

PERSPECTIVE

RESEARCHERS AT ISEAS – YUSOF ISHAK INSTITUTE ANALYSE CURRENT EVENTS

Singapore | 16 April 2021

Identity Politics: Resoundingly Absent from the 2020 Regional Election in Tasikmalaya

*Amin Mudzakkir and Ahmad Najib Burhani**



In this picture, community member and students of an Islamic boarding school walk in front of a banner showing portraits of the then Indonesian frontrunner presidential candidate, Jakarta Governor, Joko Widodo (L) and running mate Jusuf Kalla (R) in Tasikmalaya in western Java island on June 12, 2014. Politics of identity and the politicisation of religion were dominant features in both the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections, and also in the 2017 gubernatorial election in Jakarta. In the 2020 regional election in Tasikmalaya, sectarian issues and identity politics proved remarkably irrelevant in influencing voters.

** Amin Mudzakkir is Researcher at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), Jakarta. Ahmad Najib Burhani is Senior Visiting Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and Senior Researcher at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), Jakarta.*

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- Tasikmalaya previously gained national and international repute as an intolerant district where discrimination towards religious minorities had occurred sporadically, including during the pandemic.
- Although sectarian issues and identity politics surfaced in the early days of the 2020 regional election in Tasikmalaya, they proved remarkably irrelevant in influencing voters.
- A key factor which dissipated the impact of identity politics in the Tasikmalaya election was the fact that all the four candidate teams claimed affiliation with the Nahdatul Ulama and/or other Muslim entities. Furthermore, religious leaders in Tasikmalaya urged contestants to refrain from provoking conflict on the basis of ethnicity or religion.
- Polarisation along sectarian lines was also mitigated by the broader context of the 2020 regional elections being contested by diverse political coalitions which were formed on the basis of local interests and pragmatic considerations instead of strict alignment with the political parties at the national level. This greatly helped to alleviate the Islamist-nationalist divide so often seen in Indonesian politics.

INTRODUCTION

Politics of identity and the politicisation of religion were dominant features in both the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections, and also in the 2017 gubernatorial election in Jakarta. Discussions on the potential use and abuse of religion as well as the polarization of Indonesian society in the 2020 simultaneous regional election have been common.

In Tasikmalaya, for example, sectarianism was lurking during the early days of the slotted campaign time. A big banner quoting the joint-ministerial decree on Ahmadiyya from 2008 was erected at the gate of Al-Aqsa Mosque in Badakpaeh, Cipakat, Singaparna, Tasikmalaya. The Ahmadiyya community owns the mosque. Rumours distributed through WhatsApp messages and social media said that Azies Rismaya Mahfud, the mayoral candidate from the Gerindra Party and Democrat Party coalition, was a Shi'a devotee, a member of a religious group considered deviant by some people in Indonesia.¹ The intention was unequivocal: it was to denigrate Azies and undermine his electability.

This attempt at identity politics, and the playing up of sectarian issues did not work in the Tasikmalaya election, however. How did that happen? And what does it imply for Indonesian democracy?

ISLAMIC IDENTITY AND SECTARIANISM IN TASIKMALAYA

Tasikmalaya is often associated with “Kota Santri” (Santri City or City of Pious People).² The idea to construct Tasikmalaya as a *Santri City* began at the end of the New Order when *santri* became a powerful force and *santri*-ness a strong identity for the district.³ This designation is based on the religiosity of its population, the huge number of *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) located there, and the strength of political Islam in that district. A majority of the population in Tasikmalaya are Muslims. Tasikmalaya is also famous for the number of big and old *pesantren* in that district,⁴ i.e. at Cipasung, Sukahideng, Suryalaya, Riyadlul Ulum Wadda'wah Condong, Bahrul Ulum Awipari, Sukamanah, Baitul Hikmah Haur Kuning, and Cintawana.⁵

Tasikmalaya was the stronghold of the Masyumi Party, one of the strongest political parties under the Sukarno regime (1945-1965). When Kartosuwiryo led the rebellion, commonly known as DI/TII (Darul Islam / Tentara Islam Indonesia) under the banner of Islam between 1949 and 1962, Tasikmalaya was the bastion for his group.

After the Reformasi period in 1998, Tasikmalaya implemented various “sharia” regulations which were considered discriminatory towards minorities.⁶ One of them was regulation No. 13/2001 on the strategic plan for Tasikmalaya Regency, “which is religious / Islamic”. Following this regulation, the local government issued circular No. 451/SE/Sos/2001 on “the effort to improve the quality of belief and piety” and Decree No 13/2003 451/Se/04/Sos/2001 on the requirement for enrolling elementary and middle schools to reflect the vision of the regency, which also focused on being “religious / Islamic”. Besides this regulation, Tasikmalaya witnessed several attacks against religious minorities by Muslim groups, especially towards the Ahmadiyya. In 2014, the Ahmadiis were forced to sign a declaration that stated that they have to leave the Ahmadiyya if they wanted their marriage to be registered with the Ministry of Religious Affairs.⁷ Even during the pandemic, which was first announced by President Joko Widodo on 2 March 2020, discriminations towards minorities in this district did not show any sign of slowing down. A case to note is the effort of the local government to seal

off Al-Aqso Mosque, which is owned by the Ahmadiyya community, in Badakpaeh, Cipakat, Singaparna on 6 April 2020.⁸ The discriminatory regulations and attacks to religious minorities brought repute to the district, nationally and internationally, as an intolerant district.⁹

NAHDLATUL ULAMA AND THE 2020 REGIONAL ELECTION

The 2020 regional election in Tasikmalaya saw four pairs of candidates running against each other: 1) Azies Rismaya Mahpud-Haris Sanjaya, 2) Ade Sugianto-Cecep Nurul Yakin, 3) Cep Zamzam Dzulfikar Nur-Padil Karsoma, and 4) Iwan Saputra-Iip Miftahul Faoz. Interestingly, all of them claimed to be representing the *santri* element of the Tasikmalaya population. More specifically, they claimed to represent the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU).¹⁰ Although direct election of heads of the Tasikmalaya regency government has been held since 2006, the 2020 election was the first to see all candidates claiming to represent NU.¹¹

Although NU has a strong influence on society, its role in local politics had not been very visible and it had even seemed neglected in politics.¹² National developments after the 2019 presidential election appeared to have changed this situation. With the inclusion of several NU leaders in Joko Widodo's administration, such as Ma'ruf Amin as the Vice President, many, including politicians in Tasikmalaya, identified or affiliated themselves with NU, expecting to win more support and more votes through it.

It is worth noting that the government's decision to divide Tasikmalaya into Tasikmalaya City (Kota Tasikmalaya) and Tasikmalaya Regency (Kabupaten Tasikmalaya) in 2001 provided a platform for the NU to gain more influence in the government. In urban areas, the influence of the NU is limited or obscure. Modernist religious organizations such as the Muhammadiyah and the Islamic Union (Persis) are stronger and more dominant than the NU in urban areas. These two organizations have several schools and *pesantren* in the city. In the regency areas, NU is indeed more dominant.

Large Islamic boarding schools located in the district are commonly affiliated with the NU. Among them are Cipasung, Sukahideung, Sukamanah and Haurkuning. Even Miftahul Huda *pesantren*, which was initially somewhat distant to NU because of the connection between its founder, Choer Affandi, and the Darul Islam (DI) movement, is now moving closer to NU.¹³ Moreover, after the banning of Hizbut Tahrir (HTI) and the Front of Islamic Defenders (FPI), the role of the NU as the holder of religious authority in Tasikmalaya Regency seems definite, with almost no contender to challenge its position.

Below is stated the background of the four pairs of candidates and how they affiliate themselves with the NU. Azies Rismaya Mahfud is a son of Haji Mahfud – better known as Haji Engkud – (died 2010), the founder of the Mayasari group, a company that originally focused on public transportation in Jakarta (*Mayasari, Primajasa, Doa Ibu*) but has now expanded into other fields including property and retail.¹⁴ Together with his four siblings – Agus Mahfud, Ade Ruhjana Mahfud, Amir Mahfud, and Rahmi Mahfud – Azies controls the businesses of their parents.¹⁵ In addition, they also manage the Al-Muttaqin educational institution, an elite school in the city of Tasikmalaya. Haji Mahfud, as a native of Tasikmalaya, tried his luck in Jakarta since the era of Governor Ali Sadikin in the 1960s. He has since become a successful businessman.

Apart from doing business, Haji Mahfud and his children, including Azies, were active in the Islamic movement, and in political parties. In the past, Haji Mahfud was a member of the Islamic Ummah Association (PUI), but his children, while becoming activists in Islamic Students Associations (HMI), became close to a Shi'ite group (IJABI).¹⁶ In terms of political parties, Haji Mahfud's family is very dynamic. Initially, they supported the Crescent and Star Party (PBB), then the National Mandate Party (PAN), then the Islamic Union Party (PPP) and the Justice and Welfare Party (PKS) to an extent, but lately, they have been seen to be actively associating with Gerindra Party. In the 2020 Tasikmalaya election, Azies was formally registered as the candidate for Gerindra Party and the Democrat Party.

Azies' running mate, Haris Sanjaya, is an NU activist, and was in fact the chairman of the Nahdlatul Ulama Student Association (IPNU) in Tasikmalaya Regency. In addition to the IPNU, he was also active in Ansor, NU's Youth wing, and a member of the National Awakening Party (PKB). He was general chairman of PKB Tasikmalaya Regency for two periods and a member of parliament for Tasikmalaya. But since his party, the PKB, decided to support other candidates in the elections, Sanjaya moved to join Azies. One of the significant meanings of this partnership between Azies and Sanjaya was that it relieved Azies of the sectarian issue. Azies, who was associated with the Shi'a denomination, was no longer attacked on that issue after his appointment of Sanjaya as his running mate.¹⁷

The second candidate, Ade Sugianto is a politician from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP). At 23, he served as chairman for the parliament in Tasikmalaya Regency (1999-2004). He then became deputy regent and subsequently replaced Uu Ruzhanul Ulum as the regent of Tasikmalaya. That happened after Ulum became deputy governor of West Java. Ade studied Archeology at Gadjah Mada University but did not finish his undergraduate programme.

Knowing that Tasikmalaya is "Kota Santri", Ade asked Cecep Nurul Yakin to be his running mate in the 2020 election.¹⁸ Cecep is the chairman of PPP for Tasikmalaya Regency. He is a son of the late Adang Mukarom, a prominent *ulama*, and a grandson of the late Abdulloh Muslim of Khoirul Huda Islamic Boarding School, Pancatengah. His father and grandfather were well-known as students of Mama Ruhayat Bantargedang, a sufi guru, who died in Mecca in the early 20th century. Cecep is also active in the NU as the chairman of Pagar Nusa, a martial art group, of Tasikmalaya.

The third candidate, Cep Zamzam Zulfikar Nur, was running as an individual candidate and did not use any political party as his vehicle. Before that, he was a civil servant in the Local Government Office of Tasikmalaya. He is a son of the late Asep Moch. Saefullah of *pesantren* Nurul Wafa, Sukarame, Tasikmalaya, who is a teacher of Tatang Farhanul Hakim (former Regent of Tasikmalaya). Tatang was the man behind Cep Zamzam's candidacy. It was also Tatang who mobilized community support for Cep Zamzam, and helped Cep Zamzam to complete the administrative requirement of having a certain number of ID cards in order to pass the process of individual candidacy. Besides Tatang, Cep Zamzam also received much show of support from the alliance of young ulama of the NU, named the Alliance of Ajengan Anom (Asparanom).¹⁹

To accompany Cep Zamzam in the election, Tatang asked Padil Karsona, a senior bureaucrat from Cikalong, Tasikmalaya, who had had a long career in Purwakarta, to become his running mate. Padil's last appointment in the government's office was as Regional Secretary of

Purwakarta Regency. He actually ran for the regency in Purwakarta in 2018, but failed. Cep Zamzam and Padil were the first pair running independently, without political party, in Tasikmalaya.

The fourth candidate, Iwan Saputra, is a bureaucrat and son of Lieutenant Colonel Basuni (former military commander in the district of Tasikmalaya, Chairman of the Tasikmalaya parliament, and Chairman of the Golkar Party).²⁰ Iwan's last bureaucratic appointment was as Head of Bappeda (Agency for Regional Development) of Tasikmalaya Regency. Iwan's main supporters, therefore, came from Golkar circles, army children (FKPPI), and certain *pesantrens*, such as Pesantren Suryalaya and Pesantren Idrisiyah, the two largest tarekat *pesantrens* in Tasikmalaya. These two *pesantren* were affiliated with Golkar Party during the New Order.

Being aware that he was not closely affiliated with the NU and did not have a strong religious background, Iwan took Iip Miftah Faoz as his running mate. Iip is a son of the late Saefuddin Zuhri of Haurkuning Islamic Boarding School, one of the largest NU Islamic boarding schools in southern Tasikmalaya. Iip himself is also an alumnus of the Sukahideng Islamic boarding school and was active in various *pesantren*-based NGOs, as well as in the Ansor of Tasikmalaya Regency. In addition, he was also coordinator of village assistants for the Ministry of Villages in West Java for several years. This pair was registered as a candidate from PKB, Golkar, PKS, PAN and Nasdem.

Since all candidates claimed to be associated with NU, sectarian issues did not arise during the campaigning period.²¹ What happened instead was mutual-claim and internal competition within the NU, and they did not attack each other with sectarian issues. The three candidates for deputy regents, namely Cecep, Haris, and Iip, even showed their friendly relationship in a photo taken during their participation in the *Madrasah Kader NU*, 7 November 2020. During a debate held by the Tasikmalaya Election Commission, a vice regent candidate, Iip Miftahul Faoz, said loudly that using the term "Islamic" was not really important in public statements.²² This was put forward in response to another candidate for vice regent, Cecep Nurul Yakin, who asked him why he did not include the words "religious / Islamic", referring to the Sharia By-Law No 13/2001, in their vision and mission statements.

During the campaign, the candidates avoided specific and distinctive issues. The incumbent promised to continue with the existing development, while the challengers contested that development in Tasikmalaya Regency was lagging behind. It was only Iwan-Iip who raised an alternative policy. If elected, they promised to issue a card, named *Peduli Umat Melayani Rakyat* (PUMR) or "Caring (Muslim) Community and Serving People", to be used to strengthen the welfare of people, especially Muslims.²³ Paying special attention to the Muslim community was seen as an important factor; the 2020 regional election in Tasikmalaya Regency was basically a struggle to win the vote of *santri* (pious Muslims).²⁴

The regional elections was held on 9 December 2020. Nothing unique happened except when the Indonesian Survey Circle (LSI), led by Denny JA, announced in the afternoon, the result of their quick count. The quick count showed that Iwan-Iip had won with 33.99% of the votes, followed by the incumbent Ade-Cecep with 31.29%, Azis-Haris with 23.14%, and finally Cep Zamzam-Padil with 11.58%. The LSI itself is a political consultant for the Ade-Cecep pair. After the quick count was released, Iwan-Iip immediately claimed victory.²⁵

However, on 16 December 2020, the Indonesian Commission of Election of Tasikmalaya Regency (KPUD) announced a different result from the LSI quick count.²⁶ Ade-Cecep won over Iwan-Iip. Ade-Cecep had received 32.18% of the votes, while Iwan-Iip had won only 31.47%. This decision of the KPUD generated controversy, and Iwan Saputra and his deputy filed a lawsuit to the Constitutional Court for alleging systematic fraud committed by Ade Sugianto.

Until today, the Constitutional Court has as yet not issued any decision regarding the winner(s) of the election in Tasikmalaya.

CONCLUSION

The rise in NU's role in Tasikmalaya has resulted in them having strong influence in the local political contest. The question why identity politics failed to determine the 2020 Tasikmalaya election can be answered from this point of view. The fact that all four pairs of candidates claimed to represent NU aided in promoting pluralism, making identity-based attacks arguably less successful. Azies Rismaya, who was initially accused as a member of a deviant religious group, was no longer attacked for it after he decided to partner with Haris Sanjaya, an NU leader. The accusation disappeared by itself.

What happened during the election was mainly competition among NU people. Fortunately, NU leaders in Tasikmalaya were well-prepared and responded wisely to the potential use of identity politics among NU candidates. Atam Rustam, the local chairman of the NU, announced that the board of the NU did not provide any recommendation to vote for a certain candidate. More important than that, Atam asked voters not to be provoked by the issue of SARA (ethnicity, religion, race, and inter-group). This announcement was not only written in a circular letter, but also video-recorded and widely circulated to the public. This announcement was very effective in mitigating the use or the abuse of sectarian issues and identity politics.²⁷

In other words, the role of Islamic organizations, in this case; NU of Tasikmalaya Regency, was to ensure that the issue of identity politics was not used and abused during the elections. The role of civil Islam in balancing democracy cannot be underestimated. The absence of identity politics in the 2020 Tasikmalaya election evidently reflected this aspect.

Besides the role of NU local leaders in limiting the use of sectarian issues, the context behind the 2020 regional elections could have also contributed to the absence of identity politics. Simultaneous elections took place in many parts of Indonesia. There were 270 regions across the country covering nine provinces, 224 regencies and 37 municipalities which held election that same day, 9 December 2020. The division between Islamist party and nationalist party collapsed in this election. PKS and the PDIP, previously seen as water and oil, were allied in 13 regional elections.²⁸ In Tasikmalaya, PKB, PKS, PAN, Golkar and Nasdem were allied in support of Iwan-Iip.

The blurring division, coalition, and alliance among political parties made it difficult to have a single national issue to define them and contrast them from other parties. They could not orchestrate a single theme in all the regions. Therefore, it was not surprising that there was no polarisation during this election.

The last factor that contributed to the absence of identity politics was the banning of the Indonesian Hizbut Tahrir (HTI).²⁹ This organisation had been the brain behind the rise of identity politics and the implementation of Islamic Sharia in several districts, and was the mastermind behind various demonstrations and rallies, including the 212 movement that demanded the government to give a dominant role to Islam and to discriminate against non-Muslims. With the banning of the HTI in 2017, no other organization has appeared which is active, capable and systematic enough to promote identity politics in elections.

There was, of course, the Front of Islamic Defenders (FPI), a loyal partner of the HTI. The supreme leader of the FPI, Muhammad Rizieq Shihab, returned from self-exile in Saudi Arabia on 10 November 2020. However, without the help of the HTI, Shihab seemed unable to consolidate his supporters to activate identity politics during the regional elections. The government had continuously tried to restrict the activities of the FPI and finally banned it not long after the regional elections, on 30 December 2020.³⁰

¹ “Azies Klarifikasi Tuduhan Dirinya Syiah, di Masjid As-Siraj wal Arsyad”, *kapol.id*, 14 June 2020, <https://kapol.id/azies-klarifikasi-tuduhan-dirinya-syiah-di-masjid-as-siraj-wal-arsyad/> (accessed 4 March 2021).

² For a discussion on the concept of *santri*, see: Burhani, Ahmad Najib Burhani, “Geertz’s Trichotomy of Abangan, Santri, and Priyayi: Controversy and Continuity”, *Journal of Indonesian Islam*, 11 (2/2017): 329-50. For Tasikmalaya as “Kota Santri”, see: Amin Mudzakkir, “Perseteruan Memori Kolektif: Kontestasi Islam dan Politik di Tasikmalayaa Pasca-Orde Baru”, *Dinika: Academic Journal of Islamic Studies*, Vol. 4 (3/2019): 399-412.

³ It began after the 1996 riot, when some people vandalized the properties of Chinese and attacked houses of worship of non-Muslim minorities. See Mudzakkir (2019).

⁴ Of the 1.8 million in Tasikmalaya Regency, only 593 were non-Muslims. See *Kabupaten Tasikmalaya dalam Angka 2021*. Tasikmalaya: BPS – Statistics of Tasikmalaya Regency, 2021, p. 152.

⁵ “10 Pondok Pesantren Besar Di Tasikmalaya”, *nu-kotatasikmalaya.id*, 25 Sep 2020. <https://nu-kotatasikmalaya.id/10-pondok-pesantren-besar-di-tasikmalaya/> (accessed 4 March 2021)

⁶ For more detail, see Amin Mudzakkir, “Konservatisme Islam dan Intoleransi Keagamaan di Tasikmaya”, *Harmoni*, Vol. 16 (1/2017): 57-74; Also, Amin Mudzakkir, “Dilema Kota Santri: Politik kewarganegaraan di Tasikmalaya Pasca-Soeharto”, Presented at the 7th International Symposium of Journal Antropologi Indonesia, 23-26 July 2019. <https://simposiumjai.ui.ac.id/download/9-10-kota-santri-dilema-the-politics-of-citizenship-in-post-soeharto-tasikmalaya/>

⁷ *Laporan Kebebasan Beragama / Berkeyakinan dan Intoleransi 2014* (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2014), p. 53.

⁸ “Upaya Penyevelan Masjid Ahmadiyah di Kabupaten Tasikmalaya Tuai Penolakan”, *pikiranrakyat.com*, 7 April 2020. <https://www.pikiran-rakyat.com/jawa-barat/pr-01362265/upaya-penyevelan-masjid-ahmadiyah-di-kabupaten-tasikmalaya-tuai-penolakan> (accessed 4 March 2021).

⁹ Jessica Soedirgo, (2018) “Informal networks and religious intolerance: how clientelism incentivizes the discrimination of the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia”, *Citizenship Studies*, 22 (2/2018): 191-207.

¹⁰ For Haris Sanjaya, Cecep Nurul Yakin, and Iip Miftahul Faoz, see “3 Kader NU Bertarung di Pilkada Tasikmalaya, Ini Sikap PCNU”, *jabar.nu.or.id*, 24 Sep 2020, <https://jabar.nu.or.id/detail/3-kader-nu-bertarung-di-pilkada-tasikmalaya--ini-sikap-pcnu> (accessed 12 March 2020); For Cep Zamzam Dzulfikar Nur, see “Kiai Muda Siap Dukung Cep Zamzam,” *radartasikmalaya.com*, 23 Sep 2019, <https://www.radartasikmalaya.com/kiai-muda-siap-dukung-cep-zamzam/> (accessed 12 March 2021)

¹¹ Since 2006, the Regency of Tasikmalaya had held local elections three times. In 2006, Tatang Farhanul Hakim was elected regent. In 2011, Uu Ruzhanul Ulum was elected to succeed Tatang

Farhanul Hakim. In 2016, Uu Ruzhanul Ulum was elected for the second time as regent. Candidate's association with the NU, although weakly, appeared in all those three elections. In 2020, being part of the NU was believed to be a key to success and, therefore, all the candidates claimed to be part of the NU. For 2006 election, see "Tasikmalaya Gelar Pilkada, 4 Pasangan Bertarung", *detik.com*, 7 Jan 2006, <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-514433/tasikmalaya-gelar-pilkada-4-pasangan-bertarung>; For 2011 election, see "KPU Tetapkan Pasangan 'Huda' Menangkan Pilkada Tasikmalaya", *antara.com*, 15 Jan 2011, <https://jabar.antaranews.com/berita/29844/kpu-tetapkan-pasangan-huda-menang-pilkada-tasikmalaya>; For 2016 election, see "Molor Sebulan, Calon Tunggal Bupati Tasikmalaya Ditetapkan", *tempo.co*, 11 Jan 2016, <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/737591/molor-sebulan-calon-tunggal-bupati-tasikmalaya-ditetapkan> (accessed 13 March 2021)

¹² On the political maps in Tasikmalaya, between the city of Tasikmalaya and the Regency of Tasikmalaya, see Amin Mudzakkir, "Konservatisme Islam dan Intoleransi Keagamaan di Tasikmaya", *Harmoni*, Vol. 16 (1/2017): 57-74.

¹³ Choer Affandi is the founder of the Miftahul Huda Islamic boarding school, one of the largest Islamic boarding schools in Tasikmalaya and even West Java. Before founding the pesantren in 1967, he was well known as a Darul Islam influential figure. See Amin Mudzakkir, "Konservatisme Islam dan Intoleransi Keagamaan di Tasikmaya", *Harmoni*, Vol. 16 (1/2017): 57-74; Amin Mudzakkir, "Mobilisasi Islam dan Politik di Jawa Barat: Sebelum dan Sesudah Rangkaian Aksi 212" in Cahyo Pamungkas and Yogi Setya Permana (eds.), *Intoleransi dan Politik Identitas Kontemporer di Indonesia* (Jakarta: LIPI Press, 2020), pp. 173-196.

¹⁴ "Sekilas Tentang Sosok Seorang H. Azies Rismaya Mahpud", *rakyatmerdeka.com*, n.d., <https://rakyatmerdeka.com/2020/07/12/sekilas-tentang-sosok-seorang-h-azies-rismaya-mahpud/> (accessed 4 March 2021)

¹⁵ "Azies Rismaya Jadi Cabup Tasikmalaya Paling Tajir", *detik.news.com*, 25 Sep 2020, <https://news.detik.com/berita-jawa-barat/d-5188076/azies-rismaya-jadi-cabup-tasikmalaya-paling-tajir> (accessed 4 March 2021)

¹⁶ Interview with Nurjani, a local journalist, in Tasikmalaya, 26 Nov 2019.

¹⁷ "Azis Minta Restu NU untuk Maju sebagai Cabup Tasikmalaya", *koropak.co.id*, 8 Feb 2020. <https://news.koropak.co.id/11548/azis-minta-restu-nu-untuk-maju-sebagai-cabup-tasikmalaya> (accessed 4 March 2021).

¹⁸ "Berangkat dari Keluarga Pondok Pesantren, Berikut Profil H Cecep Nurul Yakin, Calon Wakil Bupati Nomor Urut 2", *kamarang.com*, 9 october 2020. <https://www.kamarang.com/berangkat-dari-keluarga-pondok-pesantren-berikut-profil-h-cecep-nurul-yakin-calon-wakil-bupati-nomor-urut-2/> (accessed 4 March 2021)

¹⁹ "Kiai Muda Siap Dukung Cep Zamzam", *radartasikmalaya.com*, 23 Sep 2019. <https://www.radartasikmalaya.com/kiai-muda-siap-dukung-cep-zamzam/> (accessed 4 March 2021)

²⁰ "Mengenal Sosok Bakal Calon Bupati Tasikmalaya Iwan Saputra", *sakata.id*, 21 Sep 2020. <https://sakata.id/sosok/mengenal-sosok-bakal-calon-bupati-tasikmalaya-iwan-saputra/> (accessed 4 March 2021).

²¹ Yang muncul justru adalah politik uang sebagaimana dikemukakan oleh badan pengawas pemilihan umum (bawaslu) setempat. Lihat, <https://tirto.id/pilkada-tasikmalaya-2020-bawaslu-temukan-dugaan-politik-uang-f7W5> (accessed 16 Maret 2021)

²² See "Pilkada Kabupaten Tasikmalaya, Debat dengan Cecep, Iip: Jargon Islami Tidak Terlalu Penting", https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QrTaVSS_90M (accessed 13/3/2021)

²³ "Inilah Janji Politik Cawabup Iip untuk Masyarakat Kabupaten Tasikmalaya", <https://literasinews.pikiran-rakyat.com/politik/pr-92860870/inilah-janji-politik-cawabup-iip-untuk-masyarakat-kabupaten-tasikmalaya> (accessed 19/03/2020)

²⁴ "Ceruk Suara Santri di Pilkada Tasikmalaya", <https://koran.tempo.co/read/nasional/459855/ceruk-suara-santri-di-pemilihan-bupati-tasikmalaya?>

- ²⁵ “Iwan-Iip Menang di Pilbup Tasikmalaya Versi QC LSI Denny JA”, *detik.com*, 9 Dec 2020. <https://news.detik.com/berita-jawa-barat/d-5288777/iwan-iip-menang-di-pilbup-tasikmalaya-versi-qc-lsi-denny-ja> (accessed 4 March 2021)
- ²⁶ “Quick Count LSI Denny JA di Pilkada Tasikmalaya Meleset, Akademisi: LSI Harus Jelaskan ke Publik”, *kompas.com*, 17 Dec 2020. <https://regional.kompas.com/read/2020/12/17/13223551/quick-count-lsi-denny-ja-di-pilkada-tasikmalaya-meleset-akademisi-lsi-harus?page=all> (accessed 4 March 2021)
- ²⁷ “Maklumat PCNU Kab. Tasikmalaya Terkait Pilkada Kabupaten Tasikmalaya”, 20 Oct 2020. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RTeOwdmsCcs> (accessed 4 March 2020).
- ²⁸ “Bersatu di 13 Pilkada PDIP-PKS Ternyata Bukan Minyak dan Air”, *rm.id*, 30 August 2020. <https://rm.id/baca-berita/pilkada/45854/bersatu-di-13-pilkada-pdip-pks-ternyata-bukan-minyak-dan-air> (accessed 4 March 2021).
- ²⁹ Ahmad Najib Burhani, “The Banning of Hizbut Tahrir and the Consolidation of Democracy in Indonesia”, *ISEAS Perspective*, 19 September 2017. https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2017_71.pdf
- ³⁰ Ahmad Najib Burhani, “Will the Banning of the FPI Thwart Radicalism?”, *ISEAS Commentary*, 5 January 2021. <https://fulcrum.sg/will-the-banning-of-the-fpi-thwart-radicalism/>

<p><i>ISEAS Perspective</i> is published electronically by: ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute</p> <p>30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735</p> <p>Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: https://www.iseas.edu.sg/support</p>	<p>ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed.</p> <p>Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission.</p> <p>© Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article.</p>	<p>Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok</p> <p>Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong</p> <p>Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng</p> <p>Editors: William Choong, Malcolm Cook, Lee Poh Onn, and Ng Kah Meng</p> <p>Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s).</p>
--	---	---