TRENDS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

BEYOND SLACKTIVISM

The Dynamic Relationship between Online and Offline Activism among Southeast Asian Youths

Iim Halimatusa'diyah

ISSUE 10
2024

ISEAS YUSOF ISHAK INSTITUTE

TRENDS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The **ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute** (formerly Institute of Southeast Asian Studies) is an autonomous organization established in 1968. It is a regional centre dedicated to the study of socio-political, security, and economic trends and developments in Southeast Asia and its wider geostrategic and economic environment. The Institute's research programmes are grouped under Regional Economic Studies (RES), Regional Strategic and Political Studies (RSPS), and Regional Social and Cultural Studies (RSCS). The Institute is also home to the ASEAN Studies Centre (ASC), the Singapore APEC Study Centre and the Temasek History Research Centre (THRC).

ISEAS Publishing, an established academic press, has issued more than 2,000 books and journals. It is the largest scholarly publisher of research about Southeast Asia from within the region. ISEAS Publishing works with many other academic and trade publishers and distributors to disseminate important research and analyses from and about Southeast Asia to the rest of the world.

BEYOND SLACKTIVISM

The Dynamic Relationship between Online and Offline Activism among Southeast Asian Youths

Iim Halimatusa'diyah

ISSUE
10
2024

ISEAS YUSOF ISHAK INSTITUTE

Published by: ISEAS Publishing
30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace
Singapore 119614
publish@iseas.edu.sg
http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg

ISEAS Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

Name(s): Iim Halimatusa'diyah, author.
Title: Beyond slacktivism : the dynamic relationship between online and offline activism among Southeast Asian youths / By Iim Halimatusa'diyah.
Description: Singapore : ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, April 2024. | Series: Trends in Southeast Asia, ISSN 0219-3213 ; TRS10/24 | Includes bibliographical references.
Identifiers: ISBN 9789815203455 (soft cover) | ISBN 9789815203462 (ebook PDF)
Subjects: LCSH: Internet and activism—Southeast Asia. | Youth—Social networks—Political aspects—Southeast Asia. | Youth—Political activity—Southeast Asia.
Classification: DS501 I59T no. 10(2024)

Typeset by Superskill Graphics Pte Ltd
Printed in Singapore by Markono Print Media Pte Ltd

FOREWORD

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The **Trends in Southeast Asia** series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Beyond Slacktivism: The Dynamic Relationship between Online and Offline Activism among Southeast Asian Youths

By Iim Halimatusa'diyah

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- As digital platforms continue to evolve, youths increasingly employ social media, online forums, and digital campaigns to advocate for social and political change. While this phenomenon is often considered disparagingly as slacktivism, recent studies find that individuals engaging in digital activism often also participate in other conventional forms of activism.
- Despite a surge in youth activism across Southeast Asian countries, comparative analysis in this region remains scarce. Using data from the World Values Survey of several studies, and case studies on Indonesia, this article examines the extent to which online political activism serves as a catalyst for mobilization, awareness and community building among young people in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines.
- Additionally, it examines the interplay between online and offline political activism and its impact on traditional forms of activism.
- The study argues for a reciprocal relationship between online and offline political activism, particularly noting the potential for digital efforts to influence real-world action, especially on cohesive issues such as corruption.

Beyond Slacktivism: The Dynamic Relationship between Online and Offline Activism among Southeast Asian Youths

By Iim Halimatusa'diyah[1]

INTRODUCTION

Youth political engagement has been perceived as declining especially in developed countries (Sloam et al. 2019). However, this decline is often only associated with formal or traditional political engagement such as voting in elections or joining political parties. Beyond formal political participation, youth activism remains visible in various forms of non-formal political engagement such as signing petitions, joining demonstrations and strikes as well as those facilitated by social media. Social media provide solutions to improve youth political engagement by being a new medium of communication for political actors and institutions to disseminate information to wider audiences including young citizens and facilitating an alternative space for these to express their views and preferences beyond the formal forms of political engagement (Keating and Melis 2017).

Youths are digital natives who spend more of their time online compared to adults. Data from the digital global report in 2023 show that the average amount of time spent using the Internet among youths

[1] Iim Halimatusa'diyah is Visiting Fellow in the Regional Social and Cultural Studies Programme at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore; Senior Lecturer at Islamic State University (UIN) Syarif Hidayatullah; and Deputy Director for Research at the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) UIN Jakarta.

aged 16–24 years old is the highest—7 hours 28 minutes for females and 7 hours 9 minutes for males. On the other hand, the average amount of time spent on the Internet for those in older age categories is 7 hours and gets lower with their increasing age (Kemp 2023a). Therefore, it is not surprising that social media have become a strategic alternative space for the young to channel their social and political aspirations. Via social media, youths can obtain and share information on political issues, organize activities, coordinate offline activism faster, and reach a wider public. Social and political engagements facilitated by social media are often considered *slacktivism*—defined as "low-cost and low-risk digital practices" such as signing online petitions, "liking" a Facebook page, or retweeting a tweet on Twitter (Schumann and Klein 2015). While some are optimistic regarding the impacts of slacktivism on fostering a more sustainable political engagement (Smith, Krishna, and Al-Sinan 2015), others maintain a pessimistic view, considering it a superficial online activity that lacks commitment to effectuating social change (Christensen 2011). This perspective portrays slacktivism as a less meaningful activism driven by self-presentation, group identification and narcissistic motivations that may even hinder broader social-political activism efforts (Lim 2013; Harlow and Guo 2014).

In light of this debate, this study examines the extent to which youth online activism—often considered *slacktivism*—affects their offline political activism. It addresses questions such as the following: What are the determinants of youth political activism? What is the relationship between youth online and offline political activism? Under what conditions does online political activism lead to offline activism?

This study focuses on four Southeast Asian countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines. It also highlights two case studies within Indonesia's context. Southeast Asia is an interesting research locus as youths make up 34 per cent of the total population (Tobing 2022), and they are expressly critical of the future of the region. Additionally, there has been a remarkable resurgence and tremendous variations in youth political activism across Southeast Asian countries in recent years. Furthermore, social media have created new opportunities for youths in the region to engage in political activism (Vadrevu and Lim 2012).

Using both quantitative data from the World Values Survey Wave 7 (2017–22) and specific subset data on youth (aged between 16 and 24 years old) and qualitative data from various secondary sources, I argue that the relationship between online and offline activism is reciprocal, and mutually reinforcing.

SOCIAL MEDIA TRENDS

Despite challenges of diversity and digital divides, the Internet and social media have significantly penetrated Southeast Asian countries, and their usage is generally consistent with global trends. For instance, youths in Southeast Asia tend to spend more time using the Internet and social media than their older compatriots. The 2021 data on Southeast Asian youth social media habits show that Internet and social media usage has increased significantly; youths spend roughly 10 hours per day engaging in online activities. A significant quarter of their working hours is spent on social media interactions, demonstrating the ubiquitous influence of digital platforms in their daily life. Notably, 99.6 per cent of Internet users aged 16–24 years actively use social networks, making it their main online activity. Furthermore, Southeast Asian youths participate on diverse digital platforms; on average, they are on 7.4 different social media platforms per month (Kemp 2021). This variation highlights the dynamic nature of youth online activities; they move across platforms to connect, share and engage with others.

Figure 1 illustrates the average number of social media platforms utilized by youths across Southeast Asian countries. Singapore stands out with youths using an average of 8.3 social media platforms every month, followed closely by the Philippines and Malaysia at 8.1 and 8 respectively. Indonesia and Thailand's youth exhibit significant online presence, averaging 7.5 and 7 platforms respectively. Meanwhile, Vietnam shows a slightly lower average at 6.4 platforms, suggesting a comparatively less diverse social media landscape for its young population (ibid.).

Generally, YouTube is the most popular platform (90.1 per cent) among Southeast Asian youths, followed closely by Facebook and Instagram, at 87.7 per cent and 87.4 per cent respectively (see Figure 2). The use of videocentric platforms like TikTok (64.6 per cent) and

Figure 1: The Average Number of Social Media Platforms Used: Youths in Southeast Asia



Source: Kemp (2021).

Figure 2: Social Media Platforms Used: Youths in Southeast Asia



Source: Kemp (2021).

visual-sharing platforms like Instagram demonstrates their significant preference for multimedia content. Facebook Messenger (68.2 per cent) and WhatsApp (53.8 per cent) remain prevalent for messaging purposes, while Telegram Messenger (49.8 per cent) also garners considerable users. Interestingly, while Line (38.1 per cent) and Zalo (15 per cent)

are common in specific countries like Thailand and Vietnam, others like Snapchat (25 per cent) and LinkedIn (19.5 per cent) have relatively lower adoption rates (ibid.).

As depicted in Figure 3, the favourite platforms among Southeast Asian youths are Facebook, favoured by 25.4 per cent of youth, followed by Instagram (21 per cent), WhatsApp (15.2 per cent), TikTok (11.2 per cent), and Twitter (7.3 per cent). Slightly diverging from the broader Southeast Asian trend, the top five favourite social media platforms in Indonesia are instead WhatsApp (35.5 per cent), Instagram (18.2 per cent), TikTok (14.9 per cent), Facebook (14.2 per cent), and Twitter (8.2 per cent) (Kemp 2023b).

In establishing a robust and multifaceted presence across digital platforms, Southeast Asian youths are undergoing changes and redefinitions in their social interactions and cultural identities. The main question then concerns the relationship between social media and political engagement among youths and the extent to which the large youth online presence facilitates their civic and political involvement.

Figure 3: Favourite Social Media Platforms: Youths in Southeast Asia



Source: Kemp (2021).

YOUTH ONLINE AND OFFLINE POLITICAL ACTIVISM

Using several indicators to measure youth political activism, this study considers variations in youth political activism across Southeast Asian countries, focusing particularly on Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. Figure 4 shows the mean scores of various forms of online political activism among youths in each country. A mean score of 1 indicates a low level of participation while 4 implies the highest level of engagement.

Regarding online political activism, Indonesian youths are more likely to search for political information online, indicating a proactive approach to political issues. Malaysia follows closely, demonstrating a similar propensity towards seeking political information online. However, Malaysian youths tend to have a higher level of participation in signing petitions online, suggesting a more active involvement in formal forms of online political expression. Philippine youths, while displaying

Figure 4: Online Political Activism: Youths in Southeast Asia



Source: World Value Survey Wave 7, 2017–22.

a lower level of engagement in searching for political information online compared to their Indonesian and Malaysian counterparts, demonstrate a relatively higher propensity for encouraging others to take action online. In contrast, Thai youths demonstrate a balanced engagement across all categories of online political activism, with mean scores aligning within a comparable range to those of other countries.

Figure 5 shows the mean scores of offline youth political activism. While Indonesian youths are more likely to attend demonstrations, Malaysian youths are significantly more active in signing offline petitions. Indonesian youths are moreover particularly active not only in signing petitions but also in joining unofficial strikes, reflecting comparatively higher mean scores for these categories. Malaysian youths display a moderate level of engagement in attending demonstrations and exhibited a slightly lower mean score compared to Indonesia. Similar to Malaysia, Thailand youths tend to have moderate mean scores across offline activism categories, indicating their moderate level of engagement

Figure 5: Offline Political Activism of Southeast Asian Youths



Source: World Value Survey Wave 7, 2017–22.

in offline political activities. In contrast, Philippine youths demonstrate a mixed pattern of engagement and have relatively lower mean scores across all categories of offline political activism compared to Indonesia and Malaysia. This suggests a less pronounced involvement in offline political activism.

These variations suggest diverse approaches among the young in channelling their political aspirations both online and offline. What are the determining factors for these different levels of engagement? At the national level, the historical context, political structure and socio-economic dynamics of each country may have contributed to these differences. At the individual level, it is necessary to examine which factors may have influenced their different levels of political engagement.

DETERMINANTS OF YOUTH POLITICAL ACTIVISM

Beyond Slacktivism: Online and Offline Youth Activism

Optimists view social media as important additional channels for facilitating new forms of civic and political engagement (Bennett and Segerberg 2013), and not a replacement for traditional forms of political engagement (Christensen 2011). They also believe that such platforms can lead to a more sustainable political engagement (Schumann and Klein 2015). Sceptics, on the other hand, perceive online political activism as slacktivism, and that it is potentially detrimental to social-political activism in the broader traditional sense (Kristofferson, White, and Peloza 2014; Lim 2013). Slacktivism is also viewed as meaningless and ineffective in bringing about real-life political outcomes. Worse yet, such activities may divert political participants away from the more effective forms of traditional political participation (Morozov 2011).

While many are sceptical about online activism—or slacktivism—and its effects on real-life political participation, the findings of this study prove otherwise. In contrast to such a view, this study finds that youths who are politically engaged online are more likely to participate in real-life activism as well. As shown in Table 1, youths in Southeast Asia who actively seek information online tend to be actively

Table 1: OLS Regression Predicting Youth Political Action in Southeast Asian Countries

Variables	(1) Model 1 Sign Petition	(2) Model 2 Boycott	(3) Model 3 Attend Demonstrations	(4) Model 4 Join Strikes
Searching information online	0.13***	0.08***	0.08*	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Signing petition online	0.36***	0.20***	0.19***	0.10**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Encouraging others to take action online	0.09	0.12**	0.17***	0.13***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Organizing political protest online	0.01	0.09	0.15**	0.17***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Information sources from social media	0.01	–0.04	–0.01	–0.03
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Interested in politics	–0.01	0.00	0.03	–0.03
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Discussing politics	–0.09*	0.01	0.04	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Bridging social capital	0.00	–0.07**	–0.01	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)

continued on next page

Table 1 — cont'd

Variables	(1) Model 1 Sign Petition	(2) Model 2 Boycott	(3) Model 3 Attend Demonstrations	(4) Model 4 Join Strikes
Bonding social capital	0.13***	0.10**	0.01	–0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Active member in religious organizations	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Active member in sports or recreational organization	0.02	0.04	0.06	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Active member in art/music/educational organization	–0.03	–0.09**	–0.11***	–0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Active member in labour union	–0.06	0.08	–0.02	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Active member in political party	–0.03	–0.13*	–0.13*	–0.07
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.06)
Active member in environmental organization	0.09*	0.07	0.10*	–0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)

Active member in professional organization	0.02	0.05	–0.09	–0.00
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Active member in charitable/humanitarian organization	0.11**	0.03	0.05	0.07
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Active member in a consumer organization	–0.07	–0.01	0.04	0.00
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Active member in self-help group, mutual aid group	0.11	0.02	0.05	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Active member in women's group	–0.05	–0.06	0.03	–0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Religion (ref=no religious affiliation)				
Catholicism/Christian	0.16	–0.51***	0.08	–0.55***
	(0.21)	(0.17)	(0.11)	(0.10)
Islam	0.19	–0.52***	0.04	–0.59***
	(0.23)	(0.19)	(0.15)	(0.12)
Others	0.37	–0.41**	0.17	–0.46***
	(0.24)	(0.19)	(0.15)	(0.13)
Sex (Male)				
Female	0.01	0.00	0.05	–0.06
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)

continued on next page

Table 1 — cont'd

Variables	(1) Model 1 Sign Petition	(2) Model 2 Boycott	(3) Model 3 Attend Demonstrations	(4) Model 4 Join Strikes
Age (ref=20 years old and younger)				
21 years old and older	0.06	0.05	0.03	0.02
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Income level (ref=Low income)				
Medium income	0.10	0.02	–0.06	–0.12**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
High income	0.05	–0.05	–0.05	–0.12
	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.08)
Social class	–0.00	–0.00	–0.00	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Marital status (ref=Married)				
Divorced/Separated/Widowed	0.20	0.08	0.13	0.25
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)
Single	0.11	0.01	0.05	–0.04
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Living together as married	–0.08	–0.09	–0.07	0.05
	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.10)

Employed	0.09*	0.04	0.07	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Education level (ref=Primary education)				
Secondary education	0.11	–0.07	0.11	–0.02
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.09)
Post-secondary education	0.00	–0.08	0.14	–0.09
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.10)
Tertiary education	0.21	–0.06	0.16	–0.06
	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.11)
Country (ref=Malaysia)				
Indonesia	–0.19**	–0.10	0.28***	0.04
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.07)
Philippines	0.14	–0.09	0.17	–0.12
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.09)
Thailand	–0.31***	–0.02	–0.12	–0.03
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)
Constant	0.25	1.26***	0.22	1.39***
	(0.31)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.20)
Observations	627	625	626	626
R-squared	0.35	0.32	0.28	0.26

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

involved in offline political activism including signing offline petitions, boycotting and participating in protests. Those who actively participate in signing online petitions are even more inclined to engage in forms of offline activism ranging from signing offline petitions, boycotting, participating in demonstrations and joining strikes. Furthermore, youths who actively encourage others to take political action online are more likely to participate in boycotts, protests and strikes. Similarly, those who participate in organizing online protests tend to engage in offline protests and strikes as well.

The findings of this study also challenge the idea of "spatial dualism" which considers offline activism as more authentic than online activism (Showden et al. 2023) and consequently discredits the commitments of online activists. However, in line with findings from other studies, this study confirms that youths who engage in either online or offline activism are more likely to engage in both (Lane and Cin 2018; Milošević-Đorđević and Žeželj 2017). Offline activism becomes increasingly intertwined with digital space, creating interactions and hybrid activism (Showden et al. 2023). Live streaming, broadcasting and sharing offline activism enable youths to connect with individuals who may be unable to participate directly offline, by allowing them to witness or join from a far distance. This enhances the visibility and connectivity of the activist efforts.

In this context, activism is no longer only motivated by issues that directly affect youths and that involve their local neighbourhood. On the contrary, activism can stem from what they witness beyond their physical reach, such as events happening in other regions or countries. Indirectly, this connectivity has encouraged youths to be global citizens who are sensitive to issues occurring in various parts of the world. Solidarity actions in response to events taking place in Myanmar, Ukraine and Palestine are examples of how youth activism has become highly connected and hybridized.

Social Capital: Bonding-Bridging Social Capital and Associational Membership

Social capital, defined as resources inherent in relationships that can be leveraged to attain personal and collective objectives through network

connectivity (Bourdieu 1986; Putnam 2000), is often considered as a key factor in promoting various forms of political involvement (Bourdieu 1986; Coleman 1988). However, the impact of different types of social capital, such as bridging and bonding, on youth political activism remains subject to debate. Bridging social capital involves trust and reciprocal ties among individuals with similar identities and socio-economic origins while bonding social capital entails trusting relations across diverse networks between socio-economically dissimilar members (Jhang 2021). While many studies emphasize the importance and positive influence of bridging social capital on political and economic developments, bonding social capital is often viewed negatively, associated as it is with ethnic conflict and intolerance, and as a hindrance to economic and democratic growth (Sten 2004).

This study presents a different finding. Youths with a higher level of bonding social capital are more likely to engage in boycotts and sign petitions offline, while those with a higher level of bridging social capital are less likely to participate in boycotts. Firstly, engagement in boycotts among Southeast Asian populations, particularly Muslim communities, often stems from issues of religious morality. For instance, boycotts in response to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have occurred repeatedly in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore in 2008, 2014 (Mohamed Nasir 2016), and most recently in 2023–24. Another example is the boycott of products perceived to be supporting the LGBTQ movement in Indonesia (Asnawi, Fanani, and Setyaningsih 2022). Regarding these boycotts, bonding social capital becomes important. The sense of unity and solidarity among Muslims who consider themselves part of the *ummah* motivates individuals in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore to boycott Israel.

Secondly, boycott practices are often influenced by individuals closest to them, such as family, friends, or community organizations they are affiliated with (Klein, Smith, and John 2004). Consequently, individuals with a level of bridging social capital that prioritizes inter-group relations tend to have lower participation in boycotts.

Additionally, associational membership is also considered another determinant of political engagement; as civic associations provide a training environment for citizens to acquire relevant democratic skills,

foster civic values and develop collective efficacy (Andrews et al. 2010; Verba et al. 1993; Putnam 2000). These associations not only empower youth democratic culture but also serve as agents of mobilization in disseminating political information and encouraging group discussions (Eliasoph 1998). Since non-profit organizations can be hugely varied, the extent to which different types of associations matter for youth political activism remains underexplored.

This present study shows that youths who have active membership in environmental and humanitarian organizations are more likely to sign petitions and attend demonstrations. On the other hand, youths who are active members of art or music organizations and political parties are less likely to engage in signing petitions, in boycotts and demonstrations. These findings indicate that associational membership does not necessarily affect social and political activism among the young. Types of organizations do matter as they generate different types of civic skills, political interests and participatory models. Participation in environmental and humanitarian organizations may generate social awareness of human suffering and other types of grievances that often become the subject of petitions, boycotts and demonstrations. Participation in art, music or educational organizations may not sensitize individuals to such feelings as this focuses more on personal interests and achievements. Additionally, those who may have been concerned with social or political issues may express their concerns directly using music or artwork rather than participating in signing petitions offline, boycotts, or demonstrations. Meanwhile, those having a close connection with political parties may perceive direct communication with politicians as being more effective than signing petitions or participating in demonstrations.

Policymakers need to encourage grassroots organizations to facilitate intensive interactions between their members and to strengthen their sense of social and political solidarity. Since professional organizations are now replacing small and local organizations with a strong societal basis in the community, the need to encourage youths to join more socially oriented organizations grows ever stronger.

INDONESIAN YOUTH POLITICAL ACTIVISM

Determinants of Indonesian Youth Activism

Confirming the findings in the Southeast Asian context, Indonesian youths who engage in online activism tend to participate more in offline political activism. For example, those signing online petitions are more likely to participate in signing offline petitions, in boycotts and demonstrations. While those who actively search for information online are more likely to participate in demonstrations, those who use social media as a source of information and to actively discuss politics, are more likely to sign petitions offline. Those interested in politics and often discuss politics tend to engage more in signing offline petitions. In terms of social capital, Indonesian youths who have a higher level of bonding social capital tend to participate more in boycotts but less in strikes. See Table 2.

Additionally, Indonesian youths who use social media as a source of information and also frequently discuss politics are more likely to participate in signing petitions offline. In terms of marital status, single youths are more likely to participate in rallies than those who are married. Meanwhile, compared to married youths, those who are divorced or cohabitating but not married tend to have lower levels of political participation in terms of signing online petitions, and participating in boycotts and demonstrations. In terms of education, compared to Indonesian youths with primary education, those with secondary and tertiary education are less likely to engage in boycotts and demonstrations.

The propensity of Indonesian youth to participate in demonstrations and boycotts is an interesting subject for further investigation. Social media, in this case, facilitates youth to search for information online, and this includes information related to demonstrations and boycotts. In addition, bonding social capital also helps youth to be more exposed to socio-political issues within their bonding ties, and this encourages them to participate in boycotts.

This article will further explore two case studies related to demonstrations and boycotts involving youths in Indonesia.

Table 2: OLS Regression Predicting Indonesian Youth Political Action

Variables	(1) Model 1 Sign Petition	(2) Model 2 Boycott	(3) Model 3 Attend Demonstrations	(4) Model 4 Join Strikes
Searching information online	0.02	0.00	0.16***	0.03
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Signing petition online	0.35***	0.26***	0.15**	0.11
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Encouraging others to take action online	0.05	0.10	0.07	0.16**
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Organizing political protest online	0.08	–0.03	0.09	0.12
	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Information source from social media	0.09**	0.01	–0.01	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Interested in politics	–0.01	–0.04	0.03	–0.02
	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Discussing politics	0.17**	0.10	0.02	–0.04
	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Bridging social capital	–0.06	–0.02	0.04	0.06
	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)

Bonding social capital	0.07	0.12**	–0.01	–0.12*
	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Religion (ref=Catholicism/Christian)				
Islam	0.04	–0.22	–0.12	–0.14
	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Others	–0.07	–0.12	–0.37*	–0.16
	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.21)	(0.24)
Sex (ref=Male)				
Female	–0.08	–0.07	0.05	–0.09
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.07)
Age (ref=20 years old and younger)				
21 years old and older	0.05	–0.05	0.05	0.17**
	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Income level (Low income)				
Medium income	–0.04	0.10	–0.17	–0.12
	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.12)
High income	0.03	0.01	0.09	0.02
	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.17)
Social class	0.00	0.01	–0.08	–0.03
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Marital status (ref= Married)				
Divorced/Widowed/Separated	–0.44*	–0.37	–0.44**	0.09
	(0.27)	(0.24)	(0.21)	(0.23)

continued on next page

Table 2 — cont'd

Variables	(1) Model 1 Sign Petition	(2) Model 2 Boycott	(3) Model 3 Attend Demonstrations	(4) Model 4 Join Strikes
Single	–0.06	–0.03	0.20**	0.09
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)
Living together as married	–0.33**	–0.27**	–0.36**	–0.15
	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.16)
Employed	–0.06	0.04	0.04	–0.10
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Education level (ref=Primary education)				
Secondary education	0.06	–0.25**	–0.12	–0.14
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.17)
Post-secondary education	0.14	–0.50**	–0.42*	–0.42**
	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.19)
Tertiary education	–0.01	–0.43**	–0.38*	–0.24
	(0.28)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.22)
Constant	0.19	1.11***	1.25***	1.10***
	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.33)	(0.30)
Observations	372	371	372	372
R-squared	0.23	0.22	0.22	0.21

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Case Study of the 2019 University Student Demonstrations

Studies on the relationship between online and offline activism are generally based on four hypotheses. First, the independence hypothesis assumes that the relationship between the two is independent and unrelated to each other. Second, the gateway hypothesis proposes that online activism will be followed by offline activism as political experiences online can be an exercise for engagement in real-life activism. Third, the spillover hypothesis suggests that real-life political activism is reproduced in the online space. Therefore, individuals who have interests and knowledge of politics are also likely to use digital media for their purposes. Fourth, the reciprocity hypothesis posits that online and offline political activities influence each other as both activities are often closely intertwined and have been co-developing. Therefore, online and offline political activism are mutually reinforcing (Kim, Russo, and Amnå 2017).

In this study, I argue that the relationship between online and offline activism is reciprocal and mutually reinforcing. To demonstrate how they are intertwined, I use the case of the student demonstrations in Indonesia which took place on 19–30 September 2019. These demonstrations were considered to be the biggest since the 1998 university student demonstrations—the *Reformasi*—to overthrow the authoritarian regime, and which became a critical juncture for Indonesia's democratic transition known as *Reformasi*. Although the demonstrations were peaceful in the beginning, conflict between police and protesters was inevitable, and this led to multiple deaths and casualties. As a result, this demonstration is commonly known as "Black September". The term does not only apply to the protest, but also to other human rights violations that occurred in September, such as the Second Tanjung Priok Tragedy in 1984, the Second Semanggi Tragedy in September 1999, and the murder of Munir, a human rights activist, in September 2004 (Detik.com 2023).

The September demonstration was a critical response from students and activists to the ratification of several problematic bills, with the revision of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) Act being the main issue. The revision of this bill was deemed to weaken the KPK's roles and authority as the agency expected to eradicate corruption in Indonesia.

University students utilized digital space and the streets to express their opposition to the revision of this law. In cyberspace, students launched hashtag wars that were linked to street protests in various parts of Indonesia. Some of the most dominant hashtags were: #ReformasiDikorupsi (Reformasi is corrupted), which was associated with student street protests in Jakarta; #GejayanMemanggil, linked to protests on Gejayan Street, a strategic location where students from various campuses in Yogyakarta met; #BengawanMelawan, tied to street protests in Solo; and #SurabayaMenggugat, which was a call for protests in Surabaya. In addition to the above cities, many student protests also flared up in other parts of the country.

The intensity of hashtag activism peaked before the street protests and continued until after the protests had subsided. As can be seen from Figure 6, a prominent hashtag war was observed from 19 to 30 September. The black-coloured hashtags were pro-student hashtags supporting the students' rejection of the problematic bills. Meanwhile, the red hashtags were pro-government hashtags, and the ones in yellow were hashtags that represented other political interests aside from the main agenda of the demonstrations.

The data in Figure 6 also reveal that the pro-student hashtags remained cohesive and unified, from the beginning of the protest to the end despite the emergence of other interests in the middle and towards the end of the protest. This solid response suggests that online activism on cross-group issues such as the issue of corruption is more likely to translate into offline activism such as demonstrations. According to data from a nationwide survey by Indikator Politik Indonesia on Indonesian youths aged 17–35, corruption ranks as the foremost issue problem among youth—with 64 per cent expressing significant worry—compared to other problems such as the environment, employment, or even human rights (Indikator Politik Indonesia dan Indonesia Cerah 2021). Such data confirm that the issue of corruption is held as a significant issue across different groups. Hence, when there were attempts to undermine efforts to eradicate corruption in Indonesia, youths responded to them vociferously and decisively through online activism that soon transformed into offline mass movements.

A closer look at the #Gejayanmemanggil movement confirms that the relationship between online and offline activism is often reciprocal

Figure 6: Timeline of Top Hashtags and Number of Tweets



Source: BBC (2019).

(Figure 7). #GejayanMemanggil was a movement organized by youths, mainly students in Yogyakarta, in response to various problematic bills, including the revision of the KPK Act. This movement initially started as online discussions on Twitter in response to the protests held by students in Jakarta on 19 September 2019. Students and activists initiated a discourse via social media, raising questions about the pivotal role of youths and university students in Yogyakarta. This digital dialogue later transitioned into offline discussions held on 21–22 September 2019, and culminated in the establishment of the Alliance of the People's Movement (Gerakan Aliansi Masyarakat Bergerak).

Subsequently, agreements achieved during the gathering were shared on online platforms where participants disseminated information about demonstrations scheduled for 23 and 30 September 2019. Social media posts calling for the demonstration successfully reached out to those who actively sought political information online. This resulted in thousands of students participating in the street protest on 23 September 2019. During this demonstration, youths also actively posted their street actions online through live streaming, hashtags and photos. This served to encourage more youths, particularly university students, to join the

Figure 7: Online Posters Calling for Demonstrations in Gejayan, Yogyakarta

Source: Instagram Account of Gejayan Memanggil, 2023.

subsequent demonstration held on 30 September 2019. These social media postings also motivated other students and youths who could not participate directly to share content about the protest, and this amplified the coverage and effect of these actions. See Table 3.

Using the list of top influencers of #GejayanMemanggil analysed by Drone Emprit[2] (Fahmi 2019), we conducted digital observations of their social media accounts. The findings suggest that most of the influencers were not only active in mobilizing the masses through their postings regarding #GejayanMemanggil, but they were also directly involved in the march in Gejayan and in posting their activities on their social media accounts. Agus Mulyadi with the account @AgusMagelangan, one of the top influencers of #GejayanMemanggil, for instance, shared on his social media account: "Tomorrow is off to join many other groups to Gejayan. See you there. #GejayanMemanggil". Youths used various attractive and light-hearted ways when conducting protests both online and offline which nevertheless demonstrated their bold stances. For example, many university students who participated in the protests held banners or signages with interesting messages that were short but meaningful or funny and satirical in expressing their disapproval and criticism of the ratification of the problematic laws.

Figure 8 shows some examples of protestors holding signages that deliver simple and humorous messages rejecting the revision of the KPK bill. The top left picture shows a female protestor in the centre of the crowd holding a sign: "Enough for my love to crash. KPK Don't". In the top right picture, a female protestor holds a sign: "RIP (Rest in Peace) KPK" to express her concern over efforts to weaken the KPK's role in fighting corruption. Meanwhile, in the bottom left picture, a female demonstrator holds a paper saying, "I've seen smarter cabinets at IKEA" and the last picture shows a male demonstrator holding the sign: "I thought it was only my heart that weakened, but so did the KPK". The messages conveyed by these demonstrators embody a

[2] Drone Emprit is media kernels working on monitoring and analysing social media and online platforms based on big data technology.

Table 3: Chronological Order of #GejayanMemanggil Movement

Date	Actors	Action	Place or Media
20 September 2019	University students and activists	Discussing various contentious bills and questioning the stance of activists in Yogyakarta.	Twitter
21–22 September 2019	University students, activists and NGOs in Yogyakarta	Discussing youths' pertinent concerns and efforts to hold grassroots mobilization and establishment of the Gerakan Aliansi Rakyat Bergerak (The People's Movement Alliance).	Yogyakarta
22 September 2019	University students, activists, NGOs in Yogyakarta and the public	Calling the public via social media platforms to participate in the demonstration through the utilization of the hashtag #GejayanMemanggil.	Social media: Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, etc.
23 and 30 September 2019	University students, activists, NGOs and the public in Yogyakarta	Engaging in street demonstrations: #GejayanMemanggil I and II	Gejayan Street

Source: Fuadi (2020).

Figure 8: Youth Protestors Rejecting the Revision of the KPK Bill

Source: Various online sources, 2023.

youthful style, infused with humour which effectively captured public attention and garnered participation not only from youths but also the general public.

Case Study of Boycotting Israeli Products

In response to Israel's invasion of Gaza, many Indonesian Muslims including youths have expressed their sympathy for the Palestinians and condemned Israel's actions. One form of activism that youths have undertaken is boycotting Israeli products or companies supporting Israel. Boycott is a form of political consumerism—an intentional decision to seek or avoid certain products for political, ethical, or environmental

motives (Stolle, Hooghe and Micheletti 2005). In this case, the boycotts are driven by political, ethical and religious motives.

Data from an online survey from Kurious-Katadata Insight Center (KIC) of 2,554 Indonesian respondents show that around 36 per cent are actively boycotting pro-Israel products while 47 per cent support such actions but have not joined in. The survey results also show that most respondents who actively boycott (2,118 respondents: 58.9 per cent female and 41.1 per cent male) do so because they want to support Palestine (64.7 per cent), protest against Israel's actions (61.8 per cent), and express their concern over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (58 per cent) (Agustiyanti 2023).

Data from Google Trends, as depicted in Figure 9, indicate that the boycott in Indonesia commenced in early October, coinciding with the onset of the invasion on 7 October 2023. This action escalated and reached its peak in the middle and end of October before declining in early November. The data also show that the action was fairly widespread throughout Indonesia. Unlike street demonstrations, the boycott can be considered a "personalization of politics" (Bennett 2012) for several reasons. First, the issue is socially fragmented. While many individuals supported and participated in the boycott, many others remained ambivalent, expressing concerns that boycotting would only hurt the Indonesian economy and its people. Second, the boycott emphasizes individual expression over collective action frames. Third, the boycott aims at various targets such as companies or brands deemed to be pro-Israel. Fourth, due to its nature as individualized collective action, boycotting is often coordinated through online media tools. Therefore, the use of social media is very common in the expression of individual engagement.

On TikTok, a popular platform among youths, hashtags on #boikotisrael account for 284 million views. Others use different social media platforms such as Twitter (X), Facebook and Instagram to post videos and pictures of the invasion and Israeli products, and to share their thoughts as well as express support for the boycott. The following highlights several examples of youth expressions on X which capture the diverse opinions and social fragmentation on boycotting Israel products:

Figure 9: Google Trends of Boycott Israel



Source: Google Trends, 2023.

- A young netizen who made posts featuring photos of foreign brands wrote: *"You can start this small movement by yourself. Show our voice."* Another X user who posted a photo of brands allegedly affiliated with Israel and the United States on top of a photo of the Gaza Strip filled with grey smoke wrote: *"We can't go there to fight. What we can do is pray and #BoikotIsrael #BoikotProdukIsrael."* Meanwhile, another X user who posted a video showing examples of other countries boycotting pro-Israel brands stated: "*This is done to convey the message that they are criticizing Israel's attacks*." (BBC 2023).
- Although boycotting did gain traction among youths, some are expressing concerns that the movement will harm Indonesia's economy. An X user admitted that he does not agree with the boycott in support of Palestine. Instead, he prefers donating to refusing to buy products from Israeli-affiliated companies. He posted: "*The employees are Indonesian, and the supplies come from Indonesian SMEs too. Why not just donate? I think it would be more useful"*. There are also X users who highlight potential economic losses if Indonesians choose to boycott Israel-affiliated products which are manufactured in Indonesia: *"What is certain is that it is different management and different labour. If you boycott everything, won't the domestic economy suffer?* (ibid.)".

What is clear though is that the case of boycotting pro-Israel products once again reflects the mutual relationship between online and offline activism. Those who advocate for the boycott of pro-Israel products on online platforms also tend to carry out the action in reality, and vice versa. One Facebook user that I observed who actively called for boycotting pro-Israel products posted:

> You just ignore boycotting Israeli products even though MUI (the Indonesian Ulama Council) has officially issued a fatwa stating that it is haram for Muslims to use and eat Israeli products. Make sure what you choose for your *takjil* (snack or non-alcoholic

sweet beverage to hasten breaking the fast) is not a source of tears for your relatives in Gaza.[3]

In the comment section, she also added that she no longer consumed a product after finding out that it was produced by a pro-Israel company. Another Facebook user also shared a motivating post directed to herself and her followers: "*Don't forget to continue boycotting pro-Israel products. Bismillahirrahmanirrahim...We can do it #freepalestine*."[4]

CONCLUSION

To conclude, this study shows that the relationship between online and offline activism among youths is dynamic and reciprocal in that both mutually affect each other. Youths in Southeast Asian countries engage in different forms of online and offline activism to express their political aspirations. To reiterate, Indonesian and Philippine youths are more likely to participate in demonstrations, while Malaysian and Thai youths prefer signing petitions offline.

Additionally, online activism relating to cross-group issues is more likely to transform into offline activism. As seen above, corruption is an issue that resonates with most Indonesian youths. The efforts to weaken the KPK's role in eliminating corruption could have unified youths regardless of their political and ideological backgrounds. However, on certain issues such as boycotting pro-Israel products, religion remains an important determinant in building solidarity among Indonesian youths. The role of various stakeholders, especially religious leaders, is necessary to ensure that such a movement is not detrimental to the socio-political development of a religiously heterogeneous society like Indonesia.

---

[3] This quote was posted by a Facebook female user on March 12th, 2024.

[4] This quote was also posted by another Facebook female user on March 12th, 2024.

As shown above, membership in social organizations does not necessarily encourage youth political participation. Different types of organizations pose varying impacts on whether a youth is politically active or not. Active membership in environmental and humanitarian organizations has been proven to help youth gain exposure to, and increase their sensitivity and awareness of, various socio-political issues. It subsequently encourages them to play a more active role in their surrounding social and political realities. On the other hand, active membership in music and art organizations, as well as joining political parties, have made youths more oriented towards achieving personal and group interests. Therefore, the effects of membership in these organizations are inversely related to their political activism. Thus, the government should provide opportunities for various civic organizations to flourish as they will provide civic training for youths in responding to social and political issues.

Furthermore, policymakers should recognize the equal importance of both online and offline forms of activism to better understand their relevance in empowering young people as agents of socio-political change. Therefore, freedom of expression in the digital space should be protected so that youths can be well-informed on socio-political issues. It is also imperative to improve youth education and digital literacy to enable the young to process online information.

REFERENCES

Agustiyanti. 2023. "Bola Liar Isu Boikot Israel Menghantam Bisnis Ritel". Katadata.com.id, 26 December 2023. https://katadata.co.id/agustiyanti/indepth/658ab41c76a38/bola-liar-isu-boikot-israel-menghantam-bisnis-ritel

Andrews, K, Marshall Ganz, Matthew Baggetta, Hahrie Han, and Chaeyoon Lim. 2010. "Leadership, Membership, and Voice: Civic Association That Work". *American Journal of Sociology* 115, no. 4: 1192–242.

Asnawi, Nur, Muhammad Asnan Fanani, and Nina Dwi Setyaningsih. 2022. "Participation of Muslim Consumers in Boycotts of Global Companies' Products: Social Dilemma Perspectives". *Resmilitaris* 12, no. 2: 2807–21.

BBC. 2019. “Demo Mahasiswa: Lini Masa ‘perang Tagar’ Antara Demonstran Dan Propemerintah Di Twitter”. BBC News Indonesia, 1 October 2019. https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/trensosial-49880667

———. “Seruan Boikot Israel Di Media Sosial, Apakah Akan Berdampak Terhadap Israel?”. BBC News Indonesia, 3 November 1023. https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/articles/c3gldnyzy7ro

Bennett, W. Lance. 2012. “The Personalization of Politics: Political Identity, Social Media, and Changing Patterns of Participation”. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 644, no. 1: 20–39.

———, and Alexandra Segerberg. 2013. *The Logic of Connective Action: Digital Media and the Personalization of Contentious Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1986. “The Forms of Capital”. In *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*, edited by John G. Richardson, pp. 241–58. Greenwood Press.

Christensen, Henrik Serup. 2011. “Political Activities on the Internet: Slacktivism or Political Participation by Other Means?”. *First Monday* 16, no. 2.

Coleman, James S. 1988. “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital”. *American Journal of Sociology* 94: S95–S120.

Detik.com. 2023. “September Hitam: Rentetan Sejarah Kelam Pelanggaran HAM Di Indonesia”. 5 September 2023. https://www.detik.com/jabar/berita/d-6912982/september-hitam-rentetan-sejarah-kelam-pelanggaran-ham-di-indonesia

Eliasoph, Nina. 1998. *Avoiding Politics: How Americans Produce Apathy in Everyday Life* Cambridge University Press.

Fahmi, Ismail. 2019. “#GejayanMemanggil”. DroneEmprit, 23 September 2019. https://pers.droneemprit.id/gejayanmemanggil/

Fuadi, Ariza. 2020. “Social Media Power for Protest in Indonesia: The Yogyakarta’s# Gejayanmemanggil Case Study”. *Jurnal Studi Komunikasi (Indonesian Journal of Communications Studies)* 4, no. 3: 541.

Harlow, Summer, and Lei Guo. 2014. “Will the Revolution Be Tweeted or Facebooked? Using Digital Communication Tools in Immigrant

Activism". *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication* 19, no. 3: 463–78.

Indikator Politik Indonesia dan Indonesia Cerah. 2021. "Persepsi Pemilih Pemula Dan Muda (Gen-Z Dan Milenial) Atas Permasalahan Krisis Iklim Di Indonesia". https://indikator.co.id/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Materi-Rilis-Diseminasi-Surnas-Perubahan-Iklim.pdf

Jhang, Fang-Hua. 2021. "Bonding Social Capital and Political Participation: The Mediating Role of Political Interest". *Social Science Journal*: 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1080/03623319.2021.1919846

Keating, Avril, and Gabriella Melis. 2017. "Social Media and Youth Political Engagement: Preaching to the Converted or Providing a New Voice for Youth?". *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 19, no. 4: 877–94.

Kemp, Simon. 2021. "The Social Media Habits of Young People in Southeast Asia". https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-youth-in-south-east-asia-2021#:~:text=Across South-East Asia%2C people, using the internet every week

———. 2023a. "Digital 2023: Global Overview Report". Datareportal, 26 January 2023. https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2023-global-overview-report

———. 2023b. "Digital 2023: Indonesia". Datareportal, 9 February 2023. https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2023-indonesia

Kim, Yunhwan, Silvia Russo, and Erik Amnå. 2017. "The Longitudinal Relation between Online and Offline Political Participation among Youth at Two Different Developmental Stages". *New Media & Society* 19, no. 6: 899–917.

Klein, Jill Gabrielle, N. Craig Smith, and Andrew John. 2004. "Why We Boycott: Consumer Motivations for Boycott Participation". *Journal of Marketing* 68, no. 3: 92–109.

Kristofferson, Kirk, Katherine White, and John Peloza. 2014. "The Nature of Slacktivism: How the Social Observability of an Initial Act of Token Support Affects Subsequent Prosocial Action". *Journal of Consumer Research* 40, no. 6: 1149–66.

Lane, Daniel S., and Sonya Dal Cin. 2018. "Sharing beyond Slacktivism: The Effect of Socially Observable Prosocial Media Sharing on Subsequent Offline Helping Behavior". *Information, Communication & Society* 21, no. 11: 1523–40.

Lim, Merlyna. 2013. "Many Clicks but Little Sticks: Social Media Activism in Indonesia". *Digital Activism in Asia Reader*, 127.

Milošević-Đorđević, Jasna S., and Iris L Žeželj. 2017. "Civic Activism Online: Making Young People Dormant or More Active in Real Life?". *Computers in Human Behavior* 70: 113–18.

Mohamed Nasir, Kamaludeen. 2016. "Boycotts as Moral Protests in Malaysia and Singapore". *International Sociology* 31, no. 4: 396–412.

Morozov, Evgeny. 2011. *The Net Delusion: How Not to Liberate the World*. Penguin UK.

Putnam, R.D. 2000. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Schumann, Sandy, and Olivier Klein. 2015. "Substitute or Stepping Stone? Assessing the Impact of Low-threshold Online Collective Actions on Offline Participation". *European Journal of Social Psychology* 45, no. 3: 308–22.

Showden, Carisa R., Emma Barker-Clarke, Judith Sligo, and Karen Nairn. 2023. "The Connective Is Communal: Hybrid Activism in Online & Offline Spaces". *Social Movement Studies*, pp. 1–20.

Sloam, James, Matt Henn, James Sloam, and Matt Henn. 2019. "Rejuvenating Politics: Young Political Participation in a Changing World". *Youthquake 2017: The Rise of Young Cosmopolitans in Britain*, pp. 17–42.

Smith, Brian G., Arunima Krishna, and Reham Al-Sinan. 2019. "Beyond Slacktivism: Examining the Entanglement between Social Media Engagement, Empowerment, and Participation in Activism". *International Journal of Strategic Communication* 13, no. 3: 182–96.

Sten, Widmalam. 2004. "The Utility of Bonding Social Capital". Mimeographed.

Stolle, Dietlind, Marc Hooghe, and Michele Micheletti. 2005. "Politics

in the Supermarket: Political Consumerism as a Form of Political Participation". *International Political Science Review* 26, no. 3: 245–69.

Tobing, Dio Herdiawan. 2022. "Preparing Southeast Asia's Youth to Enter the Digital Economy". Asian Development Blog, 15 July 2022. https://blogs.adb.org/blog/preparing-southeast-asia-s-youth-enter-digital-economy (accessed 31 January 2024).

Vadrevu, Shobha, and Sun Sun Lim. 2012. "Youth, Politics and Social Media in Southeast Asia: Trends, Events and Implications". *Youth: Future Agents of Change or Guardians of Establishment*, pp. 19–28.

Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, Henry Brady, and Norman H. Nie. 1993. "Citizen Activity: Who Participates? What Do They Say?". *American Political Science Review* 87, no. 2: 303–18.

ISSN 0219-3213

ISEAS
PUBLISHING

30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace
Singapore 119614
http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg

TRS10/24s

ISBN 978-981-5203-45-5

9 789815 203455