Webinar on “PKR: How Anwar’s Party Works”

In this webinar, Mr James Chai shared his findings on the structure of Malaysia’s People’s Justice Party (PKR) and its differentiating characteristics compared to other parties.

MALAYSIA STUDIES PROGRAMME WEBINAR

Wednesday, 31 January 2024 – While PKR led by Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim is the second-largest party and the first multiracial party to govern Malaysia, little has been studied about it and its inner workings. The Malaysia Studies Programme organised a webinar with Mr James Chai as a guest speaker to uncover the party’s rapid growth, chaotic democracy and unfulfilled potential. Mr Chai is a Visiting Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.

Speaker Mr James Chai with moderator Dr Francis Hutchinson. (Credit: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute)

Mr Chai’s presentation comprised three main parts: why is understanding PKR important, defining features of PKR, and what the future holds. Mr Chai started off with a historical overview of PKR’s performance. Founded in 1999 shortly after Anwar was sacked from UMNO, then Parti Keadilan Nasional (PKN) was not able to garner many votes. With only five seats in parliament, it was unable to change the political landscape. In 2004, PKR only had one seat (that of Wan Azizah Wan Ismail’s, Anwar’s wife, in Anwar’s stronghold), as many supported UMNO’s Abdullah Badawi who promoted himself as an anti-corrupt figure. The relatively low support early on led many to think that PKR would be dissolved after a few years, not unlike the short-lived Semangat 46. PKR’s fate changed rapidly in 2008 after Anwar was released from jail. Not only was it part of an opposition coalition, it was considered a government in waiting. While the party failed to capture the Reformasi rebellion in early days, it experienced an upward trajectory in support from 2013 to 2022, with Anwar becoming the Prime Minister for the first time since Reformasi, after 24 years. Mr Chai then pointed out that unbeknownst to many, PKR is the second largest party in Malaysia after UMNO; it is significantly larger than Bersatu, Amanah and DAP, and also larger than PAS. This fact is significant as PKR is a relatively new party of only 20-30 years old, compared with UMNO, PAS and DAP which are 60-70 years old. Yet, even though PKR has become a stable player, literature dedicated to PKR has been scarce compared to other mainstream parties. The next two parts of the presentation thus contributed to filling this gap in knowledge.

The second part of the presentation focused on defining features of PKR. Namely, its large and rapidly growing membership, one-person-one-vote system, and stronghold being mixed and slightly Malay. Firstly, Mr Chai assessed that PKR’s history is a story of a “big tent”, that is, cooperation with other groups (NGOs, political parties, movements), tied to a central bond that is Anwar Ibrahim. PKR was formed in 2004 as a merger between PKN and Parti Rakyat Malaysia, a left-wing radical political party, formed in 1955. A key characteristic of PKR is being a conglomerate of different groups of people which has allowed for accommodation of different interests. The groups include ex-UMNO members, ex-PRM members, street activists, NGOs, student bodies, Islamic activists, and women NGOs. From 2018, when PKR was first part of the Mahathir-led government, it experienced a spike in membership following years of steady increase. Mr Chai proposed three potential reasons for PKR’s large membership. First, the expectation of federal patronage: people are incentivised to register as members with expectations that there will be rewards, though these rewards did not eventually materialise. Second, the low barrier to entry based on the multiracial big tent approach. Not only is it easy to join PKR, members have a chance to acquire significant party position at a quick pace. An example would be Adam Adli, current deputy Minister of Youth and Sports of Malaysia, who joined PKR only a few months before party elections. He was elected as youth head of the party and elevated to his current role within a short span of time. Third, the direct elections where every member in the party gets to vote for the highest leadership and can run for any party positions themselves, a system unique to PKR. This direct election system creates an incentive for people to recruit more members if they want to win a position in the party; whenever there is a direct election, many PKR members recruit their family and friends to vote for them.

However, the abovementioned strengths are also PKR’s weaknesses. Precisely because it is easy to join PKR, the party is largely consisted of unmotivated and inconsistent members, with 15-20% turnout rate during party elections. This figure is a more realistic estimate of the number of active PKR members. At the same time, there is a low membership fee compliance, possibly attributed to low commitment or lack of enforcement by the party. Membership fee only accounts for around 1.1% of PKR’s yearly revenue, or approximately only 40 thousand members pay yearly. In addition, unlike UMNO and PAS, PKR relies on fence sitter voters; it does not have the ability to mobilise members in a substantial way on its own to win a victory, meaning that its vote count fluctuates. Shifting gears to the grassroots level, Mr Chai shared that PKR’s stronghold is Selangor, which has the highest number of members, sub-divisions, and parliamentary seats. While its second and third largest members are in Sabah and Sarawak, they yield little electoral return. East Malaysia has many NGO movements primarily in human rights and environmental activism that became PKR members, though that has changed after the Sheraton Move and the rise of the Sarawak coalition movement GPS that almost monopolises Sarawak. Perak, on the other hand, is a “dark horse”, delivering outsized electoral returns due to good organisation on-the-ground through branches like Gopeng.

Mr Chai then zoomed into PKR’s practice of direct election, being the first and only party that adopts this practice. Until 2009, PKR adopted the delegate system, where ordinary members vote at the division level only. In 2010, it adopted direct voting which increased the maximum vote for eligible voters to 122. This huge process resulted in chaos, which then led to a shift to a hybrid system where ordinary members vote at the division and leadership level (excluding 20 excos at central and women’s wing), with maximum vote reduced to 62 votes, still a sizeable number. This massive democratisation also led to massive problems, Mr Chai pointed out. It led to intense factionalism and is logistically and administratively taxing, with an election taking an average of 81 days; the longest taking 135 days in 2014. In addition to the hybrid system, there have been attempts in recent years to practise online voting to address these challenges. Mr Chai observed that the most vicious contests have always been reserved for the deputy president, seen as heir apparent to Anwar Ibrahim. Factions also tend to be organised along the deputy president’s teams. An example would be long-time deputy president Azmin Ali (2010-2020) who eventually led the Sheraton Move and departure of top leadership from PKR in 2020 and 2021.

Looking at PKR’s electoral stronghold, Mr Chai opined that PKR’s “secret formula for success” is at the mixed seats with no clear ethnic majority or slight Malay majority seats (50-60% Malay population in that seat). These seats tend to be in urban or suburban areas, which opens up the opportunity for PKR for capture more seats as Malaysia’s demographic profile evolves. PKR would thus have the opportunity to emerge as the largest party. In 2018 for example, when the tides turned in favour of PKR, they were able to capture a significant number of seats.

The last part of the presentation looked at what the future holds. First, PKR has significant unfulfilled potential given that its membership is undermobilised and underused. As federal patronage is unlikely, members have to fundraise for activities which poses a challenge as the majority of members belong to lower socio-economic brackets of society. Another unfulfilled potential lies in divisions that are wide but thin. Youth recruitment is also concerning, with a severe lack of a next generation of leaders after Nurul Izzah, Rafizi Ramli, and Nik Nazmi. At the same time, the second and third largest block in East Malaysia has eroded since the Sheraton Move, dampening the party’s roots in East Malaysia. A significant challenge going forward is finding a cause for supporters to rally on. Now that Anwar has become prime minister, PKR struggles to find a cause, unlike PAS and UMNO which fight for long-standing causes – Islamic and Malay bumiputera respectively. Second, direct elections have a lot of problems but also promise. If PKR can resolve logistical issues, time taken for elections, and reduce factionalism, it can create possibly the most democratised system and reap the benefits of it. Ideally, such a direct election system can ensure that no money politics happen, create candidates in touch with national issues, and train politicians who survive challenges. Third, by understanding PKR’s “secret winning formula” by focusing on mixed seats, it can win a substantial number of seats. About 50% of seats fit that profile in West Malaysia. Seats could also look increasingly mixed in the future and if boundaries are hypothetically drawn more objectively, the estimated number of mixed seats could go up to about 140.

Summing up, Mr Chai assessed that PKR is a party with a lot of promise but much of its potential is unfulfilled. While it has a large membership, it is largely unmobilised, uncommitted and unmotivated to do more for the party. The party elections offer a lot of democratic benefits in creating potentially strong candidates and a fair system but suffers from chaos and factionalism. Finally, even though PKR has figured out its niche in mixed and slight Malay majority seats, it has not capitalised on this understanding but in fact retracted in support it has gained for the past year.

The webinar proceeded to a Q&A session. Mr Chai fielded questions including: cadreship – whether there is training to cultivate a shared vision of the party, likely successors to Anwar, how policymaking happens within PKR, PKR’s ability to win support outside of its Selangor stronghold, and PKR’s level of centralisation. Malaysia Studies Programme Coordinator Dr Francis Hutchinson moderated this webinar, which attracted participants from the policy, business and academic communities.