Webinar on “The International Community’s Response to the Myanmar Crisis: What Comes Next?”

In this virtual event held under Chatham House Rule, Ambassador Derek Mitchell discussed the international community’s response to the 2021 military coup In Myanmar, including possible options for and potential constraints to further moves by the international community on the Myanmar crisis. He also shared his thoughts on the actions and objectives of various Myanmar stakeholders to date, and possible next steps.

MYANMAR STUDIES PROGRAMME WEBINAR

Friday, 7 October 2022 – The Myanmar Studies Programme of ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute invited the President of the National Democratic Institute in Washington D.C. and former United States Ambassador to Myanmar, Mr Derek Mitchell, to discuss the international community’s response to the current Myanmar crisis. The webinar, moderated by Ms Moe Thuzar, acting coordinator of the Myanmar Studies Programme, attracted the interest of 101 attendees. During the webinar, Ambassador Mitchell stressed the importance of taking new approaches and more urgency towards the current crisis in Myanmar by ASEAN, Myanmar’s neighbours and the major powers.

Clockwise from top left: Mr Choi Shing Kwok, Director and CEO of ISEAS, who delivered the opening remarks, Ms Moe Thuzar (moderator), and speaker Ambassador Derek Mitchell. (Credit: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute)

Key discussions include the following:

  • The 2021 coup in Myanmar has catalysed a deeply tragic situation for the country and its people. Even so, the international community should remain inspired by the potential of the Myanmar people demonstrated over the past decade, and commit to assisting the country’s future.
  • Myanmar’s potential has been blighted by decades of systematic subjugation, repression and degradation into a locus of instability, mainly perpetrated by “guys with guns”. The past two years (since February 2021) shows how Myanmar was derailed from realising its full potential.
  • The February 2021 coup also illustrates several miscalculations by the military, including assumptions of a smooth power takeover that would enable the military to revisit its objectives for a “discipline-flourishing democracy”. However, the military underestimated the overwhelming support of Myanmar people for the National League for Democracy and its leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Additionally, young people in Myanmar, particularly young women, who have enjoyed freedom of speech and expression over the past decade are unwilling to give up their dignity and voice.
  • The military in Myanmar is applying a scorched-earth approach to the protests against military rule. By doing so, it is systematically destroying the country’s potential. The fear of losing political prerogatives is fuelling the military’s persistent narrative that it is the sole guardian of Myanmar’s unity, sovereignty, and chauvinistic protection of “race and religion”. In actual fact, the military – now referred to by many in Myanmar as “sit-tat” rather than Tatmadaw – are fighting for their own survival.
  • Conflict(s) that used to exist only in areas around the country’s peripheries have now reached Myanmar’s heartlands. The coup and the military’s use of lethal force to quell protests have ironically unified the country as never before, against the military. The generals too are united (“hanging together”) from fear of “hanging separately”.
  • The Myanmar military still possesses massive firepower, purchased from Russia. This firepower is being used in the military’s scorched-earth operations, and the international community has seen and heard reports of villages being burnt, schools being bombed, and political prisoners being tortured and executed.
  • Yet, there is no easy answer on how the international community can help the people of Myanmar escape their current plight. At present, members of the international community have all reverted to their “traditional” responses, based on past experience.
  • The United States (US) and Europe have reverted to the application of sanctions, albeit targeted, rather than broad-based. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Japan and India have also reverted to their standard practice of engagement with the Myanmar military for a variety of self-interested reasons. China and Russia have likewise assumed their traditional opportunistic roles in Myanmar’s present political crisis. China has continued to be pragmatic in engaging with whoever is necessary in order to protect its economic and geopolitical interests in the country, while Russia is openly supportive of the military and its actions. Neither seems interested in the well-being of the country or the citizens. Confronted with a variety of crises elsewhere, the Myanmar crisis does not seem to be an urgent priority for the US.
  • Globally, Ukraine has taken up the most attention from the US and Europe, given the geopolitical circumstances. Ukraine crisis threatens European peace at a fundamental level and even jeopardises the entire UN system. Even though both Ukraine and Myanmar are facing existential threats, there are not enough resources in the global community to go around, and the Myanmar crisis has not received attention similar to that accorded to Ukraine.
  • The international community thus needs to have a greater sense of urgency for the crisis in Myanmar. Members of the international community, particularly countries in Southeast Asia and Japan, must not engage in professional exchanges with the military as the Sit-tat makes a mockery of what qualifies to be called a “military.” They have guns and uniforms but lack standards of military discipline and focus their attention not on defending the country from external threats but on defending their economic and political interests at the expense of the Myanmar people. They give themselves medals for killing their own people. The Myanmar military has been an embarrassment to the region, and their actions have consequences for regional security, stability, and development.
  • The international community needs to leave their traditional comfort zones – perfunctory sanctions by the West, toothless engagement from ASEAN, Japan and India, etc – and focus on further restricting the military’s (and their families’) key interests, including access to cash, weapons, international services (health, education, banking, etc.), and regional institutions and militaries via political recognition.
  • ASEAN should revisit the Five-Point Consensus, as the past twenty months have shown that diplomacy alone is not enough to shift the Myanmar military’s calculus.  Diplomatic overtures from ASEAN and the United Nations will continue to fail absent imposition of stronger negative incentives for the junta, including tighter international sanctions on the military and their families.
  • Creative international initiatives are lacking. Where is the international contact group? Where is the coordinated diplomacy to ensure the delivery of urgent humanitarian assistance, or to come up with a coordinated international strategy? ASEAN has the potential to be at the centre of these efforts, bringing in other key players in the region, although its divisions appear to make that unlikely. The United States could contribute by posting a senior diplomat in Southeast Asia to serve as special envoy for Myanmar issues.
  • Admittedly, adding to the challenges of addressing the Myanmar crisis, is the reality that the conflict is not just between two main opposing sides, i.e. the democratic opposition and the junta. There are many ethnic armed groups and divisions within the country which add to the complexity of the crisis and lead to a sense of futility among U.S. policymakers.
  • Still, changing the calculation of the Myanmar military remains the foundation of change. The international community needs to discuss ideas and devise innovative responses to convince the generals in Myanmar that it is in their best interest individually and collectively to change course rather than continue with the current violent response to protest and political opposition.
  • It is difficult to conceive of a viable exit strategy for the country at the moment given the deep divisions and fundamentally different interests between the junta and the people. But the democratic opposition/resistance movement in Myanmar must work towards greater unity and a common vision among themselves about the future of the country if it hopes to effectively deal with the current challenge and gain more attention from the international community. This is a daunting task to be sure, but essential for any prospect of success.

The general discussion that followed Ambassador Mitchell’s observations further probed questions related to the US government’s approach to sanctions, the US’s broader Indo-Pacific engagement, the possibilities and aftermath of the SAC’s planned election and ASEAN’s potential response, the revival of the humanitarian and democratic “ecosystem” along the Thai-Myanmar border, Myanmar’s neighbours and their engagement with the SAC, Myanmar’s turn to Russia, its relationship with China, lessons that the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) and the National Unity Government (NUG) can learn from the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) which was formed in the 1990s, and the task and priorities of preparing for Myanmar’s recovery.