

VISITING RESEARCHERS SERIES NO. 2(2001)

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Future: Continuity and Change
in Indonesian Politics**

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April 2001

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June-August 2000

BACK TO THE (SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT) FUTURE: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN INDONESIAN POLITICS

Background

The mass reform movement in Indonesia during the past two years had brought about a tremendous political change in this country. *Reformasi*, as the movement is popularly known in Indonesia, was successful in bringing down President Soeharto and his “New Order” regime in May 1998. At the beginning of the movement, there was a deep skepticism among analysts of Indonesian politics about whether the movement would be able to last long enough to cause a dent on the regime’s structure, let alone toppling Soeharto. Such doubt was understandable, bearing in mind that for more than thirty years, Soeharto had been able to consolidate his power not only through the elimination of virtually all political contenders but also through economic development that had won him a widespread legitimacy.

The success of the *Reformasi* movement has led many analysts to believe that the Indonesian politics have fundamentally changed, that new political forces have replaced the old ones, and that identities and loyalties have shifted. This is the fruit of economic development carried out by the New Order regime, which has indeed created higher prosperity, improved health care system, and better schooling system. As a result, the new Indonesian generation, especially the new middle class in urban areas, is a generation of modernity, seemingly detached from the old primordial loyalties that have divided their forefathers. Globalization, which Indonesia has been actively seeking to be a part of, has also made the younger generation more familiar with the ideas of democracy. Even though democracy is interpreted differently by different political forces and actors in Indonesia, *Reformasi* was launched in the name of “democracy”. Never before in the history of Indonesian politics had western-style liberal democracy won so many adherents as it does now, albeit vaguely defined.

The downfall of Soeharto has brought about a sense of democratic euphoria among the public. After being tightly regulated for almost four decades since the introduction of “Guided Democracy” by Sukarno in 1959, the Indonesian polity seemed to make the most of its newfound freedom. After President Habibie, who replaced Soeharto in May 1998, announced that a general election would be held in 1999, 160 political parties were

established during the period of May 1998 to February 1999.¹ However, the General Election Commission (KPU) later decided that only 48 parties had the sufficient level of support and number of branches to be eligible to participate in the 1999 election.

At this juncture, the similarities between the new and the old (pre-1959) Indonesian politics resurfaced. 34 parties contested the first election in 1955 — regarded as the most democratic election Indonesia had held until 1999. Many of the contestants of the 1999 election significantly resembled those of the 1955 election, not only in themes and ideologies, but also in the reemergence of old names. In an apparent effort to attract the voters who voted for particular parties in 1955, a number of parties claimed that they were the legitimate descendants of major parties from the immediate post-independence period. For instance, there were six parties that claimed that they were the successors of PNI (*Partai Nasional Indonesia* — Indonesian Nationalist Party), the party that received the most votes in 1955; four claimed to represent the defunct Masyumi (or sometimes “Masjumi”), PNI’s close competitor in 1955; and four claimed descendancy from Nahdatul Ulama (NU), which came out fourth in 1955 election.

Interestingly, the result of 1999 election was significantly similar with that of the 1955 parliamentary election held in September. In 1955, 34 parties contested the votes and only 28 parties actually won any seat in the DPR (parliament). Only 10 parties won more than 2 seats. The majority of the parliamentary seats (78%) were won by four major parties: PNI (nationalist), Masjumi (modernist Muslim), NU (traditionalist Muslim), and PKI (the Indonesian Communist Party).² The result of the 1999 election similarly showed that out of the 48 contestant parties, 17 actually won any seat, and only 7 won significant number of seats (more than 5). The majority of votes can be clustered into: PDI-P (nationalist party), Golkar (“functional groups” of the former ruling party), modernist Muslim parties alliance of Middle Axis (Poros Tengah), and PKB (traditionalist Muslim with links to NU). Thus, the only differences between 1955 and 1999 elections lie in the absence of PKI, and the presence of Golkar. PKI was banned in 1965 by the Soeharto regime following a failed coup attempt and Golkar was the political vehicle of the New Order regime.

This paper seeks to outline the elements of continuity and change in Indonesian politics since the advent of nationalist movement leading to the recent political change. In discussing change, it focuses on the external and internal factors that influence the socio-cultural as well as the political makeup of the Indonesian society. In particular, this analysis will be directed toward the interaction between so-called “Western” ideas such as nationalism, Marxism, capitalism and democracy, and traditional/primordial values. The discussion of continuity focuses on the geographical and sociological roots of Indonesia’s

contending political cultures, especially between the Javanese and the *Seberang* (outer islanders). Also discussed is the centrality of the influence of Islam in creating the streams (*aliran*) of political thinking, namely, the *Abangan*, the *Santri* and the Javanese *Santri* variants. Particular attention is paid on the structural manifestation of these political streams in the forms of political parties, mass and religious organizations.

Continuity: *Aliran* in Indonesian Politics

Analyses of Indonesian politics since the 1950s has revolved around the issue of *aliran*. Indonesian politics is said to be organized by this concept. In general, there are two definitions of *aliran*, as mentioned by Clifford Geertz. One is “a political party surrounded by a set of voluntary social organizations formally or informally linked to it”. The other is “a comprehensive pattern of social integration”.³ Subsequent political analysts have tended to use one of these definitions or a combination of the two.

In a widely read article among students of political culture, Benedict Anderson argued that he was more comfortable with the latter definition of *aliran*. According to him, *aliran* was “a distinctive, integrated cultural outlook, together with its organized and unorganized (but potentially organizable) adherents”.⁴ On the other hand, Herbert Feith demonstrated the first definition of *aliran* in *Indonesian Political Thinking, 1945-1965*, a classic book he co-edited with Lance Castles. Feith defined *aliran* in terms of “streams of political thinking”. A dominant party was found in each stream. These parties were supported by various social groups, representing the youth, labour, women, students, intellectuals, artisans, and so on.⁵

The present analysis tends to agree with both definitions. *Aliran*, as shall be demonstrated in the ensuing pages, signifies a distinctive politico-cultural set of beliefs. The beliefs are represented in the public sphere by a number of social organizations, and in the political sphere by a political party. An *aliran* party is usually distinguishable from the others by the level of mass support that it receives both in and out of elections. The support, in general terms, can be discerned according to geographical localities such as between Java and the outer islands, between coastal and agricultural areas in Java, and between rural and urban areas.

Aliran is different from ideology,⁶ although it is influenced by a number of “Western” ideologies. A number of political parties did try to demonstrate that they were the vanguards of certain ideologies. Marxism-Leninism is represented by the PKI (*Partai Komunis Indonesia* — Indonesian Communist Party), nationalism by the PNI (*Partai Nasional Indonesia* — Indonesian National Party), democratic socialism by the PSI (*Partai Sosialis*

Indonesia — Indonesian Socialist Party), and capitalist developmentalism by the Golkar (*Golongan Karya* — Functional Groups). However, as shall be argued in this paper, these affinities have less to do with mass support than with a platform to wage a political competition with the other parties. To say it from the perspective of the voters, the amount of voters who voted for a certain party due to the party's ideological choice was significantly less than those who based their votes on the cultural outlook of the party. Furthermore, over a period of time, some *aliran* parties shifted their ideological orientation. This had been done without alienating their constituents.

Aliran is also different from class. Although the PKI was notable for its zest and rhetoric of class struggle, the localized support that they received came mostly from the ability of its leaders to communicate effectively with the Javanese cultural group, rather than through their Marxist-Leninist orientation. Hence, each *aliran* could enjoy the support from its respective cultural group with no consequence to the class differentiation within such group.

However, it should also be noted that in the past, both class and ideology were still important in *aliran* politics, especially in trying to win the support of the majority group, the Javanese. The race for Java was competed primarily by two *aliran* parties, the PNI and the PKI. Here, the issue of class and ideology emerged. The PNI appealed to the more conservative middle and upper classes, while the PKI gained support from the more radicalized lower class. Such a race also happened in some other areas, albeit not to the extent as in Java. In the contemporary setting, class and ideology grew more salient in Indonesian politics, due to the growth of the middle class and its increasing exposure to the outside world. These conditions were a result of economic development during the New Order era. Nevertheless, as this paper shall argue, such a phenomenon has by no means supplanted *aliran* politics.

Contending Political Cultures

Selective Eclecticism

The rich natural resources and the strategic position of the archipelago now known as Indonesia had attracted many civilizations to interact with its population. As a result, some of the world's major religious beliefs, *i.e.*, Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, and Christianity, influenced the way of life, world-view, and philosophy of the people. Of equal importance in shaping the Indonesian culture is the animist beliefs developed by the indigenous people prior to the arrival of the major religions. Probably due to the openness of the territory and various external exposures, the people of this archipelago tended to be flexible in accepting external

influences and to adapt the new influence to the old. As a result, many facets of the local cultures are eclectic in nature.

Such eclecticism, however, is not uniformly applied across various ethnic groups in Indonesia. In general, it can be said that there is an inner selective mechanism in each of these groups which filters external influence according to acceptance or rejection. Usually, such selection involves the suitability of the traits in the external ideas to the existing pattern of social and power relationship in the indigenous population. This might explain why ideological based parties were more popular with certain ethnic groups. The belief system and worldview of the various ethnic groups are the results of such “selective eclecticism,” which involved a long process of selection, internalization, adaptation, articulation, and eventually value socialization among the people.

In many early works on Indonesian politics, two political cultures stood out broadly speaking. They were the political cultures of the Javanese and the *Seberang* (outer islands). The following is the discussion of the central assumption of the organization of society, and conception of power and politics held by these political cultures.

Javanese Political Culture

The Javanese political culture is more widely explored by social scientists than the *Seberang* political culture. This is probably due to the fact that the Javanese are the largest Indonesian ethnic group and can claim ancestry from a prominent ancient civilization. Given their long history, the Javanese have built a culture that is complex, intricate, and rich in spiritual life. The cradle of the Javanese civilization is the fertile agricultural land in central Java around the present day cities of Yogyakarta and Surakarta (Solo). Historically it had been an agricultural society. As in many such societies, the Javanese developed an inward-looking, insular, communitarian, status-conscious, and hierarchy-minded culture. Such cultural features were also due to the heavy influence of Hinduism in Java. The caste system of Hinduism had created significant social differentiation and stratification, which became deeply embedded within the Javanese psyche.⁷ The Javanese leadership made a clear distinction between *gusti* (lords) and *kawula* (subjects).⁸

The idea of power in Javanese culture is rather peculiar. It runs against the common perception of power in the West. Anderson argued that for the Javanese, power is concrete and holders of power are expected to be able to demonstrate the power through possession of several objects deemed to have supernatural powers.⁹ Power is also homogeneous. It means that there is no differentiation of types of power. Power is also regarded as constant in total quantity. It means that an increase in one’s power must happen at the expense of power loss

from the others. Thus, quest for power is perceived as a zero-sum game. Lastly, power is detached from moral questions. It implies that it does not matter how power is achieved. What does matter is whether one has power or not.¹⁰ In terms of accession to power, the Javanese perceived that power was either received from inheritance or through divine favour (*wahyu*). Such favour is believed to be bestowed upon rulers of relatively humble origins, coming to power after a period of turmoil and bloodshed.¹¹

In the Javanese conception, power is closely associated with “concentration” and “oneness”. Conversely, diffusion of authority means an impurity in power, and therefore should be avoided by all power holders. Thus, for a Javanese leader, diffusion of power within the state was regarded as a sign of weakness. A Javanese leader would always strive to unite different segments of the society under his rule and try to mold different — sometimes opposing — ideas from different groups into a single new idea that could be the lowest common denominator accepted by all.¹²

The search for harmony is the keyword in understanding Javanese social life, including statecraft.¹³ The Javanese have shown a profound ability to absorb new ideas, select parts of the new ideas suitable with their way of life, merge them with the existing culture, and thus rejuvenate the old culture as well as creating a new, syncretic one. Therefore the Javanese were known to be tolerant to “other’s” ideas, so long as these ideas did not contradict the central assumptions of their social lives.

Another important facet of the Javanese concept of power is the concept of *pamrih* (concealed personal power) in explaining the ruler’s downfall from power. A ruler is said to have *pamrih* in his leadership if he refused or hesitated in carrying out his duty to the state because of sympathy or empathy for his friends or family members. A *pamrih* was also perceived to exist if the ruler carried out a certain act for himself (usually wealth) or as favour for his close associates or family members, in other words, corrupt and nepotistic practices.¹⁴ *Pamrih* was a sign that the power of the ruler was weakening and that a change of power was imminent.

Seberang Political Culture

As opposed to the vastness of works studying the Javanese political culture, the outer islands’ political culture is relatively inadequately covered. It is perhaps due to the fact that, in contrast of the Javanese, there are various groups living in these islands, and they tend to spread out over the archipelago. Relative lack of communication among them, rendered the creation of a single civilization among these groups unimaginable. Hence, it is quite difficult to accurately detect the presence of a *Seberang*¹⁵ political culture.

Nevertheless, there are some common qualities shared by many of these non-Javanese ethnic groups, or at least among the larger, more assertive and articulate ones. Among these groups are the Acehnese, Bataks, and Minangkabaus of Sumatra, and the Bugis and Makassar peoples of Sulawesi, as well as the people of Maluku island, which include the people living in coastal towns in the northern parts of Java (*peisir* Javanese).

According to Koentjaraningrat, there are two categories in the socio-geographical feature of these peoples. First, the majority of these ethnic groups live in the coastal areas. This is the case of the peoples of Minangkabau, Aceh, Bugis, Makasar, Maluku, and the *peisir* Javanese. Second, some of the *seberang* ethnic groups live in remote, interior areas. Prominent examples of this category are the Batak, the Toraja and Minahasa of Sulawesi, and the Dayak of Kalimantan.

The common feature between these two categories of ethnic groups lies in the influence of Hinduism, which was minimal compared to the similar influence in Java.¹⁶ As a result, social stratification did not become the main rule of the societies. While in many, if not all of these groups, there was a functional differentiation, especially the existence of the rulers and the followers. In general the differentiation was not as complex and intricate as in the Javanese model. In many of these ethnic groups, especially in the coastal communities, the rulers were less shrouded in an aura of mysticism and secrecy, and generally were more accessible. Decision-making process in the *seberang* communities was also generally more open and the commoners were usually involved. The rulers frequently consulted the public for decisions regarding the societies during consultation meetings (*musyawarah*).¹⁷

The socio-geographical difference between the coastal and the interior non-Javanese societies did not amount to significant differences in their world-views about the statecraft. In the interior outer-island tribes, a significant degree of mysticism developed around the idea of power. The lack of Hindu influence rendered a relatively more relaxed social stratification. The coastal communities were traditionally engaged in commerce and seafaring activities. As merchants, they tended to possess the qualities of being open, direct, and individualistic. The *lingua franca* of the seafaring merchants in the archipelago in the 16th or 17th century was Malay. As opposed to the complex Javanese language, the Malay language is egalitarian and unstratified. For these qualities, the Javanese often regard the *seberang* people as “*kasar*” (rude or unrefined).¹⁸

Compared to the Javanese, the culture of the *seberang* communities are less structured and elaborated. This is due to the small agricultural surpluses and high rate of mobility of the people.¹⁹ In some instances, the effort to develop classes of civil servants and nobility was interrupted by the strengthening of colonial rule. Such was the case of the Bugis,

where the direct rule of the Dutch colonial administration caused the use of noble symbols to decline rapidly.²⁰

The individualistic and mercantilistic features of the *seberang* cultures emphasizes the sense of territoriality to a level higher than that in the agricultural Javanese. As opposed to the Javanese's inclusive and assimilative traits, the *seberang* people tended to be more exclusive and rigid. The sense of "us-them" is more prevalent in the *seberang* cultures than in the Javanese culture. As an illustration, a Javanese would likely approach a difference of opinion by saying, "I am aware of our differences, and I see some virtues in your idea. Let's sit down and talk about it, maybe we can find a middle ground where we can incorporate your idea and mine," whereas a typical *seberang* person would likely approach similar situation by saying, "I am aware of our differences, and I am standing by my idea. I suggest that you pursue your idea while I mine."

Islamic Influence

The differences between the Javanese and *Seberang* political cultures are more apparent in their different reactions toward the Islamic influence. Islam came to the archipelago in the 13th century, brought by merchants from southern India and Persia.²¹ It first arrived in Indonesia through the eastern coastal towns of North Sumatra from Malacca, which had previously been Islamized. The first Islamic sultanate in the archipelago, known as Samudera Pasai, was formed in this part of the island. From Sumatra, Islam spread to the northern coastal towns of Java, where a new sultanate was formed, the Demak. During the 15th century, the rising Demak state challenged the power of the declining interior Javanese kingdom, the Majapahit. After a series of power struggle, which involved a mixture of peaceful conformist proselytization of the local people and use of force, Majapahit fell. In its place, a new Javanese sultanate of Mataram was established.

The next stage was the Islamization of the peoples living in the other islands of the archipelago. This was primarily conducted by the Islamic Sumatra, Malacca, and Javanese sultanates. Just prior to the arrival of European traders, Islam had become the predominant religion of the land. Its strongest footholds could be found in the following regions: Sumatra, except the interior of northern Sumatera, the whole of Java, the coastal areas of Kalimantan, all over Sulawesi except in the interior of South Sulawesi and the northern tip of the island, northern Maluku islands, and western Lesser Sunda islands.²²

However, there was a significant difference in the reception toward Islam in Java and in *Seberang*. Such a difference resulted in different forms of Islam being practiced in Indonesia. In Java, Islam won the adherence among the people primarily due to the cultural

approach taken by the Islamic proselytizers, known as the “*Wali*”.²³ After merchants from Sumatra and Malacca Islamized the northern coastal towns of Java, the Javanese *Wali* introduced Islam to the interior Javanese. In an effort to convey the message of Islam to the Javanese masses, these *Wali* employed the symbols, folklore, legends, and rituals of the old Hindu culture, such as *wayang* and *gamelan*.²⁴ Such strategy was proven highly successful within a relatively short period of time and Java was effectively Islamized.

Most Javanese were able to find Islam suitable to their way of life due to the conformist messages carried out by the *Wali*. This was aided by the fact that Islam came to Indonesia from Persia and southern India, where it had already been patrimonialized.²⁵ Hence, in the interior of Java, practices of Islam were mixed with the existing Hinduistic cultural attributes. In many cases, Hindu practices were more dominant than the Islamic rituals. From time to time, the Javanese would engage in Hinduistic ceremonies larded with some Arabic words said to be derived from the Koran. However, most Javanese would claim themselves as Muslims, even though they rarely execute the Islamic rituals as defined by the “Five Pillars of Islam.”²⁶ This variant of Javanese nominal Muslim is known as the *Abangan*.²⁷ In fact, the religious practices of the interior Javanese, signifying a balanced syncretism between animistic, Hinduistic, and Islamic elements, are so different from Islam, that a new syncretic religion was created altogether.²⁸

East Java was considered a hinterland of Java located outside the sphere of the influence of “proper” Java but still heavily influenced by the interior Javanese values. Here, Islam was practiced more piously. It was developed through a complex schooling system, known as the *pesantren* with its followers known as the *Santri*. Historically, during the height of Hindu Javanese kingdoms, religious and intellectual powers were not held by the ruling class residing in the *kraton* (palaces) in the heartland of the Javanese culture (Yogyakarta and Surakarta). Rather these powers were possessed by the *kyai* (teachers) living in the eastern coastal and interior areas of Java. As opposed to the decadent lifestyle of the urban *kraton* ruling class, the *kyai* built, taught, and led a frugal lifestyle in the *pondok* (boarding schools), located mostly in the villages.²⁹

As in the other parts of Java, Islam was also welcomed and generally took over the social institutions in eastern Java. And as in the *kraton*, the *pondok* also embraced Islam syncretically. For the most part, the teaching styles and rituals in the *pondok* did not abandon the previous Hinduistic practices. Islamic teachings basically just glossed over the Hindu recitations. In addition, the patrimonial worldview of the *kyai* towards power and leadership remained similar to that held by the Javanese *kraton*. But in contrast to the *kraton*, in most *pesantren*, the relationship between the *kyai* and the *Santri* was rather informal. Most *kyai*

were relaxed and casual when they related to their *Santri*. Nonetheless, this interaction was marked by the most stringent rule, namely, the *kyai* were to be respected and the *Santri* were to follow the creeds laid out by the *Kyai* at all times. The *Santri* were also expected to protect and defend the honour and dignity of the *Kyai* from external criticism. It did not mean however that criticisms were not allowed to be uttered within the *pesantren*. In fact, in some *pesantren* the learning atmosphere could get very lively. But when it came to the interaction with the outside world, all *Santri* were behind their *kyai* without any reservation. In essence, therefore, the presence of Islam did not alter the existing political culture and institutional power relations in Java.

Islam took the purest form in the outer islands. Due to the lack of existing powerful Hindu kingdoms, Islam was embraced without any major violence. Many local rulers in Sumatra, Sulawesi, and the Maluku perceived Islam to be the religion of the merchants. Because of the flourishing trade with Islamic Malacca, the major trading power in the region at that time, the peoples of the outer islands quickly embraced Islam in order to facilitate their business. They also did not have any major objection to the form of egalitarian Islam. They even perceived Islam to be nicely suited to the egalitarian lifestyle and simple social structure that these maritime trading societies had developed over centuries. Furthermore, Islam was seen as a powerful alternative to Hinduism which was then embraced by the Javanese.

When Islamic reformism entered the archipelago in the early 20th century by way of Malaya, the *Seberang* peoples were the first to welcome it. Islamic reformism was then a new movement propagated by the Egyptian Muhammad Abduh, aimed at purifying the teaching of Islam from local mystical practices. Reformist Muslims called for the return to the Koran and *Hadits/Sunnah Rasul*³⁰ as the sole guides of Islamic teaching. The teaching also intended on rationalizing Islam and updating it to the needs of the contemporary era, through the concept of “*Ijtihad*.”³¹ Hence, it was also called “Islamic modernism”. Again, the more straightforward and rational *Seberang* peoples accepted this movement wholeheartedly because it seemed to suit their cultural traits.³² Therefore, the type of Islam developed in these communities was different from the Javanese variants. As we shall see later, such differences brought about a separate development of social and political institutions as well as distinct political ideas. But before that, we need to identify the influence of western ideas on the indigenous political cultures and the interaction between the two. Such interaction resulted in the establishment of the streams of Indonesian political thinking and their institutions, known as the *aliran*.

Catalysts for Change: The External Ideas

In Indonesia, contacts with the outside world occurred since at least the 4th Century. The earliest evidence of the existence of a state in Indonesia indicated the presence of external influence. In Kutai, Kalimantan, inscriptions on stone denoted the presence of a Hindu kingdom. The early external ideas adopted by the Indonesians were Hinduism and Buddhism. In that regard, Islam, which came later, could also be regarded as one of the external influences. However, the influence of these “eastern religions” had been deeply embedded in the psyche of the various ethnic societies. Hence, such forms of external influence had been indigenized in the belief system and practices, as well as in the social institutions of the local people.³³

The external ideas considered then, were those coming from the Western world. They were nationalism, Marxism, capitalist developmentalism, and liberal democracy. Indonesians began acquaintance with these Western ideologies since the advent of Ethical Policy, which was introduced by the Dutch colonial administration. The policy provided education for the local people as well as career opportunities in the growing colonial administration. These opportunities however were only granted to the members of the ruling class (*priyayi*). The policy was officially intended as a form of compensation to the Indonesians for the benefits accrued from the colony. But the policy could also be read as a means to win the legitimacy from the local population after the Dutch’s territorial possession in the East Indies had been consolidated. The Dutch was also in a dire need for manpower to administer their vast territory.³⁴

In any case, the Ethical Policy exposed the Indonesians to the whole range of external ideas. Eventually, these ideas interacted with the local cultural traits resulting in the creation of the streams of political thinking (*aliran*). However, the influence of the external ideas did not happen all at the same time. It was on-going and became the constant factor in Indonesian history, albeit of different ideologies. The idea of nationalism was dominant at the beginning, as well as communism and liberal democracy. Liberal democracy died in the end of 1950s, but was resurrected in the 1990s. Communism died in the later half of 1960s, and it seemed never to make a comeback. The idea of capitalist developmentalism became the dominant paradigm in the 1970s and although weakened, was still very much adhered to until now.

Nationalism

As in many other colonized countries, the idea of nationalism was the first and most popular idea to influence the local population of the Netherland’s East Indies. Creating a state out of a territory spanning more than 13,660 islands, more than 300 ethnic groups, and 365 local

languages and dialects was indeed a tremendous and daunting task. Without a powerful ideology to unite all these peoples, it was difficult to imagine a nation-state.³⁵ Yet, Indonesia was established and has thus far withstood the test of time. At many junctures in its history, the integrity of the nation came to the brink of collapse, only to be rebounded and reconfirmed.

Without the presence of a colonial power, Indonesia would not have existed. For example, the Sumatrans were culturally closer to the Malays in Malaysia than to the Papuans in Irian Jaya. In turn, the Papuans were closer to the Melanesians of South Pacific than to the Javanese. What tied these disparate peoples in a common bond was what Hatta once described as, *perasaan senasib sepenanggungan* (the feeling of common fate and common plight). In this sense, therefore, nationalism could be seen as a reaction toward the perceived sufferings produced by colonialism.

As an ideology, nationalism aspired to create a unified political and cultural entity from a plethora of such entities. The new identity usually signified a break from the past, but was also inspired by the old one. In some cases, the new identity merely reflected a change in symbolism while the structure remained largely the same.

The Indonesian nationalism was born out of a long history of struggle against the colonial rule launched sporadically but continuously by the various ethnic groups in the archipelago. Such recalcitrance brought about a feeling of bitterness and strong resentment among Indonesians toward the Dutch colonialism. As a result, nationalism in Indonesia was marked by the abandonment of Dutch symbolism. This was reflected in the adoption of Malay instead of Dutch as the national language, and subsequently, the relatively quick abandonment of Dutch as a social language.³⁶ Governmental symbolism was also rejected. The independent Indonesia adopted a presidential system modeled after the United States, instead of the parliamentary system of the Netherlands.³⁷ The plan to create a Dutch commonwealth similar to that of the British was rejected outright. By 1950s the remaining Dutch economic interests in the archipelago were frozen and nationalized.³⁸

However, the aspiration of nationalism was very much tied to the model and examples brought by the colonial power. Ruth McVey argued that the struggle to achieve freedom and nationhood was strongly associated with the idea to achieve modernity. The growing contact with the outside world — the fruit of ethical policy — brought about a collective awareness among the Indonesians of the virtues and strengths of modernity. They were aware of the fact that their civilizations had been defeated by the European wealth, power, and mastery over nature.³⁹ Similarly, Ben Anderson asserted that the adoption of Malay as the national language, instead of Javanese which was the language of the majority,

may have to do with the desire to emulate the “democratic” way of speech, akin to the Dutch language system, without having to adopt the language of the oppressors. The Javanese language had complex stratification, while the Malay language, being the common language of the merchants, knew no strata.⁴⁰

The quest for modernity was felt widely especially among the educated Indonesians. The overwhelming sense of purpose at the advent of the nationalist movement was directed at achieving nationhood as an integrated people. There was a consciousness at that time that the particular local cultures signified feudalism and primitiveness, and therefore had to be abandoned in the quest for modernity.⁴¹ Indonesia was modernity itself. Thus, being integrated as one people, as opposed to identification with the local cultures, was seen as the foundation of modernity. This precept provided for a very powerful impetus for the establishment of the Indonesian nation.⁴²

The legacy of nationalism as a quest for modernity ran strong throughout the history of the republic. Even though the end of revolutionary struggle revealed that the archipelago was too diverse to be controlled from the centre at the risk of imbalances, the idea of a federal state propagated by the Dutch was shortlived.⁴³ The rejection was due to the strength of the nationalist integrative idea and the anti-colonial feelings. McVey even contended that the regionalist movements of 1950s did not have secessionist aspiration. Rather, it could be perceived as an effort to alter the dominance of Javanese leadership.⁴⁴

As nationalism became socialized and institutionalized, it appeared to be more suitable for the Javanese political culture and less for the *Seberang*. The integrative notion of the ideology fitted nicely with the Javanese political culture’s tenet of achieving harmony and oneness (*manunggal*). It was estranged from the *Seberang*’s individualist quality. Such type of nationalism was further developed by the Javanese leaders as a credo of nation building and as a foundation for authoritarian rule. Sukarno, for instance, declared that he was a nationalist, a Muslim, and a communist at the same time. This statement signified an embodiment of all political forces in the one body politic, which he symbolized.⁴⁵ As we shall see later, the political force that propagated such an idea (the PNI) won adherence mostly among the Javanese, while it was less popular in the outer islands.

Hence, nationalism can be understood in two ways. First, it is a sense of identity bound by the perceived common sufferings in the past and by the continuous aim to achieve modernity in the future. This idea was felt strongly all over the archipelago by the majority of the people regardless of ethnicity. Second, it is a Javanese ideology of achieving social and political integration by eradicating all the particular characteristics and creating a new integrative one, with the whole process maintained through a strong control from the centre.

Such an idea was popular among the Javanese, and apparently less so among the non-Javanese.

Marxism

The impulse of the Indonesian nationalist movement was generally inspired by Marxism. It was through Marxist analysis of class relations and oppression that the movement for independence initially found its *raison d'être*. Colonialism was seen as an extension of capitalism. The Dutch were the capitalist oppressors and the indigenous people the oppressed working and peasantry classes. This view was widely popular among the indigenous people. This was true throughout the period of struggle for independence, despite the fact that most of the nationalist leaders were from the *priyayi* (aristocrat) class.

As with nationalism, Marxism influenced all political forces from diverse political cultures in Indonesia. If in later days of the republic, the communists were at a loggerhead with the Muslims, the seed of communism in Indonesia was sown in the *Sarekat Islam* (SI), the first Muslim nationalist movement in the 1920s.⁴⁶ However, as with nationalism, Marxism was going to be proven more popular among the Javanese and less with the *Seberang*.

The nationalist leaders came to acquaintance with Marxism through the presence of Dutch socialist and labour movement leaders in the colony, the most renowned of whom was H. J. Sneevliet. He and other Dutch socialists declared the ISDV (*Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereniging* — Indies Social Democratic Association) in 1914. It is interesting to note that the first leftist party in the Netherlands East Indies, which later would emerge as the PKI, was actually dominated by the Dutch.⁴⁷ After a number of measures taken by the colonial government against the ISDV, this party decided to look for greener political pastures. At that point of history, the SI was the largest nationalist movement and naturally, was attractive to the ISDV. The SI was then dominated by the urban dwellers, merchants, *pesisir Santri*. The presence of a modern rationalist idea such as Marxism attracted many SI followers. Initially, Marxism was not portrayed as antithetical to Islam. There was even a conscious effort on the part of some SI leaders to synthesize socialism with Islam.⁴⁸ However, when the power base was sufficiently secured and Marxist successfully implemented, the leftist SI leaders joined the ISDV's in setting up the PKI in 1920.⁴⁹

Beside the nationalist and Islamic movements, the idea of socialism was also popular among the young Indonesian students studying in the Netherlands (the *Perhimpunan Indonesia* — Indonesian Association, of which independence heroes Hatta and Sjahrir were the leaders) and in Bandung, where Sukarno was studying. So, the influence of Marxism was

widespread. Marxist vocabulary was the common language spoken by all nationalist leaders during the pre-independence period.⁵⁰

However, in the post-independence period, the proponents of Marxism appeared to have been divided into two contending camps. The first camp was that of the social democrats. Its main proponent was the PSI. This party was dominated by *Seberang* intellectuals lead by Sjahrir, a Minangkabau. While there were also quite a number of Javanese in the party, such as Sumitro and Soedjatmoko, they were intellectuals trained in the West. Hence, they shared the rationality and openness of the *Seberang*. Even though the PSI was not an Islamic party, it shared an affinity with the Masjumi, another *Seberang* party, especially on the issues of central control, communist ascendancy, and Javanese domination. While PSI's influence came to an end with poor performance at the 1955 election, their functionaries remained active. Sumitro and Soedjatmoko⁵¹ continued to be revered as leading Indonesian intellectuals. Sumitro was to be the chief architect of the New Order's economy through a network of economist protégés whom he developed in the University of Indonesia. Ironically, as we shall see in the next part, most of the ideas related to him could be categorized as capitalist, instead of socialist.

The second force was the PKI. As opposed to the PSI's appeal among the urban intellectual *bourgeoisie*,⁵² the PKI was much more popular among the *Abangan* rural masses in the heartland of Java. Their sphere of influence was identical to that of the nationalist PNI. The difference was in the social-economic class. The PKI received more support from the lower-class *Abangan*, while the PNI from the *priyayi Abangan*.⁵³ How could the PKI which professed egalitarianism, modernity and rationality be followed by status conscious and mystical Javanese? The answer lay with the ability of its leaders to use Javanese symbolism and common language in conveying their message to the relatively uneducated masses.⁵⁴ PKI leaders also had effectively portrayed themselves as leaders free from *pamrih*.⁵⁵ But the strongest reason seemed to be the relaxed attitude of the PKI toward religion and religious obligation. The syncretic and tolerant *Abangan* found refuge in the “*netral agama*” (neutral of any religion) attitude amidst the vehement calls for purism by the reformist Muslims. Conversely, as the PKI grew to be more Javanese and anti-Islam, the level of support that it received from the *Seberang* became minimal.

The military suppression of PKI after the failed coup attempt in 1965 fundamentally wiped out the PKI as a political force. Most of its supporters appeared to have shifted their allegiance to the nationalist party or the government party, *Golkar* (*Golongan Karya* — Functional Groups). Some socialistic ideas were to be picked up late in the New Order era in the advent of the so-called “*ekonomi kerakyatan*” (the people's economy). However, it is

doubtful that the communists were responsible for the resurgence, because the idea appeared to be propagated by the modernist Muslims.⁵⁶ In any case, even though there were some scattered remnants of Marxism, it ceased to exist in any notable form after the pogrom of 1965-1966.

Capitalist Developmentalism

The rise of General Soeharto to power by 1967 marked the end of leftist policies in Indonesia. The attention shifted from political struggle against the Western powers to economic development. The role of communist and leftist politicians, which was growing in importance in the final years of Sukarno rule, was supplanted by the economists and technocrats. Many of these experts received training in the West. The economists, who laid down the foundation of the New Order development policies, were the *protégés* of Dr Sumitro Djojohadikusumo (former PSI leader) in the Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia (FE-UI). Most of them underwent training in the University of California, Berkeley. Thus the nickname, the “Berkeley Mafia”.⁵⁷

On the political side, the New Order saw the rise of the Indonesian military (TNI/ABRI)⁵⁸ to power. The military had been influential during the Sukarno era where they occupied several civilian government posts. In the initial stage of the New Order, there was a massive intrusion of officers into civilian life. Posts such as ministers, governors, regents, ambassadors, and others were held by military officers. The justification for such move seemed to be to maintain vigilance against the threats to national security, namely the communists.

Thus, the path of Indonesian development was crafted by the cooperation between the military and the economists/technocrats. Such cooperation was fostered by the close relationship between the economists and the Army School of Staff and Command (*Seskoad*). The economists taught in the school and often held discussions with the ascending officers, including General Soeharto. As a result, the approach was a combination of development economics and security approach.

The main notions in this approach were related to Keynesian precepts. Basically, it sought to achieve economic growth through export orientated-industrialization. The modernization of the country’s infrastructure was deemed necessary in order to achieve this objective. Major transformation from commodity/agricultural production, which had been the backbone of the economy, to manufacturing had to take place. In order to realize this, this idea posited that capital was needed. There were two sources of capital; development aid or loan from developed Western nations, and foreign investment. The strong anti-communism

stance of the regime in the Cold War environment was perceived as an asset to win the favour from the Western nations. The previous policy of economic nationalism was abandoned and serious efforts were launched to attract foreign investment.⁵⁹

This approach asserted further that a conducive political environment was needed so as to achieve economic development. In foreign policy, this was translated into cessation of confrontation politics with the neighbouring countries and the establishment of a cooperative framework, which later turned out to be ASEAN. In domestic politics, repressive control was applied. Party political structures were simplified through the merger of political parties. While elections became a regularity, the regime made sure that *Golkar* would always win overwhelmingly. Press was put under strict control, and opposition efforts were suppressed.

Robison called such combination of economic development and political control which was created by an alliance between technocrats and the military, a repressive developmentalism.⁶⁰ The results of such an approach were mixed. On one hand, the technocrats were able to revive the Indonesian economy which has fell to a terrible shape during the Sukarno era. Economic and infrastructural development had brought about material prosperity, improvements in standard of living and facilitated mobility of the people throughout the archipelago. On the other hand, political life became monotonous. The political forces that embodied people's aspiration became inactive. As a result, not only did communism become extinct, Islamic modernism and traditionalism were also on the verge of extermination as political forces.

Judging by the qualities of this approach, the reactions of the divergent political cultures varied. Despite putting on a different appearance, the New Order regime actually reflected a continuation of the previous one. If Sukarno tried to integrate the diverse political forces in Indonesia through the concept of *Nasakom* ("Nasionalis, Agama, Komunis", or Nationalism, Religion, Communism), the Soeharto regime sought to achieve similar objective through *Golkar*.⁶¹ Being the political vehicle of the military, *Golkar* also carried much Javanese symbolism. Hence, the Javanese seemed to be more comfortable with the idea of such political control. However, the New Order clearly caused disappointment among the *Seberang* Muslims. After being banned by Sukarno in early 1960s, *Masjumi* hoped to make a comeback in political life. But the continuation of *Abangan* rule has dashed this hope. Further simplification of the party system has also reduced the political role of the modernists, at least in the first two decades of the New Order.

The fruits of economic development were certainly welcomed by all. However, there was a discontentment, especially among the *Seberang*. Traditionally, the outer islanders and the *Pesisir* were the merchant class in Indonesia. Ever since the colonial period, they have

been in fierce competition with the overseas Chinese.⁶² In the independence period, some military officers reportedly maintained mutually beneficial relationship with the Chinese entrepreneurs. Such cooperation almost became the norm for business transaction during the New Order. Consequently, the Chinese and military joint ventures soared as the main economic actors. This was considered as an alienation from the indigenous Muslim economic interests, and contributed to the growing tension between the two groups as well as dissatisfaction with the regime. As a result, a number of racial riots exploded in various places during the New Order era.⁶³

Furthermore, the stress on manufacturing was also perceived to have created an economic imbalance between Jakarta and Java on one hand and the outer islands on the other. Factories were set up mainly in Java, which already had good infrastructure. The growth of the service sectors has also benefited Jakarta, where there was a concentration of professionals.⁶⁴ Such regional disparity has exacerbated the *Seberang's* dissatisfaction with this approach. Notwithstanding the deficiencies, this approach had proven to be very influential in the last three decades of Indonesian history, and continued to be so, especially because of the growing interconnectedness of the economies among nations. Indonesia's active participation in the global economy was the logical consequence of the capitalist development that had been carried out throughout the New Order era.

Democracy

The influence of the idea of democracy was perhaps the most puzzling of the external ideas in Indonesian history. This was partly due to the dual meaning of democracy itself. Social scientists have debated on the meaning of democracy. There are the minimalist and maximalist definitions of democracy. The former, usually known as the procedural definition, refers to the holding of regular elections and alternation of people in office as conditions of democracy.⁶⁵ The latter refers to the adherence to liberal values as the essence of democracy. This view posits that a liberal democracy consists not only of elements known in the procedural definition, but also of values of governance and society beyond election. These values include protection of individual civil and political rights, and rights of minority groups to govern and have autonomy over their own culture. This condition necessitates a tolerant attitude from the majority group.⁶⁶

The different definitions render rather contrasting analysis. Initially, democratic values were generally alien to most Indonesians from all political cultures. This was perhaps due to the colonial legacy. The divide and rule tactic employed by the colonial power had rendered a sense of deep mutual distrust among different peoples of the archipelago. As a

result it was quite difficult to assert that tolerance has existed immediately after independence. As had been described above, the Javanese were inherently more tolerant than the *Seberang*. However, such a quality was at times overshadowed by their assimilationist trait, which meant that toleration was rendered only after sufficient commonalities were detected or achieved. Differences were generally not considered as positive. Nonetheless, the Javanese were at least potentially more tolerant than the *Seberang*.

On the other hand, democracy as a political competition was naturally more attractive to the *Seberang*, who as merchants, were used to the idea of open competition. However, the less tolerant aspect of the *Seberang* personality threatened tyranny if the competitive structure was tilted to a monolithic one. Nonetheless, the *Seberang* were generally more apt to open political competition than the Javanese.

The idea of democracy was in a state of hibernation during the Guided Democracy and throughout most of the New Order era. It made a comeback as a result of increasing exposure of the new middle class to the outside world in the latter New Order period. This was facilitated by economic globalization and the revolution in communication and transportation technologies.

In sum, since independence, the idea of democracy had influenced different political cultures in Indonesia to varying extent. It penetrated into the urban modern society only at the latter part of the New Order, when economic and social development reached a more advanced stage in terms of material attainment and global exposure. As the urban population grew rapidly during the last decade of the New Order, the idea of democracy won more adherents.

The Three *Aliran*

The religious differences marked by the various ethnic groups' different responses toward Islam carried some further consequences. Each of these political cultures, the *Abangan* Javanese, the Javanese *Santri* (the traditionalist Muslims), and the *Santri Seberang* (the modernist/reformist Muslims), articulated their own political thinking and established various social institutions. In different stages of Indonesian political history, each of these groups was exposed to foreign ideologies. They decided which ideology best suited their respective cultural traits through a selection process. The result was a new eclectic form of political platform that they associated themselves with. The following is a discussion on the political tenets of these *aliran*. There were two groups of political issues which became the arena they contested in. One was the substantial issue involving choices of the state ideology/foundation

and the degree of concentration within the state. The other was the format issue, regarding the characteristic of leadership and the degree of flexibility toward changes of ideas.

The Abangan Variants

There were two main proponents in this *aliran*, namely the nationalists and the communists, and to a lesser degree, the military. Throughout the history of their existence, their support (especially for the former two) mainly came from the *Abangan* heartland of Central and the western part of East Java. The three political forces espouse the Javanese conception of power, leadership, and statecraft. This was apparent from their political views on both the substantial and format matters.

On the matter of state foundation, the *Abangan* clearly rejected the idea that Islam should be the state's ideology. This stance ran opposed to the idea put forward by the Muslim political forces. The idea was that as a logical consequence of the demographic fact,⁶⁷ Islam should serve as the state foundation. The *Abangan's* rejection stemmed out of the fear that there would be an application of Islamic law (*syariah*) especially among those who professed Islamic faith. As was mentioned earlier, most *Abangan* claimed that they were Muslims. They rarely exercise their faith in terms of the Islamic teaching. Rather they had their own ritual practices that were derived from the Hindu customs and traditions. So different they were from the pious Muslims that there had been a number of assertions that they were regarded as a different belief. In so doing, they undermine the majoritarian notion of "90% Muslims" put forward by some Muslim leaders.⁶⁸

It is also possible to assert that the rejection was due to the idea of a compromise to achieve unity, which was so central to the socio-political Javanese concept. Recognizing the plurality of the Indonesian society, this *aliran* argued for the lowest common denomination that all could agree upon. The *Pancasila* (the five pillars that eventually became the state foundation)⁶⁹ in this regard basically compromises between secularism, where no single religion predominates the state, and religiosity, where religion (especially Islam) became one of the important pillars of the state. Through *Pancasila*, Sukarno⁷⁰ was able to unite the different cultures in Indonesia and revolved them around him personally, based on the power of his presidency and his ideas.

Furthermore, through the *Pancasila* and the idea of nationalism, a new culture, the so-called Indonesian culture, was expected to develop. In this culture, the Javanese might be seen as rendering a number of compromises. For instance, although the Javanese was the largest ethnic group in Indonesia, its language did not become the national language as mentioned earlier. However, national symbolism was infused with many important Javanese

cultural values and icons, such as *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (the state motto: “Unity in Diversity”) and *Pancasila* (the state ideology). More importantly, the national culture was a culture dominated by the state. And in turn the Javanese dominated the state apparatus.

As an extension to the above argument, the *Abangan* also agreed to a unitary state rather than the federal system. A strong central government in the unitary state system was perceived as a more powerful state due to the high degree of power concentration. On the other hand, a federal system where authority was derived from many sources and divided among many actors resembled a weak state where power was diffused. Seen from this perspective, the creation of a single national identity embodied in the unitary state was an effort at assimilation and syncretism, which was consistent with the Javanese beliefs.

Entrenched in the Javanese culture, the *Abangan* believed in the mystical qualities of the leaders as well as in the clear division between leaders and followers. Therefore the leaders were expected to be able to demonstrate their powers in real terms.⁷¹ They were also expected to maintain their distance from the common people⁷² and were generally not held accountable to them. The Javanese leaders usually perceived the presence of an opposition as a sign of their weakening power. Hence these leaders always strived to reduce opposition by co-optation followed by oppression. Conversely, these leaders expressed their gratitude by granting their loyal followers fiefdoms where the latter had full authority to rule on behalf of the former. For the leaders from this political persuasion, receiving tributaries, which in modern political leadership framework might be regarded as grafts, was regarded as a normal attribute for power.

The *Abangan*'s ideological position tended to be rigid. This was perhaps a bit puzzling bearing in mind that the Javanese were inherently adaptive and tolerant. This was partly due to the long history of the Javanese civilization and the high priority given to values socialization resulting in the traditional values deeply implanted in the Javanese' subconscious. Another reason was the siege mentality of the Javanese amidst all the external influence that they encountered throughout history. First, Islam from Sumatra and Malacca, then the Dutch. Even after independence, the *Abangan* were tied in a rivalry with the more purist Muslims. As a result, while the Javanese tended to adapt from time to time, the process was highly evolutionary. Hence at any given juncture in history they might appear to be rigidly clinging to their existing values.

The Santri Seberang

In the lexicon of Indonesian politics, the *Santri* are more popularly known as the modernist Muslims. Indeed, what differentiates it from the traditionalist Muslims is their different

socio-geographical roots. As has already been discussed above, the proponents of modernist movement came mainly from the outer islands or from the coastal areas (*pesisir*) of Java, while the traditionalist were mainly from the eastern Java. It is important to note, however, that as Islam progressed in Java, many Javanese *pesisir* people came to the heartland of Java (Yogyakarta and Surakarta) for economic activities and eventually resided in separate quarters in the towns of that area. The interaction with the local people ultimately brought the idea of Islamic reformism here. These people were known as the *kauman*.⁷³

Throughout the history of the republic, the modernist Muslims had been forcefully advocating Islam as the state ideology. The often cited ground for this policy was the demographical statistic. For them, the logical consequence of a Muslim majority state was to have Islam as the state foundation. They rejected the notion of religious differences between the *Santri* and the *Abangan*. They argued that the *Abangan* was merely in the initial stage of Islamic awareness. The presence of an Islamic state, then, was perceived as an efficient tool to bring all Muslim Indonesians' faith to the higher stages. In a secular state, such a function would be less effective. Furthermore, there was a profound belief among the Muslim leaders that secularism would lead to the destruction of the society because a secular state did not have the ground to establish acceptable norms and morality.⁷⁴

The socio-geographical root of the modernist movement made it more prone to the idea of local autonomy. Its proponents' general fear that a unitary state with the strong centre would continue Javanese domination, was proven throughout the history of the archipelago. The increasing *Abangan* power after the Presidential Decree of 5 July 1959 turned this fear into a reality.⁷⁵ A number of rebellions erupted in the outer islands as a reaction toward the decree. Most of the top echelon members of the Masjumi (the vanguard modernist muslim party) and of the PSI (the socialist party) fled to West Sumatra and established the PRRI (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia — Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia) which was led by Sjafruddin Prawiranegara of Masjumi. The Sumatra movement was also met with enthusiasm in Sulawesi, where some eastern Indonesian military officers, dismayed at the growing Javanese control, declared the Piagam Perjuangan Semesta (Permesta — Charter of Common Struggle). It was led by Lieutenant Colonel Sumual of the Minahasa.

The fact that the modernist Muslims allied themselves with the PSI, a secular party but with a strong *Seberang* culture led by Sjahrir, a Minangkabau, and the military officers led by the Christian Sumual, confirmed the assertion that there was a fear among the *Seberang* peoples of Javanese domination. Two of the demands they put forward to the central government were that power should be devolved from the centre to the regions and that more

opportunities should be given to the non-Javanese population. Judging by these demands, the *Seberang* might be defined as favouring a sort of local autonomous arrangement, with devolved power.⁷⁶

Rooted in the *Seberang* egalitarian political culture, this *aliran* reflected an affinity with a democratic and open style of leadership. Masjumi (and also PSI) leaders played major roles in the post-independence period and in the period of parliamentary democracy (1950-1959). The political competition was fierce in both the parliament and the *Konstituante* (Constituent Assembly). Seven cabinets were formed during between 1949-1957, led by three Masjumi leaders and two PNI leaders. The Minangkabau Mohammad Hatta became the Prime Minister in one of them, as well as fellow Sumatrans Natsir and Burhanuddin Harahap. Political debates in both state bodies were very lively.⁷⁷ It appeared that the democratic and open political process appealed more to the *Seberang* than it did to the Javanese. The Javanese, such as Sukarno, seemed to be dismayed by the high degree of power diffusion of the parliamentary politics. This was apparent in his remarks on the period, “On all sides, we see our people drifting, rudderless, suffering from confusion and dullness of the spirit.”⁷⁸ On the other hand, *Seberang* politicians such as Natsir felt comfortable with the democracy. According to him, “If the constitutional parliamentary democracy system is allowed the opportunity to develop, we believe, it will save Indonesia of all the troubles that it has to endure as consequences of the transition in its position as a young state.”⁷⁹

As has been discussed above, the *Seberang* culture tended to be more aggressive than the subtle Javanese. It was also more straightforward and less compromising. As a result, the political position of this *aliran* was inherently rigid. The PRRI/Permesta rebellion might be seen as an example of such rigidity. In March 1957, a number of parties, including Masjumi and NU issued a joint statement to reject the *Konsepsi Presiden* (President’s Conception). The *Konsepsi* was issued by President Sukarno a couple of months earlier, calling for all leaders to “bury all political parties” and acknowledge the position of the PKI. The *Konsepsi* was widely perceived as a prelude to the authoritarian Guided Democracy where the PKI played a major role later on. When Sukarno pressed ahead with the disbanding of *Konstituante* and the return to the presidential system of the 1945 Constitution, the parties who initially rejected the *Konsepsi* reacted differently. The Masjumi and the PSI launched a regional rebellion,⁸⁰ while the NU, an inherently Javanese party, agreed to a compromise and became the sole representation of political Islam in the Guided Democracy period. The rigidity of the *Seberang* parties later cost them their political ventures. The Masjumi and the PSI were banned in August 1960 and were never reinstated.⁸¹

The Javanese Santri

As a hybrid *aliran*, some parts of the political platform of the Javanese *Santri* reflected similarities with the Javanese *Abangan*, while the others with the *Santri Seberang*. However, it is important to note that this *aliran* was the most flexible and dynamic in its development. Over time the political position of this group shifted, and along with it, its relative position to the other *aliran*. The reason for such flexibility might be traced to the Javanese traits of tolerance and syncreticism as has been discussed above. Straddling the two opposing *aliran*, the traditionalist Muslims felt at home in both. They were able to play a sort of balancing role, as well as to shift alliance when the need arose. Another important reason was the presence of liberal but influential *Kyai*, such as Abdurrahman Wahid. Under his tutelage, the traditionalist Muslims made an exponential intellectual growth. Gus Dur, as he was affectionately called, had a zest for modernity and modern ideas. He was an excellent mentor, who always pushed his *Santri* to study modern philosophy and protected them from the scrutiny of the more conservative *kyai*. Many young Indonesian doctorate holders who graduated from foreign universities had NU/*pesantren* background. This caused the mushrooming of liberal ideas within the fold of NU.

NU's flexibility in shifting political platform was nowhere more apparent than in the issue of state foundation. The NU and the Masjumi were the two Islamic parties that aggressively pushed for an Islamic state. While the Masjumi was more sophisticated in rationalizing and articulating this demand, NU's approach was more rudimentary and it relied on its capability as solidarity makers to garner support for the idea. However, when that idea was politically defeated, this *aliran* was quick to adapt to the new institution by playing down the issue. At that point, the traditionalist Muslims became willing participants in the new power sharing agreement between the nationalists, Muslims, and communists arranged by Sukarno.⁸²

After the transfer of power from Sukarno to Soeharto's New Order regime, there was a resurgence in the propagation for an Islamic state foundation launched by the traditionalist Muslims. When that idea was proven again not feasible to pursue, the NU dropped it. The presence of Wahid as NU's leader, brought a significant change to the NU's perception of state ideology. The *Pancasila* was accepted more smoothly by the traditionalist Muslims than by the modernists. Consequently, there was an intense effort launched by the NU's top leaders to convince their followers that *Pancasila* and Islam were not detrimental to each other, and that in fact Islam would flourish in the *Pancasila* state.⁸³ At this point, NU was transformed from being proponents of an Islamic state foundation to advocates of the *Pancasila*.

The Javanese basis of the traditionalist Muslims made it more comfortable with the idea of a unitary state with the strong centre. This was apparent in NU's non-participation in the regional rebellions followed by the strengthening of central role and growing authoritarianism of Sukarno. In fact, it appeared that the majority of the NU's *Kyai*, who were from eastern Java, felt more at ease with Sukarno, an eastern Javanese,⁸⁴ than with the *Seberang* people dominating the Masjumi. Such cultural proximity made the NU a strong supporter of Sukarno during the fight against the *Seberang*'s rebellions. For the NU, PRRI/Permesta brought about a "major loss for the interests of the Muslims."⁸⁵

However, under Wahid's leadership and the growth of liberal ideas, the traditionalist Muslims grew more accepting of the idea of local autonomy. It still remained within the framework of a unitary state with a powerful centre. The eclecticism made the NU focus on the issue of local cultural identity, which was considered to lie within the regional policy sphere. It did not focus on the economic and legal autonomy of the regions, which were still considered as the central government's authority.

Being part of the Javanese political culture, the Javanese *Santri*'s belief in leadership was deeply autocratic. As has already been discussed above, the *Kyai* was the sole leader in the *pesantren* and the *Santri* were expected to abide by the rule set out by the *Kyai* at all times. As in the *Abangan* world, leadership in the Javanese *Santri*'s was also associated with mysticism. The most respected *Kyai* were believed to have mastered the esoteric and mystical knowledge,⁸⁶ so that they could command not only the physical world but also the metaphysical one. However, differing from the secluded approach of the *Abangan* rulers, the *Kyai* were open and more direct in the relations with their *Santri*. In most *pesantren*, *Kyai*, *Santri* and their families lived in the same compound and mingled in daily activities. During gatherings, the *Kyai* and *Santri* sometimes exchanged jokes and they laughed heartily. Such an atmosphere could not be found in the sacred and almost magical ambience of the *Abangan*'s *kraton*.

In sum, the political platforms of each political *aliran* might be summarized in the table below.

Political Platforms	Political <i>Aliran</i>		
	Javanese <i>Abangan</i>	<i>Santri Seberang</i>	Javanese <i>Santri</i>
State Foundation	Pancasila	Islam	Islam (later Pancasila)
Degree of Centralization	Unitary State with Strong Center	Local Autonomy/ Devolution of Power	Unitary State with Strong Centre (later a mixture between local cultural autonomy and strong centre)
Leadership Style	Closed, Autocratic, Mystical	Open, Egalitarian, Rational	Open, Egalitarian, Autocratic, Mystical
Degree of Political Flexibility	Rigid	Rigid	Flexible

Institutional Continuity and Change

In the Indonesian socio-political life, these political *aliran* manifested themselves into contending social and political organizations. The ensuing analysis is based on Feith's classification of the political *aliran* which was discussed earlier. It aims at revising and extending such classification. As we shall see, the *aliran* have shown remarkable resilience and flexibility over time, as demonstrated by the adaptability of their organizations amidst political change.

The Sukarno Era (1945-1965)

Six forces, whose salience grant them the status of political *aliran* during the period of early independence until the end of Sukarno era, were the PNI, Masjumi, NU, PKI, PSI, and TNI/ABRI.

Differing from Feith's classification, the PSI and TNI/ABRI are included in this group. Feith actually acknowledged the centrality or at least the potential of both forces to become *aliran*. But he either dismissed them as being inconsequential due to the lack of mass support, as in the case of PSI, or incoherent in terms of political thinking, as in the case of TNI/ABRI.⁸⁷

Although the urban and rational PSI was unable to win sizable support from the rural and emotional masses, its influence in the Indonesian polity during the Sukarno era was very significant. The PSI was known as the party of intellectuals. In a newborn state where not too many intellectuals existed, PSI's elite dominated the government and the parliament, until the 1955 election. Support for the party came mainly from the bureaucrats, who were responsible for the day to day governance. Even after its eclipse, individual PSI elite remained

influential. The involvement of some of its functionaries in PRRI/Permesta rebellion also demonstrated its resilience as a political force. Most importantly, the idea of democratic socialism it espoused remained alive throughout this period. In later periods, it gained increased saliency, albeit transformed.

Feith acknowledged that as time went on, the TNI/ABRI was becoming more united and also tended to create a distinctive political thinking of its own. However, he stopped short of describing such thinking. In general, it can be inferred that the military was heavily influenced by *Abangan* values.⁸⁸ The members of the TNI/ABRI came from all over Indonesia. Initially, the *Seberang* people such as Nasution, Simbolon, and others played important roles. But by the end of this period most of its senior staffs became increasingly occupied by the Javanese *Abangan*. Hence, the doctrine developed during this period resembled that of Sukarno's, which was nationalism and anti-open competition through political parties. However, the military was suspicious of other parties, especially the communists. This differed from Sukarno's viewpoint of seeing the Javanese integralistic power concept as incorporating the nationalist, Islam, and communist forces.

Along with the PSI, the PKI also ranked high at the western influence scale. This was apparent from the efforts of the party leaders in educating their followers in communism. Even though most of its followers came from the lower-class *Abangan*, the PKI elite tried to bring modernity to the followers through Marxism. Its aim was to replace primordial affinities to class affiliation by mediating between tradition and modernity.⁸⁹

Having the support from the *priyayi Abangan*, the PNI was more entrenched in Javanese values. This was further exacerbated by Sukarno, who was also the founder of the party. The PNI was also influenced by democratic socialism, especially at a symbolic level. Its purported ideology was *Marhaenism*.⁹⁰ Despite the controversial elitist lifestyle of its leaders, the party's image as the protector of the *wong cilik* (commoners) remained strong even until today, through its successor party.

During the Japanese occupation, several Muslim organizations that were modernists as well as traditionalists, were merged into Masjumi. In the early independence period, Masjumi became one of the major parties. Such an alliance of the two different Islamic *aliran*, however, proved shortlived. Since 1949, there was an increasing modernists' grip on the party, led by Natsir. Such development made the traditionalists feel marginalized. As a result, in 1952 the traditionalists in Masjumi announced their departure from the party and declared the NU as a political party.⁹¹ Subsequently, the two Islamic parties developed different orientations. Due to the similarity in politico-cultural root, the NU did not have difficulty coping with the growing *Abangan* power in the Guided Democracy, while the

Seberang Masjumi perceived estrangement.⁹² On the other hand, the similarity in political culture between the Masjumi and the PSI brought them closer in the later part of this period. The development in this period demonstrated the prevalence of political culture over ideology.

The Early New Order Period (1967-1990)

The hallmark of this period was the rise of the TNI/ABRI to power after the failed communist coup in 1965.⁹³ Power transfer went through a prolonged struggle. The political structure built by Sukarno during the Guided Democracy period was gradually replaced by a new structure. It was not until 1973 that the new party political structure was firmly in place. General Soeharto himself became the definitive president only in 1968, although he had effectively run the country since 1967. He was appointed as the President “ad interim” by the *Madjelis Permusjawaratan Rakyat Sementara* (MPRS — Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly), the highest state organ. Sukarno remained as the formal president.

The repression of communists after the G-30S/PKI was thorough. Even though the number of victims varied according to different sources, it was clear that the rank and files of the PKI had been purged. Its remaining followers were reeducated and released to close scrutiny by the security apparatus. As a result, communism as an ideology ceased to exist throughout the New Order period.

There was a glimpse of hope among the previously barred *Seberang* leaders, especially the Masjumi and the PSI, that their parties would be reinstated. However, such optimism proved false. Soeharto rejected the formal reinstatement of both parties on the ground that they were involved in PRRI/Permesta. It became apparent that the political platform of the New Order government was based on a tight control of the party political system.

In the aftermath of the failed 1965 coup, PSI’s close association with a number of officers, especially Professor Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, resulted in the inclusion of PSI to the fold of Golkar and the New Order. Professor Sumitro and his protégés in the Economics Faculty of the University of Indonesia (FE-UI) became the main architects of the New Order’s economic success.

It was a different story for the other *Seberang* party. While the modernist Muslims were allowed to establish a new party, the *Partai Muslimin Indonesia* (Parmusi — Indonesian Muslims Party), the new quasi-military government banned the participation of Masjumi’s old leaders in the party. The leadership of the new party was basically hand-picked by the government. Such a practice also fell upon the PNI, as well as the other parties.⁹⁴

Along with controlling the party leadership, the New Order regime also developed a strong alternative political force called *Golongan Karya* (Golkar — Functional Groups). Historically, Golkar was set up by the TNI/ABRI as an alternative to the political *aliran* system. Hence, Golkar officially did not belong to any *aliran*. However, since it was created by the military, its political values reflected the Javanese traits.

The TNI/ABRI had been active in politics since the latter half of the 1950s. General Nasution inspired the creation of IPKI (*Ikatan Pejuang Kemerdekaan Indonesia* — Association of Indonesia's Freedom Fighters) after the end of revolutionary war for independence. However, the real military's involvement in politics coincided with the desire of Sukarno to minimize the role of political parties and made the functional groups, such as peasants, farmers, labourers, fishermen, youths, women, and so on more visible in politics. Sekber Golkar (*Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya* — Joint Secretariat of the Functional Groups) was formed in 1964. It was largely driven by the military.

Golkar became the main political vehicle of the quasi-military New Order regime until the late New Order period. During the run up to the 1971 election, Golkar played the role of a “bulldozer”. Its networks of civil servants had to pledge a “monoloyalty” to Golkar since 1969.⁹⁵ The military apparatus had obtruded to the village level. Through these 2 manoeuvres, Golkar emerged as the winner in the election by significant margin. It received 62.8 percent of the votes, while the other former major parties from the 1955 election failed miserably. NU, Golkar's closest contender, won 18.7 percent; PNI 6.9%; and Parmusi 5.4%.⁹⁶

Another political restructurization measure taken by the regime was the “simplification” of the party system policy. The idea was congruent with the suspicion of political parties long held by some military officers which resulted in the creation of Golkar.⁹⁷ Even though the seed of such thinking had been expressed during the Second Army Seminar in 1966,⁹⁸ it was not until 1971, when the parliament, turned the idea into reality. In this parliament, formed out of the 1971 election, the Islamic parties were persuaded to unite in one faction, known as *Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan* (Development Unity faction). The nationalist, socialist, and Christian parties formed another, known as *Fraksi Demokrasi Pembangunan* (Development Democracy faction). In 1973, both factions announced the merger of their constituent parties into two new political parties. The *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (PPP — Development Unity Party) was made up of NU, Parmusi, Serikat Islam, and Perti. The *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia* (PDI — Indonesian Democratic Party) comprised PNI, Partai Kristen Indonesia (Protestant party), Partai Katolik, Murba (socialist

party), and IPKI. From then on, the party system in Indonesia officially acknowledged only the two parties and Golkar.⁹⁹

The depoliticization policy of the New Order created a general malaise among the political *aliran*. While political activities still existed, their extent was limited to the power struggle within the parties, and rarely touched the national political issues. In the PDI, it was the consensus of the merged parties that the PNI was the *primus inter pares*. All PDI chairpersons during the New Order came from the PNI. However, the choice of the party leaders had to be approved by the government.

In the PPP, the inclusion of both the modernists and traditionalists brought about an uneasy coexistence. Like in Masjumi, the NU felt that it was being gradually marginalized. This culminated in the declaration of NU to depart from the PPP and stayed out of politics in 1984. Under Abdurrahman Wahid, the NU aimed to return to social, economic, cultural, and educational functions that was initially envisaged for the organization when it was established in 1926.¹⁰⁰ However, the separation of NU and PPP was not complete. Many NU activists remained in the PPP and in the later period, were successful in taking control of the party. Different from the traditionalists, the continuous political malaise among the modernists that had existed since the Guided Democracy meant that the social, economic, cultural and educational functions of the Muhammadiyah, the largest social organization of the modernists, received more attention. Unlike the NU, Muhammadiyah's schools, universities, hospitals, women and youth centres had expanded to many parts of the archipelago.

In the spectrum of Western/traditional influence, nothing much had changed during this period compared to the previous one. The new dominant political force, Golkar, was located higher in the spectrum than the other organizations. This was due to the inclusion of PSI-inclined professionals in the organization. These western trained economists introduced a new external idea — development economics. In addition, the significantly better relations that Indonesia had with the Western nations in this period meant that the government was able to translate the idea of capitalist development into reality. Development aid poured in from donor countries, both individually and through a multilateral grouping, known as the Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI).¹⁰¹ It also came from multilateral financial organizations, such as the IMF, the World Bank, and UNDP. Golkar's domination of the bureaucracy made it virtually the only organization that was professionally able to establish and maintain contacts with the outside world.

Among the other organizations, Muhammadiyah, which had already been accustomed to modern ideas, was more prominent than the others. Even though NU's modernization

programme had been launched in the latter half of this period (since Abdurrahman Wahid's chairmanship in the early 1980s), it remained highly traditional for the most part.

The rise of the military in Indonesian politics during this period marked the supremacy of *Abangan* culture.¹⁰² Even though the role of another *Abangan* institution, the PNI, had been demoted along with that of the other political parties, the Javanese cultural traits lived on and even flourished through the New Order regime. The similar cultural root between Sukarno and Soeharto rendered their beliefs in political control as an underlying assumption of governance. Despite differences in their methods, both were consistent with Javanese conception of power. Sukarno unified differences in a political system revolving around himself, while Soeharto simply tried to eradicate those differences.

As for the *Santri*, both Javanese and *Seberang*, this period was marked by a decline in their political saliency. However, the maintenance and development of their politico-cultural traits were still carried on in their social mass organizations, the NU and Muhammadiyah. This explains why despite the political drought, the *aliran* persisted, and resurfaced in the later periods when political control was more relaxed.

The Late New Order Period (1990-1998)

This period was marked by significant and interesting political changes. Such changes were the results of relaxation in political control, the growth of the middle class as a result of economic development, and the public's increased accessibility to the outside world.

There was not so much change, however, in the political parties or at least in the structure of the formal party system, where they were still strictly under the authority control. But outside of the formal system, this period saw an ascendancy of the modernist Muslims and the competition between the *Abangan* and the *Santri-Seberang*. At the same time, there was also a significant change in the ideological orientation of the traditionalist Muslims.

The growth of the modernists was apparent from the establishment of the *Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia* (ICMI — Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association) in 1990. Even though its name carried a scholarly tone, ICMI was actually an amalgamation of scholars, bureaucrats, entrepreneurs, student and NGO activists, professionals, as well as underground and establishment politicians. Although initially meant as an umbrella organization for Muslims of all stripes, most of ICMI's members came from the modernist persuasion. In addition, many of its members also came from the younger generation of middle class families. Most of them were the "New Order generation," growing up in urban areas and in an environment where *aliran* were not the main theme of politics. ICMI's appeal seemed to be the openness within the organization amidst the environment of political

stiffness; aspiration for more political openness; and as a mediation between modern and religious values. At least during the first year of its establishment, ICMI's appeal as an effort to build a civil society in Indonesia was quite strong.

But ICMI could also be viewed in terms of its relations with Soeharto. Its establishment was perceived by some analysts as an effort of Soeharto to gain a new mass-based support after a series of rows with some military officers who were critical of the first family's involvement in business. The appointment of B. J. Habibie, Soeharto's protégé, as ICMI Chairman seemed to confirm such notion. ICMI's establishment was openly opposed by some officers. A number of traditionalist Muslims, including Abdurrahman Wahid, also opposed ICMI, because it had too much modernist flavour in it.¹⁰³ Despite the opposition and despite its non-political pronouncement, ICMI's political influence was growing quickly. In 1993, three years after its establishment, ICMI was able to penetrate deeply into Golkar. The appointment of Harmoko, a civilian close to the modernist circle, and the subsequent "greenization"¹⁰⁴ was seen as a major blow to the *Abangan* military. As a result, many modernist Muslims came to the 1993-1998 parliament on Golkar's tickets and many viewed the cabinet of the same period as an ICMI Cabinet.¹⁰⁵

As a result of ICMI's rise, interesting changes also occurred in the internal composition of the TNI/ABRI. In this period, a new faction emerged within the TNI/ABRI. This faction was led by a number of Muslim officers with modernist inclination, such as Prabowo Subianto (the son of PSI's Sumitro), and the two Sumatrans, Feisal Tanjung, and Syarwan Hamid. They grew closer to the modernist Muslims. At the same time, the Javanese officers with nationalist inclination, such as Moerdani and Try Sutrisno appeared to lead the other faction. Such factionalism within ABRI was known as the "Red-White"¹⁰⁶ and the "Green" factions.

Another interesting phenomenon in this period was the modernization of NU. Under Abdurrahman Wahid, the NU became closer to the ideas of liberal democracy, namely minority rights as well as civil and human rights protection. This was the fruit of educating the young traditionalists in Western educational institutions. Also responsible for this "advancement" was the close relationship that Gus Dur enjoyed with the NGO communities, both at home and abroad. As a result, the image of NU, especially of Gus Dur himself, shifted from that of rural *Santri* advocating an Islamic state to a cosmopolitan one with a strong leaning toward the protection of the minority groups. However, it should be noted that not all *Kyai* and *Santri* welcomed Gus Dur's initiative. Many, especially the NU elements in PPP, chose to remain in the Islamic traditionalist tenets.

In this period, there was a leveling of exposure to Western influence among the major political groups. Greater openness to the outside world and growing interconnectedness among nations facilitated by the information technology revolution were the primary factors behind this change. The NU especially, made significant leap forward, leaving behind the modernist Muhammadiyah.¹⁰⁷

The three political *aliran* were in competitive mode in this period. While the formal political system remained fixated in the quest for economic prosperity and political stability, the real politics experienced a high rate of dynamism. The rift developing within the *Abangan* institution, as exemplified by the tension between Soeharto and the ABRI generals, rendered a decline in its relative position *vis a vis* the modernists. It remained predominant in absolute terms. The traditionalists have transformed their platform substantially and were also vying for power. After being dormant for some time, all three *aliran* were about to engage in a dramatic power struggle that eventually lead to the creation of a new structure in Indonesian politics.

The Reformasi Era (1998-)

In the final years of the millenium, Indonesia underwent another period of change in its political system. Similar to the political structural change in 1945 and 1965, this period was marked by bloody conflicts, confusion, and uncertainty. Indeed, many observers were baffled by the speed and extent of change that had swept the country. As what analysts thought about Sukarno previously, Soeharto's power appeared to them so deeply entrenched in the Indonesian polity that only "an act of God" (mortality) could remove him from power. However, Soeharto not only stepped down from power, the political structure that he had built for the last three decades crumbled. From the Javanese political culture perspective, Soeharto's downfall was due to the *pamrih* that he had conducted. This *pamrih* took the forms of corruption and cronyism that had become endemic, with the first family business growing predatorial in the final years of his rule. The practice of *pamrih* by rulers usually resulted in the loss of *wahyu*, as was the case with Soeharto's downfall as well as Sukarno's.¹⁰⁸

Despite the chaotic appearance of the recent Indonesia's political transition, the new political structure was hardly a novelty in the country's history. Many elements in the new structure resembled that of the *aliran* politics prior to the Javanese' control ascendancy. In this period, the political *aliran* resurfaced. In spite of all the attempts to bury them during the Sukarno and Soeharto era, they had survived. When the political restraints were lifted off, they reappeared in their natural habitat — party and parliamentary politics.

While the institution reflecting *Abangan*, the military, was in significant decline in this period, another institution was on the rise. The suppression of the party *Abangan* institution during the New Order did not eradicate it. The rise of Megawati Sukarnoputri, daughter of Sukarno, was partly responsible for this resurgence. Megawati became the chairperson of the PDI in 1997. Fearful of the powerful influence associated with Megawati's father in inciting the ascent of party nationalists, the New Order regime sought to replace her with a more favourable figure.¹⁰⁹ While formally, the government was successful in getting rid of Megawati in what later became known as the "July 27 Incident,"¹¹⁰ in real political terms, the tide has been turned. Megawati and several of her followers decided to set up a rival party of the official PDI, named the PDI *Perjuangan* (PDI Struggle). Despite being an underground party in the final year of the New Order, it emerged as the largest party in the 1999 election of the *Reformasi* era.

A conflict exploded between the party nationalists and the formal rank and files of the TNI/ABRI, which then had been under the control of modernist-leaning officers. The rival nationalist officers seemed to have found refuge in the PDI-P. Differences in methods aside, the similarity in their Javanese politico-cultural background should explain such union.

The traditionalist Muslims institutional transformation in the *Reformasi* period was rather straightforward. The PKB (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* — National Awakening Party) was set up in this era in the midst of the burgeoning Javanese *Santri*'s aspiration for a comeback to practical politics. The PKB was established by NU's *Kyai* and *Santri*, and during the 1999 election, most PKB regional offices were manned by NU's officials. Even though Gus Dur himself initially did not become a PKB member, doubtless his influence in the party was enormous.

Notwithstanding the gain that the modernist Muslims had made during the latter half of the New Order, they seemed to encounter some difficulties in uniting themselves in one political vehicle. In some respects, the difficulties resided with the personal conflict of interests among the elite. The other reason might be the lack of a strong institution that can accommodate the interests of the modernist masses. The modernists tended to be dispersed all over the various political organizations.¹¹¹

As a result, there were four major parties representing this *aliran* in the 1999 election. The PPP was one of the prominent parties. Increasingly, it had come under the control of the non-Gus Dur faction traditionalists but it still retained a large modernist followers. Modernist aspiration was also carried by the PAN (*Partai Amanat Nasional* — National Mandate Party) led by the reformist Amien Rais, former chairman of Muhammadiyah. Similar to the NU-PKB relationship, many Muhammadiyah cadres also became PAN's functionaries, although

the party officially declared itself as open and non-sectarian.¹¹² Muhammadiyah's members carried out most of PAN's regional and national activities. Another party, the PBB (*Partai Bulan Bintang* — the Stars and Crescent Party) was set up by a number of protégés or descendants of former Masjumi leaders. However, their influence was rather limited. Another yet smaller party, the PK (*Partai Keadilan* — Justice Party) was set up by young urban modernists, many of them professionals.

Although coming to the election in different banners, the similar political culture among these modernist Muslims parties, brought them together in a parliamentary alliance, called “*Poros Tengah*” (Middle Axis). The alliance was initially intended to provide an alternative to the intense presidential race between Habibie, Golkar's candidate and Megawati. However, these parties had the potential to create a more permanent, albeit informal, alliance.

In this period, the Golkar was becoming more influenced by the *Santri-Seberang* tradition. The election of Akbar Tanjung, former chairman of HMI (*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam* — Islamic Students Association), a modernist student movement during the early New Order years had accentuated such influence. The defeat of Edi Sudradjat, former Army commander, to Tanjung in the Golkar's chairperson election, had resulted in the exodus of some nationalist elements in the party. Many of them, including Sudradjat, established the PKP (*Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan* — Justice and Unity Party), which would later prove inconsequential in the election. But some of them also appeared to have joined the PDI-P and the PKB, solidifying alliance on *aliran* line.¹¹³

In this period, the Golkar has also increasingly become a regionalist party. Although it lost a substantial portion of its support in Java to the PDI-P and the PKB, its influence in the outer islands grew relatively. This was especially true in eastern Indonesia, especially in Sulawesi. This was due to the increasing representation of Sulawesi people in the leadership of Golkar as well as its nomination of Habibie as a presidential candidate.¹¹⁴ While the relations between the HMI and eastern Indonesia factions were sometimes uneasy, the fact that most of the latter were also modernist Muslims made it a working coalition.

The stature of “green TNI/ABRI” has largely dissipated during this period. It was weakened by the complicity of its officers in the May 1998 riots against the ethnic Chinese in Jakarta. However, a number of associates of some influential generals of this faction, became members of some *Poros Tengah* parties. The most prominent example was the PBB members who were active in a think-tank established by General Prabowo.

This “new” constellation of political forces was seen as a continuation from that of the 1950s. The *aliran* parties were getting the same regional basis of votes in the 1999 and 1955 elections.

The nationalists were more popular in Java than the outer islands. This was especially true in 1955. While its outer islands’ votes increased significantly in 1999, the majority of votes still came from Java. The modernist parties received most of its parliamentary seats from the outer islands, resembling the Masjumi in 1955, with a slight increase in their outer islands’ portion. The traditionalist PKB, like the NU in 1955, acquired its parliamentary seats overwhelmingly from Java. Its share of votes from the outer islands has shrunk by more than half in 1999.

The alliance pattern in the *Reformasi* parliament (see Figure 1) also resembled the political pattern in the Parliamentary Democracy period, in that it was continually shifting depending on the issues. The proportion of factions in the *Reformasi* parliament, estimates for political *aliran* affiliation of its members, and voting pattern can be found in Figures 2 to 6. The modernist Muslims comprised of the Poros Tengah parties and 75% of Golkar as well modernist affiliated smaller parties.¹¹⁵ The nationalist *aliran* comprised of the PDI-P and 25% of Golkar as well as the nationalist affiliated smaller parties. Finally, the traditionalist Muslims were made up of PKB and smaller traditionalist affiliated parties.

As we see from Figure 2, the modernist Muslims had a slight majority. Therefore, in the subsequent figures, we see that the modernists tended to win the parliamentary voting.¹¹⁶ But we also see that alliances were continually shifting. The nationalists and the traditionalists were in a close alliance during the elections of DPR and MPR chairmanship. In Figure 3, we see that their candidates (Matori Abdul Djalil of PKB for Speaker of the MPR and Sutjipto of PDI-P for DPR) were defeated by the modernists (Amien Rais for MPR and Akbar Tanjung for DPR).

However, in evaluating the accountability speech of Habibie, which determined his candidacy, this alliance pattern changed (Figure 4). There was fear that the Bank Bali scandal and the East Timor referendum would trigger a chain reaction of disintegration. As a result, many modernists who initially supported Habibie moved to reject the speech. While it was difficult to trace which faction voted for rejection due to the closed voting, it was estimated that at least 30% of the modernists’ votes went to the other side.

In the presidential election, this pattern shifted again (Figure 5). This time the rejection toward the nationalists’ candidate Megawati was strong. And a coalition between the modernists and traditionalists brought Gus Dur to the presidency. However, Gus Dur’s alienation of the modernists and nationalists during his first year as the President changed the

alliance pattern again. In the “*interpelasi*” motion before the MPR annual session, the coalition of modernists and nationalists cornered the traditionalist president (Figure 6).

As a general rule, we may induce that when solid, the modernists command a majority in the parliament. The traditionalists were the small minority and they continuously needed an alliance with the others. The nationalists had a bigger potential for controlling the parliament, but only if they were able to attract the votes of the nationalist element in Golkar and maintain a working coalition with the traditionalists. Having influenced by similar politico-cultural roots (i.e., the Javanese) the potential for a nationalist-traditionalist coalition was greater than that of the other dyads.

Structural political change in this period would not have been possible without the changing composition of the Indonesian social structure. One of the important by-products of New Order’s economic development was the growth of the middle-class in Indonesia. Some scholars contended that this new rich class was a product of state-led capitalist and industrial development. The result was a middle class dependent on the state’s patronage. Its existence relied on the opportunities and benefits rendered by the state.¹¹⁷

However, the information technological revolution exposed the urban middle class to the Western culture, either in the form of news media or pop-entertainment. While its impact on society was debatable, it did bring about some nascent changes to the society. A study conducted by a Jakarta-based think tank, the Center for Information and Development Studies (CIDES), in the final years of the New Order era confirmed such changes. The study demonstrated that the middle class was more critical toward the regime’s perceived abuses of power, more open in expressing their ideas, and aspired for a democratic governance.¹¹⁸

An Afterthought:

Erosion of the *Aliran* Politics in the Future?

The growth of the new generation of middle class had not only brought about an aspiration for a more open political system, it had eroded *aliranism* to some extent. Brought up in a social environment where modernity instead of *aliran* was the order the day, the new middle class was indifferent toward the *aliran*. In addition, many members of this class came from a mixed-marriage family, usually between the Javanese and *Seberang* persons. As a result, defining one’s socio-cultural affinity became difficult, let alone the politico-cultural one.

At the same time, urban development, modernity and better transportation facilities led to a significantly higher rate of one-way geographical mobility, i.e., urbanization, to Jakarta, the capital city. In the past, many leaders maintained their ties with their places of origin and continually rejuvenated their ethnic and cultural identities. During the New Order,

many of them found that ethnic identity was antithetical to the order of the day, which was modernity.¹¹⁹ However, their politico-cultural traits were not transformed by their modern lifestyle. These traits remained deeply embedded in the subconscious of the elite psyche. As a result, there seemed to be an effort to dissociate *aliran* from certain geographic bases and to associate them with the modern ideological terminology.

The combination of the above two trends resulted in a de-ethnicization of political *aliran* in formal political discourse. For the new middle class generation, selection of political affiliation was largely due to their own “modern” idea of statehood. In many cases, the image of parties became a more important factor than their political platform. For instance, many young urban people voted for PDI-P in the last election partly because of a nostalgia for the Sukarno era. They perceived it to be more open, democratic and egalitarian, overlooking the autocratic and highly stratified nature of the regime.

There were other factors behind the more politically conscious new middle class’s support to political parties. The PKB was attractive to some of them, especially those with NGO background, because of their tolerant and protection of the minorities. The modernist parties received support because of their aspiration for an open political system, and the PDI-P for its unwavering stance on national unity and integrity.

However, Indonesia’s party system remained organized along *aliran* lines because the new middle class was still relatively small. But, if the growth of the middle class would return to its previous rate before the economic crisis a few years ago, the de-*aliranization* of the Indonesian politics may continue.

It is important to note, however, that de-*aliranization* should only be read as the decreasing emotional and primordial support for the *aliran* parties. The lack of *aliran* affinity of this new middle class meant that its members would be tempted to change their votes from one party to another depending on their performances. Therefore parties would be compelled to perform well in the modern setting in order to attract these swaying voters. But de-*aliranization* did not mean that the politico-cultural traits that have become the platform of the *aliran* would diminish, nor that the political *aliran* itself would fade, given its root in the deeply embedded political culture among diverse Indonesian societies.

Political culture is the defining aspect of the structure of any polity since it connects with a sense of identity, belief system, and pattern of social relationship of the populace. While political change can happen abruptly and a revolution can topple an entrenched, established regime with surprising speed, a political culture tends to be stable and persistent. Therefore, the rise of *aliran* politics in the *Reformasi* era is to be expected. Political *aliran* is the manifestation of diverse political cultures in the structure of the Indonesian polity. It is

the “state of nature” of Indonesian politics. It will surface whenever an uninhibited political system exists.

Many viewed *aliran* politics as an undesirable situation. Some contend that it was backward and antithetical to the modern idea of Indonesia. It was also perceived as inherently unstable and conflict-ridden. Therefore, twice in Indonesian history, there were efforts to control the political *aliran*, through Sukarno’s Guided Democracy, and Soeharto’s New Order political paradigm. However, those efforts failed to bury the *aliran*. It can also be said that it was unstable because it was not allowed to evolve naturally.

Perhaps in future, with further growth of the Indonesian middle class, the political *aliran* would have to evolve. The leaders might become aware that they could not rely solely on primordial ties as the only source of support. The more viable *aliran* would be able to adapt their politico-cultural traits to the changing needs of the Indonesian polity amidst the ever increasingly fierce competition in the global economy.

NOTES

1. Data from *Litbang Kompas* (Research and Development Unit of *Kompas* Daily), 1999, quoted in Daniel Dhakidae (1999) *Partai-partai Politik Indonesia: Kisah Pergerakan dan Organisasi dalam Patahan-Patahan Sejarah* (Indonesian Political Parties: History of Movements and Organizations), in *Litbang Kompas Team* (1999) *Partai-partai Politik Indonesia: Ideologi, Strategi, dan Program* (Indonesian Political Parties: Ideologies, Strategies, and Programs), Kompas, Jakarta, pp. 31.
2. The result of 1955 parliamentary election can be found among others in Herbert Feith (1962) *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, pp. 434-435. For a complete breakdown of the result, consult Alfian (1971) *Hasil Pemilihan Umum 1955 untuk Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (D.P.R.)* (1955 Parliamentary General Election Result), Lembaga Ekonomi dan Kemasjarakatan Nasional, Jakarta. In December 1955, another election was held to elect the members of the *Konstituante* (Constituent Assembly) tasked with drafting a new constitution. The result composition did not differ too much from the parliamentary election. For the result, see Adnan Buyung Nasution (1992) *The Aspiration for Constitutional Government in Indonesia*, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, pp. 32-34.
3. Clifford Geertz (1959). “The Javanese Village,” in G. William Skinner, ed. *Local, Ethnic, and National Loyalties in Village Indonesia: A Symposium*, Yale University Press, New Haven, pp. 37-41.
4. Benedict R. O’G. Anderson (1972). “The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture,” reprinted in Benedict R. O’G. Anderson (1990) *Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, fn. 85.
5. Herbert Feith (1970). “Introduction” in Herbert Feith and Lance Castles, eds. (1970) *Indonesian Political Thinking, 1945-1965*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca.
6. Referring to “Western” ideologies, such as Marxism, nationalism, democratic socialism, democracy, and capitalism.
7. In the words of Geertz, Java “has been civilized longer than England”. See Clifford Geertz (1960) *The Religion of Java*, The Free Press of Glencoe, New York, p. 7.

8. William R. Liddle (1996) *Leadership and Culture in Indonesian Politics*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, pp. 65-66.
9. R.M. Koentjaraningrat (1975) *Introduction to the Peoples and Cultures of Indonesia and Malaysia*, Cummings Publishing Company, Menlo Park, California, pp. 58-60.
10. T. Mulya Lubis (1992) "The Future of Human Rights in Indonesia," in Harold Crouch and Hal Hill, eds. (1992) *Indonesia Assessment 1992: Political Perspectives on the 1990s*, Political and Social Change Monograph 17, Research School of Pacific Studies, Department of Political and Social Change, Australian National University, Canberra, p. 297; Anders Uhlin (1997) *Indonesia and the "Third Wave of Democratization": The Indonesian Pro-Democracy Movement in A Changing World*, Curzon, Surrey, p. 52. The word "gusti" is also used to refer to God, which signifies the deep reverence toward the leaders.
11. Known as "pusaka" or sacred things. These can be in the forms of certain kris (Javanese dagger), spears, carriages, musical instruments, and so on. See Anderson (1972), p. 27.
12. Anderson (1972), pp. 22-23.
13. Koentjaraningrat (1985) "Javanese Terms for God and Supernatural Beings and the Idea of Power," in A. Ibrahim, S. Siddique and Y. Hussain, eds. (1985) *Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, p. 290; Anderson (1972), pp. 38-39.
14. Anderson (1972), pp. 24-25; pp. 28-33.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 28-33.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 51-53.
17. The word "seberang" (or in the old Malay known as "sabrang") means "the other side". However, it can also be construed as "out there," signifying the centrality of the Javanese culture and the mutual alienation between the two political cultures.
18. Koentjaraningrat (1975), pp. 57-60.
19. Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin (1996) "*Masyarakat Aceh dan Demokrasi*" (The Aceh Society and Democracy), in Muhammad Najib, ed. (1996) *Demokrasi dalam Perspektif Budaya Nusantara* (Democracy in the Perspective of Indonesian Cultures), LKPSM, Yogyakarta, Indonesia, pp. 40-47; Tadjuddin Noer Effendi (1996) "*Demokrasi dalam Perspektif Budaya Batak*" (Democracy in the Perspective of Batak's culture) in Najib, *op.cit.*, pp. 83-87; Sjafrin Sairin (1996) "*Demokrasi dalam Perspektif Kebudayaan Minangkabau*" (Democracy in the Perspective of Minangkabau's culture) in Najib, *op.cit.*, pp. 142-146.
20. The literal translation is "rude". However, it may also be read as "uncivilized." See Koentjaraningrat (1975), pp. 58; Anderson (1972), pp. 50-51.
21. Liddle (1996), p. 66.
22. Koentjaraningrat (1975), pp. 94-95.
23. More recently, there has been a speculation that Islam also came to Indonesia from China, brought by some of the Muslim Chinese envoys, the most popular of whom was Admiral Cheng Ho, and that it came directly to Java. However, a systematic study of this claim is yet to be undertaken.
24. Koentjaraningrat (1975), pp. 20-22. The western Protestant and Catholic missionaries, who later accompanied the traders, then converted the peoples in areas where Islamic influence was weak. Such peoples were primarily the interior peoples of Sumatera, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Papua, as well as the coastal people of southern Maluku, and the eastern part of the Lesser Sundas. Until today, the Protestant and Catholics of Indonesia, who make up around 10 percent of the whole population, come primarily from these ethnic groups.
25. There were nine prominent *Wali*, affectionately known to the Javanese as "Wali Songo".
26. Anderson (1972), p. 68.
27. *Ibid.*, pp. 68-69.
28. Consist of belief in one God - Allah, performing prayer five times daily, fasting in the *Ramadhan* month, giving alms (*zakat*) according to the Islamic law, and performing *Hajj* to Mecca if financially viable.

29. Means “red”. The term was introduced in the academic circle by Geertz in “The Religion of Java”. The term came from the colour of the cloth (actually the colour was red earth) that these Javanese wore, as opposed to the white cloth worn by the more pious Javanese Muslims (*putihan*).
30. Geertz, *op.cit.*, p. 5; Liddle (1996), p. 65; Koentjaraningrat (1975), p. 21 called this belief as “*Agama Jawi*” or “*Kejawen*”. After the failed communist coup in 1965, there was a fervor for religions, partly induced by the government. Hence all Indonesians must declare faith in one of the five officially recognized religions (Islam, Protestant, Catholic, Hindu, and Buddhism). Most of the Javanese claimed Islam as their religion. However, in the 1970s, there was a movement to get the *Kejawen* a recognition as a religion. Later it was acknowledge as “*Kepercayaan atas Tuhan Yang Maha Esa*” (belief in the one God). Although it was not officially acknowledged as a religion but it acquired equal legal position with the religions. For a concise account of *Kejawen* practices, see Koentjaraningrat (1975), pp. 112-119.
31. Benedict R.O’G. Anderson (1966) *The Languages of Indonesian Politics*, reprinted in Anderson (1990), pp. 126-129; Andrée Feillard (1999) *NU vis-à-vis Negara: Pencarian Isi, Bentuk, dan Makna* (NU vis-à-vis the State: The Search for Content, Form, and Meaning), LKIS, Yogyakarta, pp. 3-5.
32. The words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad, deals mainly with social and political issues.
33. Meaning “interpretation” or “reinterpretation” of the Islamic texts.
34. Anderson, *op.cit.*, pp. 69-70; Koentjaraningrat (1975), p. 45; Feillard, *op.cit.*, pp. 6-7; Feith and Castles, *eds.*, *op.cit.*, pp. 201.
35. For a critique of the nativity of Indonesian ideologies, see Aidit, D.N. (1962) “Which Ideology is Native?” in Feith and Castles, *eds.*, *op.cit.*, pp. 310-313.
36. Anderson, *op.cit.*, pp. 96-97.
37. Anderson argues that a nation-state is a community imagined by its populace to exist. See Benedict R.O’G. Anderson (1983) *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Verso, London.
38. In just one generation, Dutch ceased to be spoken or understood in Indonesia. This is different from in Suriname, where Dutch continues to be the national language to this day.
39. From 1950-1959, a parliamentary democracy was applied. In 1959 however, the system was again changed back to a presidential model.
40. The nationalization of Dutch companies was carried out amidst growing tension between the two countries over the West New Guinea (Irian Jaya) question.
41. Ruth McVey (1996) “Building Behemoth: Indonesian Constructions of the Nation-State,” in Daniel S. Lev and Ruth McVey, eds. (1996) *Making Indonesia: Essays on Modern Indonesia in Honor of George McT. Kahin*, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, p. 12.
42. Anderson (1966), p. 139.
43. McVey, *op.cit.*, p. 14; also see the accounts of young nationalist leaders in the Boven Digoel camp, especially Sjahrir in Rudolf Mrázek (1996) “Sjahrir at Boven Digoel: Reflections on Exile in the Dutch East Indies,” in Lev and McVey, *eds.*, *op.cit.*, pp. 59-60.
44. The Oath of the Youth in 1928, an all important milestone of the foundation of the Indonesian state, carried the message of “One Fatherland, One Language, and One Nation.”
45. After the recognition of independence by the Dutch in 1949, Indonesia took the form of a federal state, in which the Republic of Indonesia was one of the members. However, in 1950 the Republic of the United States of Indonesia ceased to exist after its constituent states disbanded themselves and merged with the Republic of Indonesia.
46. McVey, *op.cit.*, p. 19.
47. Anderson (1972), pp. 35-38.

48. The first PKI leaders, such as Alimin, Semaun came from the splinter group within the SI, known as the faction of “*SI Merah*” (Red SI). For the history of the PKI, see Ruth T. McVey (1965) *The Rise of Indonesian Communism*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York; Justus M. Van der Kroef (1965) *The Communist Party of Indonesia: Its History, Program, and Tactics*, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada.
49. McVey (1965), pp. 14-15.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
51. Van der Kroef, *op.cit.*, pp. 10-12. Initially PKI stands for *Persarekatan Kommunist di India* (Communist Association of the Indies).
52. Anderson (1966), p. 137.
53. Soedjatmoko once served as the Rector of the United Nations University in Japan.
54. Thus, the PKI cynically nicknamed the PSI as “*soska*” (*sosialis kanan* — rightist socialists).
55. Here Geertz’ typology of *Abangan*, *Santri*, and *priyayi* might be useful. See Geertz (1960). The typology actually received many criticisms because it seemed to lump class and cultural differences together. *Abangan* and *Santri* are cultural divide, while *priyayi* is a class or status denomination. See Donald K. Emmerson (1976) *Indonesia’s Elite: Political Culture and Cultural Politics*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, pp. 23-24, fn. 6.
56. Anderson (1972), pp. 36-37; Anderson (1966), p. 146.
57. Anderson (1972), p. 53.
58. The functionaries of ICMI (*Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia* — Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association), such as Adi Sasono and Dawam Rahardjo, were the chief proponents of this idea in the 1990s.
59. Included in these economists were Widjojo Nitisastro, Emil Salim, Ali Wardhana, Subroto, Mohammad Sadli, even though the latter two actually went to Stanford and MIT respectively. All of them held several cabinet portfolios during the New Order.
60. Acronyms for *Tentara Nasional Indonesia* (Indonesian National Soldiers) and *Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia* (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia).
61. Richard Robison (1990) *Power and Economy in Soeharto’s Indonesia*, Journal of Contemporary Asia Publishers, Manila, pp. 86-87.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
63. David Reeve (1985) *Golkar of Indonesia: An Alternative to the Party System*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 264-265.
64. In fact, one of the rationales of *Sarekat Islam* was to organize the Muslim indigenous merchants *vis a vis* the Chinese.
65. Robison, *op.cit.*, pp. 16-19, pp. 23, pp. 51-52.
66. For an account of the uneven regional growth in Indonesia, see Hal Hill (1996) *The Indonesian Economy Since 1966*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 229-235.
67. Samuel P. Huntington (1993) *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, pp. 5-9
68. Larry Diamond (1999) *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, pp. 11-12.
69. While the figure varies from one census to another, it is generally believed that the proportion of Muslim population in Indonesia is between 85-90 percent.
70. Atmodarminto (1957) “The *Abangan* Case against an Islamic State,” in Feith and Castles, *eds.*, *op.cit.*, pp. 192-196.
71. The pillars are belief in one God, humanity, national unity, representative democracy, and social justice.
72. The first Indonesian president, a Javanese *Abangan*. He is known as the founder of Pancasila.
73. For example, Anderson argues that Sukarno’s well-publicized sexual activities were intentionally crafted as a demonstration of his power. See Anderson (1972), p. 32.

74. This is evident in Soeharto's rule. But in Sukarno's case, it is more obscured because he frequently cited the struggle for "*wong cilik*" (common people) as his theme. However, Sukarno seemed to be more comfortable being in the companies of dignitaries at the lavish parties that he often held.
75. Koentjaraningrat (1975), pp. 21-22, p. 61. The actual meaning of the word is "the people," but it may also be read as "the different people."
76. Nasution, *op.cit.*, pp. 107-108.
77. The Decree abolished the Konstituante, a state-sanctioned body established to discuss the new constitution. The Konstituante was unable to resolve the question of state foundation due to the tug of war between the *Abangan* and the Muslims. The Decree also declared the return to the 1945 Constitution. It meant the end of parliamentary democracy in Indonesia and the beginning of a strong, autocratic presidential system. For details, see Nasution, *op.cit.*, pp. 397-401.
78. For details of the two movements and the ensuing military struggle with the central government, consult Feith (1962), pp. 520-555, pp. 578-597.
79. For an excellent detail on debates in the Konstituante, see Nasution, *op.cit.*
80. Feith (1962), p. 223. See also Anderson (1972), pp. 37-38.
81. Quoted in Ramly Hutabarat (1988) "*Mohammad Natsir dan Demokrasi*" (Mohammad Natsir and Democracy) in Endang Saifuddin Anshari and M. Amien Rais, eds. (1988) *Pak Natsir 80 Tahun, Buku Pertama: Pandangan dan Penilaian Generasi Muda* (80 Years of Mr. Natsir, First Book: The Views and Evaluations of the Young Generation), Media Da'wah, Jakarta, pp. 129-130.
82. Yusril Ihza Mahendra (1988) "*Prolog PRRI dan Keterlibatan Natsir-Sjafruddin*" (Prologue to the PRRI and the Involvement of Natsir-Sjafruddin) in Anshari and Rais, eds., *op.cit.*, pp. 145-158.
83. While the Masjumi never officially reestablish itself after the fall of Soeharto, a number of parties claimed to be its legitimate descendants. See the Background part of this paper.
84. Known as *Nasakom* (*Nasionalis, Agama, Komunis*). NU's participation actually raised controversies within the rank and file of the party, and as the PKI grew stronger, the NU became closer with the Army. See Feillard, *op.cit.*, pp. 60-65.
85. Feillard, *op.cit.*, ch. IX.
86. *Ibid.*, p. 89.
87. *Ibid.*, p. 53.
88. Anderson (1972), p. 55.
89. Feith (1970), p. 17.
90. Leo Suryadinata (1989) *Military Ascendancy and Political Culture: A Study of Indonesia's Golkar*, Ohio University's Monographs in International Studies, Southeast Asia Series, No. 85, Athens, Ohio, p. 21.
91. Anderson (1972), p. 30.
92. A class-based ideology strongly influenced by Marxism. Sukarno once said that *Marhaenism* was "Socialism a lá Indonesia". For a description of *Marhaenism*, see the statement of the PNI principles, "The Aims of the Party" in Feith and Castles, eds., *op.cit.*, pp. 160-164.
93. Feillard, *op.cit.*, pp. 44-46; Feith and Castles, eds., *op.cit.*, pp. 201-202.
94. Feillard, *op.cit.*, pp. 46-52; Feith and Castles, eds., *op.cit.*, p. 202.
95. In officially known as the *Gerakan 30 September/Partai Komunis Indonesia* (G-30S/PKI – September 30th Movement/Indonesian Communist Party).
96. Julian M. Boileau (1983) *Golkar: Functional Group Politics in Indonesia*, CSIS, Jakarta, p. 53; Reeve, *op.cit.*, p. 278.
97. Reeve, *op.cit.*, pp. 286-288.
98. Boileau, *op.cit.*, pp. 54-57.
99. Reeve, *op.cit.*, pp. 266-280.
100. In which the political parties were classified into five groups, i.e., Islamic, Christian, nationalist, "Pancasila" socialist, and Golkar.

101. The new structure was made into a law in 1975. See Reeve, *op.cit.*, p. 290, Boileau, *op.cit.*, p. 71.
102. Feillard, *op.cit.*, chs. VIII and X.
103. Later changed into Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI).
104. Robert Hefner called it “the victory of Javanism”. See Robert W. Hefner (1995) *ICMI dan Perjuangan Menuju Kelas Menengah Indonesia* (ICMI and the Struggle toward an Indonesian Middle Class), Tiara Wacana, Yogyakarta, pp. 5-8.
105. On ICMI and its opposition, consult among others Hefner, *op.cit.*; Adam Schwarz (1994) *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney.
106. Known in Bahasa Indonesia as “*penghijauan*.” Green connotes Islam. Another popular term to characterize this period was “*ijo royo-royo*,” a Javanese colloquial term means “green all over.”
107. Despite the appointment of Try Sutrisno, a nationalist military, as the Vice President, Habibie was given the opportunity to influence the formation of the Cabinet.
108. Signifying the national colours and thus also has a nationalist connotation.
109. Despite the political progress that the modernist Muslims have achieved, Muhammadiyah was said to have undergone an intellectual stagnation during this period. For a collection of critiques of the organization, see Nur Achmad and Pramono U. Tanthowi *eds.*, (2000) *Muhammadiyah “Digugat”: Reposisi di Tengah Indonesia yang Berubah* (Muhammadiyah “in Question”: Reposition in the Changing Indonesia), Penerbit Kompas, Jakarta.
110. Franz Magnis-Suseno (1999) “*Langsir Keprabon: New Order Leadership, Javanese Culture, and the Prospects for Democracy in Indonesia*,” in Geoff Forrester (1999) *Post-Soeharto Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos?*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.
111. Should also be noted here was the role of the modernist Muslim-leaning officers in the TNI/ABRI as well as some modernist elements in Golkar.
112. During that day, a number of policy, military, and paramilitary personnel dressed up as PDI’s cadres stormed the PDI Central Board office in Jakarta, which until then, in spite of the ouster of Megawati, had been under the control of her loyalists. The attack caused a number of dead victims, as well as missing persons.
113. Prominent modernists could even be found in the PDI-P.
114. A number of nationalist-leaning politicians and figures from minority groups also became members of PAN.
115. However, given the non-*aliran* and all-embracing nature of its organization, *santri*-ization of Golkar was not complete, as was the incomplete *abangan*-ization of the past. So there remains some elements representing both the nationalists, although most of them have left the party for PDI-P, and the traditionalists. The presence of the so-called “white Golkar” led by Marzuki Darusman may be seen in this perspective.
116. This faction was known as the Iramasuka (Irian Jaya, Maluku, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan) caucus led by Habibie’s close associate, Baramuli.
117. The data for 1955 election is processed from Alfian, *op.cit.*, p. 16, while the 1999 data is acquired from *The Jakarta Post*, July 17, 1999, p. 2. The Javanese provinces in these graphs include Central and East Java as well as Bali, due to more or less similarity in political culture. However, Bali was not included in the 1955 data because during that time it was still part of West Nusa Tenggara. The outer islands comprised of provinces in Sumatra, Sulawesi, and the rest of Eastern Indonesia, except for Irian Jaya in 1955, which was then still colonized by the Dutch.
118. This is a rough estimate. However, it is also conservative, since it means that the Marzuki faction commands 25% of the Golkar faction in the parliament. Many perceive this quite unlikely after the sweeping HMI victory in the Golkar congress prior to election as well as the growing influence of the Iramasuka caucus.
119. All figures here are estimates. The military vote was not taken into account. This is because it is quite difficult to estimate their voting direction. For instance, there was a speculation that the military would vote for Habibie, owing to his closeness with Wiranto.

But also the East Timor fiasco has brought a deep dissatisfaction among the officers toward Habibie. Furthermore, there was also a report that the military would remain neutral in the competition among political parties. However, the relatively low number of abstain vote indicated that this was not the case. Many contend that the military was playing the role as a kingmaker. But it was doubtful, given the low number of votes that it had in the parliament.

120. See for instance Kunio Yoshihara (1988) *The Rise of Ersatz Capitalism in South-East Asia*, Oxford University Press, Oxford; Richard Robison (1996) "The Middle Class and the Bourgeoisie in Indonesia" in Richard Robison and David S.G. Goodman, eds. (1996) *The New Rich in Asia: Mobile Phones, McDonald's and Middle-Class Revolution*, Routledge, London; Donald K. Emmerson (1995) "Region and Recalcitrance: Rethinking Democracy through Southeast Asia," in *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 8, No. 2.
121. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, et.al. (1998) *Kontradiksi Aspirasi and Peran Kelas Menengah di Indonesia* (The Contradiction in Aspiration and Role of the Middle Class in Indonesia), CIDES, Jakarta.
122. A tale of Purwoko in Emmerson's study of Abangan and Santri parliamentarian in the New Order era might be indicative of this trend. See Emmerson (1976).

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Figure 1
Faction Composition of Members of Parliament (DPR)




Figure 2
Political *Aliran* Affiliation of Members of Parliament (DPR)




Figure 3
Voting Pattern according to Political *Aliran* Coalition




Figure 4
Voting Pattern according to
Political *Aliran* Coalition




Figure 5
Voting Pattern according to
Political *Aliran* Coalition





Figure 6
Voting Pattern according to
Political *Aliran* Coalition



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