Webinar on “One Year After the Coup: Whither Myanmar?”

The webinar examined the updated situation of Myanmar and its people one year after the Myanmar ’s violent power grab as well as the State Administration Council (SAC)’s relentless crackdown on various communities across Myanmar.

Myanmar Studies Programme Webinar

On Thursday, 27 January 2022, the ISEAS Myanmar Studies Programme convened a webinar under Chatham House Rule, and invited Anthony Davis, a Bangkok-based security analyst and consultant; Nyantha Maw Lin, an independent analyst and former business owner; and Debbie Stothard, founding director and coordinator of ALTSEAN-Burma.

Ms Moe Thuzar, co-coordinator of the ISEAS Myanmar Studies Programme, moderated the webinar, which attracted the interest of 171 attendees. The discussion shared updates and analyses, offering some insight into the multi-faceted challenges – and consequences – of Myanmar’s continuing crisis after the 1 February 2021 coup. Key points discussed by the panellists included the following:

Clockwise from top left: Debbie Stothard, Moe Thuzar (moderator), Nyantha Maw Lin and Anthony Davis. (Credit: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute)

The situation of conflict and contestation:

  • Many areas in Myanmar are still being contested, and the military is not in absolute control. But such a situation is not new in the Myanmar context where various sub-state actors such as the ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) have managed to retain territorial control over several decades.
  • However, the extent to which that dynamic spread into Bamar heartlands is new. The military has lost the will and support of the majority of people in Myanmar. Protracted conflict is to be expected between the military and the resistance forces.
  • Myanmar people think of ‘Tatmadaw’ as an occupying force extracting the funds dedicated to the state and the people. Withdrawal of large legacy investments also indicates that more sanctions or punitive measures against the military may be forthcoming, and investors are unwilling to navigate the increasing constraints. In such a scenario, Myanmar may see a return to decentralised resource extraction exercised by the military in the 1990s. Land sales, logging and mining concessions, illicit production of timber, and trade reliance on China and Thailand may thus become features of the Myanmar economy again if more formal and aboveground revenue sources dwindle.

Various forces resisting the military rule:

  • The National Unity Government (NUG) and National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) continue to hold the line. The NUG remains popular among the public and has formed alliances with other key political and armed ethnic groups.
  • At the time of this conversation, the People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) have trained over 50,000 persons in the past nine months, in guerrilla warfare. The PDFs have practised these guerrilla tactics on infrastructure projects and have also targeted alleged junta sympathisers.
  • The capacity and resilience of the PDFs were underestimated in the early days. However, given the current scale of the resistance, it is also important to recognise the constraints faced by the PDFs which are mainly a lack of weaponry and lack of strategy. These two elements have a symbiotic relationship. Weaponry and strategy go together for tactical advances that compel an armed force to think strategically. Having a clear strategy gives a clearer idea of the logistics needed for tactical advances. The main concern now is that both elements are missing in PDF actions.
  • PDF leaders have repeatedly requested for weapons, but they do not seem to have developed a broader strategy. While the NUG’s Ministry of Defence has the ability and theory to develop a national strategy for resistance which can be passed down to PDFs and their allies, the ministry is not able to facilitate the supply of weapons.

International/regional responses:

  • The international community must recognise the scale and enormity of the Myanmar crisis. There is no foreseeable path to a resolution which leads to widespread displacement and suffering of refugees including Rohingyas. There is also a potential for a more active narcotics trade.
  • The international community’s actions seem to be hampered by their “fear of the unknown” should there be an absence of the military in Myanmar. Their concerns include a power vacuum and demobilisation. It is important to understand, however, that the military’s role in the country’s politics is being questioned, rather than an absence of the military altogether. Empowering NUCC is also important in this context, as the NUCC is the platform where Myanmar may be able to find a viable, stable outcome in the political setup beyond the 2021 coup.  
  • It is important for external interlocutors to understand that consistently accommodating the military may not bring about a resolution to the current crisis. Unless the military is deleveraged or forced to do so, there will be no stability in Myanmar. The legacy of the military as a force for stability, peace and progress is no longer viable, and the military can no longer be seen as an insurmountable force of hard power. The current situation, and indeed, the past decade (2010-2020) showed that the military needs to undergo structural changes. The SAC does not enjoy state centrality in the same way the military did at the time of the 1962 coup, even though the military was not popular.  However, the military as a force in Myanmar cannot be ignored, as it is still the best resourced and organised against all the different resisting factions.
  • On the part of ASEAN, its credibility as the central platform for the international community’s engagement on the crisis situation is now at stake with the Myanmar crisis. The efforts of the ASEAN Chair for 2022, Cambodia, indicate that the Five-Point Consensus in its present form has lost its focus.
  • ASEAN needs to recognise the various security consequences of the worsening situation in Myanmar, as many still look to ASEAN for a credible response. Even so, practical measures are being taken by some of Myanmar’s neighbours. For example, China has established humanitarian and health aid buffer zones, and has also unilaterally vaccinated local communities in those areas. Local communities in these areas are largely receptive to such interventions as they believe the presence of the Chinese Red Cross and medical personnel may also shield them from airstrikes by the Tatmadaw. Additionally, displaced people seek refuge in such buffer zones.

Looking ahead to 2022:

  • There may not be any significant change on the part of the military in 2022. The military may use the dry season to hit back at the resistance, and also use more armoured vehicles, airstrikes and drones to escalate the conflict. Horrible atrocities have become a pattern and ASEAN leaders have only started to realise the seriousness of the situation.
  • The word “stalemate” to describe the situation in Myanmar is misleading and reflects analytical laziness in talking about the future. Conflict is dynamic and fluid. While the Tatmadaw may not be easily defeated, they cannot simply keep killing all PDFs or dissenters to instil ‘stability’ in the country.  At the same time, the military is deploying snipers in urban areas, possibly as a strategy to scare the urban population into quiescence.  
  • An interesting question is whether the Tatmadaw can continue on its path of using overwhelming brute power to manipulate or control a political outcome. This still seems to be the sentiment of the top military leaders, even though on-ground realities may inform field and mid-level commanders otherwise.
  • A ‘balance of chaos’ in central Myanmar may likely continue.
  • The EAOs seem to have had the most gains in the present scenario. EAO blocs of ethnic power have been emerging (e.g. Kachin, Wa, Arakan and Karen), and are building up buffer forces with the PDFs on their territorial borders.  Yet, all these ethnic forces seem to have a gravitational pull towards the centre.
  • It is important to monitor the future of the Bamar heartlands, even though a clearer picture may only emerge two or three years from the present moment.
  • Another important question relates to whether the military regime can still maintain the flow of liquidity to fund their actives, in view that several multinationals have indicated their intention to pull out, or have already done so. Those remaining in Myanmar will be hard-pressed to continue operations if the State Administration Council (SAC) interferes with e-commerce and internet access. Targeted sanctions are also starving the SAC and its affiliates of much-needed cash.

Questions posed to panellists after their discussion mainly related to clarifying the state of conflict and clashes in Myanmar, the role and activities of the PDFs, and the role and postures of Myanmar’s neighbours China, Thailand, India and Bangladesh in relation to the current Myanmar crisis, the Myanmar military’s increasing interactions with Russia, and some additional thought on collective and individual measures by ASEAN member states with regard to engaging different stakeholders and possible retaliatory measures by the SAC.