ISEAS Perspective

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• Elections in Malaysia are held at the national and state levels, and in holding these concurrently, disruptions and costs have been reduced.

• As with the federal government, state governments can decide when to hold their elections. In the past, when Barisan Nasional (BN) was in power at the centre and in most states at the same time, this discretion was largely discounted.

• Following BN’s fall from power in 2018 and the country’s political context becoming more fluid, state government elections have been increasingly held out of sync with federal elections. In the last four years, state polls have been held on six separate occasions.

• Concerned about rising costs, prolonged campaigning as well as implications for the country’s political stability, some have proposed clustering state elections or ensuring that they are held alongside national polls.

• There are pros and cons to such arrangements. Concurrent polls can be cheaper, encourage higher turnout rates, and reduce the length of campaign seasons. Conversely, state leaders would be forced to hold elections at times not of their choosing, and state-level issues could be overshadowed by national ones.

• The challenges inherent in pursuing such a reform in Malaysia are considerable and would involve amending the federal constitution, as well as the various state constitutions.

• Consequently, it is likely that the Unity Government will head into the next electoral season under the current arrangement. The Sabah and Sarawak state elections are due in 2025 and 2026 and can be held without much concern for the current coalition arrangements.

• In contrast, the Melaka and Johor elections will be crucial barometers for the Unity Government. Due by late 2026 and mid-2027 respectively, they may expose internal weaknesses in the run-up to the general election due some 9-12 months later.

* Francis E. Hutchinson is Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Malaysia Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. The author would like to thank Lee Hwok Aun, Ong Kian Ming and Sara Loo for their comments, feedback, and inputs.

ISEAS Perspective 2024/34, 15 May 2024

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INTRODUCTION

Malaysia has a multi-levelled political system, which is comprised of a federal government and 13 state counterparts – all of which hold their own elections.[1] Influenced by the British Westminster system, the federal government holds elections for parliament – and the state governments for their assemblies – at least once every five years. With the exception of Sarawak, which has run on its own electoral cycle since 1963, elections for the federal and state governments have traditionally been held simultaneously.[2]

This arrangement has been a tradition, rather than a result of any specific legislation. According to the Constitution, elections at the federal and state levels are called by the King or Sultans and Governors on the advice of the elected leadership in parliament or respective state assembly. Given this, state leaders have the prerogative to call for elections at any time, independently of the federal government.[3] Elections at both the national and state levels are organized and overseen by the Election Commission, whose establishment is stipulated by the Federal Constitution.[4]

What minimized dispersion in election dates in the past was the fact that, up until 2018, the Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition was in power at the federal level and also in most states. Consequently, elections were held at the behest of the BN leadership and taken with national interests at the forefront. While BN state leaders may or may not have been in agreement with the timing, internal party mechanisms served to ensure compliance. BN state leaders often aspired to subsequent national cabinet positions and were reluctant to defy orders from national leaders which could compromise their career trajectories. Furthermore, recalcitrant menteri besar or chief ministers could be toppled by votes of no confidence passed by BN assemblypersons.[5]

In recent years, this homogenizing influence has lost force. In 2008, Barisan Nasional was beaten unprecedentedly in five state governments. In 2018, BN was defeated at the national level and in most states for the first time. Following a two-year interlude, BN returned to federal power – but in a subordinate position in the Perikatan Nasional and then the Unity Government groupings. The relative decline in BN’s power at both federal and state levels allows more autonomy for state leaders to prioritize local considerations when calling for elections.

Out-of-cycle elections can occur for several reasons. First, state governments can rise and fall due to local-level machinations. Motions of confidence and no-confidence can be passed in state assemblies, and – similar to the Sheraton Move in February 2020 that led to the fall of the Pakatan Harapan administration – local coalitions can come undone. Thus, the precipitous Sabah election in 2020 arose due to a faction of the ruling coalition crossing the floor to join the opposition. Deprived of his majority, then-chief minister Shafie Apdal opted to call an election.[6] In a similar move, the 2021 Melaka election was held because a group of UMNO representatives withdrew their support for the sitting administration, thereby denying it a majority in the state assembly.[7] The Johor election in early 2022 was ostensibly called because the death of an assemblyperson meant the sitting coalition commanded only the slimmest of majorities.[8]

Second, elections can be held out-of-cycle when the federal government decides to hold its own polls early. National-level leaders often seek to hold elections in circumstances that are favourable to them, such as following budget launches or when economic tailwinds are particularly favourable. Of course, national-level political dynamics may also push for earlier polls. While the fifteenth general election could have been held as late as in September 2023, in October 2022 the Ismail Sabri-led administration ceded to pressure from the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) to ride on the momentum generated by the Melaka and Johor state elections, maximize the political bounty from the October budget release, and avoid the worst of the monsoon season.[9]

However, the November 2022 date meant that state governments also holding their polls then would have effectively lost almost a full year of their terms. Despite the recommendation by the Prime Minister Ismail Sabri that all eligible state governments hold their elections along with the national government, only the BN-led state governments of Perlis, Pahang, and Perak opted to do so.[10]

Conversely, states led by the opposition grouping Pakatan Harapan (PH) and the Islamist party, Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) opted to go to their full terms.[11] Among other reasons, party leaders argued that they needed to prepare for the year-end flooding season.[12] Despite being led by different coalitions, the leaders of these six states were able to arrive upon a mutually-agreed schedule to dissolve their assemblies.[13] Following this, the Electoral Commission established 12 August as the common date for elections in Negri Sembilan, Selangor, Penang, Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu.[14]

Faced with the cost of holding elections more frequently, as well as the potential for instability, there have been calls for measures to make the political system more structured.[15] There are arguments in favour of, and against simultaneous elections. While relatively few countries have mandated simultaneous polls and some actively discourage them, this reform is currently being debated in India, for example. This country’s constitutional similarities to Malaysia and the related discussions illustrate the complexities inherent in pursuing such a reform.

As Malaysia transitions towards a more dynamic and fluid political context, this issue will continue to simmer. This Perspective examines this issue in four sections. Following this introduction, the second will look at the costs and benefits of synchronous and asynchronous elections. The third section will look at the experience of other countries. The final section will look at how such a reform could work for Malaysia going forward.

COSTS AND BENEFITS

There are theoretical arguments for and against holding simultaneous elections.

The first argument in favour of simultaneous elections is cost. Holding national and state elections on the same day means that the election workers, physical infrastructure, and associated logistics are only used once. For example, the August 2023 state elections cost an estimated RM 420 million.[16] Had they been held alongside their national equivalent in November 2022, they would have added little to the RM 1.1 billion budget earmarked for those polls.[17] It is also important to note that the costs involved in organizing the elections are borne by the federal government. This means that state governments actually wield the discretion of when to hold elections but do not incur the associated costs.[18]

The second argument concerns political participation. National polls usually have higher rates of voter turnout than their state-level equivalents. Thus, holding elections simultaneously would increase the proportion of people voting for their respective state leaders.[19] This issue is of particular importance to outstation or overseas residents, who need to travel back to their constituencies to vote. Holding simultaneous elections would increase the probability of them voting for both levels of government, rather than requiring them to return more than once over a five-year cycle.

Analysts also argue that holding national and state elections simultaneously would concentrate political activity to one specific period, allowing life to return to normal soon after. Despite the Unity Government’s large parliamentary majority, many argued that the August 2023 state polls constituted a de facto referendum on the new administration. Consequently, much bandwidth and political capital were consumed in preparing for these polls, held a mere nine months after the November 2022 election. Furthermore, frequent elections, persistent campaigning, and prolonged periods of political uncertainty can undermine public trust in polls altogether.

Nonetheless, there are valid counterarguments to such an arrangement. First, it can be argued that forcing state governments to align their electoral cycles with national ones goes against the spirit of federalism, which seeks to incorporate different political, cultural, and social aspirations within one framework. Additionally, such a measure would deny autonomy and agency to state leaders. As with their national equivalents, states have their own political rhythms and dynamics, and a specific state administration may have valid reasons for holding polls at another time. Furthermore, holding elections simultaneously would reduce the salience of state-level political issues, as attention to national-level issues and debates would be prioritized.[20] Last, making politicians face more frequent electoral tests increases their accountability to voters.[21]

There is an additional argument that holding smaller subsets of elections makes the logistics more manageable. This is because the election machinery is not overly stretched and can focus on specific polls in different parts of the country.[22] This argument has more traction for demographically and geographically large polities, as large numbers of officials need to be mobilized and immense logistical challenges addressed all at once.[23]

Asynchronous elections can also provide crucial information for national leaders. Thus, state or provincial elections held in the run-up to national polls can yield crucial information for party leaders and strategists. Results can be used as a barometer for prevailing opinions and support for flagship policies. In addition, electoral weaknesses and swing voters can be identified to allow more focussed messaging during national campaigns. However, these elections can also create instability should support levels in key states drop or exacerbate existing electoral vulnerabilities.

INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES

Despite the theoretical advantages to holding concurrent elections, there are relatively few countries that currently have this electoral arrangement. South Africa and Sweden are two notable cases where national and subnational elections are held at the same time.

In South Africa, the electoral arrangements were the result of protracted negotiations between different ethnically-based parties that were concerned about issues such as voter turnout and representativity. The end result was an agreement that national and provincial elections would be held simultaneously in order to enable out-station voters to return to vote, but that voters would use different voting forms for each election in order to underline their different purpose.[24]

In Sweden, simultaneous elections have been credited with the country’s high turnout rates, particularly for subnational elections. That said, there have been calls to separate the elections in order for more media coverage of local issues. This is due to the perception that national-level issues tend to dominate elections.[25]

Most federal countries prefer to hold national and subnational elections on different dates and, in some cases, follow distinct electoral cycles. Australia and India are useful comparators for Malaysia, as they are both federal systems with a central government and state counterparts. Indeed, these two countries’ federal systems influenced the eventual structure adopted in Malaysia upon its independence. The Reid Commission, charged with designing Malaysia’s federal system, had constitutional experts from the United Kingdom, Australia, India, and Pakistan.[26]

Turning to Australia, its electoral system is specifically designed to ensure that federal and state elections do not coincide. Federal elections for the lower house are on a three-year cycle although, following the Westminster tradition, parliament can be dissolved and elections held earlier than this.[27] In contrast, most state elections have a fixed four-year cycle, with stipulated dates and days of the week when these elections must take place.[28]

While some states have held elections on the same day, federal elections have never been held concurrent with a state election.[29] There is, at present, no discussion about moving towards simultaneous elections in Australia, although extending federal government terms to four years is being debated.[30] Constitutional amendments are onerous to organize and require the bill to be passed in parliament and then decided via a national referendum.[31]

India offers another instructive comparator. Being a federal system like Malaysia, the Indian constitution provides state governments the authority to hold their own elections. During the first two decades following independence, the Congress party was in power at the centre and in most states and all shared the same electoral cycle. However, after 1967, elections began to be held out of sync, as first several state governments and then the central government dissolved early.[32] Today, with the federal government and 30 state and territory governments holding their elections, polls are a frequent event.

In a bid to promote national unity, reduce time and resources spent on campaigning, as well as lessen administrative costs, the Modi administration has been promoting ‘One Nation, One Election’. The arguments have focussed on cost efficiency, reducing the time spent on elections and campaigns, lessening demands on the armed forces who are mobilized to ensure safety and security, and reducing the salience of polarising discourse during campaigns.[33] The biggest pushback has come from state- or regionally-based political parties who argue that this measure would lessen the time and importance spent on local issues, and voters would be encouraged to vote the same way for national and state leaders. Others such as Congress leader Rahul Gandhi have argued that it goes against the country’s formation as a ‘Union of States’.[34]

Beyond the theoretical reasons for or against this reform, the practical challenges inherent in this reform are formidable. Homogenizing national and state elections would require curtailing the tenures of more recently elected state administrations and lengthening the terms of other administrations that had been elected earlier. However, while this could be done as a one-off exercise, unless the legislation bestowing autonomy to the state governments to call for their elections is amended, there is nothing to prevent them from reverting to their own cycles if they so wished.

Ensuring a more permanent arrangement would involve adding an elaborate framework of rules. These would govern how state administrations can be dissolved, as well as provide for the frequent use of President’s Rule or Emergency powers by the central government to run states for the intervening periods between when their assemblies are dissolved and when the next scheduled elections take place.[35] 

OPTIONS FOR MALAYSIA

How, then, does the scenario look for Malaysia?

In the short term, it is unlikely that the Unity Government administration will be able to persuade the leaders of the different states to adopt timings for elections that are against their interests. Internal party hierarchy can influence state administrations run by Pakatan Harapan, given that this coalition is at the core of the sitting government. However, given that it is not yet clear whether BN will remain a coalition partner with PH going into the next national election,[36] it is likely that BN will decide election dates for the states it controls based on its interests alone. This is even more likely for states run by the opposition coalition, Perikatan Nasional.

Consequently, the Unity Government has two options for addressing this issue. The first would be an ambitious structural reform along the lines being debated in India. This would require some amendment to the timing of a national election, perhaps along the lines of a fixed term. Such a reform would require a constitutional amendment. The Unity Government ostensibly has more than a two-thirds majority in parliament which could be used to pass this measure. However, this would only apply to the federal government. Amendments to provisions surrounding the dissolution of legislative assemblies are stipulated in the various states’ constitutions and changes would also require amendments to these foundational documents.[37] For any reform of this nature, it is likely that extensive preparation would be necessary, including studying electoral processes elsewhere.

In addition, discussion of political reform is currently more focussed on separating the offices of the attorney general and public prosecutor, as well as the extension of citizenship to children born overseas to Malaysian mothers.[38] Consequently, it is highly unlikely that substantial changes to the electoral system will be implemented ahead of the next round of elections.

This then leaves the more organic approach of having the state elections follow their current cycle. The table below has the dates of the most recent election for Malaysia and for the thirteen states, along with the latest date on which parliament or the respective state assemblies can dissolve. This date is five years from the day of the first parliamentary or assembly sitting. Following dissolution, elections need to be held within the subsequent 60 days.

Looking ahead, Sabah and Sarawak are among the earliest state elections to be held. The political configuration of these two states is quite different from the peninsula and the results of the elections are likely to be relatively self-contained. For Sabah, it is quite likely that the eventual ruling coalition at the state level will seek to align itself with the ruling coalition at the federal level. For Sarawak, past trends indicate that the coalition in power at the state level, Gabungan Parti Sarawak (GPS), is likely to remain in power. GPS is also a current member of the Unity Government and it is unlikely that there would be a reconfiguration of this relationship so far ahead of national polls.

This is not the case for Melaka and Johor, whose elections are due roughly one year and eight months ahead of the next general election. These two states are particularly important for UMNO, lying in the southern part of the peninsula, which is one of the last redoubts of Malaysia’s grand old party. Of the two, Johor is the most important, given the party’s founding in the state and traditional strong reputation of people from the state at the party’s apex.[39]

There will be several dynamics at the forefront when UMNO party strategists plot the ideal date for the various state elections. The first will be the popularity of UMNO party president Zahid Hamidi particularly among UMNO grassroots members. In Melaka and Johor, the party is exceptionally disciplined and able to mobilize contingents of supporters to turn up to vote. However, should Zahid’s leadership be contested or should there be signs of unrest within the party, the turnout levels could be affected. Indeed, party members could even use these polls as a way of signalling their discontent. An upset in one of these states would affect UMNO’s momentum in the run-up to the national election. 

Conversely, should the UMNO leadership feel confident, it could contemplate holding the Melaka, Johor, and even the Perak and Pahang state elections together. This would cost the latter states almost a year of their terms and would represent a huge gamble for the party. That said, solid wins across these states would put UMNO in a very solid position ahead, both of national polls and of inter-coalition bargaining in preparation for national polls.

Another option would be to delay elections in some of these states to cluster them. The way to do this would be to declare an Emergency in the states running on an earlier electoral cycle. This was done most recently in 2021, when the Sarawak state election was delayed from June to December 2021, due to the COVID pandemic.[40] That said, a plausible reason would need to be given, and consent obtained from both the King and the Prime Minister. This, in turn, would require delicate inter-coalition negotiation between PH and BN.

Relatedly, the other determining factor would be the relationship between PH and BN as they plan their electoral strategies for the next general election. Will they contest jointly or separately? From PH’s point of view, the Melaka and Johor elections would be held uncomfortably close to national polls if they were to run their full terms. However, any move to bring the national election forward to coincide with the elections in these states would entail sacrificing almost a year of the current term. This is unlikely.

Another option would be for the current schedule to run its course, with the Sabah, Melaka, Sarawak and Johor elections taking place in that order. Then, if the Unity Government and particularly Pakatan Harapan is feeling confident, they can bring the Penang, Selangor, and Negri Sembilan elections forward and hold them alongside the federal election. This would allow them to accumulate political capital and begin the second term on the front foot. Given that Perikatan Nasional is solidly in power in Kedah, Kelantan, and Terengganu, there will be little that the Unity Government can do to influence the timing of their state elections. However, in reducing the number of states holding their elections just after national polls, the ‘mid-term’ effect on the sitting administration (should it be elected) would be reduced. Conversely, should Pakatan Harapan feel unsure about its chances at the federal level, it may seek to allow the elections in the states it currently controls to proceed to their full term, thus spreading the risk across two sets of polls. It is also possible that different PH component parties have different preferences regarding the timing of the polls in the states they control.[41]

The end of BN’s dominance in 2018 has had multiple effects on Malaysia’s political system. The reduction of the coalition’s influence at both the federal and state levels has uncovered the underlying autonomy of state governments. Given the challenges inherent in adding more structure and predictability to the timing of elections, the most likely scenario is that out-of-cycle polls will remain a characteristic of Malaysia’s political system for the foreseeable future. Political leaders will continue to cross the river by feeling the stones and seeking to determine the direction of the wind. Now, however, the wind blows from different directions.

ENDNOTES

For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• While often overlooked, electoral boundaries can strongly shape political competition and policy priorities. In Malaysia, the long-dominant United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) manipulated boundaries in ways that amplified the power of votes in its stronghold areas. This created significant discrepancies in the number of voters across electoral districts—known as malapportionment—and is strongly associated with distortions to governance and disillusionment with the political process.

• The 2019 UNDI18 constitutional amendment lowered the voting age to 18 and introduced automatic voter registration. This increased the size of the electorate by a remarkable 40% between the 2018 and 2022 general elections. More recently, Anwar Ibrahim’s unity government has pledged to increase the parliamentary seat share of East Malaysia’s Sabah and Sarawak from the current 25% to 35%, despite the states already being significantly over-represented. Both these developments worsen the malapportionment in the country, potentially causing further political distortions.

• Against the backdrop of already high levels of malapportionment, the impact of UNDI18 on malapportionment is more modest than most narratives suggest, though it is responsible for creating a number of problematic mega-districts. By contrast, implementing the proposed seat increase for Sabah and Sarawak would substantially worsen state and district level malapportionment. While this may be justified, given East Malaysia’s unique position in the federation—as well as a newfound political agency—there is little obvious justification for the ongoing discrepancies within Peninsular Malaysia, particularly the under-representation of Selangor.

• A dominant narrative in Malaysia, voiced by numerous political elites in recent months, holds that reducing malapportionment is disadvantageous for ethnic Malays. This however reflects assumptions that are no longer valid following demographic developments and changes to Malaysia’s party system since 2013. To the contrary, in terms of electorate size, there are substantial similarities in the seats won by the Malay-majority Parti Islam se Malaysia (PAS) and their arch-rival Chinese-majority Democratic Action Party, while on average the largest seats were won by the Malay-majority Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) and Amanah.

• In short, there is no empirical basis for the ethnic-focused narrative. Recognizing this would facilitate constructive discussions around addressing malapportionment, particularly in light of the significant political reordering that a seat increase for East Malaysia would produce.

* Kai Ostwald is Associate Senior Fellow with the Malaysian Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. He is also Director of the Institute of Asian Research at the University of British Columbia, and Associate Professor in UBC’s School of Public Policy and Global Affairs.

ISEAS Perspective 2024/30, 25 April 2024

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INTRODUCTION

The size and shape of electoral districts can profoundly impact political outcomes. Malaysia is a case in point: the strategic manipulation of district boundaries over decades played a key role in sustaining the electoral dominance of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and its Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition partners prior to their 2018 defeat. This was achieved primarily through malapportionment—the unequal distribution of voters across electoral districts—which amplified the influence of voters in the BN’s stronghold areas, allowing the coalition to consistently secure parliamentary majorities well above their level of popular support.[1] 

While Malaysian politics have evolved dramatically since 2018, manipulated electoral districts continue to shape political representation and competition. Three key questions stand out. First, the UNDI18 constitutional amendment (in 2019) significantly increased the size of the electorate and appears to have exacerbated malapportionment, although to what extent and effect is yet unclear. Second, the BN’s defeat in 2018 decoupled East Malaysia’s party system from the Peninsula’s and catalyzed demands for greater East Malaysian influence in federal politics, including via an increase in parliamentary seats from the current 25% to 35% — which the manifesto of Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s coalition pledged to do. If implemented, this move would further increase malapportionment, but it is likewise unclear to what extent. Finally, given the broader fragmentation of the party system, it is uncertain whether previous patterns of who benefits and who is disadvantaged from malapportionment still hold.  

This Perspective addresses those questions and reaches several conclusions. Malapportionment, which entails myriad costly distortions to politics and governance, remains high and would increase significantly through the introduction of new East Malaysian seats. While the unique position of East Malaysia may justify that, the extensive malapportionment in Peninsular Malaysia is less defensible. Importantly, constituency-level demographic changes and new coalition compositions mean dominant narratives around who benefits from malapportionment are now outdated and flawed. Updating the underlying assumptions provides an opportunity to address the most problematic boundary distortions.

THE POWER OF A VOTE

Malapportionment arises when there are disparities in the number of voters across electoral districts. The figure below illustrates the effect through two hypothetical districts: District A has one voter, while District B has eight voters. Since each district has one seat in parliament, District A’s voter has significantly more power to shape parliamentary outcomes than does a voter in District B. In short, malapportionment amplifies the influence of voters in districts with relatively few voters, while diluting the influence of voters in districts with relatively many voters. As a result, the preferences of District A’s voter are overrepresented, which contradicts the normatively important “one person, one vote” principle. By creating incentives for political leaders to focus resources and policy decisions on over-represented voters, this dynamic creates extensive political distortions and fosters clientelistic behaviours.[2] On the side of voters, perpetual under-representation is associated with political disengagement.

Malapportionment illustrated

During its decades in power, UMNO systematically reshaped Malaysia’s electoral process in ways that provided it and its coalition partners fundamental advantages (Lim 2002, Ostwald 2017). This included reducing the size of electoral districts in areas where the coalition enjoyed strong support, allowing it to inflate its parliamentary seat share relative to its vote share. The effect of this cannot be overstated: in the 2013 general election, for example, malapportionment allowed the BN to secure a 20% parliamentary seat advantage despite losing the popular vote by 4%. By 2018, decades of manipulating electoral boundaries left Malaysia with unusually high levels of malapportionment by global standards (Ong, Kasuya, and Mori 2017).[3]

The Pakatan Harapan (PH) government that took power in 2018 pledged extensive reforms, including of the electoral process (Ting and Horowitz 2023). Among its successes was the UNDI18 constitutional amendment that lowered the voting age from 21 to 18 and introduced Automatic Voter Registration (Weiss 2022). The measures were implemented prior to the 2022 general election, increasing the number of eligible voters by over 40%. A disproportionate number of these new voters were registered to districts that already had a relatively high number of voters, exacerbating the disparity in district sizes. The figure below illustrates this by arranging Malaysia’s 222 electoral districts from smallest to largest (in terms of registered voters) for both the 2018 (dark grey) and 2022 (light grey) elections. Several things are striking. First, the range in district-level electorate size has grown even larger: the largest district (303k) in 2022 had over ten times as many voters as the smallest (28k). Second, the disparities are significant even beyond the extremes: the 75^th percentile district (117k) in 2022 is almost twice as large as the 25^th percentile (62k). Finally, the largest increases in electorate size appear to be in districts that were already disproportionately large.

UMNO’s defeat in 2018 fundamentally altered the political dynamic between the peninsula and the East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak. Specifically, major East Malaysian parties that once belonged to the BN left the coalition post-election and leveraged their seats to play a stronger role in federal-level politics. Since 2018, this has included more prominent cabinet positions, including the current Deputy Prime Minister from the Sarawak-based PBB. Notably, the manifestos from the three major coalitions contesting the 2022 election all outlined intentions to empower East Malaysia through such things as greater revenue sharing from petroleum exploitation and political empowerment (Lee 2022). 

The PH manifesto—from current Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s coalition—went furthest in offering Sabah and Sarawak a 35% parliamentary seat share, a significant increase from the current 25%. This reflects demands from East Malaysian political leaders, who see the increase as integral to fulfilling the original terms of federation under the 1963 Malaysia Agreement (MA63), as well as critical to ensuring that the peninsula’s domination of politics is kept in check. It is unclear whether, how, and when this rebalance might occur, but there are signs of growing momentum in its favour.[4]

Given the political difficulty of removing seats from peninsular states, the path of least resistance is likely through adding new seats in East Malaysia. Procedurally, this can be done through a two-thirds majority parliamentary vote, which is theoretically attainable given the supermajority that Anwar’s unity government currently holds.

Assuming the number of peninsular seats remains unchanged, East Malaysia would require 33 additional seats to reach the 35% seat target. At present, the seat split between Sabah and Sarawak is 45% and 55% respectively; the electorate split is similar at 46.5% and 53.5% respectively. Assuming the new seats are divided at that proportion, Sabah and Sarawak would receive 15 and 18 new seats respectively. That would bring Sabah’s total to 40 and Sarawak’s to 49 seats. Given that existing seats in Sabah and Sarawak already tend to be smaller than their peninsular counterparts in terms of electorate size, the proposed seat additions would further elevate malapportionment.

There is real and growing urgency to this question, given the complex sequencing challenge that arises due to the redelineation exercise currently in motion for Sarawak and on the horizon for Sabah (in 2025).[5] The key question is how many seats the Electoral Commission is basing the exercise on. If it is the current number, then a resource intensive redelineation exercise would have to be re-conducted following any Parliamentary approval of new seats. If it is an expanded number (for example, the promised increase to 35% of the total), then the exercise assumes Parliamentary approval that has not yet been attained. This has further implications for redelineation of state-level seats, which are likewise highly malapportioned.[6] 

THE SIZE AND SCALE OF MALAPPORTIONMENT

Both the UNDI18 increase in electorate size and the proposed MA63-related seat increase impact malapportionment in ways that affect political competition and representation. We now turn attention to systematically measuring the magnitude of those changes, which provides insights into their effects.

The starting point is inter-state malapportionment, in other words, the unequal distribution of seats across Malaysia’s thirteen states and three federal territories. The figure below illustrates this, comparing inter-state malapportionment in the 2018 election (light grey), 2022 election (medium grey), and under the potential MA63 plan that increases East Malaysia’s seat share to 35% (dark grey). The figure shows how many seats above or below a state has relative to its share of the total electorate. For example, in the 2018 election, Terengganu had approximately 5% of Malaysia’s electorate but only 3.6% of seats, making its voters underrepresented in parliament: based on its electorate size, it had 3 seats too few, as indicated by the -3 value. In short, the figure captures how over- or underrepresented states are, relative to the size of their electorate.

Three states stand out. Sabah and Sarawak are already significantly overrepresented in parliament relative to their electorate size: Sabah had approximately 7 seats above what the size of its electorate called for in 2022, while Sarawak had 11 more. Should the MA63 proposal be implemented, that would increase to a surplus of 20 and 26 seats, respectively. To put that into concrete terms, the mean number of voters per district would fall from 67,575 (in 2022) to 42,235 for Sabah, and from 62,680 (in 2022) to 39,655 for Sarawak, relative to 106,040 for peninsular seats. That may be justifiable given their unique position in the federation and the many features that continue to make them distinct. There is little clear justification, however, for Selangor being so vastly underrepresented: it had 14 and 17 seats too few in 2018 and 2022 based on its number of voters; this would climb to a deficit of 22 seats should the MA63 proposal be implemented.[7] That amounts to a mean number of 167,175 voters per district in 2022. In short, the weight of one East Malaysian voter would be approximately four times that of a voter in Selangor.

There is substantial malapportionment of federal seats within the states as well. The figure below captures the number of voters in each district (left columns are from 2018, right columns are from 2022) for each state and federal territory. As is clear, the UNDI18 reforms and natural population growth increased the size of nearly all districts, but the effect—visible both as a general upward shift and the greater dispersion of seats—is more pronounced in some states than others. The growth of problematic mega districts is also evident. In 2018, only two districts—both in Selangor—had more than 150,000 voters. By 2022, twenty-five districts were above that threshold, now including Kedah, Perak, Negri Sembilan, Malacca, Johor, and a majority of Selangor’s districts.[8]

An international comparison helps contextualize the scale of malapportionment in Malaysia. The primary measure for malapportionment is the percentage of seats that need to be shifted from over-represented districts (with relatively small numbers of voters) to under-represented districts (with relatively large numbers of voters) in order to achieve an equal apportionment of voters across districts (Samuels and Snyder 2001). In short, higher values denote greater malapportionment. The figure below compares malapportionment in several high-income democracies—which Malaysia seeks to join—and regional counterparts to Malaysia in 2018, 2022, and under the MA63 35% proposal.[9]

As anticipated, the UNDI18 reforms did increase malapportionment between 2018 and 2022, but against the backdrop of already very pronounced levels, this increase is modest in scale. Implementing the MA63 proposal without addressing existing malapportionment would have a far more substantial effect. Regardless, the primary conclusion is that under all three conditions, malapportionment in Malaysia is considerably higher than in counterparts, with the exception of Myanmar (which based its electoral districts primarily on colonial-era administrative boundaries). This is significant, given the evidence from around the world that malapportionment has pernicious effects on a range of important matters including governance, economic development, conflict, and voter motivations.

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Malapportionment in Malaysia is fundamentally a political issue. The founding 1957 Constitution called for constituencies to contain a nearly equal number of voters, with some deviation—limited to no more than 15%—to account for differences in population density, means of communication, and community composition. That limit was relaxed in 1962 and repealed entirely in 1973, paving the way for the current significant disparities. Indeed, each redelineation before 2016 saw the addition of new seats, typically allocated disproportionately to areas under the BN’s control (Chacko 2019).

This pattern of redelineation contributed to the BN’s dominance and supported a (generally unspoken) view that malapportionment provides additional assurance of Malay-Muslim political dominance. Consequently, reforms that mitigate malapportionment are sometimes cast as ploys to empower ethnic Chinese, particularly the DAP. For example, in mid-2019, UMNO’s president Zahid Hamidi suggested the DAP’s interests in redelineation were driven by a desire to gain more seats, which would be unfavourable to Malays.[10] More recently, former Selangor UMNO chief Noh Omar warned while campaigning for the PN that redelineation would be favourable to the DAP, would reduce the number of Malay-majority seats, and might even lead to a DAP prime minister.[11]

The narrative that the DAP would be the sole beneficiary of more equal apportionment is not reflected in more systematic analyses. That is because today’s malapportionment reflects not current party strengths and alignments, but rather party strengths and alignments at the time of previous redelineations, which were conducted under BN domination. The main implication is that parties that were historically associated with the BN tended to win smaller seats in 2022, while parties historically opposed to the BN tended to win larger seats. Given the comprehensive fragmentation of Malaysia’s party system relative to the era of BN dominance, that no longer cleanly aligns with current coalition structures.

The figure below shows the electorate size of districts won by major parties (or coalitions in East Malaysia) in 2022. The middle line of each box indicates the median district, while the upper and lower bounds of the box indicate the 25^th and 75^th quartiles, and the dots indicate outliers. For example, the median district won by UMNO had approximately 68k voters (54k and 79k respectively for the 25^th and 75^th percentiles), while its largest seat has 133k voters.

The distribution is striking. On the peninsula, small seats were won primarily by UMNO and Bersatu, despite them being bitter rivals in 2022 campaigning. This reflects Bersatu’s status as essentially an UMNO-clone party, at least initially comprised primarily of former UMNO elites with existing ties in over-represented areas. By contrast, PAS’s median district had 106k voters (83k and 116k at 25^th/75^th percentiles), significantly larger than their bumiputera rivals and reflective of their historical position as an opposition party. In fact, excluding a small number of outlier mega districts, PAS and DAP districts are quite similar in terms of size, especially in comparison to the smaller UMNO, Bersatu, or East Malaysian districts. On the high end of the distribution are PKR and Amanah districts, both of which are not only historically oppositional to the BN, but also primarily Malay-oriented. This underscores a related key point: (typically large) urban districts are now often more diverse—and more Malay—than in earlier decades, further undermining the narrative that malapportionment is primarily an ethnic issue. In fact, when controlling for party and geographic factors, an OLS regression analysis finds no evidence for an independent effect of ethnic composition on district size.[12]

Two overarching conclusions emerge from this brief study. Malapportionment in Malaysia, which was already high from a comparative perspective, increased modestly through the 2019 UNDI18 constitutional amendment and would grow significantly greater if a proposed seat increase for East Malaysia is implemented. Given the many pernicious distortions associated with malapportionment, this is a concern for issues ranging from governance to development and political polarization. Even if the unique relationship between West and East Malaysia justifies the aforementioned increase, there is no clear justification for the considerable inter- and intra-state malapportionment on the peninsula. That leads to the second conclusion: given the fragmentation of Malaysia’s party system, the simple race-based narratives around malapportionment and redistricting are no longer empirically substantiated. On the contrary, a Malay-Muslim party such as PAS has potentially as much to gain from reducing malapportionment as does its Chinese-majority rival DAP. Given that the obstacles to reducing malapportionment are ultimately political rather than technical, updating assumptions about the potential effects of reform could generate the cross-party support to see it through.

REFERENCES

Bhavnani, Rikhil. 2021. “The effects of malapportionment on economic development”. PLoS ONE, 16(12): e0259150.

Chacko, Danesh Prakash. 2019. “Winning Elections by Rigging Borders? Barisan Nasional’s Brazen, and Failed, Attempt”. In Hutchinson and Lee (eds), The Defeat of Barisan Nasional: Missed Signs or Late Surge? Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.

Chai, James. 2022. “Bigger Constituencies, Lesser Political Clout”. ISEAS Fulcrum, no. 175.

Daxecker, Ursula. 2020. “Unequal votes, unequal violence: Malapportionment and election violence in India”. Journal of Peace Research, 57(1): 156-170.

Lee Hwok Aun. 2022. “Malaysia’s GE-15 Manifestos: Wading Through a Flood of Offerings”, ISEAS Perspective, no. 113.

Lee Hwok Aun. 2023. “Will UMNO’s Mutant Electoral Map Bite Pakatan Harapan?” ISEAS Fulcrum, no. 177.

Lim Hong Hai. 2002. “Electoral Politics in Malaysia: ‘Managing’ Elections in a Plural Society”. In Croissant, Bruns and John (eds), Electoral Politics in Southeast and East Asia, Singapore: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Ong Kian Ming, Yuko Kasuya, and Kora Mori. 2017. “Malapportionment and Democracy: A Curvilinear Relationship”. Electoral Studies, 49: 118-127.

Ostwald, Kai. 2017. “Malaysia’s Electoral Process: The Methods and Costs of Perpetuating UMNO Rule”. ISEAS Trends, no. 19.

Ostwald, Kai. 2023. “The Politics of Malapportionment and Electoral Reform in a Dominant-Party Regime”. In Ting and Horowitz (eds) Electoral Reform and Democracy in Malaysia, Copenhagen: NIAS Press.

Ostwald, Kai, and Constant Courtin. 2020. “Malapportionment in Myanmar’s Elections: A Slumbering Menace”. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 42(2): 145-173.

Samuels, David, and Richard Snyder. 2001. “The Value of a Vote: Malapportionment in Comparative Perspective”. British Journal of Political Science, 31(4): 651-671.

Tindak Malaysia. 2023. “Persempadanan untuk Sarawak”, available at: https://www.tindakmalaysia.org/persempadanan/sarawak_redelineation

Ting, Helen, and Donald Horowitz (eds). 2023. Electoral Reform and Democracy in Malaysia, NIAS Press.

Washida, Hidekuni. 2019. Distributive Politics in Malaysia: Maintaining Authoritarian Party Dominance. Routledge.

Weiss, Meredith. 2022. “Can Youth Save Malaysia’s Democracy?” RSIS Working Paper, no. 337.

Wong Chin Huat. 2018. “Constituency Delimitation and Electoral Authoritarianism in Malaysia”. The Round Table, 107(1): 67-80.

ENDNOTES

For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.