



# THE SERIOUS SOCIAL IMPACT OF NON-VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN INDONESIA

A'an Suryana and  
Nur Syafiqah Mohd Taufek

# TRENDS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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## FOREWORD

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

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# **The Serious Social Impact of Non-violent Extremism in Indonesia**

By A'an Suryana and Nur Syafiqah Mohd Taufek

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

- The rise of religious extremism in public discourses is a cause for concern for government officials and moderate Muslims.
- While a substantial body of research on violent extremism is available, the issue of non-violent extremism remains neglected by scholars.
- Although exposure and subscription to non-violent extremism do not automatically lead to violence, it still needs to be curbed because it can fan hatred that in turn can lead to physical violence and repression of human rights. Non-violent extremism also boosts polarization in the community.
- Given this potential impact, the government needs to pay more attention to the dissemination of non-violent extremist public discourses, especially on social media. It could work together with influential religious organizations which possess immense religious authority and legitimacy.





# The Serious Social Impact of Non-violent Extremism in Indonesia

By A'an Suryana and Nur Syafiqah Mohd Taufek<sup>1</sup>

## INTRODUCTION

The dissemination of extreme religious discourse remains a cause for concern among government officials and moderate Muslims in Indonesia. On 3 December 2020, Minister of Religious Affairs Fachrul Razi warned religious teachers across Indonesia that extreme religious ideas could reach students via three “doors”: teachers, the school curriculum, and extracurricular religious activities.<sup>2</sup> He called for teachers to exercise extra vigilance and be more active in guiding students so that they do not fall victim to religious extremists’ agendas via those “doors”. Two weeks later, Central Java Governor Ganjar Pranowo sat with academics and *ulama* (Islamic religious scholars) to discuss pressing issues facing the nation. Following the meeting, they issued a statement saying that they would jointly fight against “radical contents in social media”.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> A'an Suryana is Visiting Fellow at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore. Nur Syafiqah Mohd Taufek is Research Officer at the same institute. We would like to thank Dr Syafiq Hasyim, Mr Antonius Made Tony Supriatma and Dr Norshahril Saat for their constructive comments and suggestions.

<sup>2</sup> Public Relations Department, “Perkuat Moderasi, Menag Minta Guru Agama Bina Organisasi Siswa”, *Berita*, The Ministry of Religious Affairs, 3 December 2020, <https://kemenag.go.id/berita/read/514789/perkuat-moderasi--menag-minta-guru-agama-bina-organisasi-siswa> (accessed 21 March 2021).

<sup>3</sup> Budi Arista Romadhoni, “Lewat Medsos, Ganjar dan Ulama Jateng Gaungkan Jihad Lawan Radikalisme”, *Suarajawatengah.id*, 18 December 2020, <https://jateng.suara.com/read/2020/12/18/074705/lewat-medsos-ganjar-dan-ulama-jateng-gaungkan-jihad-lawan-radikalisme?page=all> (accessed 17 February 2021).

Muhammad Bukhari Muslim of Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN Jakarta) argues that in comparison to the moderate *ulama*, Indonesia's conservative figures and groups have the upper hand in promoting their extreme religious views. They appear more convincing and possess better social media skills as compared to the moderate *ulama*, and therefore, have better access to Muslims who are increasingly turning to social media to study Islam.<sup>4</sup> Alexander Arifianto (2020, p. 11) explains that new information and technologies (such as social media)—which are spurred by various government regimes that had been promoting freedom of expression since 1998—have opened up access for conservative *ulama* to disseminate their views. These conservative views have challenged and eroded the religious authority of moderate *ulama* from mainstream Muslim organizations.

The first part of this article looks at non-violent extremism discourses that appear on the social media accounts of the eleven most popular preachers in Indonesia. Social media have increasingly played an important role in shaping people's minds. A 2017 national survey jointly carried out by Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat (PPIM) UIN Syarif Hidayatullah and UNDP Indonesia, shows that social media was the most popular site for university and school students studying Islam, followed by religious texts, television, and offline religious events such as Majelis Taklim (Saputra 2018, p. 31).<sup>5</sup> The survey found that exposure to content on social media boosts religious extremism among students rather than enlightens them.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Muhamad Bukhari Muslim, "Media Sosial dan Kekosongan Syiar Moderasi Beragama", *Republika.co.id*, 15 July 2020, <https://republika.co.id/berita/qdhgl3440/media-sosial-dan-kekosongan-syiar-moderasi-beragama> (accessed 17 February 2021).

<sup>5</sup> Some 50.89 per cent of 1,859 respondents in the survey state that they learned Islam from social media. When asked what other sources of Islam learning they have had, the respondents answered: books or holy books (48.57 per cent), television (33.73 per cent) and offline religious events, such as Majelis Taklim (17.11 per cent) (Saputra 2018).

<sup>6</sup> According to the survey, 84.94 per cent of the 1,859 respondents, or 1,579 had access to the Internet, and 59.5 per cent of the 1,579 students who had access to

To examine whether the preachers' social media contents support non-violent extremism, this survey employs parameters stipulated in the United Nations (UN) Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Preaching contents are categorized as extreme if they are not in line with articles stipulated in the UDHR.

The second part of this research explains the impact of non-violent extremism discourses on Indonesian society, such as people's right to life, liberty and security; equality between men and women; as well as people's right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Some case studies have been conducted for this purpose (see Sebastian, Hasyim and Arifianto 2021). However, due to limited space, this article will only present two case studies demonstrating the impact of non-violent extremism discourse: the extremist discourses targeting Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), and attacks against the Ahmadiyah in Manislor village, West Java province. The article will conclude with several recommendations to the government.

This research contributes to the scholarship on terrorism studies. The existing scholarship in terrorism studies heavily focuses on violent extremism including strategies and methods for counteracting violent extremism (Sumpter 2017; Chalmers 2017; Agastia, Perwita and Subedi, 2020), the use of social media for terrorist recruitment and coordination (Nuraniyah 2019; Johnston, Iqbal and True 2020), and the role of civil society organizations in combating terrorism (Achsini et al. 2019; Ramakrishna 2014). Meanwhile, the impact of non-violent extremism on the social well-being of Indonesians remains neglected by scholars. This article seeks to address this research gap.

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the internet and turned to the social media to learn Islam—had both radical and very radical outlooks of Islam. This is a substantial number. The survey found that the dissemination of Islam extremism by social media *ulama* had contributed to the rising extremism or radicalization among university and school students in Indonesia (Saputra 2018, p. 33).

# **NON-VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS**

Scholars in terrorism studies are divided into: first, those who distinguish between non-violent extremism and violent extremism; and second, those who blur the differences. The former defines non-violent extremism as extreme ideas that have not been converted into terror-related violence. Terrorism expert, Sidney Jones, suggests that non-violent extremism takes the form of, among others, intolerance, which is perpetrated by above-ground, non-clandestine organizations; while in contrast, violent terrorism refers to terrorist attacks (Stange 2019, p. 18).<sup>7</sup> Similarly, scholar Chris Angus contends that the domain of non-violent extremism is in the sphere of discourse, while violent extremism, such as terrorism attacks, is in the domain of practice. He further argues that people who possess extreme ideas wish to transform “the nature of society and government” (Angus 2016, p. 2). They might keep the ideas among themselves, or they might actively communicate these ideas to others. However, as long as these ideas are not realized as acts of violence, they remain a part of non-violent extremism (Angus 2016, p. 2; Muhtadi 2019, p. 29).

On the other hand, terrorism expert Alex P. Schmid (2014, p. 18) argues that violent extremism covers both the advocacy and the practice of jihad (struggle or efforts). According to this view, extremists who support and justify terrorist attacks in public or in private can be categorized as violent extremists even if they have not committed actual violence.

This article concurs with the first group of scholars. Non-violent extremism needs to be clearly distinguished from violent extremism as it constitutes extreme ideas in the sphere of discourse, while violent extremism refers to extreme ideas that are already converted into acts

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<sup>7</sup> The statement was made during an interview with an Austrian scholar (Gunnar Stange).

of violence. Furthermore, non-violent extremism is detrimental to social cohesion and the fulfilment of human rights without the need to manifest physical violence.

Peter Coleman and Andrea Bartoli (2018, p. 2) explain that extremism can be defined as “activities (beliefs, attitudes, feelings, actions, strategies) of a character far removed from the ordinary”. This definition suggests that extreme ideas are not normal. However, what constitutes “ordinary or normality” and “extreme ideas” is different from one person to another. For instance, within Islam, some Muslims consider *jihad* (struggle or efforts) as an extreme idea when interpreted as “holy war” in a peaceful situation.

By contrast, other Muslims believe that *jihad* interpreted as “holy war” is part of their religious calling, hence, they consider it as a normal and not an extreme idea. Abu Bakar Baasyir, a major figure behind the shadowy regional terror group Jemaah Islamiyah, argues that *jihad* must be carried out for the glory of Islam. *Jihad*, in the form of violent attacks against the enemies of Islam such as the United States, can be conducted anywhere; but when perpetrating *jihad*, its implementation needs to avoid possible casualties among Muslims. Hence, he claims that *jihad* should be implemented in a place where few or no Muslims live (Atran 2005, p. 18).

Given that extreme ideas are multi-interpretable depending on the backgrounds and interests of people, acceptable parameters are needed to determine what kind of views can be considered extreme. This paper argues that the UN UDHR is the most useful source to serve as parameters of extreme definition. A total of fifty member states approved the declaration in 1948, with eight others abstaining and none dissenting.<sup>8</sup> In 1990, numerous Muslim countries set up their human rights declaration, namely: the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam. Most of the articles in the Cairo Declaration is compatible with

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<sup>8</sup> United Nations (UN) website, “History of the Document”, <https://www.un.org/en/sections/universal-declaration/history-document/index.html> (accessed 7 March 2021).

the human rights standards stipulated in the UDHR. However, some do exhibit an exclusivist outlook and contradict the universal standard of human rights. Hence, the Cairo Declaration is deemed less universal.

Exclusivist articles in the Cairo Declaration include Article 10, which implies that Muslims are not allowed to convert to religions other than Islam or atheism (Delling 2004, p. 80). Article 2 verse D states that “safety from bodily harm is a guaranteed right. The state has to safeguard it, and it is prohibited to breach it without a sharia-prescribed reason.” This article can also be interpreted that the state can breach the security of a person so long as it is prescribed by Islamic sharia. This means that the article has no universal value as it can only be implemented in countries under Islamic regimes.

In addition, the last two articles in the Cairo Declaration assert that all the rights and freedoms stated, as well as its interpretations, are subject to Islamic sharia. This clearly shows the exclusivist nature of the declaration because they suggest that all the declarations’ articles must obey Islamic laws whilst disregarding the existence of other laws. The implementation of these articles can also violate the universal standard of human rights since “different schools of interpretation of the Islamic sharia can be used to set the limits of the rights stated in the articles, [leaving] a wide spectrum of possible applications, of which the most extreme without a doubt falls outside the international human rights standard” (Delling 2004, p. 50).

On the other hand, the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights is more universal and has even been approved and supported by Muslim (and Islamic) countries such as Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria. The support of these Muslim countries boosts the universality and legitimacy of the UN UDHR. In addition, numerous Islamic countries have ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that is based on the UN Declaration of Human Rights.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (UN-HROHC) website,” Status of Ratification: Interactive Dashboard”, last updated 9 February 2021, <https://indicators.ohchr.org/> (accessed 7 March 2021).

In the Indonesian context, the definition of extremism is highly contested. Pancasila, which is the Indonesian state ideology and philosophy, and the 1945 Constitution are supposedly the highest sources of laws and regulations in the country. All laws and regulations that regulate citizen behaviours and aspirations must conform to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. Hence, Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution can be used as legal and social norms that distinguish extreme ideas and actions from normal ones. However, Pancasila's legitimacy declined after the Soeharto regime used it as a tool to repress people who challenged his power. The demise of the Soeharto regime paved the way for Islamists to promote Islamist (theocratic) ideas (see Saeng 2017, p. 173), which posed a further challenge to Pancasila that serves as Indonesians' official way of life. Governments in the post-Soeharto era, including the President Joko Widodo administration, have been struggling to restore people's faith in Pancasila (see Muslimin, 2016, p. 37). Hence, Pancasila do not provide suitable parameters since its authority is still highly contested.

The above also implies that Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution are still works in progress despite claims by the government and nationalists that they are already in their final form. Given that they are still under philosophical and ideological dispute, and are still not wholeheartedly accepted by a majority of Indonesians, this article will not use Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution as parameters to determine which ideas or practices are extreme. Instead, this article uses some articles in the UN UDHR as parameters to determine which ideas or practices are extreme by virtue of the fact that has received acceptance by a substantial number of parties at the global level.

## **NON-VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND SOCIAL MEDIA PREACHERS**

As mentioned earlier, the public remains concerned over the rampant dissemination of non-violent extremist ideas in Indonesia's public sphere. To ascertain if there is basis for these concerns, this article provides a survey on the views of eleven social media preachers as reflected in the contents of their preaching on their respective social media platforms. These preachers are chosen based on their popularity on social media.



They are preachers with the largest number of followers on four social media platforms: Instagram, Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube (see Table 1).

On the right to life, liberty, and security of a person, all preachers in the survey generally condemn the acts of terrorism committed in the name of *jihad*, with some of them approving the implementation of *jihad* only in war zones such as in Palestine (in that the *jihad* can be conducted through suicide bombings). Abdullah Gymnastiar, for example, argues that “terrorism is not born from religion but arises from a sick mind” (see Appendix 1, no. 1), while Adi Hidayat states that “terrorism and extremism have no place in any religion. People should unite to fight against these ideas” (Appendix 1, no. 4). While also condemning acts of terrorism, Buya Yahya Al-Bahjah argues that *jihad* conducted through suicide bombing is permissible only in the context where Muslims are oppressed, such as in Palestine. He opines that suicide bombing is not a sinful act when committed in a war zone because it is part of *siyasa* (the politics of war) (Appendix 1, no. 2).

The preachers’ views on equality between men and women are consistently against the spirit of the UN UDHR which emphasizes equality between men and women in that most of the preachers put men in a higher social position than women. Abdullah Gymnastiar and Khalid Basalamah blatantly mention that men are mentally superior to women. Abdullah Gymnastiar argues that women often do not speak with clarity and tend to be confused (Appendix 1, no. 1). Khalid argues that men are more capable of using their brains because they are more rational and less emotional than women (Appendix 1, no. 11).

On women having a career, at least four preachers (Buya Yahya Al-Bahjah, Adi Hidayat, Haikal Hassan Barras and Khalid Basalamah) believe that men should serve as breadwinners for their family because culturally, and in the religious view, men are protectors of their wives. Khalid, for instance, claims that “women are created from men’s ribs, so they cannot function as a backbone. Just like the ribs, women are supposed to be covered and taken care of, not exposed” (see Appendix 1, no. 11). However, the preachers do not explicitly prohibit women from working. Women are permitted to work to help meet the family’s needs, and only if their job situation allows them to continue spending time with

**Table 1: Social Media Preachers and Their Number of Followers in Social Media**

No	Preachers	Number of Followers				YouTube Subscribers
		Instagram	Facebook	Twitter		
1.	Abdullah Gymnastiar	6.5 million	7.3 million	3.5 million		674,000
2.	Oki Setiana Dewi	13.9 million	2.3 million	N/A		1.67 million
3.	Hanan Attaki	8.5 million	N/A	N/A		1.78 million
4.	Felix Siauw	4.8 million	N/A	3.3 million		907,000
5.	Yusuf Mansur	2.8 million	6.9 million	3 million		122,000
6.	Buya Yahya al-Bahjah	3.4 million	14,190	N/A		3.01 million
7.	Abdul Somad	4.7 million	326,914	N/A		1.79 million
8.	Adi Hidayat	3 million	366,954	N/A		N/A
9.	Mustofa Bisri	523,000	54,748	2.4 million		109,000
10.	Haikal Hasan Barras	2.1 million	N/A	604,900		36,900
11.	Khalid Basalamah	2.3 million	230,413	67,800		1.7 million

Notes: Updated as at 21 February 2021.

N/A means not available.

This survey only highlights their views on selected contentious topics (see Appendix 1). Their views are then compared with articles written in the UN UDHR.

their children (see Adi Hidayat's views on women in Appendix 1, no. 4; Abdul Somad, Appendix 1, no. 3). Only two preachers support women's absolute right to work. Mustofa Bisri argues that it is up to women to decide on the course of their life (Appendix 1, no. 8), while Yusuf Mansur argues that men should not be egoistic and should give women the freedom to pursue their career, such as becoming businesswomen (Appendix 1, no. 6).

On interfaith relations, the preachers' views are divided. Some views are aligned with the UDHR's support for freedom of thought, conscience and religion. For example, they encourage their followers to enhance tolerance towards believers of religions acknowledged by the Indonesian state, such as Catholics and Protestants. This view reflects progress from the past when Catholicism and Protestantism were considered rivals and threats to Islam since they made up the second and the third largest religions in the country. Abdullah Gymnastiar, for example, believes that Muslims and non-Muslims are God's creations so they ought to respect each other (Appendix 1, no. 1). In one of his sermons, Hanan Attaki cited a Quranic verse that prohibits Muslims from insulting non-Muslims' beliefs (Appendix 1, no. 7). These frequent calls for tolerance towards followers of mainstream religions in Indonesia suggest that Catholics and Protestants are no longer perceived as a threat against Islam. This situation occurs because the Muslim community in Indonesia has been facing threats that arise from within, such as extremism due to increasing exposure to extremism in Middle-Eastern countries.

While the social media preachers generally express tolerance towards followers of mainstream faiths, some of them are hostile towards non-mainstream faiths such as Ahmadiyah and Shi'a. For example, Buya Yahya Al-Bahjah argues that most Shi'a followers in Indonesia follow the Ja'fari school of thought which is known to slander the companions of the Prophet. Hence, such a school of thought should not be tolerated (Appendix 1, no. 2). Buya Yahya also thinks that Ahmadis are apostates who can be killed, but notes that execution can only be carried out at the order of the *imam* (government leaders) and if followers of Ahmadiyah refuse to repent (Appendix 1, no. 2).

Two contentious issues fall under the category of the right of people to take part in the government of their country: the Islamic caliphate

and non-Muslim leadership. On the Islamic caliphate, preachers are split with some supporting the establishment of the Islamic caliphate while others oppose it. Abdul Somad, Felix Siauww and Hanan Attaki, among others, support the establishment of an Islamic caliphate. When asked if the Islamic caliphate can be established in a democratic system, Abdul Somad stated that “that was exactly the *ijtihad* of Hassan Al-Banna who fought for Islam through politics and establishing Islamic party (Ikhwanul Muslimin).” (Appendix 1, no. 3). Felix Siauww, a staunch supporter of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia<sup>10</sup> which promoted the establishment of an Islamic caliphate, argues that the caliphate system is the way forward to overcome injustices in society. He expresses that it is ideal for religion to organize politics and not for politics to organize religion (Appendix 1, no. 5). Hanan Attaki offers a more extreme interpretation of the Islamic caliphate, arguing that the period of the Islamic caliphate which conquered the East and the West represented the pinnacle of Islamic preaching. He further argues that the Islamic caliphate is a universal blessing (Appendix 1, no. 7). In contrast, Buya Yahya Al-Bahjah, and Yusuf Mansur oppose the establishment of an Islamic caliphate in Indonesia. Buya Yahya argues that the Islamic caliphate cannot be established when there is already an existing government or leadership in a country (Appendix 1, no. 2). Yusuf Mansur does not advocate for an Islamic caliphate system. He believes in electoral democracy, as reflected in his active participation in the presidential election in 2019, in which he threw his support behind President Joko Widodo, who was seeking a second term in office (see Appendix 1, no. 6).

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<sup>10</sup> On numerous occasions, Felix Siauww promoted the benefits of an Islamic caliphate, and that those were the main reasons behind the establishment of HTI. On 26 June 2019, Felix Siauww even admitted that he was an HTI member, and he “learned about Islam with HTI for 15 years”. Indonesian government disbanded HTI in 2017. See Kumparan, “Ustaz Felix Siauww Jelaskan soal Dirinya Kerap Dikaitkan dengan HTI”, Kumparan.com, 26 June 2019, <https://kumparan.com/kumparannews/ustaz-felix-siauww-jelaskan-soal-dirinya-kerap-dikaitkan-dengan-hti-1rLpMy2MpYi/full> (accessed 28 April 2021).

On non-Muslim leadership, all preachers who express their views on the matter oppose the election of non-Muslim leaders. They argue that political leaders must be Muslim because the Quran supports only Muslim leaders. Abdul Somad, for example, cited al-Ma'ida, verse 51, which states that whoever chooses non-Muslims as their guardians, will be counted as one of them (Appendix 1, no. 3). Adi Hidayat fears that choosing non-Muslim leaders would allow them to take charge of Muslim affairs (Appendix 1, no. 4). Felix Siau argues that the leader of Indonesia must be a Muslim. He believes that a political leader is like an *imam* (leader) who leads in prayer (who must be a Muslim). Hence, a leader who is not a Muslim is unable to lead Muslims (Appendix 1, no. 5). Khalid Basalamah argues that the role of a leader in Indonesia is to implement sharia, hence the Indonesian leader must be a Muslim (Appendix 1, no. 11).

On “no one shall be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment”, four preachers in the survey support hudud and qisas to be implemented in Indonesia. *Hudud* (plural; or *hadd* in singular form) are punishments prescribed in the Quran and *hadiths*<sup>11</sup> for conducts that violate God’s rights.<sup>12</sup> The punishments are fixed for six crimes which include theft (amputation of the hand), illicit sexual relations (death by stoning or one hundred lashes), and apostasy (death or banishment).<sup>13</sup> Meanwhile, *qisas* means retribution. Whereas *hudud* are punishments implemented for the violation of God’s rights, *qisas* are punishments fixed for the violation of the rights of humans.<sup>14</sup> The punishment in

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<sup>11</sup> *Hadiths* are reports of Prophet Muhammad and his companions’ words and deeds in the early period of Islam.

<sup>12</sup> “Hadd”. In *the Oxford Dictionary of Islam*, edited by John L. Esposito. *Oxford Islamic Studies Online*, <http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e757> (accessed 11 March 2021).

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> *Rumah Fiqih Indonesia*, “Persamaan dan Perbedaan Antara Qishash (Qisas), Jinayat dan Hudud”, 15 November 2015, <http://rumahfiqih.com/konsultasi-1804-persamaan-dan-perbedaan-antara-qishash-jinayat-dan-hudud.html> (accessed 11 March 2021).

*qisas* (which is in the “an eye for an eye” style of punishment) applies to crimes such as murder, intentional and unintentional physical injury. Families of the victim, however, may waive corporal punishments, and instead, choose monetary compensation.

The preachers surveyed who express their views on the matter generally support the implementation of *hudud* and *qisas* because these punishments are regulated in the Quran and *hadith*, and they believe that they can create deterrence. Buya Yahya al-Bahjah argues that *qisas* is still relevant today. If anyone believes that other laws are better than Islamic law, she or he can be deemed an apostate or *kafir*. Those who believe in Islamic law but do not seek to establish it (*sharia*) are *fasiq* (impious/sinners) (Appendix 1, no. 2). Khalid Basalamah argues that, although the forms of *qisas* and *hudud* punishment look cruel, their implementation is important to prevent people from taking revenge and from committing the same offence (Appendix 1, no. 11). In contrast, Abdul Somad argues that, since *qisas* and *hudud* are not yet implemented in Indonesia, repentance, and yearning to be punished suffice for wrongdoers (Appendix 1, no. 3).

Extreme ideas are quite prevalent among social media preachers. A substantial number of preachers express extreme ideas in various contentious subjects on Islam teachings. For example, on “equality between men and women” and “the implementation of *qisas* and *hudud*”, most of the preachers believe that men are superior to women, and that the implementation of *qisas* and *hudud* is important to establish a deterrence effect. These views contradict the stipulations in the UDHR, especially on “equality between men and women” and “no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. Extreme ideas are also found in other subjects, such as “the right of people to take part in the government of their country” and “interfaith relations”. These are evidence that extreme ideas are quite ubiquitous in social media accounts of preachers.

This finding justifies the increasing concern among government officials and moderate Muslims on the prevalence of non-violent extremist discourse in the public sphere, especially on social media. While non-violent extremism ideas may not lead to violence, they can help create environments that are favourable for the materialization of

violence. For example, non-violent extremism in the form of heresy campaign against Ahmadiyah people provoke people of Sunni to commit violence against Ahmadiyah properties. The idea on men's superiority over women encourages men to perform domestic violence against their wives. The following two sections will discuss the existing literature and two case studies on the impact of non-violent extremism.

## **THE IMPACT OF NON-VIOLENT EXTREMISM: THE AHMADIYAH AND AHOK CASE STUDIES**

An issue that is hotly debated among scholars and policymakers in terrorism studies is the extent to which non-violent extremism is dangerous. On one hand, a group of scholars supports the idea that non-violent extremism is dangerous because it will eventually result in physical violence, such as suicide bombings. On the other hand, others continue to dispute its links with terrorism.

Security expert Michael Whine, who concurs with the former group, argues that the rise of terror acts in Britain following the 9/11 attack in New York was due to the government's ignorance about the spread of non-violent extremism in Britain. Whine (2011) argues that the government was too late "to understand the importance of Islamist ideology that has penetrated parts of the Muslim community and which provides the conveyor belt or springboard to terrorist involvement."

Similarly, Schmid (2014, p. 20) argues that one cannot be assured that extreme religious ideas will not materialize into an act of terrorism. Hence, distinguishing between non-violent extremism and violent extremism can be dangerous. A recent survey on 113 British jihadists shows that exposure to non-violent extremism can lead to terror acts. At least 77 per cent of the jihadists had links to non-violent extremism in Islam, "whether by association with Islamist organizations or through connections to individuals who follow and spread extremist ideology" (Tony Blair Institute 2018). In Indonesia, a security report by the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC 2016) explains how exposure to extremist preachers led members of a vigilante group to perpetuate acts of terrorism.

In contrast, some scholars argue that exposure to extremist ideology which is non-violent does not necessarily lead to violent extremism. Robert Lambert and Jonathan Githens-Mazer (2010, p. 899) argue that the causes of violent extremism are complex. They demonstrate how an immigrant youth who was seemingly integrated into British Christian culture participated in a terrorism plot, while his brother who was more overtly religiously ideological did not participate in the plot. Arun Kundnani (2015, p. 15) was also critical of the official narrative that once Muslims adopt extreme ideas, acts of terrorism would eventually result. The scholar argues that ideology is not the underlying cause of terrorism, but merely serves as an enabler. The government needs to look at other factors that drive Muslims to terrorism, such as a recent traumatic event, or government policies that spark resentment among Muslims, such as the US and the UK attacks on Iraq which claimed the lives of many Muslims.

Government failure to identify the root causes of violent extremism will lead to misguided policies to tackle the problem. Instead of pouring funds into transforming the mindset of British Muslims, Kundnani (2015, p. 39) argues that the government should focus on mobilizing resources to investigate individuals who could be suspected of “intent to commit acts of terrorism, incite it or finance it”. In the Indonesian context, the mobilization of combatants by Laskar Jihad (a non-jihadist, Salafi group) to Maluku Islands to fight in a civil war against Christians in the year 2000, was driven more by “a firm belief in a worldwide conspiracy led by the United States to undermine Islam and the Muslim *umma*” (Hasan 2005, p. 16) than its Salafist ideology.

This article argues that although exposure and subscription to non-violent extremism do not automatically lead to violent extremism, non-violent extremism still needs to be curbed because it can fan hatred and lead to physical violence and violation of human rights. Non-violent extremism also boosts polarization in the Indonesian community. In support of these arguments, this article presents and analyse two case studies: first, the frequent physical attacks against Ahmadiyah’s properties in the predominantly Ahmadiyah village of Manislor, West Java province between 2002 and 2010, and second, the sectarian discourse against Ahok during the Jakarta gubernatorial election campaign in 2017.



## **PHYSICAL ATTACKS AGAINST AHMADIYAH**

Religious conflict in the Manislor village, West Java province, has been occurring since the early 1950s when residents began leaving Islam and folk religions to subscribe to the Ahmadiyah faith. This movement faced some fierce resistance (Tisna Prawira 2012, p. 33). But the number of Ahmadiyah followers grew exponentially, nevertheless, and they became the majority in the village; by 2015, 75 per cent of the population in the village were Ahmadis (Imamah 2015).

Verbal disputes between Ahmadis and non-Ahmadis often occurred, with Ahmadiyah being labelled heretical. However, Ahmadiyah mosques and houses were not targeted as yet. During the authoritarian era of Soeharto, Ahmadiyah prospered due to the regime's emphasis on social and political stability. Anti-Ahmadiyah groups kept silent for fear of a backlash from the government. Ahmadiyah's Manislor branch was even able to organize the Ahmadiyah National Meeting in 1984 in the village without any major social backlash from non-Ahmadi residents. The situation changed following the decentralization and democratization drives in 1998. Following the end of the authoritarian regime of President Soeharto in 1998, anti-Ahmadiyah groups in Manislor and its surrounding areas began to be openly critical of the Ahmadiyah faith in their village.

The year 2002 became the turning point in the history of violence in Manislor village (Burhani 2016, p. 12; Imamah 2015). That year, an Islamist puritan organization, the Institute of Islamic Research and Study (LPPi), invited Muslim religious preachers and the executives of a Muslim's youth organization in Manislor village to participate in a national seminar at the Istiqlal Mosque, Jakarta, on 11 August. This seminar was titled: "Ahmadiyah: Its Heresy and Danger". This seminar was also broadcasted nationwide through news programmes on at least two national television stations. The coverage amplified anti-Ahmadiyah sentiments among people who did not only live in Manislor and its surrounding areas, but also in areas such as West Nusa Tenggara where a substantial number of Ahmadiyah followers live (Burhani 2016, p. 12).

After returning to Manislor, the executives of the Manislor's youth organization began to escalate its anti-Ahmadiyah campaigns by erecting banners and posters on the streets of Manislor. They demanded the disbandment of Ahmadiyah, which is a legal organization established through the 1953 government decree. The executives of the youth organization also held religious events in Al Huda Mosque in the village where speakers discussed topics that can be categorized as non-violent extremism, such as actively labelling Ahmadiyah as heretical.

Al Huda Mosque is the main mosque in the village controlled by anti-Ahmadiyah people, located at the border between housing complexes separately inhabited by Ahmadiyah and non-Ahmadiyah people. The speakers expressed anti-Ahmadiyah views in their fiery sermons. The large crowd attending the event were hard to control, and the situation resulted in a string of violence in the village. Several months after the intensive anti-heresy campaign started, at least thirty-eight houses and a mosque belonging to followers of Ahmadiyah had been vandalized (Sulhan 2006, p. 7). These kinds of incidents did not happen only in 2002 but continued intermittently until 2010.

This case study shows that non-violent extremism, in the form of a heresy campaign against Ahmadiyah, was detrimental to the followers of the minority faith. Ahmadiyah followers lived in relative peace during the Soeharto regime. However, the right to practise their faith and the right to life, liberty and security were violated following the heresy campaign in the post-Soeharto era which resulted in vandalism of their houses and mosques. This case also shows that non-violent extremism fanning hatred can lead to physical violence.

## **HATE SPEECHES AND SECTARIAN DISCOURSES AGAINST AHOK**

The anti-non-Muslim campaign against then Jakarta Governor, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, also known as Ahok, began way before he faced blasphemy charges. On 3 October 2014, several vigilante groups including Islamist and Betawi ethnic vigilante groups (Islam Defender's Front, or FPI) and Front Betawi Rempug (FBR), staged a protest in front of the House of Representatives (DPR) to demand annulment of

the appointment of Ahok as Jakarta Governor. Ahok, who was earlier Jakarta Deputy Governor, was set to replace former Jakarta Governor, Joko Widodo, who had been elected Indonesia's President. In the major protest that was "the culmination of a previous string of protests",<sup>15</sup> the protesters stated that since Ahok is a non-Muslim (a Christian) Chinese-Indonesian, they feared that he would produce policies that were disadvantageous to Muslims.

After Ahok was appointed Jakarta Governor, FPI frequently took to the streets to protest against Ahok's personality and policies. The protests were not detrimental to Ahok's political position. He remained a popular governor and looked on course to win the gubernatorial election in 2017. Despite making a controversial speech during his visit to Kepulauan Seribu Island in September 2016—he was accused of having made a blasphemous statement<sup>16</sup>—he could still win the most number of votes in the first round of the 2017 gubernatorial election (42.99 per cent), ahead of his rival candidates, Anies Baswedan and Sandiaga Uno (who obtained 39.95 per cent votes).<sup>17</sup> Although Ahok and his running mate

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<sup>15</sup> Linda Hairani et al., "Kenapa FPI dan FBR Menolak Ahok?", *Tempo.co*, 4 October 2014, <https://metro.tempo.co/read/611836/kenapa-fpi-dan-fbr-menolak-ahok/full&view=ok> (accessed 16 March 2021).

<sup>16</sup> During a working visit to Kepulauan Seribu Island on 27 September 2016, Ahok complained publicly that Muslim preachers would prevent him from winning gubernatorial election by persuading people not to vote for a non-Muslim candidate, and used Al Quran's Surah al Ma'idah, Verse 51. This verse literally says: "O believers! Take neither Jews nor Christians as guardians—they are guardians of each other. Whoever does so will be counted as one of them. Surely Allah does not guide the wrongdoing people." Ahok accused Muslim preachers "for spreading lies by using Al Ma'idah, Verse 51." After due process of law, judges at North Jakarta District Court found him guilty of blasphemy "for suggesting that some people had abused a Quranic verse to block his re-election bid". See Callistasia Anggun Wijaya, "Ahok Guilty of Blasphemy, Sentenced to Two Years", *Thejakartapost.com*, 9 May 2017, <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/05/09/ahok-guilty-of-blasphemy-sentenced-to-two-years.html> (accessed 16 March 2021).

<sup>17</sup> Jabbar Ramdhani, "KPU Tetapkan Ahok-Djarot dan Anies-Sandi Maju Putaran Dua Pilkada", *Detik.com*, 4 March 2017, <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3438375/kpu-tetapkan-ahok-djarot-dan-anies-sandi-maju-putaran-dua-pilkada> (accessed 16 March 2021).

Djarot Saiful Hidayat won the first round of the election, the damage done on Ahok's visit to Kepulauan Seribu Island continued to haunt his prospect of winning the run-off election against the Anies Baswedan and Sandiaga Uno pair. The supporters of his opponent increased their attacks by using sectarian issues, including his alleged blasphemous statement in Kepulauan Seribu Island. They also utilized the discourse that being a non-Muslim candidate made him unelectable as Jakarta Governor.<sup>18</sup> More specifically, these attacks contained discourses such as “do not vote for a non-Muslim candidate” or “do not organize prayers and Islamic rituals for the deceased who voted for the blasphemer of Islam”.<sup>19</sup> These non-violent extremist discourses triggered a massive, but peaceful series of protests in the capital between 2016 and 2017. The number of participants in the protests—who were mainly Muslims of various ideological strands—was one of the largest in Indonesian history.<sup>20</sup>

These sectarian attacks, which were mounted online through social media (Mietzner 2018, pp. 271–72) as well as offline through on-the-ground outreach activities (Lim 2017, p. 14) such as the series of protests, were effective in changing the minds of Muslim voters. As a result, Ahok and his running mate, Djarot Saiful Hidayat, lost to Anies Baswedan and Sandiaga Uno.

During the gubernatorial election campaign, the increasing use of non-violent extremism arguments polarized society. Sectarian hate speeches—which targeted not only Ahok, but also Anies Baswedan and Sandiaga Uno—became the topics of daily conversation among people in and out of Jakarta. Indonesians were divided into anti- and

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<sup>18</sup> Sri Lestari, “Isu SARA Meningkatkan di Pilkada DKI Jakarta, Salah Siapa?”, *Bbc.com*, 24 March 2017, <https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-39372353> (accessed 17 March 2021).

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> The first anti-Ahok rally was organized on 2 December 2016. At least 500,000 people attended. See: Indra Budiari, “Anti-Ahok Rally Ends Peacefully”, *Thejakartapost.com*, 2 December 2016, <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/12/02/anti-ahok-rally-ends-peacefully.html> (accessed 19 March 2021).

pro-Ahok camps. Social tensions were high and affected even personal relationships. This manifested in the forms of unfriending friends on Facebook and “shouting matches around dinner table” (Lim 2017, p. 10).

The Ahok case shows how a non-violent extremism campaign—in the form of a hate speech discourse that provokes and persuades people to not vote for Ahok—was effective in preventing Ahok from winning the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election.<sup>21</sup> The non-violent extremism campaign polarized Indonesian society, and in many cases, enhanced social tensions.

## **CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

The article has addressed two questions. First, through the survey of preaching contents on the accounts of eleven preachers, the article confirms that public concern over the rise of non-violent extremism discourses is justified. Second, using the Ahok and Ahmadiyah cases, the article has shown that non-violent extremism in the form of hate speeches and heresy campaigns resulted in detrimental impacts on society. Apart from influencing elections, it led to polarization and deprived followers of minority faiths of their right to life, liberty and security.

These two research findings should serve as a wake-up call for government officials and the public at large on the danger of non-violent extremism that is rampant in social media. The Ahok and Ahmadiyah case studies show that the pervasive presence of non-violent extremism should not be ignored, and the government needs to pay more attention to the dissemination of such extremist discourses.

To address the problem, the government should work together with civil society groups such as Nadhlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. As organizations that possess immense religious authority, such a partnership will enhance the credibility of anti-non-violent extremism messages from the government. The government has already partnered

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<sup>21</sup> Supporters of Ahok had retaliated by using racial attacks against Ahok competitor, Anies Baswedan, who is an Indonesian of Arabic descent, to undermine his gubernatorial candidacy.

with NU and Muhammadiyah to combat violent extremism,<sup>22</sup> and the effort can be extended to include partnership for combating non-violent extremism discourses.

In addition, government institutions need to be more creative and proactive in promoting tolerance values in the community. Such tolerance messages should target the biggest users of social media: the millennials.<sup>23</sup> Some Indonesia state institutions have been adept at using social media to disseminate their policies, and even their views. For example, the administrator of Air Force's Twitter account has served as social media influencer at times through creative and fun postings on various social topics.<sup>24</sup> More state and government institutions need to follow their lead. The Ministry of Information and Communication has published a booklet that serves as guidance for state and government institutions "to maximize the use of the social media" (Rosarita Niken Widiastuti 2018). However, political will and more concerted efforts are needed to push the government and state institutions to maximize the use of the social media to promote tolerance in Indonesia society.

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<sup>22</sup> ABC Australia, "NU dan Muhammadiyah dan Program Deradikalisasi di Indonesia", *Tempo.co*, 20 April 2018, <https://www.tempo.co/abc/1677/nu-dan-muhammadiyah-dan-program-deradikalisasi-di-indonesia> (accessed 19 March 2021).

<sup>23</sup> By 2019, millennials (people aged between 19 and 34 years old) were the biggest users of social media in Indonesia. According to an Indonesian official, 80 million millennials use social media that year. See Hernawardi, "80 Juta Pengguna Medsos di Indonesia Didominasi Generasi Millennial", *The Ministry of Communications and Information Lombok Barat Office*, 30 April 2019, <https://lombokbaratkab.go.id/80-juta-pengguna-medsos-di-indonesia-didominasi-generasi-milenial/> (accessed 29 April 2021).

<sup>24</sup> The Twitter account can be accessed at: [https://twitter.com/\\_TνιαU](https://twitter.com/_TνιαU)

## APPENDIX 1: Social Media Ulama's Preaching Content

	<b>UN Human Rights Indicators</b>	<i>Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person</i>	<i>On equality between man and woman</i>
	<b>Compliance to indicators measured by views on:</b>	<i>Jihad through terror</i>	<i>Polygamy; Career women; Hijab; Gender roles</i>
<b>No.</b>	<b>Preacher</b>	<b>Preaching Contents</b>	
1.	Abdullah Gymnastiar	<p><i>On terrorism:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Condemns terror acts including the 2015 attack against a mosque in Papua and 2018 bombing<sup>1</sup> in Surabaya that targeted three churches.<sup>2</sup></li> <li>• “No religion condones such acts of terror, and certainly not Islam.”<sup>3</sup></li> <li>• “Terrorism is not from religion but arises from a sick mind”<sup>4</sup></li> </ul> <p><i>On ISIS:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is not reflective of the Islamic culture in Indonesia and can be countered by spreading the message of peace and love promoted by Islam.<sup>5</sup></li> <li>• Concerned about the movement and how it can tarnish the image of Islam.<sup>6</sup></li> </ul>	<p><i>On women:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sees polygamy as a solution if a man cannot resist being seduced by women.<sup>7</sup></li> <li>• A good wife is loyal to her husband and will not attract controversy.<sup>8</sup></li> <li>• Women are created from the ribs of men. Men cannot be harsh on women lest it would break them. This is not to say acting less harshly towards them will not make them any straighter. Women often do not speak with clarity and tends to confuse themselves.<sup>9</sup></li> </ul>
2.	Buya Yahya Al-Bahjah	<p><i>On suicide bombing:</i></p> <p>Permissible in the context of being oppressed such as in Palestine. In this case, suicide bombing is not considered as suicide, but <i>siyasa</i> (the politics) of war. In a peaceful</p>	<p><i>On women:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Women can pursue a career as long as they fulfil their duties towards their husbands. Husbands should provide for the family.<sup>21</sup></li> </ul>

<i>On the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion</i>	<i>On the right of people to take part in the government of his country</i>	<i>No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment</i>
<i>Religious minorities; Other faith communities; Intra- and-interfaith relations</i>	<i>Caliphate system; Islamic state; Non-Muslims seeking to occupy public office</i>	<i>Hudud and qisas</i>
<p><i>On interfaith relations:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Both Muslims and non-Muslims are God’s creations, so they should respect each other.</li> <li>• “<i>Yahudi juga makhluk Allah ... Nasrani juga makhluk Allah. Mengapa sesama makhluk Allah bertengkar...</i>” (“Jews and Christians are creations of God, so why fight each other?”).</li> <li>• Encourages his followers to work together with other faith communities and advocates for the “harmony of togetherness” (“<i>indahnyanya kebersamaan</i>”).<sup>10</sup></li> </ul>	<p><i>On caliphate system:</i></p> <p>In 2007, he spoke at a rally staged by Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) calling for an international caliphate.<sup>11</sup> However, analysts saw this as a strategy to reassert his status following his polygamy controversy. Responding to the banning of HTI, he stated that the government made the decision in the community’s interest and should be accepted by the community.<sup>12</sup></p> <p><i>On voting for non-Muslim electoral candidates:</i></p> <p>His stance is to choose a believing Muslim leader who has good moral behaviour, is trustworthy, responsible and just.<sup>13</sup></p>	Views not known.
<i>On religious minorities and intrafaith relations:</i> Ahli Sunnah Wal Jama’ah Al-Asy’ari is the only true creed. Those who transgress the creed are heretical. Not	<i>On caliphate system:</i> Cannot be established when there is already an existing government and leadership in a country. Citizens must obey a leader even if he is <i>fajir</i>	<i>On qisas (retribution):</i> Islamic Law is superior to other existing laws as it ensures justness and is effective in crime prevention. <i>Qisas</i> is still relevant today

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<b>No.</b>	<b>Preacher</b>	<b>Preaching Contents</b>
		<p>environment such as Indonesia, suicide bombing is prohibited and should not be condoned. Muslims should also protect other faith communities from terror acts committed by other Muslims.<sup>14</sup> Those who seek to terrorize others are dehumanizing. There are extremists in every faith community but that does not mean the entire community are extremists.<sup>15</sup></p> <p><i>On jihad:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No <i>jihad</i> uses weaponry in today's age, but there are other ways to fight against God's "enemies"<sup>16</sup>: (1) Stop purchasing products produced by oppressors. (2) Support the Habaib and <i>ulama</i>.<sup>17</sup></li> <li>• Today, Muslims still need to be cautious and prepare themselves with knowledge and skills relating to war or defence because Muslims must remain strong.<sup>18</sup></li> </ul> <p><i>On terrorism:</i></p> <p>They are common people who are misled and should be guided to the right teachings. He cautions his followers against people who have similar ideologies as ISIS.<sup>19</sup> They are blinded by their pursuit of upholding Islam. It is not their fault per se. Their intention is pure but their means are wrong. Hence,</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Any <i>ulama</i> who opines that the <i>hijab</i> is not compulsory goes against the majority view and they are considered as less credible.<sup>22</sup></li> </ul>

all Shi'a are heretical such as the Zaidiyah sect, but most Shi'a in Indonesia come from the Ja'fari school of thought who are known to slander the companions of the Prophet, and hence cannot be tolerated. It is best for the moderate Shi'a to counter the teachings of other Shi'a.<sup>23</sup> Meanwhile, Ahmadis are deemed as apostates who can be killed, but execution can only be carried out with the order of the *imam* (government leaders) and only when they refuse to repent.<sup>24</sup>

*On interfaith relations:*

- Wishing Merry Christmas is discouraged as it implies that one agrees with the belief that Jesus is the son of God.
- Non-Muslims should not feel offended when called a *kafir* (infidel).<sup>25</sup>

(indecent). One may criticize a leader but not throw them out in the form of a coup.<sup>26</sup>

*On democracy:*

Democracy is not rooted in Islam but provides an opportunity for (Indonesian) Muslims to further establish Islam's presence and elect a great leader. He reminds his followers that support to any Islamic groups must be accorded to only those who follow the Asy'ari creed which he perceives as the only correct faith.<sup>27</sup>

*On the role of political leaders:*

Most important is to execute *shariat* Islam.<sup>28</sup>

and should be implemented. If anyone believes that other laws are better than Islamic law, he or she can be deemed as an apostate or *kafir*. Those who believe in Islamic law but do not seek to establish it are *fasiq* (impious/sinner). It is important to slowly work towards establishing Islamic Law (in this context defined as punishments of crimes).<sup>29</sup>

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<b>No.</b>	<b>Preacher</b>	<b>Preaching Contents</b>	
		one cannot ascertain whether they will be punished by God. <sup>20</sup>	
3.	Abdul Somad	<p><i>On jihad in the Middle East:</i> Discourages Indonesian Muslims from taking part in <i>jihad</i> due to the lack of military training. The best way to support Palestinians is through donations.<sup>30</sup></p> <p><i>On suicide bombing:</i> In the context of Palestine which is in a state of war, a suicide bomber is considered a martyr.<sup>31</sup></p>	<p><i>On women:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The <i>hijab</i> is compulsory. A woman who does not cover her <i>aurat</i> will be thrown into hell and her husband will also be held accountable.<sup>32</sup></li> <li>• Women can work as long as she: (1) gained permission from her husband; (2) does not wear too much make-up; (3) is not always in the company of non-mahram;<sup>33</sup> (4) does not wear feet bangles; (5) does not speak in seductive manner; (6) covers her <i>aurat</i>.<sup>34</sup></li> </ul>

<p><i>On religious minorities and intrafaith relations:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sunnis and Shi'a differ in fundamental matters which are not petty.<sup>35</sup> Hence, there is no prospect for intrafaith unity.</li> <li>• "Ahmadiya bukan Islam" (Ahmadiya is not part of Islam) because they believe that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is their prophet.<sup>36</sup></li> <li>• Wahhabism exists on a spectrum and those who deviate are those who accuse others of doing <i>bid'ah</i>.<sup>37</sup> To him, accusing others of doing <i>bid'ah</i> will only destroy Islam from within.<sup>38</sup></li> </ul> <p><i>On interfaith relations:</i>      "Merry Christmas": A person who wishes others Merry Christmas agrees that      (1) Jesus is the son of God;      (2) Jesus was born on 25 December; and (3) Jesus was crucified.</p>	<p><i>On caliphate system:</i>      It encompasses the Islamic political and economic system. When asked if a caliphate system can be established in a democratic system, he cites that that was what Hassan Al-Banna sought to do, i.e., to fight for Islam through politics and establishing an Islamic party (Ikhawanul Muslimin).<sup>39</sup> The purpose of the caliphate system is to implement syariat Islam. Pancasila provides the opportunity for Indonesian Muslims to do so as seen in the case of Aceh.<sup>40</sup></p> <p><i>On voting for non-Muslim electoral candidates:</i>      A <i>kafir</i> (non-Muslim) cannot be a leader to the Muslim community.<sup>41</sup> When asked who Muslims should choose, between a corrupted Muslim candidate and a just non-Muslim candidate, he states that Muslims should not be deceived by the image of a "just non-Muslim".<sup>42</sup> He cited Al-Ma'idah:51 (Whoever chooses the <i>kafir</i>, he is from amongst them.)</p>	<p><i>On hudud and qisas:</i>      Only punishments can redeem people of their sins such as adultery. Seeking forgiveness is not enough. Islamic way of punishment lightens the punishments of a sinner in the hereafter.<sup>43</sup> Today, <i>hudud</i> cannot be carried out only because the government does not use Islamic law. The law is still relevant and can be carried out under a caliphate system.<sup>44</sup></p>

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<b>No.</b>	<b>Preacher</b>	<b>Preaching Contents</b>	
4.	Adi Hidayat	<p><i>On jihad:</i> Reminds his followers to be cautious of movements or groups that advocate for the bombing of communities in the name of <i>jihad</i>.<sup>45</sup> “It is not <i>jihad</i> to kill, bomb or shoot people without any reason.”<sup>46</sup></p> <p><i>On terrorism:</i> Terrorism and extremism have no place in any religion. People should unite to fight against these ideas.<sup>47</sup></p>	<p><i>On women:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The ruling on veiling is clear and should not be problematized. Whoever denies the obligation of veiling is a <i>munafik</i> (hypocrite) and will be thrown into the deepest of hell. He discourages Muslims from listening to people with such views.<sup>48</sup> <i>Hijab</i> is a measure of one’s faith.<sup>49</sup></li> <li>• Women can work but husbands should remain the main provider. It is wrong for women to become the breadwinner while husbands stay at home. Women can work to fulfil their hobbies, but it would be a burden for them.<sup>50</sup> Women can work as long as it does not compromise their duties at home.<sup>51</sup></li> </ul>
5.	Felix Siauw	<p><i>On terrorism:</i> It is against humanity. The term terrorism is only used as a label when the perpetrator is a Muslim. If Muslims are terrorists, minorities in Indonesia cannot exist. He claims that Islam has saved Indonesia and is the foundation of the country. If Islam teaches terrorism, minorities would have ceased to exist but</p>	<p><i>On hijab:</i> It is immoral to state that the hijab is not compulsory.<sup>58</sup> Ideas such as feminism are wrong and must be removed from the minds of Muslims.<sup>59</sup></p>

<p><i>On religious minorities and intrafaith relations:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sunnis and Shi’a differ in their articles of faith and Islam. He cites that the prophet warned the ummah of these people (Shi’a).</li> <li>• He reminded his followers that some Shi’as and Ahmadis were born into such faiths so it is difficult for them to understand the truth. Hence, Muslims should preach and have dialogues with them.<sup>52</sup></li> </ul> <p><i>On interfaith relations:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Muslims cannot wish Christians “Merry Christmas”.<sup>53</sup></li> <li>• Muslims can work with non-Muslim as long as they do not interfere in matters of worship.<sup>54</sup></li> </ul>	<p><i>On voting for non-Muslim electoral candidates:</i></p> <p>Muslims cannot elect a leader other than a <i>mu’min</i> (a faithful believer) except when there is no choice. He opines that the “Jews and Christians” mentioned in Al-Ma’idah:51 include those who are not hostile towards Muslims including close friends. They cannot be elected as a leader due to the fear that they would take charge of Muslim affairs.<sup>55</sup> Non-Muslims are free to contest in elections but Muslims cannot support and elect them. Such logic is justified in a Muslim majority country. If the same logic is applied in a non-Muslim country where Muslim candidates are not supported by the non-Muslim majority, it is justified.</p>	<p><i>On qisas:</i></p> <p>Aims to instil fear in people and prevent them from committing an offence. Imposing strict punishment is important as a form of deterrence. Cites how Duterte’s strict anti-narcotics campaign led to the reduction of drug use.<sup>56</sup></p>
<p><i>On religious minorities:</i></p> <p>Felix promotes unity within the Muslim community. In a Facebook post, he mentions that all Muslims, including Ahmadis and Shi’ites are brothers, hence Muslims should not offend them with their words and actions. As long as a person believes in the <i>shahada</i> (Islamic creed)</p>	<p>Islam encompasses all realms of life and cannot be separated from governance. Interprets the fourth principle of Pancasila to mean a collective representation led by those who are wise and would apply God’s Law. He also states the importance of “Oneness of God” as the first principle of Pancasila.<sup>65</sup></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Islam is a comprehensive and wholesome religion that consists of different kinds of laws, including <i>qisas</i> and <i>hudud</i> which are often rejected because they are perceived as violent. He reminds Muslims to be careful and not be selective in practising religion.<sup>71</sup></li> </ul>

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<b><i>No.</i></b>	<b><i>Preacher</i></b>	<b><i>Preaching Contents</i></b>	
		they still thrive, are protected and respected. He claims that what is currently happening is the tyranny of the minority over the majority. <sup>57</sup>	

he is a Muslim.<sup>60</sup> In a tweet in 2014, Felix wrote that if there is interfaith tolerance, there is all the more reason for intrafaith tolerance to exist.<sup>61</sup>

*On interfaith relations:*

- Tolerance is accepting that other people have their beliefs and letting them practise their faiths without imposing one's faith onto others. Tolerance, however, does not mean following other people's way of worshipping. Calling Muslims intolerant for not wishing "Merry Christmas" is itself an intolerant act.<sup>62</sup> Saying "Merry Christmas" is equivalent to agreeing to their faith. It is safer for Muslims to not say anything during non-Muslims' festivities. He likened "Merry Christmas" to that of *shahada*: both are words with connotations.<sup>63</sup>
- Muslims cannot insult other religions for the purpose of leveraging their religion. But that does not mean that Muslims should not preach or speak the truth. There will always be people who feel offended when Muslims preach or talk about Islam.<sup>64</sup>

*On caliphate system:*

A legacy of Islam.<sup>66</sup> He distinguishes the idea of caliphate advocated by HTI and ISIS. Today, the fear towards the caliphate system stems from a misunderstanding of the concept and such a misconception is used as a mechanism to prevent people from trusting the caliphate system. According to Felix, a *khalifah* (caliph) is a political successor of the Prophet. He said that there are only dichotomies: heaven and hell, Muslims and non-Muslims, God's Law and man-made laws.<sup>67</sup>

*Khilafah* system is the way forward to overcome injustices in society. Muslims can disagree with the system and prefer other political systems but they cannot criticize the system.<sup>68</sup> It's ideal for religion to organize political matters and not for politics to organize religion. He claims that those who are anti-*khilafah* tend to politicize religion.<sup>69</sup>

- Expresses support for Brunei Sultanate's plan in being "firm" with the LGBT group. He states that those protesting Brunei's plan to execute LGBT tend to have double standards. Brunei's plan to execute LGBT must be supported by Muslims.<sup>72</sup>

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<b>No.</b>	<b>Preacher</b>	<b>Preaching Contents</b>	
6.	Yusuf Mansur	Views not known.	<p><i>On hijab:</i>  <i>Hijab</i> is compulsory but should not be forced onto women. Women who choose not to wear the <i>jilbab</i> should not be insulted. The different views on the <i>hijab</i> are ideological but should not spark conflict.<sup>73</sup></p> <p><i>On women having career:</i>  Men should not be egoistic and should grant their wives blessings to pursue business. He highlights the importance of intention when setting up business, for example, to assist the husband financially. He opposes the view that women's</p>

	<p><i>On voting for non-Muslim electoral candidates:</i> The leader of a country must be a Muslim similar to an <i>imam</i> who leads prayers, especially in a Muslim country. A leader who is not Muslim is unable to lead believers.</p> <p><i>On the role of a leader:</i> Not to make new rules but instead, implement God’s law. He encourages Muslims to elect a leader who can bring them closer to God, respect the <i>ulama</i> and Islamic thought, and does not have enmity against Muslim activists.<sup>70</sup></p>	
<p><i>On interfaith relations:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It is fine for Muslims to choose not to wish “Merry Christmas” but encourages them to give their non-Muslim neighbours food or delicacies during the festivity.<sup>74</sup></li> <li>• But in 2014, he reminded Muslims not to take part in celebrating Christmas, including dressing up in ways that consist of Christmas elements. Tolerance is respecting and appreciating other faith communities without</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Does not advocate for an Islamic political system or the caplihate system.</li> <li>• Remains close to current politicians (known as a Jokowi–Ma’ruf Amin supporter). In an Instagram post, he clearly stated his preferred candidates for the 2019 presidential election. He claimed that Islam under Jokowi had flourished. Nevertheless, he made a disclaimer that he would withdraw his support from Jokowi if he offended the Muslim community in</li> </ul>	Views not known.

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<b>No.</b>	<b>Preacher</b>	<b>Preaching Contents</b>	
			<p>role is confined to the domestic realm. Such perception is misleading because the Prophet's first boss was a woman (Khadijah). However, he reminds women to be firm when carrying out their business, especially when dealing with male clients.</p>
7.	Hanan Attaki	Views not known.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Once commented that the ideal weight of women is 55 kg and later clarified that he meant that it is important for women to take care of their body and weight to please their husbands.</li> <li>• A wife dressing up for her husband is a form of <i>ibadah</i>.<sup>82</sup></li> </ul>

<p>taking part in their festivities.<sup>75</sup></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Muslims can enter churches. Such ruling comes from classical jurisprudential <i>ulama</i>. He encourages people to respect the diversity of opinions.<sup>76</sup></li> </ul> <p><i>On intrafaith issues:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Intrafaith views not known, but once posted a prayer for Qasem Soleimani, the Iranian and Shi'a General who was killed by the US military.<sup>77</sup></li> <li>• Pointed out that there are generally good interfaith relations in Indonesia but weak intrafaith relations. He finds it odd that Muslims can tolerate other faith communities but not fellow Muslims.<sup>78</sup></li> </ul>	<p>his renewed term as a President.<sup>79</sup> Yusuf also complimented Jokowi's religiosity.<sup>80</sup> In 2016, Yusuf said that it was timely that Indonesian Muslims participate actively in politics. He claims that Indonesian Muslim's backwardness is due to their lack of participation in politics.<sup>81</sup></p>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It is important to be considerate of other people's feelings. He cites the verse that prohibits Muslims from insulting non-Muslims' beliefs.<sup>83</sup> Religious differences can be tolerated and fostered through discussions that are argumentative but appreciative of the</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Encouraged Muslims to take interest not only in the presidential election but also the legislative election as it determines who represent the community's voice and create policies for the community.</li> <li>• The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) is the most consistent in striving for</li> </ul>	<p>Views not known.</p>

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<i>No.</i>	<i>Preacher</i>	<i>Preaching Contents</i>	
8.	Mustofa Bisri	<p><i>On ISIS:</i>            Advised Indonesians to be cautious of ISIS. Followers of ISIS lacks understanding on Islam. Organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah play an important role as a bastion against ISIS' influence.<sup>87</sup> Not all external influences are good. Not all flags with <i>la ilaha illallah</i> ("There is no God but Allah") is good.<sup>88</sup> Instead, in the case of ISIS, its members have caused much violence.</p>	<p><i>On women:</i>            It is not on society to decide for women whether they should become a housewife or pursue a career. It is also not on society to judge their piety. Women has the right to decide their course of life.<sup>89</sup></p>

<p>differences. One community should not offend another. Festivities are also to be celebrated separately.<sup>84</sup></p>	<p>policies that are compliant with Islamic sharia and “Eastern” values.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Encourages Muslims to elect leaders who represent <i>dakwah</i> parties, and have a deep understanding of halal and haram matters.<sup>85</sup></li> <li>• The pinnacle of <i>dakwah</i> was when Islam managed to conquer the East and West. This is known as the caliphate system. His idea of Islam as <i>rahmatan lil ‘alamin</i> refers to a universal caliphate system.<sup>86</sup></li> </ul>	
<p><i>On religious minorities and intrafaith relations:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Defended Ahmadiyah when the sect was banned by MUI. He stated that as an NU member, he ought not to be biased and should be tolerant. It is not right to act violently towards Ahmadiyah just because they are considered heretical. He reminded NU members not to use violence when dealing with ideological conflicts.<sup>90</sup></li> <li>• The tension between Shi’a and Wahhabi is purely a political conflict, not ideological.<sup>91</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Religion should not be politicized for the purpose of political gains.<sup>94</sup> He criticized electoral candidates who suddenly act religious or establish close relationships with religious figures to gain sympathy and clout. He also criticized the blind usage of the term “Allahu Akbar” (God is the Greatest) as a chant during political campaigns without understanding the meaning behind it.<sup>95</sup></li> <li>• There is such a thing as practising politics and religion moderately. The</li> </ul>	<p>Views not known.</p>

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<i>No.</i>	<i>Preacher</i>	<i>Preaching Contents</i>	
9.	Haikal Hasan Barras	Views not known.	<p><i>On hijab:</i> Compulsory on women, and those who refuse to wear the <i>hijab</i> should not disturb others who do.<sup>97</sup></p> <p><i>On women having a career:</i> Women who stay at home are more honourable in Islam, but in today's context, women have no choice but to work. This is a</p>

<p><i>On interfaith relations:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It is fine to use the term “non-muslims” when socializing. This is part of the ethics of socializing. This should not be confused with discussion of <i>aqidah</i> (whereby the term <i>kafir</i> does not have equal weightage with “non-Muslim” and hence, irreplaceable). The only reason why the issue of calling <i>kafir</i> “non-muslim” became viral was that it has been politicized during elections.<sup>92</sup></li> <li>• Criticized demonstrations that denounced Ahok. These movements did not seek to defend the religion or Quran but a move for political gain. Muslims who took part in the demonstrations had gone beyond the line in hating Ahok.<sup>93</sup></li> </ul>	<p>nation’s attitude towards politics as exhibited during political campaigns is not moderate. Being extreme can cloud one’s judgement and cause a person to act unjustly. Being overcompetitive in politics makes people forget that a rival candidate and their supporters are fellow citizens who do not deserve hate. It is important that a political leader is of a sound mind, do things moderately and is not corrupt. Otherwise, the society would learn from the leader’s attitudes and behaviours.<sup>96</sup></p>	
<p><i>On interfaith relations:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Tolerance is not interfering in worshipping affairs of others, not insulting other religious teachings, damaging worshipping places and imposing one’s belief onto others. Tolerance is helping anyone regardless of faith</li> </ul>	<p><i>On caliphate system:</i>          Khilafah Islamiyah is part of Islamic teachings. The caliphate system is not the same as an Islamic state—it does not require the establishment of a new state. The caliphate system is not antithetical to Pancasila. The <i>khilafah</i> system has got</p>	<p>Views not known.</p>

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<i>No.</i>	<i>Preacher</i>	<i>Preaching Contents</i>
		<p><i>dharurat</i> (urgent) situation. The issue is not about whether women can work or not but whether they can educate their children. Working mothers must ensure that they have time to spend with their children. He encourages women to choose jobs that allow them to spend time with the children.<sup>98</sup> God mentions that men should be the protector of women. Women having a higher salary can cause their husbands to feel small. The way to overcome this is for husbands to be more authoritative. When men feel challenged, it is not because their wives obtain a higher salary, but because men are not very authoritative.<sup>99</sup></p>

and working together without having to practise each other's beliefs, celebrate their festivities or inter-marry.<sup>100</sup>

- Wishing “Merry Christmas” may lead a person to agree that Jesus is the son of God. Instead of saying “Merry Christmas”, one can simply say “*Selamat merayakan Natal Anda*”.<sup>101</sup> In a tweet, he reminded Muslims to not disturb those celebrating Christmas, but also not to celebrate alongside them.<sup>102</sup>

*On religious minorities and intrafaith relations:*

A follower of a Shi'a sect for two years. His experience gave him the credibility to speak against Shi'as. “*Saya pernah Syiah 2 tahun, jadi kami tahu persis apa yang terjadi*” (I was a Shi'a for two years. I know exactly what was happening). In 2016, he called for the cancellation of Asyura event that was to be held by Shi'as.<sup>103</sup> Shi'as who are pro-Ali but do not label other companions as *kafir* are acceptable. Sunni and Shi'a mainly differ in the articles of faith and number of prayers.

nothing to do with Pancasila.<sup>106</sup> The *khilafah* system will ultimately be established nearing the end times. This is part of the Sunni creed and whoever does not believe in it is *kafir*. But he affirms that currently, the Pancasila, UUD 1945 and NKRI are the best foundation for Indonesia.<sup>107</sup> Envisions the caliphate system to be similar to that of the European Union. Instead of *khilafah*, it can be called “Uni Islam” (Islam/Muslim union).

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<i>No.</i>	<i>Preacher</i>	<i>Preaching Contents</i>	
10.	Oki Setiana Dewi	<p><i>On radicalism and terrorism:</i> A worrisome matter in Indonesia, especially because teenagers are vulnerable to such ideology. Islam does not preach hatred, violence nor intimidation of others. In contrast, it teaches mankind to exercise compassion towards everyone regardless of race, ethnicity, religion or belief. This</p>	<p><i>On hijab and niqab:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Disagrees with the <i>niqab</i> ban on civil servants. The government should accept the wearing of <i>niqab</i>. <i>Niqab</i> serves to protect women. <i>Niqab</i> is useful especially when one's face is charming. It helps to protect a person from slander. Women are required to wear the <i>niqab</i>.<sup>111</sup></li> </ul>

<p>Claimed that Shi'as created a new Quran. In a lecture, he quoted ideas from Shi'a texts that are problematic to highlight Syi'a deviance. This lecture was also streamed live via his Instagram account. At one point, he laughed at the arguments his audience had regarding Shi'as. He also mentioned that he had been on missions to Garut where Shi'as had "spread extensively" to preach. He told the audience that he was going to Garut once again to preach on the dangers of Shi'as in Indonesia and invited the jema'ah to come with him for fear that he would be killed. He also prepared a checklist for the <i>jema'ah</i> to determine whether a person is a Shi'a.<sup>104</sup> He also lamented on Twitter on the prevalence of Shi'a and for advertising publicly their events.<sup>105</sup></p>		
<p><i>On Shi'as:</i> Wrote a thesis on the Shi'a community in Indonesia. Highlighted that Shi'as in Indonesia have diversified religious practices. Some rituals initially practised by Shi'as such as the remembrance of Ali on 10 Muharram have been</p>	<p><i>On Pancasila:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• "The principles and articles contained in Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution are in line with Islamic values and the purposes of Islam "<i>'baldatun toyyibatun wa rabbun ghafur'</i>".<sup>116</sup></li> </ul>	<p>Views not known.</p>

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No.	Preacher	Preaching Contents	
		<p>teaching is relevant to the plural society in Indonesia. Terror acts such as suicide bombing cost many lives, including the self, families and are detrimental to the country. Terrorist incidents in Indonesia have tarnished the image of Islam.<sup>108</sup> She expressed her dismay towards the bombing in Surabaya, Sidoarjo and Pekanbaru. Muslims and non-Muslims are brothers, and have the duty to unite and live in harmony, not be divided. Killing one life is like killing the whole of humanity [<i>“Membunuh satu nyawa sama saja membunuh seluruh nyawa”</i>].<sup>109</sup></p> <p>“Highlighted the importance of interpreting and implementing religious moderation in inappropriate ways, accomplishing world peace without ideological, religious, or racial-based violence. She said that Indonesia, as a diverse nation, must uphold tolerance as the key to develop as a peaceful country.”<sup>110</sup></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Questions those who have yet to wear the <i>hijab</i> why they are delaying the matter. Is of the view that covering up should precede opening one’s heart to doing good because humans are not without mistakes. If women wait until their heart is open to wear the <i>hijab</i>, it will take a long time. If women are scared of not getting job opportunities because of wearing the <i>hijab</i>, they have to believe that God has accorded to each person his/her sustenance. Hence, they should not rely on humans but God. A good man will not allow his wife to be seen by other men. The fact that God has dictated a dressing guideline for women shows His love towards women. Women who have donned the <i>hijab</i> should be grateful because they have been chosen to guard their chastity. Wearing the <i>hijab</i> is a sign of love and shyness to God. <i>Hijab</i> is a protector and helps women become honourable.<sup>112</sup></li> <li>• Women cannot dress like men. In the digital age, where religious content is accessible, there is no excuse to not wear the <i>hijab</i>.<sup>113</sup></li> </ul>
11.	Khalid Basalamah	<p><i>On suicide bombing:</i> There is no such thing as committing suicide for the sake</p>	<p><i>On women:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Women are more emotional than rational hence it is</li> </ul>

<p>adapted and adopted by other Muslim communities in Indonesia.<sup>114</sup></p> <p><i>On interfaith relations:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Muslims and non-Muslims are brothers, and have the duty to unite and live in harmony, not be divided.<sup>115</sup></li> <li>• Muslims are not allowed to dress similarly to non-Muslims or wear clothes and adornments that have symbols of other religions.</li> </ul>		
<p><i>On interfaith relations:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Muslims cannot wish “Merry Christmas” because</li> </ul>	<p><i>On Muslims voting for non-Muslims candidate:</i></p> <p>Muslims cannot elect a</p>	<p><i>On qisas and hudud:</i></p> <p>People claim these punishments are cruel because they</p>

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<b>No.</b>	<b>Preacher</b>	<b>Preaching Contents</b>
		<p>of killing enemies in Islam. In the case of Palestine, <i>ulama</i> have agreed that they are in the state of <i>jihad</i> so it becomes compulsory for locals to resist.<sup>117</sup></p> <p><i>On ISIS:</i> A movement initiated by the “Yahudi” (Jewish) community to divide Muslims.<sup>118</sup></p>
		<p>discouraged to give them choices or to consult them. If women are given choices, they might disobey their husbands. However, boys, should be consulted because they would grow to be decision-makers and leaders of society.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Women, despite being highly educated, still need to be guided and protected by their husbands. This is by the <i>hadith</i> stating that women are like the crooked ribs of men, when forced to straighten would break, but when handled with care, would remain crooked. Men should not be violent towards women but must be firm towards them. Men should understand that when women ask for a divorce, they are driven by emotions and will feel better after being given a gift. This is also the reason why divorce is in the hands of men, because men are capable of using their brain.<sup>119</sup></li> </ul> <p><i>On veiling:</i> Those who reveal their aurat in public are the same as a person who drinks alcohol publicly or engages in adultery publicly. When women cover up, they will not attract men’s attention and make men wary of their attempts to disturb women. But if women</p>

it means “Merry God who has a child” and may lead to infidelity.<sup>122</sup> We can do good to non-Muslims but anything to do with the matter of belief cannot be pursued.

- Muslims can do good towards non-Muslims including giving donations/ alms to them and helping those in need. But it is prohibited to follow their rituals because an infidel’s place is in hell.<sup>123</sup>

*On religious minorities and intrafaith relations:*

- Shi’as reject the *sunnah* (sayings and actions) of the prophet. If Shi’a followers in Indonesia had truly understood the essence of Shi’ism, they would have left the sect. The Shi’as he encountered believed that Ali is a prophet, Quran is not perfect, and that Sunnis are *kafir* and can be executed. Claims that Shi’as executed Saddam Hussein, killed thousands of sunni in Iraq and destroyed their mosques. In contrast, Sunnis had never attacked Shi’as except for defence. Claims that forty

non-Muslim leader, based on Al-Ma’eda:51-59, Ali Imran:28 and An-Nisaa:138-146. Between a just non-Muslim leader and an unjust Muslim leader, choose the Muslim leader because you never know how just the former truly is. The case is different in non-Muslim countries where Muslims are a minority.<sup>127</sup> In Indonesia (a Muslim-majority country), choosing a non-Muslim leader is questionable. There is no excuse to not choose a Muslim leader. The role of a leader is to execute the sharia, hence the leader must be a Muslim.<sup>128</sup>

He referred to those supporting Ahok or non-Muslims as *munafik*. The anger towards Ahok is justified based on Al-Ma’idah:57 because in Islam, anyone caught committing an offence, must be judged and punished.<sup>129</sup>

have not been the victims of crimes. These punishments are measures to prevent people from taking revenge and from committing the same offence. Citing Al-Baqarah:179 , he states that *qisas* is meant to preserve the prosperity and safety of people. God’s Law is not the same as man-made laws. As mentioned in the Qur’an, those who do not comply with God’s Laws are *fasik* (wicked), *zalim* (despotic) and *kafir* (unbelievers).<sup>130</sup>

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<b>No.</b>	<b>Preacher</b>	<b>Preaching Contents</b>
		<p>reveal their <i>aurat</i>, it opens the door to obscenity. He cited that women who reveal their aurat is like a candy that has been unwrapped and exposed.<sup>120</sup></p> <p><i>On women having a career:</i>            Women can generate their income, but only out of necessity. Women are created from men's ribs so he questions why they want to function as a backbone. Ribs are supposed to be covered and taken care of, not exposed. Cited Ibn Baz in which women upon going to work would face things such as being in a crowded bus with opposite gender which are haram.<sup>121</sup></p>

years ago, Shi'as came to Mecca during haj season and killed the pilgrims. Sunnis and Shi'as differ in Islamic creed. Due to the damages done by Shi'as, the measures taken by the Saudi govt are justified. Sunnis in Indonesia should not wage a war against Shi'as but preach to them.<sup>124</sup>

- Bashar Al-Assad is a Shi'a who has killed thousands of sunnis in Syria. Shi'a is "*sesat dan salah*" (deviant and wrong). Shi'as are responsible for spreading fear towards Wahhabi and labelling them terrorists. The least Muslims can do is to pray that Shi'as will stop causing damage and be expelled from Indonesia. They are like a venom in the *umma*, hence Muslims cannot turn a blind eye to their activities.<sup>125</sup>
- On Ahmadiyah: Based on his experience with an Ahmadi, he said that the reason they believe in another prophet is because the word *khatim* also means "ring" not just the "end"
- The current Wahhabi ideology is spread by Shi'as—they confer the name deviant onto the current-day Wahhabi.<sup>126</sup>

## *Notes to Appendix 1*

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