Wednesday, 10 January 2024 – The 27th Regional Outlook Forum, a flagship event organised by ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, was held at the Sands Expo & Convention Centre, Singapore. It was attended by over 550 in-person and virtual participants.
To kick off this one-day forum, Mr Choi Shing Kwok, Director & CEO of ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, delivered his Welcome Remarks.
Keynote Address: Rivalry and Distrust in the Global Order: How Should Southeast Asia Respond?
In his keynote address, Tan Sri Anifah Aman, a Senator of Malaysia’s Dewan Negara and former Minister of Foreign Affairs (2009–18) examined the historical shifts in geopolitics and the issues facing Southeast Asia before putting forth several key imperatives for ASEAN. The session was moderated by Professor Chan Heng Chee, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and Ambassador-at-Large with the Singapore Foreign Ministry.
Starting his presentation by charting the epochal shifts in the post-Berlin Wall era, Tan Sri Anifah noted that the fall of the Berlin Wall led to a paradigmatic shift in politics in the present day, paving the way for democratic values and capitalist economies to proliferate. During the shift, China emerged as a main beneficiary, having been able to fill the vacuum left by the former Soviet Union. Since then, and particularly after the Global Financial Crisis, China has become a major economic power that profoundly influences global trade dynamics, as seen through its Belt and Road Initiative. Its global engagements, however, have not been devoid of challenges. Tan Sri Anifah noted, for instance, that there have been non-tariff barriers to China’s market penetration, like local resistance to China’s producers in the United States. As a result, producers have looked towards Southeast Asia for alternative markets. He also put forth that these responses have arguably resulted in China’s assertiveness and desire to upgrade its naval and military to protect its interests.
He also charted the U.S.’s strategic evolution post-Cold War. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S.-driven NATO and the European Union have both moved to engage new members, causing Russia to become alarmed. He argued that this expansion has been the main reason for the current Ukraine-Russia war. Simultaneously, the U.S. and China’s relations have become more strained with the introduction of strategic initiatives like AUKUS and Indo-Pacific Alliances, particularly as these show the U.S.’s recalibration of their foreign policy priorities towards the region.
Against this backdrop, he argued, ASEAN has to carefully consider how to navigate the complex geopolitical terrain, alongside the volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous contemporary world. Indeed, technological transformations, the rise of social media, and the danger of disinformation have amplified governance challenges. Thus, ASEAN’s regional conflicts are not just an internal matter, and neither are other conflicts limited to that geographical region in the present interconnected landscape of global politics.
To illustrate his point, Tan Sri Anifah looked at the recent Israeli-Gaza conflict. Drawing on South Africa’s case against Israel as well as Pope Francis’ comments regarding Israel’s actions in Gaza, he called into question the appropriateness of Israel’s response to Hamas’ attack. The differing responses to the same conflict, he argued, reflected the states’ differing priorities and geopolitical interests. Simultaneously, he also criticised the U.S. for siding with Israel without regard for the UN Charter on human rights, stating that the U.S.’ actions in this regard create a trust deficit as it can no longer be relied upon as an arbiter for democracy and human rights.
Bringing this back to the region, Tan Sri Anifah asked ASEAN to re-evaluate the U.S.’s role in the region, questioning whether states could rely on the U.S. to defend the rights of individuals given its stance in the Israel-Palestine conflict. He also questioned China’s so-called aggressiveness, noting that during his stint as Malaysia’s Foreign Minister, China had been rather amenable to engaging in dialogue and resolving issues between China and ASEAN member states, in part due to the grouping’s unity and cohesiveness. Citing the South China Sea as an example, he noted that China had respected ASEAN’s desire to dialogue from a collective standpoint rather than via bilateral channels, although it would have preferred the latter, thus showing its willingness to engage the region.
Given the shifting sands, ASEAN thus needs to have an unwavering commitment to neutrality, human rights and regional peace. To this end, Tan Sri Anifah elucidated the strategic imperatives which ASEAN should have: advocating for a united voice based on shared principles, encouraging UN reforms for more equitable global governance, and improving ASEAN’s institutional capacity, which he argued would help ASEAN to navigate new and future complexities efficiently. Referencing the experience of Labuan island, Sabah, of adopting a Blue Economy model of sustainably leveraging marine resources for economic growth, Tan Sri Anifah argued that ASEAN must have the capability to cooperate on security issues, insist on freedom of navigation, and press for cross-border protocol to protect ASEAN member states’ and ASEAN’s interests.
Concluding his speech, Tan Sri Anifah exhorted ASEAN not to remain a bystander in global issues, but to take initiative and project itself as a responsible regional body. In particular, he called for the grouping to respond to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and do so independently of geopolitical manoeuvrings by the great powers. Finally, he once again encouraged ASEAN to champion UN reform as part of its advocacy and strategic foresight.
The moderator Professor Chan Heng Chee and several others from the audience posed questions during the Q&A portion. Among them were questions regarding ASEAN’s ability to balance the U.S. and China, especially with reference to the Israel-Palestinian conflict, as well as the conflict’s domestic impact on Malaysia and ASEAN member states. There were also queries on what ASEAN could do to end the Russia-Ukraine war, how ASEAN could navigate its awkward position of being sandwiched between the U.S. and China, alongside a question on Malaysia’s policy regarding the South China Sea, and whether China was truly receptive to ASEAN member states’ views. Finally, there was also an enquiry on whether member states would desire to engage in a collective regional push for external change when neutrality has been a cornerstone of ASEAN’s policy.
The questions reflected a broad interest in ASEAN’s efficacy and neutrality. Addressing the South China Sea question, Tan Sri Anifah recalled from his tenure as foreign minister that Malaysia does not recognise the “nine-dash line” while upholding peace and stability in the region. He also emphasized the importance and benefit of frank diplomatic dialogue, and the imperative of solutions to the Gaza crisis, and reiterated the need for ASEAN’s voice to be accorded due recognition by the superpowers.
Session 1 – Geopolitical Currents: U.S., China, and Japan
The first panel discussed the factors beneath the strategic distrust between the U.S. and China, and how middle powers like Japan have strategically responded to geopolitical rivalry. Moderated by Ms Hoang Thi Ha, the session featured a panel of three speakers who each shared the American, Chinese and Japanese perspectives.
Commencing the panel discussion was Dr Evan Feigenbaum, Vice President for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, who highlighted that the current state of U.S.-China relations is not in a state of “free-fall.” Its apparent stability, he argued, is contingent upon the current domestic priorities for the Chinese government and the U.S.’ strategic imperative to avert a crisis in the Indo-Pacific region amidst the ongoing Israel-Hamas war and the Russian-Ukraine war. Despite this semblance of stability, Dr Feigenbaum asserted that the U.S.-China relationship lacks equilibrium. To substantiate this perspective, he proceeded to delineate three primary points to illustrate the intricate dynamics that undergird the ostensibly stable yet tumultuous nature of the U.S.-China relationship.
First, Dr Feigenbaum noted that there has been a profound shift in the dynamics of security competition between the two major powers. Notably, the U.S.-China relationship has become infected by what he termed as “the securitisation of everything”, whereby securitisation between the two powers has extended beyond traditional security concerns and encompassed various non-security related aspects. In particular, the realms of economics and security, instead of progressing on “parallel paths”, have significantly collapsed together in the past decade. This phenomenon is increasingly observed in both Washington and Beijing, where economic activities are “refracted through the lens of national security” – commercial ties, which were previously perceived as mutually beneficial, are now viewed through a “competitive and zero-sum prism”. Identifying how the zero-sum logic of security competition has also been increasingly applied to the domains of technology and data flow, Dr Feigenbaum envisaged that regulators in the U.S. would adopt a precautionary approach to control emerging technologies such as quantum computing, nano-technology, new synthetic and composite materials, and life sciences.
Second, Dr Feigenbaum observed a significant shift in the U.S. priorities, emphasising that strategic competition with China has incrementally taken a central role in U.S.’ foreign policy. He referred to former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage’s words of “getting China right by getting Asia right”. However, he expressed concerns about a troubling trend whereby the U.S. initiatives in the region are increasingly foregrounded by strategic competition with China, prompting worries about China’s countermeasures, most evidently the creation of its “unreliable entities list” that mirrors the U.S.’ corresponding list.
Finally, Dr Feigenbaum highlighted that the U.S. is finding itself in an unfavourable position vis-à-vis China, attributing it to three key factors. First, he pointed to the diminishing leadership role that the U.S. once held post-World War II, where it served as a provider of economic goods and security for regional stability. The U.S. has faltered in maintaining its status as a standard setter in recent years, evidenced by its withdrawal from numerous trade deals such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Additionally, Dr Feigenbaum highlighted that the U.S. has been grappling with a crisis of confidence. Historically, U.S. actions precipitated crises of confidence on two notable occasions. The first instance occurred in 1975 when the communist forces took control of South Vietnam. The second crisis transpired in the mid-1990s when the U.S. bailed out Mexico in the wake of the 1994–95 Peso crisis but did not follow suit with Thailand when the Baht came under attack in 1997. Presently, concerns and fears arise over the perceived shift of the U.S. “turning inward”. Finally, employing a mathematical metaphor, Dr Feigenbaum highlighted that the U.S. is presenting a strategy akin to “subtraction”, dictating for states to “involve China less” on multiple fronts. However, he has observed a broader trend where states are increasingly discussing strategies involving “addition” and “multiplication.” In this context, Dr Feigenbaum concluded his speech by stating that the U.S. contemporary challenge lies in formulating and presenting an agenda to its partners that addresses substantive concerns such as growth, employment and sustainability, rather than solely concentrating on geopolitical considerations.
Professor Xiang Lanxin, professor emeritus at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID), Geneva, initiated his discussion with a cautionary note, highlighting an escalating trend toward confrontations in the U.S.-China relationship. Despite the U.S. employing the 3C Framework of “Compete, Collaborate, Confront” to define its China policy, Professor Xiang underscored a concerning trajectory wherein the two major powers exhibit a dangerous inclination toward potential military conflict. In this context, he emphasised the importance of signalling, especially to prevent communication breakdown over contemporary issues such as the political status of Taiwan. On one hand, the U.S. advocates for a “one-China policy”. On the other hand, China insists on a steadfast “one-China principle”. Despite the surface-level similarity in terminology, Professor Xiang underscored the fundamental differences in the two interpretations – policy is characterised by its adaptable nature suitable for circumstantial adjustments, while core principles are inexorable and inflexible. Drawing parallels to the pre-World War I era, Professor Xiang recalled historical lessons where major powers faltered in communication, “consistently talking past each other.” Against this historical backdrop, he emphasised the pivotal role of effective signalling in preventing misunderstandings and fostering dialogue amidst the rising tensions between the two major powers.
Professor Xiang provided further insights on avoiding miscalculations, stressing the need for strategic stability over mere tactical stability. Reflecting on the 2023 APEC Summit that transpired in San Francisco, Professor Xiang observed attempts from the U.S. side to seek provisional and tentative tactical stability. However, he cautioned that such short-term measures are unlikely to endure. Highlighting China’s inclination for strategic stability, Professor Xiang called for discussions on fundamental issues, and the potential for identifying a “middle ground” where the involved parties could find commonality. Expressing concern with the outcome of the 2023 APEC Summit, Professor Xiang suggested that the exchange fell short of addressing core concerns between the two major powers and warned that the U.S.-China rivalry is entering a dangerous stage.
China’s tendency to engage in long-term thinking occasionally extends to what Professor Xiang perceives as strategic overreach. He also noted that China has miscalculated in perceiving the “rise of the East” and “decline of the West”, suggesting a potential flaw in their strategic thinking. Pointing to the wolf warrior diplomacy employed by China, he highlighted that the Chinese foreign policy rhetoric could render the contemporary geopolitical landscape an even more “tricky” one. Professor Xiang concluded his speech by positing that both the U.S. and China are “considerably weakened”, experiencing significant internal vulnerabilities stemming not from economic or military shortcomings, but rather from domestic political challenges. He therefore called for a strategic thinker capable of discerning the underlying issues and formulating effective solutions to navigate the current complexities of the geopolitical rivalry.
Professor Kawashima Shin, professor of international relations at the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, the University of Tokyo, began by illustrating Japan’s strategic dilemma shaped by its geopolitical position and alliances. On one front, some observers assert that the nation should emulate the behavioural norms of the developed countries. Conversely, others have made the case that Japan should recalibrate its foreign policy to adapt to the dynamically shifting global landscape and the relative decline in the overall influence of developed nations. Confronted with this predicament of aligning with the G7 countries and navigating the challenge of preserving peace and stability amid neighbouring countries like China, Russia and North Korea, Japan thus exercises caution in manoeuvring the rivalry between the major powers. As an illustration, while the Japan-U.S. alliance has led to joint security measures and the imposition of sanctions against Russia in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine, Professor Shin identified that there is a reluctance by the country to overtly endorse democratic values and the term “rule of law”; instead, the Japanese government has opted to use the term “human dignity” since Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s speech at the United Nations (UN) Assembly in September 2023.
Professor Kawashima delved deeper into the focal points within Sino-Japan relations by first examining Japan’s traditional approach to its engagements with China. To date, Japan has built its relationship with China through an approach characterised by the separation of politics and the economy. This dichotomy is reflected in public sentiments: while 85 per cent of its citizens express unfavourable sentiments towards China, 70 per cent still acknowledge the importance of fostering diplomatic ties between Japan and China. However, the rise of new concerns – such as the escalating military prowess of China, coupled with its heightened naval and maritime police activities in the vicinity of Japan – have complicated Japan’s attempts to maintain the demarcation between the political and economic realms. Professor Shin thus opined that Japan now stands at a juncture where it is compelled to bolster its military deterrence against China.
This imperative, while partially stemming from the U.S. overtures, is also grounded on Japan’s belief that ensuring peace and stability in the region can only be attained through proactive utilisation of frameworks such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. In light of the evolving dynamics, Professor Shin underscored that the primary challenge for Japan now lies in maintaining substantive relations with China, encompassing economic ties, while concurrently upholding “peace and stability” in East Asia, further highlighting that a hardline stance vis-à-vis China is untenable considering the significance of the Chinese market to Japan.
Looking toward 2024, which has been heralded as an “election year” due to the plethora of elections due to happen globally, Professor Kawashima noted that U.S.-Japan relations could follow contrasting trajectories. Of particular significance is the highly anticipated U.S. presidential elections happening in the final quarter of the year. If the Democratic Party remains in power, continuity in existing policies is expected. However, in the event of the election of the Republican candidate, Donald Trump, Professor Kawashima warned that a shift in Japanese policies could be on the horizon. He predicted that under Trump’s administration, a declaration might be made to withdraw all U.S. troops stationed overseas. Additionally, there could be a call for allies to provide “something in return” for the U.S.’s continued military presence. The absence of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who forged close ties with Trump, also raises pertinent questions about who will engage in discussions and assume a strategic role with the Republican candidate.
Concluding his speech, Professor Kawashima admitted that he could not provide a definitive conclusion regarding the optimal strategic measures Japan must adopt in dealing with the evolving global landscape. Acknowledging the complexity and intricacies involved, he emphasised the importance of active commitments to dialogue and exchanges to navigate the volatile and dynamic landscape of the contemporary context.
The Q&A session commenced with a question about the changes and continuities in U.S.-China relations under a Trump 2.0 or Biden 2.0 administration. In response, Dr Feigenbaum highlighted distinctive features of the Trump administration, emphasising Trump’s lack of internationalist inclinations, disinterest in public goods provision, and reluctance towards rule-making. He also pointed out Trump’s frequent prioritisation of the “America-first” mentality, expressing concerns about its implications for international partnerships. Professor Xiang further contributed to Dr Feigenbaum’s answer, detailing Trump’s indifferent approach to ideologies and disregard for allies, coining Trump as the “tariffs man.” Professor Shin concluded the discussion by evaluating that Japan might benefit more from Biden’s Presidency due to his willingness to foster alliances and engage in global governance, as opposed to Trump.
Another participant questioned whether similar to the U.K. peacefully relinquishing its superpower status to the U.S. after World War 2, the U.S. is prepared to cede its “number one” position to China. Professor Xiang responded by noting that China is not keen to supersede the U.S., arguing that assuming the role of being the “world’s police” places a heavy burden on a country’s economy. Ms Hoang added to the conversation by highlighting the difficulty in defining what being “number one” entails, illustrating that the position cannot refer solely to a state’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Dr Feigenbaum contributed his insights by emphasising the fragmented nature of the current world. He referred to a past statement made by Obama to the Wall Street Journal on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), wherein he outlined three potential scenarios in international relations: a U.S.-centric world, a Sino-centric world, or a bipolar world reminiscent of the Cold War. Dr Feigenbaum pointed out that the world has been “fracturing” and moving towards fragmentation, thus challenging the conventional narratives of a unipolar or bipolar world.
An audience member sought insights on how developments in Chinese domestic politics would impact China’s approach to U.S.-China relations, particularly in light of increasing political consolidation and the blurring of lines between the state-party and society in recent years. Professor Xiang responded by emphasising the critical role of domestic conditions in shaping a country’s external relations. He further highlighted the current state of U.S. domestic politics, noting that the country is experiencing a situation close to a form of civil strife, drawing on the example of the Capitol attack on 6 January 2021 in the U.S.
The final audience question, referencing the differences in U.S. and Japan’s foreign policy approaches to China, inquired about the potential lessons the U.S. could learn from Japan’s balanced approach and how the two countries could enhance their coordination in managing relations with China. While Dr Feigenbaum highlighted the notable improvement in U.S.-Japan coordination over the last two decades, he also noted that both countries face unique and differing challenges in their relations with China. Notably, he elaborated on how the U.S. is fighting against the “map” and economic gravity in its strategic competition with China in Asia, where the U.S. needs to grapple with the geographic realities of China’s contiguous positioning with every sub-region of Asia. From a Japanese perspective, Professor Kawashima expressed concerns about heightened China-Russia military exercises around Japan following its sanctions on Russia, proposing the necessity for dialogue and mechanisms to preserve regional peace.
Session 2 – Regional Economic Challenges: Supply Chains, Technology, and Investment
Moderated by Dr Jayant Menon (Senior Fellow in the Regional Economic Studies Programme at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute), the second session of ROF2024 focussed on the U.S.-China geopolitical tensions and the spate of resultant economic challenges facing Southeast Asia, especially those related to supply chains of raw materials and component parts, digital technology value chains in key sectors such as semiconductors, and investment relocation to ASEAN.
The first panellist, Dr Lili Yan Ing (Lead Advisor on Southeast Asia at the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia, ERIA; and Secretary General at the International Economic Association, IEA) began her presentation with a brief overview of the protracted trade war between the US and China, ripple effects of which are now being felt in the technology sector, strategic industries, and even the domain of national security. In light of the growing rifts, while America has been ramping up its “friend-shoring” efforts, the People’s Republic is rallying behind President Xi Jinping’s “dual circulation” strategy aimed at demarcating China’s domestic economy and the rest of the world.
Dr Ing emphasised that the protectionist and anti-globalisation sentiments emerging from the trade war are becoming more widespread, as evidenced by the rapid fragmentation of value chains and the growing use of trade coercion tactics such as sanctions, as well as tariff and non-tariff barriers. The diminishing efficacy of the multilateral trading systems’ institutions, like the World Trade Organisation, has only exacerbated matters.
The conflict may, however, generate some positive spill-over effects for ASEAN. In the case of the semiconductor industry, for instance, between 2017 and 2022 China’s exports grew from US$94 billion to US$220 billion, or 134 per cent, whereas exports from ASEAN rose by a staggering 217 per cent, from US$52 billion to US$165 billion, during the same interval. Likewise, when compared to 2018, foreign direct investment (FDI) received by China dropped by 91.5 per cent in 2023, but the inflow into ASEAN jumped by 46.9 per cent. The FDI relocation can almost exclusively be attributed to the trade conflict, Dr Ing commented.
With regard to the economic challenges facing the region, the speaker drew the audience’s attention to the ratio of value-added of the manufacturing sector to national GDP, which appears to have stagnated or diminished across the majority of ASEAN member states since the 2000s. Not only are most countries in the region still involved in resource-intensive and low-skill manufacturing, but the value-addition of their services sector is also not on par with the global average. In this regard, Singapore remains the only exception. Another challenge relates to what Dr Ing called ASEAN’s “self-inflicted political economy pains”. In addition to external political pressures, certain countries in Southeast Asia — particularly Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines — have been prioritising their domestic political agenda over regional economic concerns, resulting in over-protectionism in the region. She cited the recent increase in local content requirements (LCRs), cumbersome licensing systems, and investment barriers to substantiate the point.
The second panellist Dato’ Seri Wong Siew Hai (President of the Malaysia Semiconductor Industry Association, MSIA) then shared his perspective on the semiconductor industry – the so-called “new gold” of today’s data-driven digital economy. His presentation was divided into three segments: first, a quick synopsis of the existing semiconductor landscape; second, the impact of the Covid-19 crisis; and third, the ramifications of the geopolitical tensions on the industry.
Quoting recent statistics, Dato’ Seri Wong said that, in 2022, global semiconductor sales totalled US$575 billion, with the figure expected to rise by 13 per cent in 2024, and to a whopping US$1 trillion in 2030. ASEAN currently accounts for about a fifth of the market share, with Singapore and Malaysia occupying the dominant positions among all the member states. Singapore has developed significant expertise in wafer fabrication, contributing to 5 per cent of the international wafer capacity, whereas Malaysia plays a crucial global role in assembly, testing, and packaging operations. The outlook for the industry appears very positive, with a super-cycle growth phase expected in the next two to three years.
The first wave of the Covid-19 pandemic wreaked havoc on the semiconductor industry worldwide, but the effects were particularly pronounced in Southeast Asia. Prolonged lockdown and cordon sanitaire measures led to large-scale supply chain disruptions and significant losses. However, during subsequent waves, as the reliance on the digital economy escalated — via gadgets that use integrated circuits — a boom in production ensued, with the industry’s traditional “just-in-time” manufacturing model giving way to new “just-in-case” approaches. A number of prominent companies began building storage facilities ahead of time even without inventory at hand.
On the U.S.-China trade war, Dato’ Seri Wong explained that early US sanctions on China’s Huawei on security grounds made it very challenging for the firm to source major components, which not only just affected its competitiveness in the market but also strained global supply chains. Further American restrictions on China’s wider semiconductor industry — in the form of prohibition of employment of U.S. citizens in Chinese businesses operating in the sector, and limits on the sale of cutting-edge chipmaking gear to Chinese fabs that produce chips at 14 nanometres or below — have also dampened future growth prospects. This has, however, boosted ASEAN’s semiconductor ambitions. Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam are the latest beneficiaries of the trust deficit between the world’s two largest economies.
Dato’ Seri Wong concluded his presentation with two future projections on the medium- to long-term consequence of the U.S. and China’s conscious decoupling in the semiconductor industry. First, while the chip war may create a major opportunity for upgrading India and ASEAN’s semiconductor capacities, China will continue to play a key role in the fabrication of vital lower-end components. Second, if forced to abandon their neutral stance on the conflict, most chip firms would design bifurcated protocols for their American and Chinese clients.
After the presentations, the panellists fielded varied questions from the audience on: first, the changing industrial policies of individual ASEAN countries; second, the possibility of an over-supply of semiconductors; and third, the practical challenges facing chip players in maintaining a balance between good market sense and national security concerns. Dr Ing maintained that governments should prioritize market forces and competition, focusing on the provision of infrastructure and social services, rather than picking the winners which can impose costs on society due to inefficiency. Dato’ Seri Wong explained that, in the prevailing unpredictable economic conditions, semiconductor firms are increasingly inclined toward increasing capacity and securing longer-term orders, having suffered losses due to the inability to meet demand. He also conveyed how the industry has become very mindful and vigilant to check on supply chain restrictions that have resulted from geopolitical rivalries.
Session 3 – Malaysia: New Possibilities?
The third session of ROF2024 explored Malaysia’s political outlook and the challenges facing Anwar Ibrahim’s Unity Government after one year in power. Moderated by Dr Francis Hutchinson, Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Malaysia Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, the panel featured two politicians who offered their perspectives on the fluid political context and how it could influence policy changes.
Datuk Seri Dr Mujahid Yusof Rawa, a Senator of Malaysia’s Dewan Negara Malaysia and Deputy President of Parti Amanah Negara (AMANAH), spoke about the complexity of Malaysian politics and highlighted a unique historical occurrence in 2022 when the country witnessed the change of Prime Minister (PM) three times within a single Parliamentary term. Despite the 15th General Election (GE15) results leading to a political impasse and Parliamentary gridlock, Dr Mujahid was of the view that it also presented an opportunity for all political blocs to unite and consider the country’s future. Against this political backdrop, the urge for national consensus and the formation of a Unity Government emerged.
Datuk Seri Mujahid assessed the formation of a Unity Government as a feat in and of itself, reflecting parties’ capacities to set aside their differences and prioritise the country’s stability. This success gave PM Anwar Ibrahim an advantage, as he rebuilt people’s trust in government when there was a rise in distrust towards political institutions.
While acknowledging the achievements during the first year of the Unity Government, Datuk Seri Mujahid also recognised the challenges ahead. The country’s diversity is its strength but could also be a source of contention. He believed Malaysia’s Founding Fathers were cognisant of how divisive politics could be, thus promoting tolerance as a core principle. He explained that tolerance, at times, carries a negative connotation as it implies concession. As such, Malaysia is transitioning from tolerance to acceptance based on respect and trust. While he remains hopeful for this shift to become a reality, Dr Mujahid highlighted that the persistent threat of communalism – the exploitation of religious and cultural differences for political gain – continues to pose a challenge to Malaysia.
Drawing on his extensive on-the-ground experience, Datuk Seri Mujahid believed that the issue of Islam and Melayu has become entrenched in political contestations, with parties competing amongst themselves to prove that they are “more Islam and more Malay”. Acknowledging the fragility of the issue, he was of the view that PM Anwar’s main task was to defuse competition based on identity politics. Dr Mujahid proposed four measures to address identity politics: approaching the topics of Islam and Melayu through a constitutional approach that prioritises the middle-ground; addressing the high cost of living and improving livelihoods, as he sees identity politics as an unintended consequence of constituents’ socio-economic grievances; enacting legislation, such as the proposed National Harmony Bill, to criminalise the exploitation of the 3Rs (race, religion, and royalty); and promoting the Malaysia Madani policy framework to highlight moderate and progressive Islam.
Despite the intricacies of Malaysian politics, Datuk Seri Mujahid expressed optimism about the various possibilities to achieve a better Malaysia. In his concluding remarks, he underscored the importance of calculating the risks associated with any potential action and striking a balance between idealism and pragmatism to address persistent issues such as identity politics.
Tuan Wan Ahmad Fayhsal Wan Ahmad Kamal, Member of Parliament for Machang and Youth Chief of Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (BERSATU), described the current situation in Malaysia as being in a state of perma-crises, characterised by an extended period of instability and insecurity due to catastrophic events. From the lens of a Malay nationalist politician, the downfall of Barisan Nasional (BN) and the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) were seen as catastrophic events that altered the trajectory of Malaysian politics.
Given the disappointing results of the August 2023 state elections for the ruling coalition, Wan Fayhsal emphasised the importance of the ethnic Malay votes. The victory of Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) by a significant margin was a profound indicator of BN’s losing grip on the Malay heartland. He suggested that PM Anwar Ibrahim recognise the need to secure support from the majority of Malay voters to achieve his objectives. Wan Fayhsal also linked this to Anwar’s consistent practice of wearing the traditional Baju Melayu every week and hosting Malay Islamic events.
Similar to Dr Mujahid’s views, Wan Fayhsal reiterated that trust and power revolve around identity politics in Malaysia, as it is primordially entrenched in the country’s political setting. He added that the existing societal structure is still based on communal politics, noting that the inception of Malaysia as a federation began with the practice of consociational politics. While no party can govern effectively without the support of all races, he believes that all parties within a coalition understand their respective roles and remain committed to fulfilling promises made to their electorates.
He explained that Malaysia had undergone significant changes since 1998, transitioning from communal, racial, and party-driven politics to a new form of coalition based on multi-racial politics. While this provides hope and may suggest a paradigm shift, Wan Fayhsal highlighted that this new coalition model only works in certain localities. In some places, identity politics still shapes voter support for parties, for example in the Malay heartland of Kedah, Kelantan, and Terengganu.
Articulating his views as a member of the opposition, Wan Fayhsal provided a candid assessment of the Unity Government: without a clear plan for the majority of Malay voters, instability will persist. He reiterated the importance of the Malay voters in building trust in the current government and spoke of PM Anwar’s efforts to connect with PAS. Without this strong Malay-based party in government, he believed the situation would continue to be fluid. Regarding UMNO’s role, Wan Fayhsal expressed scepticism about the party instilling similar confidence. He shared that some UMNO members have suggested that being in the opposition is better, given the uncertainty of their role in the current government and the repercussions they face when providing honest appraisals of the government.
On Malaysia’s future, Wan Fayhsal expressed optimism about the country’s potential to move beyond identity politics. He highlighted past achievements, citing Mahathir’s Vision 2020, which emphasised racial equity while outlining clear policies. He argued that achieving Malaysian unity hinges on the realisation of a “Bangsa Malaysia” (Malaysian nation), the creation of which requires participation from all members of the community. Concerted efforts are needed to overcome divisiveness across all sectors, including business, culture, education, and trade. Wan Fayhsal identified efforts to support the creation of an overarching national identity: military service similar to Singapore’s National Service; the use of the national language – Bahasa Melayu – in all levels of government and civil service to avoid miscommunications; and the enactment of national cultural policies. Success depends on effective policies, strong political will, and a stable political coalition. He concluded by saying that these measures should ideally be led by a Malay, Bumiputera-based party, to ensure the country’s stability and to propel its development.
Dr Hutchinson kicked off the Q&A session by highlighting that the Unity Government currently has over two-thirds of the majority in Parliament needed to amend the Constitution. He inquired about the willingness to introduce structural changes to improve the stability of the country’s political system and sought insights into areas where there might be a convergence of interest — for both the coalition government and the opposition.
Dr Mujahid highlighted Anwar Ibrahim’s two-thirds majority as a sign of stability and concurred that leveraging this majority for structural changes is essential. However, he also acknowledged that this would require long-term planning and trust-building. Regarding fixed Parliamentary terms, he mentioned that it was in the pipeline and that it aligned with Pakatan Harapan’s (PH) manifesto. He voiced his support for the Political Financing Act, which would combat money politics and advocated for its tabling in Parliament. Reflecting on his time as part of the opposition in past governments, he recalled his support for the Anti-Hopping Law. The spirit of governance should be to maintain stability for the country’s benefit and thus, he urged for the opposition to be practical and objective.
Wan Fayhsal agreed that the Political Financing Act is crucial but added that there were still details to be discussed. He also identified the Parliamentary Services Act, championed by the coalition government, as one area the opposition would support. The endorsement of the Act would help enhance stability and create better conditions for all parties and their constituents.
The first question from the audience began with an observation that both party loyalty within Parliament and party identity among voters have declined. She inquired about the defining issues for respective coalitions and parties, and how these issues translate into policies, considering the dilemma between ideology and practicality.
Wan Fayhsal recounted that after the current government’s formation, the PM did not extend an olive branch to the opposition. Instead, he accused them of stealing RM600 billion and made a series of accusations against opposing members of Parliament. This unfortunate start has made cooperation challenging. Despite this, since the end of the elections, the opposition has concentrated on the common cause of developing the country. Wan Fayhsal evaluated the government’s promised reforms as being slow-paced, noting that one year constitutes 20 per cent of the political mandate in a five-year term, and expressing hope for the acceleration of initiatives.
Datuk Seri Mujahid emphasised that during Malaysia’s hung Parliament, the idea of a Unity Government was prompted by His Majesty the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, not Anwar Ibrahim. He noted that if His Majesty is apolitical, this should serve as the foundation for other blocs to consider the idea of a Unity Government. While Dr Mujahid acknowledged the missed opportunity for cooperation after the elections, he also believed many common areas of interest still exist. He was of the view that both the government and the opposition must be objective and progressive. He also mentioned that his party, AMANAH, was established as a centre party to help with consensus-building and constitutionality in debates and stressed that the way forward for Malaysia is through the middle ground.
Next, a participant asked Datuk Seri Mujahid about the feasibility of addressing the Islam-Malay debate through a constitution-based approach, especially considering the polarisation in interpreting the constitution. Datuk Seri Mujahid reiterated that Islam-Malay discussions should be approached through a constitutional lens, while also considering shared concerns. He identified economic prosperity and growth, and national unity, as areas where parties with different ideologies can find commonalities. He also underscored these areas as potential catalysts to transition the country from identity-based to principle-based politics, a transition he sees the current government actively pursuing for the overall benefit of the nation.
The participant also asked Wan Fayhsal about Perikatan Nasional’s (PN) intention to garner support from beyond the Malay communities and whether there were unique outreach strategies for the different communities or localities. Wan Fayhsal emphasised that the election results showed a strong mandate from the Malay-Bumiputera communities. He shared that BERSATUhas established an Associate Wing (Sayap Bersekutu), where the wing’s leader holds a position equivalent to that of a Vice President and is integral to the party’s Supreme Council. The Head of the Wing also partakes in all critical discussions and policymaking within the party.
Wan Fayhsal added that despite having plans and strategies in place, there are still shortcomings. He shared that based on conversations with external parties, including embassies in Malaysia, their main worry is not BERSATU but rather PAS. He expressed scepticism about PAS invoking strong imagery of extremism towards the non-Malay constituents, attributing this perception to miscommunication. He suggested that for PAS to progress, the party should position more professionals as part of their frontlines. While religious groups and scholars will always play a crucial role in policymaking and strategic planning, it is also crucial to address the party’s challenging public image.
As for BERSATU, Wan Fayhsal argued that the party is not much different from UMNO in their framework. It is a Malay party created by former UMNO leaders who fought the 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) scandal and recognised the flaws of practising patronage politics. He argued that to advance, BERSATU should bring in more non-Malay members as part of their representatives, who would be able to provide critical views on how to engage with non-Malay communities.
Dr Hutchinson concluded the session by highlighting the importance of practitioners’ perspectives to reflect the possibilities of policymaking for prosperity and peace.
Session 4 – The Philippines and Thailand: Enduring Elites, Deepening Dilemmas
The fourth session of the forum, moderated by Dr Napon Jatusripitak (Visiting Fellow, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute), focused on the persistent issues of political dynasties, elite power structures, and the deepening public dilemmas in the Philippines and Thailand. This session featured insightful contributions from Ms Marites Dañguilan Vitug (Editor-at-Large for Rappler), and Dr Anusorn Unno (Associate Professor at the Faculty of Sociology and Anthropology, Thammasat University).
Ms Vitug led the discussion by analysing the political atmosphere in the Philippines under President Marcos Junior’s administration. She drew a stark contrast between his landslide victory in the 2022 election and the People Power Revolution that had dethroned his father, ex-president Marcos Senior, 36 years earlier. This dramatic shift in public opinion, she noted, stemmed from the perceived failures of previous democratic reforms and the authoritarian regime of ex-president Duterte, marked by extra-judicial killings in his war on drugs and the suppression of opposition.
She further elaborated on how Marcos Junior’s ascent to power was aided by a disinformation campaign that cast a favourable light on Marcos Senior’s era. His strategic alliance with Duterte’s Daughter Sara Duterte led to the formation of a unity coalition that successfully bridged various political factions.
In terms of policy under Marcos Junior, Ms Vitug pointed out significant domestic and foreign shifts. Domestically, his focus was on reinstating democratic norms, ending state-sanctioned killings, releasing opposition figures, and rejoining the International Criminal Court (ICC). On the foreign front, his administration concentrated on strengthening ties with traditional allies such as the U.S. and recalibrating relations with China, which included withdrawing from some Chinese railway projects while remaining a participant in the Belt and Road Initiative. She emphasized Marcos Junior’s commitment to a new transparency initiative, requiring public disclosure of any confrontations with China in the South China Sea, a clear departure from his predecessor’s approach.
A pivotal aspect of his foreign policy, as highlighted by Ms Vitug, was the strategic decision to allow the reopening of U.S. military bases in the Philippines. This move, aimed at countering China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea, reflected a broader trend of Western nations seeking defense agreements with the Philippines, acknowledging its strategic regional importance. Discussions and agreements with nations like Australia, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, and France were pursued to bolster defense ties.
Moreover, Ms Vitug underscored the role of state and social media in promoting Marcos Junior’s policies and the efforts to reshape historical narratives about Marcos Senior’s regime in the educational curriculum. She noted the post-election fragmentation of the Marcos-Duterte unity coalition, with Sara Duterte openly criticising Marcos Junior at times and seeking greater control over confidential and intelligence funds. Despite these internal political challenges and a slight decline in popularity, Marcos Junior’s government maintained substantial public support, as evidenced by his over 65 per cent approval rating – which is primarily due to rising inflation. She expects the split between the Duterte and Marcos camps to deepen. This will shape the political landscape leading to the 2025 mid-term elections.
Dr Unno continued the session, exploring relationship dynamics and trust levels among citizens and elites in Thailand. He emphasized that trust and distrust, both between citizens and elites and among the elites themselves, have been central and root causes of political conflicts in Thailand for the past two decades. Since Thailand’s abolition of absolute monarchy in 1932, its political landscape has been marked by enduring competition between traditional elites (royalists and conservatives) and political elites (liberals), with the military consistently in a pivotal role.
In the 1990s, traditional elites, represented by King Bhumibol, ascended to power. The king, an intellectual himself, wielded significant influence over Thai politics by uniting diverse classes and the political spectrum within Thai society. For example, his agricultural and economic theories garnered support from various stakeholders, including civil society, intellectuals, and environmentalists. His relationship with the military also appeared to be one in which he is in control. His cordial relationship with civil society played a pivotal role in introducing the concept of “Royal democracy” into the 1997 Thai constitution, the first constitution drafted by the people, not the elites.
However, Dr Unno explained that the constitution’s design aimed to create a strong government, which posed the biggest challenge for traditional elites. Former Prime Minister Thaksin effectively used the constitution as a tool. After his landslide victory in the 2005 election, four years after his 2001 election victory, his party formed a single-party government for the first time in Thai history. This rise of the new political elites threatened the traditional elites.
The sense of alarm among traditional elites was shared among their civil society supporters. In 2005, the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), or yellow shirts, disputed the election’s fairness, demanding the restoration of royal prerogatives through Article 7 of the constitution. The king declined to be involved and tasked the constitutional court, which invalidated the election results, leading to a political deadlock. PAD, in cooperation with traditional elites, faced opposition from Thaksin’s supporters, the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD), or red shirts, which allied with political elites.
Dr Unno discussed the growing distrust between traditional and political elites in Thailand after the dissolution of the Future Forward Party in 2020. This led to a decline in public reverence for the monarchy and contributed to the Move Forward Party’s victory in the 2023 election. However, when the monarchy’s future was at stake, traditional elites in the senate supported the less threatening Pheu Thai party for the Prime Minister position, despite the MFP’s majority. With this political manoeuvre, Pheu Thai shifted from challenging the traditional elites to being backed by them, which signalled reconciliation but fragmented the party’s supporter base. This also highlighted the diversity among Thailand’s elites and their occasional cooperation to block rival factions.
The Q&A session began with a question for both speakers about whether the alliance among elites in both countries represents a short-term convenience or a lasting pact. Ms Vitug mentioned that the partnership between Marcos Junior and Sara Duterte is already broken, and it was primarily for political control. She also expressed her concern about the future of democracy in the Philippines. Dr Unno added that Thai politics typically sees short-term alliances, and the new king does not exert the same political influence as his father, but he still wields power over the military and the privy council, allowing traditional elites to maintain control in Thai politics.
A question about the Philippines’ current strategic approach to the South China Sea issue was directed to Ms Vitug. She mentioned that there are regular bilateral consultations, but the Philippines will continue to assert its sovereign rights. As the ASEAN China Code of Conduct implementation has been delayed, the Philippines is resorting to traditional diplomatic tools. They attempted to establish a hotline with Beijing, but there was no response from the other side during recent sea skirmishes. Currently, Beijing shows no intent to relinquish its claim, and their strategy appears to be to wear down the Philippines.
Dr Unno was asked about the outcome of the recent Thai election and whether it favoured traditional elites. The question also raised concerns about voter turnout in the next election if the ballot box results are not respected. Additionally, he was questioned about Thailand’s position in the midst of U.S.–China competition. Dr Unno explained that traditional elites may seek reconciliation, as evidenced by military leaders paying respect to the new Prime Minister. Despite youth frustration toward the shifting Thai political landscape and reconfigurations, Dr Unno believes they are learning from this experience and exploring new avenues to engage in politics. Regarding U.S.–China competition, he noted that Thai people, in general, are more interested in the U.S., but there are strong business ties between the two countries, making the China–Thailand relationship cordial.
Another audience member asked about the Philippines’ 2025 general election, and Ms Vitug responded that it will likely be a battle between the territorial camps, with no serious challenges from the opposition. The competition will revolve around the split between Marcos Junior and Sara.
Session 5 – Indonesia’s 2024 Elections: Contenders and Consequences
Moderated by Ms Julia Lau, Senior Fellow and Co-Coordinator of the Indonesia Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, the fifth session focused on Indonesia’s upcoming 2024 presidential elections and President Joko Widodo’s legacy.
Dr Yanuar Nugroho, Visiting Senior Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and former Deputy Chief of Staff to the President of Indonesia (2015–2019), framed his presentation around five key themes: the political elite; the impact of dynastic politics; Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and other stakeholders’ roles in the upcoming elections; proposed economic strategies; and whether the next president would continue Jokowi’s signature policies. The formation of the three presidential candidate pairings had led to shifting alliances and power dynamics within the political elite. Dr Nugroho noted that coalitions that used to support President Jokowi were split in their support for the candidates. The majority leaned toward the Prabowo-Gibran pair: frontrunner Defence Minister Prabowo Subianto represented populist ideology, with continuation (of Jokowi’s policies) as his team’s key approach. Former Central Java governor Ganjar Pranowo represented the nationalists, with “improvement” as his key policy notion while former Jakarta governor Anies Baswedan focused more on “change”, taking a clear reformist stance and challenging Jokowi.
Elaborating on the impact of dynastic politics, Dr Nugroho stated that Jokowi’s seeming involvement in the elections had changed each candidate’s campaign approach. Prabowo and Ganjar initially claimed that the president supported them, but this changed when Jokowi’s eldest son Gibran Rakabuming Raka became Prabowo’s running mate. In response, Ganjar criticised President Jokowi’s actions and adopted a narrative of becoming a “better version” of the latter if he were elected. Anies chose to stay clear from being aligned with Jokowi and promoted himself as an entirely different candidate. While Indonesians disapproved of dynastic politics, Dr Nugroho noted that the impact on Prabowo-Gibran’s popularity rating was minimal. In fact, Gibran becoming Prabowo’s running mate had spiked their ratings as it was a clear indication of Jokowi’s support for Prabowo.
For business elites and oligarchs, Dr Nugroho believed the majority supported candidate Prabowo, mostly out of pragmatism. Interestingly, major coal or palm oil companies have not shown clear preferences and supported all three candidates. Civil society actors demonstrated the most support for Ganjar, then Anies, with little to none for Prabowo. As for religious leaders, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) allegedly supported Prabowo while some in the intellectual wing chose to support Ganjar. The Indonesian Catholic Church showed some support for Team Ganjar–Mahfud, who were both present at a synodal meeting for the Indonesia Bishops’ Conference in November 2023. Members of the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB), especially those close to Muhaimin, naturally chose to support Anies.
Dr Nugroho briefly elaborated on the economic strategies proposed by the three candidates. All pledged to continue promoting economic growth and strengthening domestic industries to reduce over-reliance on foreign investment. He assessed they would all continue with policies initiated by President Jokowi, such as the new capital city (IKN), Nusantara, social protection, and industrial downstreaming. The differences would lie more in policy execution, such as Prabowo’s preference for protectionism versus Anies’ penchant for liberalisation and market solutions. Prabowo’s approach would likely be more government-centric in directing economic policy compared to Anies and Ganjar, who would likely limit or balance the government’s role in economic development. Anies and Ganjar had indicated that they will include “re-industralisation” as a component of downstreaming. For Nusantara, Prabowo expressed strong support, emphasising the importance of developing it in an environmentally sustainable way. Ganjar was neutral, stating that there was a need to have more feasibility studies done. Interestingly, Anies, despite being critical, did not mention Nusantara in his vision and mission document. Dr Nugroho believed that he may be “forced” to continue with the IKN if elected, as his likely coalition would not have the capability to stop the project.
Dr Nugroho concluded by stating that Indonesia’s political landscape was currently dominated by the contestation of interests, whether personal or party, not ideas. There was less room for the development of new ideas, given that there was no real political opposition to provide proper checks and balances. As a result, transactional politics based on parties’ interests dominated the parliament (DPR) while civil society organisations were ineffective in opposing top-down policy implementation. There was a need to change the fundamentals in Indonesia’s political landscape. Otherwise, dynastic politics and contestation of interests will persist, jeopardising the democratic growth of the country in the long run.
Professor Burhanuddin Muhtadi, Visiting Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and Professor of Political Science at Islamic State University (UIN) Syarif Hidayatullah, began by elaborating on recent electability poll results. He explained that the electability of a candidate was not purely dependent on his capability but also on how well he was received by the national parliament (DPR) and the public. A higher approval rating meant a candidate’s higher electability. At this point, Prabowo had the highest approval/electability rating. While Ganjar initially enjoyed some support because he was from the same party as President Jokowi (the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, PDI-P), this changed when Gibran became Prabowo’s running mate. Support was re-directed to Prabowo-Gibran while those who did not support Jokowi lent their support to candidate Anies.
Professor Burhanuddin elaborated on the link between President Jokowi’s high approval rating and the elections. Across time in Indonesian politics, since direct presidential elections have been held, a president’s approval rating has been inversely proportional to inflation. In general, periods of higher inflation would see lower approval ratings for the president, reflecting society’s disgruntlement. Professor Burhanuddin illustrated this pattern with a time series graph comparing President Jokowi and his predecessor Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s approval ratings with inflation trends during their terms. This explained why Jokowi consistently enjoyed a high approval rating of around 70-80 per cent because inflation was low, notwithstanding the pandemic and other challenges. As a result, Jokowi was not a lame duck but a kingmaker for 2024.
Professor Burhanuddin also shared the poll results his survey institute collected from July to December 2023, where respondents were asked to select the candidate pairing they would vote if the presidential election were held at the time of the survey. While most respondents initially selected the Ganjar-Mahfud pair, this changed when Gibran secured his running mate position under Prabowo (the “Jokowi effect”). Surprisingly, respondents who shifted to Prabowo-Gibran consisted of non-Jokowi supporters within PDI-P. Dr Burhanuddin focused on the past eight weeks of poll results, which showed a stagnant trend for Prabowo-Gibran, suggesting that an equilibrium of support might have been reached. Unless an extraordinary event happened in the next few weeks, this trend would likely continue till election day (14 February). Dr Burhanuddin highlighted that young voters formed the largest voter segment, at 53 per cent of the electorate. Prabowo currently held a lead for respondents in this category. Yet a significant number of young voters supported Anies or Ganjar, so either man still had a chance to beat Prabowo in a second round.
Professor Burhanuddin speculated that if Prabowo won the election, Golkar, a party endorsing Prabowo, could topple PDI-P as the leading party in the DPR but there may not be significant shifts in policies regardless of who became president. Despite having differentiated campaign platforms, all three candidates would eventually seek practical solutions when elected president. Indonesian politicians still held democracy in high regard despite the rise of dynastic politics; it was the best form of government for Indonesia and most Indonesians will continue to exercise their right to vote.
The Q&A session kicked off with a question on the factors driving vote choices in Indonesian society, given that voter support was increasingly delinked from party identification or policy direction. Professor Burhanuddin referenced polls that asked why Indonesians supported a particular candidate, to which the majority indicated that social assistance was the main factor they supported President Jokowi, especially after the Covid-19 pandemic, whereas previously, infrastructural development topped the list. Dr Nugroho added that there was a narrative circulating on the ground that if Indonesians did not vote for Prabowo, the government’s social assistance scheme would be removed. This showed how importantly the people viewed social assistance — whoever championed a strong social assistance scheme would secure the voters’ support.
A few participants focused their questions on the rift between President Jokowi and former president Megawati Sukarnoputri and its impact on PDI-P, and why younger voters did not seem to know the complicated history of candidate Prabowo. Ms Lau spoke of national memory and its associated challenges, including distortion or manipulation. To the question on PDI-P’s internal rift, Dr Nugroho responded that despite this, President Jokowi was still well-liked by the PDI-P grassroots who saw him as a perfect president who was always there for the people. PDI-P, being aware of his popularity, would not take any negative action toward Jokowi during the 2024 campaign but this could change after the election. Both speakers candidly responded that Megawati would eventually “punish” Jokowi.
Asked whether Megawati is to be blamed for not preparing a successor after President Jokowi, Dr Nugroho acknowledged that there could be some fault on Megawati’s part for not having proper succession planning. However, President Jokowi and his supporters had tried to extend his second term or even try for a third term, based on the pretext that the pandemic had destabilised the country. Megawati put a stop to this attempt to subvert democracy and insisted that elections must be held in 2024. In some sense, President Jokowi had already betrayed democracy, especially when his sons became involved in politics.
On the question of how Prabowo was able to rehabilitate himself, Dr Nugroho believed that his attempts in the last two elections (2014 and 2019) had helped to soften his image and many voters had begun to forget what he had done during the Suharto era. Professor Burhanuddin commented that Prabowo remained popular among young voters, especially those born after Reformasi (1998–99). This generation of young people did not have any experience with Prabowo’s history and based their choice on his current ‘gemoy’ or grandfatherly image.
An online participant asked if there were any differences in the voting choices between rural and urban constituents. Professor Burhanuddin stated that those from the rural areas were more in favour of Prabowo while urbanites leaned towards Ganjar or Anies. This rural preference for Prabowo tallied with how Jokowi’s supporters mainly came from rural areas, while urban voters were generally displeased with Jokowi’s decision to put Gibran into politics.
The final question of the day concerned the effect of the ongoing presidential debates in influencing voters’ choice and whether Megawati should shoulder some blame for the current “mess” of Indonesia’s politics. The speakers noted that while Prabowo had run as Megawati’s vice-presidential running mate for 2009, Jokowi’s strategising with regards to emplacing his son was his own idea. Dr Nugroho added that the presidential debates could bring about only 2 to 3 per cent of change in vote choices. Work at the grassroots level remained crucial in influencing votes, together with social media, as he believed the latter was the main platform from which young people received information about the elections. Professor Burhanuddin added that Anies and Ganjar were adjusting their campaign strategies with a second round of elections in mind. Ganjar was trying to improve his image by using social media to appeal to young voters. Anies was taking a more offensive stand vis-à-vis Prabowo. A second round would mean that the two challengers had a longer runway on which to defeat Prabowo — all candidates were tapping social media to convince supporters from the other camps to switch sides. This made Indonesia’s elections highly dynamic.
Related links:
1. Welcome Remarks by Mr Choi Shing Kwok
2. Media Coverage
3. Event photos
4. Event videos