Dr Hoon reminded that after 1998, there was fierce competition among diverse interest groups — religious, political, capitalist, ethnic, gender/sexuality, labour/class — in the suddenly opened-up public sphere. This combined with the rising influence of Islam from the Middle East, and other international factors such as the 9/11 led to a backlash towards the liberal movement within Islam — for example, in 2005, MUI released fatwa prohibiting secularism, pluralism, and liberalism (abbreviated allusively as SiPiLis); banned interfaith prayers; declared inter-religious marriage haram; and declared Ahmadiyah a deviant sect. This has led to assumptions of growing “Islamisation” in Indonesia. Less known, however, is the growth of Christianity.
The seminar was chaired by Dr Andrew Carruthers, Visiting Fellow at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute (Source: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute)
Historically, Christianity, coming from Europe, was confined to political and economic minority elites. There was a “great harvest” of people turning to Christianity as those without religion converted en masse to Christianity after 1965 to avoid being maligned as atheist or communist. Official census showed steady increase: 7.4 per cent Christians in 1971, 9 per cent in 2000, and 10 per cent in 2010. Catholics hovered at around 3 per cent. Some senior priests have claimed that the number could be as high as 20 per cent Protestant, likely downplayed due to the sensitivity. The growth was mainly driven by Pentecostal/Charismatic churches that found fertile ground within the urban middle class.
Generally, in Indonesia there are three mainstream Protestant churches — Ecumenical, Evangelical, and Pentecostal churches. The Ecumenical is the oldest, but the Pentecostal churches have been the fastest growing denomination, combining music, modernity, technology and transnational networks. The Pentecostal Christians are increasingly interested in political participation, but they are also highly fragmented and diverse, ranging from small, parochial congregations to shop-houses and mega churches. The latest trans-denominational global networks departed from vertical structures of formal membership structures, traditional liturgy, and appointed council leaders; to fluid and horizontal organizational configuration coalesced around ‘networkers’ and ‘contact persons’. This movement is ambitious, combative, well-organised and resourceful, with funders and patrons including billionaires such as Harry Tanoe. It aims to penetrate into all sectors of society with Christian values (e.g. produce Christian sinetron; blur boundaries between Christianity and capitalism). The Korean Wave Jesus movement has been particularly visible, organising two large concerts inviting Korean pop stars in 2014. Despite the high-profile publicity, there was no disruption from radical groups since there was the strong presence of army, security forces, and obvious political patronage.
Thus, the perceived threat of Christianisation can be traced to their growing social networks, economic capital and political influence — a host of Christian programmes are appearing on Christian-owned television networks. On the other hand, Christians also felt the threat of Islamisation, with the growing Islamic media and public piety, implementation of Shariah and bylaws. The recent case of Ahok made Christians feel further marginalized, with sermons emphasizing Ahok as a martyr and Christians being persecuted.
To the question of political allegiance of the Christian groups, Dr Hoon replied that some senior, influential chairpersons of the Pentecostal churches actually declared Prabowo as their choice, most likely due to patronage networks and promises. The allegiances among Christians themselves are very diverse — for example, some theological schools in Jakarta has for more than ten years taught gender and sexuality in their curriculum, inviting people from different denominations, feeling that they have more in common with progressive Muslims. It is also difficult to categorise the ethnic groups attending the churches.
Participants at the seminar (Source: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute)
It would be a challenge to accommodate religious diversity in Indonesia. There are competing local ideologies (such as Pancasila and Bhinneka Tunggal Ika) and global discourses such as assimilation, integration, pluralism and multiculturalism. But pluralism is a contested concept in the religious sphere: it can mean diversity, tolerance, and peaceful coexistence of religious difference, but it also conjures the fear of relativism, secularism, and liberalism (and more recently, in relation to LGBT groups). Multiculturalism on the other hand has historically encompassed state policies of inclusion and minority recognition that focuses on rights, citizenship and difference. However, it deals mainly with cultures, with little emphasis on religion, and it is facing increasing attack across Europe, U.S. and Australia. The state could have a role of preventing hostility and violence by maintaining religious and racial harmony, but it also risks reinforcing racial and religious boundaries by preventing organic interaction and hybridity between groups from occurring. What is direly lacking in Indonesia is state involvement in not only organising or sponsoring such interactions, but also in enforcing strong rule of law. Indonesia for a long time had allowed state sanction and/or involvement in violence. This brings a double whammy — allowing politicisation of religion, and religionisation of politics — without a clear line of law enforcement.