Webinar on “Understanding Thailand’s Constitutional Reform: Process, Politics, and Implications”

In this webinar, Dr Siripan Nogsuan Sawasdee (Professor in the Department of Government at the Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University) and Mr Parit Itim Wacharasindhu (Member of Parliament and Spokesperson of the Move Forward Party) discussed Thailand’s constitutional reform efforts.

THAILAND STUDIES PROGRAMME WEBINAR

Thursday, 8 February 2024 – The webinar explored potential changes to Thailand’s constitution after the May 2023 general election, which saw the defeat of military-backed parties. Since 1932, Thailand has seen 20 constitutions, each often contested by political elites and eventually overhauled. Constitutional reforms have gained traction recently, driven by calls to reduce military influence in politics both during the pro-democracy movements in 2020-2021 and the 2023 general elections. Both the Move Forward Party, which secured the most seats in the election, and the ruling Pheu Thai Party have committed to rewrite the constitution. However, the prospects for reform remain uncertain, facing both political and technical hurdles.

Clockwise from top left: Dr Napon Jatusripitak (moderator), Mr Parit Itim Wacharasindhu and Dr Siripan Nogsuan Sawasdee. (Credit: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute)

The ISEAS Thailand Studies Programme hosted a webinar under Chatham House rule, featuring Dr. Siripan Nogsuan Sawasdee from Chulalongkorn University, and Mr. Parit Wacharasindhu, a Member of Parliament and Spokesperson for the Move Forward Party (MFP). They provided valuable insights into the process, politics, and implications of Thailand’s constitutional reforms. The webinar attracted 90 attendees and concluded with 11 thought-provoking questions.

The webinar covered the following noteworthy points:

  • Thailand’s current 2017 Constitution can be understood as a legacy of military rule.  It fits into the historical pattern of coup-constitution cycle as it was written by a constitutional drafting committee appointed by the military regime, whose leaders staged a coup in May 2014. During the 2016 constitutional referendum, campaigning against the junta-drafted constitution was tightly suppressed. Therefore, the fairness and the integrity of the 2016 referendum for the current constitution should be questioned.
  • Due to public opposition, drafters of the controversial, which went into effect on 6 April 2017, set high amendment barriers under Section 256, necessitating votes from a third of the Senate and 20% of MPs belonging to parties that do not hold ministerial positions or leadership positions in parliament. The concentration of power in the Senate and the military regime’s influence on the senatorial selection process have shifted the balance away from the House of Representatives, fueling calls for a complete constitutional overhaul rather than mere amendments.
  • In addition to having the authority to jointly select the prime minister alongside the House of Representatives until May 2024, the Senate also has the final say in appointing members of the Constitutional Court and other independent agencies. These agencies, along with the court, empowered by the current constitution, can prevent certain politicians from gaining power or fulfilling their promises to voters.
  • Another potential area for constitutional reform is the 20-year national strategy, which, in theory, allows for the removal of any elected government if their policies contradict these strategies.
  • Constitutional Court ruling 4/2021 included a very ambiguous statement that requires one referendum before the drafting of new constitution and one more referendum after the new constitution was drafted.
  • A government-established panel for constitutional reforms proposed holding three referendums: the first to authorize the initiation of the reform process, the second to approve the amendment of Section 256, which was obstructing reform efforts, and the last to endorse the new constitution. The first referendum should also address whether to adopt a new constitution that excludes the current constitution’s Chapter One – the form of the state – and Chapter Two – the monarch’s power.
  • The motion to include questions on Chapters One and Two was agreed upon by both the Move Forward Party and Pheu Thai in early 2023, before the general elections, when both were opposition parties. However, the motion was blocked by the Senate. The situation changed after the 2023 general election.
  • Primary differences between Pheu Thai and Move Forward after the 2023 general election lie in Pheu Thai government’s pledge not to amend Chapter One, and   Chapter Two, while Move Forward and progressive groups advocate for the drafting of a new constitution without any precondition.  without such restrictions. Move Forward also advocates for a wholly elected body of constitutional drafters rather than a mixture of elected and appointed of the constitutional drafting assembly (CDA).
  • The latest development is that Pheu Thai is now seeking another Constitutional Court’s judgment on whether only two referendums, instead of three, shall be held to save money and time. If the Constitutional Court allows bypassing a preliminary referendum, Move Forward and Pheu Thai should persuade other parties, especially senators, to support amending Section 256 and forming a constitutional drafting assembly.
  • With the two-referendum approach, the new hotly debated issue centers on the process and nature of the Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA). If Move Forward Party’s proposal is accepted by the senators, the fully elected CDA will comprise three types of members: General/Area-based, Expertise-based (requiring election), and Diversity-based (representing underrepresented groups, also requiring election).
  • By going for only two referendums, the initial one can start next year, allowing the Election Commission to align it with the local administration elections in January 2025.
  • In the new constitution, highly debated issues like how the Prime Minister should be selected, whether there should be a senate or constitutional court, how people’s rights should be protected, should be included.

The audience raised questions about the monarchy’s role in constitutional reform discussions, strategies to overcome political apathy towards reforms in Thai politics, whether to replace or amend the constitution, the link between Thai legal/political culture and constitutional reforms, and the steps needed to ensure the new constitution’s long-term sustainability.