

PERSPECTIVE

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Preview of the 2019 Indonesian Elections

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- 192.8 million Indonesian voters will be choosing their president and vice president, as well as four different levels of legislative representatives, on 17 April 2019.
- Incumbent President Joko Widodo and his vice-presidential running mate, Ma'ruf Amin, have an 18-20 per cent lead over their opponents, Prabowo Subianto and Sandiaga Uno, in most of the opinion polls conducted in March 2019.
- According to these polls, the political parties of these candidates, namely, the Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle (PDI-P) and the Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra), will enjoy the “coattail effect” and gain the most votes due to the visibility of their presidential candidates.
- The opinion polls show that the support bases of the respective candidates do not differ significantly from when they contested against each other for the presidential office in 2014. However, the fight for votes in Jakarta is expected to be a close one.
- The key to winning the elections is still whether the candidates and political parties can get their supporters to come out to cast their ballots on polling day.

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INTRODUCTION

On 17 April 2019, about 192.8 million¹ Indonesian voters will go to the polls to elect their president and vice president, as well as four different levels of legislative representatives. The latter include 136 members of the Regional Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD), 575 members of the People's Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR), 2,207 members of 34 provincial People's Representative Councils and 17,610 members from 514 district and municipal People's Representative Councils (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD). This will prove to be a challenging election, not only logistically, but also for voters, who will have to pick their representatives from five separate ballot sheets.²

This is the first time that Indonesia will hold the presidential and legislative elections simultaneously,³ and it is expected that the presidential election will overshadow the legislative elections. Pollsters and analysts are expecting a “coattail effect” for the political parties that presidential candidates belong to, namely, the Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle (PDI-P) and Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra), which had nominated Joko (Jokowi) Widodo and Prabowo Subianto (hereafter Prabowo) respectively. These political parties are expected to do well as the presidential candidates’ electability is expected to rub off on their respective parties.

The 2019 presidential election may be seen as a replay of the 2014 presidential election because the same presidential candidates are facing off against each other. What is different are the vice-presidential candidates. Under pressure from his coalition, Jokowi had selected the 76 year-old conservative Muslim cleric Ma’ruf Amin, who is chairman of the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) and former supreme leader of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia.⁴ This is seen as a tactical move to combat the image that Jokowi is anti-ulama (Islamic scholar), and that he is not religious enough. On the other hand, Prabowo picked Sandiaga Salahuddin Uno (hereafter Sandiaga), former deputy governor of Jakarta. As one of Indonesia’s most successful young entrepreneurs, the 49 year-old Sandiaga is seen as having strong appeal for the 42 million millennial voters⁵ and as someone who can speak authoritatively on the economy.⁶

Another difference between the 2014 and 2019 elections is the fact that Jokowi now runs as the incumbent and part of the political establishment, whereas in 2014 he was a commoner and an outlier challenging the Jakarta elite personified by Prabowo. Jokowi has now turned the tables on Prabowo with a coalition of 10 political parties (that had won 62 per cent of the votes in the 2014 election) supporting his bid for re-election. In contrast, Prabowo, who had a majority coalition in 2014, had lost some of his former allies, including Golkar Party (Golkar)⁷ and the United Development Party (PPP). Now Prabowo has only five parties (that had won 36 per cent of the votes in 2014) behind him. However, this also means that Jokowi is no longer touted as a populist reformer, but as an incumbent, he now has to defend his track record in order to justify another five-year term.

This article serves as a preview to the 2019 elections. It summarises the findings of the latest surveys on the electability of the presidential candidates and political parties. It then reviews the electoral bases of the presidential candidates by looking at voting behaviour in the 2014 election, and how such behaviour in particular regions is influenced by religious, ethnic and

historical factors. Finally, the article will give an overview of how voting behaviour is likely to be influenced by demographic and geographical factors.

THE ELECTABILITY OF THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES AND THE POLITICAL PARTIES

Since direct elections were introduced in Indonesia in the post-Reformasi era, surveys seeking to measure the popularity and electability of (potential) political candidates have been growing steadily, leading to a booming polling industry. Indeed, after the nominations for presidential candidates were formally announced on 10 August 2018, the results of no less than 40 surveys conducted by 20 different institutions have been announced. Most of the more reliable surveys found Jokowi-Ma'ruf's support rate to be between 50 and 60 per cent, while Prabowo-Sandi's support rate tend to range from 30 to 40 per cent, thus giving Jokowi-Ma'ruf a comfortable lead of about 20 per cent.⁸

However, the alarm was raised for the Jokowi-Ma'ruf camp in late March when survey results released by Litbang Kompas suggested not only that support for Jokowi-Ma'ruf had fallen to below 50 per cent (49.2 per cent), but also that their lead had narrowed to 11.8 per cent.⁹ As Jokowi's lead in the polls had also narrowed significantly (to less than 5 per cent) in the month before the 2014 presidential election, this was a worrying sign for Jokowi's supporters.¹⁰

Nevertheless, although the lead has narrowed, it remains a double-digit lead, and this is supported by survey results released by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) a week later. The CSIS survey showed that Jokowi-Ma'ruf still had a support rate slightly above 50 per cent (at 51.4 per cent) as compared to Prabowo-Sandi's 33.3 per cent, which gives the former a lead of 18.1 per cent.¹¹ This lead of about 18-20 per cent was replicated in surveys conducted in March 2019 by other reputable pollsters such as Charta Politika, Indo Barometer, Lingkaran Survei Indonesia (LSI) Denny JA and Indikator Politik Indonesia.¹² These polls, all conducted about a month before the election, point towards a comfortable win for the Jokowi-Ma'ruf pair.

The CSIS survey also suggests that there is indeed a "coattail effect" on the electability of political parties. Leading the pack in the survey results are the PDI-P (25.9 per cent) and Gerindra (13.3 per cent), followed by Golkar Party (9.4 per cent), National Awakening Party (PKB) (7 per cent), Democratic Party (PD) (5.5 per cent), Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) (4.6 per cent), National Democratic Party (Nasdem) (4.3 per cent), United Development Party (PPP) (3 per cent) and National Mandate Party (PAN) (2.5 per cent).

Comparing the CSIS findings with the results of surveys conducted by Litbang Kompas, Charta Politika, LSI Denny JA and Indikator around the same period (late February-March), the ranking of the top five parties remains about the same.¹³ To the extent that actual voting behaviour conforms to the results of these polls, PDI-P, Gerindra, Golkar and PKB will pass the 4 per cent threshold and gain a firm foothold in the DPR.¹⁴ PD, PKS, Nasdem, PPP and PAN, expected to win 2.4-5.9 per cent of the votes in four out of five of the most recent surveys, sit in a precarious grey zone where they may or may not reach the threshold.¹⁵ Finally, the People's Conscience Party (Hanura) and the new political parties – Indonesian

Unity Party (Perindo) and Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI) – seem unlikely to meet the threshold and therefore may not be represented in the new DPR.¹⁶

Table 1. The Likelihood that Political Parties will Cross the Electoral Threshold and Enter the DPR, Based on Survey Results

High Likelihood	Medium Likelihood	Low Likelihood
PDI-P Gerindra Golkar PKB	PD PKS Nasdem PPP PAN	Perindo ¹⁷ Hanura PSI

Comparing the survey results with the performance of the political parties in the 2014 election, it does appear that the parties of the presidential candidates are expected to gain the most. While the PDI-P had won 18.95 per cent of the votes in 2014, it is expected to win 24.2-26.9 per cent in the coming election. Likewise, Gerindra, which won 11.81 per cent in 2014, is expected to win 11.7-17 per cent this year. In contrast, Golkar, PD, PAN and Hanura are expected to see significant dips in their electoral support. In view of this, PDI-P and Gerindra will be riding on the “coattail effect” and campaigning for their presidential candidates and DPR seats concurrently. On the other hand, their coalition allies will be focusing on campaigning for their own parties and gaining their own foothold in the DPR rather than on the presidential campaigns.

THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES AND THEIR ELECTORAL BASES

The two presidential candidates do not differ significantly in their policy platforms, in terms of holding to dichotomous positions on how the country should be run. What differentiate them more are their respective backgrounds and the supporters they attract.

Jokowi is a self-made middle-class businessman of humble Javanese background who had never lived outside his Javanese environs till he took on the governorship of Jakarta in 2012. His political rise was meteoric and was the result of political reforms (especially decentralisation) that had taken place in Indonesia since Suharto lost political power in 1998. The direct election of regional leaders allowed him to become mayor of his hometown, Surakarta, in 2005, and later, governor of the capital of the nation in 2012. Due to his popularity and perceived high electability, the PDI-P nominated him as its presidential candidate in 2014, and he won with 53.15 per cent of the votes against Prabowo’s 46.85 per cent.

In contrast, Prabowo has an elite lineage,¹⁸ spent much of his childhood outside Indonesia, and was a rising star in the military till he was forced into early retirement for alleged involvement in the kidnapping of pro-democracy activists in 1998. During his political career, Prabowo had transformed himself into a pro-Islam candidate, and was recommended as presidential candidate by *Ijtima Ulama*, a congress of Islamic scholars. In fact, Prabowo had been building his relationship with conservative Islamic movements since he was in the

military. He founded Gerindra in 2008 and this has served as his electoral vehicle for his presidential bids in 2014 and 2019.

The different backgrounds of the candidates attract different coalition groups. Jokowi-Ma'ruf is supported by political parties that, broadly speaking, can be described as center-left nationalists and proponents of moderate Islam. On the other hand, Prabowo-Sandi is supported by parties that take a right-nationalist or conservative Islam position.¹⁹

In terms of electoral support, the results of the 2014 election showed that Prabowo had won mostly in provinces dominated by conservative Islam. This may be due, not only to his pro-conservative Islam image, but also the historical ties between his family and Sumatra during the regional rebellion of 1958.²⁰ Back then, Prabowo's father, Soemitro Djojohadikusumo, had joined the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI), a rebel group based in West Sumatra that opposed the central government led by President Sukarno.²¹ This may explain Prabowo's strong electoral base in various parts of Sumatra. Meanwhile, Jokowi had won in regions that had traditionally supported secular-nationalist political parties, such as Central and East Java.

Electoral support from the various ethnic groups also seem to conform to this larger picture. According to the CSIS survey, Prabowo-Sandi seem to be more popular among the Acehnese, Melayu and Minangkabau,²² who are dominant in the areas of Sumatra where Prabowo had won in 2014. On the other hand, Jokowi-Ma'ruf are significantly more popular among the Javanese, Batak and other ethnic groups,²³ which corresponds geographically to Central and East Java, North Sumatra and much of Eastern Indonesia where Jokowi had had stronger support in 2014.

DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SUPPORTERS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES

The CSIS survey also reports the demographic characteristics of the supporters of both pairs of presidential candidates. The Jokowi-Ma'ruf pair is more likely to attract rural voters (57.2 per cent) and those with low and medium education (57.3 and 45.8 per cent respectively), and has overwhelming support from Catholics and Protestants (93.1 per cent).²⁴ This accords with the trends found in the surveys conducted by Litbang Kompas and LSI Denny JA. In addition, the latter surveys also find that younger voters and those with higher income tend to support the Prabowo-Sandi pair.²⁵

These trends are similar to the demographic characteristics of the voters that supported Jokowi and Prabowo in 2014. Back then, Jokowi was also more popular in rural areas (46.8 per cent compared to Prabowo's 38.1 per cent) and among graduates of elementary and middle schools (47.6 per cent and 42.4 per cent respectively), while Prabowo had more support from high school and university graduates (42.6 per cent and 46.2 per cent respectively). Likewise, non-Muslims voted overwhelmingly for Jokowi (68.8 per cent compared to Prabowo's 11.5 per cent). Prabowo also had stronger support from voters with higher income, while Jokowi's support was stronger among voters with lower income.²⁶ Table 2 summarises the demographic characteristics of both camps' supporters in broad strokes.

Table 2. General Demographic Characteristics of Supporters of the Presidential Candidates

Jokowi-Ma'ruf	Prabowo-Sandi
Rural	Urban
Lower Education	Higher Education
Non-conservative Muslim; Non-Muslim	Conservative Muslim
Older	Younger
Lower Income	Higher Income


GEOGRAPHICAL PATTERNS

Besides the demographic patterns, there are also clear geographical patterns related to support for the two pairs of candidates. Figure 1 shows the support for Jokowi and Prabowo respectively across all provinces in 2014.

From the Figure, it is clear that Prabowo's strongest support comes from the provinces of West Java, Banten, various parts of Sumatra, West Nusa Tenggara and Gorontalo. Surveys suggest that this general picture will remain largely the same for 2019. The CSIS, Litbang Kompas and Charta Politika surveys all indicate that Prabowo will have a clear advantage in Sumatra. Likewise, Jokowi will have stronger support in Central and East Java, and much of the rest of Indonesia. It is in West Java, Banten and Jakarta that the surveys differ significantly in their results.

The CSIS survey suggests that Jokowi-Ma'ruf will win in West Java and Banten (considered Prabowo's strongholds) and Jakarta.²⁷ Similarly, the Charta Politika survey suggests that Jokowi-Ma'ruf will win Jakarta, Banten and West Java, although an earlier survey by the same institution found that the pair will lose Jakarta and Banten marginally.²⁸ In contrast, the Litbang Kompas survey indicates that Jakarta, West Java and Banten will all have stronger support for Prabowo-Sandi.²⁹ These differing results, and the fact that respondents who did not give an answer was at around 10 per cent or more, suggests that West Java, Banten and Jakarta are key battlegrounds that both camps are working hard to win over to their side. In particular, Jakarta, which Jokowi won in 2014, may swing over to the Prabowo camp.³⁰ Meanwhile, Jokowi may close the gap with Prabowo in the latter's home base of Banten and West Java, even if he does not overtake Prabowo.³¹

Figure 1



CONCLUDING REMARKS

Because the main contenders are the same, it is tempting to see the 2019 presidential election as a mere replay of 2014. However, we must not forget that as familiar opponents, the candidates would know how their strengths and weaknesses match up against each other, and they would find ways to remedy their weaknesses and erode their opponents' strengths. Thus, we find that Jokowi has chosen a running mate that can boost his Islamic credentials, and Prabowo has partnered someone who can claim to be self-made and who can relate to the millennials.

Yet, despite the efforts of the presidential candidates, they do not seem to be reversing the demographic traits found in their electoral support base, at least insofar as the results of the various polls are concerned. The geographical support bases of the respective candidates also seem to remain largely similar, except that Jakarta may tip over to Prabowo-Sandi. If the findings of the surveys so far hold, we should see a comfortable win for Jokowi-Ma'ruf, with PDI-P and Gerindra being the main beneficiaries of their presidential candidates' popularity and visibility.

However, we have to remember that it is not these surveys that determine the outcome of the elections, but the actual votes cast on 17 April 2019. The predictions of surveys have been known to be misleading,³² although institutions have been evolving ever more sophisticated ways of making more accurate measures of public opinion. Depending on which part of the 192.8 million eligible voters actually goes to the polling stations to cast their votes, the outcome of the elections could be different from the predictions of the surveys. Getting their respective supporters to the polling stations on Wednesday, 17 April, could be the most important challenge of the campaign teams.

Appendix 1: Select 2019 Presidential Election Survey Results from August 2018 to March 2019

No.	Institution	Survey Dates	Jokowi-Ma'ruf (%)	Prabowo-Sandi (%)	Jokowi-Ma'ruf's lead over Prabowo-Sandi (%)	Undecided & No-Answer (%)	Sample Size
1.	Indikator Politik Indonesia	22-29 March 2019	55.4	37.4	18	7.2	1,220 respondents
2.	Lingkaran Survei Indonesia (LSI) Denny JA	18-26 March 2019	56.8-63.2	36.8-43.2	20-20	-	1,200 respondents
3.	Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)	15-22 March 2019	51.4	33.3	18.1	15.3	1,960 respondents in 34 provinces
4.	Indo Barometer	15-21 March 2019	50.8	32	18.8	17.2	1,200 respondents
5.	Charta Politika	1-9 March 2019	53.6	35.4	18.2	11	2,000 respondents
6.	Jaringan Suara Indonesia (JSI)	3-8 March 2019	55.6	26.1	29.5	18.4	1,220 respondents
7.	Litbang Kompas	26 February-5 March 2019	49.2	37.4	11.8	13.4	2,000 respondents
8.	Saiful Mujani Research Center (SMRC)	24 February-5 March 2019	57.6	31.8	25.8	10.6	2,820 respondents
9.	Lingkaran Survei Indonesia (LSI) Denny JA	18-25 February 2019	58.7	30.9	27.8	9.9	1,200 respondents (0.5% is broken votes)
10.	Saiful Mujani Research Center (SMRC)	24-31 January 2019	54.9	32.1	22.8	13	1,620 respondents (1,426 with valid interview)
11.	Celebes Research Center	23-31 January 2019	56.1	31.7	24.4	12.2	1,200 respondents
12.	Populi Center	20-27 January 2019	54.1	31	23.1	14.9	1,486 respondents
13.	Lingkaran Survei Indonesia (LSI) Denny JA	18-25 January 2019	54.8	31	23.8	14.2	1,200 respondents
14.	Cyrus Network	18-23 January 2019	57.5	37.2	20.3	5.3	1,230 respondents
15.	Charta Politika	22 December 2018-2 January 2019	53.2	34.1	19.1	12.7	2,000 respondents in 34 provinces

16.	Alvara Research Center	11-24 December 2018	54.3	35.1	19.2	10.6	1,200 respondents in 34 provinces
17.	Indikator Politik Indonesia	6-16 December 2018	54.9	34.8	20.1	9.2	1,220 respondents in 34 provinces
18.	Lingkaran Survei Indonesia (LSI) Denny JA	5-12 December 2018	54.2	30.6	23.6	15.2	1,200 respondents
19.	Lingkaran Survei Indonesia (LSI) Denny JA	10-19 November 2018	53.2	31.2	22	15.6	1,200 respondents
20.	Lingkaran Survei Indonesia (LSI) Denny JA	10-19 October 2018	57.7	28.6	29.1	13.7	1,200 respondents in Indonesia
21.	Jaringan Suara Indonesia (JSI)	8-13 October 2018	54.8	30.8	24	14.5	1,200 respondents
22.	Litbang KOMPAS	24 September-5 October 2018	52.6	32.7	19.9	14.7	1,200 respondents in 34 provinces
23.	Populi Center	23 September-1 October 2018	56.3	30.9	25.4	12.1	1,470 respondents in 34 provinces
24.	Lingkaran Survei Indonesia (LSI) Denny JA	14-22 September 2018	53.2	29.2	24	17.6	1,200 respondents
25.	Saiful Mujani Research Center (SMRC)	7-14 September 2018	60.4	29.8	30.6	9.8	1,074 respondents in Indonesia
26.	Indikator Politik Indonesia	1-6 September 2018	57.7	32.3	25.4	9	1,220 respondents in 34 provinces
27.	Lingkaran Survei Indonesia (LSI) Denny JA	12-19 August 2018	52.2	29.5	22.7	18.3	1,200 respondents in 34 provinces

Appendix 2: Electability of Political Parties According to the Latest Surveys (Feb-Mar 2019)

Rank	Litbang Kompas (26 February- 5 March 2019)	Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (15-22 March 2019)	Charta Politika (19-25 March 2019)	LSI Denny JA (18-26 March 2019)	Indikator Politik Indonesia (22-29 March 2019)	Performance in 2014 Election
1	PDI-P (26.9%)	PDI-P (25.9%)	PDI-P (25.3%)	PDI-P (24.6%)	PDI-P (24.2%)	PDI-P (18.95%)
2	Gerindra (17%)	Gerindra (13.3%)	Gerindra (16.2%)	Gerindra (13.4%)	Gerindra (11.7%)	Golkar (14.75%)
3	Golkar (9.4%)	Golkar (9.4%)	Golkar (11.3%)	Golkar (11.8%)	Golkar (11.5%)	Gerindra (11.81%)
4	PKB (6.8%)	PKB (7%)	PKB (8.5%)	PD (5.9%)	PKB (8.8%)	PD (10.19%)
5	PD (4.6%)	PD (5.5%)	PD (5.2%)	PKB (5.8%)	PD (8.7%)	PKB (9.04%)
6	PKS (4.5%)	PKS (4.6%)	Nasdem (5.2%)	PKS (3.9%)	PKS (6%)	PAN (7.59%)
7	PAN (2.9%)	Nasdem (4.3%)	PKS (5%)	Perindo (3.9%)	Nasdem (5.7%)	PKS (6.79%)
8	PPP (2.7%)	PPP (3%)	PAN (3.3%)	PAN (3.1%)	PPP (4.9%)	Nasdem (6.72%)
9	Nasdem (2.6%)	PAN (2.5%)	PPP (2.4%)	PPP (2.9%)	Perindo (2.6%)	PPP (6.53%)
10	Perindo (1.5%)	Perindo (1.1%)	PSI (2.2%)	Nasdem (2.5%)	PAN (2.2%)	Hanura (5.26%)
11	Hanura (0.9%)	Hanura (0.8%)	Perindo (2%)	Hanura (0.9%)	Hanura (1.3%)	
12	PSI (0.9%)	PSI (0.5%)	Hanura (1%)	PSI (0.2%)	PSI (1.3%)	

¹ This is based on figures released by the Indonesian General Election Commission in December 2018 (<https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20181215171713-32-353929/kpu-jumlah-pemilih-tetap-pemilu-2019-capai-192-juta>, accessed 6 April 2019).

² Each voter may have to choose from more than 500 candidates on the five ballot sheets.

³ The simultaneous elections of 2019 are regulated under the Omnibus Elections Law, Law No. 7 of 2017 (Article no 167, no 3, Chapter VIII).

⁴ See Burhani, Ahmad Najib and Deasy Simandjuntak, “The Ma’ruf Amin Vice-presidential Candidacy: Enticing or Splitting Conservative Votes?”, *ISEAS Perspective*, Issue 2018, No. 51, 4 September 2018; also Saat, Norshahril, “The Implications of a Ma’ruf Amin Vice-Presidency in Indonesia”, *ISEAS Perspective*, Issue 2019, No. 11, 4 March 2019.

⁵ On the estimate of millennial voters, see: <https://tirto.id/sana-sini-ngaku-milenial-bagaimana-peta-milenial-indonesia-cX5W>, accessed 6 April 2019.

⁶ For Sandiaga’s views on the economy, see Hui Yew-Foong and Siwage Dharma Negara, “The 2019 Presidential Election as a Referendum on the Economy: An Interview with Sandiaga Uno”, *ISEAS Perspective*, Issue 2019, No. 12, 12 March 2019.

⁷ Golkar had come in second after PDI-P with 14.75 per cent of the votes in the 2014 election.

⁸ See Appendix 1 for the results of a select list of 27 surveys conducted from August 2018 to March 2019.

⁹ “Survei Litbang ‘Kompas’: Elektabilitas Jokowi-Ma’ruf 49,2 Persen, Prabowo-Sandiaga 37,4 Persen”, *Kompas*, 20 March 2019

(<https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2019/03/20/05391211/survei-litbang-kompas-elektabilitas-jokowi-maruf-492-persen-prabowo-sandiaga?page=all>, accessed 20 March 2019). Litbang Kompas is the research wing of Kompas newspaper, Indonesia’s most prominent broadsheet.

¹⁰ For example, the Saiful Mujani Research Center had found in a survey conducted on 30 June-3 July 2014 that Jokowi’s lead had narrowed to 47.6 per cent against Prabowo’s 44.9 per cent (<https://news.detik.com/survei/d-2631367/survei-smrc-prabowo-hatta-449-jokowi-jk-476>, accessed 20 March 2019).

¹¹ “CSIS Survey: Incumbent Electability Tends to Decrease”, *The Insider Stories*, 28 March 2019 (<https://theinsiderstories.com/csis-survey-incumbent-electability-tends-to-decrease/>, accessed 28 March 2019).

¹² See Appendix 1.

¹³ Only LSI Denny JA ranks PD above PKB. See Appendix 2.

¹⁴ Parties competing for DPR seats have to meet the vote acquisition threshold of at least 4 per cent (instead of the previous 3.5 per cent) of the votes nationally to be included in the determination of seats for the DPR. However, no threshold is required for competing in the DPRD. Refer to Law No. 7 of 2017 (Article 414, Chapter XI).

¹⁵ See Appendix 2.

¹⁶ There are two other new parties in the Prabowo camp, namely, Berkarya Party and Garuda Party, but their performance in the surveys is even less promising.

¹⁷ The surveys rank Perindo above Hanura, and find that it may garner 1.1-3.9 per cent of the votes, which makes it the new party most likely to cross the electoral threshold.

¹⁸ Prabowo’s family history can be traced back to the colonial era and his grandfather, Raden Mas Margono Djojohadikusumo, was a founder of Bank Negara Indonesia (BNI). His father, Prof. Dr. Soemitro Djojohadikusumo, was an economist and held several cabinet positions in the 1950s.

¹⁹ Islamist support for Jokowi and Prabowo has become more complicated recently. After Jakarta’s gubernatorial election in 2017, when Prabowo’s coalition toppled Jokowi’s ally, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), Jokowi moved to divide the Islamist forces. The climax was when he appointed Ma’ruf Amin, an anti-Ahok figure, to be his vice-presidential candidate. On the Prabowo side, on the other hand, the Islamist support is not as solid as it was in 2014. Prabowo’s party, Gerindra, is often involved in conflicts with PKS. Both parties differed in terms of policy in parliament and in determining who would be deputy governor of Jakarta after the position was vacated by Sandiaga.

Meanwhile, the PKS leadership has also become divided. A new splinter group has emerged, calling itself *Gerakan Arus Baru Indonesia* (Garbi or Indonesia's New Stream Movement). On changes in Prabowo's relationship with his Islamist coalition, see Azis Anwar Fachrudin, "Questioning Prabowo's alliance with Islamists," *New Mandala*, 15 March 2019 (<https://www.newmandala.org/questioning-prabowos-alliance-with-islamists/>, accessed 6 April 2019).

²⁰ For a historical account of the rebellion where Sumatra is concerned, see Kahin, Audrey, *Rebellion to Integration: West Sumatra and the Indonesian Polity, 1926-1998*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2000.

²¹ After the rebellion failed, Soemtro fled abroad and returned to Indonesia only after Sukarno fell. He was appointed finance minister in the early years of the New Order under former President Suharto and widely acknowledged as the architect of the New Order economy.

²² CSIS, "Laporan Hasil Survei Nasional: Pertarungan antara Elektabilitas dan Mobilisasi Pemilih (Periode Survei: 15- 22 Maret 2019)", p. 12.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), "Laporan Hasil Survei Nasional: Pertarungan antara Elektabilitas dan Mobilisasi Pemilih (Periode Survei: 15- 22 Maret 2019)" [National Survey Results Report: Fighting between Electability and Voter Mobilization (Survey Period: March 15-22 2019)].

²⁵ The LSI Denny JA survey found that voters aged 19 and below are more likely to support Prabowo-Sandi (50.5-56.9 per cent) while the Libang Kompas survey found that voters below 22 are more likely to support Prabowo-Sandi (47 per cent). Both surveys also found that the higher the income, the higher the likelihood that voters will support Prabowo-Sandi. LSI Denny JA, "Jokowi di Ambang Dua Periode?" [Jokowi in Two Periods], March 2019; *Kompas*, 20 March 2019, pp. 1-3.

²⁶ The data is gleaned from an exit poll taken on the day of the 2014 presidential election on 9 July by Indikator Politik Indonesia. See http://www.indikator.co.id/uploads/20140709204910.Hasil_Exit_Poll_Pilpres_2014_95.2_INDIKATOR.pdf, accessed 5 March 2019.

²⁷ CSIS, "Laporan Hasil Survei Nasional: Pertarungan antara Elektabilitas dan Mobilisasi Pemilih (Periode Survei: 15- 22 Maret 2019)", p. 10.

²⁸ See http://www.chartapolitika.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/201903251111_rilis-Survei-Maret-2019.pdf, accessed 25 March 2019. For the earlier survey, see Charta Politika, "Rilis Survei Nasional Peta Elektoral Terkini Pileg & Pilpres 2019 (periode 22 Desember 2018 - 2 Januari 2019) [Release of the Latest National Survey of Electoral Maps for the 2019 Legislative and Presidential Elections (period 22 December 2018 - 2 January 2019)], p. 56.

²⁹ *Kompas*, 20 March 2019, p. 2.

³⁰ Although the CSIS survey suggests that Jokowi will keep Jakarta, he only has a slight lead with 38.8 per cent against Prabowo's 30 per cent, while those that did not answer constituted 31.3 per cent. This makes Jokowi's position in Jakarta rather precarious.

³¹ As the sample sizes of the surveys, usually between 1,200 to 2,000, are too small to measure the voting tendencies of 34 provinces accurately, we cannot be too dependent on the surveys in predicting regional voting behaviour.

³² One classic example was how Jokowi's own bid for the Jakarta governorship in 2012 was predicted wrongly by even the most reputable surveys. See Hui Yew-Foong and Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, "The gubernatorial race in Jakarta: Background and implications", in Ulla Fionna (ed.), *ISEAS perspective: Watching the Indonesian elections 2014*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2015.

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