each ad, which included details like an incorrect election date or information designed to delegitimise the voting process, violated policies established by the respective platforms. TikTok’s failure to reject these ads raises serious concerns about its ability to combat election-related disinformation.
Also, in June 2024, TikTok repeated a similar error by approving 16 advertisements targeted to Ireland containing[8] election disinformation ahead of the European parliamentary elections, as revealed by a Global Witness investigation. The adverts included false information encouraging people to vote online and by text, neither of which are permitted methods of voting in the upcoming elections, as well as false information about the voting age and incitement of force against immigrant voters. These findings raise questions about whether TikTok is breaching new EU rules that require platforms to mitigate election disinformation.
These case studies underscore the urgent need for social media companies to invest in more effective content moderation practices, particularly in non-English languages and during sensitive political events. The failure to do so can have severe consequences, including the erosion of democratic processes, the incitement of violence, and the undermining of social cohesion. As governments and civil society organisations continue to scrutinise the role of social media in shaping public discourse, it is imperative that these companies take decisive action to address the spread of hate speech, disinformation, and inflammatory content on their platforms.
Table 1: Some cases associated with social media platforms approving problematic contents in the past 8 years
| Platform | Parent Company | Case |
| Meta | Hyper-partisan political ads and fake news generated more engagement on Facebook during the 2016 presidential election[9] Meta’s 2023 ad policy allowed posts that denied the legitimacy of the 2020 U.S. presidential election, enabling the spread of misinformation on its platform[10] Meta approved AI manipulated political ads in India during 2024 Indian elections[11] | |
| Meta | Meta approved ads on both Facebook and Instagram claiming 2020 Election was rigged.[12] | |
| TikTok | Byte Dance | TikTok approved 90% of 2022 US midterm election disinformation ads[13] TikTok approved misleading election disinformation ads for publication in Ireland ahead of 2024 EU elections[14] |
| X | X | X ran ads on #whitepower and other hate hashtags in June, 2024[15] |
| YouTube | 2021 YouTube continues to push dangerous videos to users susceptible to extremism, and white supremacy[16] |
THE PERILS OF ENGAGEMENT-DRIVEN ALGORITHMS
At the heart of the problem lies the fundamental business model of social media companies. These platforms are designed to keep users scrolling, clicking, and engaging for as long as possible, as this allows them to serve more ads and generate more revenue. To achieve this goal, their algorithms are optimised to show users content that is most likely to capture their attention and elicit a strong emotional response. Unfortunately, research has shown that inflammatory, divisive, and sensationalistic content often drives the highest levels of engagement.[17] A 2018 study by researchers at MIT[18] found that false news stories spread six times faster on Twitter than true ones, and that lies were 70% more likely to be retweeted. Another study by researchers at New York University and Université Grenoble Alpes[19] found that false news received six times more likes, shares, and interactions on Facebook during the US 2020 election as compared to factual ones. These studies, among others, demonstrate that despite various mitigation efforts, misinformation and sensationalised content thrive on social media due to their ability to generate high user engagement.
Consequently, a perverse incentive is created for these algorithms to amplify hate speech, conspiracy theories, and extreme political views, since these are more likely to go viral and keep users hooked on the platform. This dynamic perpetuates a vicious cycle, where the most engaging content is promoted, regardless of its veracity or potential for harm, ultimately prioritising profits over the well-being of individuals and society as a whole.
Moreover, social media companies have become heavily reliant on political advertising[20] as a key revenue stream. During election campaigns, political parties and their supporters are willing to spend vast sums to promote their messages and target specific demographics. This has led to a perception that platforms like TikTok,[21] Facebook,[22] and X[23] are reluctant to crack down on misleading or inflammatory political ads, even when they violate their own policies. These companies often cite reasons such as freedom of expression,[24] mistakes in content moderation[25] or the inability to effectively monitor the vast amounts of content on their platforms.[26] But, the validity of these excuses is questionable, particularly given the substantial resources at their disposal.
Furthermore, the high cost of content moderation initiatives in non-major world languages including indigenous languages,[27] creates additional barriers to effective content regulation. This leaves marginalised communities particularly vulnerable to the spread of disinformation and hate speech. As a result of these inadequacies, a permissive environment has emerged where bad actors can spread disinformation and hate with relative impunity, knowing that social media companies will prioritise their ad dollars over the integrity of public discourse.
THE PATH FORWARD: STRONGER REGULATION AND GLOBAL COOPERATION
It is clear that social media companies’ attempts at self-regulation have been woefully inadequate. Voluntary measures and public relations campaigns have failed to address the systemic issues that allow hate and disinformation to flourish on these platforms. Governments and international organisations must step in to hold these companies accountable and enforce meaningful standards for content moderation.
One potential approach is the imposition of substantial fines for repeated failures to enforce content policies. If social media giants and to face significant financial penalties each time they allowed hate speech or disinformation to spread, they would be far more motivated to invest in robust moderation systems and human oversight. Another strategy could involve mandating a minimum level of investment in content moderation, especially for non-dominant, non-English languages, where harmful content frequently slips through the cracks. Regulators could require that a specific percentage of these companies’ revenue be dedicated to hiring and training moderators with the linguistic and cultural knowledge needed to identify and remove problematic posts.
Regular third-party audits of content moderation systems and ad approval processes could also play a crucial role in promoting transparency and accountability. Independent auditors could assess the effectiveness of these systems, identify areas for improvement, and publicly report on their findings. This would provide much-needed visibility into the inner workings of these platforms and put pressure on companies to address any shortcomings. Additionally, policymakers may need to reexamine the legal frameworks that currently shield social media companies from liability for user-generated content. If it can be demonstrated that their algorithms are systematically amplifying hate speech and disinformation, they may need to bear greater responsibility for the harms that result.
However, given the global nature of social media, a piecemeal approach by individual countries is unlikely to be sufficient. To truly rein in the power of these platforms, we need coordinated action at the regional and international levels will be needed. Countries facing similar challenges with online hate and disinformation should come together in demanding change from social media companies. For example, member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) could greatly benefit from collaborating to develop a shared set of standards and regulations for content moderation. While achieving broad consensus on content moderation standards across ASEAN member states may be difficult due to diverse political systems and interests, there are still opportunities for cooperation on specific issues of shared concern.
ASEAN governments could focus on areas where there is greater alignment, such as combating online exploitation, protecting minors, and countering violent extremism. By pooling resources and expertise, member states can develop targeted initiatives to tackle these pressing issues more effectively. Additionally, regional cooperation should prioritise capacity building and knowledge sharing to help governments navigate the complexities of online content regulation. This could include joint research projects, training programmes for policymakers and regulators, and platforms for ongoing dialogue and coordination. By fostering a shared understanding of the challenges and best practices in content moderation, ASEAN member states can work towards more informed and effective policymaking.
While top-down regulation may be challenging given the political dynamics within ASEAN, member states can still advocate for greater transparency and accountability from social media companies. This could involve pushing for more investment in local content moderation teams, clearer timelines for removing flagged content, and increased transparency around algorithms and data practices.
To complement regional efforts, ASEAN could also engage with multilateral forums such as the United Nations, the G20, or the OECD to develop global norms and guidelines on social media governance. By sharing their unique perspectives and experiences, ASEAN member states can help shape the international discourse on these critical issues.
Ultimately, while the path to effective content moderation in Southeast Asia may be complex, a flexible and collaborative approach that respects the diverse contexts of member states offers the best chance of making meaningful progress. By focusing on areas of common ground and working towards incremental improvements, ASEAN governments can help create a safer and more responsible online environment for their citizens.
SAFEGUARDING DEMOCRACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE
The unchecked power of social media companies poses a danger to the health of democracies. The case studies from India and Malaysia demonstrate how the failure to effectively moderate online content can fuel real-world violence, deepen societal divisions, and erode public trust in democratic institutions, especially in the age of rapidly developing communication technology and the increasing penetration of AI into our daily lives.
We have seen the deadly impact of social media-fuelled violence[28] in places like Myanmar[29] and Sri Lanka,[30] the erosion of public trust in democratic institutions as a result of targeted disinformation campaigns and the rise of polarisation and extremism as algorithms feed users’ increasingly radical content. It is time for policymakers, civil society, and the public to demand accountability from social media giants and take decisive action to address the harms they enable. This will require a multi-faceted approach, combining stronger regulation, increased investment in content moderation, regular audits and transparency measures, and legal reforms to clarify the responsibilities of these companies. Close cooperation and coordination among countries at regional and global levels are crucial to ensure consistent, effective, and enforceable standards and rules governing social media. The stakes could not be higher. If we fail to act, we risk allowing social media companies to continue to be used as weapons against the very values and institutions that underpin our free and open societies.
The power of social media companies is too great to be left unchecked. It is time to work together to build a digital future that promotes transparency, accountability, and the responsible exchange of ideas, while safeguarding against the spread of hate, lies, and division. Only then can we fully realise the potential of these technologies to inform, connect, and empower us, rather than divide and mislead us.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |