2023/93 “The August Poll in Penang: A Perspective on Pakatan, its Partners and its Prospects” by Francis E. Hutchinson
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- In the August 2023 state election in Penang, Pakatan Harapan (PH) and its former foe Barisan Nasional (BN), secured a much-needed win for the Unity Government (UG).
- The UG won 29 of the state’s 40 seats, which was slightly below its target of 30-32, but enough to secure the psychologically-important two-thirds majority in the assembly.
- While the UG retained Penang, its victory was partial. The results show that the UG’s hold on Malay-majority seats was significantly eroded, leaving it almost exclusively dependent on non-Malay voters for support.
- PH’s campaign also exposed internal fissures and questionable candidate choices within its component parties – notably the Democratic Action Party (DAP).
- PH’s former foe and current campaign companion, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), also underperformed. The UG’s new-found cooperation did not bear fruit, with UMNO winning a mere two seats – one by a whisker.
- Despite internal fissures, the opposition coalition Perikatan Nasional (PN) performed well, securing an unprecedented 11 seats. These were mostly in the northern and rural Malay-majority part of the mainland, but also included a vital foothold on the island.
- The pattern in Penang shows that, as with the country at large, the Unity Government has a good grip on the tiller, but the vessel is listing to one side. Unless concerted action is invested to right the ship, keeping a straight course will be challenging.
* Francis E. Hutchinson is Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Malaysia Studies Programme at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. The author would like to thank Rebecca Neo for drafting the maps used in this Perspective, as well as Xinying Chan, James Chai, and Lee Hwok Aun for their comments.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/93, 23 November 2023
INTRODUCTION
Penang, like five other states in Malaysia, headed to the polls on August 12. Rather than holding their elections in November 2022 in tandem with parliamentary polls, three states helmed by Pakatan Harapan (PH) and three led by Perikatan Nasional (PN) decided to go to their full terms. This cluster of elections was billed as a crucial barometer for the Anwar Ibrahim administration.
The state is one of PH’s electoral heartlands, which the coalition has held since 2008. As with Selangor, Penang has been vital for PH, serving as a showcase for policy initiatives as well as a platform to prepare aspiring party members for national office.
With a population of 1.8 million, Penang is one of Malaysia’s smaller states. It is highly urbanized and wealthy, with a per capita income 25 per cent above the national average. Penang is diverse, with large Bumiputera (45.2 per cent), Chinese (44.5 per cent), and Indian (9.7 per cent) communities.[1]
Of PH’s component parties, the Democratic Action Party (DAP) has the strongest connection with Penang. National leaders such as Lim Guan Eng (Bagan) and Steven Sim (Bukit Mertajam) have parliamentary constituencies in the state, and Lim Kit Siang (Tanjong) and the late Karpal Singh (Jelutong and Bukit Gelugor) served as MPs for Penang in the past. The state is also important for Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) – particularly Anwar Ibrahim who has a four-decade association with the Permatang Pauh parliamentary seat.
Despite PH’s incumbency in the state and its dominant performance in the 2013 and 2018 elections, results from the 2022 parliamentary election showed that the coalition was vulnerable in Malay-majority seats, particularly in the northern part of the mainland. BN and its lead party, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), were in an even more precarious position with scant prospects of winning more than one or two seats.
Given the short interval between the 2022 parliamentary and 2023 state polls, observers expected a broadly similar performance on August 12. While the UG was expected to retain Penang, what was in question was the size of its majority in the state assembly. Party leaders also looked for indications that PH’s partnership with UMNO translated into increased Malay support. And observers sought to establish whether PN’s momentum from November 2022 would allow it to make inroads in the state.
Drawing on trends in voting behaviour as well as fieldwork during the campaign period, this Perspective will examine the results of the August 2023 elections in Penang.[2] After this introduction, the second part will set out key aspects of the state’s political context. The third will look at the campaigns and electoral strategies employed by the UG and PN. The fourth will analyse the results, and the final section will look at the implications.
BACKGROUND
Over the past decades, Penang’s urbanized and diverse population has been open to political competition. Indeed, Penang fell to an opposition party, Gerakan in the 1969 election. However, the party subsequently joined BN in 1972 in the wake of the 1969 racial riots.[3] This alliance enabled BN to recapture the state and retain control until 2008. Despite its hold on power, BN usually tracked about 10 percentage points lower in Penang than the national average during this period (Figure One).
Figure One
In 2008, the swing away from BN in urban and ethnically-mixed seats saw PH’s precursor Pakatan Rakyat securing 29 out of 40 seats in the state assembly.[4] Following that, Pakatan Rakyat and then PH went from strength to strength, securing 30 seats in 2013 and 37 in 2018.[5]
However, the coalition’s 2018 results turned out to be its electoral pinnacle as, following the Sheraton Move, it lost four seats.[6]
Six parliamentary and 19 state seats are on the island, while seven parliamentary and 21 state seats are on the mainland (Figure Two). With one exception, every parliamentary constituency contains three state seats.[7] Reflecting Penang’s ethnic diversity, there are 25 non-Malay majority state seats, of which 15 are in the northeastern aspect of the island in and around the capital George Town. The other ten seats are on the mainland in the larger urban centres of Perai and Bukit Mertajam, and then in a strip southwards along the coast.
There are five Malay-majority and ten Malay super-majority seats. The Malay-majority seats are in three locations. Two seats, Batu Maung and Bayan Lepas are on the more rural southern coast of the island. The other three are on the mainland, with two (Sungai Bakap and Sungai Acheh) on the border with Perak in the south, and another, Teluk Ayar Tawar, in the north. The remaining ten Malay super-majority seats are grouped in two locations. Eight are clustered in the northern aspect of the mainland, and two are on the westernmost aspect of the island.
Figure Two. State Seats by Ethnicity (2023)
The DAP has performed strongly in Penang, running in and continuously securing strong majorities in the same 19 seats since 2008. These include seats in and around George Town, as well as on the mainland in urban centres such as Bagan and Bukit Mertajam.
PKR has also had a consistent presence in the state. First securing nine seats in 2008, the party then won 10 seats in 2013 and 14 in 2018. PKR is present in a more diverse range of constituencies than DAP, with some ethnically-mixed seats in urban areas as well as Malay-majority seats on the mainland and the island.
The third PH component party, Amanah, made its debut in Penang in 2018, securing two rural, Malay-majority seats.
UMNO has had a consistent presence in Penang – usually securing 10 to 12 seats in each election. These include the state seats within the Kepala Batas parliamentary seat, associated with Abdullah Badawi, Malaysia’s fifth prime minister. UMNO has also performed well in the state seats within Tasek Gelugor parliamentary constituency, as well as on the western aspect of the island. However, following its electoral drubbing in 2018, UMNO was left with only two state seats in Tasek Gelugor (Sungai Dua and Permatang Berangan).
Conversely, PAS has traditionally had little electoral traction in the state. It won one seat in each election from 1999 to 2018, usually in the central (Permatang Pasir) and northern part (Penaga) of the mainland. Bersatu won its first two seats, Bertam and Telok Bahang, in 2018. These seats are also Malay-majority and more rural in character.
In the November 2022 parliamentary election, PH did well, retaining 10 out of its 11 parliamentary seats. PN secured three parliamentary seats, all in the northern part of the mainland, including UMNO’s Kepala Batas and Tasek Gelugor, as well as Permatang Pauh, that had been held by Anwar Ibrahim’s daughter, Nurul Izzah.
Looking at voting patterns at the state seat level, PH prevailed in 29 seats – of which 26 were by more than a 5,000-vote majority. Assuming similar voting patterns in the August 2023 polls, PH was comfortably on course to retain power. However, the coalition looked vulnerable in Malay-majority seats such as Seberang Jaya, Bayan Lepas, and Pulau Betong. The results also indicated that UMNO was in dire straits, with this once-dominant party only securing a majority of votes in one seat – Bertam.
Figure Three
Conversely, these results indicated that PN would have won 10 state seats, largely at the expense of UMNO and PKR.[8] However, not all wins were convincing, and PN prevailed in four seats by margins of less than 1,000 votes.
THE COALITIONS AND THEIR CAMPAIGNS
PH leaders dissolved the Penang state assembly on June 28. The Election Commission then set July 29 as nomination day, with the election scheduled for August 12.
Despite being a state government election, its framing as part of a referendum on the Anwar Ibrahim administration meant that the campaigns in Penang blended local and national issues, with senior political figures from both coalitions heavily involved in events.
The Unity Government
The UG’s manifesto and candidate line-up were announced on August 1 in Butterworth on the mainland. High-profile PH leaders attended campaign events in the state, not least Anwar Ibrahim and Nurul Izzah from PKR, Mujahid Yusof Rawa from Amanah, and Anthony Loke from DAP.[9]
Several key themes permeated UG ceramahs and campaign events, including:
- The PH government’s track record of economic management of the state, notably attracting an estimated RM 200 billion in approved manufacturing investment since 2008.[10]
- The desirability of continued political stability in the state and country, which would enable continued foreign investment – with recent investments by Tesla and Infineon cited as examples.[11]
- The importance of having the same coalition in power at the federal and state levels, which would facilitate the funding of key projects, such as Penang’s Light Rail Transport.[12]
The Unity Government’s manifesto focussed on the state’s economic competitiveness, as well as large-ticket infrastructure projects in the pipeline such as the LRT, high interchanges, and a cable car (Table One). The Manifesto also stressed livelihoods, cost-of-living issues, housing, and allocations for both Muslim and non-Muslim communities.
Given its incumbency, but cognizant of PN’s momentum, PH’s target was 30-32 seats in the assembly.[13] The apportionment of seats between PH component parties was straightforward. Both the DAP and Amanah retained the same 19 and 2 seats, respectively, and PKR kept 13 out of its 14 seats.
However, discussions between PH and BN prior to the campaign were fraught. Given PH’s haul of 37 seats in 2018, there were few seats to cede to BN. UMNO’s original intention was to secure seats for itself first, before discussing possibilities for its BN partners, MCA and MIC. UMNO initially sought ten seats for itself but PH offered four.[14] The end result was that UMNO would be allocated six seats, and MCA and MIC declared that they would not contest the elections.[15]
The seats that UMNO was allocated included its two, plus the three seats that PAS and Bersatu won in 2018. In addition, PKR ceded Sungai Acheh, which it won in 2018 but subsequently lost following the Sheraton Move. UMNO also wanted one state seat within the Permatang Pauh parliamentary seat, arguing that its membership base in the area would be an asset for campaigns in all three state seats.[16] However, this request was not granted. Despite the intense negotiations, there appeared to be little overt dissatisfaction on either side after this, with joint walkabouts and grassroots meetings beginning in June.[17]
Surprisingly, the Penang state election raised a considerable degree of tension within the DAP, belying its reputation as a disciplined party.[18] There were rumours whether the incumbent Chief Minister Chow Kon Yeow would seek a second term or if his predecessor, Lim Guan Eng, would seek to return. The second possibility was precluded by a 2018 amendment to the state constitution that barred any assemblyperson from seeking a third term as CM.[19] Consequently, the focus shifted to whether Lim would seek to topple Chow or stack the incoming state cabinet with his supporters. Chow’s confirmation as the CM candidate came rather late – only in mid-July after the state assembly had been dissolved.[20]
This tension affected the candidate selection process. The DAP fielded eight new candidates in its line-up. Five of those dropped were members of the previous state cabinet, and included three veteran assemblypersons, notably: P Ramasamy (Deputy Chief Minister); Chong Eng (Social Development and non-Islamic Religious Affairs); and Phee Boon Poh (Welfare and Environment).[21]
The official argument was that the party was seeking to field younger candidates.[22] However, two of the state cabinet members that were dropped, Yeoh Soon Hin (Tourism and Creative Economy) and Soon Lip Chee (Youth and Sports) were relatively young. Furthermore, a one-term state assembly person, Satees Muniandy (Bagan Dalam) was also dropped, and a local councillor tipped to replace Ramasamy in Perai was bypassed.[23] Eyebrows were also raised by Lim’s decision to retain his Air Putih state seat, despite his previous three terms as an assemblyman and his concurrent status as MP for Bagan.[24]
Perikatan Nasional
Cognizant of the state’s ethnic diversity as well as Gerakan’s long tenure in Penang, PN approached the election somewhat differently. There was less airtime given to national-level figures such as PAS President Hadi Awang and Bersatu Chairman Muhyiddin Yassin, or direct comparisons to the states under PN.[25] Much of the messaging was by Gerakan party president, Dominic Lau, and kept a clear focus on economic issues as opposed to religious and cultural ones.
Key themes included the following:
- PH’s administration of the state, notably the degree to which economic policy benefited investors and foreign workers at the expense of locals, as well as the disparity in development between the island and the mainland.[26]
- Governance issues, with PH’s commitment to anti-corruption being questioned, given its alliance with UMNO, as well as the degree to which Malays had positions of responsibility in the state cabinet.[27]
- The PN manifesto for Penang had 33 pledges across eight areas, but was noticeably silent on religious issues, instead devoting considerable attention to livelihood and environmental issues (Table One).
Given PH’s long hold on the state, expectations of PN’s performance were modest. PN Chairman Muhyiddin Yassin targeted some 20 seats, but other estimates were more circumspect, normally around 10-12 seats.[28]
Inter-party negotiations were complex. Gerakan was allocated 19 seats for its candidates. While this was the most among PN member parties, they were almost all in very hostile terrain, namely non-Malay majority seats. Questions were raised by Bersatu and PAS about Gerakan’s capacity to manage the campaign and field sufficient candidates of electable quality – with party president Dominic Lau being a notable exception.[29] Bersatu ran in 11 seats, of which three were contested by representatives from their non-Malay supporter’s wing. PAS contested in 10 seats, and also fielded 3 non-Muslim candidates. Relative to Gerakan, the other two parties were on much more favourable terrain, running in Malay-majority seats.
Conscious of Gerakan’s limited electoral viability and reluctant to name a Bersatu or PAS member who could potentially alienate voters, PN did not name a candidate for Chief Minister. This allowed PH and UMNO to attack PN for its ambiguity and also ask if Gerakan was really the lead party in the coalition and if it would be able to control PAS.[30]
The pertinence of these questions was raised by tensions between PAS and Gerakan. Dominic Lau requested Bayan Lepas, a Malay-majority seat on the island, whose demographic composition made it more electorally viable. However, grassroots PAS leaders in the area strenuously objected, arguing that their party should have the seat.
Gerakan ultimately prevailed, but subsequently spilled out. Lau attended a PN campaign event to pay his respects to PAS president Hadi Awang, but was turned away.[31] PAS leaders ultimately apologized,[32] but still did not commit to helping Lau campaign in his seat.[33] PH leaders argued that PN’s commitment to multiculturalism was not genuine and Gerakan was not a fully-fledged member of the coalition.[34]
RESULTS
Despite fears that the turnout would be low, an estimated 72.7 per cent of eligible voters went to the polls in Penang. PH secured 27 seats and UMNO, 2. While slightly below the pre-election target, this was still above a two-thirds majority in the assembly.
Of the PH parties, the DAP did the best, retaining all of its 19 seats. Most of these larger urban seats were retained with majorities above 7,000, and three (Payu Terubong, Batu Lancang, and Sungai Puyu) won by some 20,000 votes or more. With this, the party cemented its stronghold on the state’s urban and mixed seats.
PKR did not fare so well, losing 6 out of its 13 seats. As with DAP, it did very well in ethnically-mixed seats such as Machang Bubuk, Batu Uban, and Bukit Tambun, which it secured with majorities above 15,000. However, it fared markedly less well in Malay-majority seats such as Pinang Tunggal, as well as its two seats within Permatang Pauh (Seberang Jaya and Penanti), where it was swept from power. Amanah also had a middling performance, retaining only one of its seats (Bayan Lepas) against Gerakan and losing the other (Permatang Pasir) to PAS.[35]
For UMNO, the polls were borderline disastrous. The party won just two seats, Bertam and Sungai Acheh – the second by a mere 124 votes. UMNO’s hold on its northern redoubt was hollowed out, and its performance in Bertam was arguably due to Reezal Merican’s stature as a former cabinet member and extensive personal networks in the seat. The other high-profile candidate, Sheik Hussein Mydin, was beaten in Sungai Dua by the PAS Penang leader, Fauzi Yusoff by more than 5,500 votes.
Given its low base, PN’s performance was strong, with the coalition netting 11 seats. PAS and Bersatu accounted for seven and four seats respectively, with Gerakan losing all its contests. Most of PN’s seats are located in the mainland’s north in the parliamentary seats of Kepala Batas, Tasek Gelugor, and Permatang Pauh. However, in contrast to the voting patterns seen in November 2022, PN secured two seats on the island (Pulau Betong and Telok Bahang), indicating a more pervasive presence of PAS’s grassroots network in that area than previously thought.[36]
There was very little traction for third-party candidates, with none registering more than 1,000-1,500 votes and having little to no influence on the outcome.
Figure Four. Penang State Election – Seats by Winning party
THE OUTLOOK
Although it witnessed an important decrease in the size of its majorities in the respective assemblies, PH ultimately retained control of its three states in the August 2022 election. Coupled with the UG’s sizeable majority in parliament, it is likely that the Anwar Ibrahim administration will last a full term.
In Penang, a refreshed state cabinet has been sworn in, including two new Deputy Chief Ministers, Mohamad Abdul Hamid (PKR), and Jagdeep Singh Deo (DAP).[37] UMNO was brought into the cabinet through offering one of its assemblymen, Rashidi Zinol, the trade, entrepreneurial, and rural development portfolio.
That said, there are several lingering issues facing the re-elected state administration.
First, the doubts pertaining to Chow Kon Yeow’s hold on the Chief Minister’s position kindled by the campaign have persisted. Despite PH’s victory, rumours about Chow being replaced by the party leadership have continued, sapping his political capital.[38]
Moreover, the fallout for the DAP from the candidate selection process has rumbled on. Three of the dropped candidates came out publicly to criticize the internal workings of the party, particularly the centralisation of power. The former DCM, P. Ramasamy, has since quit the DAP and taken up quite a critical stance vis-à-vis the party as well as PH’s commitment to reform.[39] His departure was followed by other DAP members, some of whom have questioned the degree to which the needs and concerns of Indian voters are adequately dealt with.[40] Over the long-term, this could provide ammunition for opposition-led campaigns vis-a-vis Indian voters.
More widely, the UG is vulnerable to charges that it is not sufficiently representative. Of its 29 seats, 25 are non-Malay majority. PKR and Amanah secured but one Malay-majority seat each, namely Batu Maung and Bayan Lepas. UMNO has also not been able to significantly bolster the UG’s stable of seats. Conversely, the UG’s hold on the state is underpinned by PN’s non- performance in non-Malay majority seats – of which all remain with PH.
More widely, PH’s strategic compact with BN is a mixed bag. Beyond the scant electoral terrain and the nominal boost to representativity afforded by the alliance, the association with UMNO left PH vulnerable regarding issues pertaining to corruption and good governance.
While the UG’s hold over Penang, Selangor, and Negri Sembilan looks secure for now, the Anwar Ibrahim administration’s honeymoon is now over, and the Prime Minister and his coalition remain vulnerable regarding issues as they pertain to Malay voters. He will need to invest political capital decisively in the months ahead.
APPENDIX
Table One. Highlights of the UG and PN Manifestos
| Unity Government | Perikatan Nasional | |
| Welfare and Socio-Economic Wellbeing | Social Development Fund for needy groups financed by a levy on medical tourism | RM60 million in payments for vulnerable groups |
| Public Transport | Light Rail Transit (LRT) Newly-launched ferry service Highway interchanges Cable car system in Bukit Bendera. | Against the LRT, proposing an Autonomous Rail Transit |
| Economic Development | Scaled-down Penang South Island to house high value-added industries High Tech Park in Bertam Medi-tech Centre in Batu Kawan Global Business Services Centre | Against Penang South Island due to its potential impact on livelihoods RM3.5 million to promote tourism Develop a Penang Medical City Promote traditional and alternative medicine |
| Livelihoods | Payments to delivery and taxi drivers Microcredit scheme for small-scale entrepreneurs | RM10 million in microcredit for SMEs RM5 million for upgrading equipment and boats for fishermen Payments to delivery, taxi, and trishaw drivers |
| Education | RM60 million for government-aided schools Scholarships and laptops for B40 members | RM14 million in funding for religious and vernacular schools, Payments and scholarships for students RM1 million for parent-teacher associations |
| Skills Development | Establish a technical and vocational education institution to train 20,000 workers | RM1.5 million for industrial training |
| Housing | 220,000 affordable houses 100,000 of these for low-income families 22,000 rent-to-own units | Increasing the supply of houses under RM100,000 |
| Governance | Digital Service Centre to improve customer service in state government constituencies | Development of apps to improve service delivery in state government constituencies Youth leadership programme |
| Religion | Assistance to B40 members to perform the Hajj RM20 million for religious schools RM10 million for non-Islamic places of worship (up to 2028) | |
| Civil Society | RM2 million annual grant to NGOs | |
| Environment and Water | RM100 million for flood mitigation RM1 billion for water supply | RM5 million for upgrading reservoirs RM5 million for rehabilitating rivers Planting 1 million trees |
Table Two. Seats that Flipped
| State Code | State Name | Ethnic Composition | Winning Party 2018 | Winning Party 2023 |
| N02 | Bertam | M(68.9) C(21.8) I(8.7) | Bersatu | UMNO |
| N03 | Pinang Tunggal | M(78.8) C(17.1) I(3.7) | PKR | PAS |
| N04 | Permatang Berangan | M(86.7) C(6.3) I(6.6) | UMNO | PAS |
| N05 | Sungai Dua | M(81.1) C(16.0) I(2.4) | UMNO | PAS |
| N06 | Telok Ayar Tawar | M(64.8) C(23.8) I(10.1) | PKR | Bersatu |
| N10 | Seberang Jaya | M(68.5) C(18.3) I(12.1) | PKR | Bersatu |
| N11 | Permatang Pasir | M(75.4) C(22.1) I(2.1) | Amanah | PAS |
| N12 | Penanti | M(79.8) C(17.8) I(1.7) | PKR | Bersatu |
| N20 | Sungai Bakap | M(59.4) C(22.5) I(17.4) | PKR | PAS |
| N21 | Sungai Acheh* | M(63.8) C(27.7) I(7.6) | PKR | UMNO |
| N39 | Pulau Betong | M(66.3) C(28.4) I(4.3) | PKR | PAS |
* This seat was ceded from PKR to UMNO.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2023/92 “Myanmar-Russia Relations Since the Coup: An Ever Tighter Embrace” by Ian Storey
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Myanmar-Russia relations have strengthened considerably since Moscow acknowledged the Tatmadaw’s seizure of power on 1 February 2021, and the junta endorsed the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022.
- Coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing views Russia as the ruling State Administration Council’s (SAC) preferred major power partner.
- Russia is now Myanmar’s largest source of military assistance. The Tatmadaw relies heavily on Russian-made aircraft to suppress anti-SAC forces.
- Myanmar is the only Southeast Asian country to transfer military supplies to the Russian armed forces for use in occupied areas of Ukraine.
- Naypyidaw seeks cooperation with Moscow to resolve the country’s energy crisis by importing Russian oil and partnering with Russian energy companies to exploit the country’s hydrocarbon reserves and develop renewable energy sources including wind, hydro and nuclear.
- The SAC wants Russia to provide Myanmar with nuclear power by transferring small modular reactors. Naypyidaw’s atomic power ambitions have renewed fears that the junta seeks to acquire nuclear weapons, despite the absence of solid evidence.
- While China remains Myanmar’s most important source of trade and investment, the SAC and the Kremlin have agreed to boost commerce and tourism.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/92, 21 November 2023
* Ian Storey is Senior Fellow and co-editor of Contemporary Southeast Asia at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.
INTRODUCTION
In February 2023, Myanmar and Russia marked the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties. For most of that period, relations have been insubstantial. It was only in the 2010s that the two countries began to move closer together, primarily due to the Myanmar military’s (Tatmadaw) growing preference for Russian-made arms over Chinese-manufactured equipment. Since the Tatmadaw seized power in a coup on 1 February 2021, and Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the two countries have entered into a much tighter embrace. In the face of international disapprobation and Western sanctions, Naypyidaw and Moscow have forged closer diplomatic and political ties and moved to deepen military and economic cooperation.
Nearly three years on from the coup, Myanmar has become the second most important country for Russia in Southeast Asia after Vietnam. For Myanmar, although China remains its largest source of trade and investment, Russia is the junta’s preferred major power partner. Significantly, Russia was the only major power to acknowledge the Tatmadaw’s 2021 power grab, while Myanmar was the only ASEAN member state to endorse Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine and to send military supplies to Russia’s armed forces.
This article focuses on the four main areas of Myanmar-Russia cooperation since the coup: diplomatic validation; defence; energy; and commerce and tourism.
MUTUAL DIPLOMATIC VALIDATION
On 1 February 2021, the Tatmadaw ousted the democratically-elected government of the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi. Senior NLD leaders were detained on trumped up charges and a state of emergency was declared. Coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing appointed himself chairman of the State Administration Council (SAC) and later prime minister of a provisional government. The junta used violence to suppress anti-SAC protests, which ultimately escalated into a civil war that has engulfed every part of the country.
The coup elicited international condemnation. Western countries denounced the takeover and imposed sanctions on SAC leaders. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) also condemned the coup. Min Aung Hlaing attended a special ASEAN leaders’ meeting in Jakarta where he reluctantly accepted a Five-Point Consensus (FPC) designed to end the escalating violence and encourage political dialogue among all parties. However, the SAC refused to take the initiative seriously, leading ASEAN to ban SAC officials from attending the organisation’s high-level meetings. China, which had established close ties with the Tatmadaw following an earlier coup in 1988, was taken aback by the putsch and did not immediately recognise the SAC’s authority. Although Beijing has sought to protect its sizeable economic interests in Myanmar, politically, it has kept the SAC at arm’s length. Min Aung Hlaing himself appears to view China with distrust, especially its close relations with several Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) which have been in conflict with the central government for decades. Since seizing power, the SAC Chairman has not visited China nor met with any senior Chinese leaders. When Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Bagan to attend a foreign ministers’ meeting of the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Forum in July 2022 he pointedly did not travel to Naypyidaw to see the SAC chairman.[1] Beijing did not invite Min Aung Hlaing to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Summit in Beijing in October 2023, even though China has financed a number of major BRI projects in Myanmar.[2] The SAC’s relations with Beijing have deteriorated since a coalition of EAOs launched a sustained military offensive against the Tatmadaw in late October in northern Shan State, blocking trade routes to China.[3]
In sharp contrast, the Kremlin viewed the 2021 coup as a golden opportunity to advance Russia’s interests in Myanmar, particularly arms sales which have fallen in other Southeast Asian countries, particularly Vietnam.[4] Moscow moved quickly to consolidate relations with the SAC by utilising strong personal connections between the two countries’ military leaders. After his appointment as commander-in-chief of the armed forces in 2011, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing visited Russia on several occasions, during which he forged a good rapport with Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and his deputy Colonel-General Alexander Fomin. A few weeks after the coup, Fomin travelled to Myanmar and was the highest-ranking foreign dignitary to attend the Armed Forces Day parade in Naypyidaw on 27 March.[5]
In a clear indication of the position Russia occupies in the hierarchy of the SAC’s foreign relations, three of the four overseas trips Min Aung Hlaing has undertaken since the coup have been to Russia: to Moscow, Kazan and Irkutsk in June 2021;[6] Moscow again in July 2022;[7] and Vladivostok and Irkutsk in September 2022.[8] Min Aung Hlaing has used these visits to convey the impression that Myanmar is not internationally isolated, to cement relations with the Kremlin leadership (though he has only met President Vladimir Putin once, on his third trip[9]) and to promote bilateral cooperation in areas such as defence, energy and trade. The SAC chairman has repeatedly praised Putin as a leader,[10] and expressed his gratitude to the Kremlin for its assistance since the coup, including the supply of Russia’s Sputnik COVID-19 vaccine.[11] In a media interview during his first trip to Moscow as SAC chairman, he pointedly referred to Russia as Myanmar’s “forever friend”, relegating China and India to the rank of “close friends”.[12]
To reciprocate the Kremlin’s solidarity following the coup, the SAC immediately endorsed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, significantly the only ASEAN member state to do so.[13] However, as Myanmar’s NLD-appointed ambassador to the United Nations was able to retain his position due to support from the United States (with no objection from China or Russia), Myanmar has consistently voted for UN General Assembly resolutions condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The exiled National Unity Government (NUG) – composed of ousted NLD parliamentarians and representatives from various ethnic groups – has also denounced Russian aggression.[14] Kremlin leaders have repeatedly expressed their appreciation for the SAC’s criticism of Western sanctions and for “understanding” its rationales for invading Ukraine.[15] Moscow agrees with Naypyidaw that anti-SAC resistance fighters are “terrorists” while Naypyidaw accepts the Kremlin’s narrative that Ukrainian forces are “terrorists” (leading some of ASEAN’s dialogue partners to boycott meetings of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus experts working group on counter-terrorism, which is co-chaired by Myanmar and Russia).[16]
Russia has helped provide Myanmar with other opportunities to break out of its diplomatic isolation. As Myanmar’s relations with ASEAN have soured due to the SAC’s failure to implement the FPC, the junta has looked to associate itself with other multilateral forums, especially those in which Russia (and China) play key roles. These include the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), to which Myanmar became a dialogue partner in September 2022.[17] The Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) grouping agreed this year to accept new members starting from 2024, and Myanmar is expected to submit a formal membership application soon. The SCO and BRICS not only provide Myanmar with alternative diplomatic options to ASEAN, but are also viewed by the SAC as potentially important avenues of economic cooperation. Myanmar has courted investments from SCO members in its energy sector and seeks access to financial loans through the BRICS’ New Development Bank.[18] Myanmar has also expressed an interest in forging closer ties with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), presumably with a view to negotiating a free trade agreement (as Vietnam and Singapore did in 2015 and 2019, respectively).[19]
Russia and Myanmar have also initiated cooperation in areas that support each other’s authoritarian rule. Moscow has voiced support for the SAC’s plans to hold legislative elections (probably in 2025), which Western countries have already derided as a sham.[20] In May 2023, the election bodies of Myanmar and Russia signed an MOU on electoral cooperation.[21] In an effort to counter negative reporting about Myanmar and Russia in the international press, in September 2023 Russia’s state-owned news agency Sputnik signed a content-sharing agreement with the SAC’s mouthpiece The Global New Light Of Myanmar.[22]
THE DEFENCE NEXUS
In the 1990s, China became Myanmar’s main weapons supplier. Under Western sanctions, and with Russia’s defence industrial sector in disarray following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Tatmadaw had few other choices. However, by the early 2000s the junta had moved to diversify its arms imports away from China, both because of dissatisfaction with the quality and reliability of Chinese-made equipment and as part of an overall policy aimed at reducing the country’s dependence on Beijing. Russia was the main beneficiary of this policy. In the 2000s, Myanmar purchased Russian-made MiG-29 Fulcrum multi-role jet fighters, Mi-35 attack helicopters and Mi-17 transport helicopters.[23] These formidable aircraft enabled the Myanmar Air Force (MAF) to step up attacks on EAOs along the country’s periphery, including in the Kachin, Kayin, Shan and Chin States that had been in conflict with the central government for decades.[24]
Myanmar’s defence ties with Russia moved into a higher gear following the appointment of General Min Aung Hlaing as commander-in-chief of the armed forces in 2011. He not only considers Russian weapon systems to be superior to Chinese equipment but also distrusts Beijing’s intentions in Myanmar, especially its close ties with several EAOs. Between 2013 and 2020, Min Aung Hlaing visited Russia four times, forming close personal bonds with the Russian armed forces’ senior leadership. Even during the NLD’s six years in office (2015-21), defence cooperation remained the mainstay of Myanmar-Russia relations. Between 2017 and 2021, the Tatmadaw placed orders with Russia for a significant quantity of military hardware, including 22 Yak-130 light-combat aircraft, six SU-30MK Flanker fighter jets, 20 BRDM-2 armoured reconnaissance vehicles, Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missiles and Orlan-10E surveillance drones.[25]
Since the military takeover, Myanmar’s defence cooperation with Russia has become even more vital. As civil war has engulfed Myanmar, and conflict has spread from the periphery to the Burmese heartland, the SAC has lost control over large parts of the country and suffered heavy combat losses. In response, the Tatmadaw has been forced to become more reliant on air power to counter anti-SAC resistance forces, including the armed wing of the NUG, the People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) and various EAOs. MAF fighter jets have targeted NUG-aligned administration centres and local service providers, including schools, clinics and displaced persons camps. Air strikes against civilian targets have led to numerous atrocities.[26] For example, on 11 April, the MAF attacked the opening ceremony of an NUG administration office in Pazigyi village in the Sagaing region, killing 170 civilians including 40 children.[27] According to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights Situation in Myanmar, Tom Andrews, and various NGOs that monitor the conflict in Myanmar, the majority of MAF air strikes have been carried out using military aircraft from Russia and China, especially the former.[28] In particular, the MAF has relied heavily on its Yak-130s and Mi-35s, including in the attack on Pazigyi village.[29] Andrews has accused Russia and China of being complicit in probable war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated by the SAC.[30]
Both Russia and China have resisted calls to impose an international ban on arms sales to Myanmar. On 18 June 2021, Russia joined with China in abstaining from a vote on a non-binding resolution at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) calling for member states to cease all arms transfers to Myanmar.[31] The SAC rejected the vote (adopted by 119 countries) as interference in its internal affairs. To underscore his scorn for the UNGA resolution, a few days after the vote, Min Aung Hlaing travelled to Russia and visited the headquarters of the state-run arms exporter Rosoboronexport in Moscow, the production facilities of the Kazan Helicopter Company in Kazan, and the United Aircraft Corporation in Irkutsk, the makers of Sukhoi fast jets.[32] Over the past two years, Myanmar and Russia have exchanged numerous high-level defence delegations.
Since the coup, Russia has displaced China to become the largest provider of military assistance to Myanmar. According to the Swedish think tank SIPRI, between 2021 and 2022, Russia provided Myanmar with US$276 million in military supplies, compared to US$156 million from China.[33] The UN estimates that during the same period, Russian commercial entities transferred US$406 million in defence supplies to Myanmar, with China in second place at US$267 million.[34] It should be noted, however, that the SAC and Russia have not signed any new big defence contracts since the coup.
The SAC has shown its appreciation for the Kremlin’s military support in two ways. First, and most importantly, the junta has returned the favour. In early 2023, the head of Ukraine’s military intelligence, Lieutenant-General Kyrylo Budanov, revealed that Moscow had requested military supplies from a number of countries using Russian-made weaponry, including Myanmar, to make up for equipment shortfalls which were hampering its combat operations in Ukraine.[35] A few months later, it was reported that Russian tank manufacturer Uralvagonzavod had imported optical targeting systems from Myanmar to upgrade T-72 tanks which had been taken out of storage, refurbished and sent to the frontline in Ukraine to make up for the Russian army’s huge tank losses.[36] The spare parts had been provided by Uralvagonzavod to the Myanmar army for its own T-72 tanks which it had purchased from Ukraine in the early 2000s.[37] In July, reports emerged that Russian forces were using 120mm mortar rounds manufactured in Myanmar.[38] While the SAC’s transfer of munitions and spare parts will not have a decisive impact on Russia’s war efforts in Ukraine, they underscore how close relations between the two countries’ armed forces have become since 2021. No other country in Southeast Asia has responded positively to Moscow’s request for military assistance, including Vietnam, its closest partner in the region. Second, the SAC has bestowed personal honours on officials in the Russian government who have played a key role in promoting defence ties between the two countries. Thus, in November 2022, the SAC awarded honorary titles to three Russian defence officials: Defence Minister Shoigu was awarded the title Sithu (the lowest order awarded to people who are deemed to have done ‘great work’ for the country); Colonel-General Fomin was named Thiri Pyanchi (for ‘outstanding performance’); and Alexander Ostrovsky from the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation was awarded an ‘excellent administrative performance’ medal.[39]
ENERGY COOPERATION
The coup turned Myanmar’s existing electricity generation problems into a full-blown energy crisis. The country’s power infrastructure has been damaged in fighting between the Tatmadaw and PDFs, resulting in rolling blackouts in major towns and cities. Rising global oil prices and the falling value of the currency have created fuel shortages for the population, while the withdrawal of Western energy companies from offshore gas fields has halted upstream production.[40]
To find solutions to the country’s energy crisis, the SAC has turned primarily to Russia.
As a short-term measure, Myanmar has begun importing Russian crude oil which Moscow is offering to non-sanctioning countries at discounted prices. Between March and June 2023, Russian oil exports to Myanmar jumped from almost nothing to 8.36 million barrels of oil.[41] A proportion of that oil is likely to have been jet fuel for use by MAF aircraft to conduct air strikes. However, not all Russian oil shipped to Myanmar is for domestic consumption. According to Energy Intelligence, from February 2023 Russia began delivering an estimated 70,000 barrels of oil per day to China using a Chinese-funded oil pipeline from the port of Kyaukphyu in Myanmar to Kunming in Yunnan Province.[42]
As a longer-term solution to the problem, the SAC seeks to achieve a higher level of energy self-sufficiency by exploiting hydrocarbon resources and developing renewable energy sources. The junta has requested technical assistance from Russian energy companies to develop inland and offshore oil and gas fields – presumably including those from which Western and Japanese companies have withdrawn – and the construction of additional oil pipelines and oil refineries.[43] For renewable energy sources, the SAC has partnered with Russia’s state-owned energy giant Rosatom to develop hydro, wind and, controversially, nuclear power.[44]
In the early 2000s, the previous junta signed a series of MOUs with Rosatom to develop nuclear power capabilities. The NLD government shelved those plans but after the coup, the atomic power option was urgently revisited. In 2022, the SAC and Rosatom signed three MOUs[45] with the ultimate aim of providing Myanmar with a small modular reactor (SMR). SMRs are much cheaper, more mobile and reputedly safer than conventional nuclear power plants.[46] In February 2023, the first concrete outcome of these MOUs was the opening of a Nuclear Technology Information Centre in Yangon.[47] A fourth MOU on nuclear cooperation between Myanmar and Rosatom was signed during Russia Energy Week in Moscow in October 2023.[48]
In December 2022, SAC spokesman Zaw Min Tun predicted: “We expect construction of a small-scale nuclear reactor to start within a few years.”[49] However, achieving that goal is an ambitious target for Myanmar. Questions include who would run the nuclear facilities (Myanmar or Russian technicians, or both?), how would a cash-strapped Myanmar pay for such a costly programme, and whether a Russian-supplied SMR would be subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.[50] The SAC’s quest for atomic power has also rekindled speculation that the Tatmadaw has ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons,[51] despite no solid evidence that a ‘Burmese Bomb’ is indeed the SAC’s ultimate goal.[52]
COMMERCE AND TOURISM
In addition to arms sales and energy projects, Myanmar and Russia have sought to circumvent Western sanctions and strengthen commercial ties. Myanmar’s economy is in a dire state. The coup effectively wiped out a decade of GDP growth as Western companies pulled out, exports plummeted, energy costs rose, trade revenue fell, inflation soared and the value of the kyat collapsed.
Since the coup, Myanmar and Russia have regularly held government-to-government talks on how to promote closer trade and investment ties and exchanged high-level business delegations. Myanmar business people have attended the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum and the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok. In late 2022, in an effort to evade Western financial sanctions on both countries, the Russian and Myanmar central banks agreed to direct ruble-kyat payments to facilitate commercial transactions, presumably including arms sales. Economic ties between Myanmar and Russia should be kept in proportion. Commerce between the two countries is minuscule. According to the International Monetary Fund, in 2020, two-way trade amounted to a mere US$58.3 million before falling to US$34.5 million in 2021.[53] In 2022, it had risen to US104.4 million. In the same year, however, Myanmar-China trade was worth US$11.5 billion.
Myanmar has been keen to attract Russian tourists, especially to its beach resorts in areas such as Rakhine State.[54] Post-coup, Russian visitors have been offered visa-free travel to Myanmar and allowed to use Russian-issued Mir credit cards, one of only a handful of countries to do so.[55] During 2022, the two sides discussed establishing direct air links between Yangon and Mandalay and several Russian cities including Moscow, St. Petersburg, Novosibirsk and Vladivostok. In August 2023 it was announced that from September, Myanmar Airways International (MAI) would fly twice a week from Yangon and Mandalay to Novosibirsk.[56] Located in Siberia, Novosibirsk is Russia’s third largest city and appears to have been given priority over Moscow and St. Petersburg because it is home to the company that manufactures the SU-34 fighter-bomber (which the MAF appears keen to acquire due to its central role in suppressing anti-Assad forces in Syria since 2015) and a Rosatom facility that processes uranium and fabricates nuclear fuel.[57] Direct flights between Yangon and Moscow with MAI are expected to start in 2024.
CONCLUSION
The Tatmadaw’s ouster of the NLD government in February 2021, and the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine a year later, have pushed Myanmar and Russia much closer together. The Russian government has taken advantage of the coup to promote its arms sales and other economic interests in Myanmar. Wary of becoming dependent on China, coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has looked to Russia as his preferred major power partner, and has sought Moscow’s assistance to resolve two major problems: defeat anti-SAC resistance forces and solve the country’s energy crisis. Russia’s military assistance is prolonging the conflict in Myanmar and its estrangement from ASEAN, and Moscow may be complicit in SAC war crimes. So long as the SAC holds power, and the conflict in Europe drags on, the Myanmar-Russia embrace will grow ever tighter.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2023/91 “The Challenge of “Halal Lifestyle” and Occupational Preferences in Indonesia” by Iim Halimatusa’diyah and Wahyudi Akmaliah
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The concept of “halal lifestyle”, which is considered to be aligned with Islamic principles, is highly popular in Indonesia today. Proponents of the concept argue that it encompasses a range of practices that adhere to ethical and religious guidelines. Studies on halal lifestyles tend to focus on the development of the halal industry as an economic consequence of the growing adoption of halal practices.
- The extent to which the halal lifestyle has affected individuals’ occupational preferences remains largely unexplored. By focusing on the movement of middle-class Muslims in Indonesia leaving their current occupations for jobs perceived as halal, this article examines the conditions supporting the emergence of this trend.
- We argue that since the fall of the authoritarian Suharto regime in 1998, Indonesia has witnessed a rise in social conservatism. This encouraged not only the emergence of Islamic revivalist groups, but also an emphasis on personal piety. Our observations indicate that three specific employment industries—entertainment, finance, and Multi-Level Marketing (MLM)—are considered contentious, with varying interpretations of their alignment as a “halal occupation”.
- Finally, the growing social and economic vulnerability of Indonesian Muslims at the individual and community levels may contribute to religious intolerance within Indonesian society.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/91, 15 November 2023
* Iim Halimatusa’diyah is Visiting Fellow at the Regional Social and Cultural Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Senior Lecturer at Islamic State University (UIN) Syarif Hidayatullah, and Deputy Director for Research at the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) UIN Jakarta. Wahyudi Akmaliah is Ph.D. candidate in Malay Studies at the National University of Singapore and a Researcher at BRIN (National Research and Innovation Agency), Jakarta.
INTRODUCTION
The concept of “halal lifestyle” is gaining prominence in Indonesia. While halal means permissible in Islam, halal lifestyle, a relatively new terminology, refers to how a person lives in accordance with Islamic principles. The concept follows the Quranic verse that maintains Islam as ad-deen, a way of life, and that the religion regulates behaviours, habits and interests. The halal lifestyle discourse has contributed to the development of the halal industry—which offers halal products to satisfy Muslim consumers globally. Today, the halal industry encompasses food and beverages, finance, travel, pharmacy, cosmetics, fashion, education, healthcare, wellness, recreation, and music. The global growth of the Muslim population, which directly leads to higher demand for halal products, is driving the halal industry. While this industry is a global phenomenon, Indonesia is leading the way.[1] The Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) has played a significant role in shaping the halal industry by promoting sharia compliance in the public sphere.[2]
In response to the global trend, the Indonesian government, particularly during the Jokowi administration (since 2014), has devised a strategy to support the halal industry’s potential economic contributions. This strategy materialised as the “Indonesia Islamic Economic Masterplan 2019–2024,” developed by the Ministry of National Development Planning (Bappenas). Subsequently, the government established Bank Syariah Indonesia (BSI), the nation’s largest state-owned Sharia-compliant bank, to create a conducive environment for the rapid development of the Islamic economy.[3]
While many studies on the halal lifestyle often focus on the development of the halal industry as an economic consequence of the growing adoption of halal practices, the extent to which the halal lifestyle affects individuals’ occupational preferences remains largely unexplored. Shifting from one job to another is a common phenomenon and a respected right of every individual. However, turning from well-established, stable jobs to uncertain, low-paid ones on religious grounds is a trend that needs looking into. This article addresses why shifting to ‘halal’ occupations is gaining ground among middle-class Muslims. What jobs are in line with a halal lifestyle, and does this movement impact Indonesians in general?
POPULARISING ‘HALAL’ OCCUPATIONS
While no official statistics are available on the matter, people leaving a well-established job for a so-called ‘halal job’ is becoming more prevalent among middle-class Muslims in Indonesia. The end of the Suharto authoritarian regime saw the growth of Islamic revivalist groups that had long been suppressed under the New Order regime, and these now seek to revive the “authentic” tenets and teachings of Islam as they imagine these to have been developed by the first Muslim communities.[4] This rise in Islamic conservatism coincides with the growing emphasis among Indonesian Muslims on rigid personal piety as the ideal mode of thinking vis-à-vis other orientations of Islam such as communitarian spirit and progressive rational sciences. The reinforcement of the halal and haram dichotomy in all aspects of Muslim life, including occupational preferences, is one apparent example of this rigid interpretation of Islam.
Since the end of the Suharto authoritarian regime in 1998, democratisation has allowed various Islamic groups to articulate their previously suppressed views and ideologies. At the same time, media and digital technologies have also amplified conservatism in offline and online spaces. A study by the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) UIN Jakarta, which extracts social media data from 2009 to 2019, shows firstly, that religious narratives during the ten years were dominated by conservative religious narratives (67.2%); and secondly, these narratives were heavily echoed by conservative figures active on social media.[5] Many of these figures were the initiators of the “hijrah movement” (hijrah means migration) which encourages Muslims to shift to a more Islamic way of life. This movement covers the hijrah of occupation.[6] The term “hijrah” was initially used to describe the movement of the Prophet and his Companions from Mecca to Medina in 622. While the original meaning of hijrah referred to the physical movement from one location to another, a moral meaning of the term later developed, referring to Muslims’ spiritual upliftment. The rise of Islamic conservatism has encouraged a narrow moral interpretation of hijrah that refers only to the virtues acclaimed by certain groups and that marginalises other groups who have different interpretations.[7]
The hijrah movement is vocal in expressing their views online and offline. The personalities associated with it are likely to have sizable followers and social media engagement. Their ideas relating to occupational hijrah gain much traction and are quickly and widely circulated among their followers. Syafiq Riza Basalamah is one of the figures who actively motivates Muslims to embark on occupational hijrah, and he has more than two million followers and subscribers on his social media platforms. Responding to one of his followers who was thinking of leaving his current job but doubting if that would be economically sustainable, Basalamah said:
“Hijrah is something that entails a struggle and the struggle requires sacrifice. When the Prophet’s companions hijrah from Mecca to Habasyah, they had no relatives, home, or job. All of them left Mecca for the sake of Allah. They believed that it was Allah who provided their livelihood. It is not the company, the workplace, or the boss. It is not a matter of resigning and then you would lose your livelihood.” [8]
Other hijrah movement groups also helped articulate occupational hijrah among the Indonesian Muslim middle class. They include, among others: the Shift of Pemuda Hijrah in Bandung, Kajian Musyawarah, Yuk Ngaji, Strangers Ghuraba, and Terang Jakarta in Jakarta, and Better Youth in Surabaya.[9] Interestingly, most of these religious networks employ hybrid methods, combining social media platforms and Islamic teachings and packaging these with pop culture in order to attract urbanised Muslims.
TYPOLOGIES OF ‘HALAL AND HARAM’ OCCUPATIONS
Distinguishing between halal and haram occupations remains difficult, given that between the permissible and non-permissible poles are sub-categories such as subhat (doubtful) and makruh (permissible but discouraged). Islamic law is usually a generic guidance allowing room for multiple interpretations previously dominated by established Islamic organisations such as Muhammadiyah, NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), and MUI. Our observation indicates that three specific areas of employment—entertainment, finance, and Multi-Level Marketing (MLM)—remain contentious.
Indonesian Muslims pursue various professions in the entertainment scene. A number of them became prominent musicians and artists, or play supporting roles. However, due to their work, some have to frequent nightclub environments, where they may be exposed to what Muslims consider ‘immoral behaviour’ (maksiat), such as alcohol consumption, and free intermingling between unmarried men and women. Musicians particularly are faced with this moral dilemma. Even if these musicians do not consume alcohol—considered sinful in Islam—their line of work may be seen as encouraging alcohol consumption in others (called subhat).
Due to the lack of clear boundaries in Islamic law for categorising the entertainment industry as halal or haram, Indonesian celebrities working in this field find themselves in a liminal state, hovering between these two classifications. This liminality creates uncertainty and doubt among many of them, prompting questions about the ethicality of their profession. Amid this uncertainty, new Islamic resurgence movements, particularly those led by Salafi preachers, have emerged to provide their versions of clarity. They offer black-and-white categorisations within Islamic law, and provide definitive answers for these Indonesian celebrities. Notably, these preachers excel in employing digital platforms and pop culture products, and are effectively reaching a broad audience. Consequently, their teachings have profoundly impacted many Indonesian celebrities, motivating them to embark on an occupational hijrah.
Those working in the banking and finance sectors are posed with other distinct sets of challenges. There is consensus among the Islamic organisations of Muhammadiyah, NU, and MUI that usury (riba) is forbidden (haram). Nevertheless, these organisations differ on whether bank interests constitute riba; some argue that interest is doubtful (subhat) while others allowed for it (mubah).[10] Muhammadiyah and NU contend that it is permissible for individuals to work in banks as wage earners but not participate directly in usurious transactions. The critical consideration is that the source of income is halal, but they should refrain from facilitating usury transactions.[11] MUI, however, is stricter in its interpretation, and consider the transactions and wages earned in these banks as haram because bank interests are strongly related to usury. While this may already be considered rigid, resurgence groups such as HTI and Salafi are even more exclusivist and categorise such employment as clearly haram.
Consequently, those affiliated with the hijrah movement leave their jobs in banks and pursue alternative careers that are deemed halal. This shift is often motivated by a desire to adhere more closely to these groups’ anti-riba (anti-usury) principles.
Another industry that is affected by this change is the multi-level marketing (MLM) business. This type of business revolves around a distributor organisation that conducts multi-level product sales. It is commonly referred to as network marketing because group members involved in selling a specific product increase in number, eventually forming a network. This network becomes their marketing system, comprising many individuals working to introduce and sell particular products. With certain requirements and careful consideration, Muhammadiyah, NU, and MUI agree that MLM business is halal.[12] A new trend, however, suggests that MLM businesses selling certain products are haram. While this trend is still relatively small, it is significant for some who work in the industry. Those arguing that this business is haram often include former leaders who once held top positions in their MLM careers, and their influence contributes to a significant shift within the MLM business community.
The primary reason why the hijrah movement considers the MLM business haram is that it lacks a clear definition of samsarah—trade intermediary or intermediaries between sellers and buyers—in Islamic law, particularly the direct intermediary transaction between buyers and sellers. This movement argues that MLM business instead establishes an indirect intermediary between buyers and sellers, meaning that the person occupying the highest hierarchical position in the business will earn income from product sales, even though another seller of a lower rank performs the work. This movement perceives this reality to be unjust, although those at the top argue that they provide guidance and consultancy services to their subordinates. This latter argument, according to this movement, does not align with the requirements of samsara in Islamic law.[13]
THE IMPACT OF HALAL OCCUPATION
The decision to work, to change jobs, or to quit remains an individual right. However, when many decide to leave their steady jobs to pursue jobs with uncertain levels of stability in the name of religion, then a deeper dive into the reasons this, and whether this aligns with true Islamic principles becomes necessary.
At a personal level, a shift in employment may affect the economic stability of any individual and their families. Among the professions promoted as halal, or which are deemed to be following the sunnah of the Prophet, are those of traders or entrepreneurs. For example, we encountered some who had embarked on occupational hijrah ending up selling Islamic books near mosques where they studied Islam. Some offered perfumes said to be Prophet Muhammad’s favourites, engaged in culinary ventures, or specialised in Muslim apparel.[14] Some shift to informal sectors such as small and medium enterprises. In Indonesia, the informal economy still dominates. Data from the National Bureau of Statistics (BPS) in 2022 showed that 59.31% of Indonesia’s working population are engaged in the informal sector, which is likely to have relatively high job risks such as income uncertainty, low wages, and lack of social protection.[15]
As with any business, entrepreneurship comes with the risk of failure. For those who are fortunate and have good entrepreneurial skills, hijrah may provide them with better economic security than what they received from their previous jobs. However, those who do not have enough entrepreneurial skills—and the majority do not—become economically vulnerable without any steady source of income, and they tend to become part of an already saturated Islamic business market. Additionally, it will be difficult for them to grow their business if they furthermore refuse to use conventional banking services—the most skeptical among them even reject sharia banking.
Despite the possibility of failure, hijrah leaders commonly motivate people by framing hijrah as a big decision and not an easy one. The term is always made synonymous with risks, sacrifices, challenges and tribulations. Syafiq Riza Basalamah, for example, emphasises that when trying to leave a “haram” job, there is no guarantee that the person will be wealthy. These individuals might experience hardships such as poverty, ostracism and hatred. However, he highlighted that there would be God’s assurance for those who wish to hijrah for the sake of the divine.[16] Such framing often encourages people to embrace hijrah regardless of the economic insecurity and uncertainties involved.
Recognising the potential setbacks of hijrah, some hijrah groups have been expanding the functions of mosques as work-training centres. Currently, some mosques managed by conservative groups, such as the Jogokariyan Mosque and United Mosque in Yogyakarta, and the Mosque of al-Latief in Bandung, are being used not only as places of worship and Islamic learning, but as centres for training Muslim youths to engage in halal businesses and to equip them with the skills needed to become Muslim entrepreneurs.
Since a considerable number of Muslims collectively pursue this occupational hijrah, economic insecurity may not only be experienced at the individual level but also increase the Muslim community’s collective economic insecurity, thus increasing their sense of being threatened by other groups. A survey conducted by PPIM Jakarta in 2020 showed that perceived threat is associated with religious intolerance.[17] It indicates that the more individuals feel that their group is under threat, particularly economically, the lower their level of religious tolerance would be. The survey also showed that compared to other religious groups, Muslims—in this case, Indonesian Muslim youth—have the highest perception of threat compared to other religious groups, as shown in the figure below:
Figure 1. Indonesian Youth Threat Perception by Religious Affiliations
Figure 1 shows that Muslims are more likely to have a greater perceived threat than other religious groups—and the variation in the perception of threat among Muslims is relatively small. In other words, perceived threat among Muslims in general is relatively similar. Protestants and Catholics have a smaller perceived threat than Muslims, although their belief interval is larger. Hindus and Buddhists have a lower average sense of danger than Muslims, even though their belief interval is the largest. Beyond that, the perceived threat of the Confucian and Aliran Kepercayaan (local belief) groups is difficult to interpret since they are only represented by one respondent per group.
CONCLUSION
Given the drawbacks of occupational hijrah, society and the Indonesian state should proactively prevent further deterioration of social and economic conditions. The ulama and scholars need to provide the public with a better understanding of the advancement of occupations from a religious standpoint that is compatible with the rapidly changing economic and technological systems. Such a comprehensive understanding will significantly help individuals to adapt to the needs of the workforce while complying with religious teachings. They must also educate Muslims that the religion does not draw a sharp distinction between what jobs they can enter into, as long as they do not deviate from the broader principles of social justice and welfare. Moreover, there is no hierarchy of knowledge in Islam. The fact that religious subjects such as theology, Quranic studies, and Islamic jurisprudence are deemed by the Muslim resurgence to be of higher value than science, social sciences, humanities, and technology does affect what parents choose as the field of study for their children. This prioritisation of religious fields versus secular ones—in itself a problematic division—affects the career options of young Muslims.
The government should improve the quality of its social protection policies to minimise inequality in society and mitigate the adverse effects of job loss or the transition from one type of employment to another. For example, the government’s pre-employment card programme should be optimised to upgrade prospective workers’ skills. Additionally, the government should provide better training options than those offered by conservative groups, which would inevitably incorporate the ideological aspects of their movements. In all, the state and religious elites must work together to halt negative perceptions of “secular” occupations and prevent low take-up rates for important sectors of the economy, such as the arts, banking and financial sectors, simply because these are deemed by some to be non-halal. Moreover, adults who venture into low-paying but Islamic compliant jobs could put an unnecessary burden on their families and trigger other social problems.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2023/90 “Negeri Sembilan Emerges as PH-BN’s Steadiest Stronghold” by Kevin Zhang and James Chin
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The Pakatan Harapan-Barisan Nasional (PH-BN) alliance retained Negeri Sembilan in the August state election, losing only five seats in the 36-seat state assembly to Perikatan Nasional (PN). PH-BN performed the best in Negeri Sembilan among the six states which were up for grabs, even better than Penang and Selangor which are long considered as PH’s bastions.
- BN had ruled Negeri Sembilan up till 2018, when it was defeated by PH. The PH-BN alliance was expected to boost the fortunes of both coalitions, with BN drawing support from rural and semi-urban seats while PH capitalised on its urban base.
- BN retained its grassroots machinery in rural seats while PH was almost unassailable in urban seats, contributing to the overwhelming victory in terms of seats won for BN-PH. Nonetheless, PH-BN experienced a sharp fall in vote share from Malays, compared to last year’s General Election, while support from non-Malays remained rock solid.
- PN circumvented the lack of credible leadership and grassroots machinery, and instead campaigned mainly through social media, focusing on winning Malay voters. In addition, PN was handicapped by negligible support from non-Malays.
- Both PH and BN need each other to remain in power, since neither coalition fulfils the simple majority of 19 seats in the state assembly. The ability of PH and BN to formulate a mutually satisfactory relationship is crucial for the state administration, and to the federal government moving forward.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/90, 8 November 2023
* Kevin Zhang is Senior Research Officer at the Malaysia Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. James Chin is Professor of Asian Studies, University of Tasmania. The authors would like to thank Tindak Malaysia for the database of GE2023 (parliamentary election transposed onto state constituencies) and ethnic composition in Negeri Sembilan, Rebecca Neo for her cartographic work, and Francis E. Hutchinson and Lee Hwok Aun for their comments on an earlier draft.
INTRODUCTION
Compared to Penang and Selangor, Negeri Sembilan receives far less media and scholarly attention due to its small population size and less-than-stellar economic development.[1] Nonetheless, the state deserves much greater understanding since, in contrast to other states governed by the Pakatan Harapan (PH) and Barisan Nasional (BN) alliance, PH-BN had the most success there fending off the “Green Wave” during the recent August elections involving six Malaysian states. In addition, unlike Penang and Selangor where PH is dominant with BN in the back seat, PH and BN are in approximate parity in Negeri Sembilan.[2] The roughly equal footing has created constructive and dynamic relations between PH and BN, when faced with the threat posed by Perikatan Nasional (PN). Conversely, PN was least able to make inroads into Negeri Sembilan during the 2023 state election, also known as Pilihan Raya Negeri in Malay (PRN 2023). This piece analyses BN’s long presence in Negeri Sembilan, the rise of PH since 2008, and recent attempts by PN to penetrate the state.
Barisan Nasional (BN) ruled Negeri Sembilan uninterrupted since Malaysia’s independence in 1957 and was virtually impregnable in the state until the 2008 General Election. The east-west differences within Negeri Sembilan enabled PH to rise as a formidable opposition since 2008, while BN retained the state government until 2018, when the Negeri Sembilan state administration witnessed a change of power for the first time, and BN was defeated. The alliance between PH and BN – former long-time nemesis – in the aftermath of the 2022 General Election (GE2022) propelled PH and BN to contest as a joint force in PRN2023 against PN. Many predicted a complete victory for both PH and BN, with PN facing the possibility of a complete wipeout in Negeri Sembilan.[3] Yet in PRN 2023, PN managed to win five seats with the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) obtaining three and Malaysian Indigenous United Party (PPBM) securing two. PN managed to make some inroads into Malay majority seats as BN faced declining popularity, but the latter retained some of its historical advantages. Together with rock solid support for PH among non-Malays, PH-BN achieved a trumping majority in terms of seats won. The results analysis section compares PRN2023 against GE2022 voting patterns in the 36 state seats, supplemented with fieldwork conducted in the second week of the campaign period. Together with regression analysis, the piece constructs a picture of how voting patterns have changed among Malays, further segregated into urban, semi-urban and rural state seats.
BACKGROUND
Negeri Sembilan broadly mirrors the national racial demographic with Malays/Bumiputra forming more than half of the state’s 1.1 million residents.[4] Malays in Negeri Sembilan however possess unique Adat Perpatih heritage which originated from the Minangkabau Highlands in Sumatra, Indonesia.[5] Much like other west coast states on the Peninsula, the Chinese form a significant percentage at 23 per cent. The state has the highest share of Indians across all Malaysian states, which at 15 per cent is double the national average. Since non-Malay majority seats comprise only 13 of the total 36 state seats, coalitions must win at least a sizeable number of Malay-majority seats to gain control of the state government.
There are eight parliamentary seats in Negeri Sembilan, with the population spread out rather unevenly. (Map 1) The state has seven administrative districts, with district boundaries closely mirroring their respective parliamentary seats (of the same name) apart from Seremban district.[6] Rural and semi-urban seats, located in the eastern and central parts of the state, are sparely populated and have a large land area. Compared to urban seats, rural and semi-urban seats contain far less population per elected assemblyperson due to malapportionment – thereby increasing their political weight.[7]
Agricultural activities remain an economic mainstay with palm oil plantations dominating the landscape. In addition, a sizeable population in rural seats are outstation voters working in larger cities.[8] On the other hand, the western half of Negeri Sembilan is urbanised with its economy closely intertwined with Kuala Lumpur given its geographical proximity. Apart from being where the state capital is located, Seremban also has the highest economic development and population among all the seven administrative districts. Many Seremban residents travel daily to work in Kuala Lumpur.[9] In terms of demographic distribution, non-Malays comprise an absolute majority (more than 50 per cent) of total electorate in Seremban, Rasah and Port Dickson parliamentary seats while Malays are dominant in the remaining five seats. The intra-state variation in terms of economic development and racial distribution hold crucial political impact.
Map 1: Negeri Sembilan parliamentary seats and size of electorate
BN AND PH POLITICAL CONTESTATION UP TO 2018
Negeri Sembilan has historically been a BN stronghold, with the coalition ruling the state uninterrupted from 1957 when Malaysia obtained independence to 2018.[10] Up to 2004, the coalition achieved almost a clean sweep by winning 34 out of the 36 state seats. In the 2008 political tsunami which swept through much of the Peninsula’s west coast, the opposition Pakatan Rakyat (PR) – predecessor of PH – made unprecedented inroads into Negeri Sembilan when it won 15 state seats (Table 1).[11] The bulk of the PR victories were in urban state seats located within Seremban and Port Dickson districts, on the western flank of Negeri Sembilan (Map 2). Even though the bulk of seats captured by PR were non-Malay majority, it did capture urban Malay supermajority seats (Ampangan and Paroi) located in and around Seremban as well.[12] This indicates that the 2008 tsunami against BN was an urban rather than a racial (non-Malay) wave, with the western half of Negeri Sembilan being an extension of the political sentiments in Klang Valley.[13] Meanwhile, the central-to-eastern half of Negri Sembilan remained solidly under BN.
Table 1: BN and PH electoral performance in Negeri Sembilan since 2004
Map 2: 2008 state election in Negeri Sembilan
Unlike in Selangor or Penang, the large number of rural and semi-urban state seats in Negeri Sembilan meant that PR could not wrest the state government from BN. This 2008 trend largely persisted in the 2013 general election, though BN managed to claw back urban Malay majority seats while PR gained a rural non-Malay majority seat. (Map 3)
Map 3: 2013 state election in Negeri Sembilan
The nail in the coffin for BN came in 2018, when Malay-majority seats in Seremban district voted against BN – some for the first time – due to widespread anger and disappointment over corruption and the outbreak of 1MDB scandal. For the first time, PH achieved a clean sweep on the western front stretching from Chennah to Sri Tanjong. (Map 4) BN retained their traditional stronghold, albeit with reduced majorities. The crucial swings propelled PH across the simple majority threshold as they won 20 out of the total 36 state seats, forming a new state government.
Map 4: 2018 state election in Negeri Sembilan
SEAT ALLOCATION AND CAMPAIGN FOR THE 2023 STATE ELECTION
By the time the 2023 state election was held, the political scenario had changed completely. BN and PH were now allies as part of the “Unity Government” at the federal level.
After protracted rounds of seat negotiations up to the eleventh hour before nomination day, BN and PH agreed that each coalition would be given the right to contest in the seats which they had previously won in 2018. An exception was made for Lenggeng where PH ceded the seat to BN.[14] The final allocation had PH contesting in 19 seats and BN in 17 seats. The seat negotiation outcome was more favourable for PH component parties than for BN. Since each of the three PH component parties managed to win some seats in 2018, they could contest in the state election. On the other hand, all except one of the 16 seats which BN won in 2018 belonged to UMNO (United Malays National Organisation). The remaining seat (Jeram Padang) was held by a BN component party. With the Chinese and Indian component parties of BN deciding not to contest in the election, Jeram Padang was ceded to UMNO.[15] With UMNO as the sole party contesting under the BN banner, the election signified the death knell of the multi-racial BN which had once represented the three major racial groups in Malaysia.
PN’s strategy for Negeri Sembilan was to divide the core seats between PPBM and PAS, with the “candidate” factor as the most important criterion. Seat allocation was largely based on the principle of “most winnable” candidate.[16] The Malaysian People’s Movement Party (Gerakan) was on a “suicide” mission since PN receives negligible support among non-Malays, with Gerakan given the ticket to contest in urban non-Malay majority seats.[17] The final division was PPBM contesting 15 seats, PAS 13 seats and Gerakan six seats.
The quest for PN to take over Negeri Sembilan was dampened by the fact that Ahmad Faizal Azumu, PN state chief for Negeri Sembilan, did not stand as a candidate.[18] Normally, the state chief is also the lead candidate and Chief Minister designate. By not standing as a candidate, voters may have perceived PN as not being serious about capturing the state.[19] The main target of PN’s electoral strategy was the Malay-majority seats held by UMNO, with PN being most familiar with the Malay ground, considering that Bersatu brought in sizeable former UMNO members. The theme was largely similar to the national PN theme “Save Islam” and “Save Malays”.[20]
Like the other five states, campaign issues in Negeri Sembilan were largely overshadowed by national issues. Most voters perceived this election as one of national implications relating to the future of Malay and non-Malays rights.[21] Nevertheless, both sides presented their manifesto. The PH-BN “Negeri Sembilan Unity Aspiration” manifesto, was driven by five targets, 10 main thrusts and 70 initiatives, which included building 4,000 affordable homes within the next five years. PN’s manifesto was based on eight pillars: driving economic resilience and addressing the rise in the cost of living; creating sustainable future for the youth; establishing people-centric education and empowering outstanding women; elevating social welfare; strengthening infrastructure and security network; accelerating eco- and culture-based tourism; and enhancing the effectiveness of good governance.
From the manifestos, it was clear that both sides were targeting the young, or first time, voters. The free money promised by PH/BN to the young voters was substantial.
Table 3. Comparison of cash handouts: PH/BN Vs PN[22]
| PH/ BN | Perikatan Nasional |
| RM150 voucher for youths aged 16-21 from B40 families to obtain motorcycle licenses RM100 contribution to the National Education Savings scheme for all newborns between 2023 and 2027 RM300 one-off assistance for students enrolling in government boarding schools One-off university enrolment assistance: RM1,000 (degree); RM750 (diploma); RM500 (certificate) RM5,000 one-off award for first-class graduates from public universities RM500 marriage assistance for the first wedding RM200 annual donation for single mothers with an income of less than RM2,000 a month RM200 annual donation for senior citizens aged 70 and above | 20 percent school bus fare subsidy. 10 percent birthing cost subsidy or a maximum of RM300 for firstborns under a new Ibu Prihatin Nismilan initiative. RM300 subsidy for youths to apply for a B2 motorcycle license Up to RM15,000 grant under a million-dollar Young Agropreneurs Fund RM1mill incubator grant for female entrepreneurs |
RESULTS ANALYSIS
Overview
Consistent with the general perception that Negeri Sembilan was a tough nut to crack for PN, the media only identified three “hot seats”- Rantau, Klawang, and Juasseh.[23] Other than these three seats, the general consensus was that Negeri Sembilan would be the one state that PN would have difficulty gaining traction.[24] After all, there were no PN representatives in the state assembly. In GE2023, Negeri Sembilan was the only state in Peninsula Malaysia where PN had failed to capture even one parliamentary seat. PN also lacked a credible grassroots machinery in Negeri Sembilan and any real state-wide machinery, relying extensively instead on social media for campaigning.[25] The two most widely cited opinion polls prior to the PRN, conducted by Merdeka Centre and Ilham, gave PH/BN support at 59% and 47% respectively as the preferred coalition in Negeri Sembilan.[26]
PH-BN retained 31 of the 36 state seats, while PN won five. None of the “hot seats” saw a change. Rather the five seats that changed hands were: Serting, Labu, Paroi, Bagan Pinang and Gemas. Paroi and Labu were previously held by PH while the remaining three were held by UMNO.(Map 5) All the five seats which PN wrestled from BN or PH had Malays making up close to or more than three-quarters of electorate.
Map 5: 2023 state election in Negeri Sembilan
* Grey shaded areas represent the seats which PH-BN won with more than 1,000 margin of vote
In terms of vote share, PH-BN garnered 60.9 per cent while PN obtained 37.7 per cent.[27] With PH and BN joining forces, the alliance avoided a repeat of GE2023 three-cornered fight where the Malay vote was split between PH, BN and PN. With Chinese voters solidly behind PH-BN and PN receiving a negligible share of non-Malay votes, PN’s vote of 37.7 per cent came almost exclusively from the Malays.[28] Even though it gained more than a third of total votes casted, PN was severely penalised by the first-past-the-post system with its share of seats (14 per cent) being smaller than its share of votes.
Malay voting patterns in the 2023 state election
Prior to PRN2023, there were predictions being made on the extent of vote transferability between BN and PH supporters for the new PH-BN alliance.[29] Considering the deep animosity and contestations, analysts disagreed on the predicted share of BN supporters who would throw their weight behind BN-PH.[30] Since non-Malays were solidly behind PH in previous elections, the focus was on Malay voters who had a choice between PN or BN; both these coalitions share similar narratives of championing Malay rights and Islam, with PN portraying itself as a “clean” alternative. The three-corner fights between BN, PH and PN in GE2022 provide a baseline to measure the extent of vote transferability for BN voters, since BN and PH agreed to support each other in their campaigns for PRN2023.[31] While admitting that considerations may vary for parliamentary elections (GE2022) versus state elections (PRN2023), the August state election was framed by both PH-BN and PN as a referendum on the popularity of the Anwar’s administration and the PH-BN federal government.[32] National-level concerns overshadowed state issues, with the state elections being seen as a rerun of GE2022. The turnout for PRN2023 in Negeri Sembilan was also broadly comparable to GE2022, declining by around five percentage points.[33]
Since PH and UMNO joined forces in the state election, the vote share for PH and BN in GE2022 were combined as a reference point against PRN2023. There was a significant decline in the combined vote share of BN-PH, with the decline being steeper in state seats with a larger share of Malays. (Chart 1) The combined vote share for BN and PH voters is estimated to have fallen by around 25 per cent from GE2022 to PRN2023. In PRN2023, the vote share for PH-BN among Malays was estimated to be lower than 50 per cent, indicating that PN was more popular among Malays than BN-PH.
Chart 1: Scatter plot and regression values for PH-BN combined vote share in 2022 and 2023 against the share of Malay electorate
* Each dot represents a state seat in GE2022 (blue) and PRN2023 (forest green). Both regression lines are statistically significant at 0.01 per cent P value.
Nonetheless, ethnicity was not the sole determinant for Malay support for PH-BN since there were significant variations even among seats with a high percentage of Malays. In seats where Malays comprised more than 70 per cent of electorate as indicated by the yellow arrows, support for PH-BN ranged from 40 per cent to more than 60 per cent in PRN2023.
To understand variations in voting patterns among the Malays, the following section concerns state seats where Malays comprise more than 50 per cent of the electorate – known as Malay seats for ease of reference. The dot box plot compares PH-BN and PN median vote share in rural, semi-urban and urban Malay seats for PRN2023.(Chart 3)
Commentators have argued that the opposition PN drew its support from the lowest strata of Malaysian society, due to economic discontent with the PH-BN administration.[34] With uneven rates of economic growth, rural areas are generally less developed, with PH-BN posited to perform worse in these Malay-dominated areas. However, Negeri Sembilan confounds the notion that PH-BN struggles in rural seats but tends to perform better in semi-urban and urban seats. Instead, BN-PH performed best in rural Malay seats in Negeri Sembilan, with close to a 10 per cent lead over PN, reflected in the gap in chart 3. This was because rural seats have traditionally been the bastion for UMNO, with numerous rural seats in Negeri Sembilan containing large FELDA settlements. Nonetheless, compared to past performance where BN was almost invincible in rural or FELDA seats, BN underperformed.[35] According to the author’s fieldwork observation, BN relied on its traditional campaign methods of small-scale get-together events and mini-rallies (ceramah) to mobilise support rather than on selling a narrative – in contrast to PN which champions Malay rights and clean governance but lacks machinery and a human touch on the ground. PH-BN had a narrow lead over PN in urban Malay seats, reflected in the small distance in median values. Nonetheless, this remained sufficient to get PH-BN across the finishing line in straight fights against PN. PH-BN performed the worst in semi-urban Malay seats, where PN has almost a 10 per cent lead over BN-PH. Contrary to the trends argued by many commentators, PN’s inroads in Negeri Sembilan were in semi-urban and (to a lesser extent) urban Malay seats. None of the five seats PN won were rural; four were semi-urban while one was urban and located within Seremban town.
Chart 2: PH-BN and PN median vote share in Malay seats for 2023 State Election
IMPLICATIONS
While PN – especially PAS – scored a “Green Wave” of unprecedented scale in Kelantan, Terengganu, and Kedah, it failed to capture Selangor, Penang and Negeri Sembilan. PH-BN performed best in Negeri Sembilan with PN only capturing five state seats in PRN2023. Nonetheless, this opens a foothold for PN to challenge PH-BN in the next state and parliamentary elections. With careful allocation of resources and early deployment of “winnable” candidates to seats which PH-BN hold on a narrow majority, PN can be expected to pose a serious challenge in the next round (Map 5). Nonetheless, as seen in 2018 and 2023, national-level sentiments can play a critical role in deciding the outcome of an electoral contest.
The performance of the Negeri Sembilan government – where state cabinet positions are allocated somewhat evenly between BN and PH – will be closely scrutinised. The state will be a test case for whether PH-BN can collaborate successfully. Should the results be positive, there may be pressure for Johor to similarly include PH assemblypersons into the state cabinet, which at present comprises only BN members. Should the collaboration be less than successful however, this will provide ample ammunition for PN in the next state election. Some of the pressing issues concern the lack of development in large parts of the state outside of Seremban, and the absence of affordable and reliable transport options for Seremban residents who commute daily to the Klang Valley.
REFERENCES
Khairy Jamaluddin. 2023. Malaysia’s 2023 Elections: A Coming Clash of Coalitions in Selangor. ISEAS Perspective 2023/61. Singapore: ISEAS.
Ong Kian Ming. 2023a. Malaysia’s 2023 State Elections (Part 1): Projections and Scenarios. ISEAS Perspective 2023/52. Singapore: ISEAS.
Ong Kian Ming. 2023b. Malaysia’s 2023 State Elections (Part 2): Campaign Strategies and Future Implications. ISEAS Perspective 2023/66. Singapore: ISEAS.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2023/89 “From Political Islam to Islamic Lifestyles: The Changing Public Face of Islam in Indonesia” by Syafiq Hasyim
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- There is a noticeable change in the position of political Islam in Indonesia’s public sphere, especially since the decline of Islamist organisations in the last decade. Concurrently, the emerging trend of Islamic lifestyles has become more popular among Indonesian Muslims than concerns with establishing a more Islamic political system.
- There are two broad categories of Islamic lifestyle. First, the halal lifestyle in consumption and production; second, the Islamic lifestyle in the economy, including finding “pure money” or money which is free from interest. The former is now rapidly increasing due to market trends, and the latter is growing, especially after the establishment of Bank Syariah Indonesia (BSI, Indonesian Syariah Bank).
- The prospects of the Islamic lifestyle industry seem bright with the support of mainstream Muslim organisations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah and Persatuan Islam (PERSIS), among others. These seem to agree with the continued implementation of Sharia through a softer form of Islamisation, such as consumption and production of more halal products.
- Political leaders like Jokowi and Bambang Yudhoyono have supported initiatives to promote Islamic lifestyles because it helps to show that they are good Muslims, while keeping the forces of Political Islam at bay.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/89, 6 November 2023
* Syafiq Hasyim is Visiting Fellow in the Indonesia Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore, and Lecturer and Director of Library and Culture at the Indonesian International Islamic University. He would like to thank Irna Nurlina Binte Masron for her excellent research assistance on this paper.
INTRODUCTION
Indonesia now seems to be witnessing the fading away of political Islam in the public sphere, as observed in the decline of Islamist organisations in the last decade. The definition of political Islam is in its objective of establishing an Islamic political system.[1] The last attempt to revive political Islam was through the mass mobilisation of Aksi Bela Islam (Action to Defend Islam) in 2016-2017, but that failed. However, that does not end the struggle for implementing Islam as a societal system. Interestingly, the latter struggle is not only being carried out by those who do not agree with the implementation of political Islam, but is also supported by those who do not wish for the total absence of Islam from the public sphere. This article looks at the changing face of Islam in Indonesia, from a focus on political Islam to a revival of Islamic lifestyles. Two questions addressed here are: firstly, why did the main focus of Islam in the public sphere shift from political Islam to Islamic lifestyles and what factors stimulated that change? Secondly, how do Islamic lifestyles direct the inclusion of more Sharia in the public sphere?
THE DECLINE OF POLITICAL ISLAM IN NOT THE END GAME
Indonesia is neither a theocratic nor a secular state. It is a Pancasila state, according to its constitution. However, since the Muslim population constitutes a majority group, some of them dream of establishing an Islamic state. Historically, Darul Islam (DI)[2] tried to accomplish this by setting up Negara Islam Indonesia (NII, Indonesian Islamic State) but that failed. More recently, this was the unaccomplished ambition of Jamaah Islamiyyah, HTI, and many others. The Indonesian Islamist groups have also approached Islamic political parties (PKS, PPP and PKS) and Islamic organisations to amend Article 29 of the Indonesian Constitution to accommodate the Jakarta charter in the annual session meeting of MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, People’s Consultative Assembly of Indonesia) in 2000, 2001 and 2002.[3] The Jakarta Charter was formulated by the committee that also prepared for Indonesia’s independence. It contains two controversial articles. The first is the “obligation to practise sharia law for all Muslims” (kewajiban menjalankan syari’at Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluk). The second is a requirement that the President should be a Muslim.[4] Be that as it may, the idea of establishing an Islamic state is always present in Indonesian Islamists’ thinking. They still pursue Sharia implementation even without the establishment of an Islamic state. The FPI and other Islamist organisations, for instance, have proposed for Indonesia to remain a Pancasila state, but with the state accommodating within it some aspects of Sharia.
Some efforts at reviving a similar idea with the content of the Jakarta Charter re-appeared in 2016 and 2017, riding on the blasphemy case against Basuki Tjahaja Purnama or Ahok, the governor of Jakarta. The case started with Ahok’s comment about the Quranic chapter al-Maidah verse 52, viewed by Indonesian Islamists as blasphemy against Islam. They used this opportunity to consolidate their strength and mobilise for Aksi Bela Islam (Action to Defend Islam, or 212 movement). They organised big demonstrations in Jakarta, and were able to pressure the government and the court to imprison Ahok, which helped Anies Baswedan win the gubernatorial election of Jakarta in 2017.
Actually, the Indonesian Islamist groups had expected to use the momentum of their movement (Aksi Bela Islam) for the rebirth of political Islam, but the expectation was dashed. Their failure was compounded by the issuance of State Law No 16/2017 on mass organisations, which banned two proponents of political Islam, FPI (Front Pembela Islam, Islamic Defenders Front) and HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia). There are, of course, Islamist organisations that remain active, such as the alumni of the 212 movement and the new FPI, but their resonance is not strong. Rizieq Shihab, as a symbolic figure of the Islamist movement in the last decade, for example, has been keeping a low profile. In comparison, the mainstream Muslim organisations especially Nahdlatul Ulama and MUI (Council of Indonesian Ulama) have appeared more in the public sphere, and are playing a stronger role in strengthening Islamic normativity and public morality. Usually, Nahdlatul Ulama’s role features instilling Islamic values and substance instead of Islamic formalism, while MUI endorses the inclusion of Sharia in the legal and public sphere.
However, the decline of political Islam in the public sphere does not mean that the importance of Islam and Sharia is fading. It is not the end game for those who want Islam to play a significant role in the public sphere of Indonesia. This can be seen in the recent resurgence of Islamic lifestyles among Muslims.
THE REVIVAL OF ISLAMIC LIFESTYLES
Political Islam is not only the representation of Islam. Outside political Islam are other important aspects of Islam such as lifestyle, morality, and mu’amala (business). An Islamic lifestyle often refers to customs, traditions and cultures in the Muslim community.[5] Therefore, the Islamic lifestyle here often relates to the practice of Islam in daily life. An Islamic lifestyle influences how people eat and drink. This then leads to a massive emergence of halal-certified products. An Islamic lifestyle is also reflected in how people travel to prevalent sites of Islamic tourism. Also, the ways people find, use and save money in Islamic finance and banking are also expressions of an Islamic lifestyle. Fashion and dress are two other important areas of emerging Islamic lifestyles among Indonesian Muslims. Like other lifestyle types, Islamic or Sharia lifestyles have also adapted to new trends in consumption, production, dressing and tourism.
An example of Islamic lifestyle implementation is the inception of Law No 33/2014. This Law makes halal certification mandatory in Indonesia. The responsible institution to certify is no longer Lembaga Pengkajian Pangan dan Obat-obatan dan Kosmetika (LPPOM, The Assessment Institute for Foods, Drugs And Cosmetics),[6] but Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Produk Halal (BPJPH, The Halal Assurance Organizing Body).[7] This law was passed under the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) government. Jokowi then strengthened it through the State Law on Job-Creation (UU Cipta Kerja), and Government Regulation No 39/2021 on Jaminan Produk Halal (Halal Product Assurance).
The emergence of concern about the Islamic lifestyle in Indonesia was triggered by an incident in which a popular dairy product was found to be contaminated with non-halal ingredients. It was related to a milk product of DANCOW, which was mixed with pork ingredients in East Java. Muslim consumers were affected due to the widespread use of this milk product in the province. Then-President Suharto asked MUI (Council of Indonesian Ulama) to mitigate the issue. As a response, MUI established LPPOM-MUI in 1989. The LPPOM was designed as an institution under MUI to oversee halal products, and was responsible for investigating halal products and issuing halal certificates. Although halal certification was not mandatory under the LPPOM, Indonesian producers and consumers sought to comply. Halal certification is important among Indonesian Muslims and will influence their consumption behaviours.
Under Joko Widodo’s government, the role of LPPOM ended when the lawmakers agreed to establish BPJPH, giving halal certification prominence. Under the Jokowi government, Indonesia aims to become an important player in the global halal industry. Jokowi took two important policies. First, his government issued Government Regulation to State Law No 33/2014 which provided legal legitimacy for halal product certification. Second, he gave a special mandate to Vice President Ma’ruf Amin to promote a halal economy, including Sharia finance and banking.[8] All these actions have been taken as Jokowi wants Indonesia to become an international hub of the halal industry by 2024.
RESPONSES TO HALAL LIFESTYLES
In the last decade, halal lifestyle has gained traction among Muslims and non-Muslims. It is evident in the increasing concerns of the world in both responding to and adopting the halal lifestyle. The global market indicates that halal lifestyles will further shape the world market. According to the Dinar Standard’s State of Global Islamic Economy, Indonesia ranks fourth in the international halal market.[9] Importantly, those who jumped on the bandwagon were not only Muslims but non-Muslims as well. This was evident in the increasing interest of non-Muslim countries such as Australia, China, Canada and others to expand their halal product market share in Indonesia.[10]
In Indonesia, the increase in halal lifestyle is reflected in a survey conducted by the Indonesia Studies Programme of ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI).[11] When asked about their preference to buy halal products and services, 90% of Indonesian Muslims preferred halal food and only 8% of them said “No”. The survey also finds that 47% of Indonesian Muslim respondents send their children to Islamic education institutions such as pesantren, madrasah, Islamic integrated school and others, while 28% of Indonesian Muslim respondents prefer to get service from Sharia banks or finance institutions. The findings indicate a substantial interest among Indonesian Muslims to comply with Sharia.
“PURE MONEY”: LIFESTYLE IN ECONOMY
Besides stricter halal adherence, finding “pure money” has been an interesting trend among Indonesian Muslims since 1990. The term “pure money” means money which is free from interest (Arabic: riba). Indonesian Muslims have different perceptions on riba, whether it is allowed or not. Nahdlatul Ulama allows interest income in conventional banks partially because its percentage is very small. During the Abdurrahman Wahid leadership, NU established a conventional bank called NUSUMMA.[12] Under Syafi’i Ma’arif’s leadership, Muhammadiyah established another conventional bank, Bank Persyarikatan. Although both NUSUMMA and Bank Persyarikatan were not successful, they reflected an acceptance of bank interest among Muslim organisations. Yet, MUI states that bank interest is not allowed (haram). This ulama organisation promotes Sharia finance and banks.[13] MUI and Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI) established “a new Islamic lifestyle-bank, Bank Muamalat Indonesia (BMI), that used non-interest system.”[14] The BMI faced difficulty surviving as a healthy bank due to chronic problems such as non-performing financing and the decrease in capital adequacy ratio (CAR).[15] Despite the challenges, MUI continued its effort to strengthen and advance Islamic finance and banking.
A more visible success of Islamic finance and banking can be seen in the formation of Bank Syariah Indonesia (BSI) during the second term of Joko Widodo. The BSI is now among the largest Indonesian banks, backed by reliable capital and operation. It is used by government ministries. Many civil servants, students and lecturers have become customers of this bank. In the province of Aceh, BSI is very dominant and has become the largest bank.[16] Nationwide, the BSI ranks as the sixth largest national bank.[17]
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Islamic lifestyles will continue to thrive in Indonesia, running concurrent with the apparent decline of Islamist organisational discourses. There are some reasons for this. First is the continuing support for it from the ruling regime. Both pillars of Islamic lifestyle, Islamic finance and banking and halal products, have a strong legal basis in state law. In addition, the government has been directly promoting halal products. Both Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Joko Widodo paved the way for the Islamic lifestyle industry. Two state laws on Islamic finance and banking (State Law No 21/2008 on Syariah Banking) and halal products were registered in SBY’s era.[18] Joko Widodo came with strong support for both Islamic finance and halal products and provided a strategic plan for international expansion as a halal industry hub. In addition to that, halal products are now fully under the control of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Second, mainstream Muslim organisations like Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, MUI, Persatuan Islam, al-Wasliyah and many others are more comfortable with Islamic lifestyle trends instead of political Islam. After the decline of radical Islamist groups, mainstream Muslim organisations expanded their role in strengthening the meaning and practice of Islam through the Islamic lifestyle. It is in line with the vision of most mainstream Muslim organisations that want to commit to Pancasila on the one hand and apply Islam in daily life on the other hand. This vision is fulfillable with the Islamic lifestyle.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2023/88 “How Far Will PAS Deviate from the Ulama Leadership Model, and Why Does it Matter?” by Azmil Tayeb
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Ulama (religious scholars) have always been at the core of Malaysia’s Pan-Malaysia Islamic Party (PAS), and their leadership has been seen as a necessity for the party to keep to its political agenda.
- PAS may accommodate leaders and members with different backgrounds, but the top leadership positions are dominated by those versed in Islamic studies.
- The 2015 party congress (muktamar) saw a purge of the moderate professional faction, which left the conservatives fully in charge, in particular the Ulama leadership.
- However, since its surprise overachievement in the 2018 general election, PAS has been gradually promoting non-Ulamas to take up vital leadership positions, beginning with the appointment of Ahmad Samsuri Mokhtar as the Chief Minister of Terengganu in 2018 and Muhammad Sanusi Md Nor as the Chief Minister of Kedah in 2020.
- The leadership shift raises two questions: How far is PAS willing to deviate from Ulama leadership, and what type of non-Ulama leadership the party is promoting?
- Given its ambition to expand its reach beyond the rural northern Malay heartlands, PAS seems likely to induct more professionals/technocrats into its leadership ranks, to enhance its credibility for administrative and economic governance. Nevertheless, PAS will probably ensure that these new leaders will uphold the party’s commitment to core Islamic principles.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/88, 1 November 2023
* Azmil Tayeb is Visiting Senior Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. He is also Associate Professor at the School of Social Sciences, Universiti Sains Malaysia.
INTRODUCTION
Ever since the Ulama (religious scholars) leadership took control of the party in the 1980s, the Pan-Malaysia Islamic Party (PAS) has always chosen an Ulama to be Chief Minister in states it has won. When PAS regained Kelantan in 1990, its candidate for the Chief Minister post was the late Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat, an Ulama trained in Egypt and Pakistan. Nine years later, when PAS wrested the Terengganu state government from Barisan Nasional (BN), its choice for Chief Minister was Hadi Awang, a Middle East-trained Ulama and the current president of PAS. Two Chief Ministers that succeeded Nik Aziz – Ahmad Yakob and Muhammad Nussuruddin Daud – also had Islamic studies background. In 2008, riding high on the reformist wave of the then-Pakatan Rakyat coalition, PAS managed to capture the state government of Kedah and subsequently appointed the late Azizan Abdul Razak, an Ulama with educational training in the Middle East and the UK, as Chief Minister. While PAS’s leadership may reflect a broad cross-section of society, the Ulama still remain at the heart of the party.
The practice of appointing Ulama as Chief Minister changed in 2018 when PAS won the Terengganu state government. The party’s choice for the post was Ahmad Samsuri Mokhtar, an aerospace engineer and a university lecturer with a PhD from the University of Leeds. The appointment was unprecedented since Hadi Awang, the former Chief Minister, still loomed large in the picture. But then it was not much of a surprise as Samsuri was then political secretary to Hadi Awang, which meant his elevation to the Chief Minister post had the full blessing of his former boss. What made the appointment of Samsuri intriguing is that it took place in the wake of the purging of the professional (Erdogan) faction in the party in 2015, which later splintered off and formed a new Islamic party, Amanah. In the aftermath, the Ulama leadership consolidated its hold over the party, leading one to think that there was no room for pragmatists and professionals in PAS. The selection of Samsuri as the Chief Minister of Terengganu proved that to not necessarily be the case.
The ascendancy of Muhammad Sanusi Md Nor in Kedah, and in national politics for that matter, continues to signal a shift from the Ulama leadership. Sanusi took over the Chief Minister post in May 2020 after the state fell to Perikatan Nasional when several PH state assemblypersons switched their allegiance and triggered the change of government. Sanusi happened to be the opposition leader in the state assembly at the time, which made him the new Chief Minister by default. Known for his populist everyday man appeal and shoot-from-the-hip public statements, Sanusi was neither an Ulama nor a professional.[1] A Social Science graduate from the Universiti Sains Malaysia in Penang, his CV seems to straddle both private business and public service. Not even a year into his tenure, there was already talk of replacing him with Takiyuddin Hassan, PAS’s secretary general, due to uneasiness over his abrasive, confrontational style.[2] Sanusi soon proved to be politically cunning and not easy to dislodge from the post of Chief Minister. And so, his appointment as the Chief Minister following PN’s stellar performance in the recent state elections was a foregone conclusion, a testament to his popularity, not just in Kedah but also in the rest of Malaysia.
At the moment, there are two types of non-Ulama leaders on display: the professional Samsuri-led state government in Terengganu and the populist Sanusi-led state government in Kedah. PAS seems to have realised that for it to stay relevant, it needs to revamp its image, particularly to appeal to newly enfranchised young Malays and affluent urban Malays. It has to move away from the pejorative label “parti lebai” and try a new strategy to market itself.[3] Hence in recent state elections, PAS promised that states under its control would be governed by both professionals and Ulama, particularly Kelantan, where the economic development has been lagging behind Terengganu and Kedah.[4]
CHOOSING LEADERS WITHIN PAS
As an ideologically-driven party, all candidates for political positions at the state and federal levels have to be vetted and approved by the party’s main authority, Majlis Syura Ulama (Council of Ulama Leadership). Majlis Syura Ulama was established in the early 1980s for the Ulama leadership to cement its takeover of the party from the Malay nationalists. It consists of no more than 17 Ulama drawn from various components of the party: four from the Central Working Committee, four from the Dewan Ulama PAS Pusat (Central PAS Ulama Assembly), two from the youth wing, two from the women’s wing, and five from the Majlis Syura Ulama itself. The head of the Majlis Syura Ulama is called “mursyidul am” (spiritual leader) and is the highest authority in the party, alongside the party president who oversees day-to-day governing affairs.
The selection process begins when the party at the state level submits to the Majlis Syura Ulama its slate of candidates for elections and leadership posts such as the Chief Minister and state Exco members.[5] This is to ensure that candidates not only pass the requisite financial and background checks but are also closely vetted for their unwavering ideological commitment. Since the 2015 mass purge of the “Erdogan faction,” PAS has hardened ideologically, with the remaining conservative faction pulling the party further to the right. There was no more room in PAS for ideological differences. By the 2018 general elections, they had completely consolidated their control over the party, and this paid off handsomely. Contesting as a third force, PAS performed beyond expectations by winning 18 seats, creating its own “green wave” in Kedah, Kelantan, and Terengganu.[6] One key takeaway from PAS’s achievement in the 2018 general election is that the party knows it can be both religiously dogmatic and electorally viable. There is no need for it to compromise its ideology to be politically relevant, the way it did when it was part of Barisan Alternatif and Pakatan Rakyat. PAS’s electoral performance has only gone from strength to strength since 2018. As part of the PN coalition, PAS won 49 seats in the 2022 general elections, making it the party with most seats among all parties in the parliament. An estimated 54 percent of Malays voted for PN, proving the saliency of its hardline political stance to champion the special position of Malays and Islam.[7]
THE LEADERSHIP IN PN-GOVERNED STATES
At the same time, PAS also realises that it needs rejuvenation. The danger of being in power for a long time, as is the case of the PAS state government in Kelantan where the party has governed continuously for 33 years, is that it breeds complacency and voter fatigue. This is particularly so in Kelantan which has not been able to generate much economic development and employment. There is actual worry that by being Ulama-centric alone would not to sustain the party into the future. Instead, PAS needs to put forward fresh candidates with non-religious backgrounds, namely professionals, an exercise one PAS activist terms fiqh taghyir (interpreting the shariah precepts in the context of change).[8] In Kelantan, 23 out of 45 PN candidates who contested in the state election were new, of which eight came from a professional background, unprecedented in the land known as Serambi Mekah (Verandah of Mecca).[9]
PN was downright dominant in its strongholds in the recent state elections. It won 33 out of 36 seats in Kedah, 43 out of 45 seats in Kelantan, and 32 out of 32 seats in Terengganu. The sweeping results meant that these are effectively one-party states and PN can appoint any state leadership lineup it chooses without having to compromise with others. It is also an opportunity for PN to walk its election campaign talk of wanting to inject more professionalism in the states that it governs. The current composition of state exco in these three states is a good indicator of whether PN is ready to veer away from Ulama leadership and embrace more professionals into its leadership ranks.
Figure 1: Composition of state exco in PN-governed states[10]
From Figure 1 above, we can observe that Ulama plays an outsize role in the stewardship of Kelantan and Terengganu, where they make up nearly half of the present state exco lineup. Despite its campaign rhetoric, PAS is still not ready to part with Ulama leadership in these two states. The populations of Kelantan and Terengganu are homogenously Malays (more than 95 percent), predominantly rural, and hold deeply conservative Islamic values. These factors might explain why the Ulama wield substantive socio-political cachet and feature prominently in the state leadership, notwithstanding the presence of professionals within its ranks including the Chief Minister post. However, in Kedah, both Ulama and professionals are not a big part of the state exco lineup, which is dominated by technocrats and businesspersons. Unlike Kelantan and Terengganu, Kedah’s population is slightly more diverse, with Malays comprising 76 percent of the overall state population. Kedah also has the comparative edge of being close to Penang, a wealthy state with a strong industrial base that provides employment for many Kedah residents and spillover economic development, namely the Kulim Hitech Park abutting the Penang-Kedah border. As such, business acumen and policy-making experience seem to be the state exco’s prerequisites in Kedah and might explain why the composition of state exco in Kedah varies from the ones in Kelantan and Terengganu.
Perlis is unchartered territory for PAS as it had long been the unbreachable bastion of UMNO in the north. PAS never had political success in Perlis until the 2022 general elections. The defection of UMNO Perlis’s warlord Shahidan Kassim to PN and the overwhelming vote transfer from UMNO to PN finally allowed PAS to capture Perlis for the first time. While its seven-member state Exco is dominated by PAS (five members) with Bersatu making up the rest, Exco members with professional and business backgrounds comprise the majority of the state leadership. This is possibly due to the need to sustain the support of UMNO members who voted for PN; UMNO’s legacy still looms large in the state.
CHARTING A NEW LEADERSHIP PATH?
It is clear that while PAS acknowledges the urgency to reshape the party’s image when it comes to aptitude and relevance in confronting modern challenges, the efforts should not be undertaken at the expense of sidelining the Ulama leadership’s authority and diluting the party’s core ideology. The current state government in Terengganu showcases the governing equilibrium between maintaining Ulama’s imprimatur and incorporating professionalism. Kelantan, meanwhile, despite the pre-state election promise to recruit more professionals, has failed to seize the opportunity, and the Ulama continue to play a prominent role in the state leadership. It is in Kedah that we can see a discernible divergence from the traditional Ulama leadership.
The Sanusi-led state government in Kedah raises two questions about the shift in leadership practice within PAS: First, will we be seeing more non-Ulama leaders promoted within PAS and entrusted with important positions such as helming the state government, and second, What type of government can we expect from these non-Ulama leaders?[11]
As with any conservative political party, change happens at a glacial pace with PAS. It knows that it must adapt to the demands of present-day politics, namely the ambition to expand beyond its northern and northeastern bastions, and its need to do so without significantly diluting its ideology. In the 2022 general elections and the 2023 state elections, PAS, by way of PN, managed to carve inroads into urban and semi-urban areas in Selangor and Penang. Urban and semi-urban supporters of PAS expect their elected representatives to not only have a solid religious foundation but also a firm grasp on policy-making processes and bread-and-butter issues faced by the public. It is no longer enough for a PAS leader to simply say Islam is the solution but not ground it in concrete, empirically-informed policies. It is the reason why we will see more professionals and technocrats rise through party ranks. The pre-state election Debat Ekonomi (Debate on Economy) between Rafizi Ramli, the current Minister of Economy and Mohd Syahir Che Sulaiman, the PAS MP for Bachok in Kelantan, is an example of PAS’s effort to project a professional image to society at-large.[12] The debate was broadcasted live nationwide and provided a rare platform for PAS to show the general public that the party is capable of offering more than just religious homilies to modern-day economic challenges.[13]
It then begs the question what type of government we can expect when it is led by non-Ulama leaders? The current state governments in Kedah and Terengganu offer more than mere glimpses of what the non-Ulama leadership brings to the table. On one hand, it is economically pragmatic since both states have a much stronger and vibrant economic base than Kelantan. Professionals and technocrats, due to their background and experience, are better suited to deal with investors and businesses in their respective states. PAS’s Islamist ideology does not subscribe to any particular economic orthodoxy, which allows these non-Ulama leaders to pursue their own economic prerogatives without running afoul of the party.[14] On the other hand, the non-Ulama leaders are no different than the Ulama leaders when it comes to enacting PAS’s hardline stance on morality issues. Kedah under Sanusi’s administration has moved to ban all gaming and lottery outlets in the state while the professional-led government of Terengganu has introduced amendments to the state’s shariah laws that criminalise out-of-wedlock pregnancy, women who dress like men (pengkid), preparation to commit sodomy, black magic and sorcery, among others.[15] Terengganu state government has also recently barred Muslim girls from gymnastics because of the sport’s tight-fitting clothes.[16] Simply put, economic pragmatism does not equate religious moderation.
Hadi Awang, the current president of PAS, who is in the twilight of his leadership in the party, can rest assured that PAS will remain faithful to its hardline ideological course long after he is gone. Besides the two aforementioned leaders who used to be his protégés – Ahmad Samsuri Mokhtar and Mohd Syahir Che Sulaiman – Hadi Awang’s son, Muhammad Khalil Abdul Hadi, and his son-in-law, Zaharuddin Muhammad, 46 and 47 years old respectively, are also prominent party leaders. Muhammad Khalil is the state assemblyperson for Batu Buruk in Terengganu and the state Exco member for communication, Islamic propagation (dakwah), and strengthening of syariah. He recently completed his PhD at the Universiti Sultan Zainal Abidin (UniSZA) in Terengganu with the thesis title “Hak berpolitik orang bukan Islam di Malaysia menurut Siyasah Syar’iyyah” (Non-Muslims political rights in Malaysia according to syariah politics).[17] Zaharuddin Muhammad is a Middle East-trained ustaz (religious teacher) who used to be a member of Majlis Syura Ulama PAS and the Deputy Director of PAS’s Research Centre. Since the passing of the former mursyidul am, Nik Aziz Nik Mat, in 2015, Hadi Awang has molded the party to his dogmatic ethnoreligious worldview and with his people now forming the next line of leadership, there is no reason to see PAS moderating its ideological stance any time soon.[18]
Common ideological commitment remains the holding centre, as the Ulama share the mantle of party leadership with professionals and technocrats. PAS leaders and members, regardless of backgrounds, are well drilled in the party’s core ideology, which is the struggle to Islamise the state and society in Malaysia.[19] Many have joined PAS during their formative years, wended through its educational network, campus organisations, study circles (usrah) and various party indoctrination activities, and have fully internalised PAS’s values. When it comes to ideological commitment, there is no qualitative difference between Ulama and non-Ulama leaders. No one in the party doubt the devotion of non-Ulama leaders such as Samsuri and Sanusi to the cause, who can don their Western garb – in the case of Sanusi, even go shirtless in public – not having to pepper their speech with references from the Quran and hadith, and still be taken seriously as leaders of an Islamic party. It is this type of leaders, a composite of non-Ulama background and party dogma, that we will be seeing more from PAS in the near future.
APPENDIX: List of PAS’s Chief Ministers and Their Background
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2023/87 “Continuity and Change: The Limits of Malaysia’s Green Wave from a Four Arenas Perspective” by Kai Ostwald and Steven Oliver
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Malaysia has experienced a period of dramatic political change over the past decade, capped off by the November 2022 general election and the August 2023 state elections. Many analyses have pointed to a “green wave” to describe the electoral breakthroughs achieved by the Islamist party PAS and its Perikatan Nasional coalition.
- This analysis adopts a macro-level Four Arenas framework to assess what has, and what has not, changed in Malaysia’s electoral outcomes between 2013 and 2023. The framework conceives of Malaysia as four distinct electoral arenas—three on the Peninsula (Northeast, Malay-majority, and Malay-minority) and East Malaysia—each of which has unique electoral dynamics. Contrary to assumptions of comprehensive political change, the analysis demonstrates that political change is limited to just two arenas and partially a function of coalition realignment rather than significant changes in voter preferences. In other arenas, political outcomes have been remarkably consistent.
- The purported “green wave” is geographically limited in scope. It is clearest in PAS’ consolidation of the peninsula’s northern states, which are for historical reasons demographically distinct. There is less evidence, however, of a green wave affecting outcomes in other arenas: PN achieved few gains in East Malaysia and in ethnically diverse peninsular seats during the 2022/23 elections; in other parts of the peninsula beyond the north, PN’s gains were modest at best and made primarily under the relatively neutral PN—rather than PAS green—banner.
- The PN’s limited success outside of the northern states suggests that PAS may already have achieved most of its “easy” wins, and that significant inroads into new areas—without which securing a parliamentary majority is impossible—might be difficult in the absence of modifying its political positions or restructuring its coalition. Both of those, however, entail their own uncertainties and costs.
- Other coalitions face some form of this basic dilemma as well, as none are well-positioned to secure a parliamentary majority on their own. This requires improvisation and/or cross-coalition collaborations, both of which test the resilience of poorly institutionalized coalitions. Such a mix is not favourable to stability, including in the form of protracted rule by a PAS-led government that some green wave narratives present as the logical outcome of PAS’s recent gains.
* Kai Ostwald is Associate Professor in the School of Public Policy and Global Affairs at the University of British Columbia, as well as Director of UBC’s Institute of Asian Research. He is also Associate Senior Fellow of the Malaysia Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. Steven Oliver is Assistant Professor in Social Sciences and Head of Studies (Philosophy, Politics, and Economics) at Yale-NUS College.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/87, 27 October 2023
INTRODUCTION
Perhaps no narrative features more prominently in analyses of Malaysia’s November 2022 general election (GE15) or its August 2023 (PRN2023) state elections than that of the “green wave”. That narrative contends that a growing preference for Islamist politics in Malaysia has driven (and may continue to drive) electoral breakthroughs for the Perikatan Nasional (PN) coalition, and particularly its component party Parti Islam se-Malaysia (PAS). It is the latest of several developments that suggest profound changes to Malaysia’s political order, once among the world’s most stable.
Malaysia’s political order has clearly changed in the past decade. This period includes the tail-end of UMNO’s six-decade long dominance of Malaysian politics, proceeds through its unexpected 2018 defeat, enters a period of unprecedented instability that saw three new governments take power in three years, and ends with GE15 and PRN2023, which saw the Islamist party PAS secure more seats than any other. Opinion polling has fed strongly into the green wave narrative, often focusing on such things as indicators of growing conservatism among the Malay-Muslim majority. The same is true for the sentiments of newly enfranchised 18 to 21-year-old voters, not least due to their purported captivation with populist figures—especially PAS’ Sanusi Md Noor[1]—and high reliance on social media, which PAS has effectively used to promote its blend of religious and political messaging.[2]
Although narratives on voter sentiments—including the green wave—often contain elements of truth, their direct extrapolation to macro-level political outcomes risks yielding oversimplified and insufficiently substantiated conclusions.[3] This is particularly true for a country like Malaysia, where structural complexities, chief amongst which are strongly pronounced regional differences and an electoral system that distorts the translation of votes into seats, affect how changing voter sentiments impact actual electoral outcomes and the balance of power in Parliament. In short, even if preferences among a subset of the population are changing, their impact on parliamentary numbers is indirect.
This Perspective addresses a simple question: what has, and what has not, changed in Malaysia’s electoral environment during the tumultuous years from GE13 through PRN2023? In addressing this question, it adopts the “Four Arenas” framework developed in earlier work. This provides a macro-level perspective to complement voter-level studies.[4] Our analysis suggests continuity in some areas and significant change in others, though not always due to changing voter preferences. This has a number of implications, including for the “green wave” narrative. Specifically, PAS’ GE15 gains in UMNO’s former peninsular strongholds indicate a consolidation of the north, but inroads beyond the north remain limited and difficult to interpret. In short, there may be developments in voter preferences around political Islam, but at least for the time being, any electoral green wave remains regionally contained.
THE FOUR ARENAS FRAMEWORK
Malaysia can be conceived of as an amalgamation of regions with distinct demographic features and historical origins. That composition creates significant overall diversity, and strong geographic concentration of political preferences. In addition, Malaysia’s electoral districts are highly gerrymandered and malapportioned.[5] These features have myriad implications beyond distorting the translation of voter preferences into parliamentary seats. The Four Arenas framework takes these features into account to allow for macro-level comparisons of developments in Malaysian politics.
The framework views Malaysia as comprised of four distinct polities, each with their own distinct electoral dynamics. Table 1 shows the four electoral arenas, using data from the 14th general election (GE14) held in 2018.[6] The Northeast arena covers all the electoral districts of Kelantan and Terengganu. This region did not come under British control until the Bangkok Treaty of 1909 and consequently did not experience the same economic and demographic transformations as other parts of the peninsula, a condition that is reflected in its still distinct demographic structure. The East Malaysia arena comprises all districts in the Bornean states of Sabah and Sarawak, which operated largely independent of British Malaya during the colonial period and which have retained a distinct political dynamic since. The Peninsula Diverse arena is defined as peninsular districts with a greater-than-50% non-Malay electorate in GE14; it contains mainly urban and semi-urban seats, and functions—much as the Straits Settlements did under colonial rule—as a cosmopolitan gateway to the global economy. The (Malay-majority) Peninsula Malay arena comprises the peninsula’s remaining districts; they are the traditional stronghold of once-dominant UMNO. Notably, most of the seats, particularly beyond Kedah and Perlis, are also more ethnically diverse than their northern counterparts.[7] The arena’s large number of seats, in which votes are overweighted through malapportionment, made this the cardinal region of Malaysian politics from which political power emanated under BN’s long rule.
Table 1: Key attributes of the four arenas, showing data from GE14 in 2018
POLITICAL CONTINUITY AND CHANGE FROM GE13 THROUGH PRN2023
The four arenas framework provides a systematic high-level perspective on how evolving political preferences within the electorate affect parliamentary seats across the diverse arenas. Figure 1 captures the percentage of seats won by each major contestant in GE13, GE14 and GE15 in each of the four arenas. This range covers a tumultuous period for Malaysian politics, from the last general election won by the BN (GE13) through the purported green wave of GE15 and PRN2023.
The blue bars denote the UMNO-led and formerly dominant BN coalition. Red bars denote the Pakatan Rakyat (PR) coalition (in GE13) and its successor Pakatan Harapan (PH) (in GE14 and GE15). Note that for the sake of comparison, PAS is shown separately from PR in GE13, despite belonging to the coalition. Green bars denote PAS (in GE13 and GE14) and the PN coalition in GE15. The yellow bar denotes the myriad East Malaysian parties and coalitions.
Figure 1: Percentage of seats won in each arena by the major coalitions/contestants
The figures tell a story of both continuity and change. The continuity in electoral outcomes—in the sense of consolidating trends—is most striking in the Peninsula Diverse and Northeast arenas: the progressive PR/PH coalition established itself as a dominant force in the Peninsula Diverse arena in GE13 and further consolidated that position in the subsequent two elections, conceding only 2 of the 48 total seats in the arena during GE15. The story is similar in the Northeastarena, where PAS has had a significant presence since its establishment in the 1950s. While the BN was typically competitive in the arena up through GE12, the balance steadily tipped towards PAS in GE13, and was further consolidated in GE14 and GE15 (the latter as part of the PN coalition together with Bersatu).
By contrast, the Peninsula Malay and East Malaysia arenas have experienced more substantial change. As UMNO’s long-standing stronghold, the Peninsula Malay arena is arguably the region in whose image contemporary Malaysia has been shaped.[8] It was also the foundation on which the BN built its dominance: UMNO controlled many of the arena’s (large number of) seats, then relied on supplemental seats—often won by junior coalition partners—in other arenas to secure parliamentary supermajorities. The BN’s grip on the arena remained solid in GE13, where it won nearly three-quarters of the seats, but substantially loosened in GE14 and slipped further in GE15. Figure 2, which depicts seats won in the arena by party (left pane) as well as seat flows between parties in GE15 (right pane), provides additional insights.
Figure 2: (left pane) seats won by party in the Peninsula Malay arena in GE13, GE14 and GE15; (right pane) seat flows between parties in GE15 (left side indicates seats lost, right indicates new seats won).
UMNO’s losses in GE14 and GE15 were precipitous, but the beneficiaries differ between the elections. In GE14, a majority of UMNO’s lost seats were picked up by the newly-formed UMNO-clone party Bersatu, which shared much of UMNO’s platform. PAS, which contested widely as a third-party under its own logo, was largely uncompetitive, winning only 3 seats in the arena (and none in the Peninsula Diverse and East Malaysia arenas). In GE15, by contrast, PAS gained 23 seats (for a total of 26) in the arena within the PN coalition, increasing its seat count nearly 10-fold; it picked up 11 seats from UMNO, 8 from PKR, and 3 from Amanah. Bersatu’s seat count increased by a more modest 9, split between former UMNO and PKR seats.[9] In short, the Peninsula Malay arena, which was Malaysia’s most stable arena under UMNO’s long rule, has experienced substantial volatility since GE13.
PAS’ breakthrough has received particular attention, and forms the basis of the green wave narrative. This is not unwarranted: from being largely a non-entity prior to GE15 in Malaysia’s cardinal electoral arena, it now holds more seats than any other party there. But does this validate the green wave narrative? Two important caveats stand out.
First, as Figure 3 illustrates, PAS’ expansion remains regionally concentrated, even within the Peninsula Malay arena. PAS picked up six new seats in Kedah, where it now holds 9 of the 15 total. Similarly, in Perlis, it now holds 2 of 3 seats. In total, PAS controls 27 of the 40 seats in Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah, and Perlis, all northern states that remain unique following their relatively late incorporation into British Malaya.[10] Moreover, PAS won every seat it contested in those states, and its grassroots machinery was instrumental in supporting Bersatu’s 12 wins, allowing the PN to take 39 of 40 seats in the northern states. PAS’ success beyond those states, however, was far more modest; it won only 16 of the additional 37 seats it contested (47%). A similar pattern holds for PRN2023: in the northern states, PN won 108 of 113 seats (96%), of which PAS itself won 75%. In the remaining states of Penang, Selangor and Negeri Sembilan, PN holds only 39 of 133 seats (29%); those are quite evenly split between PAS and Bersatu, leaving PAS with only 18% of seats.
The second caveat relates to another geographically-defined distinction: in the northern states, PAS flags and other party insignia often accompanied (or even overwhelmed) the more neutral and centrist PN blue during GE15 and PRN2023 campaigning; in the remaining states, PN branding dominated, typically leaving little-to-no indication of underlying party affiliation, and thus making it difficult for voters to discern between PAS and Bersatu candidates.[11] In short, GE15 and PRN2023 clearly saw a PAS breakthrough. But the pattern of PAS’ wins suggests more a consolidation of northern states than it does a peninsula-wide wave, at least in terms of electoral outcomes. This does not preclude the possibility that underlying socio-political developments are driving an increase in appetite for Islamist politics, but even then, its electoral effects remain geographically bounded for the time being.
Figure 3: PAS’ expansion in the Peninsula Malay. Dark green denotes Northeast arena seats, light green denotes Peninsula Malay seats won by PAS in GE15.
The East Malaysia arena’s states of Sabah and Sarawak were often branded a “fixed deposit” for the BN for their consistent delivery of seats to the once-dominant coalition.[12] This typically came through East Malaysian component parties of the BN coalition, though East Malaysian-led local UMNO branches also contributed seats. The BN’s collapse in this arena is staggering: from winning 49 (of 57) seats in GE13, it managed only 7 in GE15. This suggests a similar fundamental upheaval of political order, as in the Peninsula Malay arena. Figure 4, however, which depicts seats won by party (rather than coalition) in East Malaysia, suggests a different story.
Figure 4: Seats won by party in East Malaysia arena in GE14 and GE15
At the party level, political change in East Malaysia—particularly between GE14 and GE15—is more modest than the BN’s collapse would suggest. This continuity amidst the collapse of BN’s seat count results from the decoupling of East Malaysian parties and political elites from their erstwhile peninsular political overlords, and not from instability in party-voter linkages. This began prior to GE14 with a split in UMNO Sabah that created the Warisan splinter party, whose seats helped PH secure a parliamentary majority in GE14. The BN’s defeat in that election precipitated a large-scale exodus of East Malaysian parties from the coalition. Those major parties/coalitions, including Gabungan Parti Sarawak (GPS) and Gabungan Rakyat Sabah, retained strong linkages to voters that allowed them to continue winning seats independent of the BN. In short, the recent changes in East Malaysian parliamentary seats reflect coalition realignments more than they do underlying changes party/elite-voter linkages.
IMPLICATIONS:
This pattern of continuity and change has important implications for political order in Malaysia. The BN’s longstanding formula for securing power—dominance of the cardinal Peninsula Malay arena, supplemented by seats from other arenas—has broken down. Despite respectable performances in Melaka, Johor, Negeri Sembilan, and parts of Pahang, there is little to suggest that the BN can re-establish its former dominance over the broader Peninsula Malay arena, particularly as PAS/PN have consolidated their control over its northern seats in Kedah and Perlis. Simultaneously, the analysis suggests that any green wave, at least in terms of actual seat wins, remains geographically bounded: PN made no meaningful inroads in the Peninsula Diverse and East Malaysia arenas, and its success in the Peninsula Malay arena was modest at best beyond the north. This does not preclude PN making further gains in the future, but does suggest that the relatively “easy” wins have already been achieved.
As the original Four Arenas article argued, securing parliamentary majorities in Malaysia requires success in multiple arenas. Given the apparent limits of the purported green wave, it is on its own unlikely to carry the PN into power. Pursuing the necessary breakthroughs in elusive arenas might compel the PN to moderate some positions or expand the coalition, but such manoeuvres require compromises that could further strain the already tense relationship between PAS and Bersatu. Therein lies the challenge confronting all Malaysian political actors: given the complexities of Malaysia’s political geography and electoral system, none of the present coalitions—whether the BN, PH, PN, GPS, GRS, or others—are well-positioned to secure a parliamentary majority on their own. That calls for improvisation between the coalitions, most of which are weakly institutionalized or are actively deinstitutionalizing.[13] Such a mix is unfavourable to stability, including in the form of protracted rule by a PAS-Bersatu coalition that some green wave narratives present as the logical outcome of PAS’ recent seat gains.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2023/86 “The Dilemma of Political Involvement among Muslim Theologians in Indonesia” by Norshahril Saat and Ahmad Muhajir
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Under Suharto’s New Order regime (1966-1998), Indonesian religious elites generally did not join formal politics or elections apart from the avenues sanctioned by the government. All Islamic political parties—of different ideologies—were grouped under the PPP (United Development Party).
- Between the 1970s and late 1990s, Nurcholish Madjid’s (Cak Nur) “Islam Yes, Islamic Politics No” shaped Indonesia’s Islamic political discourse. The more politically inclined theologians (including those from Nahdlatul Ulama, NU) joined PPP, while others who wished to make their voices heard in policymaking participated in state-formed religious institutions.
- After 1998, and under a more democratic setting, religious elites have remained divided regarding political participation. Some shun it, and prefer not to be associated with any politicians or parties, for fear of the “corruption” of their religious ideas. Some openly endorse political parties, advocate clear political roles for themselves and lobby their allies for political positions, in the name of advancing Islamic goals.
- This article discusses whether the religious elite in Indonesia is tilting towards approving direct political participation. With the election season in Indonesia due in early 2024, identity or pietistic politics is gaining more importance than ever. Yet, some religious elites prefer to focus on upholding Islamic ideals and keep their distance from politics, thereby eschewing the potential benefits of political patronage.
*Norshahril Saat is Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Regional Social and Cultural Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. Ahmad Muhajir is Visiting Fellow in the same programme, and Lecturer at UIN-Antasari Banjarmasin, South Kalimantan.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/86, 25 October 2023
INTRODUCTION
In Indonesia, Islamic religious elites’ views on the role of religion in politics have garnered attention since the fall of the New Order in 1998. From the 1970s to the late 1990s, Islamic political parties such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Partai Islam Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (PERTI), Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII) and Partai Muslimin Indonesia (PARMUSI) could only function under a single party, the United Development Party (PPP). In 1984, NU officially withdrew from formal politics after its chairman Abdurahman Wahid (or Gus Dur) declared that the organisation Kembali ke Khittah (Return to Khittah), should return to its original roots and focus on Islamic education and welfare.
The fall of Suharto triggered the democratisation process, which brought Islamic political parties other than PPP to the forefront of Indonesia’s political scene. The blossoming of Islamic political parties since 1998 is well documented. Even NU and Muhammadiyah members participated in the electoral process through new vehicles like PKB (National Awakening Party) and PAN (National Mandate Party) respectively. There has been a blurring between political and religious figures (including the ulama) ever since; for example, Gus Dur, who had shunned electoral politics previously, formed the PKB and eventually became Indonesia’s fourth president in 1999. Similarly, Muhammadiyah Chairman Amien Rais participated in the election via PAN, and between 1999-2004, was elected to be the speaker of MPR (People’s Consultative Assembly).
This article focuses on a different group of Muslim influencers or trendsetters in Indonesia, namely the religious elites or theologians, and their attitudes towards political involvement. They include the ulama (scholars), popular preachers, and ordinary religious teachers who are not career politicians. Their authority lies with the religious schools (pesantrens or madrasahs). Today, they have moved beyond the confines of the religious schools and utilise alternative platforms such as travelling roadshows and social media. This analysis contends that there has always been a diversity of views regarding the role that theologians should play in electoral politics, and the question today is, will more religious figures be swayed to participate in political campaigns in the 2024 elections? To be sure, the gulf between religious elites who shun politics and those who are neutral or actively supporting it remains. The former continues to believe that politics undermine their authority and spirituality, even if staying out means missing out on funding opportunities and acquiring positions of power, which the latter consider to be necessary for the betterment of the ummah.
ISLAM’S VIEW ON POLITICS
Muslims believe that Islam is all-encompassing, as reflected in the Quranic verse that the religion is ad deen or a way of life. However, Islamic scriptures do not always speak about all matters in detail, and mainly offer general ideas and principles. Islamic scholars then interpret texts to suit the time and spaces in which they live.
The Muslim resurgence movement that began in the 1970s advanced a different approach altogether: that Islam offers alternative systems to the West, which it deems “secular”. A faction of the movement believed in upholding shariah laws and forming an Islamic state. Political scientists refer to this faction as political Islamists. Today, another faction is gaining ground, shifting the discourse towards post-Islamism. Though not negating Islam’s comprehensiveness as opposed to Western political thought, post-Islamists believe Muslims should focus more on community work and developing shariah-compliant lifestyles rather than pushing for hard rules in the form of a state.
On the other hand, the progressives underscore moral values like justice, honesty, equality, and moderation to be the essence of Islam’s comprehensiveness. They argue that the Quran and Sunnah (sayings of the Prophet Muhammad and his behaviour during his lifetime, which has become a source of law and guidance to contemporary Muslims) do not stipulate clear injunctions to establish a particular form of government, neither do these call for the formation of Islamic parties. The political Islamists do not disagree with these values, but the progressives accept that modern political and social concepts—such as constitutions, liberal democracy, separation of powers, rule of law and checks and balances—also manifest these principles.
Today, Indonesia is a functioning democracy with the largest Muslim population in the world, where political parties are vehicles for direct electoral participation. Contemporary Indonesian theologians do not question the existence of Islamic political parties, but their attitude towards what role religious elites should play in them vary. Some support direct political participation and political parties that concurrently promote Islamic values, while others choose to keep a distance from politics altogether. In this article, we select several religious elites to illustrate the main attitudes towards politics which they hold. We choose religious elites instead of career politicians because the masses consider the former to be more authoritative when speaking about Islam. Also, theologians are community leaders whom aspiring politicians wish to engage and cultivate good relations with.
CONTENTION OVER AN ISLAMIC PARTY
At the most basic, there exists a steadfast view to which many subscribe, about the inseparability of Islam and politics. In the past, disagreements depended on whether Islamic parties should even exist (they did not exist 14 centuries ago during Prophet Muhammad’s lifetime). Abdul Wahab Chasbullah (b.1889-d.1971), a key NU kyai of the past, suggested that trying to separate politics from Islam was a futile endeavour, akin to wanting to separate sugar and sweetness.[1] This view by a senior NU cleric became the doctrinal foundation for the existence of Islamic parties, including NU, which was actively involved in electoral politics in the 1955 election, and in elections in 1970s.
By the early 1970s, there was already a cultural campaign to distinguish Islam from politics. Nurcholish Madjid, a celebrated Muslim intellectual popularly known as Cak Nur, coined the famous slogan “Islam Yes, Islamic Party No!”[2] In line with the progressives’ thinking, this captured the preference for Islamic moral teachings over political and symbolic expressions of Islam.[3] Cak Nur was a student of progressive thinker Professor Fazlur Rahman of the Chicago University. He later developed Indonesia’s intellectual reformist tradition, earning him the name Guru Bangsa (the Nation’s Teacher). Many Indonesian Muslims concur with Cak Nur’s guide; to the extent that nationalist parties have always dominated the legislative assembly since independence. In 1984, NU too withdrew from PPP and elections. By then, it had come clear that the Suharto regime was unequivocally sidelining the Islamic parties; but more than that, the Indonesian public had become very familiarised with the separation of Islam from party politics which Cak Nur advanced.
Unsurprisingly, several Muslim politicians have been displeased with Cak Nur’s slogan to this day. Instead, they advance the notion that Muslims must vote for Islamic parties as this is in accordance with Islamic teachings.[4] Former minister of religion and chairman of PPP, Suryadharma Ali, called Cak Nur’s slogan “a poison”.[5] He compared the slogan to mean abandoning Muslims’ responsibility to promote Islamic interests.[6]
Some attempted to belittle Cak Nur’s credibility by highlighting his inconsistency of thought, and political realism. To illustrate, Hidayat Nur Wahid, a founding member and former president of Islamist-oriented Justice and Prosperous Party (PKS) revealed that Cak Nur had altered his slogan in the early 2000s.[7] Cak Nur was rumoured to have approached the PKS to bid for the country’s presidency when Hidayat was serving as the party’s president. Hidayat recalled that he and the other PKS leaders were surprised by Cak Nur’s move. Hidayat then shared that Cak Nur modified his slogan to be “Islam Yes, Islamic Party Yes” when explaining that he had no reason to reject PKS.[8]
Muslim career politicians and intellectuals are at odds on whether politicians and political parties can ideally promote Islamic causes: on the one hand these can refer to values, principles; and on the other, to Islamic institutions, instruments (finance and banking) or laws (shariah or hudud laws). However, the views of theologians, whose power bases are at the more grassroots levels, are rarely captured and discussed in academic writings. To begin with, there are thousands such personalities spread across Indonesia, and it would be futile to map these diverse voices. In a broad sense, their heterogeneity can be divided the following way: those living in Java versus those outside Java; local religious schools versus national leaders; and those whose authority is tied to religious institutions versus the online influencers. At the same time, they can be cogently divided into those who prefer to keep politicians and political parties at arm’s length, for religious reasons, and those who prefer to be in their close company, for religious and practical reasons. The following demonstrates two schools of thought among a sample of contemporary religious elites, and their views on the role Muslims should play in party politics.
RELIGIOUS ELITES SUPPORTING ISLAMIC POLITICS
Popular and controversial preacher, Ustaz Abdul Somad, is positive about political power.[9] He believes that political power offers a bigger impact than religious sermons, so he appreciates Islamic scholars who take up political offices. He argues that “with a signature of a city mayor, things can move forward. With my speech from the pulpit, well… Some people may in fact, fall asleep. They do not even listen. But if you lack political skills, you should participate on the voting day. Do not abstain.”[10]
Surveys consistently show that Abdul Somad’s popularity surpasses that of his counterparts.[11] Although not as popular in Java, he is famous in Sumatera, Kalimantan and Sulawesi. In 2019, presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto offered him to be his running mate, but he declined, feeling that he lacked the political and administrative skills. However, Abdul Somad openly encouraged Indonesians to participate in the electoral process as voters and mentioned how voting responsibly was part of religion.[12] Some would consider Abdul Somad speaking beyond what typical religious elites should speak on—spirituality, piety, and morality—and moving into issues concerning politics and power.
NU kyai Gus Bahauddin Nursalim argues for pious politicians, and is more deliberate than Abdul Somad.[13] Although he remains unaffiliated with any party, Gus Baha argues that supporting Islamic parties and candidates is a must. Teaching in Central Java and Yogyakarta as a master of Islamic theology, jurisprudence and Sufism, he explains that to be able to enjoin good and prevent evil (amar ma’ruf nahi mungkar), religion needs “strength”. He says that religion can contribute to the betterment of society if it includes a little of political party, money and knowledge,[14] and concludes that Muslims should not abandon Islamic parties altogether despite their abysmal showing throughout the country’s political history. He adds that pious Muslims should not be afraid of holding public offices or being close to the political authority.[15] He also states that if the traditionalist ulama are not close to office holders, their beliefs and sites of worship will not be shielded from the Salafi-Wahhabi (purist) criticisms. He says that “the shrines of saints, that we treat with reverence, will be regarded as centres of idolatry and polytheism.”[16]
There are no doubt gains to be made for being aligned to political office holders. To illustrate, the late Guru Ahmad Bakeri, the leader of Pesantren Mursyidul Amin in Kabupaten Banjar, campaigned for Shahril Darham, a candidate for the governorship. In line with patronage politics, Ahmad was appointed manager of the provincial mosque, Mesjid Sabilal Muhtadin, a socially prestigious position that gave him access to donations for his own pesantren. Since his pesantren was surrounded by paddy field, he also received a few tractors for farming. The rule of thumb seems to be that for any appearance or speech that a religious elite makes at a political rally, he will receive honorarium.
SHUNNING POLITICS
Nevertheless, some prominent ulama in Indonesia, including those living outside Java, do not need to be involved in politics or be close to politicians to assert their authority. They often avoid the limelight and power contestations altogether. This is usually the stance of ulama who focus their efforts on teaching and leading local religious schools. These believe that the intrusion of politics into the religious realm is dangerous. In their sermons, they prefer to speak about uniting the ummah, since topics on politics can be divisive. They focus on sincerity and the hereafter, in contrast to politics, which promotes worldly interests. Unlike the ulama from several big pesantren in East and Central Java who have a history of openly supporting presidential candidates, the ulama we discuss in the following speak up about their concerns with political manipulation.
In South Kalimantan, the late Guru Muhammad Zaini Sekumpul from Martapura represented this school of thought.[17] In a viral online video, Guru Zaini said:
“We do not say “[O’ Allah] You alone we worship [but] we ask for help from political parties!” No! Do you all hear me?! I am speaking loudly. We do not ask for help from political parties! Why on earth do politicians come to Sekumpul?! What do they want here?! Have they come to politicise us, or do they think we sell political support?! [Politicians, you need to] behave properly! Do not come here and divide the ummah. We have come to be united in Sekumpul. Do not let [anyone] divide us all. The only creature that wants a divided community is Satan, the son of the Devil from the Hell of Jahannam.”[18]
A well-known Salafi preacher, Ustaz Khalid Basalamah, also refrains from formal politics. He claims to have been invited to join an Islamic party but declined, believing that politics is “slippery”. He shares:
“Ask our friends who join political parties, and ask them to say the truth, whether they often involve themselves in bribery and data falsification, all the things prohibited in Islam. I do not want to slip into that…. I think I contribute more to the ummah by teaching religion.”[19]
To some extent, Buya Yahya Zainul Ma’arif, also shares Guru Zaini’s views. He is the leader of a boarding school in West Java, and the Islamic centre Al-Bahjah in Cirebon. Since 2015, his religious sermons have been aired via the YouTube channel Al-Bahjah TV, which has 5.32 million subscribers at the time of writing.[20] He prefers politicians not to visit his school during election campaigns.[21] Although politicians bring donations when given a chance to speak before the Al-Bahjah community, Buya Yahya values political independence, because electoral-related donations would make it difficult to think objectively about the candidates.[22]
However, in 2017, Buya Yahya did not refrain from commenting on political issues, and was critical of President Joko Widodo who he regarded as protecting the Christian-Chinese Jakarta governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (or Anok) when the latter was accused of blasphemy. In 2019, Buya Yahya joined a group of ulama to support Jokowi’s main rival, Prabowo Subianto. Although some would contend that he practised “double standards”, he was consistent about not receiving any material offers from political parties and candidates during elections.
In line with the theologians who shun politics, Habib Taufiq As-Segaff, a Ba’alawi preacher and the current chairman of Rabithah Alawiyah, has warned to “beware of ulama who spend much time around the rulers! They have betrayed the Prophet Muhammad. They are like pet dogs that get excited when the owner give them something [to eat or to play with]”[23] This comment, made in public sermons a few times, offended many NU kiais. Gus Yahya Staquf, current NU chairman, even felt it was necessary to retaliate publicly that:
“[T]he point [made] about staying away from the ulama who have close relations with the government is wrong and unacceptable. The ulama are often needed to bridge the rulers and the people. The ulama also have a moral obligation to remind the rulers if they being unjust.”[24]
The theologians who shun politics never fully reject having guests from political circles and political elites at their religious schools. To maintain some distance, however, they do not give politicians the stage before their congregations to reap political capital and rally support. The theologians would normally pray for the rulers. However, they clearly understand the behaviour of some Indonesian politicians, and the potential use of money and funds to rally support. While donating to an Islamic cause such as the building of Islamic schools is an Islamic virtue, doing so not in the name of God but for political reasons is a disvalue, and so, several of the religious elite reject such donations for that reason.
CONCLUSION
In Indonesia, whether Muslim theologians or religious elites should be involved in political party or the electoral process or not is contentious. The reality is that they do get dragged into it directly or indirectly. During the Suharto New Order government, theologians either have participated in elections (under the sanctioned party PPP), or were invited to join official institutions such as the MUI (Ulama Council of Indonesia), and ICMI (Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals). After 1998, some were co-opted into the Wantimpres (Presidential Advisory Council). Any presidential or legislative assembly candidates approaching the election would endeavour to invite religious figures into the campaign teams, (termed as tim sukses in Indonesia), a practice that remains prevalent to this day.
While they differ in the degree of closeness Muslims should have to electoral politics, none dispute the significance of power in ushering change in society. Religious teachers provide good vote capital. Politicians who want to demonstrate their piety to the electorate can attend religious rituals, fund religious schools and mosques, and perform a publicised pilgrimage to Mecca, among others. But the best option is to canvass direct endorsements from religious elites who can mobilise their followers and students in support of their political patrons. In the coming elections, it is likely that this trend will continue, as political parties plan to boost their Islamic legitimacy and support base from boarding schools. Majority of the Muslims continue to seek guidance from the religious elites, whom they consider righteous and rational individuals and will make decisions based on Islamic principles.
The only caveat for overreliance on religious elites for votes is that the group is also a divided one. They are polarised in terms of their religious orientations: modernism (Muhammadiyah) versus traditionalism (NU); Sufism versus Salafism; and radical and violent approaches versus quietist approach. Even within NU there are fragmentations too, as support for different presidential candidates demonstrate. Theologians whose follower base is online compete among themselves for viewership. Their divergence can also be manifested in terms of their approach to politics: some are deliberate while others are indirect. As religious and identity issues resurface during the election season in 2024, religious personalities will be mobilised to take sides. Many continue to shun politics, and do not require money or power—just spirituality—to cement their authority over the masses. A number of religious elites have said that their credibility will be affected if they join political parties. However, a majority of the theologians can be persuaded to provide a religious cover for politicians and openly endorse one of the presidential candidates and the political parties.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2023/85 “Abdul Hadi Awang Enhances His Power as PAS President and Drives the Party to the Far-Right” by James Chai
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- This paper seeks to understand how Abdul Hadi Awang has used his influence since 2015 to restructure the Islamic party, PAS.
- After Nik Aziz’s death in 2015, Abdul Hadi shifted the power centre of PAS to the presidency, away from the spiritual-leader (Mursyidul Am, the highest policymaker in PAS sitting in the Syura Ulama Council, the Majlis Syura Ulamak or MSU). Remarkably, this was not done through amendments to the party constitution, but via the following mechanisms: a)The president’s ability to shuffle between the central committee and the MSU (revolving door concept); b) Ulama-based ideological takeover at every level of the party; and c) The reduced personal stature of subsequent spiritual-leaders after Nik Aziz.
- Abdul Hadi has impactfully exercised his powers as president in the following ways: a) Unilaterally deciding on strategic partnerships with first, UMNO, and then Bersatu and Perikatan Nasional (PN), allegedly without consulting with or obtaining the consent of the MSU chaired by the spiritual-leader; b) Driving the party’s narratives to the far right, and showing hard-line intolerance of non-Muslims; c) Clamping down on internal dissent; and d) Marginalizing Nik Aziz’s family within the party.
- PN’s recent electoral momentum will probably validate Abdul Hadi’s tactics, overshadowing their apparent extra-constitutional breaches. However, dissent may grow stronger in PAS if (a) Abdul Hadi reconsiders the PN partnership; (b) Nik Aziz’s family decides to launch more vocal opposition, and; (c) the limits on the ability of Malay votes to win Putrajaya become more obvious.
* James Chai is Visiting Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and a columnist at MalaysiaKini and Sin Chew Daily. The author would like to thank Aziff Azuddin for his assistance throughout this research.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/85, 23 October 2023
INTRODUCTION[1]
It may sound incredible now, but the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party, PAS, was formed in Penang in 1951 “from the womb of UMNO” as an Islamist movement.[2] [3] Little attention was paid then to the small and poor party of “religious elders and imams”; and few thought it could last.[4]
Part of the reason for this was due to the fact that during its first five years, it was led by presidents who could not mobilise the Malay-Muslim electorate and who were not taken seriously by the British authorities. Its third president, Dr Burhanuddin al-Helmy (1956-1969), reoriented PAS to become an anti-colonial leftist third force (Islamism) by establishing branches, starting in northern peninsula. The problematic Asri Muda years (1969-1982) were ridden with claims of treachery (working with UMNO in government), financial scandals (timber and land), and nepotism.[5] Towards the end of this period, the ulama faction, consisting of Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat (TGNA) and Abdul Hadi, came to rebuild PAS from its “shattered remnants”,[6] making it the country’s largest opposition party (by membership).
Fast forward to the present day, October 2023, and PAS is at the peak of its powers under Abdul Hadi, who assumed the presidency in 2002.[7] Three years ago, in 2020, the party obtained power at the federal executive office for the second time, with nearly a dozen of its parliamentarians appointed to Cabinet. In the 15th general election (GE15) in November 2022, the party defied expectations[8] and emerged as the party with the highest number of seats in Parliament. It even won in many places outside its largely conservative and rural stronghold. Winning 43 seats in GE15 was the party’s best performance in history,[9] double its second-best results, achieved in 1999.
Less than a year after its GE15 surprise, PAS continued its streak by winning most of the 127 seats it contested in the 2023 state elections.
| Seats contested | Seats won | Winning rate | |
| PAS | |||
| GE15 | 64 | 43 | 73% |
| PRN2023 | 127 | 105 | 83% |
| Bersatu | |||
| GE15 | 85 | 31 | 36% |
| PRN2023 | 81 | 40 | 49% |
| DAP | |||
| GE15 | 55 | 40 | 73% |
| PRN2023 | 47 | 46 | 98% |
| PKR | |||
| GE15 | 100 | 31 | 31% |
| PRN2023 | 58 | 26 | 45% |
| Amanah | |||
| GE15 | 54 | 8 | 15% |
| PRN2023 | 32 | 8 | 25% |
| UMNO | |||
| GE15 | 119 | 26 | 22% |
| PRN2023 | 108 | 19 | 18% |
Table 1: Seats contested and won by PAS and other mainstream West Malaysia parties in the 15th general election and the 2023 state elections[10]
Now, PAS no longer sees itself as an opposition party as it had done since 1955,[11] but as a government-in-waiting.[12] Its haphazard alignment with the six-year-old Malaysian United Indigenous Party (Bersatu) and the small Chinese-dominant party, Gerakan, has yielded positive results. At the same time, PAS has moved further to the right as an exclusivist party.
All these vital developments of PAS happened under the presidency of Abdul Hadi. This paper explores his influence in determining the party’s direction. To do that, I firstly examine the role of the spiritual-leader in PAS before dissecting how Abdul Hadi has taken advantage of the internal workings of the party. Thereafter, this paper will conclude with the implications of these changes to the party, and to Malaysian politics.
THE SPIRITUAL LEADER (MURSYIDUL AM) AS THE HIGHEST DECISION-MAKER
At the beginning, PAS’s organisational structure was rather straightforward. Party policies were decided by the PAS Central Committee (Jawatankuasa Kerja PAS Pusat, JKPP), chaired by the president.[13] Three sections (ulama, youth, and women) completed the party. The ulama council was uninfluential, holding only advisory powers.[14]
Everything changed in 1982 when then-PAS youth wing (Dewan Pemuda PAS) leader Mohamad Sabu, proposed the establishment of an ulama-led MSU[15] that replicated the Iranian clerical structure under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.[16] This represented a “major paradigm shift” from PAS’s previous structure.[17] The MSU was adopted as the highest decision-making body of PAS,[18] giving PAS’s ulamas expansive policymaking powers.[19]
The MSU is a 17-people ulama body,[20] with people drawn from various components of the party, chosen for their expertise in Islam.[21] [22] Unlike the democratically elected JKPP, all positions at the MSU are by appointment, and at its head sits the spiritual-leader.
As shown in Appendix 1, the PAS Constitution gives enormous powers to the MSU and spiritual-leader to decide on major policies,[23] as its “final arbiter”.[24]
Among major decisions, the most critical relate firstly to the election candidate selection powers (parliamentary and state),[25] and secondly to external party and coalition negotiations.[26] On the former, each state arm of PAS would present the list of nominees to the MSU, which would then carry out a filtering process based on character, action, and fulfilment of Islamic practices.[27] On the latter, the MSU was the final arbiter on whether or not to work with another party in a coalition.[28] Thus, whether there should be political cooperation (tahaluf siyasi) by PAS with others like DAP and PKR (Pakatan Rakyat), UMNO (Muafakat Nasional) or Bersatu (Perikatan Nasional) is determined by the MSU.[29]
In contrast, Article 26 of the PAS Constitution states that the JKPP is only an implementation body to MSU’s decisions, with the president as chief implementer.[30]
Critics have argued that the powers of the MSU and spiritual-leader are too broad,[31] especially for an unelected body. Even though PAS insiders would rebut that and say that the MSU was accountable to the views of different party wings,[32] the spiritual-leader can overrule others as he has veto powers on major decisions. The party congress (PAS Muktamar) is neither structurally sufficient nor effective as check-and-balance measure on the MSU and spiritual-leader.
The spiritual-leader role was best exemplified by the late TGNA,[33] who held the position for 24 years (1991-2015). As a larger-than-life scholar and the Menteri Besar (MB) of Kelantan for 23 years, [34] TGNA used his aura and clout to make the spiritual-leader role as powerful as the party’s constitutional powers would allow.[35] In conflicts between spiritual-leader and the president, the spiritual-leader’s views would prevail.[36] However, after TGNA, the spiritual-leader’s role was soon reduced to a “halal rubber stamp” position.[37]
HOW ABDUL HADI SHIFTED THE POWER CENTRE TO THE PRESIDENCY
After the revered TGNA passed away on 12 February 2015, Muslim clerics, Haron Din and Hashim Jasin succeeded him consecutively (see Appendix 2). Not only were both figures not as outspoken or charismatic as TGNA, they were also neither Mentris Besar nor elected representatives for any state. In fact, the former MB of Kelantan, Ahmad Yaakob, who was slated to replace Haron Din after his passing, chose not to be elevated to spiritual-leader to avoid the burden of holding both roles. Moving forward, it will be increasingly unlikely for the spiritual-leader to also hold executive portfolios, let alone an important one such as Mentri Besar.[38]
This is significant because the subdued personalities of the recent spiritual-leaders have meant that the in-practice power of the role has been reduced, paving the way for the presidency to assume more influence.[39] While the party structure remains unchanged, the leaders who came to helm the positions changed the perception and in-practice influence of these roles.[40]
More than as a result of personality, Abdul Hadi’s influence also benefited from the structural weakness of PAS and the convergence of conservative ideologies that he had championed.
The PAS Constitution gives the elected president a revolving-door kind of power, i.e. the ability to sit in both the implementing JKPP (elected) and policymaking MSU (appointed) instances. Article 8(4) of the PAS Constitution states that the JKPP must appoint four people to the MSU, and by convention, the president shall be appointed as one of the key MSU members.[41] Under occasions where the president’s personality overpowers the spiritual-leader’s, the president could, if he so wishes, control the democratic and appointed fora of JKPP and MSU to push his decisions through, with the legitimacy offered by both.[42] Due to this structural weakness, the balance of power depends on the personalities of the president and of the spiritual-leader. As will be discussed later, Abdul Hadi used this structural defect to his advantage after TGNA’s death, directing PAS to implement his choices regarding external partnerships, its political position, as well as internal decisions pertaining to stifling dissent and side-lining other factions. Abdul Hadi did not make structural changes to alter the powers of the MSU and spiritual-leader; instead, he strategically bent the body to his will.
What paved the way for Abdul Hadi was the departure of his opponents and a resulting ideological convergence. The non-ulama class of PAS who dominated the JKPP up till 2015, also called the Erdogans, contested at the party elections as an informal bloc and lost. The Erdogans, who were advocates of an inclusive approach of Islam, including adding non-ulamas without Islamic scholarship to the MSU,[43] [44] left to form Amanah.
The Erdogans’ loss and departure accelerated an ideological convergence in PAS, where the JKPP and MSU, led by ulamas, now share an exclusive view of Islam.[45] The professionals-dominated JKPP had always had conflicts with the ulama-led MSU; now, such conflicts rarely happen.
How Abdul Hadi used his powers
- Partnership
One of the most obvious ways where Abdul Hadi had shifted the powers to the presidency was in PAS’s partnership with other parties and coalitions after TGNA’s death.
The pursuit of a PAS-UMNO partnership started in 2008 after Pakatan Rakyat, a coalition with PAS, won Selangor state government for the first time. The group led by Abdul Hadi,[46]were inclined to work with UMNO in a political partnership.
This was strongly opposed by then spiritual-leader TGNA, who was furious at the group’s constant courting of UMNO. He even called for a special party congress (Muktamar Khas) to discuss the leadership problem, mainly whether or not to sack Abdul Hadi.[47] This resulted in an extended “cold war”.[48]
Before the special party congress, TGNA wrote on his blog:[49]
“[A few leaders who were problematic] would not stop actively pursuing the issue of PAS’s political cooperation with UMNO … I strongly feel there must be a change of the most important players helming the leadership of JKPP… ”[50]
TGNA’s death propelled a series of critical events that shifted the situation in favour of Abdul Hadi. The Erdogans who were against PAS-UMNO partnership lost the party elections en bloc.[51] A month after that, the MSU decided to sever ties with DAP, effectively dissolving the Pakatan Rakyat coalition.[52] The earliest exploratory step on partnership with UMNO started as early as 5 January 2016, proving that the influence of Abdul Hadi and his long-term desire for a PAS-UMNO partnership had slowly taken hold.
The GE14 was an impetus for PAS to formalise its partnership with UMNO, and on 16 September 2018,[53] four months after the general election, the MSU was given the mandate to decide on political cooperation with the intention of protecting Islam.[54] Political cooperation between PAS and UMNO was signed on 14 September 2019; Muafakat Nasional (MN) adopted conservative and Islamic ideals.
If the PAS-UMNO cooperation was evidence of the power centre shifting to Abdul Hadi’s benefit, the party’s subsequent dissolution of MN and formation of Perikatan Nasional (PN) with Bersatu was clearer evidence of the renewed power of the presidency.
Importantly, there was a period of political partnership overlap, between August 2020 and October 2022[55] when PAS was part of the political charter with UMNO under MN, and also in the PN coalition with Bersatu. It was however the process of formalising both partnerships that truly exemplified Abdul Hadi’s powers.
The former MSU member, Khairuddin Razali, claimed that the MSU had never discussed the partnership with PN, even though matters of external partnership were the MSU’s remit under the PAS Constitution.[56] It appeared to be a decision purely made at the JKPP level, with the president as the main steer. Khairuddin also claimed that Abdul Hadi met with Bersatu president Muhyiddin Yassin, and they decided to end ties with UMNO within a week. In contrast, the MN’s chartership was finalised only after extensive consultation and engagement with every layer of the party, including the grassroots at the party congress.[57]
After the dissolution of MN, Abdul Hadi explained that the reason PAS chose to go with PN instead of UMNO was because UMNO had too many “power crazy” individuals who were willing to pawn their religion;[58] at the same time, PAS’s “directionless behaviour” was cited by UMNO as its reason.[59]
The PAS-UMNO partnership as MN may have been evidence of Abdul Hadi gaining influence after TGNA, but the partnership with Bersatu under PN reflected how the centre of power at PAS had shifted to the presidency, coat-tailing Abdul Hadi’s political desires. This shift in allegiance from Pakatan Rakyat, to MN, and then PN, is a signal of PAS’s pragmatism, but also evidence of Abdul Hadi’s deepening control of the party.
- Religious supremacy
As a personality-driven party, PAS’s turn to the far right[60] reflects “Abdul Hadi’s idealism”.[61]The main ideological difference between Abdul Hadi and TGNA was less their religious leanings (both were conservatives and wanted to establish the Islamic State), and more their approach to non-Muslims.[62]
TGNA took a more pragmatic approach, seeing non-Muslims not as a threat to the party and Islam, but an audience to which one could preach Islam (dakwah) for deeds (pahala).[63] TGNA has often praised the Chinese for their economic prowess; he even mentioned a few times that he wanted to see a non-Muslim or a non-Malay Muslim convert (muallaf) become prime minister in Malaysia one day.[64]
In contrast, Abdul Hadi’s approach to non-Muslims was decidedly more exclusivist, implying that non-Muslims should not occupy prime ministership or the Cabinet[65] (“they will still end up in hell”)[66], and commonly labelling non-believers as kafir (infidels). Abdul Hadi has also claimed that corruption givers and takers were mostly non-Muslims, besides scapegoating the Chinese-dominant party, DAP, as the biggest threat to Islam.
The difference in approach was partly due to the education origin.[67] While TGNA was from the Deobandi tradition, studied in India and Pakistan, and had a more open and adaptive attitude to the world, Abdul Hadi studied in Madinah, Egypt, often regarded as the birthplace of Islamic scholarship.
What this means is that PAS’s ideology is also shaped by Abdul Hadi’s conservative lineage; he controls the narratives and ideology that currently undergirds the party. The MSU was used as a tool to double-down on Abdul Hadi’s ideology, pushing it to ultra-conservatism.[68]
- Internal dissent
One of the best examples of how Abdul Hadi deals with dissent is his effective removal of Khairuddin Razali as MSU member at the start of 2022. Khairuddin was a former minister and had been an MSU member since 2013; he was appointed as its secretary in 2020. Khairuddin has been a strong proponent of PAS’s partnership with UMNO, and was regarded as one of the most knowledgeable Islamic scholars at PAS,[69] more than the deputy president, Tuan Ibrahim Tuan Man.[70]
On 12 January 2022, Khairuddin was sacked as an executive member from the JKPP. Being a JKPP-appointed member of MSU,[71]Khairuddin’s membership and secretarial position at the MSU were also terminated, according to the president, Abdul Hadi.[72] Although the official reason for Khairuddin’s sacking was discipline, there was never a public statement by PAS leaders on the precise violation, nor were any disciplinary issues raised in accordance with the procedures under Article 85 of the PAS Constitution.
It was widely speculated that the reason for Khairuddin’s sacking was his inclination towards the MN rather than PN,[73] which was contrary to the strategy pursued by Abdul Hadi.[74]
Khairuddin made it clear that his sacking was unconstitutional as the power to sack any MSU member lies only with the MSU.[75] He argued that the JKPP trespassed the MSU’s powers by sacking him.[76] When Khairuddin resigned on 22 February 2022, the 33-year PAS member said that he did so to avoid a constitutional crisis in PAS and to safeguard intra-party harmony, which he had threatened by maintaining that the JKPP acted outside its powers in sacking him.[77]
Former PAS executive member Mahfuz Omar said that this episode symbolised Abdul Hadi’s inability to deal with differences of opinion in PAS, preferring a party of “Yes Men”.[78] This contrasts to Nik Aziz’s PAS where dissent was rife to the point of requiring tie-breaking votes.[79]
The sacking was possible because the PAS Constitution allows the president, who leads the elected JKPP, to also be part of MSU. With the combination of the constitutional clearance and the soft power he enjoyed as president, Abdul Hadi could orchestrate Khairuddin’s removal even though it was extra-constitutional.
- Factionalism and the marginalisation of TGNA’s legacy
The tension between Abdul Hadi and TGNA was always present,[80] but this only became obvious years after the latter’s death.[81]The factionalism was due partly to ideological and strategic differences,[82] but also to the natural process of a leader intending to carve out his legacy. Kelantan politics, the home state of PAS, was synonymous to TGNA, and should that trend continue and prosper, it would pose a threat to Abdul Hadi.
The first evidence was when TGNA’s second son, Nik Omar, decided to leave PAS for Amanah in 2017, due to disappointment with Abdul Hadi’s decision to work with UMNO, a sworn enemy of his father. Husam Musa, the former political secretary to TGNA, also left PAS a year earlier.
The gradual decline of Nik Abduh, another son of TGNA, within PAS is a good barometer of the decreasing influence of the TGNA faction. Nik Abduh lost at the 2021 party congress (youth wing), where Abdul Hadi’s son, Khalil Hadi received the most votes. Nik Abduh, the two-term incumbent, was also not fielded in GE15, and the party chose Abdul Hadi’s political secretary, Syahir Sulaiman, instead. TGNA faction politician Che Abdullah’s nomination was also not passed for GE15.
Crucially, Nik Abduh was dropped once again for the 2023 state election. The party did not accept Nik Abduh’s request to contest at one of the three state seats under Pengkalan Chepa, to enable him to look after the education institutions built by his late father. When the candidate line-up was announced and Nik Abduh was not on the list, the younger brother of TGNA, Nik Din,[83] recorded a video to reprimand the Abdul Hadi-aligned Mohd Amar who Nik Din said prevented Nik Abduh from contesting.[84]Nik Din had had urged voters to vote against Mohd Amar to protest against the alleged injustice.
Nik Abduh went on a two-week “fast” from politics. Although he claimed that he was not too bothered at not being fielded,[85] and his family repeatedly played the matter down, it was widely speculated that Nik Abduh had come to be further at odds with Abdul Hadi for various reasons including his preference for UMNO and his allegations about corruption at the top.[86] [87]
IMPLICATIONS OF A PRESIDENT-CENTRED PARTY AND OUTLOOK FOR PAS
Evidently, even though there no changes have been made to the PAS Constitution, the party’s power centre has shifted from the spiritual-leader to the president. The structural characteristics of PAS makes it a personality-driven party where its direction is often determined by the charisma and beliefs of the leaders. The trajectory of a subdued and non-MB spiritual-leader will likely continue, and allow the presidency to hold de facto decision-making power. A president can use his simultaneous membership in the party’s operational and religious apex agencies to legitimise his decisions.
Abdul Hadi’s decision to go with PN will likely silence dissenters especially as PAS is arguably at its electoral peak. However, in the event a rupture happens within PN,[88] going by past decisions Abdul Hadi will likely be ready to abandon any disagreeable partners.[l89] In the same vein, dissent within the party will unlikely be successful, even if it originates in the highest policy body, MSU.
However, the shift may also heighten factionalism between TGNA’s faction and Abdul Hadi. The curbing of dissenters like Khairuddin and the gradual side-lining of TGNA’s family may create disgruntlement on the ground, especially in Kelantan, as many in PAS still hold TGNA dearly. The last-minute change of MB candidate,[90] low voter turnout,[91] and loss of Kota Lama to Amanah[92] could be taken as early indications of the weakening of PAS in Kelantan. Should TGNA’s family, led by Nik Abduh, continue to be cast aside, defections cannot be discounted, and that may come to present a genuine threat to the present leadership.
What is certain is that PAS will continue to move further to the right as Abdul Hadi promotes his long-standing beliefs and PN finds resonance in stoking Malay-Muslim fears. With a weak non-Muslim counterpart in Gerakan that cannot effectively challenge the anti-Muslim rhetoric, PAS will advance these narratives undeterred.
APPENDIX 1
| Constitutional clause | Categories | Paraphrased descriptions of salient provisions |
| Article 8(1)(a)-(c) | Powers of the MSU | (a) Elaborate, explain, and interpret PAS’s policies and any provisions in the PAS Constitution that raise ambiguity on its meaning and purpose and to make a decision about them; (b) Issue instructions and orders so that the policies and decisions are followed and implemented to anyone in PAS and to monitor and protect the policies and decisions so that the intention of the Constitution is upheld; (c)Listen and decide on appeals of discipline presented by PAS members. |
| Article 8(12) | Discretion of the MSU | (12) MSU can, at its discretion, make any rules to smoothen the implementation of the tasks and powers that were given and to safeguard and protect the integrity, respect, and dignity of the MSU. |
| Article 9(1)(a)-(c) | Powers and duties of the MA | (a) Responsible as the head of MSU in exercising its powers under Article 8(1)(a), (b), and (c); (b) Decide and chair the MSU meetings; (c) Take whatever step necessary to monitor and protect the PAS Constitution, policies, and laws in the activities, movements, and administration of PAS. |
| Article 26(9) | Decision to work with other parties or coalitions | (k) JKPP to take due consideration on partnership with other organisations that does not contradict the policy and purpose of PAS and make a decision on it after that decision has been agreed to by the MSU. |
Appendix 1: Key provisions of the PAS Constitution (translated and paraphrased for succinctness and precision)
APPENDIX 2
Appendix 2: Presidents and spiritual-leaders at PAS since 1951
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2023/84 “Political Polarisation Marked Malaysia’s Recent State Elections” by Pauline Pooi Yin Leong
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The campaign narratives surrounding Malaysia’s six state elections in August 2023 indicate increasing polarisation between those advocating for a secular multicultural approach and those preferring an ethnoreligious orientation.
- Development was the key theme in Pakatan Harapan (PH) and Barisan Nasional (BN)’s political narratives. In the more economically prosperous states of Penang, Selangor and Negeri Sembilan, they focused on rallying its supporters to “safeguard” its incumbency and highlighting the comparative lack of development in Perikatan National (PN) and Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) states of Kelantan, Terengganu, and Kedah.
- Nevertheless, PH-BN’s framing of development from a secular-urban perspective had limited resonance with PN-PAS supporters whose paradigm as Muslims is that development should not be materialistic; it should also be holistic and containing spiritual elements.
- PN-PAS’s political narrative of voting as fardhu ‘ain jihad (obligatory holy struggle) appealed to an electorate wishing to vote for an Islamic party that professed to govern according to the Quran. PAS-PN leaders advocating the Islamic way of life were portrayed as heroes and warriors.
- One possible strategy to reduce the widening polarisation in the country is to re-delineate the constituencies to reflect the population’s multiracial composition so that politicians will be incentivised to promote inclusivity to gain as much support from all ethnic groups as possible, especially at the federal level.
* Pauline Pooi Yin Leong is an Associate Professor with the Department of Communication, School of Arts, Sunway University, Malaysia. Her research interests are in political communication, digital media, freedom of speech and journalism.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/84, 19 October 2023
INTRODUCTION
Political narratives are stories and messages constructed by politicians and political parties to influence public opinion and gain voter support. Complex information is organised and presented in a manner that can be cognitively understood by citizens, and that presents an inspiring socio-political reality about political issues and events. In election campaigns, political groups compete to differentiate themselves through symbolic framing in order to gain an advantage over their rivals; they may also try to counter their opponents’ narratives by highlighting inconsistencies or inaccuracies in them.
Thus, during Malaysia’s six state elections in August 2023, Pakatan Harapan (PH, Alliance of Hope) and Barisan Nasional (BN, National Front), incumbents in three states – Selangor, Penang and Negeri Sembilan – and their rivals Perikatan Nasional (PN, National Alliance), incumbents in Kedah, Kelantan, and Terengganu, both presented competing political narratives, as expected. While these contrasting viewpoints have existed prior to the state elections, the mainstream narrative then was about “Ketuanan Melayu” (Malay Supremacy), with religious rhetoric being mostly confined to PAS-dominated East Coast states. However, the success of PH in the 2018 and 2022 general elections has resulted in the opposition fusing ethnic narratives with religious elements as a means to “unite” the Malay-Muslim community and regain their “lost” political power. This has gained increasing acceptance judging from the inroads made by PN-PAS in the recent general and state elections. A digital ethnographic study of the party manifestos and speeches, press releases, media reports, debates, and social media content from the campaign period indicates increasing polarisation between those who advocate for a secular multicultural approach and others who prefer an ethnoreligious direction, continuing a longstanding trend seen throughout much of Malaysia’s history, and certainly during the country’s 15th general election (GE15) held in November 2022.
PH-BN’S POLITICAL CAMPAIGN NARRATIVES
Development was the key theme in the manifestos presented by the PH-BN incumbents in Penang, Selangor and Negeri Sembilan. For example, Penang’s 50-item manifesto focused on infrastructure, human capital, and balanced rural development, as well as housing for all.[1] Similarly, PH-BN’s “Negeri Sembilan Unity Aspiration” manifesto contained 70 initiatives to accelerate economic growth and improve livelihood, among which were affordable homes for families and financial aid for those seeking to pursue higher education.[2] Meanwhile, the Selangor PH-BN administration launched its “Kita Selangor” manifesto, which pledged to provide 100,000 high-income jobs to youths and make the state a premier investment destination in Southeast Asia.[3]
PH ministers and MPs, such as Youth and Sports Minister Hannah Yeoh,[4] spoke at campaign rallies, exhorting supporters to vote for their children and grandchildren’s future, and rallying their relatives and friends to do the same to “safeguard” the three economically prosperous states from the PN onslaught and protect their government’s incumbency. She reminded them that PN was already in control of four states – Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, and Terengganu – and that they should not trade a PKR chief minister for one from PAS. The implication was that the PH-BN administration had the ability to bring about economic growth and jobs compared to PN-PAS states which are not as prosperous and have limited development.
PH-BN also decided to demonstrate its ability to govern by showcasing Economic Affairs Minister Rafizi Ramli in a televised public debate with PAS assistant secretary-general and Bachok MP, Mohd Syahir Sulaiman from Kelantan. Rafizi, who spoke on the “New Model of Malaysia’s Economy”, discussed the three structural issues that Malaysia is facing, one of which was the reliance on oil and plantation industries, and low wages which exacerbates cost of living issues and slows economic growth.[5] According to Rafizi, recent efforts by the unity government had resulted in lower monthly inflation rates since the first month of the PH-BN government, and Malaysians would enjoy higher salaries next year when the government allocates more spending in the budget.
Meanwhile, in Kelantan, Terengganu and Kedah where PH-BN are the opposition, their counter-narrative highlighted the issue of development, or lack thereof, in these PN-administered states. For example, the Natural Resources, Environment and Climate Change Minister, Nik Nazmi Nik Ahmad, said that water quality issues were prevalent in PN-led states[6] such as Kelantan and Kedah, unlike in Selangor which is under PH.[7] It also poured cold water on the suggestion by Kelantan’s then-deputy chief minister Mohd Amar Nik Abdullah that villagers in the state were resourceful and knew how to dig wells or build tube wells[8] to obtain underground water.
Another narrative in PH-BN’s campaign was the protection of fundamental liberties such as freedom of attire. This arose after two incidents that occurred recently, one where a non-Muslim lady in Kelantan was issued a compound notice for wearing shorts[9] which was considered indecent under the state’s by-laws, and a second where a Perodua car service centre displayed a sign[10] to remind its customers not to wear inappropriate attire such as ripped jeans, short skirts, short pants as well as sleeveless shirts. This led to some members of the public questioning PN non-Muslim candidates[11] on whether they would lose their right to wear shorts in public if they voted for the coalition. These incidents were attributed to increasing conservative Islamisation in the country, and the concern that this will affect the secular way of public life, especially in more urban states. During GE15, PAS-PN managed to secure 74 seats, just 7 seats less than PH which had 81, and there was anxiety that this trend would continue in the state elections, especially in Selangor, Penang and Negeri Sembilan, which had PH-BN governments. During campaigning, PAS was painted as the bogeyman and PH supporters were called out to vote in order to protect their states against the “green wave”.[12] DAP chairman Lim Guan Eng was quoted as saying that this phenomenon may result in Penang residents being prosecuted for wearing shorts in their own shops.[13]
PN-PAS’ POLITICAL CAMPAIGN NARRATIVES
The state elections saw PN-PAS building on their strengths by campaigning on social media, using TikTok videos that were circulated on other platforms, as well as personal messaging applications such as WhatsApp. In Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu, one campaign narrative propagated by PN component Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS, Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party) was to call on voters living in other states or even overseas to come back to their home states to vote[14] to protect their Islamic government. PAS president Abdul Hadi Awang said that when other ethnic groups challenged the political dominance of Malay Muslims in the country, then voting was a fardhu ‘ain jihad (an obligatory holy struggle).[15] TikTok videos by PN-PAS supporters presented themselves as mujahideen[16] (Muslims who fight to defend their faith) and claimed that their participation in the state election campaign was part of their “jihad”[17] (spiritual warfare). Such political narratives tapped on the religious inclination of its target electorate who wished to believe that they would not just be voting for a political party but for an Islamic approach to governance that upheld the Quran.[18]
PN-PAS leaders advocating the Islamic way of life were portrayed as heroes and warriors. For example, Kedah chief minister Muhammad Sanusi Md Nor was regarded as a panglima[19] (commander) for shuttering gambling and lottery outlets[20] in the state and prioritising Islamic culture and values. Sanusi’s tendency to speak off the cuff drew comparisons to former US president Donald Trump and former Filipino president Rodrigo Duterte, but his ability to use the local dialect appealed to grassroots Malay-Muslim voters. Despite being charged with two counts of sedition for insulting the Sultan of Selangor, he was highly popular not just in Kedah but also in Kelantan and Terengganu, and many believe he gained public sympathy[21] as the perceived victim of political persecution.[22] Sanusi attacked Anwar’s privileged UMNO roots,[23] claiming that he understood the plight of the poor better since he came from a humbler background. The success of Sanusi’s election campaign was due to his fiery folksy rhetoric and to him exhorting voters to protect their Islamic government against outsiders.
PN’s manifesto for the six state elections also contained promises such as socio-economic development, job opportunities, low-cost affordable home as well as financial initiatives for women and youth entrepreneurship. For example, in Selangor, PN’s manifesto contained seven main pillars, 25 approaches and 112 offers that addressed issues such as cost of living and attracting investments into the state.[24] In Negeri Sembilan, PN’s manifesto proposed optimising the use of abandoned “tanah adat (native land) for agricultural activities to earn additional income[25] while in Kedah, it promised to provide affordable residential land lots for the low-income group as well as process long-pending land title applications.[26] The PN administration in Kedah and Kelantan also pledged to address longstanding water supply and quality.
However, analysts are of the view that political manifestos are more influential among politically literate voters in urban states such as Selangor, Negeri Sembilan and Penang than among voters in rural heartland states like Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu where personal connections with the candidates as well as race and religious factors matter more.[27] From the latter’s perspective as Muslims, progress may not be seen only from the materialistic viewpoint;[28] it should be holistic and not neglect the spiritual element. The PH-BN’s framing of advancement was from the urban context that focused on externalities such as tall buildings and condominiums; PN supporters questioned whether this was really “development” per se where society would soon consist of self-centric individuals who did not even know their neighbours. Furthermore, people in “developed” states like Selangor end up living in flats[29] because land cost is so expensive compared to those in Kedah, Kelantan, and Terengganu who have their own landed property. There was the acknowledgement that the PN-PAS administrations of these three states had shortcomings, but these were weaknesses of the authorities and could be addressed and corrected; it was not reflective of the Islamic religion which they upheld. In fact, PN-PAS supporters stated that “developed” states like Selangor also faced water issues; in addition, they blamed the federal PH-BN unity government[30] for giving insufficient support to the state government to overcome the water issues.
In the debate with PH’s Economic Affairs Minister Rafizi, PAS’ assistant secretary-general and Bachok MP, Mohd Syahir Sulaiman from Kelantan outlined his New Economic Model for Malaysia, which was graphically presented through a traditional Malay wooden house. According to Syahir, national stability is likened to the roof being supported by four economic pillars[31] of fairness, cycle, moderation and integrity. He also criticised Rafizi’s economic model for lacking direction, identity or patriotism, and that the PH government’s goal of making Malaysia[32] one of the top 30 biggest economies in the world was “meaningless” if people on the ground were still encountering economic hardships.
(https://www.pnbest.my/post/infografik-model-baharu-ekonomi-malaysia-oleh-yb-syahir-sulaiman)
Netizens on social media, especially PH supporters, trolled this infographic and circulated memes, calling it an example of a “tebuk atap” (hole in the roof) economy in reference to the previous PN federal government that came into power during the infamous “backdoor” Sheraton Move.[33] Nevertheless, PN-PAS supporters still saw Syahir as a courageous leader for taking on a political giant such as Rafizi. In fact, Syahir himself alluded to being a Sang Kancil[34] (mouse deer) taking on an elephant, which was a strategic move to paint himself as an underdog to obtain sympathy votes. A Facebook commentator who watched the Rafizi-Syahir debate noted that while Selangor’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was RM59,908, its relative poverty rate was 15.3% and its Gini coefficient, which measures income distribution and inequality, was at 0.393. In comparison, although Kelantan’s GDP per capita was RM16,567, its relative poverty rate was only 9.9% and Gini coefficient was 0.379. In his view, although Selangor was more efficient in spearheading economic growth, Kelantan was better at distributing its smaller pot of wealth to its people. This post,[35] which was republished in PAS’ online newsletter Harakah Daily, had some 5,100 likes, 3,500 shares and 731 comments, showing strong engagement from netizens. Again, this shows that the framing of PH-BN’s narrative on economic growth and development from a secular urban perspective had limited resonance with PN-PAS supporters who viewed things within a different paradigm.
Another political narrative that PN put forth was to continue its GE15 strategy of attacking PH-BN’s credibility by focusing on the corruption charges faced by Zahid Hamidi, president of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), a main component member of BN. In fact, PAS even urged Umno voters to vote for PN because it claimed that the latter’s focus on saving criminally tainted leaders meant that it had already lost its original struggle to uphold the rights and importance of the Malay community. PAS, in a press statement, said that Zahid had betrayed Umno members and supporters by supporting Anwar as prime minister and cooperating with the Democratic Action Party (DAP) in PH, which used to be its sworn political enemy.[36] It added that Umno was a pale shadow of itself and had no strong mandate from the people, having won only 30 seats in GE15, and that PN should be the new choice for voters seeking unity and justice; after all, its motto was BErsih dan STabil (Clean and Stable) i.e. PNBest.
In fact, a pre-election survey by Institut Masa Depan Malaysia (Institut MASA, Future Institute of Malaysia)[37] found that 39% of its Malay respondents who voted for BN were more likely to vote for PN in comparison to 15% switching their votes to PH. It explained that this was due to UMNO’s “diminishing performance legitimacy” and its credibility falling as a result of its leaders being tainted by corruption scandals, as well as internal politics. Furthermore, its cooperation with previous arch-enemies PKR and DAP in PH to form the unity government post-GE15 did not sit well with its core supporters. Although former UMNO secretary-general Datuk Seri Ahmad Maslan had previously urged its members to follow party discipline and support the unity government in the six state elections, party loyalists on the campaign found it difficult to convince BN Malay voters to transfer their votes to PH.[38] Thus, PN’s clarion call to Umno fence-sitters to transfer their vote to PN-PAS was more effective because these were unhappy with Umno’s cooperation with PH-DAP, whose ideology they believed to be antithetical to Umno’s dogma of championing Malay-Muslim rights and privileges. This helped PN-PAS to win all seats in Terengganu in the state elections and 22 out of 56 seats in Selangor, denying PH-BN the two-thirds majority it technically secured following political realignments in the wake of the November 2022 elections.
To push the campaign momentum even further, PAS president Abdul Hadi Awang suggested that a change of federal government would be possible if PN gained control of all six states in the elections. This could happen if members of parliament (MPs) from UMNO as well as Sabah and Sarawak supported PN, adding pressure on the PH-BN unity federal government, he added.[39] This call was echoed by PN’s information chief, Azmin Ali who added that this would be “a signal of the people’s voices towards Putrajaya” and their “vote of confidence in PN”.[40] Legally and constitutionally, the results of the six state elections were unlikely to trigger the collapse of the PH-BN unity government at federal level, especially with the introduction of the anti-party hopping law in 2022, but from the political perspective, they were viewed as a “referendum” of voter support of Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s administration.
CONCLUSION
What is clear from the campaign narratives propagated during the six state elections is that Malaysia is becoming increasingly polarised, pitting a secular multiracial approach in governing the country against a conservative ethnoreligious ideological version of governance. PN-PAS continues to make inroads into the Malay-Muslim electorate, riding on its remarkable performance in GE15. The political middle ground is becoming smaller as both sides of the political divide become more entrenched in their positions. Anwar Ibrahim is now at the crossroads – to continue with the secular multicultural approach which ensures the continued support of its voter base or to battle PN head on and focus on winning Malay-Muslim voters, which may alienate his core support. On top of this, he also has to focus on economic growth, increasing job opportunities, and managing cost-of-living issues.
One possible card up Anwar’s sleeve is to re-delineate the constituencies and address the issue of malapportionment whereby those that were previously gerrymandered to be dominated by one ethnic group, be redrawn to reflect more correctly the multiracial composition of the population, especially in the west coast of Peninsular Malaysia. Then, politicians would be incentivised to campaign on calls for inclusivity in order to gain support from all ethnic groups. Also, using ethnoreligious narratives to gain political support from the Malay-Muslim community at the expense of minority groups is a zero-sum game, which leaves the country more and more divided. While this strategy might work in Malay-Muslim majority states, gaining power at the federal level requires a different approach.
There is a need for more dialogue and discussions across the political divide to find common ground and to reduce the polarisation. The question is whether there is political will to build bridges, or will the divide-and-conquer strategy continue to grow in popularity and efficacy. Both coalitions are now recalibrating their strategies for the major battle in GE16, to be held in 2027. Ultimately, voters will have to decide the shape they want for the country.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |