EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Since President Xi Jinping assumed office in 2012, China has attached great importance to Chinese discourse power in its foreign policy agenda. In Southeast Asia, China views engagements with local media as a crucial conduit for disseminating its official narratives.
- This article examines how Chinese embassies in Southeast Asia utilise local media to tell “China’s story” in the region through three channels: 1) media events organised by Chinese embassies; 2) signed articles by Chinese leaders and diplomats in local newspapers; and 3) interviews and media briefings by Chinese ambassadors with local media.
- The overarching tone of “China’s story” to Southeast Asian audiences is positive, and the three core themes of “China’s story” involve denunciation of Western narratives, harmonisation of China-ASEAN ties, and promotion of China’s achievements.
- Notwithstanding Chinese efforts to project its discourse power in Southeast Asia, a question mark hangs over whether “China’s story” has gained credibility among Southeast Asians. There is no straightforward answer to this, given the diversity of views within the region, not only across regional states but also different sectors of society.
- China’s focus on strengthening mutually beneficial relations with Southeast Asian states, in lockstep with its discourse power push, potentially enhances its standing in the region, because the attractiveness of “China’s story” depends less on what China says but on what China does.
*Wang Zheng was previously Wang Gungwu Visiting Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. He is currently a Ph.D. candidate in political science at the University at Albany, State University of New York.
ISEAS Perspective 2022/90, 12 September 2022
INTRODUCTION
Since President Xi Jinping assumed office in 2012, China has attached great importance to the notion of discourse power in its foreign policy agenda. Xi’s speech at the National Propaganda and Ideology Work Conference in 2013 underscored the urgent need to “tell Chinaʼs story well, disseminate Chinaʼs voice well, and strengthen China’s discourse power internationally.”[1] Coined as huayuquan (话语权) in Chinese, the term connotes simultaneously the “right” of China to project its own narratives, ideas and concepts on the international stage and the “power” to influence the way people should think about the world.[2] China’s goal of projecting its discourse power is to create “a positive global image to achieve global institutional power of agenda-setting” and to shape favourable international opinion for the exercise of China’s national interests.[3]
From China’s perspective, although the balance of power in the current international system has undergone substantial changes with its rise to become the world’s second-largest economy, Western countries still dominate international discourse. Consequently, Western narratives about China are viewed by Beijing as biased and ideology-driven, posing major barriers to China’s peaceful development.[4] China therefore aspires to “accelerate the construction of Chinese discourse and Chinese narrative system … to present the Chinese story and the ideological and spiritual power behind it more fully and distinctly.”[5] China’s discourse power projection is a systematic project orchestrated by the entire party-state apparatus involving multiple subdivisions of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee, the State Council of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).[6] Chief among the implementing bodies in enhancing China’s international communication capabilities are state media, universities, Confucius Institutes, think tanks, and tech firms, among others.
One important conduit for China to project its discourse power is through media, including establishing local branches of Chinese state media overseas, enhancing China’s presence on social media platforms, and strengthening partnerships between Chinese state media and their foreign counterparts via content-sharing agreements and exchange programmes.[7] In Southeast Asia, China views engagements with local media as a crucial conduit to disseminate its official narratives. In his speech at the 2021 ASEAN Media Partners Forum, Shen Haixiong, President of the China Media Group (CMG), conveyed that media cooperation between the CMG and ASEAN “has effectively promoted mutual understanding and trust” and that China is hoping to see more local media in ASEAN states join China in “telling China stories, ASEAN stories and stories about China-ASEAN exchange and cooperation in an objective and faithful way.”[8]
“TELL CHINA’S STORY” THROUGH LOCAL MEDIA
This section examines how Chinese embassies in Southeast Asia (including China’s Mission to ASEAN) utilised local media to tell “China’s story” through their media engagement activities between January 2019 and April 2022.[9] These activities were undertaken in three forms: 1) media events organised by Chinese embassies; 2) signed articles by Chinese diplomats and top Chinese leaders in local newspapers; and 3) interviews and media briefings by Chinese ambassadors with local media.
First, Chinese embassies organised various media events, including media forums, high-level conferences, training programmes, and trips to China, to directly engage with local media and journalists (see Table 1).[10] For instance, during the ASEAN Media Delegation’s trip to China in 2019, participants were invited to attend an exhibition themed “Great History, Splendid Achievements” and visit China Central Television (CCTV). As the host to the delegation, Chinese officials reiterated China’s commitment to building a ‘community of shared future’ with ASEAN countries and repudiated Western media’s negative coverage of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation mechanism.[11]
Table 1: Selected Media Events Organised by Chinese Embassies in Southeast Asia (Jan 2019-Apr 2022)
Second, Chinese diplomats and top Chinese leaders published signed articles in local newspapers. Table 3 lists the top ten local newspapers from Brunei, Timor-Leste, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines that have published signed articles authored by Chinese diplomats and top Chinese leaders between January 2019 and April 2022. Indonesia tops the list given that both the Chinese Embassy in Indonesia and China’s Mission to ASEAN are based in Jakarta. It should be noted that newspapers listed here operate in multiple languages, including English, Chinese, and local languages such as Tetun and Bahasa Indonesia, reflecting China’s efforts to appeal to audiences with different cultural and ethnic backgrounds.
Table 2: Top Ten Local Newspapers Publishing Signed Articles by Chinese Leaders and Diplomats (Jan 2019-Apr 2022)[12]
Third, Chinese ambassadors had interviews with local media and addressed their questions in media briefings convened by Chinese embassies. Table 3 shows selected local media that interviewed Chinese ambassadors or attended media briefings convened by Chinese embassies in each Southeast Asian state between January 2019 and April 2022. Overall, Chinese embassies’ interactions with local media vary across countries, with Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines topping the list. Furthermore, China has been engaging with various local media platforms, including print, broadcast, and digital media. Similarly, these media outlets operate in different languages.
Table 3: Selected Local Media Interacting with Chinese Embassies in Southeast Asia
COMMON THEMES IN “CHINA’S STORY” TO SOUTHEAST ASIAN AUDIENCES
This section identifies the common themes from three sources of Chinese official messaging featured on Chinese embassies’ websites between January 2019 and April 2022,[13] namely: 1) local newspaper articles written by top Chinese leaders and Chinese diplomats; 2）Chinese diplomats’ interviews with local media; and 3) Chinese diplomats’ remarks at media briefings convened by Chinese embassies or at their meetings with local government officials. The author analysed 209 pieces of texts in two ways. First, word frequency in the texts is calculated to discern the overarching tone of China’s official narratives to Southeast Asian audiences. Second, three common themes running through the texts are distilled: namely, denunciation of Western narratives, harmonisation of China-ASEAN ties, and promotion of China’s achievements.
WORD FREQUENCY
Table 4 shows the top 50 frequent words and their weighted percentages in the texts, and the word cloud chart presented in Figure 1 visualises the top 100 common words in the texts.[14] Words such as “cooperation,” “mutual,” “joint,” “support,” and “friends” represent China’s characterisation of its relationship with Southeast Asian states. Terms related to China’s economic and foreign policy agenda, including poverty reduction, the BRI, and ‘community of shared future’, also feature frequently on the word list. It is evident that the overarching tone of these texts is positive, which is consistent with China’s polite attitudes towards Southeast Asian states on Twitter, contrary to its combative ‘wolf-warrior’ diplomacy in the West.[15]
Table 4: Top 50 Frequent Words
Figure 1: Cloud Chart of the Top 100 Key Words
COMMON THEMES
By coding the selected texts and organising the codes accordingly, three common themes of “China’s story” to Southeast Asian audiences are identified, namely: denunciation of Western narratives, harmonisation of China-ASEAN ties, and promotion of China’s achievements. Inherent in the narratives is a dichotomous framing of China’s attitudes towards Western and Southeast Asian countries, reflecting Beijing’s strategy of tailoring its communication methods when projecting its discourse power overseas. While denouncing Western narratives about its domestic politics and foreign policies, China portrays Southeast Asian countries as good neighbours, close friends, strategic partners, and family members. China also promotes its achievements in order to enhance its image as a benign power in Southeast Asia.
Denunciation of Western Narratives
One of the core themes in “China’s story” is Beijing’s denunciation of Western narratives about its domestic politics and foreign policies. China regards these narratives as driven by a “Cold War mentality,”[16] which motivates Western countries to demonise its achievements, sabotage the solidarity among Asian countries, and ultimately contain its peaceful development. To refute such narratives, China contends that it firmly champions multilateralism, free trade, and the rule-based international order as enshrined in the United Nations (UN) charter. In Southeast Asia, China’s position is manifest in its rebuttal of multiple Western narratives regarding the origin-tracing of Covid-19, the BRI, and the South China Sea disputes.
The origin-tracing of Covid-19 abounds in China’s denunciation of Western narratives. China views criticisms regarding the lack of transparency in its initial handling of the pandemic and the “lab-leak” theory as US attempts to politicise the issue of Covid-19 origins and undermine global cooperation in fighting the pandemic.[17] China claims it has adopted a scientific approach to determine Covid-19 origins by collaborating with the World Health Organisation (WHO) on a joint study conducted in March 2021, according to which the “lab-leak” theory is “extremely unlikely” to be valid.[18] Cambodia and Indonesia reportedly supported China in opposing the politicisation of the origin-tracing of Covid-19, according to the interviews with Chinese ambassadors to Cambodia and Indonesia in local media.[19]
Responding to the criticism of the BRI being a “debt trap,” China counters with the claim that it pursues a market-oriented approach to “foster a transparent, friendly, non-discriminatory and foreseeable financing environment” and to alleviate the debt burdens of recipient countries.[20] China also asserts that BRI projects can promote economic growth and create job opportunities for recipient countries in Southeast Asia.[21] Furthermore, China conveys that there is no hidden geopolitical agenda behind the BRI – the BRI itself aligns well with regional states’ national strategies such as Indonesia’s “Global Maritime Fulcrum” vision,[22] the Philippine’s “Build, Build, Build” programme,[23] and Malaysia’s push for the development of the digital economy.[24]
On the South China Sea disputes, China insists that the so-called “accusation” of China’s militarisation of the South China Sea is a vivid example of how Western countries “interfere in China’s internal affairs and drive a wedge between China and regional countries”.[25] China has repeatedly articulated its commitment to resolving the South China Sea disputes through consultations with claimants in the region[26] and has evaluated that consultations on the Code of Conduct (COC) have been “proceeding smoothly and effectively.”[27]
Harmonisation of China-ASEAN Ties
In stark contrast to its negative portrayal of Western countries, China has sought to harmonise its ties with ASEAN countries by highlighting the positives while downplaying the tensions in its relationship with regional states. China defines its relations with ASEAN countries as not only close friends, good neighbours, and strategic partners[28] but also family members that “have a shared future, enjoy blessings and endure misfortune together…and honour kinship and fidelity”.[29] References to the notion of “family” are very prominent, and aim to make Southeast Asian states “empathize and identify with China and against its others”.[30]
China regards cooperation as the foundation of the China-ASEAN relationship. As shown in Table 4, the word “cooperation” appears most frequently in the texts. President Xi even extols the China-ASEAN relationship as “the most successful and vibrant model for cooperation in the Asia-Pacific” and “an exemplary effort in building a community with a shared future for mankind.”[31] From China’s perspective, win-win cooperation lies at the core of China-ASEAN relations and overshadows any downsides or challenges. For instance, China views the South China Sea disputes as “neither the keynote nor the sum total”[32] of China-ASEAN relations: “Even lovers and friends may have differences, but differences should not prevent them from loving and supporting each other.”[33] Euphonic as the statement is, China’s real motive, it has been otherwise asserted, is to “condition ASEAN states into “good behaviour” by “offering rewards for those ASEAN members that follow Beijing’s scripts and imposing punitive measures on those that do not.”[34]
Promotion of China’s Achievements
The promotion of China’s achievements is another crucial part of “China’s story” to Southeast Asian audiences. China attributes its effective pandemic control to the “Chinese Solution,” which comprises the CCP’s strong leadership, a scientific and people-centred approach, and international cooperation.[35] Such an approach is believed to have won China worldwide praises.[36] In return for ASEAN countries’ support during the Covid-19 pandemic, China actively distributed medical supplies such as vaccines, masks and test kits to assist regional states in fighting the pandemic.
Despite the pandemic, China has managed to maintain the momentum of economic growth – another achievement frequently mentioned in the texts. In 2020, China was reported to be the only major economy that achieved significant economic growth during the pandemic.[37] In 2021, China announced that it realised the goal of building a “moderately prosperous society in all respects” – a major milestone of the CCP’s long march towards the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.[38] In doing so, China claimed that it “has made enormous contributions to world peace and development in its own right.”[39]
A key indicator of China’s economic growth is the elimination of extreme poverty. Touted as another “Chinese Miracle”, China’s poverty reduction campaign is claimed to have lifted over 98.99 million rural population out of extreme poverty in the past decade, marking the “complete victory in its overall national campaign against poverty”.[40] China holds that its success in poverty reduction benefits the world – the total number of over 850 million people lifted out of poverty in the past four decades accounts for more than 70 percent of the global population that has exited poverty.[41] Especially in its messaging towards Mekong countries and Timor-Leste,[42] China has underscored the applicability of its approach to eliminating extreme poverty – one that focuses on sustaining industrial growth and empowering the local economy.[43]
To capture how China’s narratives about its achievements have shifted over time, this study analyses changes in the number of references to three words – “contribution,” “achievement,” and “success” – in 209 texts from 2019 to 2021 (see Table 5).[44] As shown in Figure 2, the number of references dropped from 3.56 to 3.29 words per text during the pandemic outbreak in early 2020. At this stage, China’s tone was more defensive as it had to deal with its reputational fall-outs globally following the first ever Covid-19 outbreak in Wuhan. After that, China effectively controlled the pandemic in the second half of 2020, and started to actively distribute medical supplies to other countries, which gained momentum after the WHO approved the Sinovac vaccine for emergency use in June 2021.[45] As a result, the number of references to Chinese “contribution”, “achievement” and “success” rose to 4.79 per text in 2021.
Table 5: Number of References Per Year and Per Text
Figure 2: Number of References between 2019 and 2021
CONCLUSION
Have China’s intensifying efforts to project its discourse power in Southeast Asia helped improve its “national positive image” among Southeast Asians? There is no straightforward answer to this, given the diversity of views within the region.
At the regional level, views regarding China’s influence in Southeast Asia appear to be more critical than what China may have expected. According to the 2022 State of Southeast Asia (SSEA) annual survey, foreign policy elites remain wary of Beijing’s growing influence in the region, although they recognise China as the most influential economic and political power in Southeast Asia.[46] Only 7% of respondents think that China is a benign and benevolent power, while 58.1% are not confident that China would “do the right thing” in global affairs. Contentious issues downplayed in “China’s story,” including China’s assertive stance on the South China Sea, its use of economic tools for political purposes, and its growing influence over Chinese diasporas in Southeast Asia, are among respondents’ top concerns over China’s engagement with the region.
At the country level, perceptions of China’s presence in the region are not monolithic and exhibit more nuance. In mainland Southeast Asia, the share of respondents receptive to China’s influence in the region is higher in Cambodia and Laos than in Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam. Among maritime Southeast Asian states, foreign policy elites in Brunei, Indonesia and Indonesia are becoming more amenable to Chinese influence than those in Singapore and the Philippines.[47] However, the 2022 Pew Research survey with a broader sampling across different sectors of society indicates that while the majority of respondents from all developed countries have unfavourable views of China, only Singapore and Malaysia buck the trend with more than 60% of their respondents viewing China favourably.
There are signs that China’s focus in strengthening mutually beneficial relations with Southeast Asian states, in lockstep with its discourse power push, would potentially enhance its standing in the region. The 2022 SSEA survey indicates that confidence in China has picked up in 2022 compared to previous years, especially in Cambodia, Laos, Brunei and Indonesia, arguably thanks to its continued “charm offensives” across the region in recent years, such as vaccine diplomacy, infrastructure financing and trade integration. The 2021 Malaysia-China Relations Survey Report conducted by the UCSI Poll Research Centre also reveals that China-Malaysia vaccine cooperation has improved respondents’ perceptions of China and their attitudes towards Chinese investment in Malaysia.[48] In the final analysis, the attractiveness of “China’s story” – or the lack thereof – depends less on what China says but on what China does.
ENDNOTES
[1] “Xi Jinping’s 19 August speech revealed? (Translation)”, China Copyright and Media, 12 December 2013, https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2013/11/12/xi-jinpings-19-august-speech-revealed-translation/.
[2] For more details about the meaning of the term, see Toni Friedman, “Lexicon: ‘Discourse Power’ or the ‘Right to Speak’ (话语权, Huàyǔ Quán)”, DigiChina, 17 March 2022, https://digichina.stanford.edu/work/lexicon-discourse-power-or-the-right-to-speak-huayu-quan/.
[3] “Chinese Discourse Power: China’s Use of Information Manipulation in Regional and Global Competition”, Atlantic Council, December 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/China-Discouse-Power-FINAL.pdf.
[4] Zuo Fengrong ed., Great Changes of the World and China’s International Discourse Power (Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2020).
[5] Adam Ni, “Xi on external propaganda and discursive power”, China Neican, 4 June 2021, https://www.neican.org/xi-jinping-on-external-propaganda/.
[6] Atlantic Council 2020; and Paul Charon and Jean-Baptise Jeangene Vilmer, “Chinese Influence Operations: A Machiabellian Movement”, The Institute for Strategic Research, October 2021, https://www.irsem.fr/report.html.
[7] Charon and Vilmer 2021; and Louisa Lim and Julia Bergin, “The China Story: Reshaping the World’s Media”, International Federation of Journalists, June 2020, https://www.ifj.org/fileadmin/user_upload/IFJ_ChinaReport_2020.pdf; and Maria Repnikova, Chinese Soft Power (Cambridge University Press, 2022)
[8] “China Media Group and ASEAN media set up partnership to boost regional development”, CGTN, 15 July 2021, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2021-07-14/CMG-and-ASEAN-media-set-up-partnership-to-boost-regional-development-11TErueblh6/index.html.
[9] This study traces Chinese embassies’ activities back to January 2019 given the availability of updates
posted on their websites.
[10] The events here do not include press conferences or media briefings convened by Chinese embassies on a regular basis.
[11]“感受70载辉煌发展成就 唱响中国-东盟美好未来—东盟媒体代表团访华纪实”, 中国驻东盟使团，2019年10月25日，http://asean.china-mission.gov.cn/stxw/201910/t20191025_8849155.htm.
[12] The numbers presented in Table 2 and 3 are based on the count of updates posted on Chinese embassies’ websites.
[13] This study selected English sources since the software NVivo – which is used to code the texts and identify common themes – can only process data in English.
[14] The analysis here only examines English sources posted on the websites of Chinese embassies in Southeast Asia between January 2019 and April 2022. The count of each word also includes its stemmed terms. For instance, when counting the frequency of the word “development”, the software also takes into count its stemmed forms such as “develop,” “developed,” “developer,” and “develops.” In doing so, the analysis calculates word frequency more accurately. Furthermore, certain words that do not carry significant meanings, such as country names, are put on the stop words list and are not calculated here.
[15] Darren Cheong, “Polite Wolves: China’s Soft Twitter Diplomacy in Southeast Asia”, Fulcrum, 21 February 2022, https://fulcrum.sg/polite-wolves-chinas-soft-twitter-diplomacy-in-southeast-asia/.
[16] Deng Xijun, “An Undemocratic ‘Summit for Democracy’”, Mission of People’s Republic of China to ASEAN, 9 December 2021, http://asean.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/stxw/202112/t20211209_10464838.htm and Deng Xijun, “Uncovering Truth About AUKUS”, Mission of People’s Republic of China to ASEAN, 30 September 2021, http://asean.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/stxw/202109/t20210930_9578428.htm.
[17] “Written Interview of Ambassador WANG Wentian on Fighting COVID-19 Pandemic”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Kingdom of Cambodia, 16 August 2021, http://kh.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/dssghd_1/202108/t20210818_8938489.htm and “A signed article ‘Covid-19 origin tracing: Respect science, reject politicisation’ by Mr. Zhang Xumin, Chargé d’Affaires, ad interim of the Chinese Embassy in Singapore published in Straits Times”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Singapore, 20 August 20 2021, http://sg.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgsd/202108/t20210820_8913765.htm
[18] “Signed Article by H.E. Dr. Xiao Jianguo, Chinese Ambassador to Timor-Leste, published on Suara Timor Lorosae”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 18 June 2021, http://tl.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/xwdt/202106/t20210618_8909268.htm.
[19] “Written Interview of Chinese Ambassador to Cambodia H.E. Wang Wentian on the Outcomes of State Councilor Wang Yi’s Visit to Cambodia by Cambodia News Agency”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Kingdom of Cambodia, 20 September 2021, http://kh.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/dssghd_1/202109/t20210920_9579992.htm and “Ambassador Xiao Qian published a signed article titled United States origin tracing of coronavirus is a dead end in Jakarta Post”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Indonesia, 10 September 2021, http://id.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgdt/202109/t20210910_9633640.htm.
[20] “Keynote Speech by Chinese Ambassador Xiao Qian at Seminar ‘Connecting Indonesia and China through Belt and Road Initiative’”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Indonesia, 27 March 2019, http://id.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgdt/201903/t20190327_2049062.htm and “Full text: Why Belt and Road and Global Maritime Fulcrum Cooperation Benefits both China and Indonesia?”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Indonesia, 2 September 2019 http://id.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgdt/201909/t20190902_2049102.htm.
[21] “Timor Post published a signed article by Ambassador Xiao Jianguo on the Belt and Road Forum” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, 26 April 2019 http://tl.chineseembassy.org/eng/xwdt/201904/t20190426_1140850.htm.
[22] “Full text of Chinese ambassador Xiao Qian’s article on Belt and Road Initiative published by the Jakarta Post”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Indonesia, 9 April 2019 http://id.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgdt/201904/t20190409_2049070.htm.
[23] “Ambassador Huang Xilian: All Chinese projects will continue as planned”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of the Philippines, 1 September 2020, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceph/eng/sgdt/t1811014.htm.
[24] “Interview of H.E. Ambassador Ouyang Yujing with BERNAMA (Transcript)”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Malaysia, 16 March 2021, http://my.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgxw/202103/t20210316_9935451.htm.
[25] “Ambassador Huang Xilian: All Chinese projects will continue as planned”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of the Philippines, 1 September 2020, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceph/eng/sgdt/t1811014.htm.
[26] “The South China Sea issue should not be a tool for implementing the strategy of containing China by non-regional countries”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Kingdom of Thailand, 14 July 2020, http://th.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgxw/202007/t20200714_10149168.htm.
[27] “China-Philippines Relations Shine Brighter in the Tempering of Time”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of the Philippines, 9 June 2019, http://ph.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgdt/202106/t20210609_8936066.htm.
[28] “Remarks by Ambassador Deng Xijun at the Launching Ceremony of the ASEAN-China Survey 2021 Report”, Mission of the People’s Republic of China to ASEAN, 21 October 2021, http://asean.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/stxw/202110/t20211028_10348960.htm; “Multilateralism: still the key to a prosperous East Asia”, Mission of the People’s Republic of China to ASEAN, 21 February 2022, http://asean.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/stxw/202202/t20220221_10643913.htm; and Ambassador Ouyang Yujing “Stand together for 30 years, Start New journey with a shared future–Commemorating the 30 Anniversary of China-ASEAN Dialogue Relations”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Malaysia, 21 December 2021, http://my.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgxw/202112/t20211231_10478004.htm.
[29] Ambassador Ouyang Yujing, “Stand together for 30 years, Start New journey with a shared future—Commemorating the 30 Anniversary of China-ASEAN Dialogue Relations”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Malaysia, 21 December 2021, http://my.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgxw/202112/t2021123110478004.htm.
[30] Linus Hagström, Astrid H M Nordin. “China’s ‘Politics of Harmony’ and the Quest for Soft Power in International Politics”, International Studies Review, Vol. 22, No. 3 (2020), p.517.
[31] Ambassador Ouyang Yujing, “Stand together for 30 years, Start New journey with a shared future—Commemorating the 30 Anniversary of China-ASEAN Dialogue Relations”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Malaysia, 21 December 2021, http://my.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgxw/202112/t20211231_10478004.htm.
[32] “China-Philippines Relations Shine Brighter in the Tempering of Time”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of the Philippines, 9 June 2021, http://ph.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgdt/202106/t20210609_8936066.htm.
[33] “Full text: Written interview with Manlila Times by H.E.Amb. Huang Xilian”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of the Philippines, 20 July 2020. http://ph.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgdt/202007/t20200720_1182956.htm.
[34] Hoang Thi Ha. “Understanding China’s Proposal for an ASEAN-China Community of Common Destiny and ASEAN’s Ambivalent Response.” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 4, No. 2 (August 2019), pp.223-254.
[35] “Written Interview of Ambassador WANG Wentian on Fighting COVID-19 Pandemic”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Kingdom of Cambodia, 18 August 2021, http://kh.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/dssghd_1/202108/t20210818_8938489.htm and “Interview of H.E. Ambassador Ouyang Yujing with BERNAMA (Transcript)”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Malaysia, 16 March 2021, http://my.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgxw/202103/t20210316_9935451.htm.
[36] “Bolster Cooperation, Overcome Difficulties, And Usher in a Brighter Shared Future”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Kingdom of Thailand, 30 September 2021, http://th.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgxw/202109/t20210930_9580639.htm.
[37] “Seize the Opportunity and Achieve Win-Win Cooperation”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Negara Brunei Darussalam, 2 April 2021, http://bn.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgxws/202104/t20210402_8930160.htm.
[38] “Signed Article by H.E. Dr. Xiao Jianguo, Chinese Ambassador to Timor-Leste, published on Suara Timor Lorosae”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 29 October 2021, http://tl.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/xwdt/202110/t20211029_10403650.htm.
[39] “China’s Moderate Prosperity and Its Benefits to the World”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Negara Brunei Darussalam, 4 November 2021, http://bn.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgxws/202111/t20211104_10442233.htm.
[40] “Interview of H.E. Ambassador Ouyang Yujing with BERNAMA (Transcript)”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Malaysia, 16 March 2021, http://my.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgxw/202103/t20210316_9935451.htm.
[41] “Signed Article by H.E. Dr. Xiao Jianguo, Chinese Ambassador to Timor-Leste, published on Timor Post”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, 18 March 2021, http://tl.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/xwdt/202103/t20210318_9995669.htm.
[42] “Do Not Say You Start Too Early; and You Have Close Friends Wherever You GoState Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi on President Xi Jinping’s State Visit to Myanmar”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 21 January 2020, http://mm.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgxw/202001/t20200121_1389314.htm and “Signed article on issues of Xinjiang and Hong Kong by H.E. Dr. Xiao Jianguo, Chinese ambassador to Timor-Leste, published on Timor Post”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, 4 September 2019, http://tl.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/xwdt/201909/t20190904_1140957.htm.
[43] “Toward Zero Poverty and Sustainable Development with Innovation”, Mission of the People’s Republic of China to ASEAN, 5 September 2019, http://asean.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/stxw/201909/t20190905_8235826.htm.
[44] Given the insufficient number of sources posted in 2022 thus far, the analysis here focuses on the number of references of these words from 2019 to 2021. Similarly, the count of each word includes its stemmed forms. The figures presented on the y-axis are references of the three words per text in each year. Since the number of sources examined this study varies across each year, the number of references of the three words are divided by the number of sources each year, in order to enhance the reliability of the analysis results.
[45] “WHO validates Sinovac COVID-19 vaccine for emergency use and issues interim policy recommendations”, World Health Organization, 1 June 2021, https://www.who.int/news/item/01-06-2021-who-validates-sinovac-covid-19-vaccine-for-emergency-use-and-issues-interim-policy-recommendations
[46] Sharon Seah, et al., “The State of Southeast Asia 2022 Survey Report”, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 16 February 2022, /articles-commentaries/state-of-southeast-asia-survey/the-state-of-southeast-asia-2022-survey-report/.
[47] See Sharon Seah, et al., 2022.
[48] S Birruntha, “Vaccine cooperation improves Malaysians’ perception of China”, The Malaysian Reserve, 2 December 2021, https://themalaysianreserve.com/2021/12/02/vaccine-cooperation-improves-malaysians-perception-of-china/.
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