EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Geopolitical tensions between the US and China have been rising, with international trade facing more frequent challenges in what has become a tit-for-tat retaliatory landscape. Moreover, economic security initiatives have become more strategic and sophisticated, and more players now find themselves caught in the crosswinds of the strategic battleground.
- The US-China trade spat has seen ASEAN emerging as a viable alternative to China as a manufacturing hub, especially for technology-related goods. ASEAN economies collectively account for around 30% of US Electrical and Electronics (E&E) imports, notably on par with China, in 2022.
- Major economies have stepped up their engagement with ASEAN economies this year through the G2G channel and at a business level through the relocation of operations out of China into Thailand and Vietnam as part of a China+1 diversification strategy. China’s strict zero-COVID policies may have also catalysed the search for viable alternative production bases.
- ASEAN economies should proactively maintain their favourable position amid the global supply chain recalibration. Possible strategies could include: 1) Active engagement with key trade partners, 2) Domestic policies that provide a stable and predictable business environment, 3) Productive capacity upgrading policies, 4) Leveraging on multilateralism and 5) Strengthening the public-private-academic nexus.
* Kristina Fong Siew Leng is Lead Researcher (Economic Affairs) of the ASEAN Studies Centre. The author wishes to thank Jayant Menon, Senior Fellow of the Regional Economic Studies Programme, Sharon Seah, Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the ASEAN Studies Centre and Climate Change in Southeast Asia Programme, and Joanne Lin, Lead Researcher and Co-coordinator of the ASEAN Studies Centre for their valuable comments and suggestions.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/76, 26 September 2023
A MORE SOPHISTICATED GEOPOLITICAL BATTLEFIELD
As geopolitical tensions between the US and China continue to rise, middle powers and small countries alike remain inadvertently caught in the crosswinds and become part of the strategic battleground. Whilst the Trump presidency (2017-21) was dominated by a barrage of retaliatory tariff increases between the two economic majors, the approach to international trade policy has since become more sophisticated, taking on elements of investment policy. One such approach has countries building up capacity onshore and attracting new investments in key strategic areas in the technology supply chain, exemplified by the US CHIPS Act of 2022[1] and the European Chips Act[2] enacted in September 2023. Some non-tariff barrier approaches are more direct and are laced with a security angle, such as China’s export restrictions on key rare metals (gallium and germanium, and related compounds)[3] (effective 1 August 2023), the US’ export caps on Chinese technology giant, Huawei[4] and more recently, the Netherlands’ additional restrictions on the export of ASML Holding’s chipmaking machinery to China.[5] This back and forth is set to continue with new measures and announcements of counter-policy measures making the headlines more frequently as it becomes increasingly a race for technological dominance as much as to address economic security concerns. That said, official dialogue between the US and China on trade and investment matters, including the establishment of a working group, convey some positive signals that having a ceiling to, if not a de-escalation in, trade tensions would be the preference of both sides.[6]
ASEAN RESILIENCY AMID GEOPOLITICAL UNCERTAINTIES
Although small in its constituent parts, the ASEAN region has grown in importance as an integral node in global value chains, as both a manufacturing hub and a significant player in the technology supply chain network. The region has effectively emerged as a viable alternative to well-established supply chains, diverting some of the global manufacturing concentration away from China. To assess the extent of the trade pattern shifts catalysed by the onset of the Trump, tariff-driven trade war, and ASEAN’s standing in the global ecosystem, we take into consideration trade data from the 2016-2022 period, covering the period before the Trump trade war, through the pandemic and into the present day.
Figure 1. Import pattern shifts for the US and China (2016-2022)
Source: UNCTAD and author’s analysis
From the initial analysis of both the US’ and China’s import patterns for this period, we observe a notable shift in imports away from one another and subsequent positive spillovers to the ASEAN region, as shown in Figure 1. For the US, the share of overall imports from China fell to 17% in 2022 from 21% in 2016, while the share of China’s imports from the US fell more marginally to 7% in 2022 from 9% in 2016. ASEAN’s share of imports correspondingly grew to 11% for the US (2016: 7%) and 15% for China (2016: 12%). Notably, there are significant dynamics exhibited by the changing patterns in the Electrical and Electronics components (E&E) imports. For the US, the significant shift away from China as a key backward linkage in this sector has resulted in import shares falling to 30% in 2022 (2016: 42%), while the shift to ASEAN in tandem has resulted in import shares totaling 29% in 2022 (2016: 20%). For context, ASEAN-sourced imports for E&E products make up almost a third of US imports of these components compared to a fifth before the Trump trade tensions started. This puts ASEAN on par with China in terms of import shares for the US in this respect. That said, some of this change could have also resulted from Chinese MNCs adding capacity to ASEAN locations for their own de-risking strategies on account of rising tariff rates imposed by the US.
Comparatively, China’s import share trends over this period are more stable, with shifts in imports from ASEAN for the main categories observed more muted in comparison. Import shares for overall products stood at 15% (2016: 12.4%) and 19% for E&E components as at 2022 (2016: 18%), reinforcing the central importance of ASEAN in the trade landscape. Amid the ongoing US-China trade rivalry, ASEAN’s relationship with China has remained intact, while its relationship with the US has strengthened. However, it should be noted that despite the growing ties with the US, ASEAN’s overall trade with China stood at USD 730.1 billion in 2022, 1.7 times that with the US which had a corresponding value of USD 422.5 billion. Moreover, China constitutes 19.1% of ASEAN’s total trade, whilst the US makes up only 11.0%.
A BROAD ROLE FOR ASEAN IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
ASEAN’s changing trade patterns with major economies reflects its growing importance, as seen in Table 1. Although European economies did not see substantial changes to imports from ASEAN over the period, Japan experienced an increase in ASEAN import share, especially for that of E&E products to 16.9% in 2022 from 13.7% in 2016. This too can be a shift away from reliance on China; Japan’s import shares from there fell from a significant 52.3% in 2016 to 42.2% in 2022 in E&E components. Not only has ASEAN grown in importance as an upstream producer for major economies, it has also markedly grown as an export destination for economies such as China and Japan (Table 1). All in all, the ASEAN region is greatly intertwined in the global supply chain, with its importance growing as both a viable backward and forward linkage. That said, it illustrates the importance and provides growing impetus for all stakeholders in the global value chain to prioritise the relationships between developed economies and China with ASEAN, and vice versa.
Table 1. Major economies and their trade dynamics with ASEAN
Source: UNCTAD and author’s analysis
ASEAN’S COMPETITIVENESS IN KEY AREAS OF MERCHANDISE TRADE
As Table 2 on Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCAs)[7] shows, ASEAN is an evident choice for supply chain recalibration to ‘de-risk and diversify’. Illustrated by the RCA values of more than 1, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand have maintained their productive competitiveness in semiconductors and related electronics over this period, while Vietnam has established its standing in this regard driven by the additional capacity built up in this sector since the onset of the trade spat. Given the high level of sophistication and specialisation along the technology value chain, most of the trade diversification trends at the start of the US-China trade tensions could have initially been centred around labour-intensive and lower-tech activities.[8] However, the tide could be shifting as even very niche producers such as TSMC, a global leader in semiconductor foundries, is seeing the need to diversify from its home base of Taiwan. This may provide more high-tech opportunities for those ASEAN countries that have capabilities to move up the value chain, such as Singapore.[9] Apart from these products, resource-endowed ASEAN countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia also find themselves competitive in the supply of integral energy-related exports such as natural gas.
Table 2. Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCAs) of ASEAN countries in selected products
Source: UNCTAD (SITC Product code classifications); Note: SITC Product code of 776: Cathode valves and tubes include that of semiconductors and integrated circuits.
THE ASEAN REGION IN FOCUS FOR MAJOR TRADE PARTNERS
The region holds strategic importance with respect to backward and forward linkages and has become increasingly significant in the technology value chain, especially as a China+1 diversification strategy. As a positive spillover, the added focus on the ASEAN region as a major global trade player has spurred greater industrial capacity building in select sectors; this has led to sectoral specialisation and enhanced economic development through human capital and technological upgrading. Thus, from the perspective of ASEAN and its trade partners, it is of mutual benefit to continue active engagement and remain open to trade growth. This stance has already taken root as perceptions of ASEAN as a leader in championing global free trade amongst respondents surveyed in the ISEAS State of Southeast Asia 2023 has risen from 15.5% in 2022 to 23.5% in 2023.
To ensure economic security, major powers that are wary of China have stepped up their engagement with ASEAN, for example through a slew of face-to-face high-profile roadshows this year. One notable example is US Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen’s trip to Vietnam in July, after earlier trips to China and India. Objectives of the trip included enhancing cooperation between the countries in manufacturing, and promoting the G7’s Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) funding for renewable energy adoption, of which USD 15.5 billion were allocated to Vietnam. In the same trip, Treasury Secretary Yellen also promoted the USD 500 million available funding for international semiconductor factories under the CHIPS Act, to build up capabilities along the global technology supply chain. All these activities laid the groundwork for the official upgrade of US-Vietnam relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in September,[10] along with a spate of business deals and partnerships quickly revealed thereafter involving the participation of technology heavyweights such as Nvidia and Microsoft.[11]
MULTINATIONALS HAVE ALSO TAKEN INTEREST IN ASEAN
There have also been moves by multinational businesses, especially those in the E&E sector, to do more in ASEAN countries as part of their own strategies for self-preservation. Several major computer hardware manufacturers have announced concrete plans to diversify away from their reliance on China. In January, Dell announced its intention to completely shift away from “Made in China” chips by the end of 2024 and target at least 20% of its laptop production in Vietnam this year.[12] Subsequently, HP announced in July that they are working with suppliers to shift more production of consumer and commercial laptops to Thailand and Mexico this year, with preliminary intentions to move some of this capacity to Vietnam next year as well.[13] Apple has also diversified some of its MacBook production to Vietnam this year, marking the first time its laptops have been produced outside China.[14] Malaysia has also gained some sizeable wins with Infineon Technologies announcing that it will build the world’s largest 200-millimeter Silicon Carbide (SiC) power fab there,[15] as well as Tesla making known its intentions to set up a headquarters there later this year.
ASEAN HAS WELL-ESTABLISHED TRADE AND INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS
One of ASEAN’s strengths is that it already has some robust formal relationships with major economies individually and at bloc level. These established platforms for active engagement in trade and investment activities are beneficial to facilitate greater collaboration, and perhaps, more importantly, brings ASEAN to the fore with respect to the latest global developments. Some notable Free Trade Agreements include the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (an ASEAN+6 trade deal, that includes China), the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (which includes four ASEAN countries – Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand + 8 including Australia and Japan), ASEAN+1 FTAs with China, South Korea and India. Of note, the ASEAN-China FTA is currently undergoing an upgrade and the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA) is being reviewed. Other major bilateral FTAs include Singapore’s bilateral FTAs with the European Union (EU), United Kingdom (UK), and the United States, Vietnam’s bilateral FTAs with the EU and UK, and Thailand’s bilateral FTAs with China, Australia and Japan, with some notable ongoing negotiations between the EU and US and a number of ASEAN economies. Most recently, the EU announced the start of a scoping exercise to relaunch negotiations for the EU-Philippines FTA when the European Commission’s President Ursula von der Leyen visited the country in late July.[16]
STRENGTHENING ECONOMIC LEVERAGE WHILE REMAINING NEUTRAL
In tandem with the more focused interest that major economies’ have taken in ASEAN economies, ASEAN economies should take proactive steps to maintain their favourable position amid the global supply chain recalibration. Some possible policy strategies are:
- Pursuing active engagement with key trade partners – In line with how major economies and companies have been stepping up efforts to engage with ASEAN, it is important for ASEAN economies to show the same level of commitment and, likewise, pursue opportunities and build up relationships with key trade and investment partners. Although, ASEAN is undoubtedly in a favourable position in terms of manufacturing capabilities and competitive aspects such as production costs, ASEAN economies are not the only ones on the radar of major economies. India has frequently emerged as a key market for E&E components relocation. Complementing high-level G2G engagements this year, companies such as Tesla and Apple are seeking to build up a viable technology hub in India. Thus, there is a risk that potential complacency may lead to a loss in some of the strategic leverage ASEAN currently holds. Active engagement will also help ASEAN economies de-risk their own supply chains as well.
- Promoting domestic policies that provide a stable and predictable business environment Amid global risks and uncertainties, companies prefer operating in a business environment characterised by economic policy certainty and political stability. Thus, placing emphasis on this objective will help regional economies rank higher in terms of a relocation preference. In the latest IMD World Competitiveness Ranking 2023, five ASEAN economies feature in its assessment of 64 economies. Singapore ranks highest in terms of government and business efficiency, while the Philippines ranks the lowest. To note, Malaysia’s rankings in both these measures appear to be lower than what would be expected of an upper-middle income economy.
Table 3. IMD World Competitiveness Rankings 2023
Source: IMD World Competitiveness Center
- Prioritising productive capacity upgrading policies – Being at the forefront of technological development lends itself well to how the prospects of an economy are perceived. Targeting capital investments in new technologies and having a workforce sufficiently skilled to reap the benefits of these technologies, should be high on the priority list of ASEAN governments. Regional economies must tread carefully so as not to unleash beggar-thy-neighbour policy implications akin to the impacts some developed economies are now facing by virtue of the competitive subsidy regimes they have adopted.[17] Relocation attraction should not be based on costs alone and hence, having a robust foundation of capital and skills can help limit adverse spillover effects, as there is more to the value proposition than attractive subsidies.
- Leveraging on multilateralism – Strengthening respective domestic productive capacities and building up industrial specialisation may be worthwhile objectives for economies to pursue independently, but there are certain benefits to acting together as a bloc, especially in terms of collective interests and for smaller ASEAN member states to benefit in terms of visibility and credibility. Moreover, collaborating as a bloc on aspects such as digital upgrading and harmonisation of standards would also strengthen the region as an attractive business ecosystem. In terms of active participation in high-profile and multilateral FTAs, it would serve to maintain the region’s relevance in the global supply chain and avoid the risk of ‘being left out’ of key global economic developments. Moreover, deep FTAs, such as the ones initiated by the EU and the US, can also set the stage for economic reforms in investment protection and labour rights, which could also make these economies more attractive from an investor perspective, if implemented in a non-distortive way for the host country. In preparation for accession to high-profile FTAs such as RCEP and CPTPP, ASEAN countries involved are required to amend relevant domestic laws in order to comply with the terms of the deal. These FTAs also provide an opportunity for CLMV countries to transition to open regionalism through the multilateralisation of preferential terms of the trade accords they are party to.[18] As a start, the RCEP requires these countries to extend preferential tariffs to all RCEP members, above and beyond ASEAN. In this context, the Margin of Preference (MOP)[19] would ideally be reduced to zero and hence, again, help to increase the attractiveness of ASEAN as a trading bloc ecosystem. As of 2018, the import-weighted MOP for Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam stood at 10%[20] which is more than double that for other ASEAN economies.
- Strengthening the public-private-academic nexus – In any major industrial development, it is vital that a clear and constant line of communication between the business sector and the government exists. The benefits of this are particularly important for new areas of business and innovation. Businesses would gain a better pulse on new technological developments in their industry and perhaps even be market leaders in the area. This would be useful for policy prescriptions, especially to capacity build for the future. Moreover, businesses would also be able to provide relevant and valuable feedback on the right kind of policy mix for their industry to sustainably grow. The further integration of academic output and knowledge-sharing to this nexus, would enhance the innovation capabilities and competitiveness of economies in the region.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The Personal Data Protection (PDP) Law was ratified by the Indonesian House of Representatives at the end of 2022. Although seen as a move in reaction to some data leakage incidents, this marks an important step in the country’s journey towards digital transformation.
- However, the enactment of this law near the end of Jokowi’s terms makes it look like mere lip service since it can be implemented only after all derivative regulations are in place. Till today, none of them is ready, which means that implementation of the law will be delayed.
- There are some serious challenges in the law. First, the accountability of the government in handling and managing citizens’ personal data is not clearly defined. Second, the mandate to establish the Personal Data Protection Authority is difficult to operationalise because the chain of command involving various government entities is unclear. Third, there is a risk of journalistic work being stifled by indiscriminate use of the law by those in power.
- Policymakers must carefully identify, anticipate and mitigate potential unintended consequences of the law.
* Yanuar Nugroho is Visiting Senior Fellow at the Indonesia Studies Programme (ISP) and Regional Economic Studies (RES) at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute Singapore and Senior Lecturer at Driyarkara School of Philosophy Jakarta. Sofie Syarief is former Visiting Fellow at the Media, Technology and Society at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute Singapore and a PhD student at Goldsmiths, University of London, UK.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/75, 22 September 2023
INTRODUCTION
On 20 September 2022, Indonesia’s House of Representatives (DPR) ratified the PDP Law (Personal Data Protection, or UU Perlindungan Data Pribadi),[1] which was first initiated in 2016. The ratification happened during the ‘Bjorka havoc’ when a hacker penetrated and stole data from national online applications such as the Covid-19 tracing app, PeduliLindungi, operated by the Ministry of Health (MOH) and the MyPertamina app belonging to the state-run oil and gas company Pertamina.[2] Not long after the incident, 1.3 billion SIM card registration data were stolen, exposing personal ID details.[3] In the latest case, in early July 2023, 34 million passport numbers and immigration IDs were leaked.[4] All these data leaks involving governmental bodies were usually met with denial or excuses, the most popular being that the leaked data are obsolete[5] although ID numbers are valid for life.[6]
The PDP Law’s ratification is seen as a reactive move to the cases of data leakage. It marked an important point in the country’s journey towards digital transformation.[7] The government has been slow in developing its digital capacity, especially in protecting citizens’ personal data. Indonesia has passed the Law on Information and Electronic Transactions (UU ITE, or ITE Law). This law is seen as an ‘elastic’ regulation which, instead of providing convenience and ease of service to the public, suppresses democratic and civic space in Indonesia by introducing an extended range of vague and imprecise offences, and with draconian penalties that can be abused.[8]
The calls for more serious policies concerning data governance resurfaced when Bjorka publicly leaked several supposedly confidential datasets.[9]
Politically, the enactment of the PDP Law coming near the end of Jokowi’s term makes it look like mere lip service because it cannot be implemented until the derivative regulations are ready. These regulations are impossible to complete within less than a year. The issue of personal data and data protection is understood differently by the government – even among government bodies— and by the citizens. The logical implication is the occurrence of bias and multiple interpretations when the policy is implemented. This essay highlights some key issues related to data governance and the PDP Law. It will also discuss implementation challenges.
GOVERNMENT’S ACCOUNTABILITY, OR THE LACK THEREOF
At the heart of the PDP Law is the crucial ‘accountability principle’ requiring all organisations operating in Indonesia to be responsible for managing data.[10] Yet, there is still very little assurance of accountability when government bodies mishandle data.[11]
Government accountability on data mishandling was shown to be even more crucial a mere two months after the PDP Law was passed when another data leak occurred, in November 2022.[12] The breach was met with a firm denial from the Minister of Health[13] after the ministry (as the data controller) failed to inform the public (as the data owner) that data protection failure had occurred, as required in the PDP Law. The minister’s denial stopped further investigations within the ministry.
The response to the data leak incident illustrates the government’s ineptitude and reluctance in taking data breaches seriously. Arguably, it shows how the government has yet to understand that personal data protection is part of citizens’ rights to privacy as stipulated in the Constitution. During the abovementioned massive data breach, the president and several ministers were targeted for doxxing—an act to intentionally reveal a person’s private information online without their consent, often with malicious intent. Rather than seeing it as cause for alarm, Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs Mahfud MD — who himself was doxxed[14] — responded with a statement that showed a lack of sensibility in personal data protection. He tweeted, “I’m not bothered, and I don’t want to know. Because my personal data is not confidential. It can be taken from and seen on Wikipedia (Google), on the back covers of my books, at the LHKPN KPK (State Officials’ Asset Report of Corruption Eradication Commission). My personal data is open, no need to leak it.”[15]
In a show of privilege, the former Minister of Communications and Informatics (Menkominfo) Johnny G Plate, opted to use an American phone number after his private data was doxxed.[16] Rather than acknowledging how harmful private data breaches can be or showing care in securing the public’s data which his own ministry had harvested, he asked journalists not to make a fuss about his decision.[17]
Unfortunately, the responses from both ministers largely represent the government’s lax stance in regard to data protection.[18] The inadequate responses are compounded by half-heartedness in acknowledging the root cause, which is poor data protection governance. In handling the Bjorka hacking incident, rather than take measures to improve the nation’s cyber security system, the government opted to block sites or accounts used to hack the system. At the same time, several relevant agencies, including Kemenkominfo and the National Cyber and Crypto Agency (BSSN), shifted the blame onto the other.[19] These responses ignited public scepticism: How can the government protect citizens’ data if the authorities keep buck-passing and no one takes responsibility?
CHALLENGES TO PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION
The PDP Law stipulates two types of personal data: specific and general.[20] In public services, data are further classified into personal or individual data, aggregate or group data, and demographic data. Based on the Civil Registry (Administrasi Kependudukan/Adminduk) Law No. 24/2013 revising Law No. 23/2006, personal data are stored, managed, and protected confidentially, whereas aggregate data refer to a group of data on characteristics or events, or groupings of individual populations such as demographic events, age groups and occupations. Demographic data are used by citizens to access public services, while the government uses them as a basis to carry out development planning, budget allocation, and law enforcement.[21] These data are sourced by and are under the responsibility of government agencies.
Such a complex classification of data, especially if protection is not well managed, is prone to leakages and breaches. Poor data security or user negligence can lead to data leakage. Data breach occurs when the system is broken into.[22] Between 2019 to 2021, there were many cases of data breaches in Indonesia. Based on BSSN (2021), there were 290.3 million cyberattacks in 2019. This would increase by 41%, reaching 495.3 million cases in 2020. Understandably, as data flows exponentially increase, so does the risk of cyberattacks. From 2019 to 2020, ransomware attacks alone increased 105%.[23]
Official responses to data security problems may have shown a lack of goodwill and evasion, judging from excuses given by some individuals. One example is the statement that a particular hack involved old, outdated data[24] – implying the hacked data were not important. Another example is the claim that the system was still safe despite a hack.[25] Nevertheless, these cases have multi-dimensional impacts, not only for the individual data owners but also for data management institutions, especially when the data are managed by government agencies. For individuals, hacking of their personal data may cause material and non-material losses, for instance, when the hacked data are used for doxing, fraud, or breaking into digital assets in the form of currency and other digital products. For data management institutions, such cases reduce public confidence in their performance and may decrease service quality or cause a decline in their reputation, and potentially lead to lawsuits.
The government is hence obliged to secure data as a strategic resource. There is an urgent need for better personal data governance, both for Indonesia’s public and private sectors. The government must take full responsibility for protection of existing personal data. Indeed, it is for this reason that the PDP Law was proposed and passed.
PDP LAW AND ITS (PROBLEMATIC) SUBSTANCE
Consisting of 16 chapters and 76 articles, this law substantially covers at least four aspects, that is, data categorisation, the rights of data subjects,[26] the obligations of data controllers,[27] and the establishment of Personal Data Protection Authority (PDPA).[28]
The table below describes a juridical review of the substance of the PDP Law and the technocratic implications in its implementation, both concerning derivative regulations and the duties and responsibility of relevant institutions.
Source: Compiled by authors
Several articles in the PDP Law have legal implications and loopholes that need to be investigated. For instance, there are around 15 authorities that have not been listed — PDPA included — in resolving disputes through non-litigation adjudication mechanisms and issuing mediation decisions regarding compensation. There is a legitimate concern that the law can threaten the work of Indonesia’s press,[29] including criminalisation of it.[30] The law also regulates criminal sanctions without providing definite limits on the meaning of each element,[31] and is therefore somewhat more inclined towards imposing sanctions than raising awareness.
In particular, the establishment of the PDPA under the President begs the question of its independence since its role is to oversee the implementation of the law by all stakeholders. Another loophole are the provisions that require companies or providers to comply with requests for deletion without delay within 3 x 24 hours from the date the request was submitted.[32] These are technically problematic because in practice, companies would need a longer time to delete data, perhaps even weeks. Further, the obligation for data controllers to have a Data Protection Officer (DPO) and parameters related to the terms of the fulfilment of the rights of Personal Data Owners[33] is difficult for medium to smaller businesses to fulfil.
IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES
There are two fundamental challenges to overcome for the PDP Law to be fully implemented: (i) Preparing derivative regulations and (ii) Establishing the PDPA Board.
The formulation of derivative regulations requires a fairly long time and is a complicated process. The PDP Law mandates that nine Government Regulations (Peraturan Pemerintah, or PP) and one Presidential Regulation (Peraturan Presiden, or Perpres), and subsequent Ministerial Regulations, be produced. So far, the passage of various PP and Perpres has taken significant amounts of time, mostly around six months or even a year from draft to law. If these regulations are the priority of the President – like the Omnibus Law on Job Creation (UU Ciptaker, Law No. 11 of 2020) and State Capital Law (UU IKN, Law No. 3 of 2022), they could be formulated quickly. Arguably, the completion of derivative regulations of PDP Law has so far not been the government’s priority.[34]
The government organised a public consultation in February 2023 involving some 200 participants from the banking, health, education, IT, e-commerce, hospitality, transport, and public sectors.[35] So far, there is still no clear time horizon as to when the implementing regulations will be completed. Again, this signals that the issue of PDP is not seen as a priority.
Chapter 9 of the PDP Law mandates the need for a Perpres to establish a ministerial level non-structural body (PDPA) that reports to the President[36] and a PP on the authority of this institution as a data protector.[37] However, the institutional form of the PDPA is also unclear, even though the law explicitly stated it as being fully and directly responsible to the President (Article 58 para 4). There is a question of its independence. Although the law applies to both corporations and the government, the regulation delegates the establishment of the PDPA to the President, virtually rendering it no different from other executive institutions. Conflicts of interest may arise when there is no clear division of responsibility or authority regarding supervision and enforcement. Unclear regulations regarding the position and institutional structure of the PDPA will also leave its formation—including how vast its authoritative reach will be—heavily dependent on the President’s “good will”.[38]
The ways in which the PDPA will be established entails at least two significant problems. First, inequality of sanctions may occur in response to a failure in data protection. Any violations of data protection may be subjected to varying sanctions, from mere administrative sanctions to fines.[39] However, criminal penalties[40] are also looming, with specific penalties towards corporations.[41] Not only are governmental bodies not regarded as economic institutions that amass annual income and cannot therefore be subjected to sanctions more profound than the administrative ones, the nature of the PDPA—not being independent from the executive bodies they are supposed to regulate— opens the possibility for unfair judgments and ineffective supervision.
Second, the PDPA being an institution on par with the governmental bodies it is meant to regulate poses a serious challenge. For example, it might do very little to determine which ministry or agency is responsible for any breach of a civil registry, especially for ID numbers, and put in place measures to secure the data created and harvested under government policies. The supervision of the PDPA should hence rest with an independent commission rather than with a government ministry.
The process for establishing the PDPA will likely take a long time, and there is no guarantee that it will start work immediately after it is formed. One is reminded of the National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN), whose full organisational structure and governance remain unfinalised more than two years after its formation.[42] These lessons indicate that the institutional aspect is more urgent than the implementation of the PDP Law or the establishment of PDPA, and should be prioritised accordingly.
With such challenges, what may the implications of the enactment of the PDP Law be?
LACK OF AWARENESS OF DATA PROTECTION
The long list of sanctions against private data protection violations might force public entities and private corporations to channel their resources towards obeying the PDP Law. However, as much as sanctions are necessary, punitive actions towards citizens might be problematic if imposed before any meaningful measures to raise public awareness on protecting private data are taken.
According to a 2021 survey conducted by the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology, Indonesia’s overall digital safety index—including the safety to not share any private data via social media—is quite low, i.e., 3.1 on a scale of 1-5.[43] This reflects general ignorance towards personal data protection or that of other people; this opens possibilities for unintentional breaches, which stem not from malicious intent but from the lack of adequate awareness of private data and the importance of protecting them—evidenced by how Minister Mahfud reacted to the personal data breach against him.
With this background in mind, the law might lead to misuse and overcriminalisation,[44] like the ITE Law. In essence, it threatens criminal action against anyone unlawfully disclosing other people’s personal data. However, there is neither sufficient definition nor legal limitation on what constitutes ‘unlawful’ (Article 65 para 2) hence opening possibility for abuse. Equally, without adequate knowledge and conceptual awareness of data protection, the public is prone to unintended offence. For instance, teachers sharing students’ daily activities could potentially be a violation[45] especially because the Law categorises children’s data as ‘specific’ data,[46] implying different and more stringent legal repercussions.[47] It is therefore crucial to ensure overall awareness of personal data protection if the fundamental aim is to protect the public.
CURBING PRESS FREEDOM
In a continuation of the trend in curbing press freedom,[48] the PDP Law also has its own articles which may stifle journalism. Among the varieties of specific data that should not be disseminated, “criminal record” is included (Article 4 para 2). Within the bill, “criminal record” is elaborated as a written account of past unlawful acts and present judicial proceedings, police records and immigration records for travel ban issuance. The fact that all kinds of criminal records—including ongoing judicial proceedings—are regarded as specific data, implying offence for anyone publishing them, will potentially threaten journalistic work in reporting.[49]
Exclusions for the disclosure of specific data are also found in the Law (Article 15 para 1). However, these are limited to governmental undertaking and academic research. Journalistic works and the public’s legitimate interests are disregarded. As mentioned, the term ‘unlawful’ can also be problematic for journalistic works. There is no legal definition and limitation regarding unlawful dissemination of personal data — or even specific data — rendering the term obscure yet broad.
As such, some articles of the PDP Law can be used in an unchecked manner by certain groups, especially those in power, to restrict and criminalise journalistic works. The possible outcome is journalist reports such as exposing public officials’ history of corruption or other crimes—which are of legitimate public interest, and paramount since Indonesia is anticipating a national executive and parliamentary election in 2024— can be subjected to punishment. Not only do these articles contradict Indonesia’s Press Law (Law No. 40 of 1999)[50] which mandates the press to professionally fulfil the public’s rights to know without coercion and interference, they further question the country’s commitment to democracy.
CONCLUSION
There are several aspects within the PDP Law that must be revisited and attended to when it comes implementation. These aspects, including unclear institutional set-up and articles that have ambiguous or conflicting ideas, foreshadow unintended consequences affecting the actual protection of Indonesians’ data. Such consequences must be identified, anticipated and mitigated when they happen. Reflecting on the consequences and putting them in the bigger picture takes us to another reflection: Beyond the PDP Law lies a more fundamental need for a digital strategy at the country level. Without a strategy to provide firm ground for digital transformation, Jokowi’s vision of Pemerintahan Dilan, a digital government that serves the people, will never be realised.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- After the February 2021 coup, Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG) issued new responsible investment policies that call for companies to end tax payments to the military and divest from all military-backed companies.
- The NUG’s policies require that if companies are unable to end tax payments to the military, then they should consider initiating a ‘responsible exit’ in consultation with the parallel government and leave the Myanmar economy until democracy is restored.
- While the NUG claims that its policies on responsible investment are aligned with international standards such as the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), the UNGPs and other standards do not specifically prescribe against paying taxes to authorities, nor do they state that doing so constitutes a human rights violation under international law.
- By advising that all companies making tax payments to the junta exit the economy, rather than just targeting those that actively support or collude with the military, the NUG’s responsible investment policies may generate a counterproductive effect of foreign investors exiting the Myanmar economy, and thereby decrease the number of economic opportunities available to many ‘ordinary citizens’ in Myanmar.
* Sam Baron is the inaugural Policy Research Fellow at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies. He previously served as a Myanmar analyst with the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, based in Bangkok. Ye Khaung Oo was a Research Officer at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and is pursuing Master of International Development at Duke University Sanford School of Public Policy.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/74, 19 September 2023
INTRODUCTION
More than two years after the Myanmar military orchestrated a coup d’état that usurped state power from the National League for Democracy (NLD) government that had just won its second landslide election, the country’s economy remains in dire straits. According to a 2021 World Bank report, Myanmar’s GDP shrunk by more than 18% in the immediate aftermath of the coup.[1] This past fiscal year (2021-22), the country’s GDP rose only by a modest 3%, meaning that, cumulatively, the country’s economy will remain substantially smaller than before the coup took place, for the foreseeable future.[2]
Due in large part to the February 2021 coup, poverty across Myanmar has grown at an alarming rate, with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) recently estimating that 14 out of country’s 15 states and regions had recently entered the critical threshold for malnutrition.[3] Even relatively prosperous urban areas such as Yangon have not been spared, with new statistics from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) showing that roughly a quarter (24.1 percent) of those living in eight of the city’s poorest townships have gone without any income from February 2022 to 2023, a period of more than 12 months.[4] Rising poverty levels, and other devastating economic impacts of the February 2021 coup on ordinary people across Myanmar have raised a number of critical questions among foreign companies still operating in the country.
Principally, many companies have faced the dilemma of whether to remain in Myanmar or to initiate an exit from the economy. The National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG), a parallel government established by NLD lawmakers deposed by the junta following the February 2021 coup, prescribes that if a company cannot avoid paying taxes or making other types of payments to the junta, it should strongly consider initiating a ‘responsible exit’ from the Myanmar economy.[5] Specifically, the NUG’s policies state that all foreign companies operating in the economy should withhold payment “of all taxes and other fiscal obligations to military-controlled authorities…until the lawful and legitimate government is restored.”[6]
Pragmatically, however, several long-standing investors who operated in the Myanmar economy prior to the military takeover have been forced to pay taxes to the junta since the coup. Due to a variety of reasons such as the growing risk of retaliation against its workers and employees, many companies have made tax payments even if they are not otherwise supportive of the military government. In fact, the number of firms being forced to make tax payments to the junta recently reached a post-coup high after the junta imposed more stringent tax enforcement measures that make it substantially more difficult for firms to avoid and/or delay making payments.[7]
Thus, by advocating for all companies that cannot reasonably suspend their tax payments to the junta to exit the Myanmar economy, the NUG’s current approach to responsible investment is counterproductive, as the withdrawal of otherwise responsible companies from the Myanmar economy is likely to exacerbate poverty and negatively impact normal people.
CORPORATE EXODUS
Since the February 2021 coup, as many as 30 multinational companies have either chosen to exit Myanmar or temporarily suspend their operations in the country — dealing a blow to normal Myanmar people whose livelihoods depend on the employment opportunities provided by the private sector.[8] While the exact reasons why companies are leaving Myanmar are varied and largely sector-specific, their decision-making is being underpinned by the opinions of investors and civil society groups – some of which are advising companies either to temporarily cease their operations or initiate a ‘responsible exit’ from the Myanmar economy to avoid financially supporting the military junta or becoming complicit in human rights abuses committed against the country’s civilian population.[9] This is the position adopted by the NUG, whose official guidance on responsible investment instructs companies to consider initiating a ‘responsible exit’ in consultation with the parallel government if a company finds that it cannot reasonably suspend financial support, including the payment of taxes, to the military after conducting a self-assessment of its business activities.[10]
The NUG’s Three-Pillar Framework Guiding Responsible Investment and Continued Operations, the parallel government’s primary policy framework first articulated in July 2021, states that its policies on responsible investment are aligned with the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business & Human Rights (UNGPs) and the OECD’s Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises (OECD Guidelines), two of the most authoritative international standards governing responsible business conduct.[11] Yet, beyond stating that companies should aim to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for the adverse human rights impacts throughout their operations, neither the UNGPs or OECD Guidelines explicitly provide companies with guidance on responsible disengagement, nor do they suggest that the payment of taxes constitutes an adverse human rights impact under international law.[12]
Officially, the NUG’s policies on responsible investment state that their primary aim is to “cripple the military council by limiting its access to all financial flows, including tax revenues, contractual payments, debt, and any type of financial aid, so as to degrade and destroy their machinery of oppression and control.”[13] By calling on foreign companies that pay taxes to the military to cease their operations and exit the economy, the NUG’s policies seem to be more aimed at waging an economic war against the junta – one that squeezes the Myanmar military of revenues and legitimacy.
TAXES AND RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT
In April 2023, the activist group Justice for Myanmar (JFM) criticized ThaiBev, Carlsberg, and Heineken, three of the largest beer conglomerates operating in Myanmar, for paying tens of millions of dollars in tax revenues to the junta, known formally as the State Administration Council (SAC).[14] JFM and other civil society groups echoed the arguments of the NUG by stating that these companies continue to provide the SAC with a financial lifeline that aids and abets the human rights violations they commit against civilians across Myanmar. The decision of JFM to target the three beer companies over their tax payments reignited vigorous debate among policymakers and academics about whether the payment of taxes or other revenues to the junta actually constitutes a human rights violation under international law. It also raised questions about what extent companies should ultimately be responsible for reducing their tax payments to the junta.[15]
Most literature on the subject is focused on the fact that many forms of tax avoidance—and not tax payments—are a violation of international human rights law. Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona, the former UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, for example, argued in a 2014 report that businesses which purposefully avoided paying taxes to authorities may be in violation of their responsibility to respect human rights under Principle 13 of the UNGPs.[16] Although it must be noted that the situation in Myanmar is significantly complicated by the fact that the military’s takeover is likely illegal under the country’s 2008 Constitution, and the SAC is therefore an illegitimate government, there is simply no legal precedent by which tax payments to a de facto legal authority have constituted a human rights violation in the past.[17]
John Ruggie, the Harvard professor who was appointed by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to formulate the UNGPs, also did not believe that a company’s presence in a country paying taxes made them complicit or legally liable for the human rights violations committed by the government who received the revenues.[18] In a 2008 report to the UN Human Rights Council, Ruggie noted that a company’s “mere presence in a country, paying taxes, or silence in the face of abuse is unlikely to amount to the practical assistance required for legal liability.”
Legality aside, however, the payment of at least some taxes to the military junta is currently the only viable means by which a company can safely operate within the Myanmar economy. Particularly, the threat of retaliation against a company and its workers for the non-payment of taxes to the junta remains a principal concern. In March 2021, after the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) initiated a campaign to suspend the payment of all taxes across the country following the coup, the senior-most junta tax official said that Myanmar’s tax office would “go after businesses and employers who don’t levy taxes correctly on their customers or staff,” clearly demonstrating the risk to foreign companies.[19] Even the NUG’s own Three Pillar Framework on responsible investment states that companies must take the safety of its own employees into account when making investment decisions – recognizing the increasingly fraught tightrope companies must walk to both appease civil society and continue to safely operate.[20]
BALANCING MORALITY AND PRACTICALITY
The primary purpose of the divestment campaigns waged against foreign companies by the NUG and others within civil society has been to express disapproval of organizations with financial ties to the military and to apply social pressure on those that openly support the military regime. This approach, however, should not be replicated and broadly applied to companies and other commercial entities that merely pay taxes to the junta in accordance with local laws, and otherwise positively contribute to Myanmar society. If it can better emphasize the distinction between so-called ‘good faith’ actors attempting to operate responsibly with those that are complicit in or supportive of the military’s activities, civil society can more effectively target and stigmatize organizations that maintain ties with the military, and actively work with those that make positive contributions to Myanmar society and its economy.
Making this distinction is becoming increasingly important, because when a socially responsible investor withdraws, there is a possibility that another investor, unconcerned with ethical considerations, will seize the opportunity. When Telenor, a leading responsible business in Myanmar left the country in 2022, for example, a joint venture between M1, a Lebanese investment company with ties to military generals, and a Myanmar company acquired the company’s assets. Another telecommunications firm, Ooredoo Myanmar, may have also been acquired by a subsidiary that maintains ties to former military generals with links to junta leaders.[21] Thus, as the above examples demonstrate, as long as economic incentives remain in place, companies that are not bound by social responsibility will be eager to capitalize on the departure of those that are.[22]
Creating a scarcity of foreign investment via social pressure will ultimately result in a weakened private sector, which in turn, will give way to the military’s increasing share of control over the distribution of goods and services across Myanmar communities. Ordinary citizens, who rely on essential products and services, may eventually have no choice but to consume products produced directly by the military or its business affiliates due to the lack of viable alternatives circulating in the economy. Meanwhile, the lack of a robust private sector will also likely lead to the erosion of the middle class and a responsible civil society, both of which are critical for Myanmar’s future development.
TOWARDS A NEW APPROACH TO RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT
While it is by no means ideal for companies to be making tax payments to the military junta, the NUG’s current approach of tagging all such payments as an ‘irresponsible’ business activity lacks nuance, and ultimately, is counterproductive. While one could argue that tax payments continue to finance the junta’s reign of terror, it is clear that such payments pale in comparison to the level of harm that would be inflicted on ordinary people were companies be forced to exit the economy instead. Moreover, the SAC’s increasingly aggressive crackdowns on companies that attempt to delay or otherwise refuse to make tax payments make it increasingly untenable for any company to abide by the NUG’s policies in the future. Such considerations should compel the NUG to modify its current approach.
Going forward, the NUG may need to view tax payments made by companies to the military junta as a necessary evil, while at the same time actively work with these companies to set guardrails and reduce their effective tax burden. Rather than advocate for companies to completely withdraw, for example, the NUG could request companies to inform them of whether certain tax payments made to the military were done ‘under protest’, and to provide evidence that demonstrates other ways in which the company may be actively working to reduce their financial flows to the SAC. This approach would be consistent with international standards such as the UNGPs, which state that in cases where laws may require companies to take actions contrary to their responsibility to respect human rights, they should aim to “respect the principles of the greatest extent possible in the circumstances … and be able to demonstrate their efforts (Principle 23).”[23]
By removing tax payments as an ‘irresponsible’ business activity and providing a pathway by which companies can actively engage with the NUG without fear of reputational or operational damage to their business, the NUG can more effectively promote responsible investment, bring their policies in line with international standards, and help to ensure that companies still invested in Myanmar’s economy continue to remain there.
CONCLUSION
While the NUG’s policies on responsible investment may have made sense immediately following the coup as it sought to quickly cripple the ability of the junta to raise revenues, a new approach is now needed as the NUG’s “defensive war” against the military enters its third year and Myanmar’s economy continues to suffer. Standing strong after shattering the expectations of Western analysts who doomed the revolution to fail, the NUG has much to be proud of.[24] Yet, its leaders must also recognize that in order to sustain its revolution, the NUG must make a conscious effort to retain the companies already invested in Myanmar’s economy.
Currently, the NUG’s Three Pillar Framework on responsible investment rightfully highlights that its Ministry of Planning, Finance, and Investment will not recognize new investments made by companies with the SAC following the February 2021 coup.[25] It does, however, acknowledge the legitimacy of pre-existing investments inked between companies and the previous civilian government. The very fact that the NUG’s policies aim to restrict new inbound investment should prompt it to retain and actively engage with the companies still operating there, rather than attempt to force them out. Thus, as businesses inch toward a resumption of their operations, and ramp up their post-coup economic activity in Myanmar, the NUG might be wise to recognize that their presence in the economy is a net positive – even if they are occasionally forced to make tax payments to the military junta.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Vote-buying began to gain prominence in the region around 1992 when the New Aspiration Party took the lead in Thailand’s Deep South.
- Voters may distort or rationalize their views on vote-buying by framing it as conforming to Islamic principles, despite contradictory opinions on the matter. When accepting gifts and money in exchange for votes, villagers justify it as adherence to Islam.
- The more the political parties compete for seats, the higher is the magnitude of money spent in exchange for votes. In the past, voters typically received money from three to five sources. However, for the 2023 general election, with seven political parties competing, resources for vote-buying have expanded.
- While vote-buying might have reached unprecedented levels, there is a silver lining: the Move Forward Party, which rejects vote-buying practices, emerged second in the party-list votes. Most Move Forward Party supporters are younger Malay Muslims who feel that old-school politics—vote-buying, patron-clientelism, and identity politics—must be eradicated.
* Daungyewa (Hong) Utarasint is Visiting Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. She is Visiting Assistant Professor, Arts and Humanities at NYU Abu Dhabi (NYUAD). Her current research investigates women and voting behaviour amid conflict in the southernmost provinces of Thailand, examining obstacles to women’s political participation, and how religion and cultural norms affect women’s political mobility.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/73, 18 September 2023
INTRODUCTION
In 2010, I facilitated a focus group discussion on peace and conflict in Pattani.[1] During the discussion, a participant inquired about my religious belief, and asked, “Are you a Muslim? And if so, why don’t you wear a hijab?” In response, I shared with her my reasons and mentioned that many Arab women I had encountered did not wear the hijab. The woman replied, “Well, they aren’t as strict as we are. We are the true Muslims. We are at the Corridor of Mecca.” That was the first time I ever heard someone claim they were more Muslim than others.[2] The phrase Patani is the Corridor of Mecca is commonly heard in the area. Many Malay Muslims in the region believe that Patani Darussalam is the hub of Islam in Southeast Asia, and they take great pride in this.
Ironically, while bribery and money politics are against Islamic teaching, vote-buying during election campaigns is rampant in South Thailand, and was remarkably so in the 2011 election. While conducting my research on voting behaviour in 2012, I discovered that the so-called Corridor of Mecca region was rife with this practice. Once, while interviewing a household in Pattani, a man approached and asked the homeowner how many residents were over the age of eighteen. He drew out a stack of money, counted it, and handed it to the household owner. He even gestured towards me asking, “Does she count?” The owner glanced at me then shook her head at the “vote buyer”. On another occasion, during a visit to a subdistrict chief in Pattani, I personally witnessed a local politician running for a provincial administrative office hand over a stack of money to the subdistrict chief. The local politician also gave another stack to a religious leader seated beside him. The whole incident happened right in front of the chief’s house.[3] Much like local politicians and government officials, many religious leaders and preachers, including Imams and Khatibs, act as vote-canvassers or brokers.
Over the past two decades, vote-buying in Thailand’s Deep South has been on a steady rise. The trend has become more pronounced in the last ten years. In 2017, a retired village headman shared information that during his 27-year tenure (1984-2011), the amount offered for a vote escalated from 100 baht per person in 1984 to 500 baht in 2011. Alarmingly, the money offered per individual crept up to 1,000 to 3,000 baht in the 2019 and 2023 general election. For the 2023 general election,[4] in the final stretch before election day, substantial amounts of money were believed to have been spent in various provinces. In Pattani alone, estimates suggest that close to a billion baht (30 million USD) was spent,[5] while Yala saw expenditures of approximately 600 million baht (23 million USD). Narathiwat reportedly had spending similar to Pattani’s. Based on the interviews conducted, of all the intense election battles in Thailand’s Deep South, Narathiwat was the fiercest battleground, and was significantly infiltrated by dark money and mafias. The practice of vote-buying was so entrenched it seemed normal. This discrepancy led me to wonder: If the area is perceived to be profoundly religious, why has vote-buying become normalized?”
This article explores voters grappling with Islamic principles and their perception on vote-buying. Additionally, it seeks to understand the extent to which vote-buying is accepted among the Muslim populace in Thailand’s Deep South. I propose two hypotheses: to mitigate their guilt when accepting money or gifts for votes, voters may distort or rationalize their views on vote-buying and seek justification in Islamic principles; and the higher the number of political parties vying for the seats in Thailand’s Deep South, the more money they spend on vote-buying.
The first section of this article delves into the evolution of vote-buying in Thailand’s Deep South over the years. The subsequent section explores how voters justify accepting money or gifts in exchange for votes. The third section presents various debates surrounding the practice of vote-buying in Muslim communities. Finally, the article summarizes the main ideas and arguments and offers suggestions to address vote-buying.
THE ONSET OF VOTE-BUYING IN MALAY MUSLIM REGIONS
Both Wiroj Pipitpakdee and Den Tohmeena, former MPs from Pattani, attribute the escalation of vote-buying to the intense competition between General Kriangsak Chamanan, a former prime minister, and Bunlert Lertpreecha in Roi-et province (in Northeastern Thailand) in 1981. This contest, infamously known as the “Roi-et disease,” supposedly ushered in the era of extravagant spending to gain votes. This phenomenon eventually spread to provinces across Thailand, including the Deep South. Wiroj recalled that when he first contested in the national elections in the late 1980s, vote-buying was not as rampant.
In 1986, a group of lawyers and teachers established a political group, and they were supported by Islamic religious and spiritual leaders in the southernmost provinces of Thailand. This group eventually evolved into the well-known Wadah political faction. Distinctly rooted in ethno-religious political identity, Wadah maintained its presence in Thai politics for almost three decades. Over the years, there were numerous transitions and transformations within the faction. In 2018, some of its members reorganized themselves to establish the Prachachart party. Back in 2012, I learned through my interviews with several Wadah members that the concept of vote-buying was not widespread at the beginning of their political career.
However, vote-buying began to gain prominence in the region around 1992 when the New Aspiration Party took the lead. At that time, the Wadah faction, under the leadership of Wan Muhammad Noor Matha and Den Tohmeena, was an integral part of the New Aspiration Party. Its leader, General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, who served as the Prime Minister from 1996 to 1997, had a stronghold in the Northeastern part of Thailand. Arguably, the practice of vote-buying in Northeast Thailand spilled over into Thailand’s Deep South via the New Aspiration Party. This article contends that this era marked the beginning of vote-buying in Thailand’s Deep South.
THE ISLAMIC CONTEXT AND VOTER PERCEPTIONS ON VOTE-BUYING
While pouring funds into vote-buying does influence elections in the Deep South, it is not the sole determinant for victory. The efficiency of the vote-buying approach matters just as much, if not more. How vote-canvassers and their patrons efficiently utilize their funds and strategize their gift-giving play a crucial role. Effective time management and strategic scheduling are also vital in capturing more votes.[6]
How do Islamic institutions in Thailand’s Deep South steer vote-buying? In such scenarios, religion could and should act as a potent deterrent. However, some individuals navigate its teachings and find loopholes in how the religion interprets materialistic pursuits. This is not unique to Thailand and Islam. In Nigeria, a poll concluded that vote-buying and guidance from religious leaders were pivotal factors in Nigerian voters’ decisions.[7] In the Philippines, Imam Dr. Jamel Cayamodin, said in his Eid’l Fitr sermon stated that “Muslim communities have the highest instances of vote-buying.”[8] As for Thailand’s Deep South, I interviewed a former member of Wadah, who expressed scepticism about the ability of the Islamic Council Committee of each province to monitor vote-buying. He stated that corruption was pervasive even within these committees. Furthermore, money was often used to influence votes for the position of the head of the Islamic Council in various provinces.
Besides, there is a debate whether the term al-risywah, an Arabic word which means bribe, can really capture the whole meaning of vote-buying in Thailand’s Deep South. Imron, Yasmin, and Abdulawwal (2022) had mentioned in their article that even among religious leaders in Thailand’s Deep South, there was no unanimous agreement whether the term risywah encompasses the practice of vote-buying.[9] Younger Malay Muslims, however, are critical in these views, and believe that receiving or giving money in exchange for votes is al-risywah. The debate surfaced across social media platforms such as Facebook, TikTok, and Instagram, predominantly among the younger generation of Malay Muslims. Besides the discussion of al-risywah, a verse from Quran 2:188 says, “Do not consume one another’s wealth unjustly, nor deliberately bribe authorities in order to devour a portion of others’ property, knowing that it is a sin.” (Surah al-Baqarah, 2:188)[10] The verse has been interpreted differently by various Islamic scholars.[11] There remains a debate on whether the verse encompasses the act of vote-buying.
In many cases, it is difficult to discern whether a gift is given in hopes of securing votes or simply done out of genuine generosity. In 2023, the election campaign coincided with the month of Ramadan. An incumbent politician from Narathiwat provided free petrol to residents, allowing them to fill up at any gas station in Sungai Kolok during Eid’l Fitr, which was celebrated on 21 April, 2023. This gesture was ostensibly to facilitate people visiting their relatives across different villages. However, with election day then looming on 14 May, less than a month after the festival, one cannot help but be sceptical of the politician’s true motives. It is puzzling that the Election Committee of Thailand (ECT) did not view this as suspicious. While we were not dealing with direct cash handouts, it was undeniably a form of gift-giving.
Perceptions of what contradicts Islamic principles can differ. Several instances that may seem irrational to a literate person or urbanite are ways in which villagers justify their adherence to Islamic righteousness when accepting gifts and money in exchange for votes. They tend to adapt their voting behaviour so as not to be in violation of Islamic principles. In 2012, during an interview in Narathiwat, a woman in her 70s recounted that several vote-buyers from various political parties approached her, offering different sums for her vote: some proposed 200 baht, others 300 baht, and a few 500 baht.
One might assume that she would have accepted the highest offer of 500 baht, but she denied it, saying it would be against Islam. She explained that the individual who offered her 200 baht approached her first and she accepted that offer. According to her, accepting a later, higher offer after already committing to the first would be breaking a promise, which is against Islamic principles. She then burst into tears, pleading with us not to inform the police. We were taken aback, unsure of the situation. It was not until she confessed that the true dilemma became clear. At the polling booth, she had inadvertently voted for a candidate other than the one she had promised to support. She insisted it was an honest mistake; she had simply forgotten the number of the candidate she had intended to vote for.
During the 2023 general election, another interesting case emerged: an individual returned 500 baht (about 15 USD) to a vote-canvasser of one party after he had received 1,000 baht (roughly 30 USD) from another party. He believed it would be sinful to accept money from both sides. These cases clearly illustrate how Malay Muslim voters in the region develop ways to rationalize actions they recognize as transgressions against Islam.
VOTE-BUYING IN ISLAMIC COMMUNITIES
In Thailand’s Deep South, while many are cognizant of and discuss the vote-buying practice, the exact sum of money used remains elusive to most. The 2023 election saw the highest number of competing political parties in Thailand’s Deep South, with seven major parties vying for dominance. As mentioned earlier, the more political parties there are competing for seats, the more the magnitude of money spent to buy votes. In the past, voters typically received money from 3-5 sources. However, for the 2023 general election, with seven political parties competing in the region, resources for vote-buying funds have now expanded for voters.
Various social media platforms highlighted the issue of vote-buying in Thailand’s Deep South during the 2019 general election. For many urban voters, this was the first glimpse into the magnitude of vote-buying taking place. Projek Sama-Sama, an impromptu election monitoring collective established by local journalists and volunteers, disclosed that in the 2019 elections, individual voters received amounts ranging from 200 to 3,000 baht (US$6.2–US$94) — marking the highest recorded figures in the region’s history.[12] There are also non-government organizations such as the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) that actively monitor vote-buying and other suspicious activities during elections, and ‘We Watch’ (wewatchthailand.org), an organization that recruits volunteers to oversee polling stations across the country. Furthermore, new political entities like the Future Forward Party have set fresh standards for campaign strategies in Thailand’s Deep South. The party’s approach, which contrasts sharply with traditional election campaigns in the region, firmly rejects the use of money politics to secure votes. This has laid a new groundwork for the constituencies. Although the Future Forward Party was dissolved by the Constitutional Court in 2020, its successor, the progressive Move Forward Party, continues to refuse employing vote-buying. Like the Future Forward Party in 2019, Move Forward Party failed to secure any seats. But Move Forward Party were the runners-up for party-list votes in every constituency in Thailand’s Deep South. This marks a notable progression from four years prior.
Unlike Thailand’s Deep South, where Islamic institutions and the Islamic provincial council remain silent on vote-buying, mosques and Islamic preachers in the upper southern Thai provinces of Satun, Krabi, and Songkhla unequivocally condemn the practice. For instance, a mosque in Satun made national headlines when a large vinyl sign was displayed prominently at its entrance. The sign at Ban Kuan-Sanai mosque declared: “The Imams, Khatibs, Bilals, and the mosque committee have unanimously agreed that vote-buying/selling is strictly prohibited in our village. This is because it is not only haram (sinful) but also against the law. Action will be taken against: 1) Those bringing money into the village for vote-buying purposes, and 2) Those distributing money to voters within the village. The Imams, Khatibs, Bilals, and the Mosque Committee will abstain from any Islamic activity involving those partaking in these condemnable practices, as well as their relatives.”[13] In essence, the situation in Satun province indicates that the residents of Ban Kuan-Sanai believe vote-buying affects the reputation and daily lives of Muslims.
Another controversial incident unfolded just before election day. A letter from the Islamic Committee Council, intended for every mosque in the lower Southern Thailand region, found its way to social media. This letter, specifically addressed to all Imams in the Krabi province by the Islamic Committee of Krabi, firmly encouraged eligible voters to participate, and highlighted that vote-buying was prohibited. However, the letter’s conclusion was provocative; it explicitly directed everyone to vote for the Prachachart Party, number 11, urging support for the Islamic party, Prachachart. The letter spread like wildfire. Many, particularly the well-educated Muslims, condemned it. The Head of the Islamic Committee Council defended his position, stating that the letter had not been authorized by him but was instead issued by a secretary without his knowledge.[14]
As of March 2018, out of 3,943 mosques around Thailand, there were 707 mosques in Pattani; 666 mosques in Narathiwat; and 509 mosques in Yala.[15] I was also told that the Prachachart Party approached Imams and the Islamic councils in Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat using the same strategy they employed with the Islamic Council Committee in Krabi. The correspondence requested that Imams and ulama in each mosque encourage preachers and their congregations to support the Prachachart Party at the polls. While this may seem innocuous, the close ties between the Prachachart Party and the Islamic Council in each province effectively hinder other parties from campaigning in mosques. Restricting other political parties from seeking electoral support is considered undemocratic.
CONCLUSION
In the modern world, commercial transactions follow a legal norm wherein the exchange of goods and services between buyers and sellers is typically assured through regular market operations. Contrastingly, the relationship between vote-buyers and voters lacks this certainty. There is no guarantee that those who receive money will reciprocate as intended by the donors.[16] Vote-buying has not only become the norm among those offering bribes, but voters have also started expecting monetary payments from candidates. Distributing money or gifts helps candidates remain competitive, but there is no guarantee that those who spend the most will fare better. Religion can be utilized to counteract vote-buying, but some individuals might navigate its teachings, finding loopholes in their religious principles to further their materialistic pursuits.
Nonetheless, the 2023 general election signalled a shift in the region, with contrasting developments emerging. While vote-buying might have reached unprecedented levels, there is a silver lining: the Move Forward Party, which rejects vote-buying practices, emerged as a second in the party-list votes. Most Move Forward Party supporters are younger Malay Muslims who envision that old-school politics — vote-buying, patron-clientelism, and identity politics—need to be eradicated. To effectively mitigate vote-buying, a promising solution involves enlisting a greater number of local volunteers and NGOs. Their roles should not be limited to just election monitoring; they should also disperse throughout the region to educate villagers about the significance of free and fair elections for community development and growth. Engaging these volunteers with community and religious leaders could heighten awareness and potentially deter the practice of vote-buying.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2023/72 “Responses to Humanitarian Needs in Western Myanmar after Cyclone Mocha” by Kyaw Hsan Hlaing
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Category 5-level Cyclone Mocha made landfall on 14 May 2023 in western Myanmar, killing more than 100 lives, causing significant damage and loss in many townships across Rakhine State, and leaving approximately 1.5 million people in urgent need of humanitarian aid.
- The State Administration Council (SAC) military regime restricted United Nations agencies in Myanmar and other aid organisations access to the cyclone-affected communities in Rakhine State. The United League of Arakan (ULA), the political wing of the Arakan Army (AA), had called on the UN agencies and its partners, and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) to work with the ULA for cyclone response even before Mocha hit Rakhine.
- The SAC requires UN agencies and INGOs to deliver assistance and supplies through the SAC’s cyclone relief centre in Yangon for further distribution by the SAC. The ULA/AA, on the other hand, has opened several cyclone relief centres in at least six townships in Rakhine State, including northern Rakhine, bordering Bangladesh. The ULA/AA proactively evacuated communities in several townships before the cyclone hit, and provided early post-cyclone assistance to communities.
- The ULA has also leveraged its links with the Rakhine diaspora, civil society organisations (CSOs), and its political and military allies to receive aid for cyclone victims.
- The SAC’s restrictions on humanitarian aid agencies and actors to access western Myanmar have escalated the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine State, even as the SAC publicises its collaboration with neighbours and external partners, and state/region-level authorities in Myanmar for the Cyclone Mocha response. In such a situation, the most practical and direct ways to reach cyclone-affected communities may exist in theory, but not in practice.
* Kyaw Hsan Hlaing is an independent analyst from Myanmar’s Rakhine State, and has authored several articles on human rights, political transitions, and issues related to the 2021 military coup in Myanmar.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/72, 15 September 2023
INTRODUCTION
The humanitarian impact of Cyclone Mocha, a Category 5 storm that hit Myanmar on 14 May 2023, has added to Myanmar’s ongoing humanitarian needs and challenges, including those that arose after the 2021 coup.
In March 2023, the United Nations estimated that 17.6 million people in Myanmar required humanitarian assistance, 1.6 million were internally displaced, and 55,000 civilian buildings had been destroyed since the February 2021 coup.[1] More than two years after the coup, communities are left coping with numerous socio-economic setbacks and concerns for safety. Violence has escalated but neither the regime forces nor resistance groups seem to be fully in control.[2]
Rakhine State in western Myanmar, however, had seemed relatively stable. The SAC and the Arakan Army (AA) agreed on a humanitarian ceasefire in November 2022.[3] This was the second truce, as the AA and the Myanmar military had agreed to an informal truce in November 2020 after being at war since late 2018.[4] After the 2021 coup, the Myanmar military removed the AA from the list of terrorist organisations, and the AA began expanding its administration and judiciary role in Rakhine.[5]
Established in 2009, the AA is a relative latecomer to the ethnic armed organisations or EAOs in Myanmar but is considered one of the country’s most powerful ethnic armed groups.[6] The AA has established nine military bases across Rakhine State, and its political/administrative wing, the United Arakan League (ULA), exercises the AA’s judiciary and administrative reach.
The AA’s role and reach were tested with Cyclone Mocha. Approximately 1.5 million people in Rakhine are believed to have been affected by the storm and more than 400,000 buildings, including hospitals, schools and IDP camps were partially or completely damaged, and 65 to 90 per cent of townships in northern Rakhine State, such as Sittwe, Buthidaung, Rathedaung, Ponnagyun, Kyauktaw, Mrauk-U and Pauktaw townships were destroyed by Mocha.[7]
Before Mocha made landfall, however, the ULA had been taking the lead role in evacuating communities from areas in the cyclone path, and putting into place emergency rescue and rehabilitation activities in many townships.[8] In contrast, the SAC controlled the final agreement or approval of travel authorisations for UN agencies and partner organisations, and international NGOs to access cyclone-affected areas.[9] This paper compares the different responses of the SAC and the AA/ULA to the devastation wreaked by Cyclone Mocha, to describe how the SAC’s restrictive measures had escalated humanitarian needs.
PREPARATION FOR RESPONSE TO CYCLONE MOCHA IN WESTERN MYANMAR
Cyclone Mocha made landfall at lunch time between western Myanmar’s Sittwe and Bangladesh’s Cox’s Bazar on 14 May 2023 (Fig.1). Hours before its predicted landfall, it intensified into a category 5 storm.[10] The winds were estimated to be as high as 250 km/h, carrying it up to 195 miles per hour. Sittwe, the capital of Rakhine State, suffered extensive damage to houses and infrastructure, including telecommunications towers and power lines.[11]
The last memory of a devastating cyclone was of Cyclone Nargis in May 2008, which took almost 140,000 lives and affected millions in the Ayeyawady delta.[12] Even so, people in western Myanmar did not heed early warnings of Cyclone Mocha’s impending landfall. Communities in Rakhine State had not been affected as much by the Nargis aftermath. They were complacent, as coastal communities usually experience storms and floods when monsoon rains start in Myanmar around end-April/early-May each year. There was also an element of distrust in the SAC regime announcements. However, people started paying attention when, on 7 May 2023, the ULA/AA’s Humanitarian and Development Coordination Office (HDCO) issued public early warning announcements.[13] The HDCO also released a series of “dos and don’ts” regarding cyclone preparedness and a slogan “listen, be alert and prepare” in both Rakhine and Myanmar languages in its Telegram channel.[14]
Figure 1. Cyclone Mocha Observation Points
Source: Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU), Dedicated page and resources for Cyclone Mocah, 14 May 2023. (https://themimu.info/news/dedicated-page-and-resources-cyclone-mocha?fbclid=IwAR1fVHaqia24hltvP1DVD6OY3510oqplTcqY4FJ3yukkur8m3lKNpVo5ZSY
On 9 May, the ULA/AA evacuated people from Myebon, Pauktaw and Ponnagyun townships, areas under its control and in the cyclone’s potential path.[15] On the same day, the ULA/AA began distributing cyclone awareness posters, and “dos and don’ts” pamphlets. From 9 to 13 May, the ULA/AA reportedly evacuated more than 102,000 people including Rohingya and other minorities from Myebon, Pauktaw, Minbya, Taungok, Buthidaung, Maungdaw, Rathedaung, and Mrauk-U townships.[16]
The SAC’s cyclone-preparedness moves in Rakhine State took a different approach. On 9 May, SAC troops reportedly destroyed the ULA/AA’s cyclone awareness posters in Kyauk-phyu township.[17] On 12 May, the SAC designated seven townships – Sittwe, Pauktaw, Maungdaw, Rathedaung, Myebon, Kyaukphyu and Manaung – as “red-level” areas at high risk of disaster from the cyclone, and reminded communities that people who remained in the red alert areas would face prosecution under the Natural Disaster Management Law.[18]
Local SAC officials in Rakhine State performed a series of preventative rituals to divert the cyclone from the Rakhine coastline. Three Buddhist monks, including the Shwezaydi Sayadaw (head of the famous Shwezaydi Monastery in Sittwe), and Rakhine State SAC officials, performed a ceremony on Sittwe Beach to change the storm route.[19] In Ayeyarwady region, chief minister U Tin Maung Win and the head of the Southwestern Command Brigadier-General Kyi Khaing led a dragon-feeding rite to divert the cyclone.[20]
Human rights activists and Rakhine netizens have criticised the SAC’s lack of pre-cyclone preparations for many communities in Rakhine, including displaced Rohingya in SAC-controlled areas such as Basara, Dar Pai, Thè Chaung, and Thet Kae Pyin in western Sittwe township. UN agencies and INGOs did not escape public criticism either. Despite these criticisms, there were some efforts made to prepare for Mocha’s impact on communities in Myanmar. The ASEAN Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre) issued a briefing on 12 May that it was coordinating with SAC officials to deliver essential supplies from ASEAN.[21] Likewise, the World Food Programme (WFP) stated on 13 May that they had prepared food for over 400,000 people in cyclone response.[22]
COMPARING RESPONSES
The SAC, the ULA/AA and the NUG have separately released differing tallies of casualties and damages. On 17 May, the NUG stated that Cyclone Mocha killed 455 individuals in Myanmar, with 431 fatalities being in Rakhine State alone.[23] On 20 May, the SAC released a much lower death toll, stating that at least 145 people lost their lives in the cyclone,[24] while the ULA’s HDCO claimed 164 dead[25] on 14 June (Table 1). On 14 May, a day after Cyclone Mocha made landfall, local news agencies had reported 400 deaths and hundreds missing in the Rohingya IDP camps in Sittwe.[26]
Table 1. Different data on of fatalities and damages caused by Cyclone Mocha
| No. | Categories | SAC Number | NUG Number | ULA Number |
| 1. | Death of People | 145 | 413 | 164 |
| 2. | Houses | 183,024 | – | 288,320 |
| 3. | Religious building | 1,711 | – | 1906 |
| 4. | School | 1,397 | – | 2,142 |
| 5. | Hospital and Clinics | 227 | – | 194 |
The ULA’s HDCO reported on 14 June that there were at least 2,068 villages damaged, and 288,320 houses destroyed by Mocha. Seven townships in northern Rakhine bore the brunt of the cyclone (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Extent and Percentage of Damage in Cyclone-affected Townships in Rakhine
Source: ULA-HDCO report, 14 June 2023.[27]
The ULA/AA troops were the first responders on the ground in western Myanmar after Mocha hit Rakhine on 14 May. Starting on the morning of 15 May, ULA/AA soldiers were seen in many townships of northern Rakhine, cleaning roads, helping residents, and removing fallen trees and debris. On the same day, the ULA/AA appealed to the international community, ASEAN countries, and other international actors to urgently assist with shelter, food, medicine, and other basic needs for the affected communities.[28] The ULA’s HDCO also urged civil society organisations, UN agencies, and INGOs to work with the ULA/AA in responding to the humanitarian needs arising from Cyclone Mocha. [29]
Several local CSOs also pitched in. The All-Arakan Youth Organization Network (AAYON), Arakan Humanitarian Coordination Tam (AHCD), and Arakan CSOs Network and Arakan Responders for Emergency launched fundraising campaigns for emergency assistance. Local CSOs were also among first responders, travelling to affected areas and assisting survivors there, in the immediate aftermath of the cyclone.
On 16 May, AA leader Major-General Twan Mrat Naing appealed to civil society organisations and INGOs for shelter, drinking water, food, and medicine assistance for storm-hit communities.[30] On 17 May, the ULA announced the formation of a seven-member ‘CycloneMocha Emergency Response and Rescue Committee for Arakan’ (ERRCA), chaired by AA deputy commander Dr Nyo Twan Awng.[31] The ERRCA has opened a series of relief and rehabilitation centers in Buthidaung, Rathedaung, Pannagyun, Kyauktaw, and Mrauk-U townships, and is also working with the Rakhine diaspora and local civil society organisations.[32]
The ULA/AA also received support from its political and military alliances. On 17 May, the ULA-ERRCA announced receiving donations from the National Unity Government (NUG), the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). The KIO donated MMK300 million, while the NUG and the MNDAA donated MMK100 million each.[33] Likewise, the FPNCC and UWSA contributed MMK500 million each for storm victims in Rakhine[34] while PSC/NDAA, PSLF/TNLA, SSPP/SSA donated MMK200 million, MMK100 million, and MMK50 million respectively. In total, the ULA has received MMK1.85 billion in donation from its military and political allies. However, there are no reports of UN agencies and international organisations openly working with the ULA/AA in Rakhine.
The SAC has sited its aid-coordinating centre for Rakhine’s cyclone victims in Yangon. Since 14 May, the SAC has restricted access to the cyclone-affected areas.[35] On 15 May, the SAC declared all townships in Rakhine State as Disaster Affected Areas[36] but did not grant authorisation for UN agencies and INGOs to travel to cyclone-affected areas.[37] Also on 15 May, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing visited Sittwe and presented MMK7 billion as assistance for Rakhine State.[38] Two days after his visit, the SAC announced the assignment of 18 higher ranking-military officers to townships in Rakhine State to carry out relief and rehabilitation activities.[39]
Through May and up to mid-June, however, the UN and partner agencies were still waiting for the SAC’s approval for delivering humanitarian aid to Rakhine, despite “high-level engagements” with authorities at both Naypyitaw and regional levels.[40] On 8 June, the SAC suspended transportation for aid groups operating in Rakhine State, effectively reversing the authorisation order given by local SAC authorities.[41] The SAC’s letter to aid organisations required the UN agencies and INGOs to channel relief supplies through Yangon, which the SAC would further distribute to the “concerned state” and then inform the organisations after delivery.[42] On 11 June, however, the Rakhine State Minister for Security Affairs reportedly issued a notification allowing “some selected NGOs” to resume operations in Rakhine State.[43]
Table 2 summarises and compares the different responses by the SAC, the ULA/AA and members of the international community including the UN and ASEAN.
Table 2. SAC, ULA and the international community’s responses
| Date | SAC | ULA/AA | International Community (including ASEAN, UN, INGOs) |
| May 15 | SAC declared Disaster Affected Areas of all Rakhine State’s townships. SAC denied the INGO and UN agencies access to cyclone affected areas. | ULA issued a statement asking for international aid for cyclone-hit people in Rakhine State. ULA/AA uniformed soldiers are seen helping people, removing the destruction of trees, and cleaning the roads. | |
| 16 May | SAC leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, along with some of his ministers, visited Sittwe carrying some humanitarian assistance on his flight. | Maj. Gen Twan Mrat Naing, commander in chief of Arakan Army, spoke via a short-video seeking support from civil society organisations and international NGOs to provide shelter, drinking water, food, and medicine to storm-hit communities, in cooperation with the ULA-Arakan People Government (APG). | ASEAN AHA Center reported aid would be delivered once approved by SAC.[44] The UN refugee agency country director for Myanmar, Noriko Takagi presented her credentials to SAC foreign minister Than Swe in Naypyidaw and then met with Ko Ko Hlaing, the international cooperation minister.[45] |
| 17 May | The ULA formed a new committee called ‘Cyclone Mocha Emergency Response and Rescue Committee for Arakan’ (ERRC). | ||
| 18 May | SAC released a statement mentioning the assignment of 18 military officers to respective townships to carry out rehabilitation activities. | The AA thanked the opposition National Unity Government (NUG), the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) for their donations. The KIO donated 300 million kyats, while the NUG and MNDAA donated MMK100 million each. | The country director of the UN’s World Food Programme met with SAC foreign ministry in Naypyitaw on 18 May, to discuss cooperation in the delivery of aid to those impacted by the cyclone,[46] but the WFP is still not allowed to go into the cyclone-affected areas. |
| 19 May | PSLP/TNLA donates k500 million to ULA-ERRCA. ULA-ERRCA opens two Cyclone aid-Center in Minbya township. | The Indian government announces the donation of 25 tons of food with medicines to cyclone-affected Myanmar. three navy ships brought the assistance to Yangon port.[47] The UK Embassy in Myanmar announces that the UK would provide around £2 million for the cyclone-affected communities, especially clean water and shelter up to around 175,000 people.[48] | |
| May 21 | ULA-ERRCA opens two cyclone aid centres in Buthidaung township, and four cyclone aid centres in Mrauk-U township. | ||
| May 22 | SSPP/SSA donates K1000 million to ULA-ERRCA. ULA-ERRCA opens two cyclone aid centres in Pannagyun township. | The AHA Center announced ASEAN’s donation of about USD 60,000 worth of humanitarian aid.[49] | |
| 23 May | SAC forces arrest Rakhine writer and social worker Wai Hin Aung, his daughter, and some youths, in Sittwe township, who were attempting to deliver relief supplies to cyclone-affected families.[50] | ULA-ERRCA opens five cyclone aid centres in Rathedaung Townships. | The head of UNOCHA requests USD333 million to assist 1.6 million of the most vulnerable people, many of whom lost their homes as the cyclone hit Rakhine State. |
| 24 May | PSC/NDAA donates MMK2,000 million to ULA-ERRCA. | UN Human Rights Commissioner Volker Turk calls for the SAC to allow assessments, and life-saving aid to cyclone-affected areas. The US announces it will provide an additional $17 million to restore damages caused by the cyclone.[51] | |
| 8 June | Naypyitaw reportedly bans local and international NGOs’ access to Rakhine, reversing an earlier approval granted by Rakhine State officials.[52] | ULA- ERRCA announces that the FPNCC and UWSA contributed K500 million each for storm victims in Rakhine State. | |
| 15 June | OCHA updates that “The approval of the distribution and transportation plans for the Cyclone Mocha response in Rakhine and Chin remains pending.”[53] |
CONCLUSION
The SAC’s reluctance to allow humanitarian agencies and actors access to Rakhine State amidst its uneasy truce with AA has only added to the acute needs of cyclone-hit communities. Following the SAC’s ban on aid agencies’ travel plans to Rakhine, AA leader Twan Mrat Naing tweeted that the ULA/AA would use diplomatic means rather than force to solve the problem.[54] The ULA/AA seems to be focusing now on cyclone relief and recovery rather than opening a new war front in Rakhine.
The SAC’s travel ban on the UN and international aid organizations suggests reluctance to allow any opportunity for these entities to work with the ULA/AA on cyclone response. The SAC’s reach in Rakhine State cannot match that of the ULA/AA. SAC troop presence was visible mostly in Rakhine State’s capital Sittwe, in cleaning debris after the cyclone, while ULA/AA troops could reach many other parts of Rakhine. The ULA/AA has also opened humanitarian centres in five townships in the state.
The SAC has also sought to use the humanitarian response for Cyclone Mocha as a political tool of sorts in its engagement with UN agencies, INGOs and ASEAN, as well as with neighbours such as China, Thailand, and India. For example, the SAC allowed the AHA Center to conduct emergency response and assessments in Rakhine State prior to Mocha’s landfall, and the AHA Center has also coordinated with various officials in Myanmar and ASEAN member states to transport essential supplies to Myanmar from ASEAN and to work with relevant departmental officials in Myanmar on cyclone information.[55] India’s External Affairs Minister Dr S. Jaishankar tweeted the donation of emergency food items, tents, essential medicines, water pumps, portable generators, and clothes to cyclone-affected Myanmar on May 18.[56]Three ships from the Indian Navy transferred these supplies to Yangon port though Sittwe was geographically closer.[57] Thailand has delivered humanitarian assistance to Myanmar through SAC-facilitated channels, on 23 May, 1 June and 12 July.[58]
The post-Mocha situation in Rakhine State requires aid agencies to consider alternative means and arrangements to reach the cyclone-affected communities in remote or conflict-prone areas. A constructive and pragmatic approach would necessitate balancing between adherence to the current requirements of sending assistance through the SAC, and identifying local partners and networks who can provide a more effective and timely response to communities in need. The ULA/AA response has shown its capacity and the trust that it enjoys on the ground in Rakhine State, while the SAC’s response has shown up the gaps in trust and the Myanmar military’s overwhelming need to maintain control. This has further compounded the needs arising from the natural disaster, adding to the other consequences the 2021 military coup.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Wang Yi travelled to Singapore, Malaysia and Cambodia in his first foreign visit after his re-appointment as foreign minister, underscoring Beijing’s strong commitment to Southeast Asia by sustaining the tempo of high-level engagements.
- The visit was also possibly meant to highlight continuity—and absence of disruption—to China’s foreign relations and its Southeast Asia policy following Qin Gang’s removal as foreign minister.
- During his visit, Wang Yi sought to cultivate good relationships with new and next-generation Southeast Asian leaders, especially in Cambodia and Singapore, with a view to ensuring that the positive momentum in ties continues.
- Apart from strengthening China’s ties with the respective Southeast Asian countries, Wang Yi took the occasion to criticise the US’ policy on Taiwan and the South China Sea, as well as Washington’s export restrictions against China.
- Since Southeast Asia’s importance to Beijing has increased in light of US-China tensions, China may be trying to condition how Southeast Asia ought to behave. However, its efforts are undercut by Beijing’s aggressive moves in the South China Sea, its own long-arm jurisdiction through the set-up of overseas police stations, and its economic coercion against certain countries.
- For a longer-term sustainable relationship, China should appreciate that Southeast Asia has the “capability and wisdom” to do what is right, and this includes their strategic choice to be friends with all its key partners.
* Lye Liang Fook is Senior Fellow at the Regional Strategic and Political Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/71, 11 September 2023
INTRODUCTION
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Singapore, Malaysia and Cambodia on 10-13 August 2023. His visit coincided with the 65th anniversary of China-Cambodia relations as well as the 10th anniversary of the China-Malaysia Strategic Comprehensive Partnership, and came on the heels of the upgrading of Singapore-China ties to an “All-Round High-Quality Future-Oriented Partnership” in March 2023.[1] This was also Wang Yi’s first foreign trip after his re-appointment as foreign minister, which went to demonstrate the high priority China gives to the region and the commitment it has to strengthen ties with Southeast Asian countries. The visit was also possibly meant to highlight continuity—and absence of disruption—to China’s foreign relations and its Southeast Asia policy following the removal of Qin Gang as foreign minister. Wang Yi is concurrently a politburo bureau member and Director of the Party’s Foreign Affairs Commission, which added further significance to his visit.
This Perspective examines China’s key objectives and messages during Wang Yi’s trip to the three Southeast Asian countries, and situates his visit in the broader context of China’s approach to Southeast Asia and the intensifying US-China strategic rivalry.
SOUTHEAST ASIA’S IMPORTANCE TO CHINA
Chinese leaders often refer to the Southeast Asian region or ASEAN as a “good neighbour, good partner and good friend”,[2] highlighting the region’s geographical proximity to China and Beijing’s willingness to strengthen ties with these countries. Southeast Asia is important to China for several reasons. The region comprises a diverse number of smaller states, with some of them, such as Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar, sharing a land border with China. All of them want to grow their ties with China and Beijing is likewise keen to engage with a dynamic region of 680 million people. The ten ASEAN member countries collectively have become the largest trading partner for China since 2020 and a major recipient of Chinese foreign investment and development financing. Strategically, the region sits astride critical sea lanes of communication, namely, the Straits of Malacca and South China Sea (SCS), where a large proportion of China’s oil and gas, and other goods traverses. Furthermore, Southeast Asia is at the confluence of big power competition and its strategic importance to China has grown as US-China tensions continue to rise. Beijing has been continually strengthening ties with Southeast Asian countries to draw them closer and to prevent them from siding with the US against China.
The importance of Southeast Asia in China’s foreign policy is manifest in Beijing’s efforts to maintain annual high-level visits and diplomatic engagements with countries in the region. Wang Yi’s visit to Cambodia, Malaysia and Singapore in August 2023 was therefore part of an increasingly regularised mechanism of China’s engagement with Southeast Asia. Despite all the travel restrictions and disruptions due to the Covid-19 pandemic, Wang Yi had consistently prioritised Southeast Asia and paid official visits to all ASEAN countries in 2021 and 2022.
During his short stint as foreign minister, Qin Gang also focused on Southeast Asia in his travel calendar. He made Indonesia his first stop in his tour of the region in February 2023.[3] Apart from meeting his Indonesian counterpart Retno Marsudi, Qin Gang visited the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta where he urged ASEAN to maintain its “strategic independence”,[4] similar to Beijing’s call on other countries to uphold “strategic autonomy”.[5] Beijing views Indonesia as the most influential country in Southeast Asia and ASEAN, and therefore seeks good and stable ties with Jakarta. Moreover, as the current chair of ASEAN, Indonesia can help shape ASEAN’s relations with its dialogue partners, which include China.
At the leader’s level, Chinese President Xi Jinping made a state visit to Myanmar in January 2020, against the backdrop of the Trump administration taking tougher measures against China. It was the first time Xi toured a Southeast Asian country in his first overseas trip of the year as president.[6] When Xi resumed his overseas travel post-Covid, Southeast Asia continued to be a key area of focus, and the region constituted one of the three foreign destinations Xi made in 2022. In November 2022, Xi attended the G20 Summit in Bali, then flew to Bangkok for the 29th APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting.[7] This was Xi’s first visit to Thailand as president.[8] Xi also invited the general secretary of the Vietnam Communist Party as the first foreign leader to visit China after the Chinese Communist Party’s 20th National Congress in October 2022.
Since the start of 2023, China has continued to build on its ties with Southeast Asia through high-level visit exchanges. When Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. travelled to China in January 2023, Chinese state media highlighted that this was his first bilateral visit to a non-ASEAN country.[9] In February 2023, Cambodian Prime Minister (PM) Hun Sen was reportedly the first foreign leader to visit China after the Lunar New Year.[10] Three years ago, Hun Sen was the first foreign leader to visit China when Beijing was scrambling to contain the Covid-19 outbreak. His visit was then perceived as a lending of support to Beijing’s effort to curb the pandemic spread and a demonstration of the “unbreakable friendship” and “mutual trust” between the two countries.[11] In March 2023, Singapore PM Lee Hsien Loong and Malaysian PM Anwar Ibrahim also visited China and spoke at the Bo’ao Forum for Asia in Hainan.
It is worthwhile to mention that Southeast Asia was among the largest recipients of Chinese Covid-19 vaccines in both donation and purchase.[12] They were also the early beneficiaries of Beijing’s relaxation of Covid-19 restrictions for outbound travel. In February 2023, China approved outbound group travel to seven Southeast Asian countries; namely, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, from a list of 20 countries.[13] Brunei and Vietnam were added to this list in March 2023.[14] Countries whom China had differences with or which had imposed travel restrictions on Chinese travellers such as the US, Australia, Germany, the United Kingdom, India, Japan and South Korea were only added to the list several months later in August 2023.[15]
KEY OBJECTIVES AND MESSAGES OF WANG YI’S SOUTHEAST ASIA TRIP
Cultivating relationships with new and next-generation Southeast Asian leaders
A key objective of Wang Yi’s trip was to strengthen political ties with existing and incoming leaders in Cambodia, Malaysia and Singapore; these countries have recently been or are currently in the midst of leader transition. China has been consistently pragmatic and ideologically agnostic in building good relationships with the ruling elites in other countries. In Cambodia, apart from calling on King Norodom Sihamoni, Prime Minister (PM) Hun Sen, and Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) and Foreign Minister Prak Sokhonn, Wang Yi met with Hun Sen’s son, Hun Manet, then prime minister-in-waiting, on 13 August 2023.[16] Wang Yi was the first foreign leader that Hun Manet has met since his father announced that he was stepping down as prime minister. Earlier, in February 2023, Hun Manet had accompanied his father to call on Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing. China wants to ensure that the strong ties between China and Cambodia under Hun Sen would continue under Hun Manet as prime minister. The Chinese foreign ministry’s readout of the visit hailed the “overwhelming victory of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) in the general election”, which it said “has shown the right choice made by the Cambodian people and their trust in and support for CPP”.[17]
In Malaysia, Wang Yi met Malaysian PM Anwar Ibrahim and his Malaysian counterpart Zambry Abdul Kadir. In a break from the diplomatic norm of meeting Malaysian leaders in Putrajaya, Wang Yi made the effort to travel to Penang to meet Anwar, who was campaigning in the state elections.[18] During the meeting, Wang Yi highlighted that Anwar is “an old friend of the Chinese people”, China is a “reliable and good friend of Malaysia”, and that the two countries enjoy a “special and friendly relationship with robust bilateral cooperation”.[19]
In Singapore, Wang Yi called on PM Lee Hsien Loong, Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan and DPM Lawrence Wong who was referred to as the “leader of Singapore’s fourth-generation leadership team”.[20] Affirming the positive momentum in bilateral relations, Wang Yi expressed hope that China-Singapore relations will continue to be at the “forefront of China’s relations with neighbouring countries”.[21] This remark casts the China-Singapore relationship positively, adopting an entirely different tone compared to 2016 when bilateral ties were at their lowest point. In a relevant development, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson in May 2023 commented that the remarks by DPM Wong on democracy at the Nikkei Forum was based on “Singapore’s own successful practice” and “speaks to the aspirations of many countries”. The same spokesperson added that China and Singapore have both found “democratic paths that suit them and have their own characteristics”.[22] By giving credit to Singapore’s democratic path, Beijing is also simultaneously boosting its own political system’s legitimacy and rejecting the monopoly of the Western liberal democratic model. It repudiates US attempts to forge closer partnerships with democratic countries through the Summit for Democracy of which two have been held so far.
Promoting China’s regional cooperation agenda
Another thrust of Wang Yi’s visit was to strengthen its regional cooperation agenda through various multilateral platforms. His visit can be viewed as part of diplomatic activities to commemorate the 20th anniversary of China’s accession to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and the 10th anniversary of China’s Belt and Road (BRI) Initiative, even though the BRI has had a mixed record since its launch, and official support for the initiative seems to have waned over time.[23] A key message arising from Wang Yi’s visit was that countries in the region should cooperate even closer with China in the interest of peace, stability and development.
In the three Southeast Asian countries he visited, Wang Yi expressed China’s commitment to engage ASEAN and maintain ASEAN centrality, which is a refrain in Chinese messaging towards the region.[24] There is a view that Wang Yi’s visit was meant to shore up ASEAN ties ahead of the resumption of negotiations on a Code of Conduct in the SCS hosted by Manila in August 2023.[25] While this may be true, one should not overestimate this point as the three Southeast Asian countries hold different positions on the SCS. As non-claimant states, Singapore takes a principled position that upholds international law in peaceful resolution of disputes while Cambodia is a loyal friend of China within ASEAN on the SCS issue. Malaysia, although a claimant state, prefers not to play up its differences with China over the SCS. Earlier in April 2023, PM Anwar Ibrahim invited domestic backlash when he told Chinese President Xi Jinping that Malaysia was prepared to negotiate with Beijing on its state energy company Petronas’ exploration in the South China Sea,[26] thereby inadvertently acknowledging Beijing’s claim over Malaysia’s exclusive economic zones.
Apart from ASEAN, China is keen to be part of other regional arrangements where it can play a role and remain influential. In particular, Beijing wants to be a member of the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) first signed by Singapore, Chile and New Zealand in June 2020 to promote secure digital trade. This topic was raised in Wang Yi’s discussion with DPM Wong in Singapore. DPM Wong reportedly informed Wang Yi that Singapore welcomed China’s application in accordance with the rules and procedures of the agreement.[27] DPM Wong further expressed Singapore’s in-principle support for China joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). However, whether China can eventually become a member of DEPA or CPTPP will depend on whether it can meet the criteria of membership as well as obtain the necessary support of current members of these two organisations.[28]
The BRI was mentioned in Wang Yi’s visits to Malaysia and Cambodia as these two countries host several BRI projects. These include the Sihanoukville port and Sihanoukville Special Economic Zone in Cambodia and the East Coast Railway Line as well as the twin parks, namely, the Kuantan Industrial Park and Qinzhou Industrial Park, in Malaysia which are often touted as examples of successful collaboration under China’s BRI. However, it is important to note that these projects have experienced delays, were affected by Covid-19 lockdowns, and are still works in progress. Nevertheless, as a global-wide initiative launched by Chinese President Xi Jinping with great fanfare in 2013, Beijing is likely to press ahead with BRI. In fact, China is preparing to host the 3rd Belt and Road Forum in Beijing in October 2023.
Criticising the United States
In a departure from its usual diplomatic practice, Wang Yi specifically criticised the US while in Singapore. Usually, in a bilateral visit, China would focus on issues of common interest, and not bring in third parties. And even if third parties are mentioned, they are normally implicitly, not explicitly, referred to. However, in his meeting with PM Lee Hsien Loong, Wang Yi reportedly lashed out at the US for “conniving and supporting the Taiwan independence forces” and “violating China’s red line”.[29] He further criticised Washington for “coercing other countries to engage in unilateral protectionism against China”, a reference to how other countries had imposed export restrictions on sensitive technologies to China. In his view, these actions demonstrated that the US had become the “biggest unstable factor in the world today”.[30]
China appears to be responding in kind as US leaders have also criticised Beijing on numerous occasions in public during their visits to other countries.
The US was not mentioned in Chinese foreign ministry’s readouts on Wang Yi’s discussions with PM Anwar Ibrahim and PM Hun Sen.[31] It would appear that the readout’s highlight of Wang Yi’s criticism of the US while he was in Singapore was not only aimed at Washington but could also be meant as a warning to Singapore, given that the latter is often seen as a reliable partner of the US in Southeast Asia. In the past, Singapore has borne the brunt of Beijing’s criticism when it was seen as standing with the US against China.[32] This happened when Singapore reiterated the importance of freedom of navigation and a rules-based international order in 2016. That was the year when the arbitral tribunal ruled in Manila’s favour in the arbitration case on the SCS, which China then dismissed as “a piece of waste paper”.
US behaviour in the SCS was also a subject of Wang Yi’s criticism during his visit. In a statement issued by China’s foreign ministry, Wang Yi held Washington responsible for continuing to “stir up trouble” in the SCS by using the Second Thomas Shoal issue to pit China against the Philippines. He reiterated China’s willingness to resolve existing disputes with the Philippines through bilateral dialogue and added that the region has the “capability and wisdom” to maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea.[33] In other words, from China’s perspective, extra-regional powers like the US has no role to play on this issue.
CONCLUSION
Wang Yi’s Southeast Asian tour took place against the backdrop of intensified great power rivalry. China is closely monitoring where the countries in Southeast Asia stand with regard to this competition and is actively cajoling them not to side with the US. Beijing is expected to do more on this front as Washington is stepping up efforts to rally more Asian allies and partners over to its side.[34]
However, Beijing’s efforts to condition Southeast Asian countries or ASEAN into a certain type of behaviour that it finds acceptable is easier said than done. This is because China’s actions in areas of direct concern to Southeast Asia undermine what it seeks to achieve. Foremost among them is Beijing’s aggressive moves in the South China Sea such as its resort to lasers,[35] water cannons[36] and dangerous manoeuvres to prevent the Philippines from resupplying its personnel on the Sierra Madre on Second Thomas Shoal. These actions have emboldened the Philippines to strengthen its military and defence ties with the US, an outcome Beijing is strongly opposed to. China’s recent unveiling of a new 10-dash line map has further raised concerns in Southeast Asia and beyond. Taken together, these actions further weaken China’s call on relevant countries to resolve matters bilaterally and to expedite discussions on the Code of Conduct on the South China Sea.
China’s actions in other areas have also added to these countries’ wariness of Beijing. While China has accused the US of long-arm jurisdiction,[37] it is not entirely blame-free on this front either as it has reportedly established over 100 quasi-official overseas police stations including in Cambodia and Brunei, which undermines the sovereignty of the host countries.[38] In addition, recent examples of Beijing’s use of economic coercion against countries like South Korea, Australia and Lithuania serve as timely reminders that the Southeast Asian countries of the Philippines and Singapore too were victims of such coercive tactics in the past.[39]
Southeast Asian countries will need to be adept at navigating the increasingly complex US-China relationship. As these countries act on their respective national interests, their foreign policy decisions could at times appear to be aligned or non-aligned with either power, depending on the issue. China and the US therefore should regard Southeast Asia and the countries in the region on their merits and not merely through the lens of great power competition. Instead of the refrain that China and Southeast Asia have the “capability and wisdom” to address their own problems, a better starting point for Beijing would be to appreciate that Southeast Asian countries have the “capability and wisdom” to do what is right for their own interests and for regional peace and stability. This includes their strategic choice to be friends with not only China but other key partners like the US, Australia, the EU, India, Japan and South Korea.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- After waiting for 16 years, the Gereja Kristen Indonesia (GKI) Yasmin congregation in Indonesia can finally practise their faith peacefully in a new church building. This is the outcome of GKI Yasmin’s agreement with several stakeholders (including the Bogor City Government) following a protracted conflict concerning the legality of the church’s previous building permit.
- This case had been a prolonged embarrassment for Indonesia, as it attracted international and domestic criticism of the central and regional governments for their perceived poor handling of the case.
- The GKI Yasmin case is just one among many cases relating to the construction of houses of worship in Indonesia. On this issue, the authorities tend to defer to the demands of local residents of the majority faith, and would thereby persuade or coerce the minority faiths to relocate their houses of worship. The authorities portray this as a sound compromise solution, in the sense that it accommodates majority demands while also acknowledging the rights of minority faiths to practise their religions in their own houses of worship.
- However, this approach of applying the majoritarian principle is not ideal, as it infringes on the rights of minorities to practise their faiths. The state needs to promote “champions of peace” to influence the community to be more tolerant of minorities. In fact, the state must also be prepared to act firmly against intolerant conservative groups because, in many cases, it is these groups that are responsible for provoking communities to commit acts of intolerance and even violence against minority faiths.
*Alamsyah M. Djafar is PhD Candidate in Political Science at the Faculty of Social Sciences (FOSS), Universitas Islam Internasional Indonesia (UIII), Indonesia. He is also a Senior Researcher at Wahid Foundation, a human rights non-governmental organization (NGO) in Indonesia. A’an Suryana is Visiting Fellow at the Regional Social and Cultural Studies (RSCS) Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore. He is a lecturer in Political Science at FOSS, UIII.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/70, 8 September 2023
INTRODUCTION
After waiting for 16 years, a church congregation in Bogor City, West Java Province, finally found a new home at which to practise their faith: a new church building located just a kilometre away from where their previous church stood. This congregation, the Gereja Kristen Indonesia (Indonesia Christian Church) Yasmin, known as GKI Yasmin, had to face fierce resistance from local Muslim residents when they held religious services in their old church building. They were forced to perform religious services elsewhere, including on footpaths and other places. The congregation fought socially and legally for recognition of their right to practise their religion in their old church building, turning their resistance into a prolonged saga that made headlines in local and international media.
On Easter Sunday, April 2023, all stakeholders finally buried the hatchet, when many high-ranking government officials and religious figures turned up to mark the opening of a new church building for GKI Yasmin. Among them were Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs Mohammad Mahfud Mahmodin, Home Affairs Minister Tito Karnavian, Chair of the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) Atnike Nova Sigiro, and Bogor Mayor Bima Arya Sugiarto.
Coordinating Minister Mahfud claimed the opening of the new church building was the outcome of extensive dialogue among all stakeholders in the conflict, saying it was evidence that the state did help resolve such conflicts. Minister Tito added that the way the conflict was resolved could serve as a model for other regional governments to follow: resolution emerged after the local government granted the use of a piece of land to GKI Yasmin, meaning the congregation no longer needed to insist on performing religious services in the old church building that was the cause of disputes with local Muslim residents. KOMNAS HAM Chairperson Atnike Nova Sigiro argued that while this kind of settlement was not ideal, it was a realistic compromise.[1] This paper asks: Did the way the Indonesian state resolve this problem provide a good model for the central and regional governments to solve similar cases in the future?
Construction of places of worship occupies top position in Indonesia in terms of the highest number of violations of freedom of religion and belief. Between 1945 and 2005, there were 978 cases of rejection and dispute over the construction of places of worship, especially churches. A total of 520 cases, or more than 50 percent of the total cases, occurred after Reformasi (between 1998 and 2005).[2] Between 2009 and 2018, there were 163 violations (in the form of church closures, property vandalism, and others), with church buildings often being the targets. Among these cases included the ‘sealing’ of the church building used by GKI Yasmin Bogor City in 2008.[3]
GKI YASMIN: LONG ROAD TO FREEDOM
The GKI Yasmin saga began in 2006 when the then-Mayor of Bogor, Diani Budiarto, approved the congregation’s proposal to build a church in the Yasmin Garden housing complex in Bogor City. Muslim residents, supported by a conservative group, Forum Komunikasi Muslim Indonesia (Forkami, Indonesian Muslim Communication Forum), opposed the congregation’s plan to build the church, and started to organize a series of protests. These resulted in the Bogor Mayor rescinding the church’s building permit in 2008. The mayor claimed that the permit was revoked because some of the signatures presented were forgeries.[4]
GKI Yasmin filed a lawsuit against the mayor’s decision to the Bandung Administrative Court. The court determined in favour of the church, and so the church established a temporary building where the congregation could start holding religious services. But Forkami and Muslim residents continued to stage frequent protests in front of the building. The congregation halted construction and ceased holding religious services for fear of their safety.[5] Instead, they chose to perform religious services elsewhere. In 2010, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Bandung Administrative Court’s decision, giving the congregation legal backing to resume the construction of their church building. But the church never materialized due to the fact that the Bogor City Government sealed off the building, purportedly for safety reasons, despite the ruling by the Supreme Court.
In 2012, the Bogor City Government, backed by the central government, proposed that GKI Yasmin be granted a new piece of land for the construction of their church building, but on the condition that the congregation left the former building. The congregation rejected the proposal.
In 2019, Bima Arya, then Mayor of Bogor, proposed three solutions to resolve the protracted conflict:[6] First, the congregation would be allowed to use the old church (but at the risk of being targets of bullying or intimidation by Muslim residents); Second, the government would build both a church and a mosque in the old location to appease Muslim residents; or third, the government would grant a new piece of land as an alternative to the old location and permit GKI Yasmin to build a new church building there. After 30 official meetings and over 100 informal meetings, almost all parties approved granting the new location for the congregation. Most congregation members also agreed with the solution; to be sure, some rejected the outcome of the negotiation and still firmly wanted to hold religious services in the old location.[7] Finally, the Bogor City Government and the GKI Synod Council signed an agreement in June 2021, and the city government then granted the new land to the congregation for their new church building.[8]
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC PRESSURE
The GKI Yasmin case was a stubborn pebble in the shoes of the Indonesian government. International institutions and foreign governments frequently criticized Indonesia for handling the case poorly. The reproach began during the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) between 2004 and 2014, and continued into President Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo’s first term. For example, the Civil Society Coalition for the Third Universal Periodic Review (UPR) argued that the SBY administration had not improved the government’s policies on promoting and protecting human rights, including the freedom of religion.[9] In response to foreign pressure, SBY acknowledged on 15 February 2012, in front of 128 ambassadors of friendly countries, that religious freedom, including the GKI Yasmin case, was a concern for the Indonesian government. The case created a negative international image of the Indonesian government. However, SBY argued that because it was a legal conflict among stakeholders in Bogor, including the Mayor of Bogor, the central government could not intervene. Instead, he appealed to all stakeholders to seek an amicable solution to the conflict.[10]
Following the election of Jokowi in 2014, several international institutions continued to express concern that the new government had failed to significantly improve Indonesia’s human rights situation, especially for people of minority faiths to practise their religion. For instance, in 2017, Christian Solidarity Worldwide complained that the Indonesian government had not fully implemented all the United Nations’ UPR recommendations to improve the protection of the rights of minority faiths. In the GKI Yasmin Church case, in particular, the regional government did not follow up on the decision by the Supreme Court to ensure the rights of the church congregation to practise their religion in their own church.[11] Instead, the Bogor City Government insisted on continuing the shutdown of the church, claiming the closure was needed to prevent horizontal conflict between church-goers and members of Muslim groups who were against the establishment of the church in the area.
Increasing international pressure boosted the morale of domestic actors, especially non-governmental organizations (NGOs), in advocating for the rights of Indonesian minority faiths. Setara Institute and Wahid Foundation were among the organizations routinely monitoring the implementation of religious rights in Indonesia, and they often voiced concern over the government’s handling of the GKI Yasmin case.[12]
Adding to the pressure, GKI Yasmin and another Christian congregation facing a similar problem in Bekasi (Huria Kristen Batak Protestant [HKBP] Filadelfia) joined forces in staging routine rallies in front of the State Palace in Jakarta. Between 2012 and 2019, the two congregations held street protests and religious services in front of the State Palace for a total of 209 times.[13] These protests enjoyed widespread media coverage.
Although this international and domestic pressure was often ignored, it did raise awareness in the government that the situation was getting serious.
‘HARMONY POLICY’ AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF HOUSES OF WORSHIP
The GKI Yasmin case is just one of many cases related to the construction of houses of worship in Indonesia. When addressing this problem, the Indonesian government often relies on forced relocation, persuading or even coercing members of minority faiths to relocate their houses of worship, following the demands of local residents of the majority faith. The government often sees this ‘solution’ as the middle ground in the sense that it accommodates the majority demands while acknowledging the right of a minority faith to practise their faith in their own houses of worship. The government argues that this policy is needed to avoid violent conflict, create public order, and “build harmony” (“membangun kerukunan”)among different faiths.[14]
This ‘harmony policy’ was developed during the New Order era (1965-1998) and is still in use today. Then-Minister of Religious Affairs, Mukti Ali, first introduced this policy in the late 1970s and promoted the ‘trilogy of harmony’ concept. Through this concept, Indonesian citizens were encouraged to promote internal harmony among religious peoples, between religious peoples, and between religious peoples and the government. The harmony concept re-emerged strongly during SBY’s administration. In the view of his government, religious harmony was “a state of inter-religious relations based on tolerance, mutual understanding, mutual respect, respect for equality in the practice of their religious teachings and cooperation in social, national and state life within NKRI based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution”.[15]
This harmony concept was further manifested in SBY’s government in the 2006 Joint Ministerial Decrees No. 8 and No. 9, which rule on the establishment of houses of worship. The two decrees were issued jointly by the Minister of Religious Affairs and the Minister of Home Affairs, providing guidelines for heads of regional governments in “maintaining and empowering religious harmony, and in regulating the construction of houses of worship”. One of the contentious articles in the decree is that when wishing to build a house of worship, a congregation must submit a document that includes the list of names, the signatures, and the identity cards of at least 90 people who will use the house of worship. The document needs to be approved by local officials, including officials from the regional governments. It also needs to be approved by at least 60 residents of the neighborhood where the house of worship is to be located, as well as the approval of the head of the village. This is a tough requirement, because residents surrounding prospective locations of houses of worship often reject proposals to build houses of worship of a different faith.
In addition to these documents, the congregation also needs written recommendations from the regional office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Forum for Religious Harmony (FKUB). FKUB consists of representatives of people of different religions in the respective regions. After all documents are secured, the proposal still needs final approval from the head of the regional government, and within 90 days. The joint decrees also oblige the head of the regional government to find a new location if the existing house of worship needs to be moved to conform with changes in a master plan.
The harmony concept aims to promote peace and security in the community, but it is often implemented at the expense of minority faiths. When there are disputes between the majority faith and a minority faith, for example, in the construction of places of worship, the government often forces the minority faith to give way, claiming that the majority’s demands need to be fulfilled to avoid physical conflict; however, this policy results in loss for the minority faith in the sense that their freedom to practise their religion is violated. In other words, the approach of the state only benefits the majority group and discriminates against the rights of minorities and vulnerable groups.[16] The government’s claims are justified in some cases, as religious disputes have previously resulted in widespread violence and fatalities, as happened during the riot in Maluku Province at the end of the 1990s, which resulted in the death of some 5,000 people and the displacement of 700,000 people, or as occurred during fatal clashes between Shi’a and Sunni Muslims in Sampang District, Madura Island, East Java Province in 2012 that led to one death, 14 injuries, and the destruction of 49 houses. However, there are often other reasons for the government to resort to relocation policy, such as electoral ones: heads of regional governments seeking second terms in office often try to appease the majority faith in order to win the election, albeit at the expense of minority faiths.
Nevertheless, the Indonesian government has applied this policy in many religious disputes. Besides GKI Yasmin, in Greater Jakarta alone, four churches have been affected by it. For example, demands by conservative Muslim groups and coercion by the government saw three churches in Bekasi City[17] (part of Greater Jakarta) relocating in 2015 to an area near a public cemetery.[18] The South Jakarta City Government forced the Batak Karo Protestant Church Council (GBKP) congregation to practise their faith somewhere else because the government had in fact not issued a permit allowing them to use the building as a place of worship.[19] There are some exceptions, however. Despite demands by Muslim groups, the local government in each case refused to relocate the Catholic Church of Santo Joseph Karimun Riau in Riau (2020)[20] and the GKI Citraland church in Surabaya, East Java (2021).[21]
While all the problems above occurred in Muslim majority areas, Muslims have also faced similar problems in areas where non-Muslims make up the majority faith. An influential religious figure recalled that it was not easy for Muslims to build mosques in predominantly non-Muslim areas such as Papua, Bali, East Nusa Tenggara, and North Sulawesi. Although Indonesia is a predominantly Muslim country with some 241.7 million Muslims (87 percent of the total Indonesian population of 276.5 million in 2022),[22] there are also many islands where the majority of the local population are Protestant, Catholic, or Hindu.
DIALOGUE AND TOUGH MEASURES
Dealing with the problem of construction for places of worship is not easy. If the government backs minority faiths in building houses of worship amidst strong protests from local residents of the majority faith, it can pose security risks. Relocating the house of worship to government land is then a safe option for the government: it appeases the majority, while the minority can still practise their faith in their new house of worship.
But still, this policy does not address the initial violation of a human right. The government acts like firefighters, even though it is supposed to uphold the rights of its citizens, especially the rights of minority faiths to practise their religion wherever they see fit. This does not imply that the government must automatically approve requests from religious congregations to build places of worship at any site they desire. The site chosen for a place of worship must adhere to, among other requirements, regulatory requirements for spatial design (urban planning) and the 2006 Ministerial Joint Decrees No. 8 and No. 9.
This is a recurring problem for the Indonesian government. It sounds cliché but promoting dialogue among people of different faiths is crucial to the improvement of social relations. At the very least, mutual understanding increases when people of different faiths get to know each other better. Through dialogue, people can come to understand the aspirations and dreams of others. The government should help to spur such dialogue.
Efforts to build dialogue should be conducted simultaneously with law enforcement. The law must be enforced to create a deterrence effect. The GKI Yasmin case was a prolonged human rights case because the government used a soft approach towards the intolerant conservative group. The government should have instead taken firm action against the intolerant conservative group when they conducted hate speech and even intimidated the GKI Yasmin congregation.[23] Instead, prior to the case settlement, the Bogor City Government succumbed to the intolerant group’s demands for security and electoral reasons by shutting the church between 2008 and 2021, despite the decision of the Supreme Court granting approval for church construction in the original site. The Bogor City Government should take inspiration from governments in other places in Indonesia who uphold constitutional laws when faced with opposition against the construction of minority faiths’ houses of worship. Opposition actors who engage in acts of intimidation and violence should be reported to the police for investigation.
Scholar Khamami Zada also argues that producing ‘peace champions’ is important in reducing conflicts.[24] These peace champions should be respected figures in community, whose thoughts and ideas tend to be followed by people in the community. Government or security officials need to request that these respected figures, such as respected ulema or preachers, serve as peace champions to promote peace in the community. For example, Bogor City Government promoted influential Muslim figure Mustofa Abdullah bin Nuh, and this move was crucial in persuading conservative Muslim groups to accept the solution proposed by the government: the construction of GKI Yasmin’s new church building on a site located just one kilometer away from the old church building. On the other hand, Melissa Crouch proposes that the government and security officials get tougher on vigilante groups that provoke conflicts.[25] Tough measures in the form of arrest and legal prosecution can serve as deterrence for such groups.
CONCLUSION
This article argues that the forced relocation of minority faiths by the government is not a good model. Giving way to the majoritarian principle only infringes upon the rights of minorities in practising their faith. The state should instead promote peace champions to influence the community to become more tolerant while being firm on vigilante groups. Equally important is the dissemination of religious tolerance to all people, beginning at a young age in schools and within families. The role of religious figures is crucial for raising tolerance towards people of different faiths.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Sino-Vietnam and US-Vietnam relations have been progressing exponentially in recent years. Both former foes of Vietnam have invested in their respective bilateral relationships with increases in trade, investments and assistance. Vietnam is seen by both countries as an important and strategic partner in the region and an ASEAN heavyweight.
- Sino-Vietnam diplomatic, trade and political relations have been progressing from strength to strength since normalisation in the 1990s, but irritations continue over cross-border issues, and disputes in the South China Sea.
- US-Vietnam bilateral relationship is underscored by a deepening of cooperation in recent years in areas such as trade, maritime security, transnational crime, climate change, clean energy transition, health and education, and in the enhancing of regional connectivity and resilience in the Mekong.
- Using data from the State of Southeast Asia Surveys from 2020 to 2023, the authors investigate Vietnamese opinion leaders’ perceptions of China and the US, in view of the changing geopolitical relationship.
- The data demonstrates that while Vietnamese opinion-leaders’ views of China have oscillated over the past four years, trust in the US remains consistent.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/69, 4 September 2023
INTRODUCTION
Vietnam’s relationship with the two major powers – China and the US – is complex. To be sure, it is the only country in Southeast Asia which has fought the two most recent wars in modern history —with the US ending in 1975 and then with China in 1979. Vietnamese foreign policy promotes diversification and multilateralisation of international relations, based on the principles of “independence, self-reliance, peace, cooperation, and development”.[1] Informed by its history, this strategy enables Vietnam to maintain neutrality in its flourishing partnership with both China and the US.
SINO-VIETNAM RELATIONS
Vietnam has had a long, fractious relationship with China, suffering wars and incursions from its bigger neighbour throughout history. The most recent of these incursions was in February 1979 when the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) invaded northern Vietnam in response to Vietnam’s military intervention of Kampuchea in 1978. At the risk of oversimplifying this complicated Cold War period, it would suffice to say that until the “Kampuchea question” was resolved, Sino-Vietnamese relations remained in limbo. Hence, it was not until 1991, when the Paris Peace Accords were concluded, and Vietnam left Cambodia, that a normalisation of Sino-Vietnamese relations could occur. Since then, diplomatic, trade and political relations between China and Vietnam have been progressing from strength to strength.
Even before normalisation, Vietnam’s formal ties with China could be traced back over 70 years when the two Communist Parties established links with each other. The continuing strength of Sino-Vietnamese communist ties was demonstrated by a visit by Vietnamese Communist Party Chief Nguyen Phu Trong to Beijing immediately after the 20th Chinese Communist Party Congress in October 2022. Nguyen became the first foreign leader to visit Xi after the latter’s confirmation as third-term President.[2] The strength of these ties can be seen even as recently as when China asked Vietnam to uphold ideological ideals in relations with each other and in resolving regional issues.[3]
Beyond ideological linkages, Vietnam has also progressively become an important economic and trading partner to China. Pham Minh Chinh travelled to China in June 2023 in what was the first official visit by a Vietnamese Prime Minister to Beijing in seven years.[4] Trong’s visit to China last year also reflected new heights in bilateral economic cooperation, with 13 agreements being signed on a range of cooperation areas – two of which promote partnerships in economics and trade, and in strengthening supply chains.[5] Similarly with PM Chinh’s visit, China expressed interest to promote “strategic synergy” in bilateral relations.[6]
The year 2023 marks the 15th anniversary of the China-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership – the highest hierarchy in Vietnam’s diplomatic relations. Sino-Vietnamese relations are thus important due to geographical proximity, shared ideological beliefs, and the evolving nature of relations between the US, Soviet Union and Vietnam.[7]
US-VIETNAM RELATIONS
This year also marks the 50th anniversary of the Paris Peace Accords that were signed in January 1973 which effectively put an end to the Vietnam War. Since the establishment of formal diplomatic relations in 1995, US-Vietnam relations have changed dramatically, transforming the two from former foes to comprehensive partners; the two countries celebrated the 10th anniversary of the US-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership in April 2023.[8] The US hopes to upgrade this relationship to a strategic partnership, but Hanoi remains concerned about upsetting its powerful neighbour.[9] An upgrade, as some have suggested, would in any case be framed as a normal trajectory of the growing US-Vietnam relationship rather than as an “alliance” to contain China.[10] Reports suggest that an elevation in the US-Vietnam relationship may take place in the coming weeks, with President Joseph Biden making an official visit to mark the occasion.[11]
The exponential rise in the strategic importance of the US-Vietnam bilateral relationship is underscored by a deepening of cooperation in areas such as trade, maritime security, transnational crime, climate change, clean energy transition, health and education, and in the enhancing of regional connectivity and resilience in the Mekong. Vietnam is viewed increasingly by Washington as an important member of ASEAN. Vietnam was named a “like-minded partner” in the US’ Indo-Pacific strategy[12] and a member of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity. The importance of Vietnam to the US is evidenced in the number of visits that senior members of the US administration have made despite the pandemic, including by Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Vice President Kamala Harris in 2021, Foreign Secretary Antony Blinken in April 2023, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen in July 2023, and President Joseph Biden’s recently announced plans to visit Vietnam later this year. Vietnam signed a Trade and Investment Agreement with the US in 2007 and has since become the US’ 10th largest goods trading partner and the US’ 28th largest goods export market in 2020.[13]
VIETNAMESE PERCEPTIONS
Data from The State of Southeast Asia Survey by ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute found that Vietnamese opinion leaders’ perceptions of China have oscillated since the survey was first conducted in 2019. Yet, perceptions of the US remain strong in the same period during which the survey was taken.
Since the launch of the survey in 2019, Vietnam has consistently ranked in the top four highest number of respondents.[14] It reached the highest number in 2021, when the survey was first offered in Vietnamese. Respondents hailed from different affiliations, with all years having representation across all categories of academia, think-tanks, and research institutions; the business or finance sector; civil society, NGOs, and the media; and regional or international organisations. They also encompassed all age groups from 18-21 to those above 60.
PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA
Cross-border threats such as the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as geopolitical and geo-economic tensions, are all significant drivers that have influenced Vietnam’s perception of China. Points of contention revolve around maritime and territorial disputes, in particular in the South China Sea where Vietnam is a major claimant. This is corroborated in the survey findings, which shows that despite variations year-on-year, Vietnam consistently ranked among the top three ASEAN countries with the highest levels of distrust (respondents who chose “no confidence” or “little confidence”) in China to “do the right thing” in the wider interests of the global community. As illustrated in Figure 1, Vietnamese levels of distrust in China also rank higher than the regional ASEAN average throughout all years of the survey period.
How confident are you that China will “do the right thing” to contribute to global peace, security, prosperity, and governance?
Figure 1: Vietnamese Perceptions of China Compared to the ASEAN Average
When asked about reasons for their distrust of China, a consistent majority of Vietnamese respondents (above 45% since the question was first asked in 2020, as shown in Figure 2) indicated their concern about China’s economic and military power, which could be used to threaten their country’s integrity and sovereignty.
China’s economic importance to Vietnam is beyond doubt. It is Vietnam’s largest trading partner and the first market to reach US$100 billion trade turnover in 2018.[15] In 2022, bilateral trade between the two reached US$234.9 billion, placing Vietnam as China’s sixth largest trading partner globally and the first among ASEAN countries.[16] China has also consistently ranked as one of Vietnam’s top investors, with registered capital amounting to US$2.46 billion in 2020, US$2.92 billion in 2021, and US$2.5 billion in 2022.[17] Investments range across multiple sectors, from manufacturing to human resource development to BRI infrastructure projects such as the Cat Linh–Ha Dong tramline[18].
Despite these positive trends, China’s implementation of its zero-Covid policy still negatively impacted Vietnam’s trade flows and supply chains; Vietnam’s labour-intensive economy is heavily dependent on China for raw materials and equipment, and the latter’s restrictions disrupted local productivity. In addition, there is a significant trade imbalance between China and Vietnam, with trade deficits increasing and hitting a record US$60.2 million in 2022.[19]
Anxiety over China’s growing power has also been exacerbated in recent years due to the assertiveness over its claims in the South China Sea. Since 2013, China has engaged in land reclamation and artificial island-building, and have so far constructed 27 large artificial islands across the Paracel and Spratly Islands.[20] Subsequent fortification, including the deployment of vessels near these outposts, have also posed a threat to regional security and stability, drawing criticism from countries in the region and beyond.[21] In 2020-2022, negotiations between ASEAN and China on a draft code of conduct in the South China Sea stalled, with meetings having shifted online due to the Covid-19 pandemic.
Why do you distrust China?
Figure 2: Percentage of Vietnamese Respondents Who Distrust China and Reasons Why[22]
More recent Vietnamese perception of China offers some hope, most evidently in the 2022 survey which showed the highest levels of trust, at 24.3% (as shown in Figure 3). When asked about why they trust China, 2022 respondents cited China’s military power as an asset for global peace and security at 34.4%, its vast economic resources and strong political will to provide global leadership, and China being a responsible stakeholder that respects and champions international law – both at 25.7% (also shown in Figure 3).
Why do you trust China?
Figure 3: Percentage of Vietnamese Respondents Who Trust China and Reasons Why[23]
Although levels of trust the following year dropped back down to 4.4%, it would appear that the 20th Chinese Communist Party Congress provided China with a more positive image for those who expressed confidence in Chinese leadership (33.3%), as seen in the 2023 survey results in Figure 3, a much higher proportion than the regional ASEAN average of 8.3% who say the 20th Congress made China stronger and stable.
PERCEPTIONS OF THE US
When asked the same question about the US, survey results showed a stark contrast, with Vietnam consistently ranking among the top two countries with the lowest levels of distrust of the US – except for 2023 when it ranked fourth – throughout the four years of the survey. Figure 4 shows that Vietnamese levels of distrust towards the US are also well below the ASEAN average.
How confident are you that the US will “do the right thing” to contribute to global peace, security, prosperity, and governance?
Figure 4: Vietnamese Perceptions of the US Compared to the ASEAN Average
Vietnam is a crucial partner for the US, with its significance going beyond the context of major power rivalry in the region. This is proven by the expansion of cooperation areas between the two, along the lines of the seven pillars of: 1) addressing the legacies of war; 2) promoting shared prosperity; 3) growing security cooperation; 4) commitment to addressing climate and clean energy; 5) strengthening health cooperation; 6) supporting a resilient Mekong Region; and 7) investing in the next generation.[24]
Vietnamese perceptions of the US have been positive through the recent years, with a majority of respondents from 2020 to 2023[25] saying they are either confident or very confident in the US “to do the right thing”, as seen in Figure 5. When asked about reasons why Vietnamese respondents trust the US, the consistent majority (always above 55%) cited its vast economic resources and political will to provide global leadership. The percentage of those who view the US’ military power as an asset for peace and security has also more than doubled from 12.8% in 2020 to 28.6% in 2023. In the past few years, the US and Vietnam’s security partnership has continued to expand, with both sides being committed to a free and open Indo-Pacific region. From 2017 to 2022, the US has given Vietnam around US$92 million in security assistance under the Foreign Military Financing Programme, to promote Vietnam’s maritime security.[26]
In terms of economic cooperation, there has been a notable rise in bilateral trade to reach US$139 billion last year or 300 times greater than when diplomatic relations were normalised in 1995.[27] US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen’s visit to Hanoi in July 2023 further emphasised Vietnam as a critical player in the global semiconductor supply chain, with her vowing US support for economic and trade resilience in the post-pandemic world.[28] Yellen also called Vietnam a “key partner in advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific”, thus giving strategic weight to Hanoi. In turn, Vietnam sees the US in the same frame as providing a balance of power in the region that is increasingly dealing with an assertive, and at times aggressive, China. For this reason, despite concerns about how China would view an upgrade in the US-Vietnam relationship, the prevailing narrative of “escaping China’s orbit” [29] may bolster support for an upgrade especially on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the US-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership this year.
Why do you trust the US?
Figure 5: Why Vietnamese Respondents Trust the US
Conversely, Figure 6 shows that for the smaller group of respondents who express their distrust in the US,[30] there are two main reasons: firstly, the US’ lack of capacity and political will to exercise global leadership, with these percentages growing from 17.9% in 2020 to 29.6% in 2023, and secondly, the US’ economic and military power having the potential to threaten Vietnam’s national interest and sovereignty, with the percentages growing from 10.3% in 2020 to 33.3% in 2023. The concern that the US is distracted with its internal affairs, highest in 2020 (56.4%) at the end of the Trump Administration, dropped to 25.9% in 2023 in the third year of the Biden Administration.
Why do you distrust the US?
Figure 6: Why Vietnamese Respondents Distrust the US
IF FORCED TO CHOOSE, CHINA OR THE US?
If ASEAN were forced to align itself with one of the two strategic rivals (China or US), which should it choose?
Figure 7: Comparison of ASEAN Average and Vietnamese Respondents’ Alignment Choice
If forced to align with either China or the US, an overwhelming majority of Vietnamese respondents consistently chose the latter with percentages far outstripping the regional ASEAN averages through the past four years. Notwithstanding the slight improvements in China’s trust perception among Vietnamese respondents, the impact on foreign policy has yet to manifest. Vietnamese perceptions towards China and the US will likely continue to oscillate within the ranges in the coming years as the geopolitical environment evolves. It is not in Vietnam’s national interest to be seen choosing between one or the other major powers but rather to work with both to advance its foreign policy objectives.[xxxi]
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Southeast Asia is on the frontline both as a victim of climate disasters, and as a contributor to greenhouse gas emissions causing runaway climate change.
- Especially given constraints on a low-carbon energy transition, it is in the region’s interest to price carbon emissions either through carbon trading, or better, implement a carbon tax.
- Singapore has implemented a carbon tax, and Indonesia made a start on coal, but it is time for all countries in the region to adopt a sizable carbon price to discourage fossil fuels and encourage renewables.
- While global estimates of avoided climate damages from carbon pricing far exceed the costs of pricing carbon, the perceived conflict between short-term growth and carbon pricing is sharp in Southeast Asia.
- To allay fears of losing competitiveness, it pays for ASEAN, in fact ASEAN+6, to move in unison, even if differentiated by broad income levels, with Asia-Pacific’s finance ministers championing the reform.
* Vinod Thomas is Visiting Senior Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. He was formerly Director-General, Independent Evaluation, at the Asian Development Bank; and Director-General and Senior Vice President, at The World Bank Group. The article draws on the author’s recent book, Risk and Resilience in the Era of Climate Change (2023), click here.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/68, 25 August 2023
INTRODUCTION
The trajectory of climate change holds extremely high stakes for Southeast Asia[1] as the region is the biggest incremental contributor to GHGs, and the most vulnerable to climate disasters.[2] The region’s climate actions have not been impressive thus far, and carbon emissions and deforestation continue to go in the wrong direction. With business as usual, the region’s GHG emissions could approach 8 GtCO2e by 2030.[3] But the region has recently given attention to decarbonization as well as adaptation in the face of growing awareness of the dangers from a rise in sea levels and extreme weather events.
Except for the Philippines and Myanmar, others in the region have announced Net Zero or carbon neutrality commitments. The biggest breakthrough will come from a rapid transition to low-carbon energy use and a sharp cut in the energy intensity of economies. Especially for this region starting with a high share of fossil fuels in the energy mix, carbon pricing—through carbon markets or carbon taxes—could be a valuable step in decarbonisation and achieving anything close to ASEAN’s target of 23% of renewable energy mix by 2025.[4] Importantly, the implicit price for clean air also motivates investing in clean energy, and governments can raise money to finance green investments.
ECONOMIC RESPONSES
The goals of climate mitigation and economic growth can be achieved by imposing a price on CO2 emissions that reflects their damages. Over 60 systems of carbon pricing exist today but cover only one-fifth of global GHGs.[5] In June 2021 G-20 finance ministers endorsed the application of carbon pricing as an instrument for shifting to low carbon growth trajectory.[6] Of 38 OECD countries and G20 countries combined, covering 80% of world emissions, only 10 countries were pricing carbon at half the mid-range of the estimated cost of CO2 emissions for 2020.
One approach is using an emissions trading scheme giving policymakers control over resulting emissions levels. There are complexities in designing carbon trading. But it can encourage polluters to switch to more sustainable energy sources, since the price of pollution has now risen.[7]
Another way is to tax businesses and households that pollute. Economists have long favoured carbon pricing because of its efficiency in discouraging effluents,[8] but it would be only a part of the package of needed measures.[9] The tax rate needs to be chosen, and effectiveness of implementation and the use of the tax revenues assured. If the tax is big enough, producers would cut pollution to avoid paying it. Conversely, if the tax is too small to be meaningful, it would just lead to inaction or leakage.
The highest rate has been set by Denmark for 2025 increasing to €150/tCO2 or US$165 n 2030.[10] But the global average is only US$6 a ton of CO2. Singapore is rightly emphasizing carbon taxation as part of its climate policy. High and effective carbon taxation across major polluters like China, the US, India, Russia and Japan (which together account for 60 percent of global effluents) could move the needle on global pollution.[11]
One advantage is that the tax revenue raised could be used to support cleaner fuels. Importantly, a high-enough price of carbon will boost incentives for investment in low-carbon or carbon-reducing technologies, creating environment-friendly operations. Governments can also finance adaptation such as coastal embankments and disaster risk reduction more generally. A part of the revenues can also finance safety nets for the poor.
It is worth remembering that one fifth of global emissions are import-related. It would make sense that a carbon tax also targets discharges contained in imports that are usually excluded from country contributions. There are well-known difficulties in implementing such a tax, issues of rules of origin being one. But the divergence between consumption and production-based emissions has been rising. For example, instead of a 3 percent increase in production-based emissions since 1990, the US would have a 14 percent increase if the measurement is consumption-based.[12]
The IMF has a concrete proposal for a global minimum carbon price.[13] It would set price floors of $75, $50, and $25 per ton of carbon for the US, China and India, respectively. This could help achieve a 23% reduction in emissions by 2030. Southeast Asia could see benefits via revenue generation and its allocation to green investments. A domestic tax in Southeast Asian countries should also prevent border taxes being imposed by the European Union (EU) or the US.
The main benefit of carbon pricing is the avoided damage.[14] Under the EU’s emission trading system, modest annual reductions of some 1% annually were noted, but that is across countries and sectors employing low rates and low coverage. By one estimate, the EU’s emission trading was instrumental in cutting GHG emissions of power generation and energy-intensive industries by 43% over the past 16 years. In Sweden (with the highest rate in the world, after the Danish now), GDP increased by 78% during 1990-2017, while domestic GHGs decreased by 26%.
On the cost side, European countries indicate a zero or modest positive impact on GDP and employment. British Columbia’s carbon tax has cut emissions without hurting growth. In Canada, for a C$50 carbon tax, petroleum and coal, agriculture, power and chemicals were estimated to face unit production cost increases of 5%; 40 industries by more than 1%, and the rest by 0.6%: the economy 2.4%. In the US, the electric power industry would suffer a far greater impact from a carbon tax than would most others.
A carbon tax must be complemented by tough environmental regulations in order to be effective. The tax revenues can be used to protect vulnerable segments of the population or to reinvest in green sources of energy. Pricing also gives a boost to investors inclined to promote renewables, protect forests, or invest in clean technologies.[15] All this is relevant for Southeast Asia.[16]
A CARBON TAX IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Singapore only has 0.1 percent of the global carbon footprint, but its emissions per person is 27th highest out of 142 countries (2018). The country depends on natural gas and has geographical limitations in switching to solar and wind. But all this is even reason to scale up carbon tax and encourage energy producers to cut emissions.
In 2019, Singapore set the carbon tax at S$5 or US$3.7 per tonne.[17] This was at the low end of a range that spans Japan’s US$2.60 (S$3.50) per tonne to Sweden’s US$137 (S$184) per tonne. On the other hand, Singapore’s tax covers four-fifths of the country’s emissions compared with only one-third in the EU. A solid case can be made for Singapore to raise carbon tax to S$50 per ton. In 2020, the government announced S$25 for 2024, and S$45 by 2026, and possibly S$80 by 2030. Complementing the tax should be investments in solar and wind, including buying clean energy from neighbouring countries.
Under its Tax Regulation Harmonization Law (2021), Indonesia – the world’s top coal producer – had originally intended to implement a carbon tax from April 2022, which would have charged US$2.10/tCO2e on coal plants. Though higher commodity prices arising from the war in Ukraine caused an indefinite delay in the tax’s introduction, the Indonesian Government seems committed to its implementation. Thailand, Vietnam, and Malaysia have not adopted carbon pricing, but changes may be on the horizon. Malaysia and Thailand are considering putting emission trading and have established voluntary carbon exchanges. A carbon credit system is being considered in the Philippines.
In implementing a carbon tax, the coverage of polluters and the tax rate are decision variables. It would make sense to target the largest polluters and ones with elastic emission schedules, so that emissions are indeed cut significantly. In Singapore, power generation accounts for 40% emissions and is likely responsive to a carbon price, especially with the adoption of new technologies. Transport is less so across Southeast Asia.
The impact on business is an important consideration.[18] It is not uncommon to let companies using international carbon credits to offset a part of their taxable emissions. There is also a good rationale to have safety nets for low-income segments facing utility price increases. Carbon revenues can be used to cushion the consumer impact. Some ask if “emission intensive trade exposed” enterprises should be exempted from the carbon tax based on concerns of competitiveness and leakage effects. It turns out that for this purpose, border carbon adjustments are better than carbon tax exemptions for the domestic exporting firms. A border carbon adjustment would put a carbon tax on imported energy-intensive and trade-exposed products. Or perhaps better, and certainly simpler, an output based rebate would compensate vulnerable domestic exporters based on their production.
ROADBLOCKS
Industrial firms argue about losing their competitive advantage to exporters from countries with a lower carbon price. This concern can be minimized if ASEAN as a block adopts carbon pricing. Canada, EU, Japan, Singapore, and others also allow some exemptions to prevent “carbon leakage”, where firms consider relocating elsewhere. Political pressures from global events also complicate the picture: for example, energy prices in 2022 led the EU to sell millions of carbon permits, causing a 10% drop in carbon prices.
The impact of higher prices on low-income groups needs to be addressed. The EU excludes transport, where higher costs would be passed on to voters directly. Singapore provides rebates for consumers hit by utility price rise. The Californian system, which covers a small number of big emitters making up 80% of the state’s emissions, uses proceeds from the sales of carbon permits partly to subsidize electric cars.
Australia illustrates the difficulties even when new revenues are used to compensate consumers. Tax increases were very gradual, yet the carbon tax remained politically vulnerable. When a new conservative government took office, it repealed the 2012 tax just two years after it was instituted. Sweden handled some of these political constraints well.[19] Taxes were started on fuels for transport and heating in 1991, going from below US$30 to over US$120 per ton of CO2. Industry faced a favourable rate initially, but increases were phased in. The tax was also presented as part of a larger package aimed at lowering overall taxes, combined with social safety nets.
CONCLUSION
The question is if a full-fledged application of market interventions could make a dent on the climate crisis.[20] This paper favours all countries adopting carbon pricing through a significant carbon tax that is levied on the pollution source. This needs to be complemented by a high enough quantitative restriction on fossil fuels, in addition to eliminating all subsidies for this pollution source. Southeast Asia needs to cut its carbon emissions and be part of the climate solution that is critical for its own survival. A swift and ambitious move on the adoption of a region-wide carbon tax, even if differentiated across countries, would be a way forward. [21]
Though a carbon tax is no different from the penalty imposed on negative externalities, ranging from water pollution to the purchase of cigarettes, there is the fear of the unknown. The biggest is the concern over losing competitiveness in the short term. The idea of a uniform move, even if differentiated by broad income levels, should address this worry, especially if ASEAN plus China, Japan, Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand decide on a carbon price policy. Asia Pacific is a region that has everything to lose from runaway climate change but is heavily constrained on making a swift low-carbon transition. That is more reason to do what it can by way of carbon pricing to open unexpected avenues of cleaner energy—all the while raising much needed tax revenues. The leadership for this move must come squarely from the finance ministers of ASEAN+6.
REFERENCES
Amro. 2022. “Carbon Pricing in ASEAN+3 Economies: Progress and Challenges”. https://www.amro-asia.org/carbon-pricing-in-asean3-economies-progress-and-challenges/
Asian Development Bank. 2022. Carbon Pricing for Energy Transition and Decarbonization. November.
Bain and Company. 2023. Southeast Asia’s Green Economy 2023 Report. https://www.bain.com/insights/southeast-asias-green-economy-2023/
Black, Simon, Ian Parry, and Karlygash Zhunussova. 2022. “More Countries Are Pricing Carbon, but Emissions Are Still Too Cheap.” IMF Blog (blog). July 21, 2022.
European Commission. 2015. EU ETS Handbook
Enerdata 2022. 27 June. https://www.enerdata.net/publications/daily-energy-news/denmark-will-introduce-corporate-carbon-tax-2025.html
Farand, Cloe. 2021. G20 backs carbon pricing, ‘raising stakes’ among emerging economies. Climate Home News. December 7.
Green, Jessica F. 2021. “Does Carbon Pricing Reduce Emissions? A Review of Ex-Post Analyses.” Environmental Research Letters 16 (4): 043004
Hsiang, Solomon, and Robert E. Kopp. 2018. “An Economist’s Guide to Climate Change Science.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 32 (4): 3–32. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.32.4.3.
Jorgenson Dale W. and Peter J. Wilcoxen, “The Economic Effects of a Carbon Tax,” in Henry Lee (ed.), Shaping National Responses to Climate Change, Washington, The Island Press, 1995, pp. 237-260.
Koval, V.; Laktionova, O.; Udovychenko, I.; Olczak, P.; Palii, S.; Prystupa, L. 2022. “Environmental Taxation Assessment on Clean Technologies Reducing Carbon Emissions Cost-Effectively”. Sustainability.
Lawson, Michael.; Phua, D.; Rogers, Claire.; Meng, Su.; Robinson, Phiippa.; Chiu, Phoenix.; Thomas-Walters, Lachlan. 2023. “Developing Carbon Trading Markets in Southeast Asia”. King & Wood Mallesons. February 16.
National Climate Change Secretariat. 2023 “Carbon Tax”. Singapore.
Nogrady, Bianca. 2021. “China launches world’s largest carbon market: but is it ambitious enough?”. Nature. July 20.
Parry, Ian. 2022. “Now is the Time to Impose Carbon Taxes over the Global Economy.” Economist Impact. November 17.
Parry, Ian, Simon Black, James Roaf. 2021. “Proposal for an International Carbon Price Floor Among Large Emitters”. June 18.
Prakash, Amit. 2018. Boiling Point. Finance and Development. IMF. September. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2018/09/southeast-asia-climate-change-and-greenhouse-gas-emissions-prakash
Prasad, Monica. 2022.” Hidden benefits and dangers of carbon tax”. PLOS Climate. July 7.
Rapier, Robert. 2019. “The World’s Top 10 Carbon Dioxide Emitters.” Forbes. December 4, 2019.
Ritchie, Hannah. 2019. “How Do CO2 Emissions Compare When We Adjust for Trade?” Our World in Data. October 7, 2019.
Stiglitz, Joseph E and Nicholas Stern. 2017. Report of High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices. Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition. May 29.
Terrascope Team. 2023. Carbon Pricing in Southeast Asia and its Impact on Businesses”. Blog. June 12. https://www.terrascope.com/blog/carbon-pricing-in-southeast-asia-and-its-impact-on-businesses https://www.terrascope.com/blog/carbon-pricing-in-southeast-asia-and-its-impact-on-businesses?hs_amp=true
The Economist. 2022. “Carbon Markets are Going Global”. May26.
Thomas, Vinod. 2023. Risk and Resilience in the Era of Climate Change. Palgrave Macmillan.
World Bank. 2020. “Pricing Carbon”. June 22.
Xu, Selina. 2021“Singapore Says S$5 Carbon Tax ‘A Start’ as It Eyes Higher Levy”. Bloomberg. July 16.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The polarisation perceived in mainstream electoral politics since the 2014 Presidential election campaign has turned out to be more rhetorical than real, reflecting mainly the opportunistic tactical calculations of the two rival candidates involved.
- This was revealed with the rapprochement in 2019 between Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto and by the abandonment of past tactical alliances for new ones, as the 2024 Presidential election now approaches.
- Real polarisations do affect Indonesian political life, however, and are not the ones portrayed in the Presidential election campaigns.
- One such polarisation is between the social and political outlook of critical civil society and the political establishment embodied in the parliamentary political parties and government figures. This polarisation is easy to map as it is reflected in open opposition to major policies and laws passed by parliament and implemented by the government, albeit by societal elements not yet active in the electoral arena.
- Another polarisation is a more deeply sociological one which is reflected in a contestation between worldviews, namely between one that is a modernising, secular and socially liberal, versus the other that is traditional, religious and socially conservative.
* Max Lane is Visiting Senior Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. He is the author of “An Introduction to the Politics of the Indonesian Union Movement” (ISEAS 2019) and the editor of “Continuity and Change after Indonesia’s Reforms: Contributions to an Ongoing Assessment” (ISEAS 2019). His newest book is “Indonesia Out of Exile: How Pramoedya’s Buru Quartet Killed a Dictatorship”, (Penguin Random House, 2022).
ISEAS Perspective 2023/67, 18 August 2023
INTRODUCTION
Between 2013 and 2020, almost all analyses of mainstream Indonesian politics argued that politics was sharply polarising.[1] It was also argued that this polarisation reflected a tension between secular and conservative Islamic politics as well as between democratic and authoritarian politics.[2] What gave rise to this analysis was the contestation in 2013-2014 and again in 2019, between Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto for the Indonesian Presidency. The focus was purely on rhetorical polarisation, rather than real polarisations in society – polarisations to be discussed later in this essay.
The Presidency is an important position in Indonesian governance although it should be noted that neither a budget nor any substantial policy change can be implemented without the approval of a parliamentary majority. It was superficial from the start for commentators and academics to use the Presidential contest for framing all aspects of the country’s politics. No doubt, with just two candidates standing for the Presidency, it was easy to fall into the trap of concluding that there were only two poles to Indonesian political contestation.
THE JOKOWI VS PRABOWO “POLARISATION” WAS RHETORICAL
There was indeed a sense of polarisation generated by the 2014 and 2019 election campaigns. As noted above, there were only two candidates for both of these elections. One candidate, Jokowi, was a small-town businessman and ex-mayor of Solo, with no substantial connection to the New Order authoritarian era.[3] The other, Prabowo, was a general from the Suharto era, who was widely held responsible for the kidnappings of anti-Suharto activists in 1997 and 1998 and also for being behind the instigation of anti-Chinese riots in 1998.[4] Furthermore, he was from a family that had become extremely rich during the Suharto era.[5]
The first perception of polarisation was based on these differences: new era vs Suharto era, democratic era vs authoritarianism. But while Jokowi was a furniture manufacturer with no political involvement, long before he went into politics, he already had a close relationship with Suharto-era General Luhut Panjaitan.[6] Luhut himself had also been a business partner with Prabowo, with forestry concessions in Kalimantan.[7] Luhut was later to be the “de facto” Prime Minister during Jokowi’s two presidencies.[8]
The contrast between democratic and authoritarian era figures was emphasised in two ways. The first was through reference to the allegations made about Prabowo’s human rights record, especially in 1997 and 1998, and also occasionally references to Prabowo having contemplated a coup against President Habibie.[9] Prabowo was investigated on these questions and had to leave the Army, after which he left Indonesia to be an advisor to the Jordanian Army for several years.
Jokowi rarely, if ever, made reference to these issues in his public comments. Even in the 2014 Presidential Debates on TV, it was left to Jokowi’s Vice-Presidential running mate, Jusuf Kalla – very much himself a Suharto-era figure – to make the single reference to the 1997-98 allegations against Prabowo.[10] Jokowi said nothing in the national TV debates on human rights violations. However, a section of his supporters based in civil society (but not the PDIP) campaigned strongly in support of Jokowi on this issue.[11] Anti-Prabowo academics outside Indonesia also campaigned strongly on this through their social media presence in Indonesia.[12] The fact that it was not something prioritised when Jokowi spoke to the nation on national TV in the presidential debates was also a pointer to the need for a nuanced reading of the political situation.
The second perception was that Jokowi and Prabowo, at least in 2013-4, had different stances on the question of direct elections for President and Vice President and other executive positions. During the Suharto era and the first few years of the post-Suharto era, the President was chosen by the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR). Direct elections for the Presidency were legislated under Megawati Sukarnoputri and implemented at the end of her Presidency. Jokowi supported direct elections and Prabowo questioned it. Critics of Prabowo claimed that Prabowo’s stance was evidence of his authoritarianism – however, as we know, there are many political systems considered as democratic where the head of government is chosen by parliament, such as the Westminster system. The anti-democratic character of the election of the President under Suharto was not because the MPR elected the president, but because the regime’s control of electoral politics meant that it also controlled the MPR. After 1998, such control of the parliament by the executive was no longer possible. There was no evidence that Prabowo was advocating a return to that situation, and in any case, soon after the 2014 election, Prabowo turned to support direct elections at all levels.[13] The agreement was for parliamentary and presidential elections to be held at the same time, indicating that the basis for Prabowo’s questioning of direct elections was more related to the problems of two waves of elections, rather than that, indirect elections would facilitate a return to authoritarianism.
A more nuanced look at the two candidates and their positions reveals that on these issues, they are not really polarised. This is even more the case if the context is examined. Authoritarianism seldom just grows out of a political figure’s personality, but out of the political situation at hand. There was no political situation in 2013 or 2019 that even remotely came near to one that required an authoritarian response. There was no growing popular opposition or any destabilising rift among the elite that would call for strong-man rule. Prabowo himself never campaigned on that basis but rather, demagogically of course, campaigned against massive monetary “leakage” mainly to non-Indonesian business interests.[14] This was especially so in 2013 and 2014, when his position implied a criticism of Yudhoyono, not Jokowi who had not yet held power. Prabowo’s record indicated that he would be open to authoritarian measures if required, but over the last ten years nobody has seriously campaigned that such actions were required.
The third perception of polarisation, both in 2013-14 and 2019, has a more complex basis and, while still essentially rhetorical, does overlap with a real and significant socio-cultural differentiation. Its manifestation during both elections was in Prabowo’s tactical alliances. Prabowo aligned himself very clearly with conservative elements in political Islam, especially the Front Pembela Islam (FPI) and Alumni 212.[15] Both these organisations had come into political prominence during the campaign against the Governorship of The Greater Jakarta Region, where they opposed the Christian Chinese Indonesian politician, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama. Purnama had been accused of blasphemy against Islam after making comments on Qur’anic verses. Prior to this both the FPI and Alumni 212 forces had no significant national profile.[16] It appears that Prabowo, or his advisors, concluded from the large FPI/212 mobilisations, that these organisations would be a significant force in helping Prabowo win the elections. This happened in both 2014 and 2019, but was greater on the latter year. In 2019, Prabowo ended his campaign with a massive rally of FPI, Alumni 212 and other Islamist supporters, filling Jakarta’s Istora Sports Stadium with white-cloaked men. This very prominent alliance, playing a central role in Prabowo’s campaign, also heightened the sense of polarisation. Again, however, Prabowo himself did not give any prominence to demands for a greater religious character to the Indonesian state or society. The sense of polarisation between secular and religious issues was a consequence of the actual alliance itself, not any overt religious campaigning by Prabowo. As with the campaigning for Jokowi, supporters of Prabowo, not the candidates themselves, would take up the more polarising issues, giving these a heightened profile, as if the candidates were likely to move in a certain given direction if they won.
Both Jokowi’s first and second term have shown that serious human rights reform was not a priority. The government’s actions in the recognition of serious human rights have been very limited and basically tokenistic. Prabowo’s joining the Jokowi government as Defense Minister, with his party,has shown that Prabowo and Jokowi have similar basic political outlooks.
Furthermore, during the whole period of Jokowi’s second term as president, there has been no friction or any sign of “polarisation”. When the government did eventually announce in 2023 its policy of compensation for some victims of past human rights abuses, including those of 1965 (although unspecified), neither Prabowo nor Gerindra raised any differences in opinion.[17] In the first weeks of the manoeuvring around the 2024 Presidential nominations, the democratic versus authoritarian “polarisation” has also not resurfaced.[18]
Neither have there been any signs of Prabowo or Gerindra flirting again with the FPI or 212. Instead, in the context of Prabowo once again standing for the Presidency, he has sought to be seen as being in harmony with Jokowi, even more so than the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) itself. Additionally, Gerindra has formed a coalition with National Awakening Party (PKB) in support of Prabowo’s Presidency.[19] The PKB is more associated with the traditionalist Nahdatul Ulama, with some outspoken liberal figures, than the Arabist FPI or 212 Islamist organisations. PKB’s support is primarily in East and Central Java, while the FPI and 212’s main bases of support are in West Java and parts of Sumatra. Prabowo is not making the same mistake of overtly aligning with Islamist currents that will alienate voters in Central and West Java, in many parts of eastern Indonesia, and in north Sumatra.[20]
Although the need to compete for votes in 2024 may yet spur candidates, or their various supporters, to take up inflammatory postures opportunistically, appealing to religious, ethnic or other such sentiments, there are still no signs of the kind of rhetorical polarisation associated with the 2014 and 2019 campaigns.
REAL POLARISATIONS AND POLITICAL LIFE
The fact that mainstream electoral politics has been characterised by rhetorical, rather than real polarisation does not mean than serious ideological or cultural differentiations do not exist in society, even to the extent of a polarisation. In fact, it can be argued that there are two such ideological polarisations, interacting with each other, but not substantially manifested in mainstream, that is electoral, politics. These are between:
- An organised civil society oriented to social justice, democratic rights and socially liberal political outlook and a political establishment solidly oriented to the current hierarchy and values inherited from the New Order era of crony capitalism.
- An increasingly modernising, secular and socially liberal world view, especially in urban centres, and a very traditional, religious and socially conservative world view.
The first of these polarisations is relatively easy to document. Criticisms by civil society organisations, trade unions and other grassroots bodies, of the political establishment embodied in parliamentary parties and government figures are articulated openly.
In recent years, there has been an easily visible polarised response around the major legislation unanimously passed by parliament and signed into legislation by the President: the law on the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), the Job Creation Law and the new Criminal Code.[21] While it is clear with these that there are two very distinct poles, there is a great and fundamental power imbalance between the two. The reality is that it is the establishment parties that dominate the formal political processes, recruit memberships on a large scale (whatever the ideological shallowness of this recruitment) and also dominate the media. Figures from the political parties spend thousands of hours on television as talking heads while civil society figures get much less air time. This therefore raises a question of whether this polarisation is felt across society or only across politically active society. One legacy of the 32 years of Suharto’s authoritarian rule was the disorganisation of society and the fundamental retreat from the political life of the population. This points to another more specific polarisation, perhaps better described as a contradiction, namely the tension caused by a perspective advocated by civil society organisations which has no representation in the formal, i.e., electoral political world. The current attempt to form and run a Labor Party campaign in the 2024 elections, whether this time around it wins votes or not, reflects the reality of a polarisation around policy, or even ideology, however embryonic.[22] The Labor Party, whose support comes from some (but not all) sections of the trade unions and civil society organisations, has already announced that it cannot support any of the current three figures being proposed as Presidential candidates because these all support the Job Creation Law, which it opposes. The existence of this polarisation and also its depth and strength are visible and relatively easily to monitor.
The second polarisation – between modern, secularising, social liberalism and traditional, religious social conservatism – is more difficult to analyse and assess precisely. It is not reflected in mainstream electoral politics. While it is true that the Islamist party, the PKS, refused to vote for a new law against Sexual Violence because it did not criminalise sexual intercourse outside marriage, a few months later the whole parliament voted for such a criminalisation in the New Criminal Code.[23] To the extent that there may be differences around such a question, it is more of degree than being actually polarised. Of course, part of this polarisation is visible to the extent that it overlaps with some civil society organisations concerns with democratic and human rights, such as LBGT rights, while religious organisations and some traditional pro-family groups are very hostile to recognition of such rights. Homosexual sexual relations are even more criminalised in the new Criminal Code.[24]
However, assessing a polarisation between secular and religious consciousnesses is more complicated. Some of the more explicit political manifestations of this are perhaps easy to identify, such as a steady, if gradual decline, in the votes for political parties that explicitly identify with Islam.[25] However, even those parties that don’t do so – such as PDIP, Nasdem and Gerindra – still make sure that they appear as religious. It is also not sufficient to look at polls and other manifestations of people identifying as religious – as Muslim, Protestant, Catholic, Hindu, Buddhist, or Aliran Kepercayaan (native religions).[26] The issue is not one of identification but changes in behaviour that reflect changes in ideological outlook or world view. Such changes in consciousness are rarely a planned process but rather the outcome of deeper sociological changes.
At this point in attempting to assess the processes connected to this polarisation, we are restricted to anecdotal evidence, some of which have become widely noted. Much more research and closer observation are need to gain clarity on this process. We can only raise some questions in these final paragraphs.
One of the anecdotal phenomena is the spread of the wearing of the hijab in state schools, something almost unheard of during the New Order period.[27] In late 2022 and early 2023, there was considerable TV and press coverage of this phenomenon, and even more on social media. The Ministry of Education had to issue a clarification that girls could not be forced to wear a hijab, but still, some school heads and teachers insist that children do so. Mothers of children, many of whom experienced greater clothing and other freedoms during the New Order period, use social media to demand the same freedom for their daughters.
This phenomenon does, of course, reflect socially conservative attitudes towards women, demanding stricter control of how they dress and assuming it is females who are responsible for unwanted male sexual interest rather than men. There may be another layer to this, noticeable in both schools and on university campuses. This is when students bow and kiss the hand of teachers or lecturers. This was also a very rare behaviour during the New Order. This change is also often discussed on social media.[28] Both these observations, the wearing of the hijab being the most widely discussed, reveal a new presence of conservatism. The wearing of the hijab is clearly associated with religion (Islam) but the reinforcement of hierarchy among youth at school is not necessarily so. Rather than reflecting a deepening religious consciousness, it is more likely that there is now a greater reliance on tradition, which in Indonesia can have aspects of religion, for the buttressing of hierarchical authority. During the New Order, the established hierarchy rested on the enormous power of the New Order state, backed by the military and resting on at least two years of terror, systematic reorganisation of power and the awe provoked by a decade of sudden economic growth. In the wake of the exposure of economic and political fragility in 1997-98 and the emergence of a rivalry-ridden new elite constantly being exposed for corruption by its own Corruption Eradication Commission, the state no longer has the necessary aura to sustain respect for the various hierarchies. Even on the question of the status of women, state-backed organisations such as Dharma Wanita enforced patriarchal values. This meant less pressure on parents and schools to inculcate conformity – the state would do that later on. Now with a much less authoritative (and less authoritarian) state, the existing hierarchies of authority have to rely on tradition for enforcement, sometimes also drawing on elements of religion, albeit not with religion as its source.
These and other similar phenomenon such as hostility to LGBTQ people, open campaigning for polygamy,[29] and movements against pre-marital sex,[30] emerge haphazardly in response to the spread of socially liberal behaviour and attitudes that threaten existing authority hierarchies. Even so, the existence of religious institutions that produce the equivalent of a priesthood means that there exists a thick layer of people, mainly men, trained in how to present conservative world views. These institutions have unruptured histories going back over a hundred years in the archipelago. While the spread and intensification of urban life facilitate secular modernisation and socially liberal behaviour, there are not yet the equivalent intellectual institutions that can advocate authoritatively for a secular worldview. The religious defence of traditional sources of authority can draw on the whole world of “kyaihood”, whereas new secular outlooks have not yet any such equally authoritative spokespeople. The traditional-religious worldview is more explicitly present than the secular worldview, which is still embodied in social behaviour rather than public advocacy. The partial exception to this is when democratic and human rights civil society elements advocate for the rights of people whose space is expanded by liberal social norms, even if they are not involved in an outright exposition of a liberal worldview. This particular polarisation is between a defence of hierarchical authority using religio-traditional cultural resources, and an urban-life-encouraged, secular modernisation still without an articulated worldview.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |