Webinar on “Thai Foreign Policy Under Srettha Thavisin: Continuity, Changes and Challenges”

In this webinar, Dr Pinitbhand Paribatra (Associate Professor and the head of the International Affairs Department at the Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University) and Dr Chanintira na Thalang (Associate Professor at the Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University) examine the evolving dynamics of Thailand’s foreign policy under the leadership of Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin.

THAILAND STUDIES PROGRAMME WEBINAR

Tuesday, 19 March 2024 – The webinar examines Thailand’s foreign policy evolution under Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin and the Pheu Thai-led 11-party coalition. Seven months into their term, the current 11-party coalition headed by the Pheu Thai Party faces the challenge of balancing policy continuity with introducing changes in response to current geopolitical shifts.

This marks the first appointment of a civilian government in decades, introducing significant changes yet maintaining a sense of continuity from General Prayut Chan-o-cha’s era, though their impacts on foreign policy remain unclear. Upon taking office, Srettha actively pursued foreign direct investments, visited 60 countries, and spent 30% of his time since taking office overseas, earning the nickname “Salesman Prime Minister.” Critics, however, argue that his foreign policy embodies ruthless pragmatism, lacking the careful balance that once characterised Thailand’s foreign policy. Another concern is Srettha’s handling of Thailand’s relationship with Cambodia, allowing Thaksin Shinawatra and his daughter, Paetongtarn, to personally deal with Hun Sen and the Cambodian government.

The ISEAS Thailand Studies Programme hosted a webinar under Chatham House rule, featuring Dr Pinitbhand Paribatra and Dr Chanintra na Thalang from Thammasat University. They provided valuable insights into the current and future direction of Thai foreign policy. The webinar attracted the attention of 106 attendees.

Domestic Political Dynamics Influencing Foreign Policy

• Move Forward’s policies, seen as threats by the military and the conservative establishment, led to the party being blocked twice from appointing its leader, Pita Limjaroenrat, as Prime Minister. Despite coming first in the May 2023 general election, Move Forward eventually allowed Pheu Thai, which came in second, to undertake government formation.
• While in negotiations, Pheu Thai struck a deal with the military, forming a conservative-leaning coalition with 10 other parties, including two with ties to the Thai military. Despite over two decades long rivalry, they are uniting against the common enemy.
• On 22 August 2023, Parliament voted for Srettha to become Prime Minister, and Thaksin returned from self-imposed exile after 17 years. He was immediately taken to prison for his charges. However, by the evening during the wee hours on the following day, he was admitted to the Police General Hospital for emergency health reasons, where he spent 180 days.  He was released on parole in February 2024 to serve the remaining of a reduced sentence (from eight years to only one) under house arrest, which attracted significant attention, with many considering it to be special treatment.
• With Thaksin back in Thailand, speculation abounds on who really leads: Srettha, his daughter Paetongtarn, or Thaksin? Thaksin’s significant influence on Pheu Thai’s policies is evident which became clearer during his visit to his hometown, Chiang Mai, while under house arrest, where he was greeted by high-level officials and ministers from the Srettha Administration.
• Since Thaksin’s deal with the military, many Pheu Thai supporters have become disillusioned. The Pheu Thai-led government now faces pressure to fulfil its campaign promises, including a digital wallet scheme to distribute 10,000 baht ($285) to 50 million Thais. However, this plan has faced strong opposition from economists and former Bank of Thailand governors, who criticise it as financially irresponsible. Other campaign promises, including amending the constitution, have seen little progress. 
• The Pheu Thai-led government also faces the challenge of keeping coalition members satisfied and making cabinet reshuffles to accommodate all coalition members and party factions. There might be a lack of continuity in its policies; however, the foreign ministry is likely to remain under Pheu Thai’s control.
• Thaksin seeks to facilitate the safe return of his sister, ex-Prime Minister Yinluck, without legal repercussions, a challenge due to her existing five years of jail term for dereliction of duty. Conservatives plan to use this as leverage to influence Thaksin, who also faces lese-majeste charge for statements made abroad.
• The Thai Election Commission has asked the Constitutional Court to disband the Move Forward Party. If dissolved, MFP MPs must join a new party within 60 days in order to maintain their House membership. The MFP’s response could either fuel political discontent or enhance their prospects in the next election.

Foreign Policy of Srettha Government

• Move Forward radically changed the Thai foreign policy decision making by boosting the role of parliament in scrutinising foreign policy decision making process.
• Despite continuity in foreign policy from the Prayut government, the Srettha administration is clearly shifting focus to make foreign policy more oriented towards domestic agendas for political gain.
• The main agenda of Thailand’s foreign policy has always been the economic oriented or growth driven diplomacy to boost the foreign direct investment inflows. In a recent interview, the Srettha pointed out that Thailand is currently facing an economic crisis. The government’s main foreign policy goal is to attract more investments and secure the stronger economic ties not only with traditional trading partners like China, Japan and the US, but also with new emerging markets like Africa and the Middle.
• Additionally, there’s a strong emphasis on negotiating and securing Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with specific countries. Thailand currently signed 14 FTAs with 18 countries and economies, including the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Thailand will continue to finalise the two most important ongoing FTA negotiations with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), covering non-EU members such as Switzerland and Norway, and the European Union Free Trade Area (EUFTA), which is expected to be finalised in 2025.
• The second layer of Thailand’s foreign policy strategy emphasises revitalising border trade with Laos, Cambodia, and Malaysia. By seeking to enhance trade relations with these nations, Prime Minister Srettha aims to reassert Thailand’s leadership in the region and strengthen its negotiating position to counterbalance China’s influence. Thailand also promotes regional frameworks closer to home such as BIMSTEC.
• For the great power rivalry, the Thai government views the world as multipolar and believes that smaller states like Thailand have roles to play. This requires Thailand to adopt a proactive and flexible foreign policy, maintain neutrality and equitable relations with all sides, and engage with partners worldwide to ensure Thailand’s active participation in global foreign policy agendas. In doing so, hedging is expected to be implemented at both international and regional levels.
• Thailand views China as a central figure in the multipolar world vision and, despite concerns over China’s growing assertiveness, still regards China as a strategic partner offering significant economic opportunities. Prime Minister Srettha’s first visit outside ASEAN was to China, where he and a delegation of prominent Thai businessmen met with leading tech entrepreneurs, inviting Chinese investment into Thailand. Chinese tourists remain the primary engine behind Thailand’s GDP growth.  Thailand and China have put in place a reciprocal visa-free arrangement for their nationals visiting each other country for tourism.
• Despite some delays, US-Thailand relations remain strong. U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan visited Thailand in January 2024, followed by Thai Foreign Minister Parnpree’s trip to Washington to meet U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken. Later, the U.S.-Thailand Defence Dialogue took place in Bangkok in late February. Srettha committed to inviting U.S. tech companies to Thailand and affirmed Thailand’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). Thailand’s relations with both the U.S. and China remain unchanged, with Thailand carefully navigating its interactions with both nations. The government’s primary objective is clear: to prioritise economic growth and prosperity. In line with its multipolar worldview, Thailand also seeks to engage with other regional leaders, notably Saudi Arabia. After 22 years of stagnant relations, Srettha’s visit to Saudi Arabia for the ASEAN-GCC meeting led to the signing of over 30 bilateral agreements between Thailand and Saudi Arabia.
• Saudi Arabia views Thailand as a key partner in connectivity and energy. Meanwhile, access to the Middle East market for the Thai labour force and medical service providers represents another area of interest for Thailand. The Saudi-Thai Coordination Council, the first of its kind, has been established. 
• Thailand is also planning to develop a land bridge in southern Thailand connecting India and the Pacific Ocean to diversify options for the Thai economy and increase interdependence with partners beyond the region.

Thailand-Cambodia Relations

• The longstanding dispute with Cambodia over the Preah Vihear temple, fueled by nationalist sentiments and a major factor in the 2006 coup, remains unresolved. Additionally, Thailand’s dispute has expanded to include an overlapping claimed maritime area in the Gulf of Thailand, which holds 11 million cubic feet of natural gas and 500 million barrels of oil. Successfully negotiating these resources’ sharing with Cambodia could significantly bolster the government’s position.
• Significantly, Prime Minister Srettha’s first foreign visit since his inauguration was to Cambodia, deviating from the traditional first visit to the incumbent ASEAN chair, underscoring Cambodia’s priority for the Thai government.
• The conflict in Thailand’s Deep South presents another major challenge for the Thai government, though it is of lesser concern than the Cambodian issue. Meanwhile, Thai-Cambodian relations have reached new heights, given the close relationship between Thaksin and Hun Sen, and the fact that Thaksin’s niece is married to a Cambodian politician. The personal relations between elites on both sides will play a significant role.

Myanmar Crisis and Multilateral Collaboration

• In terms of multilateral collaboration, Thailand remains committed to a rule-based agenda. In his UN address and during high-level dialogues on financing for development, Prime Minister Srettha reaffirmed Thailand’s dedication to sustainable development, green financing, and achieving climate goals. Thailand also beefs up its relations with ASEAN.
• Regarding the Myanmar crisis, Thailand has intensified efforts to collaborate with ASEAN and continues its commitment to providing assistance and delivering humanitarian aid to the people of Myanmar along the border. Although the plan was drafted by the previous government, its implementation has become more tangible under the Srettha administration. The aid delivery has been carried out by the Thailand and Myanmar Red Cross communities and monitored by the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre).

Foreign Policy Decision Making Process of Srettha Government

• Pheu Thai’s political appointees come from business and economic backgrounds. Foreign Minister Parnpree, for example, served as the assistant to the commerce minister during the Thaksin administration and has a diverse business portfolio. Many appointments have been handpicked for those affiliated with the Pheu Thai party or Thaksin.
• Although the Pheu Thai party directs the business-oriented foreign policy, highly respected career diplomats, such as Sihasak Phuangketkeow, have been appointed to ensure the system runs smoothly and to assist political appointees.
• Srettha government has streamlined policies in ways that enable more bureaucratic coordination. For the first time in 16 years, a meeting for Thai ambassadors and consul generals was hosted, with policy directions given by the foreign minister. The prime minister also attended, alongside other bureaucratic agencies and provincial governors. The Prayut government never utilised such policy platforms for effective policy coordination.
• The Pheu Thai-led government has also assigned, for the first time, the Permanent Secretary of Foreign Affairs to serve as the core secretary of the National Foreign Policy Committee, a role previously shared by permanent secretaries from the Foreign Ministry and Commerce Ministry.

The audience raised questions about the increasingly assertive role of China in the region, the long-term stability of the coalition government, potential chances to improve U.S.-Thailand relations, Thailand-Cambodia relations, and Thailand’s stance on the Myanmar crisis. A question about Thailand’s energy transition was also raised during the session.