Webinar on “Myanmar Ten Months After The Coup”

The webinar revisited the nine possible future scenarios for Myanmar that Professor Ardeth Maung Thawnhmung first sketched out in March 2021, with a focus on changes in potential paths for Myanmar that had arisen between March and December 2021.

Myanmar Studies Programme Webinar

On Friday, 17 December 2021, the ISEAS Myanmar Studies Programme convened a webinar under Chatham House Rule inviting Professor Ardeth Maung Thawnhmung, Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science Department, University of Massachusetts at Lowell.  The speaker analysed the different turns in the Myanmar crisis since the 2021 coup and explored how the military and the anti-coup protestors both seek to shape the outcome of the crisis.  The basis of the discussion was Professor Ardeth Thawnhmung’s earlier analysis “Back to the Future? Possible Scenarios for Myanmar” published as an ISEAS Perspective on 12 March 2021.

Speaker Prof Ardeth Maung Thawnhmung with moderator Ms Moe Thuzar. (Credit: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute)

The webinar, which was moderated by Ms Moe Thuzar, co-coordinator of the ISEAS Myanmar Studies Programme, attracted the interest of 172 attendees. Professor Ardeth Thawnghmung’s discussion revisited the nine possible scenarios she had earlier projected, based on the objectives of different players, their attempts to influence the nature and direction of the crisis, and the interaction of strategies employed by the military and the protest movement. In her discussion, Professor Ardeth Thawnghmung outlined 1) potential outcomes based on the range of choices or strategies on the part of the military, ranging from non-accommodation to partial accommodation and full accommodation; 2) choices for the protest movement, from full protest to partial protest or outright compliance with the military regime. An optimal scenario for those resisting military rule would be one in which the resistance movement triumphs.   

  • Scenario 1A reflected the endgame initially envisioned by the military, with full compliance from the protest movement. Scenario 1B would be similar to the period between 1988 and 2004, when the military intensified its repression while exploring an exit strategy. Scenario 1C indicated a complete breakdown of law and order, and the cessation of basic operations of government with neither side displaying any willingness to concede.
  • Scenario 2A assesses the implications should the military decide to make concessions in order to gain public support or due to pressure or international mediation, expectations were that the SAC might allow the National League for Democracy (NLD) to contest elections in 2023 under a modified proportional representation system. This modified proportional representation system would allow the NLD to win some seats but prevent a repeat of the NLD capturing a majority of elected seats.
  • Scenario 2B would be similar to the situation between 2004 and 2010, when the military relaxed restrictions on foreign and domestic private investors and civil society organizations that refrained from political mobilization against the military. However, as Scenario 2C describes, if resistance continued at its present level, localised self-governing mechanisms of the sort that have already appeared in some areas to fill the vacuum of political authority, may further emerge/evolve.
  • Scenario 3A presents essentially the pre-2021 coup circumstances, in which the military would recognise the November 2020 election results but retain its privileges under the 2008 constitution. However, Scenario 3B projects the possibility of public protests continuing to call for the resignation of top military leaders responsible for the coup. Full military concession (Scenario 3C) would completely revolutionise Myanmar’s political landscape by abolishing the 2008 constitution, potentially transforming the country from a quasi-democracy to full democracy with the military controlled by civilian politicians, and from a unitary system to a genuine federal democracy.
  • In March 2021, a month after the coup, Myanmar was in the deadlock situation of Scenario 1C.  At the ten-month mark of the coup, the country still seems to be stuck in a situation around Scenario 1B and 1C.  Though the military’s “ideal” situation immediately after the coup would have been Scenario 1, the State Administration Council (SAC) regime’s plans for elections in 2023 would now place the military’s ideal situation closer to any of the possible variations of partial accommodation in Scenario 2 at this point.
  • Starting in March 2021, the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) started consultations with a wide range of political entities and ethnic representatives with the aim of providing support to prepare the Federal Democracy Charter.  The NUCC was formally launched in November 2021, with up to 28 participating entities. 
  • However, in August 2021, the Commander-in-Chief of Myanmar military instituted a “Caretaker Government” and assumed the position of Prime Minister.  The military had also revisited classic and predictable strategies of the past to bring as many entities and persons as possible under military control by force or coercion, in particular targeting members of the NLD and supporters of the resistance.
  • A quick glance at the conflict map of Myanmar seems to show relative “peace” in the southern and western parts of Myanmar. There was, however, a mixed situation in central Myanmar with intensified conflict in Northwest Myanmar (Sagaing region).  Such a mixed situation would be witness to some resumption of daily life, and (limited) activities by humanitarian agencies, but also targeted killings on the rise. Unprecedented humanitarian consequences were looming with more targeted killings of civilians often accused as military collaborators.
  • Assessing the military’s relative strengths, its highly institutionalised chain of command structure, superior firepower and training gave it an advantage in some areas.  Even though the civil service infrastructure had collapsed, particularly in the healthcare and education sectors, the military’s ability to rely on brute force could obtain some level of compliance from the public such as forced re-opening of schools and collecting electricity bill payments. Local authorities and security forces were still able to fund their operations and fill their pockets by extorting money from residents. Additionally, some civil servants participating in the civil disobedience movement (CDM) had returned to work due to economic difficulties.
  • On the resistance side, opposition to military rule still largely united different groups, although there seemed to be some growing disagreement on objectives and goals for the country’s political future. The NLD’s main objective seemed to be largely perceived as a return to the pre-coup situation, or complete civilian control.
  • Even so, the National Unity Government (NUG) continued to enjoy a high level of public support. The NUG had established policies and guidelines for the People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) and for resistance groups participating in the People’s Defensive War announced in September 2021. However, not all resistance groups fell under NUG control, and the NUG still faced challenges in implementing socio-economic policies on the ground.  One recognisable achievement is the ability to generate revenue by innovative means such as bonds and lottery. NUG claimed to have a 700 USD million budget.
  • The resistance forces were diverse and flexible, and, as their tactics differed from the predictable military strategies, also presented an element of uncertainty for the military to anticipate or respond to.
  • In the next one to three years, Myanmar might still be in a situation akin to Scenario 1B or 1C, and might only be able to move to Scenario 2C conditions, if all political parties could have some limited participation in the military’s projected election. However, developments in Myanmar indicate that the military seemed determined to limit NLD’s electoral dominance.
  • Potential game-changers might present themselves in the form of a more united and coherent opposition and more territorial control by the resistance groups. Though there is limited evidence at this moment, an internal split in the military leadership and more defections from the military might also tilt the balance in the resistance’s favour. Even so, the resistance’s potential to gain an upper hand was contingent on circumstances where regional powers might switch their support, or in circumstances where the Myanmar military might face a resource challenge and could not access weapons to continue its crackdowns.
  • Every news cycle of atrocities committed against civilian populations renewed public anger against the military. Poverty was on the rise again. The majority of the people in Myanmar now had no guarantee of security or rule of law. The clashes and resumption of hostilities in some periphery – and recently central – areas in Myanmar had also led to a spike in displaced populations since February 2021.
  • At this juncture, two dominant approaches to the current political deadlock were worth further examination. The first was to intensify pressure on the military with a view towards system change. Some in the opposition see this crisis as a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to push for system change.  The crisis should not be viewed as a problem or power struggle between the NLD and the military. The aspirations voiced for a more inclusive future requires attention to be paid to resolving long-lasting challenges via the Federal Democracy Charter.  The second approach, which focuses on engagement, would give more agency to the military and its role in the transitional period.  This second approach favoured more of a focus on the short-term, similar to sentiments surrounding the 2010 election scenario and its aftermath. ASEAN’s approach seemed to fall into this category.

The discussion that followed the above assessment further probed questions into the Civil Disobedience Movement, the NLD’s likely next moves, different ethnic groups’ aspirations for independence/autonomy, the NUG’s financial management capacity, specifics of the NUCC’s future plans, likelihood of further military defections, approaches by China and Japan to the current political deadlock, and the Buddhist monks (Sangha)’s perspective on the political crisis.