

PERSPECTIVE

RESEARCHERS AT ISEAS – YUSOF ISHAK INSTITUTE ANALYSE CURRENT EVENTS

Singapore | 3 January 2020

Jokowi's Management of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU): A New Order Approach?

*Norshahril Saat and Aninda Dewayanti**

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- Many considered Joko (Jokowi) Widodo's pick of Ma'ruf Amin as his running mate in the last election to mean Nahdlatul Ulama's (NU) return to power. After all, the NU-affiliated political party, PKB (National Awakening Party) also continued supporting the incumbent president.
- In August 2018, the NU central board (PBNU) also declared its support to Jokowi, as did Yenny Wahid, the great-granddaughter of NU founder KH Hasyim Asy'ari.
- Yet, some quarters in NU were upset with Jokowi's appointment of a former military general as the Minister of Religious Affairs, a position normally reserved for NU because this Ministry controls the religious boarding schools.
- A similarity in treatment of NU is noticed between Jokowi's administration and late Suharto regime, which is in the ensuring that diverse groups within the organization are given access to the government. This shows that religious groups are not static and homogeneous, but has to be understood in terms of inter- and intra-organizational contestation.

**Norshahril Saat is Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and Co-coordinator of the Indonesian Studies Programme. He is the author of The State, Ulama and Islam in Malaysia and Indonesia. Aninda Dewayanti is Research Officer at the institute, specialising in Indonesian studies.*

INTRODUCTION

On 23 October 2019, Indonesian President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) announced the Cabinet for his second term in office (from 2019 to 2024). While some members from the previous Cabinet were retained, he made some shocking appointments, such as the selection of his opponent Prabowo Subianto as the Defence Minister, despite the latter's human rights record. Before the announcement, some questions were also raised whether Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) members would feature strongly in this new Cabinet, since NU leaders openly supported the president throughout the election campaign. After all, NU's Rois Syuriah (Supreme Leader), Ma'ruf Amin, was named his running mate, which many saw as the incumbent's move to court support from the largest Islamic organisation in the country.¹ Sometime in August 2018, the NU central board (PBNU) had already declared its backing for Jokowi, and two months before the April election, Jokowi officiated the 2019 NU National Assembly (*munas*) in Kota Banjar. Although not representing PBNU, Yenny Wahid, the daughter of former president Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), and great-granddaughter of NU founder Kyai Haji Hasyim Asy'ari, also lent her support for him. With Jokowi's re-election, Ma'ruf Amin, who was also the chairman of Ulama Council of Indonesia (MUI), is now Vice-President. Many would expect that with Ma'ruf now the second in command, NU would be more assertive in the government.

The new cabinet line-up, however, shows that NU leaders are marginalised. Jokowi did not even consider NU's role as the leading actor in the country's religious affairs. Historically, NU leaders have always targeted the position of Minister of Religious Affairs (MORA), but the appointment of retired military general Fachrul Razi as the MORA is reminiscent of President Suharto's choice of Alamsjah Ratoe Perwiranegara, also a military general, as the MORA from 1978 to 1983 (see Table 3). Explaining the rationale for his choice, Jokowi said that the government is serious in combating radicalism.² Although Jokowi placed Zainut Tauhid (a PPP politician with NU background) as the deputy religious minister,³ the NU community was rather "displeased" because the highest Islamic power and authority in the country is not in NU's hands. The Ministry holds the key not only to policies regarding religious education, but also the purse strings of the Islamic boarding school (*pesantren*), which are mostly run by NU. Jokowi's treatment of NU is evocative of how the organisation was treated by the Suharto's New Order (1966-1998). This article focuses on the management of NU under Jokowi administration.

NU TRADITION AND POLITICAL HISTORY

Formed in 1926, NU is the largest Islamic mass organisation in the world – it has more than 50 million followers in Indonesia alone, known as 'citizens of NU' or *nahdliyyin*. It oversees more than 12,000 pesantren across the country,⁴ and represents the traditionalist school of thought which aims to protect rituals and practices from modernism and reformism. Its rival is the Muhammadiyah, commonly referred to as a modernist organization.⁵

Since its formation, NU has been purely a grassroots-based civil society organisation focussing on social issues. In 1943, NU joined Masyumi, a non-political organisation formed by the Japanese government.⁶ The Muhammadiyah also joined that organization, which was intended to strengthen Japanese rule in Indonesia. In 1945, NU became officially involved in party politics after Masyumi.⁷ The religious leaders (*ulama*) played a vital role among the nahdliyyin by elevating themselves to become part of the national elite class. Patronage networks between the ulama and the nahdliyyin solidify political support for NU.

In 1952, NU separated from Masyumi to become a political party, the NU Party. Among the reasons for NU's departure was that it lost the position of MORA, and that Masyumi began to be dominated by the modernist camp led by the charismatic Mohammad Natsir.⁸ In the 1955 elections, NU defied sceptics by obtaining 18.4 percent of the popular vote to become the third largest party in Indonesia after the PNI (Indonesia Nationalist Party) and Masyumi. Even the PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia) received less votes than NU. The suspension of democracy after President Sukarno introduced Guided Democracy 1956—which also contributed to the banning of Masyumi in 1960—, and a military coup in 1966 by Suharto, meant that NU's role in electoral politics also stagnated. There were after all no more elections until 1971.

Under the New Order government (1966-1998), Suharto sought to limit NU's influence. Some may even argue that he was more tolerant of the modernists than of NU. This was exemplified by the appointments of non-NU oriented individuals as MORA, which had always been NU's crown jewel under the Sukarno government. Suharto was never impressed with NU leaders' Islamic orientation, which was not pro-development and progress. NU members, however, in considering NU the bigger organisation with more members compared to Muhammadiyah, felt they should be prioritised in key appointments, particularly on religious matters. President Suharto's policy of right-sizing the political system saw NU merging with other Islam-based parties into the United Development Party (PPP) in 1973. In the same vein, all nationalist parties were merged under the PDI (Indonesian Democratic Indonesia) banner.

Suharto drove the merger of all Islamic parties because he feared they would threaten his government, even though Islamic parties controlled only 27.2 percent of the seats in the legislative assembly in 1971. This pales in comparison to their performance in 1955, where they garnered 43.5 percent of the seats.⁹ From 1973 onwards, PPP became one of three political parties allowed to contest in elections, the other two being Suharto's Golkar (Party of Functional Groups) and PDI. Even though NU was the largest among the Islamic parties, its leaders did not occupy important leadership positions in the PPP. No doubt NU chairman Idham Khalid was made PPP President in 1973, but subsequently, other NU leaders played less significant roles. Interestingly, after 1973, Suharto never appointed any NU member as MORA.

In 1984, NU withdrew from formal politics, and returned to the spirit of the organisation's founder and functioned once again as a social organization. This resulted in internal divisions and a diminishing role for the ulama. NU formally detached itself from formal politics through the declaration of *Kembali ke Khittah '26* (Return to the Guidelines of 1926) during Muktamar Situbondo. The initiative was led by the so-called "progressive NU group"¹⁰ which consisted of activists from the third generation of NU, including Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) and Mustafa Bisri. This brought about a renewal in religious thought, a reactivation of NU's role in social efforts, and a renaissance in NU's leadership.¹¹

Kembali ke Khittah '26 proved a critical juncture for NU as an institution, readjusting the role of the pesantren as the centre of learning and as agents of change. The move stimulated the emergence of intellectual institutions such as P3M (Association for the Development of Pesantren and Society) and LKiS (Institute for Islamic and Social Studies). This came to foster a contextualised approach to Islamic jurisprudence as opposed to the literary interpretation of texts, a rejuvenation of leadership down to pesantren level, and the injecting of progressive ideas and philosophy into NU.

Khittah '26 later became a political tool for Gus Dur's political ambitions, and some NU members would after that change remain active in the political scene. NU was further split into two groups: a political arm and a civil society arm. The latter was further divided into a conservative and a progressive camp. The fall of Suharto in 1998, resulting from the *reformasi* movement, accentuated this division within the organization. State elites capitalised on it by co-opting some members into the government, thus splitting the organization further by encouraging competition among the different factions. These various factions within NU sought to influence the government from within, to ensure that allies were in positions of power so that NU and individual interests could be fulfilled. This amounted to an attempt at state capture.¹²

FRAGMENTATION OF NU

During the *reformasi* movement, several NU leaders deliberated on the revival of NU as a political party. However, it was later decided that a political party was best formed outside the fold of NU. The PKB (National Awakening Party) thus came into being. Ma'ruf Amin was a co-founder of this party. In fact, Ma'ruf was tasked by Abdurrahman to oversee the political aspects of NU.¹³ He was part of the Team of Five, which included Dawam Anwar, Said Aqil Siradj (current NU Chairman), Rozy Munir and Ahmad Bagdja.¹⁴ Abdurrahman Wahid, despite being the initiator of Khittah in 1984, concurrently occupied a political party position while serving in NU. He also effectively rode on the PKB to become the President of Indonesia in 1999.

Although the PKB was able to mobilise segments of NU members for support, and survives in the country's saturated political scene to this day, it has lacked internal solidarity on political matters. In elections held between 1999 and 2019, PKB was able to garner between nine to 12 percent of the popular vote, with the exception of 2009 when it obtained only 5 percent. It has always been part of the governing coalition, with 50 seats in the legislative assembly on average. But internally, the party was marred by splits and infighting.

In 2001, PKB Chairman Matori Abdul Djilil supported a motion to bring down President Abdurrahman. After the 2004 election, another internal split took place. After PKB chairman Alwi Shihab and secretary general Syaifullah Yusof were appointed into the cabinet, some leaders argued that they consequently had to leave the leadership positions in the party. Both lost internal party elections in 2005, and the party leadership fell to Muhaimin Iskandar. In 2008, another split occurred in PKB—between Muhaimin's and Abdurrahman Wahid's faction. This division was mended only by a Constitutional Court ruling in favour of Muhaimin. Abdurrahman withdrew his support for PKB in 2009, which led to a significant reduction of votes for the party as mentioned above. Muhaimin was however able to rebuild the party and has since then been a strong supporter of the government of the day, as demonstrated in his support for Jokowi in 2014 and 2019.

At the grassroots level, NU groups that chose to remain on the fringes of electoral politics were divided into conservative and progressive factions. This tension was played out recently. Conservative faction NU Garis Lurus (NUGL) rejected Said Aqil Siradj and the PBNU's promotion of Islam Nusantara (archipelagic Islam which incorporates local culture and traditions in understanding Islam), stating that the "localising" Islamic interpretation is theological heresy (*bid'ah*).¹⁵ Although not all NUGL supporters are *nahdliyyin*, some decided to join the notorious Islamic Defender Front (FPI), a civil vigilante group guarding against immoral activities, and with a history of organizing mass rallies against non-Muslims.

The progressive faction, on the other hand, remains focused on social issues, as mandated by Khittah. This group refers to itself as “Gusdurians” in honour of the late Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid, who is affectionately referred to as Gus Dur. This group promotes religious tolerance in society. Other organisations run by NU progressives include the Wahid Institute, which looks at progressive Islamic discourse through the works of Abdurrahman Wahid. Both of these are civil society organisations (CSOs) whose efforts target different groups in a broader expanse of civil society, not only particular for nadhliyyin. While the former engages the interfaith activists and builds up religious dialogue, the later connects with the intellectuals. This group also holds that Islamist groups, particularly the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), has become a challenge to Indonesian religious harmony.

NU IN POLITICS DURING THE JOKOWI ERA

Other than Abdurrahman Wahid who became the country’s fourth president, NU leaders never really played any key role in the country’s politics after the fall of Suharto, as much as it wanted to. Although politicians affiliated to the NU ideology and religious orientation do occasionally get appointments to the Cabinets of Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001), Megawati Sukarno Putri (2001-2004), and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014), they were mainly restricted to the Religious Affairs Ministry. Under the Abdurrahman Wahid Presidency, NU member Muhammad Tolchah Hasan was made Minister for Religious Affairs. Under President Megawati, Said Agil Husin Al Munawar took that position, and between 2004 and 2009, under the SBY government, the Minister was Muhammad Maftuh Basyuni. Suryadharma Ali, also NU member but more a PPP politician, was Minister during the second SBY government (2009-2014).

Yet, it was Jokowi’s decision to appoint Ma’ruf that somehow brought NU back as a serious political contender. If it had not been for Ma’ruf, rumours have it that it would have been Mahfud MD, who also upholds the NU-orientation. Mahfud, who is a former member of the PKB, was later inducted into Jokowi’s Cabinet as Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs. Jokowi’s choice of Ma’ruf Amin as vice-president has led to numerous debates as to whether he was, or will be, a boon or a bane for the president. Ma’ruf was chosen for a simple reason: to stop religious groups from repeating what was achieved in 2017, i.e. preventing Chinese-Christian Jakarta Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) from being re-elected. Back then, Muslim conservatives rallied the masses in Jakarta after the governor was accused of insulting Islam during one of the campaign speeches. One could argue that Ma’ruf stopped the Islamists from using the Islamic card against Jokowi, and reduced the Islamic credentials of his opponents Prabowo Subianto and Sandiaga Uno, who too wanted to solicit Muslim support. Still, Ma’ruf failed in getting support from the more rightist Islamic party PKS (Prosperous Justice Party), and PAN (National Mandate Party), a party built by a key Muhammadiyah figure, Amien Rais. Others argue that had Jokowi selected Mahfud as vice-president candidate, he too could have stopped a black campaign against Jokowi, and could even court the progressive and liberal Muslim groups who valued his contributions to human rights and clean image. By contrast, Ma’ruf had issued religious rulings against religious minority groups. Some say that a Jokowi-Mahfud pairing would have widened Jokowi’s margin of victory; as it turned out the margin he gained was almost similar to that of 2014.

The support given by PKB and NU leaders to the President Jokowi has contributed to his victory in NU strongholds—namely East Java and Central Java. Jokowi failed to win in

other Muslim dominant areas such as in Sumatera and West Jawa. This also means that in areas where Islamic politics play a significant role, NU's influence does not matter much.

The Ma'ruf Amin and Mahfud MD example also reflects the fragmentation within NU, reflecting how PKB has also been divided. Technically, NU has progressive voices as well as conservative ones, with Mahfud representing the former, and Ma'ruf the later. One sees that like Suharto, Jokowi places diverse voices into his Cabinet, and has in fact also placed Muhammadiyah personnel as advisors in the Istana. In that sense, Jokowi's management of Islam may bear fruitful comparison to Suharto's during the New Order period.

CONCLUSION

Putting Ma'ruf Amin on the presidential ticket proved a crucial factor in Jokowi's victory in the 2019 presidential election. Though it did not draw support from Prabowo's support base, it boosted Jokowi in NU-dominated Javanese-majority districts.¹⁶ Nonetheless, Jokowi-Ma'ruf lost in Muslim-dominated provinces such as Aceh, West Sumatra, Riau, Jambi, South Sumatra, Bengkulu, West Java, Banten, West Nusa Tenggara, South Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, Southeast Sulawesi, and North Maluku. Support from local *kyai* (religious leader) in pesantren, as well as from the broader NU community, appeared to be a key facet in this triumph. The pesantren have also been regarded as the main contributor in support of Jokowi. Thus, many Kyai and NU political figures have expressed disappointment with Jokowi's decision to choose a military man instead of an NU figure for the MORA position.¹⁷ The NU Regional Board (PWNU) in East Java even called off their invitation to the MORA on the inauguration of *santri* day, though they still invited Vice President Ma'ruf Amin.¹⁸ In an interesting opinion piece, NU figure Nadirsyah Hosen states that it is time for Kyai and NU to refocus on society empowerment,¹⁹ as mandated by *Khittah '26*.

But having NU members in the Cabinet also does not guarantee the return of the glorious days of NU before the Suharto's New Order. Divisions within the organisation remains evident. Jokowi is mainly utilizing ways to neutralise NU's role, while at the same time, rewarding PKB for its loyal support. One is reminded of how Suharto managed the traditionalist camp when he was in power, by not only promoting a mode of thinking but neutralising traditionalist voices by both pleasing conservatives and progressives within NU.

APPENDIX
Table 1. NU figures in ministerial position under Jokowi's first term (2014-2019)

No	Name	Position	Period	Political Background
1.	Hanif Dhakiri	Minister of Employment	2014-2019	PKB politician
2.	Marwan Ja'far	Minister of Villages, Development of Disadvantaged Regions, and Transmigration (I)	2014-2016	PKB politician
3.	Eko Putro Sandjojo	Minister of Villages, Development of Disadvantaged Regions, and Transmigration (II)	2016-2019	PKB politician
4.	Khofifah Indar Parawansa	Minister of Social Affairs	2014-2018	PKB politician
5.	Imam Nahrawi	Minister of Youth and Sports	2014-2019	PKB politician
6.	Lukman Hakim Saifuddin	Minister of Religious Affairs	2014-2019	PPP politician
7.	Mohamad Nasir	Ministry of Research, Technology, and Higher Education	2014-2019	NU activist

Table 2. NU figures in ministerial position under Jokowi's second term (2019-2024)

No	Name	Position	Political Background
1.	Ma'ruf Amin	Vice President	PKB politician
2.	Mahfud MD	Coordinating Minister of Political, Legal, and Security Affairs	Former PKB politician
3.	Ida Fauziyah	Minister of Employment	PKB politician
4.	Abdul Hakim Iskandar	Minister of Villages, Development of Disadvantaged Regions, and Transmigration	PKB politician
5.	Agus Suparmanto	Minister of Trade	PKB politician
6.	Zainut Tauhid Sa'adi	Deputy Minister of Religious Affairs	PPP politician

Table 3. List of the Ministers of Religious Affairs since the independence

No	Name	President/Prime Minister	Period	Political Background
1.	Abdul Wahid Hasyim	Soekarno; Hatta; Natsir; Sukiman	Aug–Nov 1945; Dec 1949–Sept 1950; Sept 1950–Apr 1951; Apr 1951–Apr 1952	Masjumi-NU
2.	Rasjidi	Sjahrir	Nov 1945–Mar 1946	Masjumi-Muhammadiyah
3.	Fathurrahman Kafrawi	Sjahrir	Mar 1946–Oct 1947	Masjumi-NU

4.	Achmad Asj'ari	Amir Syarifuddin	Oct–June 1947	Masjumi-Muhammadiyah
5.	Anwaruddin	Amir Syarifuddin	July–Oct 1947	Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia
6.	Masjkur	Amir Syarifuddin; Hatta; Susanto; Ali Sastroamidjojo	Nov 1947–Aug 1948; Dec 1949–Jan 1950; July 1953–Aug 1955	Masjumi-NU
7.	Teuku Mohammad Hasan	<i>Emergency</i>	Dec 1948–July 1949	-
8.	Fakih Usman	Halim; Wilopo	Jan 1950–Sept 1950; Apr 1952–July 1953	Muhammadiyah
9.	Muhammad Ilyas	Burhanuddin Harahap; Ali Sastroamidjojo	Aug 1955–July 1959	NU
10.	Wahib Wahab	Soekarno	July 1959–Mar 1963	NU
11.	Saifuddin Zuhri	Soekarno; Suharto	Mar 1962 – Oct 1967	NU
12.	Moh. Dahlan	Suharto	Oct 1967–Sept 1971	NU
13.	Abdul Mukti Ali	Suharto	Sept 1971–Mar 1978	Golkar & Muhammadiyah
14.	Alamsyah Ratu Perwiranegara	Suharto	Mar 1978–1983	Army Officer
15.	Munawir Sjadzali	Suharto	Mar 1983–1993	Golkar
16.	Tarmidzi Taher	Suharto	Mar 1993–1998	Navy Admiral & Medical Officer
17.	Muhammad Quraish Shihab	Suharto	Mar 1998–May 1998	-
18.	Abdul Malik Fadjar	Habibie	May 1998–Oct 1999	Muhammadiyah
19.	Muhammad Tolchah Hasan	Abdurrahman Wahid	Oct 1999–July 2001	NU
20.	Said Agil Husin Al Munawar	Megawati Soekarnoputri	Aug 2001–Oct 2004	NU
21.	Muhammad Maftuh Basyuni	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY)	Oct 2004–2009	NU
22.	Suryadharma Ali	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY)	Oct 2009–May 2014	NU
23.	Agung Laksono	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY)	May 2014–Oct 2014	Golkar
24.	Lukman Hakim Saifuddin	Joko Widodo (Jokowi)	Oct 2014–2019	PPP
25.	Fachrul Razi	Joko Widodo (Jokowi)	Oct 2019–present	Army Officer

¹ NU is probably the largest Islamic organization in the Malay Archipelago, and wields significant political influence in Indonesia.

² I Wayan Agus Purnomo, “Juru Ceramah dari Akademi Militer,” *Tempo Magazine*, 28 October-3 November 2019, <https://majalah.tempo.co/read/158643/juru-ceramah-dari-akademi-militer> (accessed 28 October 2019)

³ While he is currently not holding any position in NU, he was an NU activist. He was the head of Ikatan Pelajar NU for 10 years during his undergraduate years. He was also a member of PBNU in the New Order era, and was its plenary member in 1988-1996.

⁴ Some sources claim the numbers to be 18,000 to 25,000.

⁵ The relation between modernist and traditionalist is further discussed in Robin Bush, *Nahdlatul Ulama and the Struggle for Power within Islam and Politics in Indonesia*, Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2009, pp. 29-33.

⁶ Before Masyumi, the organization was called MIAI (Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations)

⁷ Greg Fealy, *Ijtihad Politik Ulama: Sejarah NU 1952-1967*, (Jakarta: LKIS, 2003), pp. 50-52

⁸ *Ibid*, 93-98

⁹ Norshahril Saat, *The State, Ulama and Islam in Malaysia and Indonesia* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018)

¹⁰ Laode Ida, *NU Muda: Kaum Progresif dan Sekulerisme Baru*, Jakarta: Erlangga, 2004.

¹¹ For further details on the history of *Khittah '26*, see Bush, 2009, pp. 65-110.

¹² Norshahril Saat, *The State, Ulama and Islam in Malaysia and Indonesia* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018)

¹³ Asrori Karni, *70 Tahun Dr KH Ma'ruf Amin: Pengabdian Tiada Henti Kepada Agama, Bangsa dan Negara*, (Jakarta: The Ibrahim Hosen Institute, 2014)

¹⁴ Bestian Nainggolan and Yohan Wahyu (ed), *Partai Politik Indonesia 1999-2019: Konsentrasi dan dekonsentrasi kuasa*, (Jakarta: Kompas, 2016), p.51

¹⁵ Alex Arifianto, “Nahdlatul Ulama is home to its own hardliners,” *New Mandala*, 8 August 2018, <https://www.newmandala.org/nadhlatul-ulama-home-hardliners/> (accessed 28 October 2019)

¹⁶ Naila Shofia and Tom Pepinsky, “Measuring the ‘NU effect’ in Indonesia’s election,” *New Mandala*, 1 July 2019, <https://www.newmandala.org/measuring-the-nu-effect-in-indonesias-election/> (accessed 28 October 2019)

¹⁷ Husni Salah, “PBNU: Banyak Kiai Kecewa Soal Menag Pilihan Jokowi,” <https://www.nu.or.id/post/read/112564/pbnu--banyak-kiai-kecewa-soal-menag-pilihan-jokowi> (accessed 28 October 2019)

¹⁸ Kukuh Wibowo, “Tak Undang Menag ke Hari Santri Nasional, NU Jatim: Tidak Relevan,” *Tempo.Co*, <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1264658/tak-undang-menag-ke-hari-santri-nasional-nu-jatim-tidak-relevan/full&view=ok> (accessed 28 October 2019)

¹⁹ Nadirsyah Hosen, “Posisi NU dan Keseimbangan Sosial-Politik,” *Geotimes*, 2 November 2019, <https://geotimes.co.id/kolom/posisi-nu-dan-keseimbangan-sosial-politik/> (accessed 4 November 2019).

To read earlier issues of ISEAS Perspective please click here:

<https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective>

Preceding three issues of ISEAS Perspective:

2019/110 “Making the Belt and Road Environmentally Sustainable in Southeast Asia” by Alex Mark Lechner, John R. Owen, Angela Tritto, Alexander Horstmann, Hoong, Chen

Teo, Chee Meng Tan, Ahimsa Campos-Arceiz .

https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2019_110.pdf

2019/109 “Malaysia’s Budget 2020: A Tough Balancing Act” by Yeah Kim Leng.

https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2019_109.pdf

2019/108 “The Political Economy of Sharia and the Future Trajectory of Democracy in Indonesia” by Syafiq Hasyim.

https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2019_108.pdf

<p><i>ISEAS Perspective</i> is published electronically by:</p> <p>ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute</p> <p>30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735</p> <p>Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: https://www.iseas.edu.sg/support</p>	<p>ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed.</p> <p>Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission.</p> <p>© Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article.</p>	<p>Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok</p> <p>Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong</p> <p>Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng</p> <p>Editors: Malcolm Cook, Lee Poh Onn, Benjamin Loh and Ng Kah Meng</p> <p>Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s).</p>
---	---	--