

RESEARCHERS AT SINGAPORE'S *INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES* SHARE THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF CURRENT EVENTS

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## **Unpacking the Results of the 2014 Indonesian Legislative Election**

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### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- The recently concluded 2014 legislative elections in Indonesia produced several unexpected results, as the heavily favored PDIP party failed to reach its electoral targets, despite the popularity of its presidential candidate, Jakarta Governor Joko Widodo (Jokowi).
- PDIP's failure to win more popular votes during these elections can be attributed to the lack of campaign advertisements promoting Jokowi as its presidential candidate, local-level campaign dynamics, possible vote-buying, and the internal rivalry between supporters of Jokowi and supporters of party-chairwoman Megawati Sukarnoputri.
- The success of the Islamic parties in increasing their vote share during these elections is not the result of their increased popularity among Indonesian voters. Instead, it is the result of their strategy to recoup the votes they had lost during the 2009 elections.

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## INTRODUCTION

The recently concluded legislative election in Indonesia produced several unexpected results. The first one was the underperforming results of the opposition party the Indonesian Democratic Party Struggle (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan*, PDIP), which failed to capitalise on the popularity of its presidential candidate Joko Widodo (popularly known as Jokowi).

The party is estimated to have won only 19 percent of the popular vote, far below the expected 25 to 30 percent that had been predicted by a number of Indonesian public opinion surveys. Another unexpected result of the legislative election was the strong showing of Islamic political parties,<sup>1</sup> which seem to have obtained a combined vote share of nearly 32 percent. This reverses their poor results in the 2009 legislative elections and defies predictions made by pollsters and journalists that these parties were going to achieve even worse results in this election.<sup>2</sup>

This article unpacks the results of the Indonesian legislative election (*pemilihan legislative/ pileg*) by focusing on these two key findings. Based on a comparison of estimated results from the current election with the final results from previous post-*Reformasi* elections (1999, 2004, and 2009), it is argued that:

- a. Although PDIP managed to achieve a significant vote gain in this election, it failed to capitalise on the popularity of its presidential candidate, Jokowi, due to the lack of television advertising, local-level campaigning of candidates, possible vote-buying at the grassroots level,<sup>3</sup> and internal rivalries between Jokowi supporters and those of PDIP chairwoman Megawati Soekarnoputri, and;
- b. The stronger-than-expected results of the Islamic parties should not be interpreted as evidence of political Islam gaining ground in Indonesia. Instead, this result can be attributed mostly to the parties' strategy to re-focus their campaign within their own primary constituencies.

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<sup>1</sup> 'Islamism' considers Islam as not only a religion, but a political ideology, which is embodied in the ideal of the Islamic state and/or the application of Islamic law. Interpretations can vary: from 'pluralist' and 'adaptive' parties, such as the PKS, to more 'conservative' ones, as in the case of the PBB.

<sup>2</sup> For a poll that shows lower returns for Islamic parties, see Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS, "Amidst the 'Jokowi Effect.' Vacillating Voters and An Unfinished Contestation," 31 March, 2014 (<http://www.csis.or.id/post/press-release-csis-national-survey-march-2014>), p. 5 & 13, accessed 11 April, 2014). For an example of media accounts, see Joe Cochrane, 'Memo from Indonesia: In a Nation of Muslims, Political Islam is Struggling to Win Votes,' *The New York Times*, 7 April 2014 ([http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/08/world/asia/political-islam-indonesia.html?smid=fb-share&\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/08/world/asia/political-islam-indonesia.html?smid=fb-share&_r=0)), accessed 14 April 2014.

<sup>3</sup> For a snapshot of grassroots (blusukan-style) campaigning and vote-buying, see Alexander. R. Arifianto, Ulla Fionna, and Gwenaël Njoto-Feillard, 'A Snapshot of the Campaigning in Indonesia's 2014 Legislative Elections,' *ISEAS Perspective* No. 20 (3 April 2014) ([http://www.iseas.edu.sg/news\\_content.cfm?news\\_id=759A5157-0308-7E53-C4CAC0775536FBAA](http://www.iseas.edu.sg/news_content.cfm?news_id=759A5157-0308-7E53-C4CAC0775536FBAA)), accessed 14 April 2014.

## EVALUATING PDIP'S PERFORMANCE

Twelve national political parties competed in the 2014 legislative election,<sup>4</sup> and PDIP was favoured to win big, especially after it nominated the popular Jakarta Governor Joko Widodo as its presidential candidate on March 14, 2014.<sup>5</sup> Opinion polls had expected the party to ride the wave of the “Jokowi effect” and comfortably pass the 25 percent popular vote threshold, which would have enabled it to nominate its own presidential candidate without seeking coalition partners.<sup>6</sup>

**Table 1. Vote shares of Indonesian Political Parties, 1999 – 2014**

Parties	1999	2004	2009	2014 (provisional) <sup>a</sup>
PDIP	33.70%	18.50%	14.00%	18.94%
Golkar	22.40%	21.60%	14.50%	14.32%
Gerindra	N/A	N/A	4.50%	11.82%
Demokrat	N/A	7.50%	20.90%	9.66%
PKB	12.60%	10.60%	4.90%	9.19%
PAN	7.10%	6.40%	6.00%	7.48%
PKS	1.40%	7.30%	7.90%	6.92%
Nasdem	N/A	N/A	N/A	6.89%
PPP	10.70%	8.20%	5.30%	6.66%
Hanura	N/A	N/A	3.80%	5.44%
PBB	1.90%	2.60%	1.80%	1.61%
PKPI	1.01%	1.30%	0.90%	1.06%

Source: *The General Election Commission (KPU) data (1999-2009); The Jakarta Post - CSIS Quickcount data (2014) (updated April 11, 2014)*

<sup>a</sup> Provisional data based on CSIS-Jakarta Post Quickcount results. At the time of writing, there are recounts and revotes being scheduled to take place in a number of polling stations. Final results are scheduled to be announced by the KPU on May 6-7, 2014.

<sup>4</sup> For a comprehensive profile of the 12 national political parties competing in this year's legislative election, see Ulla Fionna and Alexander R. Arifianto, 'Getting to Know the Contestants of the 2014 Indonesian Elections.' *ISEAS Perspective* No. 14 (10 March 2014) ([http://www.iseas.edu.sg/research-output.cfm?category\\_id=63EF7BB0-1A64-6F37-E42E34D167B97E98&status=past](http://www.iseas.edu.sg/research-output.cfm?category_id=63EF7BB0-1A64-6F37-E42E34D167B97E98&status=past)), accessed 11 April 2014.

<sup>5</sup> Public opinion polls taken within the past year have indicated that Jokowi will beat any other presidential candidates (such as retired General Prabowo Subianto from the Gerindra Party) in a landslide. For instance, the latest survey conducted by the reputable Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) predicts Jokowi will beat Prabowo 54.3% to 28.3% in a two-way electoral race. See CSIS, 'Amidst the 'Jokowi Effect.' Vacillating Voters and An Unfinished Contestation,' 31 March, 2014 (<http://www.csis.or.id/post/press-release-csis-national-survey-march-2014>, p. 25., accessed 11 April 2014

<sup>6</sup> CSIS estimated that while without a clear presidential candidate, PDIP would have only obtained 20 percent of the vote share, it would have acquired 33 percent if Jokowi was declared as its presidential candidate. See CSIS (2014), *op cit*, p. 5 & 13.

However, although PDIP managed to come ahead of all other parties, it only received approximately 18.94 percent of the vote, falling far short of the 25 percent threshold. Table 1 shows that PDIP only managed to gain around 5 percent of additional votes from the last legislative election (2009), far short of its all-time high of 33.7 percent obtained in 1999.

Table 1 also shows that with the exception of incumbent President Yudhoyono's Democratic Party (PD), which loses approximately 11 percent of its vote share compared to 2009, many of the parties competing in this year's election increased their vote shares compared to their 2009 results.<sup>7</sup> While the PDIP managed to gain approximately 5 percent of vote shares, its main rival, the Gerindra Party, managed to gain about 7 percent of vote shares compared to its 2009 results. Gerindra's success can be attributed to the popularity of its leader, retired General Prabowo Subianto, who frequently asserted himself as a tough and decisive leader with a can-do attitude (unlike the image of incumbent President Yudhoyono) and to its aggressive social media campaign over the internet to attract the estimated 21 million-strong first time voters between the age of 17 and 21. Gerindra is considered to have the most extensive social media presence compared to other political parties.<sup>8</sup> The third finisher in this legislative election is the Golkar Party, which obtained 14.32 percent of vote share this year, a slight decrease from its 14.50 percent vote share in the 2009 election.

PDIP's lower-than-expected electoral performance in this year's legislative election may be attributed to its failure to capitalise on the popularity of its presidential candidate, Jokowi, during the campaign season from March 16 to April 5. The majority of PDIP's television ads featured its chairman Megawati Sukarnoputri and her daughter, Puan Maharani, and not Jokowi.<sup>9</sup> The party only released advertisements featuring Jokowi during the final two days of the campaign. Even though this advertisement was also posted on social media sites such as Youtube, it only managed to attract a small number of online viewers.<sup>10</sup> As Jokowi himself indicates in his first post-election interview, the lack of television advertisements featuring him, and the barrage of negative advertisements by his political opponents (especially from the Gerindra Party) in social media may have prevented more voters from casting their ballots for PDIP during the election.<sup>11</sup> Consequently, many voters did not see

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<sup>7</sup> Parties that receive less vote shares this year compared to their 2009 election results are: Demokrat (11.24 percent less), Golkar (0.18 percent less), PKS (0.98 percent less), and PBB (0.19 percent less).

<sup>8</sup> Alexandra Hearne, 'I Tweet and I Vote: Indonesia's 2014 Elections and Social Media,' *Radio Australia*, 3 April, 2014 (<http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/2014-04-02/i-tweet-and-i-vote-indonesia%E2%80%99s-2014-elections-and-social-media/1285632>), accessed 11 April 2014.

<sup>9</sup> See <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0JS1IALc58E>, for an example of Megawati-Puan Maharani television ad (uploaded March 10, 2014) It is seen by 7,215 Youtube viewers as of 14 April 2014.

<sup>10</sup> The PDIP ad featuring Jokowi can be viewed at: [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=stKym4\\_7qtQ&feature=s\\_hare](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=stKym4_7qtQ&feature=s_hare) (uploaded 2 April 2014). It is only viewed by 550 Youtube viewers as of 14 April 2014.

<sup>11</sup> Josua Gantan and Kennial Caroline Laia, 'Joko: 'Attacks,' Poor Marketing, Have Hurt PDIP,' *The Jakarta Globe*, 11 April 2014 (<http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/joko-attacks-poor-marketing-hurt-pdi-p>), accessed 12 April 2014.

the connection between voting for PDIP and Jokowi's presidential candidacy. Thus, these voters may have failed to support PDIP during the legislative election.<sup>12</sup>

Another reason why PDIP may have failed to win more votes in the legislative election is the fact that in this election, campaign messages were delivered through the efforts of individual legislative candidates (*calegs*) rather than through an organised strategy planned by the national party headquarters in Jakarta. Many *calegs* did not make use of the party structures during their campaign and often failed to mention which parties they came from when campaigning in their constituencies.<sup>13</sup> Vote-buying was also heavily used by all political parties in their grassroots-level (*blusukan*) campaigns and while its actual effects are very difficult to measure, it may have taken away some potential votes from PDIP as well.<sup>14</sup>

Lastly, PDIP seems to have been caught in an internal rivalry between Jokowi and Megawati Sukarnoputri's daughter, Puan Maharani, the chairwoman of the party's legislative election campaign committee. While the two have publicly denied it,<sup>15</sup> this may have contributed to the lack of enthusiastic support from Megawati towards Jokowi's presidential bid as well as the lack of campaign funds allocated by the party to support his campaign activities.<sup>16</sup> Although the two currently project a united front in their public appearances, any trace of internal rivalry needs to be resolved by the time the presidential campaign kicks into high gear in June. Otherwise, Jokowi may run into more difficulties in trying to beat whomever his opponents in the presidential elections may be.

## ANALYSING THE RESURGENCE OF ISLAMIC PARTIES

Table 2 shows that the five Islamic parties<sup>17</sup> – the National Awakening Party (PKB), the National Mandate Party (PAN), the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), the United Development Party (PPP), and the Crescent Star Party (PBB) – managed to win a

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<sup>12</sup> This is based from the observation of an ISEAS Indonesian Studies programme's staff on the election day at the Indonesian Embassy in Singapore, 6 April 2014. Many voters whom had intended to vote for Jokowi were disappointed that his picture was not featured on the ballot. Some of them went home afterwards without voting for any party (Conversations with Maxenius Tri Sambodo, 7 April 2014).

<sup>13</sup> Edward Aspinall, 'Why Was the Jokowi Effect Limited?' *New Mandala*, RSPAS, Australian National University, 10 April 2014 (<http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2014/04/10/why-was-the-jokowi-effect-limited/>), accessed 14 April 2014.

<sup>14</sup> For an account on vote-buying at the grassroots level during the campaign season and its potential effects, see Alexander. R. Arifianto, Ulla Fionna, and Gwenael Njoto-Feillard, 'A Snapshot of the Campaigning in Indonesia's 2014 Legislative Elections,' *ISEAS Perspective* No. 20 (3 April 2014) ([http://www.iseas.edu.sg/news\\_content.cfm?news\\_id=759A5157-0308-7E53-C4CAC0775536FBAA](http://www.iseas.edu.sg/news_content.cfm?news_id=759A5157-0308-7E53-C4CAC0775536FBAA)), accessed 14 April 2014.

<sup>15</sup> *The Jakarta Post*, 'PDIP Nixes Jokowi/Puan Rift Claims,' 13 April 2014 (<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/04/13/pdi-p-nixes-jokowipuan-rift-claims.html>), accessed 14 April 2014.

<sup>16</sup> Hans David Tampubolon, 'Infighting Could Ruin Jokowi's Bid,' *The Jakarta Post*, 11 April 2014 (<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/04/11/infighting-could-ruin-jokowi-s-bid.html>), accessed 14 April 2014.

<sup>17</sup> In this article, Islamic parties are defined as any whose "platform and ideologies openly states Islam or draws their main support from Muslims or Muslim organisations" (Muhtadi 2012: 204, Baswedan 2004: 672). Muhtadi and Baswedan's definition is used in this article because conservative Muslim clerics and activists can be found in all Islamic parties, even in those with pluralist (Pancasila-based) platform such as PKB and PAN.

combined vote share of 31.86 percent in the legislative election. This is a gain of 5.96 percent compared to their combined results of 25.90 percent in 2009. As most Indonesian analysts had predicted a further decrease in the Islamic parties' vote share following from their lacklustre results in 2009,<sup>18</sup> this year's results came as a surprise for many.

**Table 2. Vote shares of Indonesian Islamic Parties, 1999-2014**

Parties	1999	2004	2009	2014 <sup>a</sup>
PKB	12.60%	10.60%	4.90%	9.19%
PAN	7.10%	6.40%	6.00%	7.48%
PKS	1.40%	7.30%	7.90%	6.92%
PPP	10.70%	8.20%	5.30%	6.66%
PBB	1.90%	2.60%	1.80%	1.61%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>33.70%</b>	<b>35.10%</b>	<b>25.90%</b>	<b>31.86%</b>
		<b>Average Vote Share (1999-2014)</b>		<b>31.64%</b>

Source: The General Election Commission (KPU) data (1999-2009); The Jakarta Post - CSIS Quickcount data (2014) (updated April 11, 2014)

<sup>a</sup> Provisional data based on CSIS-Jakarta Post Quickcount results. Final results will be announced by the KPU on May 6-7, 2014.

The National Awakening Party (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* – PKB), which is affiliated with the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Indonesia's largest Islamic organisation, managed to gain approximately 9.2 percent of vote share this election, nearly doubling its performance of 4.9 percent obtained in 2009. This makes it the biggest winner among the five Islamic parties.

<sup>18</sup> For instance, CSIS March 2014 survey was predicting a combined vote share between 12.30 percent (with Jokowi as a declared PDIP presidential candidate) and 19.70 percent (without Jokowi as PDIP candidate) for the five Islamic parties. See CSIS, 'Amidst the 'Jokowi Effect.' Vacillating Voters and An Unfinished Contestation,' 31 March 2014 (<http://www.csis.or.id/post/press-release-csis-national-survey-march-2014>), p. 5 & 13, accessed 11 April 2014.



However, concerns expressed in several news reports regarding the rise of influence among Islamic parties are overblown.<sup>19</sup> Table 2 above shows that the average vote shares of the parties in legislative elections conducted between 1999 and 2014 is 31.64 percent. This indicates that the parties' 2014 combined vote share of 31.86 percent is only slightly above the average of the parties' electoral performances since 1999.

The strongest explanation for the success of these parties in this election lies in their campaign strategy to focus on their primary constituencies – most notably members of Islamic organisations that supported these parties when they were first founded (e.g., NU for PKB, Muhammadiyah for PAN, etc.). This is especially so in the case of PKB, which sought to recover from its record low vote share of 4.90 percent in 2009 by actively remobilising its voter base within its main constituency, e.g. the millions of NU members and sympathizers.

PKB's dismal result in the 2009 election was primarily attributed to the internal divisions within its leadership.<sup>20</sup> In May 2008, the late Abdurrahman Wahid, PKB's founder and first general chairman, was ousted from his position by his own nephew, Muhaimin Iskandar. As a result, the party split into two factions.<sup>21</sup> In addition to this split within PKB, a second NU-affiliated party, the National Ulama Awakening Party (*Partai Kebangkitan Nasional Ulama* - PKNU) was founded in November 2006 by a group of conservative NU clerics (*kyai*) led by KH Ma'aruf Amin.<sup>22</sup> While PKNU only won 1.5 percent of vote share during the 2009 election, many PKB politicians have blamed the party for taking away a sizable number of votes from NU members in 2009, further contributing to PKB's poor results in that year's election.<sup>23</sup>

To strengthen PKB's voter base within NU, legislative candidates (*caleg*) visited villages where NU is known to have a strong representation. In their campaigns, these *caleg* reminded NU members and sympathizers that their organisation shared historical roots with PKB and that both were defending traditionalist Islamic teachings. NU was founded in 1926 by KH Hasyim Ash'ari, while PKB was founded by his grandson, Abdurrahman Wahid in 1998 to represent the NU community in the realm of politics. Hence, according to this argument, the only option for NU members is to vote for PKB, the only party that truly represents them.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> For instance, see Otto and Schornhardt, *op cit* and Agence-France Presse, 'Islamic Parties Bounce Back in Muslim-Majority Indonesia's Parliamentary Elections,' *South China Morning Post*, 11 April 2014 (<http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1475955/islamic-parties-bounce-back-muslim-majority-indonesias-parliamentary>), accessed 14 April 2014.

<sup>20</sup> Interviews with PKB *calegs* and politicians in Yogyakarta indicate they blame their party's 2009 losses on the internal split within PKB during this time. Interviews with Sukoyo, PKB *caleg* for the Yogyakarta Provincial Council (DPRD I), Yogyakarta, 19 March 2014, and with Muhammad Kholiq, PKB Party Chairman for the Sleman District, Sleman, 20 March 2014

<sup>21</sup> After a two-year legal fight, Iskandar's faction finally prevailed over Wahid's after the Indonesian Supreme Court ruled in July 2010 that the former was the legitimate leader of the party and not the latter. Wahid passed away on December 30, 2009 and most of his former supporters eventually went back to support Iskandar's faction.

<sup>22</sup> Ma'aruf Amin is also a member of the Indonesian Ulama Council (*Majelis Ulama Indonesia – MUI*), Indonesia's semi-official *fatwa*-making Islamic council, and is now the organization's Vice Chairman.

<sup>23</sup> Interview with Muhammad Kholiq, PKB Party Chairman for the Sleman District, Sleman, 20 March 2014.

<sup>24</sup> Interviews with Sukoyo, PKB *caleg* for the Yogyakarta Provincial Council (DPRD I), Yogyakarta, 19 March

At the national level, Muhaimin Iskandar and his lieutenants have been working to mend ties between PKB and the NU leadership, which have not had harmonious relations with the party since around 2004.<sup>25</sup> In April 2011, Iskandar managed to win the endorsement of the current NU chairman, KH Said Aqil Siradj, to support PKB in its political campaigns, despite NU's official position that it is a politically neutral civil society organisation.<sup>26</sup> In addition to his endorsement, Said Aqil made numerous campaign appearances in PKB events, with a common tagline that PKB is "a fundamental part of NU and should be supported by all NU members."<sup>27</sup> Iskandar has also approached disgruntled PKB politicians such as the former Indonesian Constitutional Court Chief Justice, Mahfud MD,<sup>28</sup> and former Minister of Woman's Empowerment, Khofifah Indah Parawangsa, and succeeded in regaining their formal support for PKB.<sup>29</sup> PKB leadership's reconciliation with the NU leadership and formerly disgruntled PKB politicians has unified the two organisations for the first time since 2004, thereby potentially increasing the support of NU members for PKB in this year's legislative election.

NU's support for PKB's electoral endeavors has also been bolstered by Iskandar's ability to bring Rusdi Kirana, an Indonesian-Chinese, and founder and chief executive officer of Lion Air, Indonesia's largest budget airline, to become the party's chief financial patron in January 2014.<sup>30</sup> A month later, Kirana established the "NU-Lion partnership," which is providing hundreds of thousands of US dollars as financial assistance to support the economic development of NU Islamic schools (*pesantren*) throughout East and Central Java, the primary stronghold of NU. In the process, he has been able to gain political support from NU clerics and their students (*santri*) who are running these schools.<sup>31</sup> He also provided donations to buy advertisements for PKB and support its local campaigns in NU strongholds in East and Central Java

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2014, and with Muhammad Kholiq, PKB Party Chairman for the Sleman District, Sleman, 20 March 2014. Also see the campaign speeches made by Mr. Sukoyo and Mohammad Alfuniam, PKB caleg for the Sleman regional legislature (DPRD II), on their joint campaign appearances, 20 March 2014.

<sup>25</sup> The split between PKB and NU can be traced back to the feud between PKB's founder Abdurrahman Wahid and then NU chairman Hasyim Muzadi in 2004. The latter refused to support the former's bid for the Indonesian presidency. Instead, Muzadi became Megawati Sukarnoputri's Vice Presidential nominee. For further information, see Eunsook Jung, 'Taking Care of the Faithful: Islamic Organizations and Partisan Engagement in Indonesia, Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, August 2009.

<sup>26</sup> Investor Daily Indonesia, 'Said Aqil: PBNU Siap Dukung PKB,' ('Said Aqil: NU Leadership Board is Ready to Support PKB'), 31 January 2011 (<http://www.investor.co.id/home/said-aqil-pbnu-siap-dukung-pkb/4526>), accessed April 12 2014.

<sup>27</sup> An example of Said Aqil's campaign speeches can be found at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jdx7laV4flo>, (uploaded 16 March 2014), accessed 12 April 2014.

<sup>28</sup> Mahfud, MD is one of PKB's presidential candidates in the 2014 presidential election, along with former Indonesian Vice President Jusuf Kalla and traditional pop (*dangdut*) singer and movie actor Rhoma Irama.

<sup>29</sup> A PKB advertisement featuring these two politicians can be found at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cUsT7tlowb4>, (uploaded 21 March 2014), accessed 12 April 2014.

<sup>30</sup> Kirana was immediately made PKB's Deputy Chairman, despite the fact that he is an Indonesian of Chinese descent and a non-Muslim. Greg Fealy, 'The Lion of PKB, Rusdi Kirana,' *New Mandala*, RSPAS, Australian National University, 31 March 2014, (<http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2014/03/31/the-lion-of-pkb-rusdi-kirana/>) accessed 12 April 2014.

<sup>31</sup> Fealy (2014), *op cit*.



in March 2014.<sup>32</sup> Kirana's generous financial support to NU's *pesantren* coffers and to PKB's campaign efforts to win back NU members' votes at the grassroots level may have contributed to the increase in the party's vote share by 4.29 percent this year.

There are indications that similar strategies were pursued by other Islamic parties in their campaigns as well. For instance, in light of the "cattle meat imports" corruption scandal which implicated a number of high ranking PKS leaders and politicians, the party has strengthen its support among its loyal and highly motivated cadres. PKS chairman Anis Matta has promoted a grand narrative in his public speeches that the corruption allegation against PKS politicians was part of a political conspiracy conducted by unnamed political opponents to undermine and destroy the party.<sup>33</sup> This narrative seems to have consolidated support among the party's cadres and sympathizers, giving them a common and elusive enemy that they should fight against by maintaining the party's unity.<sup>34</sup> Another strategy that seems to have worked is PKS's various charitable initiatives to help poor citizens and victims of natural disasters at the grassroots level.<sup>35</sup> This aimed to strengthen the bond between cadres and the party and negate the effects of the various scandals faced by party officials. These strategies seem to have worked, judging from the fact that PKS obtained a vote share of 6.92 percent, approximately 1 percentage point below its all-time high vote share of 7.90 percent obtained in 2009. However, this is still far higher than the predictions made by several polling organisations.<sup>36</sup>

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

Two lessons can be drawn from the preliminary results of Indonesia's 2014 legislative election. First, the enormous popularity of a party's presidential candidate is not a guarantee for the party to win the legislative election. The PDIP failed to effectively ride on Jokowi's popularity to gain more votes in the *pileg*. Lack of advertisements promoting Jokowi's candidacy during the campaign period, the barrage of negative campaigns from his political opponents, the effects of grassroots campaigning

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Sabrina Acil, 'Anis Matta Tudung Ada Konspirasi Besar untuk Serang PKS,' ('Anis Matta Alleges a 'Great Conspiracy' to Attack PKS,') Kompas.com, 1 February 2013 (<http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2013/02/01/16172470/Anis.Matta.Tuding.Ada.Konspirasi.Besar.untuk.Serang.PKS>), accessed 12 April 2014.

<sup>34</sup> Masdarudin, 'Konspirasi: Strategi PKS Menjadi Penguasa,' ('Conspiracy: PKS Strategy to Become a Ruler,') Kompasiana, 2 April 2013, (<http://politik.kompasiana.com/2013/04/01/konspirasi-strategi-pks-menjadi-penguasa-547562.html>), accessed 12 April 2014.

<sup>35</sup> During our fieldwork in March 2014, various PKS cadres in Jakarta and Malang have indicated the success of the party to continue holding various activities and charities. These cadres demonstrated strong commitment towards seeing the party through the various troubles.

<sup>36</sup> For instance, the CSIS March 2014 survey predicted that PKS was only supposed to receive between 2.90 and 3.40 of vote shares in the April legislative election. See CSIS, 'Amidst the 'Jokowi Effect.' Vacillating Voters and An Unfinished Contestation,' 31 March 2014 (<http://www.csis.or.id/post/press-release-csis-national-survey-march-2014>), p. 5 & 13, accessed 11 April 2014.

and vote-buying, and the internal rivalry between Jokowi's supporters and Megawati Sukarnoputri's supporters, seem to be the factors contributing to the party's lower-than-expected performance.

Second, the resurgence of Islamic parties' combined vote share should not be interpreted as a sign that political Islam is enjoying increased support from the Indonesian electorate – at least not just yet. Rather, indications suggest that this is the result of these parties' efforts at consolidating support among their primary constituencies.

It remains to be seen whether these parties will be able to gain additional votes outside their own primary constituencies in future elections and whether they will be able to collectively increase their influence within Indonesian politics.

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