Webinar on “Vietnamese Civil Society: Recent Developments and Prospect”

In this webinar, Dr Andrew Wells-Dang reviewed developments in Vietnamese civil society over the past decade and examined prospects for Vietnamese civil society’s survival and effectiveness in the context of growing constraints and pressures.

VIETNAM STUDIES PROGRAMME WEBINAR

Thursday, 7 April 2022 – ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute hosted a webinar on “Vietnamese Civil Society: Recent Developments and Prospects” presented by Dr Andrew Wells-Dang, a veteran researcher of Vietnamese civil society. He currently works as Senior Expert in the Southeast Asia Program at the US Institute of Peace in Washington, DC.

Dr Andrew Wells-Dang presented three examples of Vietnamese civil society action. Dr Le Hong Hiep moderated the webinar. (Credit: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute)

Dr Wells-Dang defined civil society as “a process of organised action by citizens that influences public issues that affect people’s lives.” Therefore, his presentation focused on civil society actors and action instead of civil society organisations or a civil society sector.

Any community and citizen, including those in the business sector or the government, can participate in civil society action. Civil society is highly diverse and thus can be an area of contestation and conflict. The same is true for the state, which can be both enabling and repressive towards civil society.

Civil society action is a process of networking and coalition-building. Targets of networking depend on the topic issue and objectives of civil society actors. For example, civil society actors seeking to influence policy would develop a network with specialised professionals, NGOs, academics, experts, and current or retired government officials. Civil society actors who use social media to increase public outreach tend to work with journalists, activists and NGOs. Finally, those who organise at the community level network with local leaders, commune and district governments, mass organisations, and other local associations.

Dr Wells-Dang presented three examples of Vietnamese civil society action. The first is the 2009 campaign against government plans to mine bauxite in Vietnam’s Central Highlands. The “anti-bauxite coalition” consisted of scientists, professional officials, and several NGOs. As discussions on the issue were blocked in the state media, these advocates brought their activism to online platforms. In the aftermath of the campaign, the Vietnamese government drastically scaled down its bauxite mining plans.

The second example is the US-Vietnam Dialogue Group on Agent Orange/Dioxin, established in 2007 as an initiative of Vietnamese and American scientists, doctors, foundation representatives and journalists. Their efforts helped break the deadlock between the two countries, facilitating bilateral cooperation in dioxin remediation and provision of assistance to people affected by Agent Orange. This is an example of a civil society action that the Vietnamese state welcomes and supports.

The third example is civil society action for child rights in Ho Chi Minh City. There are three overlapping networks with more than 60 members, most of which are registered or unregistered small local charities or social service groups. Some of them, such as Buddhist and Catholic religious groups, would like to register, but they often encounter difficulties in gaining legal status in Vietnam.

Compared to these cases, land protestors, anti-China bloggers and environmental activists seem to have much less space to act in Vietnam, as often portrayed in international reports on Vietnamese laws and regulations. However, Dr Wells-Dang cautioned that how the law is enforced in Vietnam varies from case to case. In reality, the state welcomes certain aspects of civil society action while disapproving of others.

Following these examples, Dr Wells-Dang offered two observations. First, civil society is a contested concept. The Vietnamese translation of the term—xa hoi dan su—does not carry the same connotation as civil society in other languages. Moreover, the term is not used or officially recognised by Vietnamese authorities. In 2019, in order to be able to publish a book on civil society in Vietnam, the authors had to use the word xa hoi cong dan (citizens’ society) instead.

Second, the Vietnamese state seems to have a narrow understanding of civil society. Resolution No. 4 by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), dated 30 October 2016, associates “civil society” with the idea of separation of power. According to Dr Wells-Dang, this shows that Party leaders perceived civil society as a manifestation of Western-style democracy, which threatens the one-party system. Anti-civil society posts on the Internet also perpetuate the view that hostile forces are trying to overthrow the CPV by using civil society organisations to incite “peaceful evolution” and “colour revolution” in Vietnam.

But Dr Wells-Dang argued that many civil society groups in Vietnam harbour no anti-state motives and are willing to work with state allies. Therefore, he stressed the need for a broader approach toward civil society that captures the diversity of civil society actors and actions. He also noted that across Asia, civil society groups have managed to operate under a variety of political regimes that are not based on multiparty democracy or Western values. “A vibrant civil society doesn’t lead to any regime type,” said Dr Wells-Dang.

The rest of Dr Wells-Dang’s presentation focused on the current situation of civil society in Vietnam. Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, local philanthropy has increased in Central and Southern Vietnam, with religious groups playing a central role. Identity-based civil society groups, such as those with members who are LGBT people and people with disabilities, remain active. There have also been some labour strikes.

On the situation of international funding, while the total amount has remained the same, some donors have either retreated or shifted their focus to specific issues or trade promotion to maintain good relations with the Vietnamese state. Thus, Vietnamese state agencies could benefit from external assistance at the expense of civil society.

The operating space for regime critics or dissidents continues to shrink. Many are at risk of harsh imprisonment, while some prominent online voices have been silenced. Activists on sensitive subjects, such as land and the environment, have faced a similar situation. Last year and early this year witnessed the first-ever arrests of leaders of registered NGOs, which shows that the line is blurring between formal and informal civil society.

Dr Wells-Dang highlighted some other evidence of the Vietnamese state applying greater pressure on civil society actors. However, it remains to be seen whether this is a temporary or permanent change, a move against certain individuals or an indication of a broader shift in state-civil society relations. Dr Wells-Dang reiterated the contested nature of civil society, adding that attempts to control or suppress civil society could be a sign that the actions of brave advocates are having some effect.

In the Q&A session, Dr Wells-Dang answered more than 20 questions from the audience on his experience of working for international NGOs in Vietnam; the prospects of Vietnam’s draft law on associations; civil society action among Vietnamese ethnic minorities; the role of the Vietnamese Fatherland Front, non-profit organisations and private sector actors in Vietnamese civil society; whether international pressures can help widen the civic space in Vietnam; and how to make the Vietnamese government have a more proper understanding of the importance of civil society to the country’s socio-economic development.

The webinar was well-attended with about 140 participants. (Credit: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute)