2023/87 “Continuity and Change: The Limits of Malaysia’s Green Wave from a Four Arenas Perspective” by Kai Ostwald and Steven Oliver
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Malaysia has experienced a period of dramatic political change over the past decade, capped off by the November 2022 general election and the August 2023 state elections. Many analyses have pointed to a “green wave” to describe the electoral breakthroughs achieved by the Islamist party PAS and its Perikatan Nasional coalition.
- This analysis adopts a macro-level Four Arenas framework to assess what has, and what has not, changed in Malaysia’s electoral outcomes between 2013 and 2023. The framework conceives of Malaysia as four distinct electoral arenas—three on the Peninsula (Northeast, Malay-majority, and Malay-minority) and East Malaysia—each of which has unique electoral dynamics. Contrary to assumptions of comprehensive political change, the analysis demonstrates that political change is limited to just two arenas and partially a function of coalition realignment rather than significant changes in voter preferences. In other arenas, political outcomes have been remarkably consistent.
- The purported “green wave” is geographically limited in scope. It is clearest in PAS’ consolidation of the peninsula’s northern states, which are for historical reasons demographically distinct. There is less evidence, however, of a green wave affecting outcomes in other arenas: PN achieved few gains in East Malaysia and in ethnically diverse peninsular seats during the 2022/23 elections; in other parts of the peninsula beyond the north, PN’s gains were modest at best and made primarily under the relatively neutral PN—rather than PAS green—banner.
- The PN’s limited success outside of the northern states suggests that PAS may already have achieved most of its “easy” wins, and that significant inroads into new areas—without which securing a parliamentary majority is impossible—might be difficult in the absence of modifying its political positions or restructuring its coalition. Both of those, however, entail their own uncertainties and costs.
- Other coalitions face some form of this basic dilemma as well, as none are well-positioned to secure a parliamentary majority on their own. This requires improvisation and/or cross-coalition collaborations, both of which test the resilience of poorly institutionalized coalitions. Such a mix is not favourable to stability, including in the form of protracted rule by a PAS-led government that some green wave narratives present as the logical outcome of PAS’s recent gains.
* Kai Ostwald is Associate Professor in the School of Public Policy and Global Affairs at the University of British Columbia, as well as Director of UBC’s Institute of Asian Research. He is also Associate Senior Fellow of the Malaysia Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. Steven Oliver is Assistant Professor in Social Sciences and Head of Studies (Philosophy, Politics, and Economics) at Yale-NUS College.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/87, 27 October 2023
INTRODUCTION
Perhaps no narrative features more prominently in analyses of Malaysia’s November 2022 general election (GE15) or its August 2023 (PRN2023) state elections than that of the “green wave”. That narrative contends that a growing preference for Islamist politics in Malaysia has driven (and may continue to drive) electoral breakthroughs for the Perikatan Nasional (PN) coalition, and particularly its component party Parti Islam se-Malaysia (PAS). It is the latest of several developments that suggest profound changes to Malaysia’s political order, once among the world’s most stable.
Malaysia’s political order has clearly changed in the past decade. This period includes the tail-end of UMNO’s six-decade long dominance of Malaysian politics, proceeds through its unexpected 2018 defeat, enters a period of unprecedented instability that saw three new governments take power in three years, and ends with GE15 and PRN2023, which saw the Islamist party PAS secure more seats than any other. Opinion polling has fed strongly into the green wave narrative, often focusing on such things as indicators of growing conservatism among the Malay-Muslim majority. The same is true for the sentiments of newly enfranchised 18 to 21-year-old voters, not least due to their purported captivation with populist figures—especially PAS’ Sanusi Md Noor[1]—and high reliance on social media, which PAS has effectively used to promote its blend of religious and political messaging.[2]
Although narratives on voter sentiments—including the green wave—often contain elements of truth, their direct extrapolation to macro-level political outcomes risks yielding oversimplified and insufficiently substantiated conclusions.[3] This is particularly true for a country like Malaysia, where structural complexities, chief amongst which are strongly pronounced regional differences and an electoral system that distorts the translation of votes into seats, affect how changing voter sentiments impact actual electoral outcomes and the balance of power in Parliament. In short, even if preferences among a subset of the population are changing, their impact on parliamentary numbers is indirect.
This Perspective addresses a simple question: what has, and what has not, changed in Malaysia’s electoral environment during the tumultuous years from GE13 through PRN2023? In addressing this question, it adopts the “Four Arenas” framework developed in earlier work. This provides a macro-level perspective to complement voter-level studies.[4] Our analysis suggests continuity in some areas and significant change in others, though not always due to changing voter preferences. This has a number of implications, including for the “green wave” narrative. Specifically, PAS’ GE15 gains in UMNO’s former peninsular strongholds indicate a consolidation of the north, but inroads beyond the north remain limited and difficult to interpret. In short, there may be developments in voter preferences around political Islam, but at least for the time being, any electoral green wave remains regionally contained.
THE FOUR ARENAS FRAMEWORK
Malaysia can be conceived of as an amalgamation of regions with distinct demographic features and historical origins. That composition creates significant overall diversity, and strong geographic concentration of political preferences. In addition, Malaysia’s electoral districts are highly gerrymandered and malapportioned.[5] These features have myriad implications beyond distorting the translation of voter preferences into parliamentary seats. The Four Arenas framework takes these features into account to allow for macro-level comparisons of developments in Malaysian politics.
The framework views Malaysia as comprised of four distinct polities, each with their own distinct electoral dynamics. Table 1 shows the four electoral arenas, using data from the 14th general election (GE14) held in 2018.[6] The Northeast arena covers all the electoral districts of Kelantan and Terengganu. This region did not come under British control until the Bangkok Treaty of 1909 and consequently did not experience the same economic and demographic transformations as other parts of the peninsula, a condition that is reflected in its still distinct demographic structure. The East Malaysia arena comprises all districts in the Bornean states of Sabah and Sarawak, which operated largely independent of British Malaya during the colonial period and which have retained a distinct political dynamic since. The Peninsula Diverse arena is defined as peninsular districts with a greater-than-50% non-Malay electorate in GE14; it contains mainly urban and semi-urban seats, and functions—much as the Straits Settlements did under colonial rule—as a cosmopolitan gateway to the global economy. The (Malay-majority) Peninsula Malay arena comprises the peninsula’s remaining districts; they are the traditional stronghold of once-dominant UMNO. Notably, most of the seats, particularly beyond Kedah and Perlis, are also more ethnically diverse than their northern counterparts.[7] The arena’s large number of seats, in which votes are overweighted through malapportionment, made this the cardinal region of Malaysian politics from which political power emanated under BN’s long rule.
Table 1: Key attributes of the four arenas, showing data from GE14 in 2018
POLITICAL CONTINUITY AND CHANGE FROM GE13 THROUGH PRN2023
The four arenas framework provides a systematic high-level perspective on how evolving political preferences within the electorate affect parliamentary seats across the diverse arenas. Figure 1 captures the percentage of seats won by each major contestant in GE13, GE14 and GE15 in each of the four arenas. This range covers a tumultuous period for Malaysian politics, from the last general election won by the BN (GE13) through the purported green wave of GE15 and PRN2023.
The blue bars denote the UMNO-led and formerly dominant BN coalition. Red bars denote the Pakatan Rakyat (PR) coalition (in GE13) and its successor Pakatan Harapan (PH) (in GE14 and GE15). Note that for the sake of comparison, PAS is shown separately from PR in GE13, despite belonging to the coalition. Green bars denote PAS (in GE13 and GE14) and the PN coalition in GE15. The yellow bar denotes the myriad East Malaysian parties and coalitions.
Figure 1: Percentage of seats won in each arena by the major coalitions/contestants
The figures tell a story of both continuity and change. The continuity in electoral outcomes—in the sense of consolidating trends—is most striking in the Peninsula Diverse and Northeast arenas: the progressive PR/PH coalition established itself as a dominant force in the Peninsula Diverse arena in GE13 and further consolidated that position in the subsequent two elections, conceding only 2 of the 48 total seats in the arena during GE15. The story is similar in the Northeastarena, where PAS has had a significant presence since its establishment in the 1950s. While the BN was typically competitive in the arena up through GE12, the balance steadily tipped towards PAS in GE13, and was further consolidated in GE14 and GE15 (the latter as part of the PN coalition together with Bersatu).
By contrast, the Peninsula Malay and East Malaysia arenas have experienced more substantial change. As UMNO’s long-standing stronghold, the Peninsula Malay arena is arguably the region in whose image contemporary Malaysia has been shaped.[8] It was also the foundation on which the BN built its dominance: UMNO controlled many of the arena’s (large number of) seats, then relied on supplemental seats—often won by junior coalition partners—in other arenas to secure parliamentary supermajorities. The BN’s grip on the arena remained solid in GE13, where it won nearly three-quarters of the seats, but substantially loosened in GE14 and slipped further in GE15. Figure 2, which depicts seats won in the arena by party (left pane) as well as seat flows between parties in GE15 (right pane), provides additional insights.
Figure 2: (left pane) seats won by party in the Peninsula Malay arena in GE13, GE14 and GE15; (right pane) seat flows between parties in GE15 (left side indicates seats lost, right indicates new seats won).
UMNO’s losses in GE14 and GE15 were precipitous, but the beneficiaries differ between the elections. In GE14, a majority of UMNO’s lost seats were picked up by the newly-formed UMNO-clone party Bersatu, which shared much of UMNO’s platform. PAS, which contested widely as a third-party under its own logo, was largely uncompetitive, winning only 3 seats in the arena (and none in the Peninsula Diverse and East Malaysia arenas). In GE15, by contrast, PAS gained 23 seats (for a total of 26) in the arena within the PN coalition, increasing its seat count nearly 10-fold; it picked up 11 seats from UMNO, 8 from PKR, and 3 from Amanah. Bersatu’s seat count increased by a more modest 9, split between former UMNO and PKR seats.[9] In short, the Peninsula Malay arena, which was Malaysia’s most stable arena under UMNO’s long rule, has experienced substantial volatility since GE13.
PAS’ breakthrough has received particular attention, and forms the basis of the green wave narrative. This is not unwarranted: from being largely a non-entity prior to GE15 in Malaysia’s cardinal electoral arena, it now holds more seats than any other party there. But does this validate the green wave narrative? Two important caveats stand out.
First, as Figure 3 illustrates, PAS’ expansion remains regionally concentrated, even within the Peninsula Malay arena. PAS picked up six new seats in Kedah, where it now holds 9 of the 15 total. Similarly, in Perlis, it now holds 2 of 3 seats. In total, PAS controls 27 of the 40 seats in Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah, and Perlis, all northern states that remain unique following their relatively late incorporation into British Malaya.[10] Moreover, PAS won every seat it contested in those states, and its grassroots machinery was instrumental in supporting Bersatu’s 12 wins, allowing the PN to take 39 of 40 seats in the northern states. PAS’ success beyond those states, however, was far more modest; it won only 16 of the additional 37 seats it contested (47%). A similar pattern holds for PRN2023: in the northern states, PN won 108 of 113 seats (96%), of which PAS itself won 75%. In the remaining states of Penang, Selangor and Negeri Sembilan, PN holds only 39 of 133 seats (29%); those are quite evenly split between PAS and Bersatu, leaving PAS with only 18% of seats.
The second caveat relates to another geographically-defined distinction: in the northern states, PAS flags and other party insignia often accompanied (or even overwhelmed) the more neutral and centrist PN blue during GE15 and PRN2023 campaigning; in the remaining states, PN branding dominated, typically leaving little-to-no indication of underlying party affiliation, and thus making it difficult for voters to discern between PAS and Bersatu candidates.[11] In short, GE15 and PRN2023 clearly saw a PAS breakthrough. But the pattern of PAS’ wins suggests more a consolidation of northern states than it does a peninsula-wide wave, at least in terms of electoral outcomes. This does not preclude the possibility that underlying socio-political developments are driving an increase in appetite for Islamist politics, but even then, its electoral effects remain geographically bounded for the time being.
Figure 3: PAS’ expansion in the Peninsula Malay. Dark green denotes Northeast arena seats, light green denotes Peninsula Malay seats won by PAS in GE15.
The East Malaysia arena’s states of Sabah and Sarawak were often branded a “fixed deposit” for the BN for their consistent delivery of seats to the once-dominant coalition.[12] This typically came through East Malaysian component parties of the BN coalition, though East Malaysian-led local UMNO branches also contributed seats. The BN’s collapse in this arena is staggering: from winning 49 (of 57) seats in GE13, it managed only 7 in GE15. This suggests a similar fundamental upheaval of political order, as in the Peninsula Malay arena. Figure 4, however, which depicts seats won by party (rather than coalition) in East Malaysia, suggests a different story.
Figure 4: Seats won by party in East Malaysia arena in GE14 and GE15
At the party level, political change in East Malaysia—particularly between GE14 and GE15—is more modest than the BN’s collapse would suggest. This continuity amidst the collapse of BN’s seat count results from the decoupling of East Malaysian parties and political elites from their erstwhile peninsular political overlords, and not from instability in party-voter linkages. This began prior to GE14 with a split in UMNO Sabah that created the Warisan splinter party, whose seats helped PH secure a parliamentary majority in GE14. The BN’s defeat in that election precipitated a large-scale exodus of East Malaysian parties from the coalition. Those major parties/coalitions, including Gabungan Parti Sarawak (GPS) and Gabungan Rakyat Sabah, retained strong linkages to voters that allowed them to continue winning seats independent of the BN. In short, the recent changes in East Malaysian parliamentary seats reflect coalition realignments more than they do underlying changes party/elite-voter linkages.
IMPLICATIONS:
This pattern of continuity and change has important implications for political order in Malaysia. The BN’s longstanding formula for securing power—dominance of the cardinal Peninsula Malay arena, supplemented by seats from other arenas—has broken down. Despite respectable performances in Melaka, Johor, Negeri Sembilan, and parts of Pahang, there is little to suggest that the BN can re-establish its former dominance over the broader Peninsula Malay arena, particularly as PAS/PN have consolidated their control over its northern seats in Kedah and Perlis. Simultaneously, the analysis suggests that any green wave, at least in terms of actual seat wins, remains geographically bounded: PN made no meaningful inroads in the Peninsula Diverse and East Malaysia arenas, and its success in the Peninsula Malay arena was modest at best beyond the north. This does not preclude PN making further gains in the future, but does suggest that the relatively “easy” wins have already been achieved.
As the original Four Arenas article argued, securing parliamentary majorities in Malaysia requires success in multiple arenas. Given the apparent limits of the purported green wave, it is on its own unlikely to carry the PN into power. Pursuing the necessary breakthroughs in elusive arenas might compel the PN to moderate some positions or expand the coalition, but such manoeuvres require compromises that could further strain the already tense relationship between PAS and Bersatu. Therein lies the challenge confronting all Malaysian political actors: given the complexities of Malaysia’s political geography and electoral system, none of the present coalitions—whether the BN, PH, PN, GPS, GRS, or others—are well-positioned to secure a parliamentary majority on their own. That calls for improvisation between the coalitions, most of which are weakly institutionalized or are actively deinstitutionalizing.[13] Such a mix is unfavourable to stability, including in the form of protracted rule by a PAS-Bersatu coalition that some green wave narratives present as the logical outcome of PAS’ recent seat gains.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
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2023/86 “The Dilemma of Political Involvement among Muslim Theologians in Indonesia” by Norshahril Saat and Ahmad Muhajir
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Under Suharto’s New Order regime (1966-1998), Indonesian religious elites generally did not join formal politics or elections apart from the avenues sanctioned by the government. All Islamic political parties—of different ideologies—were grouped under the PPP (United Development Party).
- Between the 1970s and late 1990s, Nurcholish Madjid’s (Cak Nur) “Islam Yes, Islamic Politics No” shaped Indonesia’s Islamic political discourse. The more politically inclined theologians (including those from Nahdlatul Ulama, NU) joined PPP, while others who wished to make their voices heard in policymaking participated in state-formed religious institutions.
- After 1998, and under a more democratic setting, religious elites have remained divided regarding political participation. Some shun it, and prefer not to be associated with any politicians or parties, for fear of the “corruption” of their religious ideas. Some openly endorse political parties, advocate clear political roles for themselves and lobby their allies for political positions, in the name of advancing Islamic goals.
- This article discusses whether the religious elite in Indonesia is tilting towards approving direct political participation. With the election season in Indonesia due in early 2024, identity or pietistic politics is gaining more importance than ever. Yet, some religious elites prefer to focus on upholding Islamic ideals and keep their distance from politics, thereby eschewing the potential benefits of political patronage.
*Norshahril Saat is Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Regional Social and Cultural Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. Ahmad Muhajir is Visiting Fellow in the same programme, and Lecturer at UIN-Antasari Banjarmasin, South Kalimantan.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/86, 25 October 2023
INTRODUCTION
In Indonesia, Islamic religious elites’ views on the role of religion in politics have garnered attention since the fall of the New Order in 1998. From the 1970s to the late 1990s, Islamic political parties such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Partai Islam Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (PERTI), Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII) and Partai Muslimin Indonesia (PARMUSI) could only function under a single party, the United Development Party (PPP). In 1984, NU officially withdrew from formal politics after its chairman Abdurahman Wahid (or Gus Dur) declared that the organisation Kembali ke Khittah (Return to Khittah), should return to its original roots and focus on Islamic education and welfare.
The fall of Suharto triggered the democratisation process, which brought Islamic political parties other than PPP to the forefront of Indonesia’s political scene. The blossoming of Islamic political parties since 1998 is well documented. Even NU and Muhammadiyah members participated in the electoral process through new vehicles like PKB (National Awakening Party) and PAN (National Mandate Party) respectively. There has been a blurring between political and religious figures (including the ulama) ever since; for example, Gus Dur, who had shunned electoral politics previously, formed the PKB and eventually became Indonesia’s fourth president in 1999. Similarly, Muhammadiyah Chairman Amien Rais participated in the election via PAN, and between 1999-2004, was elected to be the speaker of MPR (People’s Consultative Assembly).
This article focuses on a different group of Muslim influencers or trendsetters in Indonesia, namely the religious elites or theologians, and their attitudes towards political involvement. They include the ulama (scholars), popular preachers, and ordinary religious teachers who are not career politicians. Their authority lies with the religious schools (pesantrens or madrasahs). Today, they have moved beyond the confines of the religious schools and utilise alternative platforms such as travelling roadshows and social media. This analysis contends that there has always been a diversity of views regarding the role that theologians should play in electoral politics, and the question today is, will more religious figures be swayed to participate in political campaigns in the 2024 elections? To be sure, the gulf between religious elites who shun politics and those who are neutral or actively supporting it remains. The former continues to believe that politics undermine their authority and spirituality, even if staying out means missing out on funding opportunities and acquiring positions of power, which the latter consider to be necessary for the betterment of the ummah.
ISLAM’S VIEW ON POLITICS
Muslims believe that Islam is all-encompassing, as reflected in the Quranic verse that the religion is ad deen or a way of life. However, Islamic scriptures do not always speak about all matters in detail, and mainly offer general ideas and principles. Islamic scholars then interpret texts to suit the time and spaces in which they live.
The Muslim resurgence movement that began in the 1970s advanced a different approach altogether: that Islam offers alternative systems to the West, which it deems “secular”. A faction of the movement believed in upholding shariah laws and forming an Islamic state. Political scientists refer to this faction as political Islamists. Today, another faction is gaining ground, shifting the discourse towards post-Islamism. Though not negating Islam’s comprehensiveness as opposed to Western political thought, post-Islamists believe Muslims should focus more on community work and developing shariah-compliant lifestyles rather than pushing for hard rules in the form of a state.
On the other hand, the progressives underscore moral values like justice, honesty, equality, and moderation to be the essence of Islam’s comprehensiveness. They argue that the Quran and Sunnah (sayings of the Prophet Muhammad and his behaviour during his lifetime, which has become a source of law and guidance to contemporary Muslims) do not stipulate clear injunctions to establish a particular form of government, neither do these call for the formation of Islamic parties. The political Islamists do not disagree with these values, but the progressives accept that modern political and social concepts—such as constitutions, liberal democracy, separation of powers, rule of law and checks and balances—also manifest these principles.
Today, Indonesia is a functioning democracy with the largest Muslim population in the world, where political parties are vehicles for direct electoral participation. Contemporary Indonesian theologians do not question the existence of Islamic political parties, but their attitude towards what role religious elites should play in them vary. Some support direct political participation and political parties that concurrently promote Islamic values, while others choose to keep a distance from politics altogether. In this article, we select several religious elites to illustrate the main attitudes towards politics which they hold. We choose religious elites instead of career politicians because the masses consider the former to be more authoritative when speaking about Islam. Also, theologians are community leaders whom aspiring politicians wish to engage and cultivate good relations with.
CONTENTION OVER AN ISLAMIC PARTY
At the most basic, there exists a steadfast view to which many subscribe, about the inseparability of Islam and politics. In the past, disagreements depended on whether Islamic parties should even exist (they did not exist 14 centuries ago during Prophet Muhammad’s lifetime). Abdul Wahab Chasbullah (b.1889-d.1971), a key NU kyai of the past, suggested that trying to separate politics from Islam was a futile endeavour, akin to wanting to separate sugar and sweetness.[1] This view by a senior NU cleric became the doctrinal foundation for the existence of Islamic parties, including NU, which was actively involved in electoral politics in the 1955 election, and in elections in 1970s.
By the early 1970s, there was already a cultural campaign to distinguish Islam from politics. Nurcholish Madjid, a celebrated Muslim intellectual popularly known as Cak Nur, coined the famous slogan “Islam Yes, Islamic Party No!”[2] In line with the progressives’ thinking, this captured the preference for Islamic moral teachings over political and symbolic expressions of Islam.[3] Cak Nur was a student of progressive thinker Professor Fazlur Rahman of the Chicago University. He later developed Indonesia’s intellectual reformist tradition, earning him the name Guru Bangsa (the Nation’s Teacher). Many Indonesian Muslims concur with Cak Nur’s guide; to the extent that nationalist parties have always dominated the legislative assembly since independence. In 1984, NU too withdrew from PPP and elections. By then, it had come clear that the Suharto regime was unequivocally sidelining the Islamic parties; but more than that, the Indonesian public had become very familiarised with the separation of Islam from party politics which Cak Nur advanced.
Unsurprisingly, several Muslim politicians have been displeased with Cak Nur’s slogan to this day. Instead, they advance the notion that Muslims must vote for Islamic parties as this is in accordance with Islamic teachings.[4] Former minister of religion and chairman of PPP, Suryadharma Ali, called Cak Nur’s slogan “a poison”.[5] He compared the slogan to mean abandoning Muslims’ responsibility to promote Islamic interests.[6]
Some attempted to belittle Cak Nur’s credibility by highlighting his inconsistency of thought, and political realism. To illustrate, Hidayat Nur Wahid, a founding member and former president of Islamist-oriented Justice and Prosperous Party (PKS) revealed that Cak Nur had altered his slogan in the early 2000s.[7] Cak Nur was rumoured to have approached the PKS to bid for the country’s presidency when Hidayat was serving as the party’s president. Hidayat recalled that he and the other PKS leaders were surprised by Cak Nur’s move. Hidayat then shared that Cak Nur modified his slogan to be “Islam Yes, Islamic Party Yes” when explaining that he had no reason to reject PKS.[8]
Muslim career politicians and intellectuals are at odds on whether politicians and political parties can ideally promote Islamic causes: on the one hand these can refer to values, principles; and on the other, to Islamic institutions, instruments (finance and banking) or laws (shariah or hudud laws). However, the views of theologians, whose power bases are at the more grassroots levels, are rarely captured and discussed in academic writings. To begin with, there are thousands such personalities spread across Indonesia, and it would be futile to map these diverse voices. In a broad sense, their heterogeneity can be divided the following way: those living in Java versus those outside Java; local religious schools versus national leaders; and those whose authority is tied to religious institutions versus the online influencers. At the same time, they can be cogently divided into those who prefer to keep politicians and political parties at arm’s length, for religious reasons, and those who prefer to be in their close company, for religious and practical reasons. The following demonstrates two schools of thought among a sample of contemporary religious elites, and their views on the role Muslims should play in party politics.
RELIGIOUS ELITES SUPPORTING ISLAMIC POLITICS
Popular and controversial preacher, Ustaz Abdul Somad, is positive about political power.[9] He believes that political power offers a bigger impact than religious sermons, so he appreciates Islamic scholars who take up political offices. He argues that “with a signature of a city mayor, things can move forward. With my speech from the pulpit, well… Some people may in fact, fall asleep. They do not even listen. But if you lack political skills, you should participate on the voting day. Do not abstain.”[10]
Surveys consistently show that Abdul Somad’s popularity surpasses that of his counterparts.[11] Although not as popular in Java, he is famous in Sumatera, Kalimantan and Sulawesi. In 2019, presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto offered him to be his running mate, but he declined, feeling that he lacked the political and administrative skills. However, Abdul Somad openly encouraged Indonesians to participate in the electoral process as voters and mentioned how voting responsibly was part of religion.[12] Some would consider Abdul Somad speaking beyond what typical religious elites should speak on—spirituality, piety, and morality—and moving into issues concerning politics and power.
NU kyai Gus Bahauddin Nursalim argues for pious politicians, and is more deliberate than Abdul Somad.[13] Although he remains unaffiliated with any party, Gus Baha argues that supporting Islamic parties and candidates is a must. Teaching in Central Java and Yogyakarta as a master of Islamic theology, jurisprudence and Sufism, he explains that to be able to enjoin good and prevent evil (amar ma’ruf nahi mungkar), religion needs “strength”. He says that religion can contribute to the betterment of society if it includes a little of political party, money and knowledge,[14] and concludes that Muslims should not abandon Islamic parties altogether despite their abysmal showing throughout the country’s political history. He adds that pious Muslims should not be afraid of holding public offices or being close to the political authority.[15] He also states that if the traditionalist ulama are not close to office holders, their beliefs and sites of worship will not be shielded from the Salafi-Wahhabi (purist) criticisms. He says that “the shrines of saints, that we treat with reverence, will be regarded as centres of idolatry and polytheism.”[16]
There are no doubt gains to be made for being aligned to political office holders. To illustrate, the late Guru Ahmad Bakeri, the leader of Pesantren Mursyidul Amin in Kabupaten Banjar, campaigned for Shahril Darham, a candidate for the governorship. In line with patronage politics, Ahmad was appointed manager of the provincial mosque, Mesjid Sabilal Muhtadin, a socially prestigious position that gave him access to donations for his own pesantren. Since his pesantren was surrounded by paddy field, he also received a few tractors for farming. The rule of thumb seems to be that for any appearance or speech that a religious elite makes at a political rally, he will receive honorarium.
SHUNNING POLITICS
Nevertheless, some prominent ulama in Indonesia, including those living outside Java, do not need to be involved in politics or be close to politicians to assert their authority. They often avoid the limelight and power contestations altogether. This is usually the stance of ulama who focus their efforts on teaching and leading local religious schools. These believe that the intrusion of politics into the religious realm is dangerous. In their sermons, they prefer to speak about uniting the ummah, since topics on politics can be divisive. They focus on sincerity and the hereafter, in contrast to politics, which promotes worldly interests. Unlike the ulama from several big pesantren in East and Central Java who have a history of openly supporting presidential candidates, the ulama we discuss in the following speak up about their concerns with political manipulation.
In South Kalimantan, the late Guru Muhammad Zaini Sekumpul from Martapura represented this school of thought.[17] In a viral online video, Guru Zaini said:
“We do not say “[O’ Allah] You alone we worship [but] we ask for help from political parties!” No! Do you all hear me?! I am speaking loudly. We do not ask for help from political parties! Why on earth do politicians come to Sekumpul?! What do they want here?! Have they come to politicise us, or do they think we sell political support?! [Politicians, you need to] behave properly! Do not come here and divide the ummah. We have come to be united in Sekumpul. Do not let [anyone] divide us all. The only creature that wants a divided community is Satan, the son of the Devil from the Hell of Jahannam.”[18]
A well-known Salafi preacher, Ustaz Khalid Basalamah, also refrains from formal politics. He claims to have been invited to join an Islamic party but declined, believing that politics is “slippery”. He shares:
“Ask our friends who join political parties, and ask them to say the truth, whether they often involve themselves in bribery and data falsification, all the things prohibited in Islam. I do not want to slip into that…. I think I contribute more to the ummah by teaching religion.”[19]
To some extent, Buya Yahya Zainul Ma’arif, also shares Guru Zaini’s views. He is the leader of a boarding school in West Java, and the Islamic centre Al-Bahjah in Cirebon. Since 2015, his religious sermons have been aired via the YouTube channel Al-Bahjah TV, which has 5.32 million subscribers at the time of writing.[20] He prefers politicians not to visit his school during election campaigns.[21] Although politicians bring donations when given a chance to speak before the Al-Bahjah community, Buya Yahya values political independence, because electoral-related donations would make it difficult to think objectively about the candidates.[22]
However, in 2017, Buya Yahya did not refrain from commenting on political issues, and was critical of President Joko Widodo who he regarded as protecting the Christian-Chinese Jakarta governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (or Anok) when the latter was accused of blasphemy. In 2019, Buya Yahya joined a group of ulama to support Jokowi’s main rival, Prabowo Subianto. Although some would contend that he practised “double standards”, he was consistent about not receiving any material offers from political parties and candidates during elections.
In line with the theologians who shun politics, Habib Taufiq As-Segaff, a Ba’alawi preacher and the current chairman of Rabithah Alawiyah, has warned to “beware of ulama who spend much time around the rulers! They have betrayed the Prophet Muhammad. They are like pet dogs that get excited when the owner give them something [to eat or to play with]”[23] This comment, made in public sermons a few times, offended many NU kiais. Gus Yahya Staquf, current NU chairman, even felt it was necessary to retaliate publicly that:
“[T]he point [made] about staying away from the ulama who have close relations with the government is wrong and unacceptable. The ulama are often needed to bridge the rulers and the people. The ulama also have a moral obligation to remind the rulers if they being unjust.”[24]
The theologians who shun politics never fully reject having guests from political circles and political elites at their religious schools. To maintain some distance, however, they do not give politicians the stage before their congregations to reap political capital and rally support. The theologians would normally pray for the rulers. However, they clearly understand the behaviour of some Indonesian politicians, and the potential use of money and funds to rally support. While donating to an Islamic cause such as the building of Islamic schools is an Islamic virtue, doing so not in the name of God but for political reasons is a disvalue, and so, several of the religious elite reject such donations for that reason.
CONCLUSION
In Indonesia, whether Muslim theologians or religious elites should be involved in political party or the electoral process or not is contentious. The reality is that they do get dragged into it directly or indirectly. During the Suharto New Order government, theologians either have participated in elections (under the sanctioned party PPP), or were invited to join official institutions such as the MUI (Ulama Council of Indonesia), and ICMI (Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals). After 1998, some were co-opted into the Wantimpres (Presidential Advisory Council). Any presidential or legislative assembly candidates approaching the election would endeavour to invite religious figures into the campaign teams, (termed as tim sukses in Indonesia), a practice that remains prevalent to this day.
While they differ in the degree of closeness Muslims should have to electoral politics, none dispute the significance of power in ushering change in society. Religious teachers provide good vote capital. Politicians who want to demonstrate their piety to the electorate can attend religious rituals, fund religious schools and mosques, and perform a publicised pilgrimage to Mecca, among others. But the best option is to canvass direct endorsements from religious elites who can mobilise their followers and students in support of their political patrons. In the coming elections, it is likely that this trend will continue, as political parties plan to boost their Islamic legitimacy and support base from boarding schools. Majority of the Muslims continue to seek guidance from the religious elites, whom they consider righteous and rational individuals and will make decisions based on Islamic principles.
The only caveat for overreliance on religious elites for votes is that the group is also a divided one. They are polarised in terms of their religious orientations: modernism (Muhammadiyah) versus traditionalism (NU); Sufism versus Salafism; and radical and violent approaches versus quietist approach. Even within NU there are fragmentations too, as support for different presidential candidates demonstrate. Theologians whose follower base is online compete among themselves for viewership. Their divergence can also be manifested in terms of their approach to politics: some are deliberate while others are indirect. As religious and identity issues resurface during the election season in 2024, religious personalities will be mobilised to take sides. Many continue to shun politics, and do not require money or power—just spirituality—to cement their authority over the masses. A number of religious elites have said that their credibility will be affected if they join political parties. However, a majority of the theologians can be persuaded to provide a religious cover for politicians and openly endorse one of the presidential candidates and the political parties.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2023/85 “Abdul Hadi Awang Enhances His Power as PAS President and Drives the Party to the Far-Right” by James Chai
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- This paper seeks to understand how Abdul Hadi Awang has used his influence since 2015 to restructure the Islamic party, PAS.
- After Nik Aziz’s death in 2015, Abdul Hadi shifted the power centre of PAS to the presidency, away from the spiritual-leader (Mursyidul Am, the highest policymaker in PAS sitting in the Syura Ulama Council, the Majlis Syura Ulamak or MSU). Remarkably, this was not done through amendments to the party constitution, but via the following mechanisms: a)The president’s ability to shuffle between the central committee and the MSU (revolving door concept); b) Ulama-based ideological takeover at every level of the party; and c) The reduced personal stature of subsequent spiritual-leaders after Nik Aziz.
- Abdul Hadi has impactfully exercised his powers as president in the following ways: a) Unilaterally deciding on strategic partnerships with first, UMNO, and then Bersatu and Perikatan Nasional (PN), allegedly without consulting with or obtaining the consent of the MSU chaired by the spiritual-leader; b) Driving the party’s narratives to the far right, and showing hard-line intolerance of non-Muslims; c) Clamping down on internal dissent; and d) Marginalizing Nik Aziz’s family within the party.
- PN’s recent electoral momentum will probably validate Abdul Hadi’s tactics, overshadowing their apparent extra-constitutional breaches. However, dissent may grow stronger in PAS if (a) Abdul Hadi reconsiders the PN partnership; (b) Nik Aziz’s family decides to launch more vocal opposition, and; (c) the limits on the ability of Malay votes to win Putrajaya become more obvious.
* James Chai is Visiting Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and a columnist at MalaysiaKini and Sin Chew Daily. The author would like to thank Aziff Azuddin for his assistance throughout this research.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/85, 23 October 2023
INTRODUCTION[1]
It may sound incredible now, but the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party, PAS, was formed in Penang in 1951 “from the womb of UMNO” as an Islamist movement.[2] [3] Little attention was paid then to the small and poor party of “religious elders and imams”; and few thought it could last.[4]
Part of the reason for this was due to the fact that during its first five years, it was led by presidents who could not mobilise the Malay-Muslim electorate and who were not taken seriously by the British authorities. Its third president, Dr Burhanuddin al-Helmy (1956-1969), reoriented PAS to become an anti-colonial leftist third force (Islamism) by establishing branches, starting in northern peninsula. The problematic Asri Muda years (1969-1982) were ridden with claims of treachery (working with UMNO in government), financial scandals (timber and land), and nepotism.[5] Towards the end of this period, the ulama faction, consisting of Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat (TGNA) and Abdul Hadi, came to rebuild PAS from its “shattered remnants”,[6] making it the country’s largest opposition party (by membership).
Fast forward to the present day, October 2023, and PAS is at the peak of its powers under Abdul Hadi, who assumed the presidency in 2002.[7] Three years ago, in 2020, the party obtained power at the federal executive office for the second time, with nearly a dozen of its parliamentarians appointed to Cabinet. In the 15th general election (GE15) in November 2022, the party defied expectations[8] and emerged as the party with the highest number of seats in Parliament. It even won in many places outside its largely conservative and rural stronghold. Winning 43 seats in GE15 was the party’s best performance in history,[9] double its second-best results, achieved in 1999.
Less than a year after its GE15 surprise, PAS continued its streak by winning most of the 127 seats it contested in the 2023 state elections.
| Seats contested | Seats won | Winning rate | |
| PAS | |||
| GE15 | 64 | 43 | 73% |
| PRN2023 | 127 | 105 | 83% |
| Bersatu | |||
| GE15 | 85 | 31 | 36% |
| PRN2023 | 81 | 40 | 49% |
| DAP | |||
| GE15 | 55 | 40 | 73% |
| PRN2023 | 47 | 46 | 98% |
| PKR | |||
| GE15 | 100 | 31 | 31% |
| PRN2023 | 58 | 26 | 45% |
| Amanah | |||
| GE15 | 54 | 8 | 15% |
| PRN2023 | 32 | 8 | 25% |
| UMNO | |||
| GE15 | 119 | 26 | 22% |
| PRN2023 | 108 | 19 | 18% |
Table 1: Seats contested and won by PAS and other mainstream West Malaysia parties in the 15th general election and the 2023 state elections[10]
Now, PAS no longer sees itself as an opposition party as it had done since 1955,[11] but as a government-in-waiting.[12] Its haphazard alignment with the six-year-old Malaysian United Indigenous Party (Bersatu) and the small Chinese-dominant party, Gerakan, has yielded positive results. At the same time, PAS has moved further to the right as an exclusivist party.
All these vital developments of PAS happened under the presidency of Abdul Hadi. This paper explores his influence in determining the party’s direction. To do that, I firstly examine the role of the spiritual-leader in PAS before dissecting how Abdul Hadi has taken advantage of the internal workings of the party. Thereafter, this paper will conclude with the implications of these changes to the party, and to Malaysian politics.
THE SPIRITUAL LEADER (MURSYIDUL AM) AS THE HIGHEST DECISION-MAKER
At the beginning, PAS’s organisational structure was rather straightforward. Party policies were decided by the PAS Central Committee (Jawatankuasa Kerja PAS Pusat, JKPP), chaired by the president.[13] Three sections (ulama, youth, and women) completed the party. The ulama council was uninfluential, holding only advisory powers.[14]
Everything changed in 1982 when then-PAS youth wing (Dewan Pemuda PAS) leader Mohamad Sabu, proposed the establishment of an ulama-led MSU[15] that replicated the Iranian clerical structure under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.[16] This represented a “major paradigm shift” from PAS’s previous structure.[17] The MSU was adopted as the highest decision-making body of PAS,[18] giving PAS’s ulamas expansive policymaking powers.[19]
The MSU is a 17-people ulama body,[20] with people drawn from various components of the party, chosen for their expertise in Islam.[21] [22] Unlike the democratically elected JKPP, all positions at the MSU are by appointment, and at its head sits the spiritual-leader.
As shown in Appendix 1, the PAS Constitution gives enormous powers to the MSU and spiritual-leader to decide on major policies,[23] as its “final arbiter”.[24]
Among major decisions, the most critical relate firstly to the election candidate selection powers (parliamentary and state),[25] and secondly to external party and coalition negotiations.[26] On the former, each state arm of PAS would present the list of nominees to the MSU, which would then carry out a filtering process based on character, action, and fulfilment of Islamic practices.[27] On the latter, the MSU was the final arbiter on whether or not to work with another party in a coalition.[28] Thus, whether there should be political cooperation (tahaluf siyasi) by PAS with others like DAP and PKR (Pakatan Rakyat), UMNO (Muafakat Nasional) or Bersatu (Perikatan Nasional) is determined by the MSU.[29]
In contrast, Article 26 of the PAS Constitution states that the JKPP is only an implementation body to MSU’s decisions, with the president as chief implementer.[30]
Critics have argued that the powers of the MSU and spiritual-leader are too broad,[31] especially for an unelected body. Even though PAS insiders would rebut that and say that the MSU was accountable to the views of different party wings,[32] the spiritual-leader can overrule others as he has veto powers on major decisions. The party congress (PAS Muktamar) is neither structurally sufficient nor effective as check-and-balance measure on the MSU and spiritual-leader.
The spiritual-leader role was best exemplified by the late TGNA,[33] who held the position for 24 years (1991-2015). As a larger-than-life scholar and the Menteri Besar (MB) of Kelantan for 23 years, [34] TGNA used his aura and clout to make the spiritual-leader role as powerful as the party’s constitutional powers would allow.[35] In conflicts between spiritual-leader and the president, the spiritual-leader’s views would prevail.[36] However, after TGNA, the spiritual-leader’s role was soon reduced to a “halal rubber stamp” position.[37]
HOW ABDUL HADI SHIFTED THE POWER CENTRE TO THE PRESIDENCY
After the revered TGNA passed away on 12 February 2015, Muslim clerics, Haron Din and Hashim Jasin succeeded him consecutively (see Appendix 2). Not only were both figures not as outspoken or charismatic as TGNA, they were also neither Mentris Besar nor elected representatives for any state. In fact, the former MB of Kelantan, Ahmad Yaakob, who was slated to replace Haron Din after his passing, chose not to be elevated to spiritual-leader to avoid the burden of holding both roles. Moving forward, it will be increasingly unlikely for the spiritual-leader to also hold executive portfolios, let alone an important one such as Mentri Besar.[38]
This is significant because the subdued personalities of the recent spiritual-leaders have meant that the in-practice power of the role has been reduced, paving the way for the presidency to assume more influence.[39] While the party structure remains unchanged, the leaders who came to helm the positions changed the perception and in-practice influence of these roles.[40]
More than as a result of personality, Abdul Hadi’s influence also benefited from the structural weakness of PAS and the convergence of conservative ideologies that he had championed.
The PAS Constitution gives the elected president a revolving-door kind of power, i.e. the ability to sit in both the implementing JKPP (elected) and policymaking MSU (appointed) instances. Article 8(4) of the PAS Constitution states that the JKPP must appoint four people to the MSU, and by convention, the president shall be appointed as one of the key MSU members.[41] Under occasions where the president’s personality overpowers the spiritual-leader’s, the president could, if he so wishes, control the democratic and appointed fora of JKPP and MSU to push his decisions through, with the legitimacy offered by both.[42] Due to this structural weakness, the balance of power depends on the personalities of the president and of the spiritual-leader. As will be discussed later, Abdul Hadi used this structural defect to his advantage after TGNA’s death, directing PAS to implement his choices regarding external partnerships, its political position, as well as internal decisions pertaining to stifling dissent and side-lining other factions. Abdul Hadi did not make structural changes to alter the powers of the MSU and spiritual-leader; instead, he strategically bent the body to his will.
What paved the way for Abdul Hadi was the departure of his opponents and a resulting ideological convergence. The non-ulama class of PAS who dominated the JKPP up till 2015, also called the Erdogans, contested at the party elections as an informal bloc and lost. The Erdogans, who were advocates of an inclusive approach of Islam, including adding non-ulamas without Islamic scholarship to the MSU,[43] [44] left to form Amanah.
The Erdogans’ loss and departure accelerated an ideological convergence in PAS, where the JKPP and MSU, led by ulamas, now share an exclusive view of Islam.[45] The professionals-dominated JKPP had always had conflicts with the ulama-led MSU; now, such conflicts rarely happen.
How Abdul Hadi used his powers
- Partnership
One of the most obvious ways where Abdul Hadi had shifted the powers to the presidency was in PAS’s partnership with other parties and coalitions after TGNA’s death.
The pursuit of a PAS-UMNO partnership started in 2008 after Pakatan Rakyat, a coalition with PAS, won Selangor state government for the first time. The group led by Abdul Hadi,[46]were inclined to work with UMNO in a political partnership.
This was strongly opposed by then spiritual-leader TGNA, who was furious at the group’s constant courting of UMNO. He even called for a special party congress (Muktamar Khas) to discuss the leadership problem, mainly whether or not to sack Abdul Hadi.[47] This resulted in an extended “cold war”.[48]
Before the special party congress, TGNA wrote on his blog:[49]
“[A few leaders who were problematic] would not stop actively pursuing the issue of PAS’s political cooperation with UMNO … I strongly feel there must be a change of the most important players helming the leadership of JKPP… ”[50]
TGNA’s death propelled a series of critical events that shifted the situation in favour of Abdul Hadi. The Erdogans who were against PAS-UMNO partnership lost the party elections en bloc.[51] A month after that, the MSU decided to sever ties with DAP, effectively dissolving the Pakatan Rakyat coalition.[52] The earliest exploratory step on partnership with UMNO started as early as 5 January 2016, proving that the influence of Abdul Hadi and his long-term desire for a PAS-UMNO partnership had slowly taken hold.
The GE14 was an impetus for PAS to formalise its partnership with UMNO, and on 16 September 2018,[53] four months after the general election, the MSU was given the mandate to decide on political cooperation with the intention of protecting Islam.[54] Political cooperation between PAS and UMNO was signed on 14 September 2019; Muafakat Nasional (MN) adopted conservative and Islamic ideals.
If the PAS-UMNO cooperation was evidence of the power centre shifting to Abdul Hadi’s benefit, the party’s subsequent dissolution of MN and formation of Perikatan Nasional (PN) with Bersatu was clearer evidence of the renewed power of the presidency.
Importantly, there was a period of political partnership overlap, between August 2020 and October 2022[55] when PAS was part of the political charter with UMNO under MN, and also in the PN coalition with Bersatu. It was however the process of formalising both partnerships that truly exemplified Abdul Hadi’s powers.
The former MSU member, Khairuddin Razali, claimed that the MSU had never discussed the partnership with PN, even though matters of external partnership were the MSU’s remit under the PAS Constitution.[56] It appeared to be a decision purely made at the JKPP level, with the president as the main steer. Khairuddin also claimed that Abdul Hadi met with Bersatu president Muhyiddin Yassin, and they decided to end ties with UMNO within a week. In contrast, the MN’s chartership was finalised only after extensive consultation and engagement with every layer of the party, including the grassroots at the party congress.[57]
After the dissolution of MN, Abdul Hadi explained that the reason PAS chose to go with PN instead of UMNO was because UMNO had too many “power crazy” individuals who were willing to pawn their religion;[58] at the same time, PAS’s “directionless behaviour” was cited by UMNO as its reason.[59]
The PAS-UMNO partnership as MN may have been evidence of Abdul Hadi gaining influence after TGNA, but the partnership with Bersatu under PN reflected how the centre of power at PAS had shifted to the presidency, coat-tailing Abdul Hadi’s political desires. This shift in allegiance from Pakatan Rakyat, to MN, and then PN, is a signal of PAS’s pragmatism, but also evidence of Abdul Hadi’s deepening control of the party.
- Religious supremacy
As a personality-driven party, PAS’s turn to the far right[60] reflects “Abdul Hadi’s idealism”.[61]The main ideological difference between Abdul Hadi and TGNA was less their religious leanings (both were conservatives and wanted to establish the Islamic State), and more their approach to non-Muslims.[62]
TGNA took a more pragmatic approach, seeing non-Muslims not as a threat to the party and Islam, but an audience to which one could preach Islam (dakwah) for deeds (pahala).[63] TGNA has often praised the Chinese for their economic prowess; he even mentioned a few times that he wanted to see a non-Muslim or a non-Malay Muslim convert (muallaf) become prime minister in Malaysia one day.[64]
In contrast, Abdul Hadi’s approach to non-Muslims was decidedly more exclusivist, implying that non-Muslims should not occupy prime ministership or the Cabinet[65] (“they will still end up in hell”)[66], and commonly labelling non-believers as kafir (infidels). Abdul Hadi has also claimed that corruption givers and takers were mostly non-Muslims, besides scapegoating the Chinese-dominant party, DAP, as the biggest threat to Islam.
The difference in approach was partly due to the education origin.[67] While TGNA was from the Deobandi tradition, studied in India and Pakistan, and had a more open and adaptive attitude to the world, Abdul Hadi studied in Madinah, Egypt, often regarded as the birthplace of Islamic scholarship.
What this means is that PAS’s ideology is also shaped by Abdul Hadi’s conservative lineage; he controls the narratives and ideology that currently undergirds the party. The MSU was used as a tool to double-down on Abdul Hadi’s ideology, pushing it to ultra-conservatism.[68]
- Internal dissent
One of the best examples of how Abdul Hadi deals with dissent is his effective removal of Khairuddin Razali as MSU member at the start of 2022. Khairuddin was a former minister and had been an MSU member since 2013; he was appointed as its secretary in 2020. Khairuddin has been a strong proponent of PAS’s partnership with UMNO, and was regarded as one of the most knowledgeable Islamic scholars at PAS,[69] more than the deputy president, Tuan Ibrahim Tuan Man.[70]
On 12 January 2022, Khairuddin was sacked as an executive member from the JKPP. Being a JKPP-appointed member of MSU,[71]Khairuddin’s membership and secretarial position at the MSU were also terminated, according to the president, Abdul Hadi.[72] Although the official reason for Khairuddin’s sacking was discipline, there was never a public statement by PAS leaders on the precise violation, nor were any disciplinary issues raised in accordance with the procedures under Article 85 of the PAS Constitution.
It was widely speculated that the reason for Khairuddin’s sacking was his inclination towards the MN rather than PN,[73] which was contrary to the strategy pursued by Abdul Hadi.[74]
Khairuddin made it clear that his sacking was unconstitutional as the power to sack any MSU member lies only with the MSU.[75] He argued that the JKPP trespassed the MSU’s powers by sacking him.[76] When Khairuddin resigned on 22 February 2022, the 33-year PAS member said that he did so to avoid a constitutional crisis in PAS and to safeguard intra-party harmony, which he had threatened by maintaining that the JKPP acted outside its powers in sacking him.[77]
Former PAS executive member Mahfuz Omar said that this episode symbolised Abdul Hadi’s inability to deal with differences of opinion in PAS, preferring a party of “Yes Men”.[78] This contrasts to Nik Aziz’s PAS where dissent was rife to the point of requiring tie-breaking votes.[79]
The sacking was possible because the PAS Constitution allows the president, who leads the elected JKPP, to also be part of MSU. With the combination of the constitutional clearance and the soft power he enjoyed as president, Abdul Hadi could orchestrate Khairuddin’s removal even though it was extra-constitutional.
- Factionalism and the marginalisation of TGNA’s legacy
The tension between Abdul Hadi and TGNA was always present,[80] but this only became obvious years after the latter’s death.[81]The factionalism was due partly to ideological and strategic differences,[82] but also to the natural process of a leader intending to carve out his legacy. Kelantan politics, the home state of PAS, was synonymous to TGNA, and should that trend continue and prosper, it would pose a threat to Abdul Hadi.
The first evidence was when TGNA’s second son, Nik Omar, decided to leave PAS for Amanah in 2017, due to disappointment with Abdul Hadi’s decision to work with UMNO, a sworn enemy of his father. Husam Musa, the former political secretary to TGNA, also left PAS a year earlier.
The gradual decline of Nik Abduh, another son of TGNA, within PAS is a good barometer of the decreasing influence of the TGNA faction. Nik Abduh lost at the 2021 party congress (youth wing), where Abdul Hadi’s son, Khalil Hadi received the most votes. Nik Abduh, the two-term incumbent, was also not fielded in GE15, and the party chose Abdul Hadi’s political secretary, Syahir Sulaiman, instead. TGNA faction politician Che Abdullah’s nomination was also not passed for GE15.
Crucially, Nik Abduh was dropped once again for the 2023 state election. The party did not accept Nik Abduh’s request to contest at one of the three state seats under Pengkalan Chepa, to enable him to look after the education institutions built by his late father. When the candidate line-up was announced and Nik Abduh was not on the list, the younger brother of TGNA, Nik Din,[83] recorded a video to reprimand the Abdul Hadi-aligned Mohd Amar who Nik Din said prevented Nik Abduh from contesting.[84]Nik Din had had urged voters to vote against Mohd Amar to protest against the alleged injustice.
Nik Abduh went on a two-week “fast” from politics. Although he claimed that he was not too bothered at not being fielded,[85] and his family repeatedly played the matter down, it was widely speculated that Nik Abduh had come to be further at odds with Abdul Hadi for various reasons including his preference for UMNO and his allegations about corruption at the top.[86] [87]
IMPLICATIONS OF A PRESIDENT-CENTRED PARTY AND OUTLOOK FOR PAS
Evidently, even though there no changes have been made to the PAS Constitution, the party’s power centre has shifted from the spiritual-leader to the president. The structural characteristics of PAS makes it a personality-driven party where its direction is often determined by the charisma and beliefs of the leaders. The trajectory of a subdued and non-MB spiritual-leader will likely continue, and allow the presidency to hold de facto decision-making power. A president can use his simultaneous membership in the party’s operational and religious apex agencies to legitimise his decisions.
Abdul Hadi’s decision to go with PN will likely silence dissenters especially as PAS is arguably at its electoral peak. However, in the event a rupture happens within PN,[88] going by past decisions Abdul Hadi will likely be ready to abandon any disagreeable partners.[l89] In the same vein, dissent within the party will unlikely be successful, even if it originates in the highest policy body, MSU.
However, the shift may also heighten factionalism between TGNA’s faction and Abdul Hadi. The curbing of dissenters like Khairuddin and the gradual side-lining of TGNA’s family may create disgruntlement on the ground, especially in Kelantan, as many in PAS still hold TGNA dearly. The last-minute change of MB candidate,[90] low voter turnout,[91] and loss of Kota Lama to Amanah[92] could be taken as early indications of the weakening of PAS in Kelantan. Should TGNA’s family, led by Nik Abduh, continue to be cast aside, defections cannot be discounted, and that may come to present a genuine threat to the present leadership.
What is certain is that PAS will continue to move further to the right as Abdul Hadi promotes his long-standing beliefs and PN finds resonance in stoking Malay-Muslim fears. With a weak non-Muslim counterpart in Gerakan that cannot effectively challenge the anti-Muslim rhetoric, PAS will advance these narratives undeterred.
APPENDIX 1
| Constitutional clause | Categories | Paraphrased descriptions of salient provisions |
| Article 8(1)(a)-(c) | Powers of the MSU | (a) Elaborate, explain, and interpret PAS’s policies and any provisions in the PAS Constitution that raise ambiguity on its meaning and purpose and to make a decision about them; (b) Issue instructions and orders so that the policies and decisions are followed and implemented to anyone in PAS and to monitor and protect the policies and decisions so that the intention of the Constitution is upheld; (c)Listen and decide on appeals of discipline presented by PAS members. |
| Article 8(12) | Discretion of the MSU | (12) MSU can, at its discretion, make any rules to smoothen the implementation of the tasks and powers that were given and to safeguard and protect the integrity, respect, and dignity of the MSU. |
| Article 9(1)(a)-(c) | Powers and duties of the MA | (a) Responsible as the head of MSU in exercising its powers under Article 8(1)(a), (b), and (c); (b) Decide and chair the MSU meetings; (c) Take whatever step necessary to monitor and protect the PAS Constitution, policies, and laws in the activities, movements, and administration of PAS. |
| Article 26(9) | Decision to work with other parties or coalitions | (k) JKPP to take due consideration on partnership with other organisations that does not contradict the policy and purpose of PAS and make a decision on it after that decision has been agreed to by the MSU. |
Appendix 1: Key provisions of the PAS Constitution (translated and paraphrased for succinctness and precision)
APPENDIX 2
Appendix 2: Presidents and spiritual-leaders at PAS since 1951
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2023/84 “Political Polarisation Marked Malaysia’s Recent State Elections” by Pauline Pooi Yin Leong
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The campaign narratives surrounding Malaysia’s six state elections in August 2023 indicate increasing polarisation between those advocating for a secular multicultural approach and those preferring an ethnoreligious orientation.
- Development was the key theme in Pakatan Harapan (PH) and Barisan Nasional (BN)’s political narratives. In the more economically prosperous states of Penang, Selangor and Negeri Sembilan, they focused on rallying its supporters to “safeguard” its incumbency and highlighting the comparative lack of development in Perikatan National (PN) and Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) states of Kelantan, Terengganu, and Kedah.
- Nevertheless, PH-BN’s framing of development from a secular-urban perspective had limited resonance with PN-PAS supporters whose paradigm as Muslims is that development should not be materialistic; it should also be holistic and containing spiritual elements.
- PN-PAS’s political narrative of voting as fardhu ‘ain jihad (obligatory holy struggle) appealed to an electorate wishing to vote for an Islamic party that professed to govern according to the Quran. PAS-PN leaders advocating the Islamic way of life were portrayed as heroes and warriors.
- One possible strategy to reduce the widening polarisation in the country is to re-delineate the constituencies to reflect the population’s multiracial composition so that politicians will be incentivised to promote inclusivity to gain as much support from all ethnic groups as possible, especially at the federal level.
* Pauline Pooi Yin Leong is an Associate Professor with the Department of Communication, School of Arts, Sunway University, Malaysia. Her research interests are in political communication, digital media, freedom of speech and journalism.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/84, 19 October 2023
INTRODUCTION
Political narratives are stories and messages constructed by politicians and political parties to influence public opinion and gain voter support. Complex information is organised and presented in a manner that can be cognitively understood by citizens, and that presents an inspiring socio-political reality about political issues and events. In election campaigns, political groups compete to differentiate themselves through symbolic framing in order to gain an advantage over their rivals; they may also try to counter their opponents’ narratives by highlighting inconsistencies or inaccuracies in them.
Thus, during Malaysia’s six state elections in August 2023, Pakatan Harapan (PH, Alliance of Hope) and Barisan Nasional (BN, National Front), incumbents in three states – Selangor, Penang and Negeri Sembilan – and their rivals Perikatan Nasional (PN, National Alliance), incumbents in Kedah, Kelantan, and Terengganu, both presented competing political narratives, as expected. While these contrasting viewpoints have existed prior to the state elections, the mainstream narrative then was about “Ketuanan Melayu” (Malay Supremacy), with religious rhetoric being mostly confined to PAS-dominated East Coast states. However, the success of PH in the 2018 and 2022 general elections has resulted in the opposition fusing ethnic narratives with religious elements as a means to “unite” the Malay-Muslim community and regain their “lost” political power. This has gained increasing acceptance judging from the inroads made by PN-PAS in the recent general and state elections. A digital ethnographic study of the party manifestos and speeches, press releases, media reports, debates, and social media content from the campaign period indicates increasing polarisation between those who advocate for a secular multicultural approach and others who prefer an ethnoreligious direction, continuing a longstanding trend seen throughout much of Malaysia’s history, and certainly during the country’s 15th general election (GE15) held in November 2022.
PH-BN’S POLITICAL CAMPAIGN NARRATIVES
Development was the key theme in the manifestos presented by the PH-BN incumbents in Penang, Selangor and Negeri Sembilan. For example, Penang’s 50-item manifesto focused on infrastructure, human capital, and balanced rural development, as well as housing for all.[1] Similarly, PH-BN’s “Negeri Sembilan Unity Aspiration” manifesto contained 70 initiatives to accelerate economic growth and improve livelihood, among which were affordable homes for families and financial aid for those seeking to pursue higher education.[2] Meanwhile, the Selangor PH-BN administration launched its “Kita Selangor” manifesto, which pledged to provide 100,000 high-income jobs to youths and make the state a premier investment destination in Southeast Asia.[3]
PH ministers and MPs, such as Youth and Sports Minister Hannah Yeoh,[4] spoke at campaign rallies, exhorting supporters to vote for their children and grandchildren’s future, and rallying their relatives and friends to do the same to “safeguard” the three economically prosperous states from the PN onslaught and protect their government’s incumbency. She reminded them that PN was already in control of four states – Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, and Terengganu – and that they should not trade a PKR chief minister for one from PAS. The implication was that the PH-BN administration had the ability to bring about economic growth and jobs compared to PN-PAS states which are not as prosperous and have limited development.
PH-BN also decided to demonstrate its ability to govern by showcasing Economic Affairs Minister Rafizi Ramli in a televised public debate with PAS assistant secretary-general and Bachok MP, Mohd Syahir Sulaiman from Kelantan. Rafizi, who spoke on the “New Model of Malaysia’s Economy”, discussed the three structural issues that Malaysia is facing, one of which was the reliance on oil and plantation industries, and low wages which exacerbates cost of living issues and slows economic growth.[5] According to Rafizi, recent efforts by the unity government had resulted in lower monthly inflation rates since the first month of the PH-BN government, and Malaysians would enjoy higher salaries next year when the government allocates more spending in the budget.
Meanwhile, in Kelantan, Terengganu and Kedah where PH-BN are the opposition, their counter-narrative highlighted the issue of development, or lack thereof, in these PN-administered states. For example, the Natural Resources, Environment and Climate Change Minister, Nik Nazmi Nik Ahmad, said that water quality issues were prevalent in PN-led states[6] such as Kelantan and Kedah, unlike in Selangor which is under PH.[7] It also poured cold water on the suggestion by Kelantan’s then-deputy chief minister Mohd Amar Nik Abdullah that villagers in the state were resourceful and knew how to dig wells or build tube wells[8] to obtain underground water.
Another narrative in PH-BN’s campaign was the protection of fundamental liberties such as freedom of attire. This arose after two incidents that occurred recently, one where a non-Muslim lady in Kelantan was issued a compound notice for wearing shorts[9] which was considered indecent under the state’s by-laws, and a second where a Perodua car service centre displayed a sign[10] to remind its customers not to wear inappropriate attire such as ripped jeans, short skirts, short pants as well as sleeveless shirts. This led to some members of the public questioning PN non-Muslim candidates[11] on whether they would lose their right to wear shorts in public if they voted for the coalition. These incidents were attributed to increasing conservative Islamisation in the country, and the concern that this will affect the secular way of public life, especially in more urban states. During GE15, PAS-PN managed to secure 74 seats, just 7 seats less than PH which had 81, and there was anxiety that this trend would continue in the state elections, especially in Selangor, Penang and Negeri Sembilan, which had PH-BN governments. During campaigning, PAS was painted as the bogeyman and PH supporters were called out to vote in order to protect their states against the “green wave”.[12] DAP chairman Lim Guan Eng was quoted as saying that this phenomenon may result in Penang residents being prosecuted for wearing shorts in their own shops.[13]
PN-PAS’ POLITICAL CAMPAIGN NARRATIVES
The state elections saw PN-PAS building on their strengths by campaigning on social media, using TikTok videos that were circulated on other platforms, as well as personal messaging applications such as WhatsApp. In Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu, one campaign narrative propagated by PN component Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS, Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party) was to call on voters living in other states or even overseas to come back to their home states to vote[14] to protect their Islamic government. PAS president Abdul Hadi Awang said that when other ethnic groups challenged the political dominance of Malay Muslims in the country, then voting was a fardhu ‘ain jihad (an obligatory holy struggle).[15] TikTok videos by PN-PAS supporters presented themselves as mujahideen[16] (Muslims who fight to defend their faith) and claimed that their participation in the state election campaign was part of their “jihad”[17] (spiritual warfare). Such political narratives tapped on the religious inclination of its target electorate who wished to believe that they would not just be voting for a political party but for an Islamic approach to governance that upheld the Quran.[18]
PN-PAS leaders advocating the Islamic way of life were portrayed as heroes and warriors. For example, Kedah chief minister Muhammad Sanusi Md Nor was regarded as a panglima[19] (commander) for shuttering gambling and lottery outlets[20] in the state and prioritising Islamic culture and values. Sanusi’s tendency to speak off the cuff drew comparisons to former US president Donald Trump and former Filipino president Rodrigo Duterte, but his ability to use the local dialect appealed to grassroots Malay-Muslim voters. Despite being charged with two counts of sedition for insulting the Sultan of Selangor, he was highly popular not just in Kedah but also in Kelantan and Terengganu, and many believe he gained public sympathy[21] as the perceived victim of political persecution.[22] Sanusi attacked Anwar’s privileged UMNO roots,[23] claiming that he understood the plight of the poor better since he came from a humbler background. The success of Sanusi’s election campaign was due to his fiery folksy rhetoric and to him exhorting voters to protect their Islamic government against outsiders.
PN’s manifesto for the six state elections also contained promises such as socio-economic development, job opportunities, low-cost affordable home as well as financial initiatives for women and youth entrepreneurship. For example, in Selangor, PN’s manifesto contained seven main pillars, 25 approaches and 112 offers that addressed issues such as cost of living and attracting investments into the state.[24] In Negeri Sembilan, PN’s manifesto proposed optimising the use of abandoned “tanah adat (native land) for agricultural activities to earn additional income[25] while in Kedah, it promised to provide affordable residential land lots for the low-income group as well as process long-pending land title applications.[26] The PN administration in Kedah and Kelantan also pledged to address longstanding water supply and quality.
However, analysts are of the view that political manifestos are more influential among politically literate voters in urban states such as Selangor, Negeri Sembilan and Penang than among voters in rural heartland states like Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu where personal connections with the candidates as well as race and religious factors matter more.[27] From the latter’s perspective as Muslims, progress may not be seen only from the materialistic viewpoint;[28] it should be holistic and not neglect the spiritual element. The PH-BN’s framing of advancement was from the urban context that focused on externalities such as tall buildings and condominiums; PN supporters questioned whether this was really “development” per se where society would soon consist of self-centric individuals who did not even know their neighbours. Furthermore, people in “developed” states like Selangor end up living in flats[29] because land cost is so expensive compared to those in Kedah, Kelantan, and Terengganu who have their own landed property. There was the acknowledgement that the PN-PAS administrations of these three states had shortcomings, but these were weaknesses of the authorities and could be addressed and corrected; it was not reflective of the Islamic religion which they upheld. In fact, PN-PAS supporters stated that “developed” states like Selangor also faced water issues; in addition, they blamed the federal PH-BN unity government[30] for giving insufficient support to the state government to overcome the water issues.
In the debate with PH’s Economic Affairs Minister Rafizi, PAS’ assistant secretary-general and Bachok MP, Mohd Syahir Sulaiman from Kelantan outlined his New Economic Model for Malaysia, which was graphically presented through a traditional Malay wooden house. According to Syahir, national stability is likened to the roof being supported by four economic pillars[31] of fairness, cycle, moderation and integrity. He also criticised Rafizi’s economic model for lacking direction, identity or patriotism, and that the PH government’s goal of making Malaysia[32] one of the top 30 biggest economies in the world was “meaningless” if people on the ground were still encountering economic hardships.
(https://www.pnbest.my/post/infografik-model-baharu-ekonomi-malaysia-oleh-yb-syahir-sulaiman)
Netizens on social media, especially PH supporters, trolled this infographic and circulated memes, calling it an example of a “tebuk atap” (hole in the roof) economy in reference to the previous PN federal government that came into power during the infamous “backdoor” Sheraton Move.[33] Nevertheless, PN-PAS supporters still saw Syahir as a courageous leader for taking on a political giant such as Rafizi. In fact, Syahir himself alluded to being a Sang Kancil[34] (mouse deer) taking on an elephant, which was a strategic move to paint himself as an underdog to obtain sympathy votes. A Facebook commentator who watched the Rafizi-Syahir debate noted that while Selangor’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was RM59,908, its relative poverty rate was 15.3% and its Gini coefficient, which measures income distribution and inequality, was at 0.393. In comparison, although Kelantan’s GDP per capita was RM16,567, its relative poverty rate was only 9.9% and Gini coefficient was 0.379. In his view, although Selangor was more efficient in spearheading economic growth, Kelantan was better at distributing its smaller pot of wealth to its people. This post,[35] which was republished in PAS’ online newsletter Harakah Daily, had some 5,100 likes, 3,500 shares and 731 comments, showing strong engagement from netizens. Again, this shows that the framing of PH-BN’s narrative on economic growth and development from a secular urban perspective had limited resonance with PN-PAS supporters who viewed things within a different paradigm.
Another political narrative that PN put forth was to continue its GE15 strategy of attacking PH-BN’s credibility by focusing on the corruption charges faced by Zahid Hamidi, president of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), a main component member of BN. In fact, PAS even urged Umno voters to vote for PN because it claimed that the latter’s focus on saving criminally tainted leaders meant that it had already lost its original struggle to uphold the rights and importance of the Malay community. PAS, in a press statement, said that Zahid had betrayed Umno members and supporters by supporting Anwar as prime minister and cooperating with the Democratic Action Party (DAP) in PH, which used to be its sworn political enemy.[36] It added that Umno was a pale shadow of itself and had no strong mandate from the people, having won only 30 seats in GE15, and that PN should be the new choice for voters seeking unity and justice; after all, its motto was BErsih dan STabil (Clean and Stable) i.e. PNBest.
In fact, a pre-election survey by Institut Masa Depan Malaysia (Institut MASA, Future Institute of Malaysia)[37] found that 39% of its Malay respondents who voted for BN were more likely to vote for PN in comparison to 15% switching their votes to PH. It explained that this was due to UMNO’s “diminishing performance legitimacy” and its credibility falling as a result of its leaders being tainted by corruption scandals, as well as internal politics. Furthermore, its cooperation with previous arch-enemies PKR and DAP in PH to form the unity government post-GE15 did not sit well with its core supporters. Although former UMNO secretary-general Datuk Seri Ahmad Maslan had previously urged its members to follow party discipline and support the unity government in the six state elections, party loyalists on the campaign found it difficult to convince BN Malay voters to transfer their votes to PH.[38] Thus, PN’s clarion call to Umno fence-sitters to transfer their vote to PN-PAS was more effective because these were unhappy with Umno’s cooperation with PH-DAP, whose ideology they believed to be antithetical to Umno’s dogma of championing Malay-Muslim rights and privileges. This helped PN-PAS to win all seats in Terengganu in the state elections and 22 out of 56 seats in Selangor, denying PH-BN the two-thirds majority it technically secured following political realignments in the wake of the November 2022 elections.
To push the campaign momentum even further, PAS president Abdul Hadi Awang suggested that a change of federal government would be possible if PN gained control of all six states in the elections. This could happen if members of parliament (MPs) from UMNO as well as Sabah and Sarawak supported PN, adding pressure on the PH-BN unity federal government, he added.[39] This call was echoed by PN’s information chief, Azmin Ali who added that this would be “a signal of the people’s voices towards Putrajaya” and their “vote of confidence in PN”.[40] Legally and constitutionally, the results of the six state elections were unlikely to trigger the collapse of the PH-BN unity government at federal level, especially with the introduction of the anti-party hopping law in 2022, but from the political perspective, they were viewed as a “referendum” of voter support of Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s administration.
CONCLUSION
What is clear from the campaign narratives propagated during the six state elections is that Malaysia is becoming increasingly polarised, pitting a secular multiracial approach in governing the country against a conservative ethnoreligious ideological version of governance. PN-PAS continues to make inroads into the Malay-Muslim electorate, riding on its remarkable performance in GE15. The political middle ground is becoming smaller as both sides of the political divide become more entrenched in their positions. Anwar Ibrahim is now at the crossroads – to continue with the secular multicultural approach which ensures the continued support of its voter base or to battle PN head on and focus on winning Malay-Muslim voters, which may alienate his core support. On top of this, he also has to focus on economic growth, increasing job opportunities, and managing cost-of-living issues.
One possible card up Anwar’s sleeve is to re-delineate the constituencies and address the issue of malapportionment whereby those that were previously gerrymandered to be dominated by one ethnic group, be redrawn to reflect more correctly the multiracial composition of the population, especially in the west coast of Peninsular Malaysia. Then, politicians would be incentivised to campaign on calls for inclusivity in order to gain support from all ethnic groups. Also, using ethnoreligious narratives to gain political support from the Malay-Muslim community at the expense of minority groups is a zero-sum game, which leaves the country more and more divided. While this strategy might work in Malay-Muslim majority states, gaining power at the federal level requires a different approach.
There is a need for more dialogue and discussions across the political divide to find common ground and to reduce the polarisation. The question is whether there is political will to build bridges, or will the divide-and-conquer strategy continue to grow in popularity and efficacy. Both coalitions are now recalibrating their strategies for the major battle in GE16, to be held in 2027. Ultimately, voters will have to decide the shape they want for the country.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
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2023/83 “Civilian Control of Those Close to the Palace: Making Sense of Thailand’s October 2023 Military and Police Reshuffles” by Paul Chambers
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Thailand’s annual military and police reshuffles, taking effect on 1 October 2023, have as usual involved political considerations, especially ties with the royal institution, pre-cadet class membership and other factionalisms.
- This year’s appointments were formalised by former Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, a junta-leader-turned-elected-prime-minister, producing conservative appointees likely to clash with the newly-elected Pheu Thai Party-led government, though both sides oppose the reformist Move Forward Party (MFP).
- In the reshuffles, the influence of the palace has been greater than in recent years (especially in the police), perhaps owing partly to the schism between General Prayut Chan-o-cha and General Prawit Wongsuwan. Prayut led the 2014 coup which toppled an elected civilian Pheu Thai government and then served as elected prime minister during 2019-2023; Prawit, his mentor, became deputy junta leader and deputy prime minister, also serving until 2023.
- 2023 has seen a resurgence in Prayut’s factional wing of Burapha Phayak or the Eastern Tigers, representing the 2nd Infantry Division, 1st Army Region, which dominated the army during 2007-2016.
* Guest writer, Paul Chambers, is Lecturer and Special Advisor for International Affairs, Center of ASEAN Community Studies, Naresuan University, Thailand. In March-May 2021, he was Visiting Fellow in the Thailand Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/83, 17 October 2023
INTRODUCTION
Thailand’s annual military and police reshuffles this year differed from those undertaken over the last ten years. Occurring on 1 October, these appointments were distinct because they marked a return to the divide between a civilian Pheu Thai-led government and the armed forces. The reshuffles also saw the resurrection of Burapha Phayak as an Army sub-faction, though under the helm of the Kho Daeng clique. Moreover, they took place in the weeks following the end of Prime Minister (General) Prayut Chan-o-cha’s Palang Pracharath military proxy party caretaker government, which had selected the new appointees. Finally, there was clear evidence of an intensification of palace influence where the police were concerned.
This year’s military reshuffle saw 762 promotions, including 28 females[1] (10 more than in 2022). There were appointments involving 514 generals, with 285 colonels or colonel-equivalent officers promoted to the rank of major general or its equivalent.[2] Thus, 2023 marked another year of top-heavy promotions to flag rank for the Thai military, though less so than in 2022 (587 generals).
RESHUFFLE DETERMINANTS: FACTIONS, CLASS TIES, EXPERIENCES
Appointments and promotions in Thailand are based upon several factors, the most significant being demonstrated loyalty to the palace. That said, factions are quite important. Key cliques tend to be based around regiment or division, educational class, service unit, and shared experience in key combat postings. Pre-cadet class has become a crucial factional determinant because in Thailand since 1958 there has been only one pre-cadet academy—the Armed Forces Academies Preparatory School (AFAPS)—which serves all officer recruits aiming to enter the Army, Navy, Air Force and Police academies. It is thus in the AFAPS that young people preparing to be officers can make factional bonds across the spectrum of security services. Deposed Prime Minister (and former Police Lt. Colonel) Thaksin Shinawatra’s AFAPS group faction was Class 10, while that of General Prayut Chan-o-cha was Class 12.
Regimental or division ties have also been important because, especially in a coup-prone country like Thailand, strategic units prevent or foment military putsches. The oldest and most strategic units have been the 1st and 11th Infantry Regiments, created in the 1850s. These regiments, under the 1st Infantry Division King’s Guard (known as the “coup division”),[3] are stationed close to palaces and Government House in Bangkok. Service in these units makes one a member of the oldest military faction, Wongthewan or “Divine Progeny”. Wongthewan dominated all other Army factions from 1870 until 1978, and also since the 2016 accession to power of King Vajiralongkorn, himself an honorary member of Wongthewan. Another important faction, the aforementioned Burapha Phayak or “Eastern Tigers”, is that of officers from the 2nd Infantry (and Cavalry) Division. Burapha Phayak’s legitimacy centres around the 21st Infantry Regiment, known as the Thahan Suea Ratchini or “Queen’s Tiger Guards” since Queen Sirikit became its honorary commandant in 1959.[4] Burapha Phayak, of which Generals-turned-politicians Prayut, Prawit Wongsuwan and Anupong Paochinda are members, was the driving force behind the 2006 and 2014 coups, dominating the Army during 2007-2016, although only Prayut and Anupong are also members of Thahan Suea Ratchinee. Still another important faction is the Muak Daeng or Special Forces, whose members included Privy Council Chair General Surayut Chulanond and 2006 coup leader General Sonthi Bonyaratklin. In 2018, the King Vajiralongkorn (Rama X) created a new faction called the Kho Daeng or “Red Rim”, for the colour of the neck of the tee-shirts worn under their uniforms —with all other officers known as Kho Khiao or “Green Rim”.[5] Officers are specifically invited into the Kho Daeng by monarchical advisors and attend a grueling, three-month-long, royal “904” military training course, during which they are carefully monitored. “904” was the codeword assigned to the monarch when he was crown prince. Only those who pass become eligible for the seniormost commands in the Army and the Royal Armed Forces Headquarters.
Overarching personalities, though less significant than that of King Vajiralongkorn, have also overshadowed military factionalism. Serving commanders of each security service, such as Army chief General Narongphan Jitkaewthae (2020-2023), always place their personal imprimatur on reshuffles. Also, in retirement, Prawit and Prayut have exerted influence over military appointments. Retired Army chief General Apirat Kongsompong’s personal influence has continued, given his accession to the posts of Vice-Chamberlain of the Royal Household Bureau and deputy director of the Crown Property Bureau. Personal influence is often helped by the sway of family elite status. Apirat’s father was an Armed Forces Supreme Commander and 1991 coup-leader. Meanwhile, Prawit’s brothers served as Police commander and Navy admiral respectively. Finally, for the highest military appointment (service commander), a prior strategic appointment is essential. Generally, any Army-commander-want-to-be must have already served as 1st Army Region commander.
PHEU THAI, THAKSIN AND THE VOTE FOR SRETTHA
Thailand’s May 14, 2023, election, though won by the Move Forward Party (MFP), whose electoral platform included monarchical and military/police reforms, resulted months later in the September appointment of a civilian government headed by Pheu Thai, the same party which had helmed the government overthrown by the 2014 coup. Since 2021, there had been much talk about a growing personal schism between Prayut and Prawit. The two even competed against each other in rival military proxy parties—Prayut through United Thai Nation, and Prawit through Palang Pracharath. Though cooperating to ensure that MFP’s candidate for prime minister was not selected, they did not jointly support Pheu Thai’s moderate businessman candidate Srettha Thavisin. In an example of a clear clash between ex-military heavyweights, Prayut’s 36-MP party and Upper House faction of around 87 Senators voted for Srettha, while Prawit’s Upper House faction of 81 Senators voted against him. The backing of Prayut’s Senators was enough to carry Srettha over the 376 threshold of parliamentarians constitutionally needed to approve a new PM.[6] Prayut clearly trumped Prawit in the selection of Thailand’s new head of government.
Meanwhile, Thaksin Shinawatra, facing eight years in prison for corruption, voluntarily returned to Thailand on August 22, the same day that parliament approved Settha as premier. He was whisked away to a hospital and given a partial pardon. A much-rumoured political bargain between Thaksin and his opponents (apparently involving Prayut) reportedly allowed for the former’s return to Thailand, for a pardon and/or parole, for the moderate Srettha’s becoming prime minister, and for Pheu Thai’s formation of a coalition with conservative parties against MFP.[7] In addition, and also on August 22, anti-Thaksin protest leader Suthep Thaugsuban was acquitted of corruption.[8] With Srettha in charge, Pheu Thai has now been transformed into the voice of the centrist status quo allied with elites and the military against the MFP.
WHAT’S NEW IN 2023?
Amidst these drawn-out political changes, Prayut was also able to effectuate a complete military reshuffle for 2023, though it was passed to the palace for endorsement earlier than usual—in August rather than September—before the next government could take office, ensuring that Pheu Thai could not meddle with it. The military appointments were well-targeted in that only arch-royalist officers are now entrenched in the top and second rungs of the armed forces.
In the tables below, the 2023 leadership changes have been organised into six groups: 1) all security services, 2) the police, 3) the Armed Forces Headquarters, 4) the Army, 5) the 1st Army Region, and 6) additional crucial Army postings. The tables demonstrate that the year’s appointments have either tended to go to palace favorites or followed the preferences of Burapha Phayak. Burapha Phayak officers in turn are either close to Prawit and/or Prayut. Officers from Pre-Cadet Class 23, the dominant class of senior military officers in 2023, have figured prominently in these appointments. Other classes whose members have received key posts in 2022 are Pre-Cadet Classes 24-26. Pre-Cadet Class 26 in particular looks set to lead Thailand’s military in the near future.
The Security Services as a Whole
The data in Table 1 indicate that in 2023 the seniormost positions in Thailand’s security services have been bestowed upon senior officials trusted by the palace. General Songwit Nunpakdee, General Jaroenchai Hintao, Admiral Adung Phan-iam, US F-35 enthusiast Air Chief Marshall (ACM) Panpakdee Pattanakul, and Police General Torsak Sukwimol are all officers with very close connections to the royal institution. An important bond for these officers is the close collegial connections between Pre-Cadet Classes 23 and 24—of which they are, except for Torsak, all members).
Yet frictions between these officers and elected civilians could perhaps grow in future because the new Srettha-led Pheu Thai government appointed pro-Thaksin “Red Shirt” activist Suthin Klangsaeng as Defence Minister. Thaksin’s brother and nephew were initially named Suthin’s advisor and secretary respectively,[9] though Suthin never signed the order, and Suthin himself implied that he might take advice from Thaksin in his ministerial responsibilities.[10] However, after probable pressure, Suthin appointed two Prayut loyalists to help helm the Ministry of Defence: General Nattapol Nakpanit as the Ministry’s secretary-general and General Somsak Rungsita as one of the minister’s advisors.[11] Meanwhile, the Permanent Secretary of the Minister of Defence is General Sanitchanonok Sangkachantra, a confidant of Prawit and Prayut.
Table 1: Key figures in the Security Services, 2023-2024. (Asterisks indicate new appointments.)
| Position | Name | Faction | Pre-Cadet Class | Retirement Date |
| Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence | General Sanitchanok Sangkachantra | Burapha Phayak | 24 | 2025 |
| Commander, Armed Forces | General Songwit Nunpakdee* | Wongthewan/ Kho Daeng | None (early on attended Class 24 but moved to Virginia Military Institute | 2025 |
| Commander, Royal Thai Army | General Jaroenchai Hintao* | Burapha Phayak/ Kho Daeng / | 23 | 2024 |
| Commander, Royal Thai Navy | Admiral Adung Phan-iam* | Royal Family Security; attache to Australia | 23 | 2024 |
| Commander, Royal Thai Air Force | Air Chief Marshal Panpakdee Pattanakul* | Western-oriented clique (US F-16, Swedish Gripen, Squadron 403, Wing 4, Attache, UK England, led Thai efforts to acquire US F-35s)[12] | 24 | 2025 |
| Commander, Royal Thai Police | Torsak Sukwimol* | Royal Guard 904 (police academy class 51) | None | 2024 |
THE POLICE
In 2023, police appointments were extremely significant because they came on the heels of the enactment of the 2022 National Police Act. Under Section 78 (1) of that new law, the prime minister has complete power to nominate a new Police Commander, subject to endorsement by the King.[13] But Prime Minister Prayut passed off on appointing a new police chief, kicking the ball to his successor Srettha. Following a month-long delay, Srettha made the decision on September 27. Among principal competitors for police commander were the aristocratic Police General Torsak and the popular Prawit-backed Police General Surachate Hakpan. The two remaining contenders were less well-connected: seniormost Police General Roy Ingkhapairoj and low-profile Police General Kittirat Phunphet. In the end, Torsak triumphed. No surprise there because Torsak was not just another guy: he is the younger brother of Air Chief Marshal Satitpong Sukvimol, the Private Secretary to the King, Chamberlain of the King’s Royal Household Bureau and the Director of the Crown Property Bureau. Despite never having attended the Police Academy, Torsak in 2018 became the first commander of the King’s Royal Police Headquarters Rajawanlop Royal Guard 904. (The unit’s name was later changed to the Special Operations Division.) And his ascent in the police was made “exempt from criteria”.[14] He likes to use proactive Buddhism in his police work and has been nicknamed “Dharma Buster” and “Robocop of Merit.[15] Torsak’s closest rival Surachate had recently investigated a friend of Torsak’s—and the friend ended up committing suicide. Then, on September 25, two days before the police appointments, police publicly raided properties belonging to Surachate, and he was implicitly implicated in illegal online gambling. Police Lt. General Trairong Phewphan, who led the raid, is close to Prayut while also a relative of a pre-cadet academy classmate of the current Agriculture Minister, Captain Thamanat Prompow.[16] The incident tainted Surachate as a police officer, and Srettha was compelled to open an investigation into the affair. Moreover, the Pheu Thai-led government, despite its powerful police factions of 1) Pheu Thai’s Shinawatra/Damapong family, 2) Police General Patcharawat Wongsuwan (Palang Pracharath Party), and 3) the Bhumjai Thai Party’s Police General Permpoom Chidchob, was unable to push for the now-blighted Surachate as the new Police Chief. However, Srettha’s appointment of the palace-favoured Torsak could be an attempt to placate the palace, given the occasional past frictions between the royal institution and the Pheu Thai Party.
His ascent to the top police post notwithstanding, Torsak will have to retire in 2024, and the senior line-up is still dominated by police officials that Prawit and his brother, former Police Commander Police General Patcharawat who dominated the police during 2008-2009 and 2014-2023, installed during the Prayut government. It is likely that Police General Kittirat, who appears to be linked to both the Wongsuwan brothers and to Kittirat’s military classmate Captain Thamanat, could succeed Torsak. Upon Kittirat’s own retirement in 2026, another peer of the palace, rising star Police General Jirapop Puridej, currently the commander of the Central Investigation Bureau, will likely succeed him unless Surachate makes a come-back. Jirapop could serve for as long as 10 years as police commander since his retirement is due only in 2036!
Table 2: The seven seniormost Police officers, 2023-2024. (Asterisks indicate new appointments.)
| Position | Name | Faction | Pre-Cadet Class/Police Academy Class | Retirement Date |
| Police Commander | Torsak Sukwimol* | Palace/Royal Guard 904/Sukwimol | None/(equivalent to Class 51) | 2024 |
| Deputy Commander 1 | Police General Kittirat Phunphet | Prawit and Patcharawat Wongsuwan and Captain Thamanat Prompow | 25/41 | 2026 |
| Deputy Commander 2 | Police General Surachate Hakpan | Prawit and Police General Patcharawat Wongsuwan | 31/47 | 2031 |
| Deputy Commander 3 | Pol. Lt. Gen. Kraiboon Thuatsong | — | 23/39 | 2025 |
| Deputy Commander 4 | Pol. Lt. Gen. Sarawut Karnphanich | Prawit and Patcharawat Wongsuwan | 24/42 | 2026 |
| Deputy Commander 5 | Pol. Lt. Gen. Thana Chuwong | Prawit and Patcharawat Wongsuwan | 26/42 | 2026 |
| Commander, Central Investigations Bureau | Police General Jirabhop Bhuridej | Palace/Royal Guard 904/Bhuridej | 34/50 | 2036 |
ARMED FORCES HEADQUARTERS
In Table 3 five new topmost appointments went to senior officers considered close to the palace. This is understandable because, although the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters is the weakest security service, it represents the public face of the Thai military and heads all defence diplomacy. Interestingly, the new Deputy Commander (Air Force) is a champion of US F-16 fighter aircraft, indicating a tilt toward more such procurement. Deputy Commanders play important roles supportive of the Commander of the Armed Forces Headquarters for each security service.
Table 3: The six senior-most Armed Forces Headquarters Officers, 2023-2024. (Asterisks indicate new appointments.)
| Position | Name | Faction | Pre-Cadet Class | Retirement Date |
| Commander, Armed Forces | General Songwit Nunpakdee* | Palace/ Wongthewan/ Kho Daeng | None (equivalent of 24)/Virginia Military Institute | 2025 |
| Deputy Commander (Army) | General Anusorn Kumaksorn* | Kho Daeng | 23 | 2024 |
| Deputy Commander (Army) | General Komsak Kamsaisaeng* | Kho Daeng | 24 | 2025 |
| Deputy Commander (Navy) | Admiral Monthat Phalin* | Naval Civil Affairs Department (royal projects) | 23 | 2024 |
| Deputy Commander (Air Force) | ACM Chanon Mungtanna* | US F-16, Squadron 403, air force attache in Sweden, commander of the Directorate of Operations[17] | 23 | 2023 |
| Chief of Staff | General Thitichai Tienthong | Prawit Wongsuwan/Sanoh Thienthong | 24 | 2025 |
The Army
Table 4 represents the victory of caretaker Prayut in manipulating the most important reshuffles—i.e., those in the Army, Thailand’s largest security service—before Pheu Thai could come to office and tilt the appointments towards its own partisan interests. General Jaroenchai, the leader of pre-cadet class 23, a confidant of both Prayut and General Apirat and a member of Burapha Phayak/Thahan Suea Ratchinee, was selected in August as Army chief, succeeding outgoing Wongthewan faction member General Narongphan. Prayut’s success in securing the appointment of Jaroenchai was also a triumph in the former prime minister’s post-2020 rivalry with Prawit. For Army chief, Prawit had favoured General Suksan Nongbualang, who hailed from Prawit’s own Regiment 2 faction. Finally, Jaroenchai’s selection was interesting because he, like Prayut and Prawit, is originally from Burapha Phayak, and not Wongthewan, as his two predecessors had been.
Thus, Jaroenchai’s ascent represents the return of Burapha Phayak. Though Suksan must retire as Deputy Army Commander in 2024, the weakness of Jaroenchai is that he too must retire that same year. He can technically be succeeded by one of the other three “tigers” or top officers: General Ukrist Butanon, General Tharapong Malakam, or General Pana Klaewplaudtuk. However, only Tharapong and Pana, a gruff officer in the mold of Prayut and the leader of Pre-Cadet Class 26, belong to the king’s Kho Daeng faction, which makes it highly unlikely that Ukrist will succeed Jaroenchai, even though Pheu Thai might favour Ukrist. Meanwhile, most Army commanders have previously commanded the strategic First Army Region. Pana, rather than Tharapong or Ukrist, has checked this box. Finally, Pana, from the Wongthewan/Kho Daeng faction, has reportedly been favoured by Apirat, Prayut, and the royal institution.[18] Unless Pheu Thai can somehow thwart his appointment, Pana will likely serve as Army chief during 2024-2027.
Table 4: The five seniormost Army officers, 2023-2024. (Asterisks indicate new appointments.)
| Position | Name | Faction | Pre-Cadet Class | Retirement Date |
| Commander, | General Jaroenchai Hintao* | Regiment 21/Prayut/ Burapha Phayak/ Kho Daeng | 23 | 2024 |
| Deputy Commander | General Suksan Nongbualang* | Regiment 2/Prawit/ Burapha Phayak/ Kho Daeng | 23 | 2024 |
| Assistant Commander 1 | General Ukrist Buntanon* | Army Operations Department | 24 | 2025 |
| Assistant Commander 2 | General Tharapong Malakam* | Regiment 2/Prawit/ Burapha Phayak/ Kho Daeng | 24 | 2026 |
| Chief of Staff | General Pana Klaewplaudtuk* | Wongthewan/ Kho Daeng /Apirat/ Narongphan | 26 | 2027 |
The 1st Army Region
The data in Table 5, which focuses on the 1st Army Region, are important because any coups or prevention of coups depends upon this large unit, which is responsible for security in Bangkok and Central Thailand. The new Commander of the region is General Chitsanupong Raudsiri, a pro-Prayut Burapha Phayak/Kho Daeng,[19] Pre-Cadet 26 classmate and friend of the aforementioned General Pana. And like Pana, Chitsanupong retires in 2027. The five other senior officials in this Army Region are all from the Kho Daeng clique, though two are connected to the Burapha Phayak/Thahan Suea Ratchini. Prawit’s influence has been erased from the First Army Region. As can be seen from Table 5, Pre-Cadet Classes 26 and 28 will be the next powerful important cliques in the Army. The presence of Kho Daeng officers in the 1st Army Region certainly represents extremely strong royal influence in this unit.
Table 5: The six senior-most 1st Army Region officers, 2022-2023. (Asterisks indicate new appointments.)
| Position | Name | Faction | Pre-Cadet Class | Retirement Date |
| 1st Army Region Commander | General Chitsanupong Raudsiri* | Burapha Phayak/Kho Daeng | 26 | 2027 |
| Cohort Commander | Lt. General. Amrit Bunsuya* | Burapha Phayak/Thahan Suea Ratchinee/Kho Daeng | 27 | 2029 |
| Deputy Cohort Commander | Lt. General Natadej Jansang* | Wongthewan/Kho Daeng | 28 | 2029 |
| Deputy 1st Army Region Commander | General Worayot Luangsuwan | Wongthewan/Kho Daeng | 28 | 2029 |
| Deputy 1st Army Region Commander | Lt. General Sarawut Chaisit* | Burapha Phayak/Thahan Suea Ratchini/Kho Daeng | 28 | 2030 |
| Deputy 1st Army Region Commander | Lt. Ajin Patomjit* | Wongthewan/Kho Daeng/Cavalry | 28 | 2030 |
Miscellaneous Matters
In Table 6, the remaining important security positions are shown. In an apparent triumph for civilian control, the new National Security Advisor Chatchai Bangchuat is technically non-military, though he did attend Thailand’s Air Force Academy. He is close to former National Security Advisor General Supoj Malaniyom, a chum of outgoing Army chief Narongphan). The new Srettha government has shown no desire to dismiss this new advisor.[20]
Meanwhile, the commanders of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Army Regions—responsible for Northeastern, Northern, and Southern Thailand, respectively—were selected by Prayut. 2nd Army Region Commander Adul Buntamjaroen, a member of the Pre-Cadet Class 26 faction, is a class peer of the quickly rising General Pana. 4th Army Chief Santi Sakuntanak, who is steering Southern counterinsurgency efforts, is a Pre-Cadet 25 classmate of Agriculture Minister Captain Thamanat, the secretary-general of Prawit’s Palang Pracharath Party.
While the 2nd Infantry Division has long been centred on fealty to Queen Sirikit, it has also become a centre of influence for Prawit and Prayut, especially the latter. Commanders of the 1st and 11th Divisions, stationed close to Bangkok, are palace favorites. Within the 1st Division, centred in the heart of the capital, the seven battalions of the 1st and 11th regiments, were in 2019 placed under the direct control of the royal palace as a new Royal Security Command.[21] This command was previously managed by royal favourite Deputy Royal Security Commander General Jakrapop Bhuridej, a member of Pre-Cadet Class 28 and the brother of Police General Jirabhop.[22] Upon his September 2023 retirement, Army chief General Narongphan became commander of the Office of Special Operations Officers under His Majesty the King, the Royal Guard’s Safety and Protection Command.
Table 6: Additional important Army positions, 2023-2024. (Asterisks designate new appointments.)
| Position | Name | Faction | Pre-cadet Class | Retirement Date |
| National Security Council Secretary-General | Chatchai Bangchuat* | (civilian) worked under Prayut | None | none |
| Commander, Second Army Region | General Adul Buntamjaroen* | 2nd Army Region (6th Division) | 26 | 2027 |
| Commander, Third Army Region | General Prasan Saengsirirak* | 3rd Army Region (4th Division) | 24 | 2025 |
| Commander, Fourth Army Region | General Santi Sakuntanak | 4th Army Region (25th Division) | 25 | 2026 |
| Commander, Special Forces Warfare Center | General Wattana Chatratanasaeng* | Special Forces | 24 | 2025 |
| Commander, 1st Infantry Division | Colonel Sitiporn Julapana | Wongthewan/Kho Daeng | 30 | 2031 |
| Commander, 2nd Infantry Division (“Eastern Tigers”) | General Tepitak Nimit | Burapha Phayak | 31 | 2032 |
| Commander, 9th Infantry Division | General Wutthaya. Chantamath | 9th infantry regiment “Black Tigers” | 28 | 2029 |
| Commander, 11th Infantry Division | General Ekawnan Mahbuthan | Wongthewan/Kho Daeng | 30 | 2031 |
CONCLUSION
The September 2023 ascension to office of the elected Pheu Thai government has paralleled the appointment of a military/police leadership close to the palace and to outgoing caretaker Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-o-cha—the same person who overthrew the earlier Pheu Thai government in 2014. Despite incoming Defense Minister Suthin’s effort to adopt appearances of cooperation between an elected civilian government and the military, cooperation between Pheu Thai and Thailand’s security leaders might prove difficult, especially since Suthin has, as a Red Shirt leader, in the past adamantly demanded a smaller, leaner military. Such a clash could also happen following recent comments by the new government that it might amend the junta-enacted 2017 constitution and/or the 2008 Defence Administration Act, in order to scrap a committee of military leaders which has vetted all senior military appointments.[23]
The palace and Prayut appear to have strongly influenced 2023’s military and police reshuffles, ensuring that arch-royalist security officials remain in top leadership positions.
Their initiative appears particularly clear in 1) the promotion of Thahan Suea Rachini/Kho Daeng Army Commander General Jaroenchai; 2) the appointment of Wongthewan/Kho Daeng Army officers to the posts of Royal Thai Armed Forces Commander and 1st Army Region commander; 3) the appointment of palace-favourite Police General Torsak as Police Commander; 4) the promotion of arch-royalist officers Admiral Adung and Air Chief Marshal Panpakdee to serve as Navy and Air Force commanders; and 5) the appointment of the palace-connected General Pana as Army Chief of Staff in preparation for his likely promotion to command the Army in 2024.
Jaroenchai’s appointment reflects the resurgence of the Burapha Phayak clique, as a sub-faction within the palace-favoured Kho Daeng army leadership. It also demonstrates Prayut’s vanquishing of Prawit. But the 2024 end of Jaroenchai’s term as Army chief will mark the end of Prayut’s own sway. Therefore, the power of both Prawit and Prayut over appointments will draw to a close, allowing the palace to further dominate reshuffles—via Apirat over the military or via Torsak and Jirabhop in the police.
Looking ahead, the Pheu Thai government will likely push for General Ukrist or even Prawitminion General Tharapong as future Army Commander, though, without royal support, either would be a long shot. However, the government does have powerful influence over the police in the form of Thaksin himself, Thaksin’s wife Pojaman Damapong (from a police family), Deputy Prime Minister Police General Patcharawat Wongsuwan, and Education Minister Police General Permpoom Chidchob. It is thus likely that the police chief in 2024 will be a compromise choice between these factions and the palace.
The fact that Prayut was able to appoint his loyalists to top military positions does not augur well for civil-military relations since the newly-elected Pheu Thai government has had a long history of friction with the armed forces—though Pheu Thai, conservative parties supporting its coalition, and the military, do all oppose the opposition MFP.
For the future, the regal institution and its associated elites will likely continue intervening in the military/police reshuffle to ensure the stability of effective, loyal, arch-royalist security forces. Sustaining strong security forces is useful in, first, repressing any potential reform-minded street protests; second, ensuring effective counterinsurgency against Malay-Muslim separatists in Thailand’s Deep South; and third, carrying out a military coup against any civilian government—led by Pheu Thai or MFP—which goes too far in attempting to implement monarchical and/or military reforms.
Thailand’s 2023 military/police reshuffles reflect a continuing post-1980 pattern of civil-military relations whereby Thai security forces are not accountable to elected civilians but answer only to peers or the palace.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
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2023/82 “Vietnam Seeks Intimate Ties with Cambodia and Laos” by Nguyen Khac Giang
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Cambodia and Laos are considered an integral part of Vietnam’s traditional sphere of influence. Both are “special partners” and priorities in Vietnam’s foreign policy.
- However, China’s increasing influence in the region since the late 2000s has challenged Vietnam’s position as the key economic and political partner of its two smaller neighbours.
- In addition, bilateral issues, such as unfinished border demarcation with Cambodia and hydropower dams with Laos, further complicate Vietnam’s efforts to keep the two neighbours by its side.
- Since Vietnam lacks the economic and financial means to match China’s resources, it has taken advantage of its strong historical relationships, political connections, infrastructure linkages, burgeoning economic activities, and robust people-to-people ties to devise an effective engagement strategy with Cambodia and Laos.
- This strategy, which emphasises regionalisation and building linkages between the three countries and other regional and international partners, serves as a counterbalance to China’s influence in Cambodia and Laos, while also benefiting Vietnam and enhancing the strategic autonomy of its neighbours.
*Nguyen Khac Giang is Visiting Fellow in the Vietnam Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. He was previously Research Fellow at the Vietnam Center for Economic and Strategic Studies.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/82, 16 October 2023
INTRODUCTION
Given their geographical proximity and shared history, Cambodia and Laos are viewed as integral components of Vietnam’s traditional sphere of influence. However, since the late 2000s, this position has been increasingly challenged by China’s growing dominance in the Lower Mekong region. Beijing has surpassed Hanoi to become the primary investor and trade partner for both nations, anchoring them within its sphere of influence through infrastructure investments, concessional loans, and strengthened military cooperation.
Against this backdrop, Hanoi has witnessed a decline in both its economic standing and its influence on policy-making circles in Phnom Penh and Vientiane. This has raised serious security concerns for Vietnam and generated negative implications for its regional agenda, particularly regarding the South China Sea dispute.
This essay examines Vietnam’s ongoing challenges and prospects in its engagement with Cambodia and Laos, in light of China’s increasing influence. It begins by outlining the strategic significance of Cambodia and Laos to Vietnam before detailing Vietnam’s multifaceted challenges in navigating relationships with these neighbours and the economic and political tools available to Hanoi to preserve its influence in both countries. It concludes with insights into the potential trajectories of the trilateral ties.
WHY CAMBODIA AND LAOS ARE VITAL TO VIETNAM
Vietnam regards Cambodia and Laos not merely as neighbours, but as “brother nations”. Emerging from the former French Indochina, these three nations forged strong bonds during their respective struggles for independence. Vietnam makes these two nations a priority in its diplomacy, classifying them both as “special partners”. The Vietnam People’s Army (VPA) played a pivotal role in toppling the brutal Khmer Rouge regime in 1979, paving the way for Hun Sen’s rise to power and long-standing rule in Cambodia. Laos is Vietnam’s sole military ally in the post-Cold War era.[1] In instances like the 2000 unrest in Vientiane, the 2003 Houphan rebellion, and the 2007 Bokeo unrest, Vietnamese security forces came to the aid of the Lao communist regime.[2]
But this historical context is only part of the story. Hanoi views its ties with Cambodia and Laos as indispensable to its own security and economic advancement, and any instability in either nation invariably reverberates across Vietnam, and vice versa.[3]
First, as the two nations cover two-thirds of its land border, Vietnam naturally seeks assurance in having friendly regimes next door. This sentiment particularly resonates with Vietnam’s perpetual anxiety regarding its northern neighbour – China. Given the complex historical legacy and ongoing uncertainty regarding Beijing’s ambitions, consolidating an “Indochina” political front to shield against potential northern threats remains a significant task for Hanoi. Past failures to achieve this, such as in the late 1970s, pushed Vietnam to engage in armed conflicts on both the Northern border against China and the Southern border against Khmer Rouge Cambodia. These wars drained the country’s resources and isolated it from the international community, pushing it to the verge of catastrophe in the mid-1980s. Some contemporary discourses even suggest that Vietnam should reorient its strategic focus landward instead of concentrating solely on the South China Sea.[4]
Vietnam’s concerns go beyond security. Cambodia and Laos serve as conduits for Vietnam’s engagement with mainland Southeast Asia, including Thailand and Myanmar. Given China’s extensive infrastructural investments in the Lower Mekong region, Hanoi is wary of the so-called “infrastructural leverage trap”. The fear is that, once Chinese-backed connectivity frameworks are established, Vietnam might find itself marginalised from primary manufacturing chains and regional trade networks.[5]
Second, Vietnam’s border regions adjacent to Cambodia and Laos present complex security challenges. Although Hanoi has largely managed to stave off widespread riots and unrests, the few that did erupt mostly originated from these border provinces, as evidenced by the recent deadly assault in Dak Lak Province that killed nine people.[6] Furthermore, these border areas are notorious hotbeds for human and drug trafficking. Ensuring border stability necessitates close collaboration with Cambodian and Lao authorities, particularly as Vietnamese law enforcement occasionally needs to conduct operations within these neighbours’ territories.[7]
Third, Cambodia and Laos contribute significantly to the legitimacy of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV). Both were involved in the independence struggle that gave rise to modern Vietnam, where tens of thousands of Vietnamese sacrificed their lives as volunteer soldiers. In its 2019 Defence White Paper, the VPA lauded its endeavours in supporting Cambodia and Laos, invoking the late President Ho Chi Minh’s proclamation: “To help our friends is to help ourselves”.[8] Furthermore, Vietnam and Laos also have a shared interest in upholding socialist ideals. Consequently, any potential drift of Cambodia and Laos away from Vietnam’s orbit raises considerable anxiety among the general public and scholars alike, damaging the CPV’s historical legitimacy.[9]
VIETNAM’S MULTIFACETED CHALLENGES IN CAMBODIA AND LAOS
Over the past decade, Vietnam’s role in the economic and political affairs of Cambodia and Laos has significantly been tested due to a multitude of factors.
First and foremost, China has replaced Vietnam as the chief economic stakeholder in both Cambodia and Laos. China accounts for nearly half of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Cambodia,[10] while half of Laos’ escalating public debt is attributed to China. Economic ascendancy inevitably provides political leverage, causing these traditional allies of Vietnam to distance themselves from Hanoi. This is markedly evident in their reluctance to involve themselves in the South China Sea dispute. For example, in 2012, Cambodia prevented ASEAN from releasing a joint communiqué, a first in 45 years, due to its unwillingness to mention the dispute in the document. Similarly, in 2016, under Laos’ ASEAN chairmanship, the association’s stance on the South China Sea was notably tempered, although the grouping managed to release a joint statement this time.[11] This shifting allegiance has made it increasingly difficult for Vietnam to build a more unified ASEAN position on the South China Sea dispute.
Second, Vietnam also faces distinct challenges in its bilateral relationships with Cambodia and Laos. These issues are rooted in history and in competing economic interests. Regarding Cambodia, contentious matters include the status of ethnic Vietnamese, unresolved border demarcation, and the potential stationing of the Chinese navy at the Ream Naval Base near Vietnam.[12] Additionally, anti-Vietnamese sentiments, sporadically voiced by Hun Sen himself,[13] exacerbate the situation. With regards to Laos, Vietnam’s primary concern lies in Laos’ hydropower development strategy, perceived by Hanoi as detrimental to the Mekong River’s ecosystem and Vietnam’s Mekong Delta. Notably, half of Laos’ 60 dams on the Mekong’s tributaries and two on the Mekong mainstream are directly financed by China.[14]
Third, Vietnam’s slow post-pandemic economic recovery has limited its ability to fulfil its infrastructure commitments to its neighbours. In contrast to China’s swift completion of its Laos-China railway project within three years, Vietnam’s promised rail link between Vientiane and the Vietnamese seaport of Vung Ang has yet to be initiated.[15] Similarly, progress on a 2017 agreement to construct a highway connecting the economic hubs of Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) and Phnom Penh has only been made on the Cambodian side, as Vietnam struggles to secure the US$700 million needed for its section.[16]
Finally, the uncertainty of the two countries’ internal affairs also poses challenges to the formulation of a good strategic plan. In August 2023, Cambodia experienced a significant power transition with Hun Sen passing his prime ministerial role to his son, Hun Manet, accompanied by a comprehensive cabinet reshuffle.[17] Vietnamese leaders have been actively engaging with these shifts, as evidenced by meetings between Prime Minister (PM) Pham Minh Chinh, National Assembly Chairman Vuong Dinh Hue, and President Vo Van Thuong, and Hun Manet in 2022.[18] However, new leadership always brings about unpredictability, and the lack of historical connection between Hun Manet and Vietnam may make the situation even more challenging for Vietnam. Meanwhile, Laos’ precarious economic climate has led to political uncertainties and sporadic public protests since last year.[19] This culminated in PM Phankham Viphavanh’s resignation in December 2022,[20] and the country’s continued economic slump in 2023 has made it imperative for Hanoi to recalibrate its support strategies for Vientiane.
VIETNAM’S ECONOMIC APPROACH
Vietnamese leadership recognises the importance of economic development in shaping the nature of the tripartite relationship. While Vietnam may not match China in terms of economic and financial resources, Hanoi has smartly capitalised on its geographic proximity in order to reinforce its economic ties with both Cambodia and Laos.
First, while China has more to offer in terms of big infrastructure projects as seen with the Laos–China railway project, Vietnam offers greater connectivity to landlocked Laos, particularly in terms of land roads and sea transportation. As the Vientiane-Vung Ang rail project has been delayed for years,[21] the main Vietnamese seaports in the central area, such as Vung Ang, Cua Lo, Chu Lai and Tien Sa, have been utilised as the export channel for Laos products to overseas markets. Vietnam can also help Cambodia to diversify trade and investment with the help of its extensive land connections. In fact, Vietnam is currently Cambodia’s biggest trade partner in ASEAN and plays an important role in linking up certain Cambodian industries to the global supply chain.[22]
Second, China may have the upper hand in state-led trade and investments, but Vietnam benefits from deeply rooted economic ties with both Laos and Cambodia, notably among non-state entities. Notably, Vietnam has 10 international border gates with Laos and 11 with Cambodia, while there are only five with China, despite China being Vietnam’s biggest trade partner. This shows the intensive cross-border economic activities among the three Lower Mekong nations, and Hanoi’s dedication to further integrate these three economies. In several key border regions, Vietnam has created or is in the process of constructing special economic zones to enhance economic connections, a plan launched by former Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung in 2010.[23] Laos and Cambodia are the first and second biggest recipients of Vietnam’s outward FDI.[24] Renowned Vietnamese corporations such as Viettel and Hoang Anh Gia Lai have invested in these countries for years, making major contributions to their infrastructural development and creating jobs for hundreds of thousands of people. These ties, born from both high-level initiatives and grassroots level engagement, are deeply rooted, and it would take a significant amount of time and efforts for China to replicate them.
Third, Vietnam has promoted economic linkage between the three countries, helping to reduce their dependence on China. Vietnamese officials often emphasise the importance of regionalisation in the CLV region in bilateral and trilateral talks. During a recent meeting with former Lao PM Phankham Viphavanh and Cambodian PM Hun Sen, Vietnamese PM Pham Minh Chinh asserted that fostering “independent and self-reliant economies” remains a strategic imperative for all three nations.[25] The Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam Development Triangle Area (CLV-DTA) – a regional cooperation framework that focuses on cross-border economic cooperation between the three countries – was originally proposed by Hun Sen in 1999. However, it was Vietnam that sought to expand the agreement from the original 13 provinces to the entire CLV region.[26]
POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT
Politically, Vietnam has significantly increased its bilateral and trilateral engagement with Cambodia and Laos across four key channels: party-to-party, government-to-government, parliament-to-parliament, and people-to-people. These channels have been in place for a while, but political activities have seen a notable resurgence since the early 2010s.
On the party-to-party dimension, the CPV has been keen to foster trilateral ties with the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) and the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP). In 2011, the national fronts of the three countries – the top party institutions geared towards mobilising society – established a biannual meeting mechanism.[27] Other party institutions, such as youth unions, have also expedited many exchange activities between the three countries.[28] A stronger testament to this effort is the trilateral summit held in Hanoi on 26 September 2021, involving CPV General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, Cambodian PM Hun Sen, and Lao President Thongloun Sisoulith.[29] This summit was the first of its kind involving the leaders of three ruling parties to be held since the end of the Cold War. Moreover, the summit among the three party leaders was held again in Hanoi in early September 2023, suggesting that this could become a regular event.[30]
At the governmental level, the prime ministers and heads of state of the three nations frequently meet, both in specifically tailored events and on the sidelines of regional meetings. In 2010, then-President Nguyen Minh Triet visited both Laos and Cambodia in a single journey, emphasising the connection between the three countries and setting the precedent for other Vietnamese leaders to follow.[31] In late 2022, the national assemblies of the three countries concluded a tripartite agreement to initiate the biannual summit of the leaders of the three parliaments. The inaugural summit is scheduled for this year in Vientiane.[32] Additionally, people-to-people ties have deepened, with Vietnam offering scholarships and training programmes to thousands of cadres from Cambodia and Laos over the years.[33] Within border regions, Vietnamese mass organisations mobilise local residents to organise recurring cultural, sports and volunteer activities with neighbouring Cambodian and Laotian communities.
In essence, the three countries maintain regular and intensive interactions across all levels, a practice they do not have with other nations, including China.[34] Evidently, Vietnam’s strategy aims to establish, even if unofficially, a trilateral Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam (CLV) group. Considering all the cooperative frameworks, the frequency of high-level summits, and mutual commitments, the bond among CLV nations can be construed as a soft alliance network which aims to achieve common goals.
It is noteworthy that Hanoi has taken significant steps to demonstrate its perception of Cambodia and Laos as equals in their bilateral interactions. For example, at a reception for Cambodian Defence Minister Tea Banh and Lao Defence Minister Chansamone Chanyalath in December 2019, Vietnamese PM Nguyen Xuan Phuc emphasised the trilateral relationship of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos as a “three-legged stool” stabilised by mutual respect, equality and a win-win approach.[35] This stance is in stark contrast to China’s approach, which typically involves taking a dominant position with smaller nations. It also differs from Vietnam’s policy during the Cold War period.
Hanoi has also worked to strengthen its connections with its neighbours, not as an exclusive group but as an integral part of existing regional frameworks, particularly ASEAN. For example, Vietnam placed emphasis on the Mekong sub-region in ASEAN during its ASEAN chairmanship in 2020.[36] In addition, it has also involved other regional partners, such as Japan, South Korea, and the United States,[37] in collaboration with Laos and Cambodia. Accordingly, Japan has provided significant technical and financial aid for the CLV-DTA initiative.[38] In the Vietnam–Laos railway project, Hanoi has sought financial backing from South Korea and the Asian Development Bank. This strategy not only relieves some of Vietnam’s financial pressures but also builds positive perceptions from Vientiane and Phnom Penh as it reduces concerns of excessive reliance on Vietnam.
CONCLUSION
In the past decade, Vietnam has worked hard to foster unity within the CLV group amid China’s growing influence in Cambodia and Laos. Hanoi has leveraged its long-standing ties with political elites, vibrant grassroots economic connectivity and geographical proximity, to solidify the trilateral bonds. Rather than attempting to keep Cambodia and Laos as its “backyard”, Hanoi has made it clear that it wants to treat them as equals. It has also encouraged Phnom Penh and Vientiane to become more deeply integrated in regional frameworks and to engage with regional partners, thereby increasing their strategic autonomy and helping to address Vietnam’s security concerns.
Both Cambodia and Laos have strategic reasons for maintaining their strong relations with Vietnam as Hanoi offers certain benefits that other partners, including China, cannot match. For Laos, Vietnam provides the optimal route to the sea for commerce, while Cambodia stands to gain from its economic proximity to Vietnam. Furthermore, China-funded infrastructure projects have encumbered Laos and Cambodia with significant debts, making them susceptible to Beijing’s influence. Vietnam serves as a counterbalance to this dynamic, making strengthening bonds between the three countries a win-win situation for all. Moving forward, all three countries are motivated to strengthen their ties, especially as the regional geopolitical environment continues to be complex and uncertain. Economic integration is to be prioritised, as was highlighted at the tripartite party summit in September 2023, but defence-security and social connections will also be essential components.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
“The Labour Politics of App-Based Driving in Vietnam” by Joe Buckley
“Indonesia’s Moderate Muslim Websites and Their Fight against Online Islamic Extremism” by A’an Suryana
2023/81 “The Critical Role of Electric Vehicles in Malaysia’s New Industrial Master Plan (NIMP 2030)” by Tham Siew Yean
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The NIMP launched this year has shifted industrial policy from a sectoral to a mission approach. Essentially, four cross-cutting challenges are to be overcome, namely advancing economic complexity, using tech-up for a digitally vibrant nation, pushing for net zero and safeguarding economic security and inclusivity.
- Electric Vehicle (EV) development is one of four new growth areas adopted for the plan due to its numerous linkages with other sectors and its potential spillovers onto these.
- The NIMP complements existing initiatives for EV development as encapsulated in the National Automotive Policy (NAP), and budget incentives given in 2022 and 2023 to drive up demand as well as the charging infrastructure.
- The NIMP focuses on supply-side development in the EV value chain, including the development of affordable EVs.
- Although the sector’s development is parked under the mission towards net zero, the different segments of the EV value chain also provide opportunities for this sector to engage with other missions as well.
- Outstanding challenges for the EV sector, if EV is to be a means to shift towards net zero carbon emissions (or net zero), includes the need to repurpose fuel subsidies for green vehicle transition and to increase renewable sources for the electricity grid of the country.
* Tham Siew Yean is a Visiting Senior Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and Professor Emeritus, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia. The views expressed in this Perspective are the author’s personal views. The usual disclaimer applies.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/81, 11 October 2023
INTRODUCTION
In the Ekonomi Madani Framework, strengthening the national economy and elevating the quality of life are medium-term goals in the country’s economic transformation journey. For this to happen, revitalizing manufacturing development is necessary; it has been shown that for middle-income countries, it is manufacturing that pulls in services, accelerates technological accumulation, and enhances the utilization of human capital and economic institutions.[1]
The ambition to reindustrialize has been driven by concerns over the decline in the share of manufacturing to Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which peaked at 31% in 2000. Manufacturing’s share fell to about 23% in 2010, and hovered around 23%-21% until the Covid years of 2020-21 when it showed a slight increase. This is attributed to a greater contraction in services value added over 2019-2020 due to the lockdown and to its slower recovery in comparison to manufacturing. In 2022, manufacturing contributed 24% to GDP, indicating a small rebound and possibly a new trend that the government is keen to take further with appropriate policy actions.
The recently launched NIMP 2030 (New Industrial Development Master Plan 2023-2030) represents the policy measures that are being proposed to reinvigorate manufacturing using a whole-of-nation approach. This Perspective outlines the state of electric vehicle (EV) development in Malaysia, salient features of the NIMP 2030, and how the plan uses electric vehicle (EV) development as a new catalyst for growth.
The EV sector in Malaysia
It is understandable that the EV sector has been chosen as a key growth driver. After all, Malaysia has the third-largest automotive industry in Southeast Asia, after Indonesia and Thailand; the automotive sector contributed around 4% to the country’s GDP in 2021.[2] Input-output analyses have found that the multiplier effects of this sector on both domestic and inter-sectoral linkages are approximately three for G7 countries.[3] In other words, a USD1 increase in the value added delivered by the automobile industry would increase output three-fold, to USD3. This multiplier effect level is at or close to the top of what is observable in other industries, and certainly stronger than the average across industry. Along the same lines, the NIMP highlights several sectors that can gain from the development of EVs, namely petroleum industry for plastic components, metal industry for steel and aluminium, E&E industry for silicon wafer, textile industry for upholstery, rubber industry for tyres and chemical industry for batteries.
Existing Initiatives before NIMP 2030
Prior to the NIMP, several initiatives had been launched to foster the development of EVs. Notably, the National Automotive Policy (NAP) 2014 aimed to develop Malaysia as a regional hub for Energy Efficient Vehicles (EEVs); these are defined as vehicles that meet a set of specifications in terms of carbon emission and fuel consumption.[4] EEVs can be internal combustion engines (ICEs), hybrid vehicles, EVs, as well as fuel cell vehicles. Incentives were provided to attract investments for the manufacture and assembly of EEVs, including EVs. These include income tax exemption of 70% to 100% for 5-10 years for investors manufacturing/assembling EVs and critical components based on pioneer status, and income tax allowance of 60% to 100% for a period of 5-10 years. Customised incentives of up to 100% import and excise duty exemptions for EVs and up to 85% for Plug-in hybrid EV (PHEVs) are also provided. The subsequent NAP 2020 launched in 2020 retained the same goal and definition of EEV.
However, this overly broad definition did not attract investments in EVs and instead encouraged existing ICE manufacturers such as Proton, Perodua and the Japanese automakers to upgrade their ICE models in production to the standards defined for EEVs so as to qualify for the incentives rather than to invest in brand new manufacturing production lines or facilities for EVs.[5]
The demand for EVs has been limited by concerns over the travel range of battery electric vehicles (BEVs) based on a single charge; this is exacerbated by the fact that the charging infrastructure in Malaysia remains underdeveloped. Hence, budget 2022 and 2023 introduced specific incentives to stimulate the demand for EVs as well as the development of charging infrastructure. Companies contributing to building EV infrastructure in Malaysia will benefit from government incentives, such as tax breaks (Table 1). Furthermore, the government also plans to install 10,000 charging stations by 2025 under the Low Carbon Mobility Blueprint.[6]
Table 1. Incentive packages for EVs, in Budget 2022, 2023
Source: Compiled by author
These incentives stirred the interest of manufacturers to bring their EV models to Malaysia, thereby creating more choices for customers, especially in terms of pricing. For example, Sime Darby brought in BYD EVs into Malaysia in 2022.[7] BYD is China’s largest EV manufacturer.
As shown in Chart 1, sales of BEVs increased between 2021 and 2022, albeit from a low base and it is projected to increase further to 2028, given planned increases in charging stations.
Chart 1. Vehicle Sales of BEV and PHEV, 2017-2022
Note: BEV: battery EVs; PHEV: Plug in hybrid EV
Source: Statista (https://www.statista.com/outlook/mmo/electric-vehicles/malaysia#unit-sales)
MITI also introduced the Battery Electric Vehicle Global Leaders Initiative (BEV GLI) in 2023 which allows foreign companies to sell cars in Malaysia without Approved Permit (AP) rules, thus making imported vehicles cheaper. Tesla was brought into Malaysia under this programme in the same year. Tesla is required to contribute towards the charging infrastructure; it is required to install at least 50 units of DC fast chargers within three years, and to open at least 30% of these for public use.[8]
NIMP 2030
The NIMP 2030 covers manufacturing development and manufacturing-related services. The vision and goals of the plan are shown in Figure 1. These are aligned with the National Investment Aspirations (NIA)[9] launched in October 2022.
Shifting from the traditional sectoral approach, the plan adopts a mission approach, patterned after Mariana Mazzucato’s “Mission Economy”.[10] This approach raises the use of visionary missions to trigger change and to facilitate various knock-on effects. The plan identifies four missions or cross-cutting challenges that need to be addressed if manufacturing is to help achieve its vision and goals. They are: advancing economic complexity; using tech-up for a digitally vibrant nation; pushing for net zero and; safeguarding economic security and inclusivity. Each mission is accompanied by specific strategies and action plans as well as mission-based projects (MBPs) or catalytic projects meant to ignite the change process and crowd in other projects during the duration of the plan.
Figure 1. Salient Features of NIMP 2030
Source: Author’s representation of structure of NIMP
Four new growth areas are identified in the NIMP 2030, namely advanced materials, electric vehicles (EVs), renewable energy, and carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUs). The case study below outlines how the NIMP aspires to facilitate the growth of EV industry, based on the framework of the plan.
EV DEVELOPMENT IN NIMP 2030
To complement the broad strokes of the NAP and the above-mentioned initiatives, NIMP 2030 focuses specifically on developing the EV value chain, lending greater substance for EV development based on concrete action plans (column two in Figure 2) and mission-based projects (column three in Figure 2)).
An important contribution of the NIMP is the use of MBPs to generate change in the desired direction. Affordable EVs remain a question as EV cars assembled locally or imported are all priced above RM100,000.[11] This is seen as a move to protect Proton and Perodua, the two national cars that manufacture cars priced below RM100,000. Thus, it is not surprising that the MBP for this action plan, which is to catalyse EV as a key growth driver, has Perodua committing towards the local assembly of affordable EV models, reportedly with a Japan partner, as its mission-based project (MBP3.2 in Figure 2).[12] This will address the affordability needed to stimulate local demand. Perodua has an estimated 39% of the car market share in Malaysia in 2022;[13] it is to launch a hybrid in 2024 and an EV in 2027.[14]
Although the development of EV is parked under mission 3 as a push for net zero, the value chain allows for the engagement of other missions in EV development (Figure 2). For example, for mission 1 – advancing in economic complexity – the plan envisages the development of local integrated circuit (IC) designs that can also be used for EVs. Likewise, the development of battery production can tap into mission 4, which is to safeguard economic security and the action plan on the introduction of a national mineral policy for downstream processing. Local technology solution providers raised under mission 2 – tech-up for a digitally vibrant nation – can be harnessed to provide technology solutions needed for EV development.
The NIMP has identified some initial MBPs and it is important to note that the plan hopes to rope in more of these; thus, any company can propose to MITI to have a MBP in any segment of the EV value chain as long as it meets the mission’s task.
Figure 2. The EV Value Chain in NIMP 2030
Note: AP: Action Plan
Source: Author
IMPLEMENTATION OF NIMP 2030
NIMP recognises implementation as the key for moving ahead in industrial development, including the EV sector. The plan therefore devotes one whole chapter to implementation. The governance structure and monitoring mechanism for the plan includes a National NIMP 2030 Council, which is to be chaired by the Prime Minister, and which includes the ministers from key ministries involved. The Council is to meet annually to review progress. Quarterly reviews will be conducted by the NIMP Steering Committee, which will be chaired by the Minister of MITI, with representatives from relevant ministries. At the last level is the Delivery Management Unit (DMU), which will monitor development of the four missions.
The plan promises to increase transparency in the reporting mechanism through periodic reporting, and a mid-term review at the end of 2026. A dashboard (NIMP Dashboard), whereby progress over time will be shown, will be hosted by MITI. In the case of the EV sector, Perodua as a MBP will have to report regularly the progress made in the production of affordable EV and determine the launch date for the car.
OUTSTANDING CHALLENGES IN EV DEVELOPMENT: POLICY GAPS
Although the NIMP provides greater granularity for EV development in the country, two challenges remain outstanding.
Fossil Fuel Subsidies: Demand Constraints
Fossil fuel subsidies create a great disincentive for consumers to shift to alternative fuels. In particular, RON 95 is usually used for motor vehicles with an engine capacity of 2,500 cc and below, which is usually the cars used by the lower income groups. RON 95 and diesel are subsidised, with the amount of subsidy dependent on the difference between the price at pump in Malaysia and the market price per litre.[15]
Rising world oil prices escalate the amount of subsidy to extents that make it unsustainable. For example, in 2022, the rise in oil prices due to the Ukraine war led to a hike in the fuel subsidy; that year alone, it amounted to RM50.8 billion and made up 17% of the government’s annual expenditure and 75% of the country’s total subsidy bill.[16]
The government has already announced its intention to shift towards targeted subsidies, starting with fuel subsidy for electricity and diesel, based on household disposable income, starting from 2024.[17] This shift will subsequently extend towards the subsidy for RON 95.
While this will reduce the subsidy burden on the government, it also implies that recipients of targeted subsidies will continue to use fossil fuel, thereby retarding the shift towards EVs and constraining the use of EVs to shift to net zero as planned in the NIMP.
A better option would be to repurpose fossil fuel subsidies for the shift towards EVs.[18] Purchase price subsidies have been used in other countries to facilitate EV adoption; a shift towards greener transportation to reduce carbon emissions will also reduce the negative externalities from using ICE cars.
Greening the electricity grid
One key motivation for pushing EV is the push to net zero. However, EV can only facilitate the transition to net zero if the electricity grid is powered by renewable energy. But Malaysia still relies mainly on coal, oil and gas, which contribute as much as 81% for generating electricity, as shown in Chart 2. The use of EVs can only serve to reduce carbon emissions if the share of renewables increases drastically. In developed countries such as Switzerland, which is ranked as the most EV-friendly country in the world,[19] the share of fossil fuels in electricity generation is only 3.6% in 2022.[20]
Tenaga Nasional has outlined a plan to increase the share of renewables to 31% by 2025 and reduce the use of coal by 50% by 2035 and by 100% by 2050,[21] but whether these targets can be achieved as planned remain to be seen.
Chart 2. Share of electricity production by source in Malaysia
Source: ourwoldindata.org
CONCLUSION
The NIMP has shifted industrial policy from a sectoral to a mission approach. Essentially, four key cross-cutting challenges need to be overcome, namely advancing economic complexity, using tech-up for a digitally vibrant nation, pushing for net zero and safeguarding economic security and inclusivity.
EV development is one of four new growth areas adopted for the plan due to its numerous linkages with other sectors and hence its potential spillovers onto these sectors. The NIMP complements existing initiatives for EV development as encapsulated in the National Automotive Policy (NAP), and budget incentives given in 2022 and 2023 to drive up demand as well as development of the charging infrastructure. The NIMP focuses on supply side development in the EV value chain, including the development of affordable EVs. Previous supply plans were focused on imported EVs in the premium segment.
The action plans and the mission-based projects approach outline the government’s policy directions. While the sector’s development is parked under the mission towards net zero, the different segments of the EV value chain will also provide opportunities for this sector to engage with the other missions as well.
Be that as it may, the EV sector faces outstanding challenges. These include repurposing fuel subsidies for green vehicle transition and increasing the renewable sources of energy for the electricity grid of the country.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2023/80 “Virtue and Violence: Revealing the Nexus between Political and Domestic Violence in Thailand’s Deep South” by Daungyewa Utarasint
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- There are several types and levels of violence to be mindful of when we frame an analysis on these issues where Thailand’s Deep South is concerned. In the three southernmost provinces, macro-level violence refers to the confrontation between the insurgency and the Thai state authorities.
- At the same time, micro-level violence can refer to domestic violence that can happen in any family, household or village. Micro- and macro-level violence might be classed differently, but they are strongly linked.
- Patriarchy is deeply ingrained in the minds of many Malay Muslim women, and they consider themselves inferior to men. In accepting male social dominance, they tolerate—and rationalise—domestic violence. Often, they choose to remain silent despite suffering abuse.
- Besides macro-level violence, the way some Malay Muslims understand Islamic virtue—whether as ethics (akhlaq), as conformity to a standard of righteousness, or as moral excellence—contributes to domestic violence in the region.
- Peace talks held between the Thai state and the insurgency had not brought socio-political problems such as domestic violence to the table. Eliminating the deeply entrenched patriarchal culture within the Malay-Muslim community presents a formidable challenge for women in the region, particularly when religious institutions have failed in their role as mediators.
* Daungyewa (Hong) Utarasint is former Visiting Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. She is Visiting Assistant Professor, Arts and Humanities at NYU Abu Dhabi (NYUAD). Her current research investigates women and voting behaviour amid conflict in the southernmost provinces of Thailand, examining obstacles to women’s political participation, and how religion and cultural norms affect women’s political mobility.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/80, 9 October 2023
INTRODUCTION
Religious leaders (including Imams) play an essential spiritual role in the Malay Muslim communities in Thailand’s three southernmost provinces. However, when addressing marital disputes, many of them often overlook the struggles of women, and frequently suggest that women should remain loyal to their husbands as a matter of honour. In 2022, during a visit to the Women’s Majlis at the Islamic Council in Yala province, a staff member shared several concerning cases with the author. In one instance, a woman arrived to file a complaint. Her face was covered in blood, and she was crying and screaming angrily that her husband had bludgeoned her with a hard object. Rather than reporting to the police, the Imam sought to mediate between the husband and wife, urging them to forgive each other. This recollection hits me intensely; as someone who merely researches on the Thai insurgency, I have come to fathom the profound importance of bringing this type of violence to public attention.
This article does not wish to repeat what most articles have covered: how the conflict and violence between the Thai security forces and the separatist movements in the southernmost provinces erupted, and the progress of the peace process. The goal, instead, is to bring attention to a different type of violence, namely domestic abuse and the ways Islamic institutions deal with it. Different forms of abuse against Muslim women in the southernmost provinces include emotional and psychological pressure, physical violence, early marriages, forced sex, and (marital) rape. According to Oxfam’s project on Violence-against-Women (VAW) in the three southernmost provinces of Thailand, “domestic violence is far more severe, widespread, and complex but remains underreported and underrated.”[1] The project aims to reduce violence against women through collaboration between the Women Networks (WNs), local civil society, the Thai government and Provincial Islamic Councils in Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat.
In 2019, VAW reported 240 cases of violence against women in Narathiwat province alone. The common causes of violence are illegal drugs and gambling (48%), followed by polygyny (33%), and other reasons (19%). In 2020, the Narathiwat and Yala Provincial Islamic Counselling offices reported 3,030 such cases.[2] The high figures may be alarming, but on a positive note, it may show that victims are now more willing to report incidences of abuse to the Provincial Islamic Council. Whether the rise in reporting is due to an upsurge in incidents, or a greater willingness of victims to come forward, is unclear. This complexity arises from the dual legal system, which combines Thai and Islamic laws.[3]
ONGOING VIOLENCE IN THAILAND’S DEEP SOUTH
Conflict and violence have plagued the southernmost region of Thailand for almost two decades, rooted in historical tensions between the Thai state and the Malay-Muslim population. Since January 2004, clashes between the Thai security forces and insurgent groups such as the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), a Malay–Muslim separatist organization, have resulted in over 7,000 lives lost and more than 10,000 injured. Conflict management and peace negotiations between Thai authorities and rebel peace negotiators are ongoing, but the BRN continues pursuing independence violently. Concurrently, there are reports of human rights abuses in the region, with the 2005 Emergency Decree enabling Thai security forces to conduct cordon-and-search operations without a warrant, monitor people by taking photos without permission, and detain suspects with reports of torture and ill-treatment.
The case of Abdullah Esomuso, a 34-year-old suspected leader of an insurgent cell, demonstrate the ongoing tension in the area. On 21 July 2019, Abdullah was found unconscious in an interrogation centre at Fort Inkayuthaboriharn, an army camp in Pattani province. He died at a hospital two months later. Relatives claim Abdullah was in great health before the military interrogation. In May 2022, two years after his death, the Thai court ruled that his death resulted from natural causes, specifically oxygen deprivation to the brain and heart failure during detention.[4] No military interrogators were convicted.
This tragedy is just one of many that have occurred in Thailand’s three southernmost provinces over the past 19 years. Although overall violence and conflict have decreased since 2013, when peace talks began, data from the Deep South Watch database indicates a 44% increase in violent incidents in 2021 compared to the previous year.[5] This suggests that despite efforts at peace, violence remains prevalent in the region.
THE DISCOURSE ON ISLAMIC VIRTUE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, AND WOMEN
As there are different types and levels of violence, we must be mindful of which of these we use to frame our analysis. Confrontation between the insurgency and the Thai state authorities is well-known in the southernmost provinces of Thailand. Because of its immense scale covering the whole region, including spillover violence affecting civilians, I describe this as macro-level violence. Micro-level violence, meanwhile, illustrates domestic violence that can happen in any family, household or village. Micro- and macro-levels of violence might be classed differently, but they are nevertheless strongly linked. To decipher the structure of violence in the southernmost provinces of Thailand, both have to be examined seriously.[6]
In those provinces, significant gaps persist in the implementation of the specialized protective measures outlined in the Victims of Domestic Violence Protection Act B.E. 2550 (2007). These shortcomings become even more evident when intertwined with the Muslim Family Law and the Law of Inheritance Code of 1941. Malay-Muslim women’s local culture, deeply rooted in patriarchy, is strongly shaped by traditional interpretations of Islamic teachings.[7] Female victims of violence in the Deep South endure in silence. Their suffering is exacerbated by cultural resistance, unequal access to justice, and significant under-reporting of domestic violence stemming from inadequate governmental responses and insufficient engagement from religious institutions.[8]
There have been many misconceptions pertaining to women’s rights in Islam. According to the World Health Organization website, statistics collected between 2000-2018 reveal the prevalence of domestic violence against women aged 15-49 by intimate partners. Bangladesh, a Muslim-majority country, ranked fourth globally at 50%, while Afghanistan took the sixth spot at 46% (WHO, Violence Against Women Prevalence Estimates, 2018, 2021). Data from some Middle Eastern countries is absent, possibly due to the reluctance of victims to come forward. This raises the question: Why does violence against women persist in Muslim societies when Islam fundamentally promotes peace and justice?
Islamic teachings and principles underscore equal partnership between men and women. The Quran does not specify particular characteristics of any gender or suggest how either gender should behave towards the other. For example, the Quran does not teach that women are naturally inferior to men.[9] In fact, there are mosques for women in China, Lebanon, and Scandinavian countries like Denmark, where Sherin Khankan became the first Denmark’s first female Imam, who lead the prayers.[10] A section that is heavily debated between male proponents and feminists would be Surah An-Nisa, which makes references to women’s role vis-a-vis men. Experts have diverse views on the chapter, especially verse 34:
Men are the caretakers of women, as Allah elevated men above others, and men financially contribute from their wealth. Good women are loyal and safekeep everything behind their husbands according to what Allah has preserved. As for those women, whose disobedience intimidates you, reprimand them, leave them alone in the bed, and whip them. When they become obedient, then punish them no longer. Truly Allah is the Highest, the Greatest of all.[11]
Meanwhile, the text from the same surah on the website www.quran.com which carries translations of the Qur’an by Dr. Mustafa Khattab, in English and many other languages is as follows:
Men are the caretakers of women, as men have been provisioned by Allah over women and tasked with supporting them financially. And righteous women are devoutly obedient and, when alone, protective of what Allah has entrusted them with. And if you sense ill-conduct from your women, advise them first, if they persist, do not share their beds, but if they still persist, then discipline them gently. But if they change their ways, do not be unjust to them. Surely Allah is Most High, All-Great.[12]
The Thai translation based on Abu Israfil Al-Fathoni leans towards men with an oppressive tone to women, while the English version by Dr. Khattab is more neutral. Dr. Khattab’s translation mentions no whipping. Many feminists view that most men who translate the teaching in this verse, do so to justify domestic violence for themselves without breaking their religious rules.[13] Thus, it leads to the discussion on what being a true Muslim means. The debate continues with many trying to secure power, and to claim that their interpretation is the correct one for true Muslims.
CAN ISLAMIC VIRTUES EMPOWER WOMEN AND AID THAILAND’S PEACE PROCESS?
The prolonged political conflict in Thailand’s southernmost regions is conflated with other challenges such as economic underdevelopment, extreme poverty, high illiteracy rates, and widespread illicit drug use. At the micro-level, patriarchy strongly influences the power dynamics between Malay Muslim men and women, further exacerbated by conventional Islamic interpretations by religious leaders. It is this that has led to the proliferation of domestic violence.[14]
Besides macro-level violence, some Malay Muslims’ orientation towards Islamic virtues—whether ethics (akhlaq), conformity to a standard of righteousness, or moral excellence—play a crucial part in sustaining domestic violence in the region. For example, if there is an incidence of rape in a village, the community might arrange a force-marriage between the rapist and the victim instead of reporting the incident to the police. Another example is a child marriage case in 2018 involving a 41-year-old man from Malaysia and an 11-year-old girl from Narathiwat.[15] Under Thai civil law, a woman cannot marry without her parents’ permission if she is under 20. However, some male religious leaders approve of such marriages in the southernmost region of Thailand. They cite a hadith that states that Prophet Muhammad (saw) married Aisha, who was only 9 years old, even though there are other narrations that dispute Aisha’s age upon her marriage to the prophet.
Patriarchy is deeply ingrained in the minds of many Malay Muslim women, and they consider themselves inferior to men. As a result, they accept male social dominance, tolerate and rationalize domestic violence, and often remain silent despite being abused. Sociologist Randall Collins suggests that the emotional dynamics of a confrontation play a crucial role in the outcome. He states, “Emotional dominance of the confrontation is the main prerequisite for successful violence; one must dominate emotionally to dominate physically”.[16] This insight highlights the psychological barriers that prevent women from resisting or escaping abusive situations, as the emotional dominance exerted by their abusers keeps them subjugated which is relevant in Oxfam’s cases in the three southernmost provinces.
My fieldwork findings in the Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat provinces confirm that domestic violence happens to women and even young boys. At the very least, Muslim women have an outlet to report to the Provincial Islamic Council in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat Provinces. One of my acquaintances shared a story of a 15-year-old boy that he met while filming a documentary in the region. The teenage boy was raped continuously by his uncle. Coping with trauma, the boy was helpless and vulnerable. His uncle threatened to kill him if he disclosed his ordeal to anyone. The boy could neither report to the police because he was afraid of his uncle nor report to the local Islamic Committee because sexual acts between males are considered a major sin in Islam. Cases of boys whose family members are raped can easily slip through the cracks; even if their mother or other relatives know about them, they are unwilling to file a complaint. They are concerned with the humiliating social stigma these acts may bring to their families. In other words, victims of domestic violence in the Deep South suffer silently under cultural resistance, unequal access to justice, and explicit discrimination.
The prevalence of domestic violence in the southernmost region has largely been ignored by both the Thai security forces and the rebel peace negotiators. Ngamsuk Ratanasatian, a Thai human rights advocate and a lecturer at Mahidol University’s Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies (IHRP) in Bangkok, observed that women in the region engage in peace-building efforts. However, the peace talk between the Thai state and the insurgency had not brought socio-political problems like domestic violence to the table.[17]
An effective conflict resolution involves more than just peace talks between the insurgents and Thai state securities; it necessitates transforming the domestic violence issue into a robust conflict management plan, recognizing it as being integral to the structural conditions and regional dynamics of violence. This involves considering both macro-level and micro-level violence concurrently in peace process discussions. However, the question remains: How can both parties contribute to alleviating domestic violence, instead of solely concentrating on ending combats?
Don Pathan, a senior programme officer for Regional Security Cooperation at The Asia Foundation, Thailand, noted that Juwae (militant fighters) are devout Muslims, and the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) is likely to treat women respectfully.[18] Given the extensive reach of the Juwae networks at the grassroots and village level, insurgent groups can potentially participate in preventing violence against women. Juwae could serve as first responders for women seeking assistance.
Eliminating the deeply entrenched patriarchal culture within the Malay-Muslim community presents a formidable challenge for the women of the region, particularly when the Islamic institution has been unsuccessful in its role as mediator. A significant power imbalance exists between the sexes, and having the Juwae as a support system can potentially counteract male or husbandly dominance, thereby helping to reduce domestic violence.
CONCLUSION
Violence in the southernmost region of Thailand is not only about constant battles between Thai security officers and insurgents, but also domestic violence within Malay-Muslim communities. The dominance of the Malay-Muslim patriarchal culture has desensitized violence-against-women to a certain degree. Many religious leaders and village councils tend to look away or are indiscreet when settling marriage disputes, which puts the burden more on the women.
In the case of the southernmost provinces of Thailand, the social significance of what some Malay–Muslim communities believe to be an Islamic virtue, in fact nourishes violence. While clashes between Thai state authorities and insurgents cost lives, domestic violence has a long-lasting effect on people in the community. The first step is to recognize the problem. The most promising way forward will inevitably involve collaboration between Women Networks, the civil society groups, Thai state authorities, religious leaders, and even insurgency groups.
In conclusion, it is imperative for peace negotiators and others to understand that the issue of domestic violence in the three southernmost provinces of Thailand is as severe as the clashes between Thai security forces and insurgents. It is impossible to achieve peace in the conflict-ridden region without systematically addressing the issue of domestic violence within the Muslim communities.
REFERENCES
Bradley, Samantha. 2018. “Domestic and Family Violence in Post-Conflict Communities: International Human Rights Law and the State’s Obligation to Protect Women and Children.” Health and Human Rights Journal, 20(2), 123–136.
International Crisis Group. April 2022. “Sustaining the Momentum in Southern Thailand’s Peace Dialogue.” https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/thailand/b172-sustaining-momentum-southern-thailands-peace-dialogue
Marddent, Amporn. 2017. “Women Political Participation in Peacebuilding in Southern Thailand.” Al Abab 6 (2). https://peaceresourcecollaborative.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Amporn-Madden.pdf
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
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