In the third of a webinar series on China’s defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia, Dr Ngeow Chow-Bing explored the development of China-Malaysia defence relations from 2015 to 2020 by examining high-level visits, bilateral combined exercises, naval port calls, academic and think tank exchanges and defence industry cooperation between China and Malaysia over the past five years.
REGIONAL STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL STUDIES PROGRAMME WEBINAR
Tuesday, 24 November 2020 – The ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, with support from the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, organised a webinar on “Malaysia-China Defence Relations, 2015-2020: Interrupted Progress Amid Political Changes and Geopolitical Tensions” on Tuesday, delivered by Dr Ngeow Chow-Bing. Dr Ngeow is Director of the Institute of China Studies at the University of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur and editor of Researching China in Southeast Asia (Routledge, 2019).
Dr Ngeow noted that the 1990s marked the “exploratory” phase of China-Malaysia defence relations, which then quickly developed in the 2000s through initiatives such as student exchanges, arms deals and bilateral exercises. The impetus for the development of defence relations during this period, Dr Ngeow added, was the build-up of tensions in the South China Sea. The geopolitical context of this defence relationship, however, has changed dramatically in the last five years: Malaysian politics has become more unstable, with frequent changes in government; regional geopolitics has become more fluid, with an increasingly assertive China; and economic growth has become more fragile for both Malaysia and its neighbours.
For instance, while there were two Malaysian prime ministerial visits to China in the last five years – by Prime Minister Najib Razak in 2016 and Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad in 2018 – the tone of the respective joint statements issued during their visits was markedly different. While both statements touched on bilateral defence cooperation, the 2016 statement was considerably more forward-looking and optimistic – with Najib having signed a defence cooperation pact with his host during the visit – compared to the 2018 statement, which was noticeably scaled-down and cautious. The number of bilateral visits by Chinese and Malaysian military and defence officials has also decreased since 2018, although scale and size of military exercises involving the two countries have steadily increased. The only major arms procurement deal between the two countries was signed in 2017, involving the joint development of four littoral mission ships for the Malaysian navy. Chinese naval visit to Malaysian ports were also particularly active from 2015 to 2018, including a notable January 2017 visit by a Chinese submarine to Kota Kinabalu, which faces the South China Sea.
Dr Ngeow thus noted that the 2015-2018 period largely marked the continuation of efforts by Prime Minister Najib and his Barisan Nasional predecessors to actively develop China-Malaysia defence ties. Defence engagement, however, slowed after May 2018 as the incoming Pakatan Harapan government, led by Prime Minister Mahathir, sought to reprioritise and reassess the compatibility of BN-brokered agreements with the new government’s agenda. Shortly after this process was completed in 2019, and as defence ties between the two countries warmed up again, the Mahathir administration was ousted from power by the Perikatan Nasional coalition. This government then quickly found itself facing the Covid-19 pandemic while managing its unstable political alliance, thus leaving little bandwidth to cultivate its defence ties with China.
The webinar concluded with a virtual Q&A session that covered issues ranging from Malaysia’s defence relations with other powers such as Australia and the UK, the country’s search for new jet fighters, the role of Malaysia’s ethnic Chinese in China-Malaysia relations, as well as Malaysia’s place in China’s Digital Silk Road initiative.
