The ASEAN Studies Centre (ASC) at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute turned seven this year. As 2015 marks Singapore’s 50th anniversary as well as the announcement of the ASEAN Community, we are commemorating this with the relaunch of ASEANFOCUS as one of the research products of our parent institute, and with more analytical content added. ISEAS itself is undergoing a renaming to honour Singapore’s first President, and the Centre is proud to be part of this exercise of renewal and refocus.

ASEANFOCUS relaunch also coincides with the 48th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting, and their discussions with counterparts from the ASEAN Dialogue Partner countries at the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Post-Ministerial Conferences. Malaysia, as the ASEAN Chair for 2015, hosted and chaired these meetings from 1 to 6 August 2015 in Kuala Lumpur. The next issue of ASEANFOCUS will carry analyses from our researchers on the outcome of these meetings.

This newsletter will continue to highlight policy-relevant research on ASEAN undertaken by the Centre, augmented by analyses and perspectives from Centre researchers and scholars of ASEAN. A new section, “ASEANInfo”, provides information on different aspects of ASEAN integration. We look forward to continue providing our community of friends with useful analysis on situations and trends in ASEAN integration. As before, we hope to continue being your focal point for information and analysis on ASEAN matters.

Rodolfo C. Severino
Head, ASEAN Studies Centre
ANALYSES

Littoral Southeast Asia

Malcolm Cook

The very way Southeast Asia is conceived as a region could be under challenge. And this challenge manifests the shared grand strategic fear behind the formation and expansion of ASEAN.

The shared fear is that Southeast Asia as a region would again be an arena of major power strategic rivalry to the detriment of Southeast Asian states’ security and autonomy. The formation and expansion of ASEAN and its promotion of the principle of ASEAN centrality are the main collective regional response to this deeply rooted fear, one well fertilised by experiences in World War Two and the Cold War.

In the post-Cold War era, China’s maritime boundary disputes with five Southeast Asian states in the South China Sea have been the regional security issue that has attracted most global attention to the region and ASEAN. It is the issue that has posed the greatest challenge to and, at times, reaffirmed ASEAN centrality and unity. China’s ongoing massive artificial island building and fortification signify its growing military interests in the South China Sea. Chinese interest in the sea at the heart of Southeast Asia could well revive the region’s shared grand strategic fear, and even render the diplomatic negotiations between ASEAN and China on a Code of Conduct to manage these disputes superfluous.

During the Cold War, nuclear-powered submarines with nuclear-armed ballistic missiles (SSBNs) offered the most credible second strike threat essential to nuclear deterrence for both the USA and the USSR. France and the United Kingdom, unlike Japan, have maintained their own independent nuclear deterrents including SSBNs for decades rather than rely on US extended deterrence.

Over the past decade, China has invested heavily in developing and making operational for the first time its own sea-based nuclear deterrent. Moreover, it has shifted the geographical base of its nascent but rapidly growing SSBN fleet from the PLAN (People’s Liberation Army Navy) North Fleet and the Xiaopingdao base near Dalian to the South Fleet and the PLAN Longpo base on Hainan Island in the South China Sea (http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/unveiled-chinas-new-naval-base-the-south-china-sea-12452). According to US Department of Defence predictions, the PLAN is expected to begin SSBN strategic deterrence patrols for the first time this year, and from the Longpo base (http://www.seapowermagazine.org/stories/20150508-china-ssbn.html).
China is at a significant conventional military disadvantage compared to the United States and its allies and security partners, making China’s nascent SSBN capability and the security of this capability central to its military preparations. Greater Chinese sea control over the South China Sea and great sensitivity towards US military operations in waters and airspace surrounding Longpo is natural and unavoidable. The 2001 EP-3 and the 2009 Impeccable incidents between China and the United States off Hainan are but two examples of this. Despite Chinese protestations about the new, military grade artificial islands in the disputed waters of the South China Sea being a Chinese regional public good, they could also serve as part of a bastion strategy to protect China’s SSBN fleet by extending China ability to provide surface and air protection to this most important undersea capability.

China’s military interests in the South China Sea have already seen China attempting to limit or deter the US’ exercise of its maximalist definition of freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea as shown by the 2001 EP-3 and the 2009 Impeccable incidents and the recent PLAN warnings against US overflights near the new artificial islands. In response, and in line with the urgings of affected Southeast Asian states, the United States has more firmly reasserted its rights verbally and in practice.

China’s concentration of its SSBN fleet and patrols in the South China Sea is turning the sea into a major arena for the strategic rivalry between the United States and China. The importance of SSBNs to China in this rivalry will likely mean that China’s interests in gaining greater sea control over the South China Sea and the assertion of Chinese sovereignty in its disputed waters will not be deterred by diplomatic pressure from ASEAN or unfavorable international arbitration rulings.

If this scenario develops, then China’s nine-dashed line may become undashed in practice as China seeks greater sea control over the South China Sea. This would put the very concept of maritime Southeast Asia with the South China Sea at its heart at risk. Maritime Southeast Asia may become littoral Southeast Asia in reality if not in name.

Malcolm Cook is Senior Fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. These are his personal views.
Do Young People Know ASEAN?

Moe Thuzar

A Dialogue Forum on "Attitudes and Awareness Towards ASEAN: A Research Finding" took place in Kuala Lumpur on 29 April 2015, as part of the series of ASEAN-related discussions and forums held in conjunction with the 26th ASEAN Summit recently hosted and chaired by Malaysia. The data shared at this forum were the preliminary findings of an update of a ten-nation survey carried out among undergraduate students, first undertaken in 2007. The 2014 update of the 2007 survey was done in order to gauge whether attitudes have changed or remain the same on the eve of the ASEAN Community 2015 announcement. Dr Eric C. Thompson of the National University of Singapore, continued as lead investigator of the survey. Dr Chulanee Thianthai of Chulalongkorn University and Ms Moe Thuzar of ISEAS’ ASEAN Studies Centre served as project investigators. The update replicated the 18 questions of the 2007 survey, addressing awareness, knowledge and attitudes, and added two questions aimed at gauging the perceptions of similarity and differences amongst ASEAN countries. The investigation was also expanded to 12 additional universities across the region.

The 2014 update shows several similarities with the 2007 survey. There is a strong commonality of responses and overall positive attitudes towards ASEAN throughout the region – in both the 2007 and 2014 surveys. Positive attitudes towards ASEAN have remained generally consistent, while awareness and knowledge of ASEAN show some increase. Overall, the students display good knowledge of ASEAN; positive attitudes towards ASEAN; and consider themselves “citizens of ASEAN” (over 80%).

The strongest ASEAN-enthusiasm continues to be among the “newer” ASEAN members such as Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. ASEAN ambivalence continues to be found in Singapore. Self-reported familiarity (with ASEAN) declined modestly between the 2007 and 2014 surveys, but the objective knowledge measure generally improved between 2007 and 2014. Across the region, students are most aware of and familiar with countries in their own sub-region (maritime or mainland).

Overall for the region, Laos and Brunei seem to be the least familiar or are “outliers” to the others. For mainland ASEAN countries, Myanmar is the outlier; and for maritime ASEAN countries, the Philippines and Brunei are the outliers. The most salient countries in ASEAN, according to the survey, are Thailand and Malaysia; and the most familiar to all respondents are Thailand and Singapore. Similar to 2007, students’ orientations towards travel and work rank Singapore as the 1st preferred destination. Thailand and Malaysia continue to rank 2nd and 3rd, with Thailand more popular than in 2007 and Malaysia less.
In 2007, the sources of information about ASEAN were primarily television, schools, newspapers, and books. Internet and radio were secondary sources. In 2014, the internet has moved up as a primary source of information (third source overall), while secondary sources now list friends, advertising and sports, in addition to radio. However, radio still continues to be an important source in the lesser developed or more remote regions. The least important sources continue to be family, movies, travel, music, and work.

Main differences from the 2007 findings are found in the responses from Myanmar and Thailand, and in the ranking of aspirations for integration. Myanmar respondents show more positive attitudes towards ASEAN. On the other hand, Thai respondents show greater ambivalence toward ASEAN as compared to 2007, together with higher objective knowledge about ASEAN. Also, in 2007, economic cooperation was ranked as the most important aspect of regional integration and cooperation, followed by tourism and development cooperation. In 2014, tourism was ranked the most important, followed by development cooperation, and economic cooperation in third place. Both the 2007 and 2014 surveys indicated political cooperation as the least important aspect of integration. Students in Vietnam gave a high rank to regional identity and solidarity.

Moe Thuzar is Fellow and Lead Researcher (Socio-Cultural Affairs) at the ASEAN Studies Centre of the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.
The ASEAN Economic Community: An Economic and Strategic Project
Sanchita Basu Das

With only months to go before the planned announcement of the ASEAN Community on 31 December 2015, more questions are being asked on whether the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) will be 1) a successful project and 2) a game changer for stakeholders in the region. A simple answer is “no”. ASEAN will not be an economic community by end-2015 and there will not be any significant changes for its stakeholders. However, this is not to denigrate strides made in regional economic integration. The AEC needs to be seen as both an economic and strategic project.

ASEAN adopted AEC aspirations in 2003, highlighting economic cooperation measures including lower trade and investment barriers; harmonised rules and regulations; and ways to place the region in the global value chain of production. The aim is to create a ‘single market and production base’ and generate more welfare gains than those facilitated through tariff liberalisation under the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) of the 1990s.

More than a decade later, the AEC has an impressive implementation rate of more than 80%. AEC has thus provided a significant beginning for ASEAN to work towards a single market objective. Tariffs have been lowered; the ASEAN Single Window is ready in a majority of the ASEAN members; key agreements related to goods, investment, infrastructure, movement of professionals are in practice; income gaps between member countries have been reduced; ASEAN is engaging its major trading partners through free trade agreements (FTAs); and the private sector – albeit in limited numbers – is also benefiting from trade liberalisation and facilitation.

Yet ASEAN is far from delivering a single market to its stakeholders. This is because the non-tariff barriers continue to prevail. The region continues to suffer from infrastructure deficiency. These factors dilute the full benefit of tariff liberalisation. Services sector negotiations have resulted only in marginal liberalisation, mainly due to lack of policy alignment at regional and domestic levels. The region continues to experience difficulties from the development gaps among its members.

Thus, it can be said that despite achieving a significant percentage of its stipulated targets, ASEAN has not yet achieved its single market objective. But economic regionalism should not be judged on the economic outcome alone. It is equally important to understand the AEC’s strategic rationale.
The impetus for the AEC in the early 2000s has an interesting context in the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis. First, the crisis caused havoc in the region’s financial systems and a slump in the real economy. ASEAN was in need of a collective economic move to steer away from the crisis. Second, the crisis also led ASEAN governments to recognise the importance of economic and financial cooperation in the broader Asian region and to institutionalise such interdependence. Thus, the ASEAN-China FTA was signed in 2002, followed by similar agreements with Japan, India, Australia-New Zealand and South Korea. Third, in 2001, China became a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and was fast gaining interest as a destination for a market and production base. As significant trade and investment diversion from ASEAN to China had started in the 1990s, the 1997-98 crisis heightened ASEAN members’ wish to increase their global competitiveness. Thus, ASEAN realised the necessity of deepening economic integration among its members, and took on the challenge by using the AEC initiative.

The AEC can also be viewed as a defensive act taken in response to the regional trading arrangements (RTAs) under the European Union and the US’s success with NAFTA. Moreover, there had been dissatisfaction with the slow progress of the liberalisation process under the WTO as well as the limited success of the APEC process.

Thus, AEC’s strategic objective is to help its members pursue their national interests. By becoming economically cohesive, the ten ASEAN economies can work together against economic and financial vulnerability, and also become a bigger market space (of over 600 million people) to foreign investors. This in turn would help boost the participation of the ASEAN economies in the global production network process. An economically cohesive region would also strengthen the member states’ bargaining power at the WTO as well as in the respective FTAs with external partners, and in other strategic matters. The financial cooperation mechanism under the ASEAN+3 framework is expected to increase the Asian voice in, and for, global financial management.

Is AEC successful in its strategic motive? Although nothing can be precisely attributed to AEC, one can see that ASEAN member states weathered the 2008 global financial crisis relatively smoothly. ASEAN governments acted quickly to adopt measures responding to the demand by private individuals and financial institutions. As a proactive measure, global economic issues are regularly discussed at ASEAN meetings. The AEC effect has also translated into a higher international standing for ASEAN. Starting April 2009, ASEAN as an organisation was invited as a participant to the Group of 20 Summit. The leaders of ASEAN and US held their first summit-level meeting in November 2009, paving the way for US participation in the East Asia Summit the following year. Growing recognition of ASEAN’s reach can also be seen in more than 80 countries appointing ambassadors to ASEAN.
With increased attention from the world’s leading economies, there is now emphasis among the members for ‘ASEAN Centrality’. In the economic integration context, the ‘ideology’ of centrality can be found in the decision made by ASEAN leaders in November 2012 to pursue a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) with all external partners that have signed an FTA with ASEAN. The RCEP will thus bring 16 economies in the Asia-Pacific region under an integrated regional economic framework.

The AEC outcome should not be seen solely in terms of its ability to achieve a single market. Rather, the AEC should be viewed as a strategic project that will attract more investments, help member countries plug into global supply chains, and strengthen their bargaining power in international economic and financial matters. Ultimately, AEC implementation will strengthen ASEAN’s position in the bigger economic space of Asia.

_Sanchita Basu Das is Fellow and Lead Researcher (Economic Affairs) at the ASEAN Studies Centre of the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. These are her personal views. An earlier version appeared as ISEAS Perspective 4/2015, published on 29 January 2015._
Timor-Leste’s Quest to Join ASEAN: The Process and the Pace

Termsak Chalermphananupap

Timor-Leste became an independent nation in May 2002. The following year, it started participating in the biennial Southeast Asian (SEA) Games and has done so regularly since then. It became a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 2005 and of the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organisation (SEAMEO) in 2006; and acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) in 2007.

Timor-Leste submitted its application to ASEAN in March 2011. ASEAN Foreign Ministers, acting in their collective capacity as the ASEAN Coordinating Council (ACC), established a working group the following year to examine all potential dimensions and implications of Timor-Leste’s membership.

Starting with economic implications, a study was undertaken in early 2013 by Prof. Dr. Richard Pomfret of the University of Adelaide, Australia, with funding from the Asia Development Bank. This was followed by a study on political and security implications, undertaken jointly by the Singapore-based Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) and the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in early 2015. A similar study on socio-cultural implications will be conducted by Malaysia’s Institute of Strategic and International Studies; and is expected to be completed by end-2015. Funding for the two latter studies come from the ASEAN Development Fund, administered by the ASEAN Secretariat.

The process of considering Timor-Leste’s membership application builds on the experience ASEAN went through in the 1990s when Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia respectively put in their bids for joining ASEAN. Back then, ASEAN engaged in extensive discussions with the prospective members to assess their readiness to participate in ASEAN priority projects, and implement ASEAN agreements. These discussions were complemented by study missions to the prospective member countries. Even so, the unexpected wide-ranging effects of the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis hampered these newer members’ further integration and active participation in ASEAN.

The interest in examining the implications of Timor-Leste’s application for membership is thus rooted to a certain extent in ASEAN’s past experience. The difference is that Timor-Leste’s application takes place after the entry into force of the ASEAN Charter, which stipulates, in its Article 6, criteria for membership. These criteria include: location in the recognised geographical region of Southeast Asia; recognition by all ASEAN member states; agreement to be bound by the ASEAN Charter; and the ability and willingness to carry out the obligations of membership. Admission is to be decided by consensus by the ASEAN Summit, upon the recommendation of the ACC.
ASEAN makes decision by consultation and consensus. Thus, every member state is expected to be represented at every ASEAN meeting, especially the high-level Summit and ministerial meetings, and participate in formulating policy decisions. Every member government is also obliged to implement all ASEAN commitments in good faith with best national effort. Any laxity in implementation could cause detrimental delays for ASEAN’s regional integration exercise.

Therefore, the ACC’s working group is taking as much time as is required to assess national capacities in Timor-Leste and examine all possible implications in the political, economic and socio-cultural spheres which could arise from Timor-Leste’s ASEAN membership. The study assessing political-security implications has recommended, among others, that the ACC Working Group members visit Timor-Leste to get (and assess) first-hand information on the current situation in the country.

Eventually, the ACC Working Group will synthesise the findings of all three studies on the implications of Timor-Leste’s ASEAN membership, and present its recommendations to the ACC. Following ASEAN practice, the final decision on Timor-Leste’s ASEAN membership will be reached through consultation and consensus among the ASEAN governments. Until then, the present process and the customary pace of consideration continues.

*Termsak Chalermpanapap is Visiting Fellow and Lead Researcher (Political-Security) at the ASEAN Studies Centre of the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. These are his personal views.*
ASEANInfo

ASEANInfo provides 1) information and analysis on various aspects of ASEAN integration and cooperation, focusing on agencies, institutions and processes; and 2) snippets of information on various ASEAN indicators, to provide a comparative source of where ASEAN integration and individual ASEAN member states are positioned in the world, through easily digestible data/information.

The ASEAN Foundation

At the Second ASEAN Informal Summit held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, ASEAN Leaders agreed to establish an ASEAN Foundation, “in recognition of the fundamental importance of improving the livelihoods and well-being of the peoples of Southeast Asia, and the need to promote ASEAN awareness as well as people-to-people contact through scholarships, fellowships and other exchanges”. On 15 December 1997, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the establishment of the ASEAN Foundation. The Foundation has its seat in Jakarta, and its activities and projects are carried out by the Executive Director and staff. Oversight is managed by a Board of Trustees and an Advisory Council. With the entry into force of the ASEAN Charter in 2009, the Foundation now has a clearer channel of consultation (and reporting) with the ASEAN Secretary-General.

The Foundation’s objective is to “assist ASEAN in its mission to foster life of peace and prosperity for all the peoples of ASEAN through close regional cooperation”, in support of “ASEAN’s vision of cultivating a community of competent, caring and cohesive societies as envisioned in ASEAN Vision 2020”. However, its establishment coincided with the advent of the Asian financial crisis that swept through several ASEAN economies in 1997-98, severely affecting workers and vulnerable populations throughout the region, and the implementation of ASEAN’s commitments for social and human development. The Foundation was thus presented with an immediate challenge of addressing poverty alleviation, human development, and education needs in an already difficult environment.

Bolstering contributions from the ASEAN member countries, Japan contributed US$ 20 million for the ASEAN Foundation under an ASEAN-Japan Solidarity Fund, aimed to be used for activities of a regional nature which would otherwise be too difficult to deal with bilaterally; and to support regional cooperation among non-governmental organisations and local governments. China and the Republic of Korea have also contributed to the ASEAN Foundation’s projects and activities. The ASEAN-Japan Solidarity Fund, however, provided the bulk of the ASEAN Foundation’s project funds in the initial decade of the Foundation’s operations. The ASEAN University Network’s Southeast Asia Engineering Education Network (AUN-SEEDNet) was supported from this fund.
In recent years, the ASEAN Foundation has diversified its partner base, widening it to include the business sector. It led the creation of an ASEAN Corporate Social Responsibility Network, highlighting the need to support people-oriented aspects of ASEAN integration. It has refocused priority attention to the aspirations expressed by the ASEAN heads of state/government, and supports initiatives on promoting ASEAN awareness in the “people” sectors of regional cooperation, through studies and surveys, training seminars and workshops, information dissemination and the establishment of networking systems. Youth in ASEAN and their role in community-building is an emerging area of attention. The Foundation has supported two region-wide surveys in 2007 and 2014 assessing awareness of and attitudes towards ASEAN by undergraduates in the member states. The ASEAN Studies Centre at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute has been involved in both exercises, and is the implementing agency for the 2014 survey which updates the 2007 findings.

Since its establishment, the Foundation has been represented by six Executive Directors, each serving a 3-year term. The current Executive Director of the ASEAN Foundation is Ms Elaine Tan, who assumed duties in 2013. More information on the ASEAN Foundation’s activities and interests are at: http://www.aseanfoundation.org/
If ASEAN were a single entity, its population would place it as the third most populous in the world, and the size of its economy would rank it in the top five. The individual profiles of the ASEAN-10, however, highlight the diversity of ASEAN’s development in many ways.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brunei Darussalam</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>40,776</td>
<td>13.90</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>1,084</td>
<td>24.30</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>252.8</td>
<td>888.5</td>
<td>3,515</td>
<td>354.47</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>1,708</td>
<td>5.95</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>326.9</td>
<td>10,830</td>
<td>443.00</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>1,198</td>
<td>32.75</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>284.6</td>
<td>2,843</td>
<td>128.90</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>0.0007</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>307.9</td>
<td>56,287</td>
<td>776.02</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>373.8</td>
<td>5,561</td>
<td>455.53</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>90.7</td>
<td>186.2</td>
<td>2,052</td>
<td>299.74</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td><strong>4.33</strong></td>
<td><strong>623</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,478</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,978</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,535</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>1,454</td>
<td>61,887</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>1,787</td>
<td>50,271</td>
<td>949</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>1,364.3</td>
<td>10,360</td>
<td>7,594</td>
<td>4,303</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>508.3</td>
<td>18,461</td>
<td>36,318</td>
<td>12,290</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1,267.4</td>
<td>2,067</td>
<td>1,631</td>
<td>778</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>127.1</td>
<td>4,601</td>
<td>36,194</td>
<td>1,506</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. of Korea</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>1,410</td>
<td>27,970</td>
<td>1,098</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>42,409</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>143.8</td>
<td>1,861</td>
<td>12,736</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>318.9</td>
<td>17,419</td>
<td>54,629</td>
<td>4,033</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: World Development Indicators, World Bank; World Trade Organization Database; Human Development Report 2014, UNDP.
Reports on ASEAN

Published by ISEAS

The Maritime Silk Road and China-Southeast Asia Relations
ISEAS Perspective no. 35, 8 July 2015
By Zhao Hong, ISEAS Visiting Senior Fellow

Multiple Challenges for the AIIB
ISEAS Perspective no. 33, 2 July 2015
By Stuart Larkin, ISEAS Visiting Fellow

Can the China-led AIIB Support the ASEAN Connectivity Master Plan?
ISEAS Perspective no. 30, 24 June 2015
By Sanchita Basu Das, ASC Lead Researcher (Economic)

The Politics of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)
Trends in Southeast Asia, no.10, 30 June 2015
By Tang Siew Mun, ISEAS Senior Fellow

Published by Others

ASEAN’s Failing Grade in the South China Sea
By Ian Storey, ISEAS Senior Fellow

PacNet #42 - Defense Diplomacy in East Asia: Will ASEAN Continue to be Central?
By Benjamin Ho
Published by Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, DC on 27 July 2015

RSIS Commentary No. 158/2015 – Indonesia and the South China Sea: A Twofold Strategy
By Iis Gindarsah
Published by the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore on 27 July 2015

PacNet #40 - A Modest Proposal to Help ASEAN Reconcile their Overlapping Claims in the Spratlys
By Michael McDevitt
Published by Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, DC on 9 July 2015

China’s Three-Pronged Strategy on Regional Connectivity
Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia under the Young Academic’s Voice on 1 June 2015
By Sanchita Basu Das, ASC Lead Researcher (Economic)

ASEAN Peacekeeping Force? Points to Ponder
The Straits Times, 28 May 2015
By Tang Siew Mun, ISEAS Senior Fellow

China’s Engagement with Regional Security Multilateralism: The Case of the Shangri-La Dialogue
By Nick Bisley and Brendan Taylor
In Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 37/1 published by ISEAS in April 2015.

The Future Maritime Security Environment in Asia: A Risk Assessment Approach
By Sam Bateman
In Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 37/1 published by ISEAS in April 2015.

State Strategy in Territorial Conflict: A Conceptual Analysis of China’s Strategy in the South China Sea
By Andrew Taffer
In Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 37/1 published by ISEAS in April 2015.

Explaining the Failure of the ASEAN Economic Community: The Primacy of Domestic Political Economy
By Lee Jones
<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09512748.2015.1022593#Va4Ey6SqpHw>

Please visit the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute website for more commentaries.
ASC Events

PAST

Seminar on “The ASEAN Community 2015: What Does It Denote?”
The Seminar was organized on 31 July 2015 at ISEAS to discuss what the announcement of the
ASEAN Community at the end of 2015 means and what we can expect beyond 2015.

UPCOMING

ASEAN Roundtable 2015, 14 September 2015
The ASEAN Roundtable 2015 will discuss expectations and realities of the ASEAN Community, with
an eye on post-2015 ASEAN.

ASEAN Lecture Series, 23 September 2015
Japan’s New Approaches to Southeast Asia, by Mr. Hitoshi Tanaka, Chairman, Institute of
International Strategy & Former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Japan.

Upcoming ASEAN Meetings and Events

August 2015

- 48th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (AMM)/ Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) in Kuala
  Lumpur
- Special Meeting of AICHR in Kuala Lumpur
- 8th Meeting of the High-Level Task Force (HLTF) on ASEAN Community’s Post-2015 Vision in
  Jakarta
- 47th ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting in Kuala Lumpur
- 28th Meeting of the High-Level Task Force on ASEAN Economic Integration (HLTF-EI)
- 9th Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Trade Negotiating Committee (TNC)
  and Related Meetings in Myanmar

September 2015

- 9th Meeting of the HLTF on ASEAN Community’s Post-2015 Vision in Bali
- 36th General Assembly of ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA)
- Special SOM Meeting on Review of the EAS (3 meetings)
- Symposium for ASEAN Connectivity
- Informal ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (IAMM) in New York
- 10th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (10th AMMTC) in Kuala Lumpur
- 10th ASEAN GO-NGO Forum on Social Welfare and Development/ 11th Senior Officials Meeting
  on Social Welfare and Development (SOMSWD) /10th SOMSWD +3
- 33rd Senior Officials Meeting on Energy – ASEAN Ministers on Energy Meeting (SOME-
  AMEM)

For more details and updates on upcoming ASEAN events, please visit:
http://www.asean.org/images/2015/June/Notional_Calendar/ASEAN%20Notional%20Calendar%2001062015.pdf
### National Days and Other Significant Events in ASEAN Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 August</td>
<td>ASEAN Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 August</td>
<td>Singapore’s National Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 August</td>
<td>Independence Day of Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 August</td>
<td>Malaysia’s National Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 August</td>
<td>National Heroes Day of the Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 September</td>
<td>Vietnam’s National Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 September</td>
<td>Constitution Day of Cambodia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed.

Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission.

Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s).

© Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article.