MIDDLE EASTERN INFLUENCES ON ISLAMIST ORGANIZATIONS IN MALAYSIA: THE CASES OF ISMA, IRF AND HTM

AHMAD FAUZI ABDUL HAMID AND CHE HAMDAN CHE MOHD RAZALI
Trends in Southeast Asia
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FOREWORD

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

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Middle Eastern Influences on Islamist Organizations in Malaysia: The Cases of ISMA, IRF and HTM

By Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid and Che Hamdan Che Mohd Razali

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• Interaction between Muslims in Malaysia and their Middle Eastern brethren has consistently been a source of apprehension to the powers-that-be from colonial times till today. Such interaction was historically made possible by the haj pilgrimage, inter-continental sufi networks, returning Malay-Muslim students from the Middle East and indigenized Arab communities who maintain links with their motherland.

• Islamist activism in Malaysia has indeed undergone changes, and these did indeed arise from contemporary Middle Eastern influences. The religious thought, practices and lifestyles of Muslims in Malaysia have traditionally been regarded as moderate. Of particular importance in the present context is the transmission of puritanical interpretations of Islam.

• Furthermore, the Malaysian version of Islamist puritanism has always been pragmatic rather than dogmatic, moderated by its multi-cultural and multi-religious setting. But newer strands of Islamism influenced by developments in the Middle East have alarmed authorities.

• The impact of this Middle East-driven wave of Islamism is not restricted to Malaysian chapters of transnational extremist groups such as the Islamic State (IS) and Al Qaeda. However, in Malaysia, the influence is more varied in its organizational impact. Newly formed Muslim organizations such as Ikatan Muslimin Malaysia (ISMA, or Muslim Solidarity Front), the Islamic Renaissance Front
(IRF) and Hizb at-Tahrir Malaysia (HTM) are all found to have maintained strong Middle Eastern links, both at the discursive or organizational levels.

- All three movements in question have so far not displayed violent tendencies although their versions of Islamism exhibit varying degrees of ideological absolutism, distinguishing them markedly from the wave of Islamism that engulfed Malaysia in the 1980s.
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INTRODUCTION

Islamist activism in the politics of the Malayan peninsula began during the early post-Second World War years, and was dominated until the early 1970s by the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP). PMIP was the chosen outfit for political Islamists previously associated with such fiercely anti-colonial movements as the Malay Nationalist Party (MNP), or Pertubuhan Kebangsaaan Melayu Malaya), Party of Muslims (Hizbul Muslimin [HM]) and Defenders of the Motherland (Pembela Tanahair [PETA]) (Ahmad Fauzi 2007a, pp. 387–91; Liow 2009, p. 21). By the time the National Front (Barisan Nasional [BN]) was founded in 1974 to succeed the Alliance (Perikatan) coalition, PMIP had morphed into the Islamic Party of Malaysia (Parti Islam SeMalaysia [PAS]), which is still a major actor in Malaysia’s Islamist scene today.

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Following the May 1969 racial troubles that engulfed the capital city of Kuala Lumpur, the Malaysian state embarked on a series of reconstruction policies, chief of which was the New Economic Policy (NEP, 1971–90). The affirmative action policies of the NEP laid the first seeds of a new wave of Islamic revival in Malaysia, as state-provided educational opportunities exposed new cohorts of Malay-Muslim youths to political socialization in university campuses both at home and abroad. A significant portion of these new experiences, taking place far away from their traditional village ambience, took on religious colouring as they mixed with international Muslim students and academics through whom they were introduced to the writings of Islamic resurgence ideologues such as Hassan al-Banna (1906–49), Sayyid Qutb (1906–66), Abul A’la Maududi (1903–79), Fathi Yakan (1933–2009), Sa’id Hawwa (1935–89), Said Ramadan (1926–95), Abdul Karim Zaidan (1917–2014), Said Ramadan al-Bouti (1929–2013) and Yusuf al-Qaradawi (1926– ). Except for Maududi who was Indo-Pakistani, all the other major influences on post-1969 Islamic revivalist thought in Malaysia were Middle Eastern thinkers, whose original works were written in Arabic. This meant that their books and treatises reached their Malaysian audience mainly through translations, either into Malay or English. Apart from the Middle Eastern figures, two other scholars whose writings made a discursive impact on Malaysia’s Islamist scene, although to a lesser extent than the others listed earlier, were the Indian Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi (1914–99), and Said Nursi (1877–1960), a Turk of Kurdish descent (Kamal Hassan 2003, pp. 430–40; Lemiere 2009, pp. 66–67, 71, 78, 83; Zulkifli Hassan 2013). Among local thinkers, the one who left the most profound imprint on Malaysian Islamist thought was Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas (1931– ) (Norshahril Saat 2012, p. 109).

PAS’s participation as a component member of BN created a vacuum, and greatly limited overt Islamist activity. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) carrying the Islamic label proliferated during this period, marshalled by four big groups active especially in institutions of higher learning, namely the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia [ABIM]), the Islamic Representative Council (IRC) — which later morphed into the Society of Islamic Reform (Jemaah Islah Malaysia [JIM]) and now styles itself as the HONOUR
Association of Malaysia (Pertubuhan IKRAM Malaysia [IKRAM]) — Darul Arqam, banned in 1994, re-emerging later as Rufa’ Corporation and mobilizing today as Global Ikhwan Holdings, and Jamaat Tabligh (cf. Nagata 1984, Sharifah Zaleha 2009, Abdul Rahman 2007, Lemiere 2009, Ahmad Fauzi 2003, 2013, 2015). Dakwah or missionary activity targeting fellow Muslims became the mantra that united the various strands of Islamist movements at the time. Different from their ideological counterparts in the Middle East and South Asia, early stirrings of political Islam in contemporary Malaysia tended to adopt a non-confrontational approach, notwithstanding the sometimes stark ideological differences its proponents held vis-à-vis the authorities. Their message mostly avoided radical discourses often identified with the global Islamist causes of such groups as Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (MB, or Ikhwan al-Muslimun) or Pakistan’s Islamic Congregation (Jamaati Islami [JI]), despite claiming to adhere to the broad precepts of both these movements (Ahmad Fauzi 2009, pp. 145–53; Lemiere 2009, pp. 53–54; Maszlee Malik 2014, p. 149). Encouraged by developments in the wider Muslim world brought to them by rapid advancements in mass communications and audio-visual technology, these socially mobile youths demanded socio-political reforms on religious terms and conditions, making Islam the rallying cry of the rising Malay-Muslim middle classes of the 1970s and 1980s (cf. Nagata 1984; Chandra Muzaffar 1987; Hussin Mutalib 1990; Ahmad Fauzi 2002; Kamarulnizam Abdullah 2003).

While Malaysia’s NGO-based Islamists continued to gain inspiration from treatises, lectures and books produced by the leaders and ideologues of these global Islamist movements, they proclaimed fealty to a distinctive manhaj Malazi (Malaysian method) of the Islamic struggle. This approach emphasized adaptation to, rather than outright rejection of existing structures and societal categories. In practice, manhaj Malazi took various forms. The term itself is believed to have originated from ABIM. As elaborated by its former Presidents Siddiq Fadzil and Ahmad Azam Abdul Rahman respectively, manhaj Malazi was meant to emphasize ABIM’s unique model without “being a carbon copy of any other Islamic movement in the world and to underscore the fact that ABIM’s dakwah need not be the same or similar with approaches undertaken in other countries” (quoted in Mohd Rumaizuddin 2003, p. 14). This does not
deny, however, that ABIM continues to draw upon the ideas and methods proposed by iconic Islamists such as Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb and Abul A’la Maududi, but only in a form suited to Malaysian concerns and conditions (Mohd Rumaizuddin 2003, p. 20). This accommodationist approach, as stressed by ABIM Vice President Jufitri Joha, founded on “knowledge, wisdom and wasatiyyah (moderation)”, would spur ABIM members to “think global and act local” in not only doing dakwah but also in countering the extreme poles in contemporary Malaysian Islam, namely the liberal stream and the literalist a.k.a. Wahhabi stream (Jufitri Joha 2013).

By 2008, a historic year in which the Malaysian opposition People’s Pact (Pakatan Rakyat [PR]) coalition — consisting of former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s People’s Justice Party of Malaysia (Parti Keadilan Rakyat [PKR]), the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and PAS, denied the ruling BN government its two-thirds parliamentary majority in the twelfth general elections (GE12), even PAS Youth was bandying the manhaj Malazi concept about (Malaysiakini 2008). PAS Youth’s “shift to centrist politics” was important considering its past history of toying with Islamist radicalism from another centre of global Islamism, i.e. Iran. PAS Youth had been instrumental in the radicalization of PAS’s Islamist discourse à la Iran in the mid-1980s and in the establishment of ulama leadership in the party, as personified in the institutionalization of the Ulama Consultative Council (Majlis Syura Ulama [MSU]) as its ultimate decision-making body, in the manner of Iran’s implementation of the concept of guardianship of the jurist (velayat-e faqih). Iran’s influence on PAS in the 1980s was also palpable in the religious vocabulary and the mutual exchange of visits between Teheran and Kuala Lumpur of Iranian Islamists and PAS personalities (Farish 2003, pp. 212–15; Liow 2011, pp. 678–80). PAS’s early years under the ulama leadership, meanwhile, were marred by the ex-communication of fellow Muslim (takfiri) cultures, as demonstrated by controversies surrounding the Amanat Haji Hadi of 1981, which effectively denounced members of the ruling United Malays National Organization (UMNO) as infidels and was allegedly responsible for the bloodshed between security personnel and PAS villagers in the village of Memali, Kedah, in 1985 (Ahmad Fauzi 2007b).
In spite of its various strategic blunders, PAS, being the only Malay-Muslim party, benefited directly from the recurrent splits within UMNO. In 1990, for example, PAS managed to wrest control of the state government of Kelantan by participating in an electoral alliance with Spirit of 46 (Semangat 46) led by Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, who in 1987 had mounted an unsuccessful attempt to unseat Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad from the UMNO Presidency. While Tengku Razaleigh returned to UMNO’s fold in 1996, PAS’s fortunes soon improved dramatically following Mahathir’s unceremonious dismissal of Anwar Ibrahim from his government and party leadership posts in September 1998. The ensuing call for reformation (Reformasi) of the socio-political system, seen to have been corrupted by years of misrule and mismanagement by Mahathir’s protracted administration, brought together opposition forces in electoral alliances under the banner of Alternative Front (Barisan Alternatif) in 1999 and later PR in 2008. Consequently, the hitherto politically neutral Malay-Muslim middle class flocked to both PKR and PAS, who moderated their discourse in sync with the larger democratic agenda of the opposition coalition, which was constantly trying to persuade PAS to drop its Islamic state demand (Ahmad Fauzi 2011, pp. 89–92; Liow 2011, pp. 681–85).

PAS’s centripetal tendencies, although never firmly embedded in the psyche of its hardcore ulama leadership, as proven by the “ulama versus professionals” crisis that peaked during the momentous General Assembly of June 2015, opened up the space for new Islamist organizations such as the Muslim Solidarity Front (Ikatan Muslimin Malaysia [ISMA]), the Islamic Renaissance Front (IRF) and the Liberation Party of Malaysia (Hizb at-Tahrir Malaysia [HTM]). They provided an avenue for middle-class Islamist-minded Malay-Muslims who could neither accept BN-UMNO’s futile Islamic projects such as Islam Hadhari (Ahmad Fauzi and Muhamad Takiyuddin 2014), nor come to terms with what they perceive as PAS’s compromise with liberal-secular activists seen as championing non-Islamic and pluralist causes (Hamayotsu 2010, pp. 170–71). These new movements, taking advantage of the opening up of political space during Abdullah Badawi’s administration (2003–09), began making their presence felt during Najib Razak’s Premiership (2009– ) (Ahmad Fauzi
and Che Hamdan 2015, pp. 316–20). Taken together, they represent the diversity of thoughts and organizational principles characteristic of the Malay-Muslim middle class of the post-\textit{Reformasi} generation.

\textbf{ISMA: NATIONALISM AND ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION}

Originally founded in 1997 as Ikatan Siswazah Muslim Malaysia (Muslim Student Solidarity Front), ISMA’s orientation fits the “conservative Islamist” category by virtue of its uncompromisingly Malay-Islamist rhetoric. Just like IKRAM and IKRAM’s organizational predecessors JIM and IRC, ISMA traces its beginning to tutelage given by Muslim Brotherhood (MB) activists to Malay-Muslim student congregations. This was done directly in Egypt and indirectly in the United Kingdom via members of its British diaspora. Links cemented with MB, as arguably the most established Islamist movement in the world, had a galvanizing effect on Malay-Muslim students determined to translate their idealism cultivated overseas into practice upon their eventual return to Malaysia. Some even overstayed their student visas in order to make the most of direct organizational experience with MB or its proxies abroad. By the time batches of Malay-Muslim graduates were flooding the employment market back home from the 1980s onwards, the Islamically inclined among them were squabbling over which group could truly claim to have inherited the MB mantle in Malaysia.\textsuperscript{2} This intra-Islamist rift culminated in 1995 with a failed attempt at \textit{indimaj} (merger without sacrificing core membership of parent organizations) between factions led by Saari Sungib and Dahlan Mohd Zain respectively (Portal Islam dan Melayu 2013\textsuperscript{a}). The Saari-led group morphed later into IKRAM although Saari himself parted ways with NGO-style activism to become a full-fledged politician, first with PKR, later winning a Selangor state assembly seat under the PAS ticket in 2008 and 2013, before joining in 2015 the PAS

\textsuperscript{2} Interview with Mohmad Nawawi Yusuf, former JIM activist and a provincial leader of IKRAM. Interviewed by Che Hamdan Che Mohd Razali, Dungun, Terengganu, 14 November 2015.
splinter group, National Trust Party (Parti Amanah Negara [AMANAH]). While IKRAM-based pro-MB Islamists achieved fame as broad-based civil society activists during the Reformasi agitations of 1998–99, the more introvert group that later coalesced into ISMA had to wait until the 2008 general elections to be in the public limelight.

ISMA’s pro-Malay-Muslim discourse began to receive publicity in the mainstream Malay language media after the electoral setback which befell BN and UMNO in 2008. Following the UMNO-led BN’s failure to retain its two-thirds parliamentary majority, UMNO’s Malay supremacy (ketuanan Melayu) nationalist rhetoric came under severe attack from various quarters. Ideologically bruised and beleaguered, UMNO decided that civil society would be the ideal helping hand. In its advocacy, ISMA’s motto of “Malay Consensus, Islam Sovereign” (Melayu Sepakat, Islam Berdaulat) came in handy. Such a slogan rallies against the alleged erosion of Malay-Muslim hegemony, to which the concept of a Malaysian nationhood is reputedly inextricably linked. By submitting to pluralist political arrangements under the PR banner, both Anwar Ibrahim and PAS, according to ISMA, had betrayed the Islamic struggle, as reflected in its collusion with the “anti-Malay-Islamic” DAP (Portal Islam dan Melayu 2015). Its president Abdullah Zaik Abdul Rahman blames alleged Malay backwardness on a “colonial mentality”, “the shrewdness of certain non-Malay leaders” and “a stealthy Jewish conspiracy” (Dina Murad 2014).

Holding steadfastly to the so-called social contract that is said to bind indigenous inhabitants of Malaysia with migrants from outside the Malay world, ISMA frowns upon attempts to challenge Malay-Muslim hegemony. This anachronistically xenophobic and ethnocentric worldview has landed ISMA in hot soup with the authorities and civil society driven by liberal democratic agendas uniting non-Malays and pluralist Malay-Muslims otherwise deemed by ISMA as “secular”. For openly ridiculing the Malaysian Chinese as “trespassers” whose citizenship ought to be reviewed, Abdullah Zaik has had over forty police reports lodged and criminal proceedings instituted against him under the Sedition Act 1948 (Portal Islam dan Melayu 2014c). ISMA also censured the Coalition of Malaysian NGOs (COMANGO) for allegedly being a front to destroy Malay-Muslim identity by legalizing unbridled freedom
of religion and promoting deviant sexual relationships and lecherous behaviour (Portal Islam dan Melayu 2014b).

Notwithstanding its seemingly parochial bias, ISMA justifies its political agenda by referring to the original thoughts of Hassan al-Banna, in particular his idea of integral/benign nationalism (*nasionalisme yang terpuji*). The inaugural convention to choose the slogan used Hassan al-Banna’s treatise *Majmua’ah Rasail* (Collection of Epistles) as the major reference work (Portal Islam dan Melayu 2014a). Although Hassan al-Banna hailed from Egypt where he founded and built the MB into a formidable opposition force, to Abdullah Zaik, his thoughts and *dakwah* methodology were relevant to the Malaysian situation. Auxiliary arguments in support of such nationalist inclinations written by ISMA members cite several authoritative *ulama* from the Middle East and none from the Malay world (cf. Mohd Sahrularifin 2011; Izzat 2014). Arab nationalism à la Hasan al-Banna was made the basis of ISMA’s embrace of Malay nationalism, and applied on Islamic grounds. In the words of the then Deputy Secretary-General of ISMA:

> The Martyred Hasan al-Banna’s explanation of Arab nationalism and its relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood *dakwah* should be a point to ponder that matures Malay-Muslims in our beloved land. The quagmire arising from ruthless power struggles ought not to jeopardise the future of Malay-Muslims in a risky situation and sacrifice the country’s identity. (Mohd Hazizi 2010, authors’ translation).

In 2013, ISMA entered the electoral fray by contesting seven parliamentary and two state seats in the thirteenth general elections

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3 Fieldwork at the Konvensyen Pemikiran Hasan Al-Banna dalam Melakar Agenda Bangsa [Convention on Hasan al-Banna’s Thought in Drawing the National Agenda], Sarjana Hall, Universiti Tenaga Nasional (UNITEN), Putrajaya, 30 January 2010. See also the video Mediaisma (2011).

4 Notes taken from Abdullah Zaik Abdul Rahman’s keynote address at the Konvensyen Pemikiran Hasan Al-Banna dalam Melakar Agenda Bangsa, Sarjana Hall, Universiti Tenaga Nasional (UNITEN), Putrajaya, 30 January 2010.
(GE13) using the platform of the moribund Islamic Congregation Front of Malaysia (Barisan Jemaah Islamiah SeMalaysia [BERJASA]). ISMA focused on Malay-Muslim-majority areas which were contested by non-Malay candidates from the other mainstream parties. Commenting on its paradigm shift from civil society activism to party politics, ISMA claimed that its political baptism of fire was intended to reassert Malay dominance in areas where Malay clout had shrunk (Portal Islam dan Melayu 2013b). After GE13, despite ISMA’s failure to draw away Malay-Muslim votes from the established parties, Abdullah Zaik insisted that ISMA had virtually achieved all its objectives in GE13 since its participation was merely to introduce its message to Malaysian society and to train and “change the mindset and action of members to become more aggressive” (Mediaisma 2013).

ISMA’s decision to participate in GE13 as a separate electoral entity could also be described as one of emulating the MB’s experience in the Middle East. Such encouragement towards democratic politics was given for instance by MB activist Kamal Helbawi when interviewed by ISMA’s media representative in Cairo in 2011 (Portal Islam dan Melayu 2011). In the same year, an ISMA delegation led by Abdullah Zaik Abdul Rahman paid a courtesy visit to the Vice Mursyidul Am of MB, Mahmud Izzat (ISMA – Kelantan 2011). While seemingly an innocent visit to a respectable comrade, in the Malaysian Islamist context, such a meeting is akin to a legitimacy-courting homage to the “big brother” within global Islamism. In view of ISMA’s apparently insular approach in national politics, such global legitimacy is important to ensure that its members and supporters are not derailed from larger Islamist objectives. ISMA maintains its distinctiveness within the spectrum of Malaysia’s Islamism by adopting electoral politics while continuing to disavow pluralist politics, which is a prerequisite for political success in multi-ethnic Malaysia. This peculiar practice is again founded upon Middle East-derived arguments. As spelt out at length by the Chairman of ISMA’s Ulama Council:

It is very sad when Muslims feel that it is alright to vote for non-Muslim candidates, even though such candidates clearly show that they are against Islam. Perhaps those who allow the
election of non-Muslim candidates in polls argue that ulama such as Sheikh Dr Yusuf al-Qaradhawi, Sheikh Muhammad Abdun, Sheikh Dr Abdul Karim Zaydan, Prof Dr Salam Madkur, Ikhwan al-Muslimin, Hamas etc. have also done so. In reality, each of them who allowed for such a possibility has also outlined various requirements, amongst which is that the candidate must accept the implementation of Islamic law (Aznan Hasan 2014, p. 57, authors’ translation).

IRF: RELIGIOUS RENEWAL AND FREEDOM OF THOUGHT

The IRF was officially launched on 12 December 2009 in a ceremony officiated by prominent Swiss-based scholar Tariq Ramadan, a grandson of Hassan al-Banna and son of Said Ramadan of MB fame, at the auditorium of the Securities Commission, Mont Kiara, Kuala Lumpur. The IRF styles itself as “an intellectual movement and a repository of thinkers’ for empowering Muslim youths by encouraging informed discussions on Islam and Muslims (IRF 2012a). It sees within its ranks forward-looking “reformists” and “renewers” who eschew romanticized references to Islam’s glorious past. IRF openly publicizes its anti-conservative streak and even “pro-secular state” stance, endeavouring to explore novel discursive spaces in Malaysia by putting forward Islamic perspectives within the context of personal liberties in matters of faith and human rights (Ahmad Farouk 2012a). The IRF contends that an individual has to be given the freedom to practise his or her religious tenets according to his or her creative self-understanding, without being unduly shackled by state regulatory mechanisms (Kanyakumari 2015). The IRF thus advocates reform mainly in the realm of religious thought. The IRF has emerged as a stern critic of the Sunni-Shi’te divide and the Malaysian state’s outlawing of religious beliefs of Malay-Muslim Shi’ites. It promotes instead the concept of “Islam without Sectarianism” — the title of a well-attended international seminar it once organized to bring together orthodox Sunnis and Shi’ites in Malaysia (IAIS Malaysia 2013). Belying its support for open and versatile interpretations of religion, however, the IRF is critical of conservative Islamists such
as the Wahhabi-Salafists, who trace their ideological origins to the puritanical teachings of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1792) in regions which constitute present-day Saudi Arabia, and whose expanding influence in Malaysia IRF chairman-cum-director Ahmad Farouk Musa acknowledges as a problem (Shahanaaz Habib 2012). With respect to civil society activism, Ahmad Farouk Musa — a physician by training — enjoys organic connections with PR and warm relations with Anwar Ibrahim.

Although it did not participate directly in GE13, the IRF does not dismiss electoral politics as un-Islamic. In fact in his position as a steering committee member of the NGO-based Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections (Gabungan Pilihanraya Bersih dan Adil [BERSIH]) 2.0, Ahmad Farouk played an active watchdog role critical of the Election Commission’s (Suruhanjaya Pilihanraya [SPR]) failure to ensure impartial elections during GE13. The IRF’s intellectual activities revolve around regular talks, workshops, forums, book discussions and publications designed to foreground critical Islamic perspectives on current issues, for which it has been lauded. Its activities have gained public visibility despite having a core membership of only 20 or so activists at any one time (cf. Mohamad Tajuddin 2014).

In order to achieve its target of intellectual regeneration of society, the IRF openly advocates the maximum use of the human rational faculty or *akal* (Arabic: ‘*aql*). This aspect differentiates the IRF from those Islamists who enjoin a literalist interpretation of Islam such as the increasingly active Salafists and the HTM, both of which it is critical of (Ahmad Farouk 2012b, p. 28). Ahmad Farouk asserts:

> Islamic Renaissance Front is the voice of reason that promotes intellectual discourse, reformation and renewal in our society and the Islamic religion for this new age (Ahmad Farouk 2014, p. xvii, authors’ translation).

The IRF traces its intellectual pedigree to progenitors of the late nineteenth century Salafiyyah methodology from Egypt, viz. Jamaluddin al-Afghani (1838–97) and Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905). This school of thought had originally penetrated Malaya in the 1930s via returning
Malay-Muslim graduates who founded modern Islamic schools called madrasahs and spread their reformist doctrine via the periodical *Al-Imam*, which was modelled on the journal *Al-Manar*, edited by Muhammad Abduh’s student Rashid Rida (1865–1935) (Shiozaki 2015, pp. 216–19). Their efforts spawned the Kaum Muda movement, whose impact in then-Malaya was however short-lived and minimal due to the domination of the established ulama institution and the religious bureaucracy (Azra 1999). The IRF sanctions Jamaluddin al-Afghani’s reproach of the traditional ulama whom he accuses of ossifying religious discourse as a means of preserving their clout in Muslim societies (Ahmad Farouk 2014, p. xii). As Ahmad Farouk reflects on his intellectual pedigree:

I was very much influenced by the reformist thoughts of Imam Muhammad Abduh and al-Afghani. I got acquainted with these figures via the writings of Indonesian reformists especially Prof Teungku Hasbi Ash-Shiddiqi, and also Buya Hamka. I read Prof Hasbi’s books including his lengthy exegesis, Tafsir An Nur. And I became familiar with their struggle when I was still in my twenties. (Interviews with Dr. Ahmad Farouk Musa).

Two catchwords which encapsulate the IRF’s philosophy are *tajdid* (renewal) and *islah* (reform) (IRF 2012b) — common terms in the global Islamist vocabulary (cf. Voll 1983). IRF however outlines three prerequisites in order for true *islah* to be actualized. Firstly, “knowledge about the comprehensive message of Islam, its universal principles, and ready-made tools to help humans in familiarizing themselves with their society, and also to change the world”. Secondly, the role of “intellectualism” in *islah*, calling for “comprehensive Islamic values to develop critical thinking, freedom to choose via reasoning and perseverance of not succumbing to blind imitation (*taqlid*) of the past or

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5 Interview with Dr Ahmad Farouk Musa by Che Hamdan Che Mohd Razali, Sri Hartamas, Kuala Lumpur, 24 April 2015, and by Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid via telephone, 22 December 2015.
present”. Thirdly, the IRF sees islah as encompassing accommodation of and combination with values that need not necessarily originally derive from Islam, as such values can be turned into Islamic values (Ahmad Farouk 2014, pp. 159–60).

What the IRF stresses here is the urgent need for Muslims to adapt themselves not only physically but also intellectually to contemporary categories and issues, without unduly harking back to their glorious past — a tendency which has led to stagnation due to the widespread practice of taqlid. Ahmad Farouk insists that taqlid can be avoided in the present era if Muslims hold steadfastly to the Islamic principles which have spawned previous generations of thinkers and reformists (Ahmad Farouk 2014, p. 159). The success of past intellectual ulama cannot however be reminisced upon in a nostalgic manner. The IRF thus promotes freedom of thought and religious pluralism within Islam, besides speaking in defence of more ubiquitous democratic and human rights. The IRF does not conceal its admiration of medieval Mu'tazilite scholars who belong to the rationalist school of Islamic thought (Ahmad Farouk 2014, pp. xv–xvi). They have also formed international networks with like-minded progressive Islamist theorists such as Azzam Tamimi and Tariq Ramadan. Its global outreach is boosted financially through grants from the Washington D.C.-based National Endowment for Democracy, which donated to the IRF US$60,000 in 2014 to help it organize seminars and symposiums related to democracy and Islam. Ahmad Farouk claims that although the IRF receives funds from the United States, it is not bound to the policies of the U.S. government. For example, it freely invites scholars who are personae non grata in the United States such as Tariq Ramadan to give talks and seminars in Malaysia.6 While a large number

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6Interview with Dr Ahmad Farouk Musa, Sri Hartamas, Kuala Lumpur, 24 April 2015. The funding is confirmed by a search on the National Endowment for Democracy database; see <http://www.ned.org/wp-content/themes/ned/search/grant-search.php?organizationName=Isamic+RENAISSANCE+FRONT+BERHAD&region=Asia&projectCountry=&amount=&fromDate=&toDate=&projectFocus%5B%5D=&&search=&maxCount=25&orderBy=Year&start=1&sbmt=1> (accessed 31 January 2016).
of these figures have Middle Eastern roots, many of them are now based in the West. In Malaysia, former Professor of Law at the International Islamic University of Malaysia (IIUM) Mohammad Hashim Kamali, counts among them (Duderija 2007, pp. 353–59). Mohammad Hashim is founding chief executive officer (CEO) of the International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies (IAIS), which is chaired by former Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi and with whom the IRF collaborated in organizing the Islam without Sectarianism seminar.

HIZBUT TAHRIR MALAYSIA (HTM): LOYALTY TO MIDDLE EASTERN PRECEPTS

Hizb at-Tahrir (HT) was founded in Jerusalem in 1953 by Palestinian jurist Taqiuddin an-Nabhani (1909–77), whose Islamist ideology distinctively fused traditionalist Islamic doctrines with modernist inclinations. In his younger days, Taqiuddin had met with MB luminaries Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb in Egypt but remained unconvinced by their methodology to revive Islam (Mohamed Nawab 2010, p. 88). After its formative period in the Levant in the 1960s, HT has today spread to more than fifty countries, penetrating Southeast Asia in the 1990s via its Australian and European chapters (Fealy 2007; Mohamed Nawab 2009a, pp. 646–48). As a transnational political party, HT openly professes the ultimate aim of amassing political power and ruling based on Islamic ideology, uniting all its branches with the imperative of reviving the global caliphate system. In contrast with the conservative Salafists who have also made inroads into MB, HT demonstrates a more compromising attitude towards both sufis and Shi’ites (Mohamed Nawab 2009a, p. 647; 2009b, p. 95).

In Malaysia, HTM’s influence expanded significantly following the Reformasi euphoria which inaugurated an epoch of new politics that witnessed concrete attempts by re-invigorated political actors to transcend narrow ethno-religious considerations. After the passing of the national leadership baton from Mahathir Mohamad to Abdullah Ahmad Badawi in November 2003, Hizb at-Tahrir Malaysia was designated
as Malaysia’s HT chapter’s official name in 2004. Prior to that, HTM had been operating under the banner of the Nusantara Intellectual Front (Ikatan Intelektual Nusantara [IKIN]), which organized public forums, seminars and demonstrations (Mohamed Nawab 2009b, p. 96; 2010, p. 93). HTM’s nascent years were characterized by consistent morale and logistical support from its Hizb at-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) counterparts, whose organization had preceded that of HTM. As an Islamist movement that openly demands the resurrection of the pan-Islamic caliphate, HTM chides PAS’ accommodation of democratic procedures in its quest for power. HTM is also critical of UMNO, which it views as a party engulfed by such malaise as the abuse of power and trangressions of religious teachings (Mohamed Nawab 2009a, p. 659; 2009b, pp. 106–108).

The HTM’s rejection of electoral democracy renders realization of its ideals in Malaysia difficult if not altogether impossible. In the HTM’s worldview, elections are regarded as a vain endeavour to change the existing system from within. More often than not, it is the Islamists who get transformed by the system. Through its mouthpiece Voice of Renaissance (Sautun Nahdah), HTM justified its boycott of GE13 on the basis of its rejection of the democratic process as perpetuation of “colonial teachings” and “lies” (Sautun Nahdah 2013a). HTM dismissed UMNO’s victory in GE13 as nothing more than a hollow victory of “the biggest Malay ethnocentric (assabiyah) party”, and considered procedural democracy as “never having delivered and never will give victory to Islam!” (Sautun Nahdah 2013b). As far as HTM is concerned, democracy is a facade to lull Muslims into a false sense of fulfilment, restoration of the caliphate being the only way to recover Islam’s glory in the modern world.

As a chapter of the international HT, the HTM professes both doctrinal, methodological and organizational fealty to its Middle Eastern headquarters (Mohamed Nawab 2009a, pp. 648, 656; 2009b, p. 98). HTM is bound to the political programme of its Middle Eastern brethren, for whom issues such as the dispossession of Muslim lands and Israeli atrocities in Gaza and the West Bank, Palestine, have always occupied a central place in its struggle. In showcasing its solidarity with international Islamic causes, HTM regularly organizes demonstrations in front of mosques after Friday prayers and at other public spaces to protest
against the government’s complicity with Western powers in denying aid to suffering Muslims (Mohamed Nawab 2009a, p. 653; 2010, p. 102). To the HTM, these Muslims, as victims of oppression sanctioned by the international order, deserve to be helped by force of arms. As laid out by the HTM weekly periodical *Sautun Nahdah*:

Verily the blood of Gazans cannot be avenged by whatever way. It can only be avenged by an army that moves from Sinai, Jordan River, south of Lithani and Golan, either in full or as a partial force, to face the Jewish entity. The blood of Gazans can only be paid back via an army which carries the vow of Abu Bakr. When it moves, the enemy will forget all except destruction and death (*Sautun Nahdah* 2012b, authors’ translation).

Such aggressiveness distinguishes the HTM from other Islamists in Malaysia. The HTM rebukes movements which employ the themes of *islah* but fall short of concrete action. What is needed instead in the HTM’s reading of the situation in post-colonial Muslim societies is *taghyir* or total change (*Sautun Nahdah* 2012a).

**COMPARISONS AND CONTRASTS**

Post-*Reformasi* Islamist activism, as represented by the three new Islamist NGOs, viz. ISMA, IRF and HTM, continues to be coloured by diversity. These three groups, in turn, represent the variety of thoughts and attitudes to religious life that characterize the Malay-Muslim middle classes. Membership of all three groups is made up of assorted sections of Malay-Muslim professionals with differing Islamic worldviews. At the discursive level, the IRF is the most pluralist, underlined by its much-frowned-upon attempts to bridge the gap between Malaysian Muslims of different faith orientations. Such openness, however, has exposed it to attacks from the conservative-oriented ISMA, which castigates the IRF as a liberal movement promoting a Malaysian version of secularism (Rafidah Hanim 2013). The IRF is dubbed by ISMA Vice-President Muhammad Fauzi Asmuni as the male version of Sisters in Islam (SIS), an all-woman Muslim NGO that propounds feminist interpretations of
scriptures (Muhammad Fauzi 2013). On the contrary, ISMA has gained notoriety by spewing ethnocentric views which have landed it in legal trouble for purportedly endangering national unity. ISMA has also been criticized for being an outdated and immature Islamist movement “suitable for the 1980s” by Salafi-inclined Mufti of Perlis Mohd Asri Zainul Abidin (Mohd Asri 2013).

In practical politics, the most important difference separating the three groups lies in the operationalization of their varying attitudes towards electoral politics and by extension, towards parliamentary democracy. To the politically conscious public and especially non-Muslims, the extent of acceptance or rejection of democratic procedures is reflective of a movement’s radicalism or moderateness. The greater a group’s disavowal of established regular elections, the more extreme it is perceived to be. Belying its unsavoury reputation as an extremist NGO, ISMA’s participation in GE13 indicates its acceptance of democratic procedures. In abiding by the rules of electoral democracy, ISMA does not conceal its long-term aspiration to become a mass-based party. Both the IRF and HTM, by contrast, are selective in character as far as membership is concerned. The IRF is obsessed with intellectual regeneration rather than the capture of political power, something in which both ISMA and the HTM, in contrast, are interested.

Continual support rendered to ISMA, the IRF and HTM is testament to the fact that the Malaysian state’s attempts to enforce orthodoxy via its religious bureaucracy have not had the intended streamlining and homogenizing impact on ordinary Malay-Muslims. Their emergence may be seen as a side effect of the mellowing of PAS since its participation in the multi-ethnic opposition in 1999. All three organizations continue to look to the Middle East for guidance in both theory and practice. ISMA, which is active among Malay-Muslim student communities in the Middle East, seeks to rediscover original MB principles that it sees as having been betrayed by PAS. This alleged betrayal could only worsen the “ulama versus professionals” clash in PAS, which saw the professional faction, whose ideological genealogy can be traced to MB and its Malaysian affiliates such as ABIM and the IRC rather than to Iran, leaving PAS en masse to form AMANAH in September 2015. Notwithstanding their similar appeals to MB doctrinal roots, the possibility of ISMA
reaching an understanding with AMANAH is remote, at least in the short term. This is due to the contrasting implications from their different ways of interpreting MB ideals in Malaysia. While ISMA’s message is notoriously exclusivist, AMANAH prides itself on its inclusivist outlook, which it perceives as injecting a fresh approach to Islamist politics in Malaysia (Zulkifli Sulong 2015). Both ISMA and AMANAH, however, pay courtesy visits to established MB figures in the Middle East as a recognition-seeking exercise in public relations. This has drawn the ire of PAS, which sees itself as the only group worthy of carrying the Islamist mantle inherited from MB within Malaysia (Malaysian Insider 2015).

In contrast to ISMA, the IRF does not close off avenues for cooperation with what in normative Islamist parlance are called liberal-secular elements of civil society. Its reading of materials overwhelmingly written by modernist scholars of Islam has convinced its members that Muslims cannot shy away from the realities of global political, economic and social transformations, even if this means embracing concepts and categories conventionally perceived as “secular”. As a movement concerned first and foremost with intellectual reinvigoration, the IRF seeks to revive the original teachings of Islam that had once distinguished the ummah as a pivot of civilizational glory in all facets of life. Towards this end, the IRF calls for an unbridled quest for knowledge and freedom of belief within Islam, which it sees as being unduly shackled by modern Muslim nation-states for political purposes. It claims to want to revive Islamic thought in pristine form as espoused by such luminaries as the medieval Mu’tazilites and modernists such as Jamaluddin al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh. In this endeavour, it refers mostly to works of progressive Muslim thinkers, most of whom have Middle Eastern ancestry but who are now based in the West. IRF therefore uses a lot of English language references, which it gradually translates into Malay for the local audience. While still Middle East-inspired, the IRF is also organizationally independent, with the West acting as the bridge for ideas to reach Malaysia. The IRF may become embroiled in controversy in the future on account of its unabashed approbation of the Mu’talizites, whose faith is regarded by orthodox Islam as having deviated from the Islamic faith — a fact emphasized by PAS’s President Haji Hadi Awang in one of his writings (Abdul Hadi 2008, pp. 79–97; Sirajuddin Abbas

Among the three NGOs, the HTM has the most international exposure, being but one subsidiary of HT International that abides by instructions from abroad. In its formative years, this meant drawing guidance from Indonesia or Europe where most of its Malaysian pioneers had studied. However, it is suspected that nowadays, the Middle East, most probably Jordan and Palestine, is the source from where the HTM’s agenda and programme are derived. Hence the HTM is dependent on its Middle Eastern brethren both doctrinally and organizationally. It is therefore most closely monitored by Malaysia’s intelligence services, especially in view of the encouraging public response to its regular Islamic State dialogues promoting its conception of an Islamic caliphate, and its frequent demonstrations. There is fear, unsurprisingly, that the HTM’s apparent advocacy of military combat may translate into actual or intended violence in support of international terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria/the Levant (IS/ISIS/ISIL). The HTM’s refusal to decontextualize its discourse and precepts away from their Middle Eastern framework has lent it the image of a potentially violent organization, something which its leaders among Malay-Muslim professionals have been at pains to deny (Mohamed Nawab 2009a, p. 658).

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Wahhabi-Salafism, the most puritanical version of Middle Eastern doctrinal influences, never really became a force to be reckoned with in Malaysia until the 1990s. Today, after three decades of Islamization of both state and society, Salafi thought has made inroads into the country’s religious life, worrying stakeholders and policymakers alike regarding the possible harmful effects that Islamist extremism would have on the putatively tolerant Malay-Muslim culture and the generally peaceful atmosphere of Muslim-non-Muslim relations (cf. Lee 2014).
The Malaysian government, through its National Fatwa Council, short of declaring an outright ban on all stripes of Wahhabi-Salafism, has pronounced Wahhabism to be unwelcome by virtue of its ultra-conservative nature potentially threatening the social fabric of Malaysia’s multi-culturalism (JAKIM 2013; Malay Mail Online 2015).

The three new Islamist organizations, viz. ISMA, the IRF and HTM, that have emerged as active civil society actors during the Premiership of Najib Razak, have until now continued the tradition of their Islamist precursors such as ABIM and JIM in moderating the conservative influence imported from Middle Eastern brands of Islamic discourse. They, however, have also attracted greater attention from moderate Malaysians and the security apparatus due to discursive affinities that they seem to have with Middle Eastern ideological forefathers whose teachings are thought to have been responsible for spawning a new wave of global Islamist extremism. As of today, Malaysian Islamists have not shown willingness to “localize” their Islamic beliefs and practices in parallel with such developments as “Islam Nusantara” among Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) traditionalists in neighbouring Indonesia (cf. Njoto-Feilllard 2015), which they see as an unduly watering down of the pristineness of Islam as a comprehensive way of life.

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MIDDLE EASTERN INFLUENCES ON ISLAMIST ORGANIZATIONS IN MALAYSIA: THE CASES OF ISMA, IRF AND HTM

AHMAD FAUZI ABDUL HAMID AND CHE HAMDAN CHE MOHD RAZALI