In this webinar, Dr Richard Q. Turcsanyi sheds light on the findings of The Sinophone Borderlands survey – comparing how the public in 13 European countries perceive China and various China-related issues, what foreign policy alignments they favour, and what policy on China they support.
REGIONAL STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL STUDIES PROGRAMME
Wednesday, 3 March 2021 — As China moves to realise its aspirations for global leadership, it becomes ever more important to understand how China is being perceived by the world, especially through the use of empirical data. In a webinar at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute to discuss “Worsening European Public Opinion on China and Implications for Asia”, Richard Turcsanyi shares the findings of the Sinophone Borderlands survey, which aggregates public opinion on China and other related issues based on a sample of almost 20,000 respondents in 13 European countries. Dr Turcsanyi is a Key Researcher at Palacky University Olomouc, Assistant Professor at Mendel University in Brno and Program Director at the Central European Institute of Asian Studies.
Dr Turcsanyi outlined the importance of tracking people’s perspectives of China by arguing that public opinion can be shown to have a “significant and strong correlation” with particular policy preferences. In particular, he stated his belief that European public opinion does play a significant role in foreign policy, especially when China is concerned. European public sentiment can determine, for instance, whether countries are able to cooperate with Chinese technology firms or engage in closer economic diplomacy with China. Dr Turcsanyi identified public scepticism as the reason for the reluctance among many Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) to commit to the Comprehensive Agreement on Investments with China.
Dr Turcsanyi shared that Sweden had the most negative perceptions of China, probably as a result of its ongoing tensions with China and the abrasive ”wolf-warrior diplomacy” practiced by the Chinese ambassador in Sweden. Only Russia and Serbia—the two countries surveyed that are neither current nor former members of the European Union—had predominantly positive views of China. In other countries, public opinion of China was mostly negative (with the singular exception of Latvia, whose respondents were split almost evenly between having positive, negative and neutral views of China.)
According to Dr Turcsanyi, it appears as though the more northern and western an European country is, the more negative its view of China. (On the other hand, countries in the south and east of Europe tend to be more favourable of China.) In general, Dr Turcsanyi asserted that there are significant internal similarities within the European Union on China: not only do they have a negative view of the country, but that view is worsening. There is also convergence about the preferred policy options for dealing with China.
Dr Turcsanyi also compared China’s standings vis-a-vis other international actors. Respondents in the European countries (excluding Serbia and Russia) view North Korea most negatively, with China coming second, though at a considerable distance. Technically speaking, the Europeans’ perceptions of China are almost similar to how they view Russia and Israel. In terms of trust, Dr Turcsanyi pointed out that Europe is not exactly making a choice between China and the United States. In Germany, for instance, respondents reported low levels of trust in both major powers, indicating that the negative views towards one of them does not necessarily translate into positive views for the other. More significantly, the respondents acknowledged China as the most economically powerful actor, while regarding the European Union as relatively weaker in comparison to both China and Russia. Meanwhile, the granular issue that most European respondents perceived most negatively about was China’s impact on the global environment.
Interestingly, the respondents selected cooperation on global issues with China—including on climate change, pandemic management and counter-terrorism—as their most preferred policy option that they hope their governments will pursue. Dr Turcsanyi suggested that this may be a pragmatic outcome: while the European public does not trust China, it recognises China’s power and the fact that global issues cannot be properly handled without China’s participation.
Dr Turcsanyi also discussed some country-specific responses. For instance, he showed that while German respondents recognise that there might be economic costs in confronting China about its human rights record, an overwhelming majority insists that the issue should be a priority in Germany’s dealings with China. Elsewhere, while anti-China sentiment is high in Sweden, the public still wants to retain a functional relationship with China: there was little support for expelling the Chinese ambassador or severing links with sister-cities in China.
In his discussion with an audience of 88, Dr Turcsanyi shared more details about the survey methodology while addressing questions relating to European perceptions about China’s Belt and Road Initiative and COVID-19 assistance to the continent, Europe’s possible position on and role in the Indo-Pacific and the policy priority of human rights in Europe’s interactions with China.
