ISEAS Perspective

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• Public expectations for the upcoming state elections in Malaysia, expected to take place in August 2023, are that Perikatan Nasional (PN) will likely win control of the Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu state legislatures while Pakatan Harapan (PH) and Barisan Nasional (BN) will likely secure the Penang, Selangor, and Negeri Sembilan state legislatures.

• Using the results from the 15^th General Election (GE15), it would appear that PN will win 32 out of 36 state seats in Kedah and almost all the seats in Kelantan and Terengganu. Meanwhile, PH and BN will be able to secure 32 out of 40 seats in Penang, 42 out of 56 seats in Selangor, and 33 out of 36 state seats in Negeri Sembilan.

• The number of seats won by PH, BN, and PN, are calculated using 3 scenarios of “low”, “neutral”, and “high” vote “transfers” between PH and BN. Even under the “low” scenario of a relatively low vote transfer rate of 30% from BN to PH, the combined electoral strength of PH and BN is sufficient to retain Penang, Selangor, and Negeri Sembilan relatively easily. At the same time, even with a relatively high vote transfer rate of 70% from BN to PH, the electoral gains for PH and BN in Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu, will remain limited, based on the GE15 election results.

• There are more marginal seats in Penang, Selangor, and Negeri Sembilan for PH, BN, and PN under all three scenarios compared to Kedah, Kelantan, and Terengganu. The focus of the campaigns will likely be in these marginal seats, mostly in Malay majority areas in the three PH-governed states.

• The potential upside for PH-BN is higher in Penang, Selangor and Negeri Sembilan, especially if a high vote transfer between PH and BN supporters takes place.

* Ong Kian Ming is Visiting Senior Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. He was a former Member of Parliament representing the DAP and former Deputy Minister of International Trade & Industry (MITI).

ISEAS Perspective 2023/52, 10 July 2023

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INTRODUCTION

One of the most important questions facing the ruling Unity Government (UG) in Malaysia is the extent to which supporters of Pakatan Harapan (PH) and Barisan Nasional (BN) will likely “transfer” their votes to their former political rivals in the upcoming state elections in the six states which chose not to dissolve their state assemblies in 2022 when the federal elections were held. Three of the governments in these states – Kedah, Kelantan, and Terengganu – are held by Perikatan Nasional (PN), while the remaining three – Penang, Selangor, and Negeri Sembilan – are held by Pakatan Harapan (PH).

While the overall results of these state elections are not likely to affect the stability of the federal government, the performance of PH and BN will still be important both politically and economically. Politically, the results will influence the thinking within UMNO of the strategic advantages of working with PH in future elections. It will also affect the overall confidence of UMNO leaders and grassroots members in the UMNO president and Deputy Prime Minister, Zahid Hamidi. For PH, the important question of whether it can increase its share of Malay support by working with a Zahid-led UMNO will be answered in these state elections. From an economic perspective, a positive result for the UG will give it more space to introduce more substantive economic reforms post-elections, including the rationalisation of various general subsidies towards more targeted programmes.

This article is divided into two parts, which are to be published separately. Part One uses the results of the 15^th General Election (GE15) held in 2022 to project the possible outcomes in the upcoming state elections, through the use of various scenarios. These projections can then be compared against different electoral baselines to show what would constitute successful results for PH, BN, and PN.

Part Two (to be published soon) focuses on the likely campaign issues and strategies used by the three major coalitions. The fact that this will be the first time that more than one state will be holding state elections at the same time will add to the unpredictability and importance of the campaign itself. Some thoughts of the implication of the results on political developments in Malaysia are presented in the conclusion.

OVERVIEW OF GE15 RESULTS IN THE SIX STATES

Based on the results of GE15, the expectation among political observers in Malaysia is that PN is likely to retain Kedah, Kelantan, and Terengganu while PH, together with UMNO, will retain Penang, Selangor and Negeri Sembilan.

The rationale behind this expectation can be gleaned from the electoral outcomes for GE15 in these six states (Table 1 below).

Table 1: Overview of GE15 results for and ethnic composition of the six states

State	PH%	PN%	BN%	PH Seats	PN Seats	BN Seats	Malay%	Chinese%	Indian%
Kedah	21.8%	54.3%	20.6%	1	14	0	77.7%	14.5%	6.8%
Kelantan	8.7%	62.9%	26.5%	0	14	0	95.0%	3.4%	0.5%
Terengganu	5.4%	61.8%	31.4%	0	8	0	96.7%	2.9%	0.2%
Penang	59.4%	23.7%	15.0%	10	3	0	39.4%	49.3%	10.9%
Selangor	52.4%	27.3%	17.3%	17	5	0	53.9%	31.4%	13.8%
Negeri Sembilan	44.4%	21.7%	31.9%	3	0	5	57.6%	26.4%	14.8%

Source: Election Commission, Own Analysis

PN dominated the elections in Kedah, Kelantan, and Terengganu in GE15 by winning 14/15, 14/14 and 8/8 seats and 54.3%, 62.9%, and 61.8% of votes, respectively.

Similarly, PH was dominant in non-Malay majority Penang, winning 59.4% of votes and 10 out of 13 parliamentary seats.

PH and BN’s combined vote share of 69.3% and 76.3% in Selangor and Negeri Sembilan respectively with PH winning 17/22 parliament seats in Selangor and PH + BN winning 8/8 parliament seats in Negeri Sembilan should also result in both states being won by PH+ BN in the upcoming state elections.

METHODOLOGY FOR PROJECTING 2023 STATE ELECTION RESULTS

However, the narratives surrounding the upcoming state elections are not just solely focused on which coalition(s) will win control of which state assemblies. In this study, attention will also be paid to the number of seats and percentage of votes won by each coalition. The detailed results will in turn provide fodder for the political class to discuss the advantages of PH and BN working together to “pool” the votes of their supporters on the one hand, and the possible further momentum gain by the PN among the Malay voters on the other.

Projecting the results of the upcoming state elections using the GE15 results as the baseline and then assuming different scenarios with regards to the extent of vote “pooling” between PH and BN will provide possible floors and ceilings of electoral benefits stemming from PH and BN working together.

Calculating the outcomes at the state seat level based on the GE15 results at the parliamentary seat level is quite straightforward. The detailed polling stream or “saluran” results tabulated in each of the classrooms where voters cast their vote is available from the Election Commission (EC).^[1] These results for GE15 were obtained for all the parliament seats, except where election petitions have been filed to contest the results leading to the EC withholding the data pending the outcome of these petitions. GE15 results are therefore available for all 15 parliament seats in Kedah, 13 out of 14 parliament seats in Kelantan,^[2] 5 out of 8 parliament seats in Terengganu,^[3] all 13 parliament seats in Penang, all 22 parliament seats in Selangor and all 8 parliament seats in Negeri Sembilan. The results for the polling streams under the state seats in each of the six states are calculated and the party which won the largest number of votes identified.^[4] The results are tabulated in Table 2 below.

Table 2: State seats won by PH, PN, and BN in the six states using GE15 results

State	PH	PN	BN	Total
Kedah	4 (2)	32 (5)	0	36
Kelantan	0	42 (1)	0	42[5]
Terengganu	0	19	1[6]	20[7]
Penang	31 (5)	8 (6)	1 (1)	40
Selangor	40 (18)	14 (9)	2 (2)	56
Negeri Sembilan	17 (5)	3 (3)	16 (12)	36

Notes: The numbers in parentheses (X) are the number of seats which were won with less than 50% of the popular vote.

Source: Election Commission, Own Analysis

The results shown in Table 2 above confirms the figures in Table 1. PN should score resounding victories by winning 27 out of 36 seats (or 75%) in Kedah by more than 50% of votes and winning almost all seats in Kelantan and Terengganu with more than 50% of votes. PH+BN should be able to secure a comfortable victory in Penang by winning 32 out of 40 seats including 26 with more than 50% of the vote. PH+BN is expected to emerge victorious in Selangor and Negeri Sembilan by winning 22 out of 56 seats in Selangor with more than 50% of the vote (with another 20 seats with less than 50% of the vote), and 16 out of 36 seats in Negeri Sembilan with more than 50% of the vote (with another 17 seats with less than 50% of the vote). This is probably why PN sees Selangor and to a lesser extent Negeri Sembilan as states where they can make some headway. But if the support for PH+BN shifts even a little in favour of the Unity Government, PN may end up with only a handful of seats in these two states. The nuances in each of the states are discussed below.

 In Kedah, even though PH (21.8%) and BN (20.6%) of the popular vote, the concentration of the support for PH was mostly in the urban areas which allowed it to “win”^[8] the most votes in 4 state seats, 2 of which were won with less than 50% of the popular vote. BN’s support was more dispersed among the non-urban seats which meant that it did not win the largest number of votes in any of the 36 state seats in Kedah.

In Kelantan, PN won 41 seats with available data with more than 50% of the popular vote with the only exception being the N9 Kota Lama seat in the heart of the capital city, Kota Bahru, which has almost 1/3 of its voters being non-Malay. It is also likely that the BN would have won the largest number of votes in at least one out of the three state seats in P32 Gua Musang which was won by PAS at the parliamentary level in GE15 with a razor thin margin of 163 votes.

In Terengganu, PN won 19 of the 20 seats with available data with more than 50% of the popular vote. The remaining seat, N21 Telemung, was won by the BN with 50.5% of the popular vote.^[9] It is likely that the polling stream results would have shown PN winning the other 12 state seats in P36 Kuala Terengganu, P37 Marang and P40 Kemamam, given that PN won these parliament seats with 64.8%, 66.5% and 57.5% of the popular vote respectively.

In Penang, PH won 31 out of 40 state seats (5 with less than 50% of the popular vote) while PN won 8 (with 6 with less than 50% of the popular vote), and BN taking only one state seat, with less than 50% of the popular vote.

In Selangor, PH won 40 out of 56 total seats. However, 18 of these seats or 45% of the 40 seats were won with less than 50% of the popular vote. It is probably this calculation which gives PN some confidence that it may be able to win control over the Selangor state assembly in the coming election.

In Negeri Sembilan, PH won 17 seats (5 with less than 50% of the popular vote) while BN won 16 seats (12 with less than 50%). With the PN only having won 3 state seats (all of which with less than 50% of the popular vote), the BN will have to win all of PH’s and BN’s marginal seats for it to take control of Negeri Sembilan, a highly possible achievement, especially given that UMNO managed to preserve its political strength in Negeri Sembilan in GE15 where it won 5 out of 8 parliament seats in the state.

The results in Table 2 above does not take into account what will happen if PH and BN are to avoid three-corner fights in the upcoming state elections. If PH and BN achieve a successful seat negotiation outcome and instead “pool” their resources and voters in a joint campaign, both coalitions can expect better support compared to the GE15 results, especially for candidates from UMNO. A reasonable assumption is that PH voters are much more likely to “transfer” their vote from PH to BN in seats where PH makes way for the BN candidate to face a PN candidate. A projection of between 80% to 100% of vote transferability from PH to BN is used in this article. At the same time, it is reasonable to assume that BN voters, especially those from UMNO, will be more wary of PH candidates, especially those representing the DAP. UMNO supporters may be less likely to support a PH candidate over a PN candidate compared to the likelihood of PH supporters voting for an UMNO candidate.^[10] A projection of between 30% and 70% of vote transferability from BN to PH is used in this article.

Table 3: Three Scenarios of Vote “Pooling” or “Transferability” between PH and BN^[11]

Table 3 above uses three scenarios to project the state election results. Scenario 1 represents a “low” outcome for PH and BN with a low transfer rate of 30% from BN to PH and a relatively low transfer rate of 80% from PH to BN. Scenario 2 represents a “neutral” outcome with a transfer rate of 50% from BN to PH and a 90% transfer rate from PH to BN. Scenario 3 represents a “high” outcome for PH and BN with a 70% transfer rate from BN to PH and a 100% transfer rate from PH to BN. The vote transfer from PH to BN is used in all the state seats won by BN or where BN came second place to PN. The vote transfer from BN to PH is used in all the state seats won by PH or where PH came second place to PN.

How will the projected results in each of the states change under these three Scenarios? The results are summarized in Table 4 below.

Table 4: Projection of state election results under Scenario 1, Scenario 2 and Scenario 3 (using GE15 results as the baseline)

Numbers in parentheses (X) indicate the seats which are projected to be won by the respective coalitions with less than 55% of the popular vote, which is the threshold used to define marginal seats in a contest featuring two parties.

For Kedah, the vote pooling effects has little impact on the projected outcomes calculated in Table 2. Only one extra seat is won by PH^[12] under Scenario 3. This is because the PH vote transfers to BN / UMNO are not sufficient to overcome the advantage achieved by PN in GE15. The attention of PH and BN will likely be on the eight marginal PN seats under Scenario 3 during the state elections.^[13]

In Kelantan, the vote polling effects also have little impact on the projected outcomes. Only under Scenario 3 is PH able to win one state seat (N9 Kota Lama) with the help of sufficient vote transfers from BN / UMNO. The number of marginal PN seats is just limited to one even under Scenario 3.^[14]

In Terengganu, the status quo of PN dominance remains, even under Scenario 3. Only one PN state seat appears marginal under Scenario 3.^[15]

In Penang, under Scenario 1, where more BN votes are transferred to PN than to PH, PN is able to pick up 4 additional state seats (from 8 to 12). BN, meanwhile, is able to pick up one additional state seat (from 1 to 2) while PH is the most negatively impacted, losing 5 state seats in total (from 31 to 26). Under Scenario 2, PH is able to maintain 31 state seats with BN gaining 2 (from 1 to 3) and PN losing 2 (from 8 to 6). Under Scenario 3, PH is able to gain an additional 2 seats (from 31 to 33), with BN winning 3 while PN loses 4 seats (from 8 to 4). The competition in Penang will be in the Malay majority state seats located under the P41 Kepala Batas, P42 Tasek Gelugor, P44 Permatang Pauh, P47 Nibong Tebal, and P53 Balik Pulau parliamentary seats. PH and BN are able to benefit more or less equally from a high transfer of votes under Scenario 3.

In Selangor, it is interesting to note that even under Scenario 1, with a low transfer of votes from BN to PH, PN actually loses one nett seat (from 14 to 13). This is because the relatively high transfer rate of votes from PH to BN helps the latter win an extra 4 seats (from 2 to 6). PH loses nett 3 seats. Under Scenario 3, with a relatively high transfer of votes from BN to PH, the latter is able to increase its number of seats by 2 (from 40 to 43) with BN picking up 5 extra seats (from 2 to 7) and PN losing 8 seats (from 14 to 6). In Selangor, BN is able to benefit more from PH’s support in Malay majority areas where BN still maintains some baseline strength, such as the northern and more rural parts of the state (areas under the parliament seats of P92 Sabak Bernam, P93 Sungai Besar and P95 Tanjong Karang). These projections show that unless PN is able to manufacture a significant swing in the Malay support away from PH and BN in the state, it faces an uphill task to capture control of the state, despite recent assertations by former UMNO state chief, Noh Omar.^[16]

Finally, in Negeri Sembilan, under Scenario 1, PN is only able to increase its number of seats by 2 (from 3 to 5) at PH’s expense (from 17 to 15). Under Scenario 3, PN faces the prospect of being left with no seat won.

CONCLUSION

To conclude Part One, unless there are big swings in favour of either PH-BN or PN among Malay voters (perhaps more likely) or non-Malay voters (much less likely), the anticipated outcome of three states remaining in the PN column (Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu) and three in the PH-BN column (Penang, Selangor and Negeri Sembilan) will be the most likely. The upside for PH-BN is higher because of the potential of higher vote transferability from PH to BN in Penang, Selangor, and Negeri Sembilan and from BN to PH in the same states (but with a lower probability).

Part Two of this article (to be published soon) will discuss the likely campaign strategies and the possible political impact arising from different electoral outcomes.

ENDNOTES

For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• A pre-election survey among Malay voters in Selangor found that there is no significant vote transferability between Pakatan Harapan (PH) and Barisan Nasional (BN). This means that BN Malay voters may not necessarily transfer their votes to PH candidates in the state election, and vice versa, despite the two parties forming a coalition government at the federal level.

• With a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of RM343.5 billion, Selangor is the highest contributor to Malaysia’s GDP and the epicentre of its economic development. As such, the election in the resource-rich state of Selangor will be very competitive and keenly contested by all parties.

• The survey also found that there is greater likelihood that BN Malay voters will transfer their votes to Perikatan Nasional (PN) candidates instead, thus giving it the advantage in the election, especially in 39 Malay-majority seats in the state. A party must win at least 29 out of 56 seats in the state assembly to get a simple majority to form the next state government of Selangor.

• With this latest polling trend, winds of change are blowing in Selangor. Whether or not these winds can sweep PN to an electoral victory in the state depends on how much strength they gather leading up to polling day.

• The survey used a face-to-face interview method, and was conducted by Institut Masa Depan Malaysia from 1 March to 20 April 2023. It collected 1,200 samples across ethnic groups in 39 Malay-majority state seats in Selangor in order to explore the dynamics of voting behaviour with a special focus on vote transferability among Malay voters. This paper examines its sub-sample of 850 Malay voters.

* Guest writers, Marzuki Mohamad is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science, Abdul Hamid Abu Sulayman Kulliyyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences, International Islamic University Malaysia. He is also a trustee of Institut Masa Depan Malaysia (Institut MASA), a local think-tank focusing on social, economic, and political research. Khairul Syakirin Zulkifli is Researcher at Institut MASA.  This article is written in both authors’ personal capacity.

ISEAS Perspective 2023/50, 5 July 2023

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INTRODUCTION

One plus one in politics may not necessarily be equal to two. It could instead be one-and-a-half, or one, or even zero. This unwritten rule in politics applies to political coalitions too. It may not be accurate to assume that the formation of a coalition, especially among rivalled and ideologically incompatible political parties, will benefit those parties in an election. Instead, each party runs the risk of losing their core supporters should there be no vote transferability between them.

By vote transferability we mean that supporters of party A, which forms a coalition with party B, will transfer their votes to party B in an election, and vice versa. If there is full vote transferability, both parties will enjoy net gain in an election. But if there is no vote transferability, there is not much that the parties gain from the collaboration. Or worse, both parties may lose out should their supporters disagree with the coalition and transfer their votes to party C instead.

Political developments in Malaysia after the 15^th general election witnessed the formation of a political coalition comprising rivalled and ideologically incompatible political parties to form a federal Unity Government led by former jailed Opposition Leader and Pakatan Harapan (PH) Chairman Anwar Ibrahim. The post-election arrangement between the leaders of two rival coalitions, PH and Barisan Nasional (BN), has paved the way for the appointment of Anwar as the Prime Minister and BN Chairman, Zahid Hamidi, as the Deputy Prime Minister.[1]

While party elites try to accommodate each other for the sake of forming the government and maintaining stability, the same cannot be said for party grassroots. Within UMNO, the leading component of BN, grouses have been simmering among the conservative Malay party grassroots who questioned the party’s ‘unholy alliance’ with its archrival secular Democratic Action Party (DAP), a leading component of PH, which UMNO has long been accusing of being an anti-Malay party.[2]

As PH and BN will participate in the upcoming state elections as coalition partners, the issue of vote transferability between the two parties has become a vital consideration. Will BN Malay voters transfer their votes to PH candidates, in the event of a straight fight between PH and PN in their constituencies? Or will there be a vote swing to PN candidates instead?

Seeking answers to these questions, we conducted a survey of eligible voters in the crown jewel state of Selangor, with special focus on Malay voters. Selangor is foreseen to be the main battleground in Malaysia’s 2023 state elections. With GDP of RM343.5 billion in 2021, Selangor is the largest state economy in Malaysia, and has been under PH’s rule (formerly Pakatan Rakyat) since 2008.

THE SURVEY’S METHODOLOGY

This survey began on 1 March 2023 and ended on 20 April 2023, and all in all, 1,200 samples were collected.[3] Voters’ demographic profile, spanning across age, ethnicity and gender, is based on the most recent fourth quarter Election Commission electoral roll data. Malays made up 54% of Selangor’s population, Chinese 32%, Indian 13%, and other races 1%. As the focus of this study is to explore the dynamics of Malay voters’ party choices, the ethnic composition for this study was re-adjusted to 69% Malays, 18% Chinese, 12% Indian, and 1% other ethnicities, which approximately reflects voter demography in 39 Malay-majority state constituencies.

The samples collected throughout the selected constituencies stood at 24% rural, 35% urban and 41% semi-urban areas. We also managed to reach out to respondents in the age groups that relatively reflect current voter configurations, i.e., 18-20 years old 8%, 21-35 years old 46%, 36-50 years old 15%, and above 51 years old 31%. We applied the face-to-face interview technique as our data collection method.

KEY FINDINGS OF THE SURVEY

To find out the extent of vote transferability among Malay voters, we asked our Malay respondents the party that they voted for in GE15 and the party that they will vote for in the 2023 state election. We found that 23% of them said they voted for BN, 22% for PH, 31% for PN and 24% refused to answer (See Figure 1).

This finding reflects Bridget Welsh’s GE15 estimate of Malay support for political parties in Selangor, i.e. 23% for BN, 24% for PH and 49% for PN.[4] The only difference is that the Malay support for PN shown in our study is lower than Bridget’s estimate. Taking her estimate as a reference point, we believe that many of our respondents who refused to reveal their party of choice in GE15 could be PN voters.

Figure 1: Parties the Malay respondents voted for in GE15.

The survey saw 39% of Malay voters in Selangor who voted for BN in GE15 saying that they will vote for PN in the upcoming state election if there is a straight fight between PN and PH in their constituency. Only 15% said they will vote for PH (See Figure 2).

This means that there is no significant vote transferability between PH and BN Malay voters in Selangor despite the fact that the two coalitions are partners in the Unity Government at the federal level. On the contrary, a significant percentage of BN and PH Malay voters are more inclined to vote for PN candidates, while many of them turned into “unsure voters”.

Figure 2: Among Malays who voted for BN in the November 2022 general election, how will they vote in a PN vs PH contest in the 2023 Selangor state election?

This means about seven out of ten BN Malay voters who have made up their minds on party choices clearly indicated that they will vote for PN, instead of PH. The survey also found that a whopping 46% of BN Malay voters have fallen into the “unsure voters” category, which indicates BN’s shaky support base at present.

Determining the voting preferences of these “unsure” BN Malay voters is a tricky business. However, historical data and past trends may shed some light on its likelihood. It is an unwritten rule of thumb for Malaysian pollsters to allocate to the opposition parties a greater percentage of those in the “unsure voters” category for a few reasons.

First, these voters might have made up their mind on their party of choice but refused to disclose it for fear of retribution, especially if they are supporting an opposition political party. Second, as these voters voted for BN in the last general election, being “unsure” this time round indicates a shift of support away from the party or its allies.

Therefore, based on historical data and past trends, we estimate that at least 60% of these “unsure” voters are more likely to vote for PN, instead of PH. Furthermore, cross-tabulation of data on party choice, perception of party leaders, government approval rating and agreement or disagreement with the formation of the PH-BN coalition government shows that the majority of the unsure BN Malay voters are pro-PN.

With 39% of the BN Malay voters clearly indicating that they would vote for PN and approximately 60% of those in the “unsure voters” category potentially doing the same, we therefore roughly estimate that at least 67% of BN Malay voters in Selangor will vote for PN in the upcoming state election.

A similar trend could also be observed among PH Malay voters. The study found that, in the event of a straight fight between PN and BN, 29% of Malay voters in Selangor who voted for PH in the last general election intend vote for PN, while 24% will vote for BN and as much as 48% have to be classed under “unsure voters” (See Figure 3).

Figure 3: Among Malays who voted for PH in the November 2022 general election, how will they vote in a PN vs BN contest in the 2023 Selangor state election?

While for PN, its support base among Malay voters remains almost solid. In a straight fight between PN and PH, 87% of Malay voters in Selangor who voted for PN in the last general election said they would vote for PN. Only 8% would vote for PH and 5% were unsure. Similarly, in a straight fight between PN and BN, 88% of them said they would vote for PN. Only 3% said they would vote for BN and 9% were unsure (See Figure 4).

Figure 4: Among Malays who voted for PN in the November 2022 general election, how will they vote in a PN vs PH and PN vs BN contest in the 2023 Selangor state election?

Should this trend continue until polling day, PN will gain more from the ‘swing votes’ it will get from BN and PH voters than the small number of votes it will lose out to those two parties. Furthermore, since quite a significant percentage of BN and PH Malay voters have become ‘unsure’ of their voting preferences, they too are potentially vulnerable to PN’s narratives in the upcoming election.

As a measure of party choices, we also looked at how the Malay voters considered the performance of the federal and state government as well as their perception of key political leaders. The survey found that only 44% of Malay voters in Selangor were satisfied with the performance of the federal Unity Government, and 48% were satisfied with the performance of the state government (See Figure 5).

On the Prime Minister’s approval rating, 43% said they were satisfied with the performance of Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim, compared to 60% who said they were satisfied with the performance of former 8^th Prime Minister, Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin, who is also PN Chairman. BN Chairman and Deputy Prime Minister, Datuk Seri Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, received the lowest approval rating; only 17% said they were satisfied with him (See Figure 6).[5]

Figure 5: Satisfaction Towards the Federal and State Government

Figure 6: Perception of National Leaders’ Performance

On the economy, only 42% were satisfied with the way the federal government has managed the country’s economy, with 57% of them saying their personal income was worse than the previous year. Inflation and the cost of living topped the list of problems faced by the voters at 60%, followed by corruption 7%, infrastructure development 6%, economic development and job opportunities 4% each and political instability, racial rights, and welfare 3% each. On these specific issues, only 20% of Malay voters were satisfied with the way the government handled them (See Figure 7).

Figure 7: Perception of Government’s Effort to Solve Issues Raised by the Respondents

While low vote transferability may make it difficult for the PH-BN coalition to retain power in Selangor, the problem is further complicated by the lack of “performance legitimacy” that is much needed by the PH-BN coalition as an incumbent government. As the federal Unity Government has been facing intense criticisms for its lackluster performance in managing the country’s economy and addressing inflation and cost of living, incumbency can be a liability for PH and its ally, the BN.

WHY IS THERE NO FULL PH-BN VOTE TRANSFERABILITY?

The post-election arrangement between PH and BN to form a coalition government at the federal level, followed by similar arrangements at the state levels, was clouded with possible voter rejection from the very beginning. While PH and BN political elites who stand to gain from the coalition seemed to be comfortable with the arrangement, grouses among party supporters had already been detected long before the two former political archrivals sealed their post-election cooperation.

A national survey conducted by the Merdeka Center for Opinion Research prior to GE15 revealed that only 32% of Malay voters agreed to the formation of a coalition between BN and Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR), while 60% disagreed with the arrangement and 8% are unsure.[6] The findings were an early sign of non-transferability of votes between PH and BN Malay voters.

Malay voters’ rejection of such a coalition seems to be consistent with the findings of our pre-state election survey in Selangor, which shows that most of the BN Malay voters are persistent in their political choice by indicating that they will not transfer their votes to PH. Perhaps as protest against the formation of the coalition, they may transfer their votes to PN instead.

The outcome of the Padang Serai and Tioman by-elections held immediately after the GE15 was also an indication of low vote transferability between PH and BN. The by-elections were the first attempt by PH and BN to contest in an election as a coalition. The PH candidate lost by 16,260 votes to the PN candidate in the Padang Serai parliamentary constituency, which was previously a PH stronghold. The BN candidate won the Tioman state seat by a slim majority of 573 votes.[7]

We believe that negotiations for post-election cooperation had been ongoing between the leaders of the two parties prior to GE15. The decision not to conclude or announce the cooperation prior to the election was a tactical move to avoid the problem of non-transferability of votes between the two parties.

Should the cooperation be announced before the general election, both parties risked losing the support of their core voters and faced a possible electoral defeat. However, the problem that the leaders of the two parties avoided in the GE15 has now come to the fore and must be dealt with in the upcoming state elections. Given the negative Malay voters’ sentiment toward the PH-BN coalition, especially among BN Malay voters, convincing them to vote for PH is an uphill task.

The BN Malay voters’ negative attitude toward the PH-BN coalition is rooted in the dynamics of ethnic politics in Malaysia. As one of the authors of this article has argued in an earlier ISEAS Perspective, ethnicity remains the key factor in determining voting preferences in Malaysia.[8]

Since independence, UMNO has been the linchpin party of the Alliance and later the BN for six decades. UMNO’s narrative of Malay political supremacy against the threat of Chinese dominance in the economy, and subsequently in politics, has been very appealing to the majority of Malays. The Chinese-based Democratic Action Party (DAP), whose ideology is mainly shaped by the Setapak Declaration 1967, which promotes equality of all citizens and rejects the categorization of Malaysians into Bumiputera and non-Bumiputera groups, has been UMNO’s long-time archrival and bogeyman. 

With strong Malay support for UMNO, BN won every general election and emerged as a dominant party in the past. However, Malay support for UMNO has gradually deteriorated since the 12^th general election when it lost its customary two-thirds majority in the Dewan Rakyat followed by its loss of popular votes in the 13^th general election, its electoral defeat to PH in the 14^th general election and its dismal performance in the 15^th general election in winning only 26 seats, the lowest number of parliamentary seats the party has ever won.

The deteriorating Malay support was mainly due to the party’s diminishing “performance legitimacy”. Having been the ruling party for more than five decades, the party was mired in allegations of corruption involving its leaders and failures to address pressing economic problems faced by the people. The 1MDB saga which led to the trial and conviction of former Prime Minister and UMNO President, Datuk Seri Mohd Najib Tun Abdul Razak, on corruption charges, as well as the ongoing corruption trial of the Deputy Prime Minister and UMNO President, Datuk Seri Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, diminished the Malays’ trust in UMNO leadership. To make it worse, internal UMNO politics have since revolved around defending its tainted leaders, which has in turn intensified the negative public perception toward UMNO, created splits among party elites, and weakened the party.

At the same time, the social and economic changes taking place in Malaysia since the 1990s, which marked the end of the New Economic Policy (NEP), eroded UMNO’s role as the sole Malay protector. More and more Malays from villages migrated to urban centers in search of a job, education, and business opportunities, hence uprooting and alienating them from the traditional UMNO’s patronage system.

From the 1990s onwards, the more liberal economic, education and cultural policies adopted by the government as a response to domestic political pressures and the need to compete globally in the age of global capitalism, has gradually reduced Malay dependency on UMNO. The new Malay middle class no longer enjoys the long list of “privileges” and “crutches” provided to the generations before them. They must now pay for their children’s higher education and compete with the non-Malays for government scholarships, entry into public universities is gradually being based on merits rather than race-based quota, and more and more Malays have to face intense competition in the private sector instead of the public sector for better jobs and better pay.

UMNO’s diminishing role in securing economic benefits to the Malays through a wide range of affirmative action policies and addressing their economic plights post-NEP, especially for those in the lower income bracket, has caused the party to gradually lose its performance legitimacy in the eyes of the Malay community. The diehard UMNO supporters who continue to support the party do so solely based on its “race legitimacy”, i.e. psychological and nostalgic reasons relating to a deep appreciation of UMNO’s past struggle for the Malays and the belief that UMNO was the last Malay bastion.[9]

For most UMNO Malays, the feat of non-Malay economic and political superiority is strong and UMNO has been their only hope against such a threat. Therefore, the “NO ANWAR, NO DAP” slogan sat deep in the conservative UMNO Malay psyche in GE15. Anwar represents the non-conservative Malay leader who rejects Malay supremacy as a political ideology, while DAP is UMNO’s long-time political foe whose ideology of racial equality runs counter to UMNO’s core struggle as a Malay party.[10] A recent statement made by former UMNO Secretary-General, Ahmad Maslan, “ordering” the party’s supporters to vote for DAP was internally conflicting and was rejected by several party leaders.[11]

At the very least, the “NO ANWAR, NO DAP” slogan kept the UMNO Malays loyal to the party up to GE15. However, with the party leadership’s decision to form a post-election coalition government with PH, in which its archrival DAP is a dominant coalition member, the conservative UMNO Malays’ trust in the party was crushed. For them, that was like the final nail in UMNO’s coffin. The party’s “race legitimacy”, to which the remaining diehard conservative UMNO Malays still clung, is completely gone.

But these conservative UMNO Malays do not stop there. In the upcoming state elections, they can still make their own choice as voters. Hence, as our survey found, seven out of ten BN Malay voters in Selangor who have made up their minds on party choices, have decided to vote for PN. It seems that PN, led by the pribumi-based BERSATU and the Islamist party PAS, is the natural alternative to BN for the conservative UMNO Malays. PN represents the imagery of Malay and Islamic conservatism that UMNO abandoned by virtue of its cooperation with DAP.

Apart from this, PN’s narrative of good governance, anti-corruption, and care for the people, as shown by the various fiscal and non-fiscal assistance given to the people through the eight economic stimulus packages rolled out during its 17 months in power, captured the imagination of Malay voters and convinced them that PN may be a better alternative to UMNO.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SELANGOR STATE ELECTION

This paper does not attempt to predict election results based on a pre-election survey held two months before the state assembly is dissolved. Instead, we believe that the upcoming state election in Selangor will be very competitive, and the actual results will depend on the campaign narratives of all the parties as well as the candidates and on other local factors.

What this survey can tell us is the general trend that can be observed at the time the survey was conducted. And the general trend is, the support base for PN among Malay voters remains solid, and the party may receive potential swing votes mostly from BN Malay voters and some from PH Malay voters. There is no significant vote transferability between PH and BN among the Malay voters in the crown jewel state of Selangor.

There are 56 seats in the Selangor state assembly, of which 39 are Malay-majority seats and 17 are non-Malay majority seats. The simple majority needed to form the state government is 29 seats.

A simple and straightforward simulation of the GE15 results expects the PH-BN coalition to win the state election by more than a two-thirds majority. However, this may only be true if there is full vote transferability between PH and BN voters. Our survey shows this not to be the case.

This survey suggests that there is a greater de-alignment between voters and UMNO which is primarily contributable to the BN Malay voters’ rejection of the PH-BN cooperation, clash of party ideologies and the existence of rival parties that shared identical ethno-religious roots. Furthermore, with the PH-led Unity Government lacking in visible efforts and policies to address the rising cost of living and to ease inflationary pressures, there is no feel-good factor that incentivizes voters to support the coalition in the election.

With this trend in mind and based on the GE15 election data for all the state constituencies in Selangor, we believe that PN is comfortable in at least 15 Malay-majority seats. We also assume that PH is safe in all the 17 non-Malay majority seats.

Which party will form the next state government in Selangor depends on the outcome of the contest in the remaining 24 Malay-majority seats. Should the swing of BN Malay voters towards PN be strong enough to tilt the balance in PN’s favour, PN will have an advantage over PH or BN in the contest for these seats. Thus, these seats will be keenly contested by all political parties.

CONCLUSION

Forming a workable and stable coalition requires not only elite accommodation, but also a certain degree of acceptance at the grassroots level. As this study shows, against the wishes of the BN party elites, its grassroots’ acceptance of the PH-BN coalition is still highly questionable at this moment. If left unchecked, it will destabilize the coalition in the long run.

With this latest polling trend, the winds of change are blowing in Selangor. Whether or not these winds can sweep PN to an electoral victory in the state depends on how much strength they gather leading up to polling day.

ENDNOTES

For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.

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