



TRENDS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

POST-ISLAMISM BATTLES POLITICAL ISLAM IN MALAYSIA

Mohd Faizal Musa

ISEAS
YUSOF ISHAK
INSTITUTE

ISSUE

17

2023

TRENDS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The **ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute** (formerly Institute of Southeast Asian Studies) is an autonomous organization established in 1968. It is a regional centre dedicated to the study of socio-political, security, and economic trends and developments in Southeast Asia and its wider geostrategic and economic environment. The Institute's research programmes are grouped under Regional Economic Studies (RES), Regional Strategic and Political Studies (RSPS), and Regional Social and Cultural Studies (RSCS). The Institute is also home to the ASEAN Studies Centre (ASC), the Singapore APEC Study Centre and the Temasek History Research Centre (THRC).

ISEAS Publishing, an established academic press, has issued more than 2,000 books and journals. It is the largest scholarly publisher of research about Southeast Asia from within the region. ISEAS Publishing works with many other academic and trade publishers and distributors to disseminate important research and analyses from and about Southeast Asia to the rest of the world.

POST-ISLAMISM BATTLES POLITICAL ISLAM IN MALAYSIA

Mohd Faizal Musa

ISEAS YUSOF ISHAK
INSTITUTE

ISSUE 17
2023

Published by: ISEAS Publishing
30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace
Singapore 119614
publish@iseas.edu.sg
<http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg>

© 2023 ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission.

The author is wholly responsible for the views expressed in this book which do not necessarily reflect those of the publisher.

ISEAS Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

Name(s): Mohd Faizal Musa, author.

Title: Post-Islamism battles political Islam in Malaysia / by Mohd Faizal Musa.

Description: Singapore : ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, October 2023. | Series: Trends in Southeast Asia, ISSN 0219-3213 ; TRS17/23 | Includes bibliographical references.

Identifiers: ISBN 9789815104875 (soft cover) | ISBN 9789815104882 (ebook PDF)

Subjects: LCSH: Islam and politics—Malaysia. | Islam and secularism—Malaysia. | Malaysia—Politics and government.

Classification: LCC DS501 I59T no. 17(2023)

Typeset by Superskill Graphics Pte Ltd

Printed in Singapore by Mainland Press Pte Ltd

FOREWORD

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The **Trends in Southeast Asia** series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Choi Shing Kwok

Series Editor:

Ooi Kee Beng

Editorial Committee:

Daljit Singh

Francis E. Hutchinson

Norshahril Saat

Post-Islamism Battles Political Islam in Malaysia

By Mohd Faizal Musa

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- During the 15th general election (GE15) in 2022 and the state elections in 2023, the clash between Anwar Ibrahim and PAS reached new heights. This can be viewed as a battle between political Islam and post-Islamism.
- Political Islam as embodied by PAS pursues the establishment of an Islamic state, while post-Islamism as represented by Anwar Ibrahim is a way of balancing the ambitions of Islam with secular approaches.
- While PAS has been consistent in espousing political Islam since its establishment, Anwar Ibrahim's approach to the role of Islam in politics has changed since his early days in UMNO. Evolving from an Islamist involved in state-led Islamization to a post-Islamist, he now espouses democratic values and multiculturalism.
- GE15 and the 2023 state elections witnessed fierce competition between PAS and Anwar Ibrahim. Both sides either escalated or downplayed crucial topics such as the implementation of *hudud* law and RUU355, the myth of Islam and Malays being under threat, the claim that states under PAS are discriminated against, and the *takfiri* denouncements of non-Muslims as election candidates or potential leaders of the country.
- The results of GE15 and the 2023 state elections between PAS and Anwar Ibrahim, who is now prime minister, show that there will certainly be sequels to come. The elections illustrate that political Islam is growing in strength. This is most evident in the fact that PAS currently has a whopping forty-three seats in the Malaysian parliament, and controls four states. The only way Anwar Ibrahim can remain in power is through assistance from PAS' old nemesis, UMNO, a party heavily tainted by corruption.

Post-Islamism Battles Political Islam in Malaysia

By Mohd Faizal Musa¹

INTRODUCTION

This paper looks at the ideologies of political Islam and post-Islamism in the Malaysian context. In conducting a historical survey of Malaysian politics, I postulate that while Abdul Hadi Awang and his party Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) are Islamists, Anwar Ibrahim is a post-Islamist. The battle between the two was both intense and sharp, and the results show that there will certainly be sequels to come. Although Anwar finally managed to become prime minister, the aftermath of the 15th general election (GE15) and the results of state elections in Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah, Penang, Selangor and Negeri Sembilan on 12 August 2023 illustrate that political Islam is growing in strength. This is most evident in the fact that PAS currently has a whopping forty-three seats in the Malaysian parliament, controls four states, and has significant numbers of seats in the state assemblies of Perak, Selangor and Pahang.

Over the years, there has been much debate about what is commonly referred to as political Islam, or Islamism. According to Andrew March, political Islam should be understood “in the broadest sense possible as the range of modern political movements, ideological trends, and state-directed policies concerned with giving Islam an authoritative status in political life”. The goal of political Islam is to “create an ‘Islamic state’ or to fuse ‘religion and state’ (*din wa dawla*)” (March 2015, p. 17.10).

¹ Mohd Faizal Musa is Visiting Fellow at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore and Research Fellow at the Institute of the Malay World and Civilization, National University of Malaysia (UKM). He also contributes to the Global Shi’a Diaspora, Project on Shi’ism and Global Affairs at Harvard Divinity School.

The core business of political Islam is undoubtedly centred on aspects of morality. It focuses on how to use political tools and means to regulate people according to the teachings of Islam as understood by these players. Furthermore, it is not monolithic. As March put it, “political Islam by and large belongs to the right of the political spectrum, but it would be a mistake to see it as a single movement or ideology. Islamist trends range from left-leaning populist protest movements to ultraconservative movements devoted more to social control over morality than to economic redistribution” (ibid., p. 17.2).

The agents of political Islam themselves maintain that Islam is a way of life, and thus should be the only governing factor and core principle in every aspect of life, including governance (Meijer 2009). This idea has led to a power struggle between the Islamists and those they dub as secularists.²

Another complex ideology is post-Islamism, which “refers to a political and social condition where, following a phase of experimentation, the appeal, energy, and sources of legitimacy of Islamism get exhausted even among its once-ardent supporters”. In this condition, the “Islamists become aware of their system’s anomalies and inadequacies as they attempt to normalize and institutionalize their rule”. After “continuous trial and error makes the system susceptible to questions and criticisms

² The main mission of political Islam is to reclaim sovereignty. With the creation of many nation-states after the end of the Second World War, Muslims were left to determine their own future. With remnants of colonial legacy left in newly formed nations such as Malaysia, Egypt, and Pakistan, the *ummah* was left in a dilemma. They were to either accept the foreign secular ideology to administer and govern the state, or to opt for a more romanticized version of politics and governance in the form of a caliphate. In many parts of the world, they were forced to choose either liberalism or theocracy. This dire situation prompted many Muslim thinkers into a debate about what to do, and these thinkers later had a large impact on the Muslim world. One of the figures who actively participated in such debates was Sayyid Qutb (1906–66), the leader of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. One of his works, *Ma’alim fi al-Tariq* (1979), is highly influential across the world. It was even translated into Malay by Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat, who was at the time the spiritual leader of PAS.

... Islamism becomes compelled, both by its own internal contradictions and by societal pressure, to reinvent itself, but does so at the cost of a qualitative shift” (Bayat 2005).

At a conference held in Amman, Jordan, on 23 May 2017, a group of Middle Eastern scholars discussed the impact of post-Islamism on their societies. In the foreword of the conference proceedings, Tim Petschulat, the Resident Director of Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in Jordan and Iraq defined post-Islamism as “a new, pragmatic and democratic form of Political Islam that is ready to leave some of the classic goals of the movement behind—such as the establishment of an Islamic state or the call to confront secularism”. He further defined it as a “movement that strives for Islamic values within and in favour of a democratic framework” (Petschulat 2018, p. 8).

As elaborated by Hassan Abu Hanieh (2018, p. 25) “the terms Islamism and post-Islamism are commonly used to define a historical trajectory that marks the start and end of the Islamist condition and project”.

As argued earlier, a battle is taking place in Malaysia between Islamism and post-Islamism, and the clash is embodied by the differences and tensions between Anwar Ibrahim—former leader of the Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia, ABIM) and current prime minister—and Abdul Hadi Awang, the leader of PAS.

This study uses an eclectic approach, combining textual analysis from different sociological and historical perspectives. I have gathered relevant media reports and older and contemporary references or books on PAS, Abdul Hadi Awang, ABIM and Anwar Ibrahim. I have thereafter also made use of data from semi-structured Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) that were conducted between 5 November 2022 to 16 November 2022, the GE15 campaign period. The respondents are eligible voters randomly approached at various public sites such as malls, shops, mosques and cafes. The sessions lasted from 30 minutes to two hours. There was a total of 94 respondents, comprising 71 males and 23 females from Kuala Lumpur, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, Melaka, Johor, Perak and Penang. The set of questions is mainly to determine how the respondents might vote in GE15 and to understand what factors might influence their decision. During the 2023 state elections campaign, I also

carried out 33 unstructured interviews in Selangor, Negeri Sembilan and Penang. Thirty respondents of these were male while 3 were female. My questions were mainly about Anwar Ibrahim's performance as Prime Minister and the participant's observation as regards Unity Government policies. In addition, I consulted party activists and local leaders during visits to three *ceramah* (mass lectures) in Selangor.

GE15 AND THE 2023 STATE ELECTIONS

The first chapter of Anwar Ibrahim's life as a "radical Islamist" saw him greatly influenced intellectually by Syed Naquib Al-Attas (Mohd Faizal Musa 2021) and, according to Chandra Muzaffar, by Malek Ben Nabi, an Algerian philosopher, Ismail Faruqi, a scholar from the United States, Hassan al-Banna of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Mawdudi (Muzaffar 1987, p. 54).

Anwar was popular among the young and the urban segment of society in the 1970s. He also fought for rural Malays, championed Malay rights and also struggled against corruption. In 1974, Anwar's anti-government activities in the form of leading student demonstrations and protests in support of poor Malay peasants in Baling, Kedah, led to his detainment without trial for two years under the now-abolished Internal Security Act. In 1982, Anwar joined the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the dominant party in the ruling coalition. This came as a surprise, given that he had been strongly opposing that party. It also created a large crack in relations between the Islamists, turning PAS and ABIM into rivals. Worse still, Anwar's action was seen by many as a betrayal of Islam.

His dismissal from the government in 1998 might have led Anwar to change from one who believes in political Islam to an understanding perceived as post-Islamism. Anwar founded the multiracial People's Justice Party (Parti Keadilan Rakyat, PKR) in 2003. Struggling to maintain a political lifeline, he was soon supported by the staunch secularist Democratic Action Party (DAP), and together with PAS, the three parties formed a fragile coalition named Pakatan Rakyat (PR), just after these parties had together managed in the general elections held that year to claim the states of Selangor, Perak, Penang and Kedah, retain

Kelantan, and gain 82 out of 222 parliamentary seats. However, PR eventually collapsed, and the more progressive members of PAS such as Mohamad Sabu and the late Salahuddin Ayub left the party in 2016 to form Parti Amanah Negara (Amanah).

Since then, PAS President Abdul Hadi Awang has been the face of political Islam in Malaysia. One of the ways in which PAS and Abdul Hadi promote political Islam is through books. For example, a book that is considered a must-read for all PAS members is Abdul Hadi's *Fikrah, Harakah dan Daulah (Ideas, the Islamic Movement and Sovereignty)*. Published in 2003, the book is a compilation of his sermons, interviews and writings which articulate his vision for Malaysia and is considered a guide by his followers.

More specifically, the book details his vision for political Islam. For example, the appendix contains extracts from Hadi's 1983 interview with Paul Wedel, a journalist with United Press International at the time, in which he explained his thoughts on establishing an Islamic State. He warned that Islam was under threat and that it was "a result of developments which arose in the colonial period and which continued until the present government" (Abdul Hadi 2003, p. 367).³

In Hadi's view, Islam should come first, followed by the nation. He said that "if Malaysia comes first, Islam will not necessarily be implemented" (ibid., p. 367).⁴ To him, an Islamic State is one that adopts and implements all Islamic principles in every aspect of life, has a constitution based on Islam, and is led by Muslims (ibid., p. 376).⁵ In

³ In the original Malay, "Ini adalah akibat dari perkembangan-perkembangan yang telah diwujudkan di zaman penjajah dan dikekalkan hingga ke zaman pemerintahan yang ada sekarang".

⁴ In the original Malay, "Bagi kita, Islam mesti didahulukan. Kalau Malaysia didahulukan tak semestinya Islam dilaksanakan".

⁵ In the original Malay, "Yang dikatakan negara Islam ialah sebuah negara yang mengamalkan prinsip-prinsip Islam, berpelembagaan Islam, di mana tenaga-tenaga dan anggota-anggota pimpinannya adalah Penganut-penganut Islam yang yakin. Semua perkara dalam negara itu samada ekonomi, politik, pelajaran, ketenteraan dan segalanya adalah berdasarkan dengan dasar yang dianut oleh negara Islam itu".

relation to that, he also believes that non-Muslim citizens should not be accorded the same rights as Muslims and should not be in any position of power. In explaining this standpoint, he made the comparison that a non-communist would not be accepted as the leader of a communist country (ibid., p. 374).⁶

Political Islam in Malaysia entered a new phase in 1982 when Anwar decided to join UMNO instead of PAS (Ahmad Fauzi 2007, p. 455). However, ever since his detention and his dismissal from the government by Mahathir Mohamad in 1998, Anwar has transformed himself from a notably failed Islamist into a unique reformist with a different touch of Islam. Against this background, the most nail-biting aspect of GE15 and the 2023 state elections was the battle between Anwar and PAS.

In his analysis of Anwar's political evolution and his rise to power as prime minister, Nader Hashemi denotes Anwar as a post-Islamist. Referring to Asef Bayat's discussion of the concept, Hashemi highlighted Anwar's "evolution towards pluralism" and his new approach towards religious politics (2022). While Sophie Lemièrè (2022) remarked that Anwar could "change his colours to match any audience", Azeem Ibrahim proclaimed that his ascension to prime minister was "good news not only for Malaysia but for the whole of the Muslim world" (2022).

PAS, on the other hand, is definitely Islamist. Although they were willing to work with Gerakan, a Chinese-based party in the Perikatan Nasional (PN) coalition, this did not mean that they had embraced post-Islamism. It was instead merely a strategic choice to indicate their willingness to cooperate with non-Muslims. Nevertheless, they continued to propagate conservative narratives while criticizing UMNO and Pakatan Harapan (PH) for corruption and being too "liberal", simultaneously portraying themselves as the defenders of Islam and as a party free from corruption (Hew 2022).

⁶ In the original Malay, "Orang bukan Islam yang tinggal di negara Islam tidak diberi hak politik dengan cara yang berlebihan sehingga boleh menjadi pemimpin negara umpamanya. Seorang yang tidak berfahaman Komunis tidak boleh menjadi Ketua Negara Komunis".

Having these differences in mind therefore makes GE15 and the 2023 state elections crucial illustrations of the battle between an Islamist and post-Islamist, and how they chose to respond to key issues. The five issues which were consistently raised were *hudud* law and the Syariah Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) (Amendment) Act (RUU355), the supposed threat on Islam and Malay rights, discrimination against PAS states, the acceptance of Madani as Anwar’s vision of and for Islam in governance and society, and the status of non-Muslims as leaders.

Hudud Law and RUU355

PAS is strongly committed to *hudud* law. After several years of the normalization of political Islam, *hudud* law has become dominant in Malay minds and remains a popular topic.⁷ In 2021, the Terengganu state government executive councillor in charge of Islam, Satiful Bahri Mamat, stated in the state assembly that the PAS administration in Terengganu was willing to implement *hudud* law once Putrajaya gave the green light (Zatul Iffah and Baharom 2021).

⁷ In April 1978, Harun Din said at a seminar that those who opposed *hudud* law in Malaysia were siding with the enemies of Islam, and that opposing its implementation was a sin for Muslims (Harun Din 1978, pp. 9–11). He was merely echoing the thoughts of other Muslim leaders who had spoken about the importance of *hudud* law even before him. One notable leader was High Court Judge and Secretary of the Muslim Welfare Organization of Malaysia (Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia, PERKIM), Dato’ Syed Agil Barakbah, who proposed elevating sharia law to the level of civil law (ibid.) In order to control the calls for the implementation of *hudud* law, ABIM said that sharia law needs to be introduced in a subtle way. In 1986, at a seminar entitled “Towards Islamization of Laws” organized by ABIM, then Lord President, Mohammed Salleh Abbas, explained that “the Islamization of laws in the country should not be done drastically such that it would cause much alarm, confusion and unhappiness; rather ‘the best changes are those which are imperceptible’”. In the same seminar, ABIM requested that “Islamic Laws be the basis of legislation in Malaysia” (Ting 2016, p. 4). Since then, the issue of *hudud* law became a popular topic during political campaigning every general election.

Yet, after years of raising the issue, PAS was very cautious in promoting *hudud* during GE15. Speaking from his pulpit at Rusila Mosque three days before polling day, Abdul Hadi played down his interest in *hudud* law and said that PAS still needed to obtain “real and solid power” before it was implemented (Abdul Hadi 2022). His sermon was broadcast live on his YouTube channel and shared on TikTok. This was a way to avoid provoking non-Muslim voters and also its coalition partner Gerakan (Farah Noor Samat 2014). At the same time, it was a way of pacifying his followers and implying that PAS would implement the *hudud* law if they won the election.

However, although they did not openly promote the *hudud* law during their GE15 campaign, it is still synonymous with the party (Muhamad Nadzri 2022). PAS even managed to table the *hudud* law enactment in Kelantan and Terengganu in 1993 and 2002, respectively. The emotions surrounding *hudud* certainly made lasting impressions on many voters as they “also feel that PAS strongly advocates Islam and the Malay race”. Conversely, they see PH as being indifferent towards Islam, and even submissive towards DAP whom they feel is antagonistic towards Islam and the Malays (Azrul Azlan 2022).⁸

While carefully dealing with *hudud*, PAS knows that this obsession with an Islamic way of life including in the aspect of law can still be politically capitalized upon. Since they know that a full-scale introduction of *hudud* law would go against the Federal Constitution, they instead propose for RUU355 to amend the sharia law.⁹

⁸ In a 2012 survey done by University of Malaya’s Centre for Election and Democracy, it was found that about 62 per cent of local Muslims supported the implementation of *hudud* law, believing that it would bring about a more just judiciary. The survey also found that there has been increasing support for *hudud* among non-Muslims (Syafique 2013).

⁹ RUU355 was first legislated in 1965 and limited the jurisdiction of the Syariah Court to imprisonment not exceeding six months, a fine not exceeding one thousand ringgit, or both. The act was then amended in 1984 as the Syariah Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) (Amendment) Act 1984 (Act A612). The amendment increased the jurisdiction of the Syariah Court to imprisonment not exceeding three years, a fine not exceeding five thousand ringgit caning not exceeding six

By 2013, Hadi Awang had attempted a number of times to table a motion to amend RUU355; this was partly motivated by Brunei's announcement on the implementation of *hudud*. Following that,

On 27 March 2014, Jamil Khir Baharom, the minister in charge of Islamic affairs, was asked in the Parliament if the federal government would allow any states to implement *hudud*. He affirmed the readiness of the federal government to work with any state government that was ready to implement *hudud*, including Kelantan. However, he suggested that to do so, it is up to the opposition member of the parliament to table a private member's bill for that purpose. (Ting 2016, p. 6).

Nevertheless, despite their efforts over the decades, PAS has not succeeded in getting the amendment passed, even when they were in power during PN's administration. Yet, post-GE15, the tables might have turned as Na'im Mokhtar, the Minister in the Prime Minister's Department (Religious Affairs) confirmed in December 2022 that the unity government would pursue the amendment of RUU355 (Roskhourah 2022). While this led to some concerns, it was thought that PAS would no longer be able to capitalize on the subject during the 2023 state elections. In fact, Anwar dismissed their calls for the amendment as "cheap

strokes, or a combination of the three (Abdul Hamid Mohamad 2017). The idea to amend RUU355 originated from former Chief Justice Abdul Hamid Mohamad who opined that the part of the *hudud* law which could be implemented without too many legal complications are those offences deemed as "offences against the precepts of Islam by Muslims, such as the consumption of alcohol, adultery, false accusation of adultery (*qasaf*), and apostasy" (Ting 2016, p. 11). PAS' compromise in proposing RUU355 instead of pushing for outright *hudud* law—taking into consideration the concerns of both Muslims and non-Muslims—could arguably be seen as the failure of political Islam, and the inroads that post-Islamism is making. According to Bayat, the rise of post-Islamism could be due to the failure of political Islam, social change and transformation leading to greater social and political consciousness, and global changes that affect ideas about political Islam (2016, p. 180).

politics”, given that they repeatedly brought it up only after they had become part of the opposition (Faisal 2023).

Still, the matter of *hudud* made a comeback in the 2023 state elections, only this time around it was not PAS who raised the matter, but Anwar instead. To show PAS’ hypocrisy in shunning DAP, Anwar hit out at them for working with Gerakan, another Chinese-based party that openly rejects *hudud* (Ragu 2023).¹⁰

The outcome of the state elections showed that PAS and PN as a whole won big in Terengganu, sweeping all thirty-two seats in the state assembly. *Hudud* also made headlines. This time, UMNO was the one making demands that PAS should have the political will and the sincerity to implement *hudud* as their solid win now means that there would be no opposition to the implementation of *hudud* (Norhaspida 2023). This is surely a clear signal that *hudud* will remain in Malaysia’s political landscape for some time to come, as a sellable item in the repertoire of political Islam.

Islam and Malays under Threat

Another baseless but persistent political narrative that arose during GE15 was the claim that Islam and Malays are increasingly under threat as a result of DAP’s presence in parliament. This was made easy with a reminder that Barisan Alternatif or PR collapsed due to DAP’s refusal to agree to the implementation of *hudud* in 2001, and that DAP was an obstacle to its implementation (Means 2012).

Although PN was careful not to scare the non-Malays, during their GE15 campaigning, the narrative that Islam is under threat was still

¹⁰ Non-Muslims are often cited as the sole obstacle to the implementation of *hudud* law, and this has invited further antagonism towards them and non-Malays as a whole. Furthermore, it is not just politicians who are responsible for such antagonism. For example, Mohamed Azam Mohamed Adil, the former Deputy Chief Executive Officer of the International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies (IAIS), blamed the Chinese parties in BN and PR for opposing *hudud* (2014, pp. 126–27). He said that only UMNO and PAS could be relied on to implement it.

at the forefront. At an event in Johor, PN chairman Muhyiddin Yassin accused PH of having a Christianization agenda. He also claimed that certain Christian and Jewish organizations had their eyes on Malaysia (*Malaysiakini* 2022). While PH reported the allegation to the police (Faisal 2022), Anwar swiftly denounced the political stunt as baseless and continued to call for equal treatment for all (Madiha 2022). He further called on voters not to be fooled by the Malay-Islam slogan sold by PAS and Bersatu (Yaya 2022). Furthermore, instead of prolonging the issue, he focused on criticizing Muhyiddin’s poor attendance record in Parliament and also lambasted Abdul Hadi for defending him.

Anwar therefore steered clear of addressing religious issues. My observations in Melaka suggest that PH dismissed Muhyiddin’s allegations to have stemmed from panic and desperation, and as a move to attract Malay-Muslim voters through instilling fear. During their campaigning in Alor Gajah, Melaka, Amanah’s youth wing reminded voters that Muhyiddin himself—when he was Minister of Home Affairs during PH’s administration in 2019—denied that Islam and Malays were under threat, and even said such claims were irresponsible (*Yadim* 2019). In Selangor, Amirudin Shari, PH’s candidate in Gombak contesting against PN’s Azmin Ali, also countered such allegations and reminded voters that the state government spent RM1.4 billion on Islamic affairs in the four years prior (*Selangorkini* 2022).

The Malay candidates fielded by DAP also countered such statements and criticized PAS for taking advantage of religion (popularly expressed in Malay as “*menunggang agama*”) to gain power and votes (*Malaysian Insight* 2022).¹¹ Furthermore, in an unexpected turn, a group of seventy

¹¹ The narrative that the Malays are under threat was already prominent even before independence in 1957. In fact, this narrative of siege mentality led to the creation of another narrative: Ketuanan Melayu (Malay Supremacy). Arising out of Malay nationalism after the Second World War, this narrative reflected “the awakening of the bulk of the Malay people to the threat of being overwhelmed by the non-Malay population of Malaya” (Wang 2001, p. 55). While in 1835 the Malays comprised 85.9 per cent of the population and the Chinese comprised only 7.7 per cent, Malays made up only 49.2 per cent of the population in 1931 census, with the Chinese comprising 33.9 per cent (Zahari Awang 2016, p. 335).

Malay professors stepped forward to pronounce their trust that Anwar as prime minister would not manipulate Islam for his own agenda (*The Vocket* 2022).

In the aftermath of GE15, the “green wave” did not subside and the worrying narrative that Islam and Malays were under threat sparked much concern among the Malay Rulers. For instance, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong called on the public to be mature and to understand that unique racial differences were “the main flavour in the formation of a Malaysian race (Bangsa Malaysia) that loves and respects each other, is tolerant, and united” (Danial 2023). Furthermore, a week before the 2023 state elections, the Agong again made it clear to the Malays that “the struggle to raise the dignity of a certain race should not result in polarization in the country to the point of undermining the spirit of unity” (*Free Malaysia Today* 2023b).

However, despite the warning, the same fear tactics were widely used in the campaigns. This time, PAS was very bold in packaging their race and religion narrative by signing a pact with Mahathir Mohamad to defend Malay rights, naming the project “Proklamasi Melayu” or “Malay Proclamation” (Ahmad Mustakim 2023). Just weeks before campaigning for the state elections even officially started, Hadi Awang sharpened his

Following this was the founding of UMNO, which united over forty Malay organizations that championed Malay ethno-nationalism (Farish Noor 2012, p. 248). By the 1970s and 80s, politics and religion became increasingly intertwined, and political parties began to compete for Malay support based on religion, and not race (ibid., p. 248). Religion thus became politicized, and Ketuanan Melayu thus morphed into Ketuanan Islam (Islamic Supremacy). This thus meant that “chasing the Malay vote became chasing the ‘Islamic vote’” (Chin 2002, p. 455). Anwar, on the other hand, called for the replacement of Ketuanan Melayu with Ketuanan Rakyat (People’s Supremacy) during the general elections in 2008 and 2013. However, while such calls gained the attention of non-Malays, it provided PAS with the justification to accuse PH of not wanting to help the Malays. This narrative was especially dominant during GE14 and GE15. Thus, instead of viewing Ketuanan Rakyat as a racially inclusive concept, the fear instilled by PAS and PN caused Malay voters to see it as a threat to their livelihood (Milner and Ting 2014, p. 48).

attack against the DAP and the Chinese, trying to remind Malay Muslims that the DAP was promoting liberty and freedom in a Western mould and that such values might harm Malay and Muslim identity (Ahmad Suhael 2023). Hadi's statement claiming that the DAP had a "Chinese agenda" later prompted police to open an investigation since the Malay Rulers had been stern and repetitively warned against using the 3R (Race, Royalty, and Religion) while campaigning (Fuad Nizam 2023).

Courting Malay voters with the accusation that Islam was under threat also emerged during the state elections in Selangor. One of the dominant issues that was not properly addressed by PH was the claim that the Selangor state government directed hundreds of private and *tahfiz* religious schools to be closed. This allegation was made by the Head of Secretariat for Selangor Islamic NGOs, Nazilah Idris, and first reported by PAS' media outlet, *Harakah Daily* (2023). Another representative from the same bloc, Kamarulzaman, even claimed this could only happen when non-Muslims were given too much political power. The objective of this fake accusation was none other than to instil fear. The media statement went viral on social media platforms such as TikTok, eventually pushing Mohd Na'im Mokhtar and the Selangor state government to deny the allegations (*Malay Mail* 2023). The truth was that in 2019, the Sultan of Selangor, Sultan Sharafuddin Idris Shah, had decreed in his royal address when opening the first meeting of the second term of the 14th state legislative assembly "that private *tahfiz* schools that are not registered with Jais and do not have a curriculum and modern academic education system be closed" (Chan 2019).

Amanah president Mohamad Sabu cited the above slander as one of the reasons PAS and PN managed to deny PH's two-thirds majority and snatched multiple seats in Malay-populated areas (*Astro Awani* 2023). According to Mohamad Sabu,

for instance in Selangor during the recent state elections, they used the issue of religious and *tahfiz* schools being ordered to close, and this made the Malay voters trust them. In actual fact, the order of the Sultan of Selangor at the time was that religious schools that did not follow regulations and standard guidelines must be closed, and need to be renewed if they wish to operate again. While this

issue led them to get temporary support, I am confident that such lies cannot be sustained for the next four years.¹²

Ignoring warnings from the authorities and Malay Rulers, during the Simpang Jeram by-election in September 2023, Hadi Awang kept claiming, that Islam was under threat under the unity government, and called on UMNO members to vote for PAS (Mohd Farhan 2023). This is evidence that PAS' political model has not changed.

Discrimination against PAS States

During the state elections, local issues such as poor infrastructure, waste management and water supply dominated the campaigning. In Kelantan, the issue of clean water supply was raised. Trying to ignore PAS' attack on issues such as race and religion, Anwar Ibrahim as head of the federal government offered solutions by calling on voters to choose state governments that were in line with Putrajaya:

Compare (Kelantan) with other states like Perak, Johor, Selangor, and Penang. Why do these states have good development? Because their leaders actually do their jobs. We have given them (PAS and Perikatan) a chance for three years. You want Islam to be upheld? We are doing that. Do you think I'm a *kafir* (infidel)? I hope we can see change here in Kelantan. Make a decision based on what's best for you, your children, as well as your children's education and job opportunities for them (Arfa 2023).

¹² In the original Malay, “sebagai contoh di Selangor pada pilihan raya negeri (PRN) yang lalu, semasa kempen mereka menggunakan isu sekolah agama dan tahfiz diarahkan tutup, isu itu membuatkan pengundi Melayu percaya mereka. Padahal arahan Sultan Selangor pada waktu itu supaya semua sekolah agama yang tak ikut peraturan dan standard piawaian mesti ditutup sebab boleh mengundang bahaya, perlu buat pembaharuan jika mahu beroperasi semula. Isu itu menyebabkan mereka dapat sokongan sementara, saya yakin pembohongan mereka itu tak boleh bertahan hingga empat tahun akan datang”.

However, PAS consistently tried to turn the table by blaming the “others”, claiming that underdevelopment in PAS-ruled states such as Kelantan was due to discrimination against the states largely populated by Malay-Muslims (Manzaidi 2023).

Furthermore, during the televised debate between PKR Deputy President Rafizi Ramli and PAS Assistant Secretary-General Syahir Sulaiman on 8 August 2023, just days before polling day, Rafizi in chorus with Anwar criticized PAS’ poor governance and failed financial management in states such as Kelantan. Syahir responded by blaming the federal government for not doing enough for them, ignoring the fact that other states like Melaka and Negeri Sembilan found creative ways to ameliorate their financial difficulties (*Harian Metro* 2023).¹³

I observed the same issue in Kedah during GE15. PAS’ history of political oppression was used by the party leadership to their advantage (Muzaffar 1987, p. 39). For example, they used incidents of Lubuk Merbau in Perak and Kampung Memali in Kedah to enhance their image as defenders of Islam (*ibid.*). This gained support for the party:

¹³ In his research on the 1978 general election, Firdaus Haji Abdullah found that the dominant themes of PAS’ campaigns in Kelantan were “the unsatisfactory socio-economic position of the bumiputra, the decline of Malay political power, the decadence of moral values, the proliferation of vice, and the failure to observe the Islamic code of conduct in the government” (1980, pp. 92–93). Additionally, they blamed the “others” (i.e., Chinese/non-Muslims) for discriminating against and bullying the Malays (*ibid.*). These themes have continued to have a central position in PAS’ narratives up till GE15. Furthermore, these themes provide PAS with the opportunity to convince the Malays that they are the best leaders for the community: “PAS considers itself to be the only pure advocate of Islam while UMNO is ‘impure’ and ‘contaminated’. PAS points out that UMNO has failed to establish an Islamic state and has not implemented shariah (Muslim law); therefore, PAS considers UMNO to be outside of Islam. PAS has gone so far as to call UMNO members ‘kafir’ (unbelievers). PAS also calls itself ‘the oppressed’ who are under the ‘Oppressors’. UMNO considers this PAS pressure as the reason that government policies must favor the Malay Muslims at the expense of inequity toward the religious and cultural minorities” (McAmis 2002, p. 86).

When PAS villages are denied piped water and electricity, when they are deprived of primary schools and health clinics, when PAS members are not given loans for small businesses, when they are not provided financial assistance to repair their houses, when their children are discriminated against in the allocation of state scholarships, they become so incensed that they are more determined than ever to pursue their struggle. Indeed, the injustice involved is so obvious that even others who have nothing to do with PAS become sympathetic to its cause once they come to know of such blatant abuse of power (ibid. 1987, p. 37).

The issue of oil royalties owed to Kelantan was also repeatedly used as part of the narrative of oppression or victimization, and this was evident during GE15 (Baharom 2018). In order to show that PN was being fair, Muhyiddin promised that Kelantan would get their full oil royalties if the coalition won the election, reminding voters that only RM400 million was given to them during PH's two years of governance (Sharifah Mahsinah 2022). Within the framework of political Islam, PAS uses this issue to say that they had been victimized for choosing Islam, and that their rights to oil royalties were denied by an UMNO-led federal government.

During his research on GE14, Azmil Tayeb spoke to a PAS activist who explained that "it was as if the actions of Kelantanese to choose PAS as the state government were punished by the federal government when many of their rights and facilities were denied" (Azmil 2018, p. 244). This alleged denial of their rights thus led to resentment against UMNO during the elections. PAS continued with this narrative against the federal government when DAP's Lim Guan Eng was finance minister when PH was in power (*MalaysiaToday* 2018; *Malaysiakini* 2023). Even post-GE15, PAS still plays victim by claiming that the unity government under Anwar refuses to address the financial constraints suffered by Kelantan, Terengganu and Kedah (Hishamuddin 2023). Immediately after the state election in Terengganu, and upon being reprimanded by the Minister of Economic Affairs Rafizi Ramli for not having proper financial and economic management, Chief Minister Ahmad Samsuri Mokhtar reacted by alleging that the federal government was punishing Terengganu voters (Faizul Azlan 2023).

Madani versus Takfiri

To understand the root of Madani, it is crucial to look at Anwar's ABIM days. Apart from PAS, another prominent group that was heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood was ABIM. Highly influential among Malay-Muslims, ABIM was founded in 1971 by the alumni of local and foreign universities, and seemingly shared ideological and organizational affinity with the Muslim Brotherhood (Abbott and Gregorios-Pippas 2010, p. 139). According to Alexander Wain, ABIM had "garnered sufficient support to begin reshaping, both directly and indirectly, Malaysia's internal political trajectory, notably by inducing a period of intense government-led Islamization" (2021, p. 29). ABIM's slogan was "Islam is the way of life", prompting, among others, the use of the *hijab* (headscarf) among Malay women (Ishak Saat 2006, pp. 105–6).

As is already known, one of the most important figures to emerge from ABIM was Anwar Ibrahim, and it was against this backdrop of Islamic revivalism and Islamization in the 1970s and 1980s that he rose to prominence as a politician. ABIM under Anwar focused on pursuing Islamic reform and revival through education. The main difference between ABIM and PAS was that ABIM was better organized. Their target audience was also more concentrated, namely on the educated and the young; they successfully attracted large numbers of university students (Farish Noor 2012, p. 248). Later as Finance Minister in Mahathir's cabinet, Anwar introduced the concept of Madani with the support of ABIM activists.

Not long after becoming prime minister, Anwar reintroduced a meaningful discourse on Madani, a term synonymous with his first stint in government in 1995 (Wartawan BH 2023). Borrowing from his policy framework cum manifesto "Script for a Better Malaysia" weeks before GE15, Anwar set his agenda by explaining how he aimed to apply the concept of Madani in policymaking across all government sectors including education, economy, law, environment, culture, tourism, industry, agriculture, healthcare and transportation (Anwar 2022). To counteract the rot in government from years of blatant mismanagement, rampant corruption, and entrenched cronyism, he offered his style of reformism (Gounjaria and Musa 2022).

The “Script for a Better Malaysia” was, however, overshadowed by other issues during the GE15 campaign such as corruption and the high cost of living, as well as the aforementioned issues that PAS was concerned about. But since becoming prime minister, Anwar has rebranded Script as Madani and hopes for it to serve as a direction for the unity government. In essence, Madani is Anwar’s version of an Islamic approach to governance which emphasizes tolerance and clean governance, without implementing *hudud* law or championing a specific racial or religious community.¹⁴

Anwar also launched the Madani narrative for the economy, “Ekonomi Madani: Memperkasakan Rakyat” in July 2023, weeks before the state elections (Prime Minister’s Office 2023). Again, it was largely ignored by voters despite Anwar’s efforts to explain his administration’s plans for diversifying and restructuring the economic system to make it more just. In fact, Malay voters comprising of youth and civil servants, among others, seemed more attracted to PN’s ideas, even if these did not include concrete plans for the economy (FocusM 2023).

It is possible that Anwar could not effectively reach out to the masses to tell them about Madani, especially since PAS claimed that the framework deviated from Islam. Hadi Awang said that non-Muslims supported Anwar’s Madani and that this was wrong as non-Muslims did not comprise the majority of Malaysian society (Latifah 2023). He further accused Anwar of constantly switching parliamentary seats and relying on non-Muslims for support.¹⁵

¹⁴ My forthcoming Trends publication (*The Evolution of Madani: How Is 2.0 Different from 1.0?*, Trends in Southeast Asia no. 18/2023) further discusses the evolution of Madani from 1995 to 2023 and how it is based on “Script for a Better Malaysia”.

¹⁵ In the original Malay, “calon pemimpinnya berpindah-randah tempat bertanding sehingga terpaksa bergantung kepada sokongan bukan Islam yang tidak mendominasi keseluruhan penduduk”.

However, PAS is not the main challenge that Anwar and Madani have to face. Instead, and as evident from the state elections, a crucial challenge is the *takfiri* phenomenon, which is part of political Islam. I argue that political Islam in Malaysia was a direct result of the influence of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood in the 1960s.¹⁶ One key idea promoted by Sayyid Qutb, a leading member of the Muslim Brotherhood, was what he described as *jahiliyyah* philosophies. He referred to nationalism, secularism and socialism as un-Islamic systems. Instead, he emphasized the doctrine of jihad, with *takfiri* (the act of excommunication or declaring other Muslims as no longer Muslims) being its main approach. He also promoted the political call for the sovereignty of God. The Muslim Brotherhood's principle "the Qur'an is our Constitution" was then adopted by PAS. It was during this period that the *hudud* law became popular and evolved into an important product of political Islam in Malaysia. Consequently, PAS became the biggest player of political Islam.

According to Jamileh Kadiver, "*takfir* is about labelling other Muslims as kafir (non-believer) and infidels, and legitimizing violation against them" (2020, p. 3). *Takfiri* is an effective weapon used by Islamists like PAS whenever needed. Over the years, *takfiri* has resurfaced to strengthen the fear that Islam is under threat and to give voters the illusion that the Malays are being oppressed.

In the 1980s, the anti-government *takfiri* climate was fueled by the issuance of an Amanat i.e. published excerpts of a speech, by then PAS state commissioner for Terengganu and present President Abdul Hadi Awang, a Saudi-educated firebrand. The so-called Amanat Haji Hadi effectively apostatized members of the ruling Umno party for retaining an infidel constitution and

¹⁶ I have argued elsewhere that Sayyid Qutb's ideas have influenced PAS. In fact, the party had direct contact with Qutb and Hassan al-Banna in the 1960s (Mohd Faizal Musa and Siti Syazwani Zainal Abidin 2021).

separating religion and politics. The Amanat was blamed for instigating rebellion against the authorities in Memali, Kedah, in November 1985 when a showdown between security forces and PAS villagers resisting the arrest of their leader, Ibrahim Libya, ended in eighteen deaths. Abdul Hadi has never disowned his Amanat. Unsurprisingly, unlike many other orthodox Sunni theologians, he regards Wahhabism as being within mainstream Sunni Islam rather than an aberration if not outright deviant sect (Ahmad Fauzi 2016, pp. 12–13).

The use of *takfiri* was evident during the elections when a video of an elderly woman from a rural area in an east coast state made its rounds on social media, in which she labelled parties other than PAS as infidels (Khairulnuar 2023). Mohd Na'im Mokhtar, the Minister of Religious Affairs, expressed his concern about the situation (*Sinar Harian* 2023). However, PAS dismissed the affair, arguing that it was an isolated case, and that the elderly woman was senile (Hazelen 2023). However, it should be noted that such an incident is not unpredictable as the *takfiri* culture is rooted in society and is known to disrupt harmony within families and even larger village communities (Wan Rohila and Che Hamdan 2020, pp. 53–55). Consequently, it is unlikely that any other party can wrest Terengganu away from PAS. In fact, some scholars argue that it was the issuance of Amanat Haji Hadi and its acceptance as a social phenomenon that resulted in difficulties in uniting Malaysians (Munif and Ismail 2005, pp. 18–19).

With the *takfiri* culture rooted in Malay minds, Hadi Awang can easily dismiss Anwar's Madani as having a Western mould, and therefore as un-Islamic, while PAS' Islam is in accordance with the Qur'an. Hadi has emphasized that for Malaysia to succeed, "it should follow the established Islamic practice and hopefully, we can establish a state and a country that follows the pattern of Allah in Terengganu and Malaysia" (Yeong 2023). My observations during GE15 and the 2023 state elections confirm that this was what PAS conveyed to Malay voters. On the government side, PH has not done enough to control this phenomenon although there are proper sharia enactments in all states that criminalize those who excommunicate other Muslims as infidels. It can be said here

that the authorities are not willing to use Criminal Offences in the Syarak Enactment 1991, perhaps due to fear of backlash.¹⁷

Non-Muslims as Leaders

During my fieldwork before and after GE15, many Malay respondents expressed their hesitation to vote for non-Muslim candidates. While they viewed DAP as the face of non-Muslim candidates, they ironically ignored the fact that PAS was working with Gerakan, a Chinese-based party in the PN coalition.

The question of non-Muslims' electability as leaders is discussed and debated in many classical and contemporary texts concerning Islamic jurisprudence. According to Adil Hussain, although Islamists are prepared to protect minorities in their visionary Islamic states, non-Muslims are not seen on equal terms when it comes to decision-making in politics and administration.

Despite comprehensive protection and communal autonomy of non-Muslims under Islamist's *dhimma* model, there is no presumption of equality between Muslims and non-Muslims. The inequality between Muslims and non-Muslims is reflected in terms of differentiation in the political representation. The non-Muslims were subjected to several restrictions in the political sphere. The Islamist scholars maintain non-Muslims cannot hold the key posts from where they can influence or change the policy of an Islamic state. Behind this, the Islamists present the rationale that in Islam, there is inseparability between the "religion" and "state" and the first and foremost responsibility of a state is to establish and defend the religion of God (2023, p. 4).

¹⁷ See eSyariah, 1993, Enactment No. 4 of 1993: Criminal Offences in the Syarak Enactment 1991. Part II—Offences. http://www2.esyariah.gov.my/esyariah/mal/portalv1/enakmen2011/Eng_enactment_Upd.nsf/100ae747c72508e748256faa00188094/0b23b51600a8378a482576c500231b96?OpenDocument

PAS' animosity and antagonism towards non-Muslim leaders must be understood against this background. To be sure, PAS' general idea on the non-electability of non-Muslims as Members of Parliament (MP) can be considered rigid and extreme. In 1986, Abu Bakar Abdullah, PAS' former Deputy Head of the Ulama Wing and the first Director of Pusat Asuhan Tunas Islam (PASTI),¹⁸ published a book entitled *Ke Arah Pelaksanaan Undang-Undang Islam di Malaysia: Masalah dan Penyelesaiannya (Towards the Implementation of Islamic Law in Malaysia: Problems and Solutions)*.¹⁹ In this book, Abu Bakar proposed ways to transform Malaysia into an Islamic state. In doing so, he suggested that non-Muslims are not eligible to be MPs. If Malaysia is transformed into an Islamic State, it is the government that would be responsible for appointing non-Muslims as MPs and, as minorities, they are only allowed to vote for their own representatives (Abu Bakar Abdullah 1986, pp. 343–45). It should be noted that Abu Bakar was responsible for designing PASTI's textbooks in the 1990s. He also served under Hadi Awang as Terengganu state executive councillor from 1999 to 2004 when the latter was Terengganu's chief minister. Their close relationship is evident from the fact that Hadi Awang wrote the preface and blurb for the above-mentioned book.

With this in mind, the historical collaboration between PAS and DAP should have been a problem. With the demise of Fadzil Nor and later Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat, the progressive members in PAS who were willing to work with DAP suffered aggression from the conservatives, thus leading to a huge split and the formation of Amanah in 2016. While those who are more aligned with post-Islamism might have different interpretations of the sacred texts, i.e., Qur'anic verses and *hadith*, regarding the status of non-Muslims (Nair 2019; *Berita Harian* 2018), the Islamists are not prepared to share power with them. In the Malaysian context, this is most evident in the ill feelings towards the Chinese and DAP as a political party. Amanah has been trying hard to correct this unrealistic view within the context of constitutional citizenship (Thayaparan 2023).

¹⁸ PAS' network of preschools.

¹⁹ It was originally his Master's thesis.

In the weeks before GE15 campaigning started, Hadi Awang accused non-Muslims and non-bumiputeras of being the root of corruption and called upon Muslim voters to take control of the situation (*Free Malaysia Today* 2022). During my fieldwork in the states of Perak, Selangor, Kuala Lumpur and Negeri Sembilan, I observed that this perception of non-Muslims as being ineligible as leaders was widely accepted as a doctrine of Islam. In fact, some respondents clearly said that it was a sin to vote for non-Muslims. During the 2023 state elections, Penang Mufti Wan Salim Wan Mohd Noor tried to counteract this view, but to no avail (Zuhainy 2023).

Not long after GE15, Hadi Awang warned against non-Muslims ruling over Malays (Nantha Kumar 2023). Furthermore, in the weeks prior to the state elections, he reiterated that non-Muslims should be grateful for being granted citizenship and should not question the status quo any further, reiterating that only Muslims should lead the country (Muhammad Yusry 2023; Ayamany 2023). Cautiously, Anwar Ibrahim brushed off Hadi's claims as an old narrative on race while emphasizing that PH was focusing on better policies (Easwaran 2023). However, as can be seen, although it is an old narrative, it so happens that perceptions about the status of non-Muslims are deeply rooted as a characteristic of political Islam, and PH has not done enough to correct such views.

CONCLUSION

If Anwar Ibrahim participated in GE15 as a Muslim leader representing post-Islamism, Abdul Hadi Awang as the leader of PAS was a classic example of a staunch Islamist, “using Islam as their political agenda” who was not willing to consider non-Muslims as leaders in his determination to pursue the idea of an Islamic state (Badrul Azmier et al. 2010, pp. 403–4).

The themes which seemed to be the most prevalent during GE15 and the 2023 state elections were that of corruption and the rising cost of living. However, a closer analysis of issues affecting the Malay voter base reveals that the five issues discussed above—*hudud* law and RUU355, the supposed threat to Islam and the Malays, the alleged federal oppression of PAS states, PAS' *takfiri* approach, and the question of non-Muslims as leaders—were also highly prevalent.

However, it appeared that PH and Anwar either did not effectively respond to these issues or deliberately chose to ignore them in favour of tackling issues like corruption and the cost of living. Even during the state elections, they chose to focus on explaining PH's policies. During GE15, they were preoccupied with defeating UMNO and BN, to the extent that they did not pay attention to the threat posed by PAS' vision of political Islam. The only shield the prime minister had to protect himself from PAS bullets was a letter written by the late Yusuf Qaradhwawi in 2015 asking Malaysians not to believe past ill allegations against Anwar (ABIM 2015). The letter was circulated online and read aloud during PH's campaign.²⁰

Although it can be said that Anwar did not really take the "religious baits" thrown at him by PAS, it does not mean that Islam was not an important theme during the federal election. As discussed above, GE15 was a battle fought between Islamists and post-Islamists, and how they approached issues concerning Islamic affairs. Later, during the state elections, the schism between the Islamists and post-Islamists seemed more visible, as PAS was more actively and fiercely responding to Anwar's ideas on Madani.

Islam has played an important role in regional politics since it first arrived in the Malay Archipelago. Centuries later, the end of European colonization triggered a journey of soul-searching among newly independent nation-states. Muslims in Malaysia partook in this process, and the global Islamic revivalism in the 1970s was the answer to their search. Islam steadily permeated local politics, and its integration into society gradually resulted in racialization, religious conservatism, and later, youth radicalization. All of these issues were prevalent during general elections throughout the decades.

²⁰ During Anwar's campaign trail in Masjid Tanah, Melaka, I observed that Anwar referred to the letter and pleaded with voters to support his Islamic mission in the form of combatting corruption. Coincidentally, Qaradhwawi passed away on 26 September 2022, shortly before the elections, allowing Anwar to take advantage of the emotional atmosphere to share the letter again.

In the 1980s, Anwar Ibrahim, once an Islamic icon representing ABIM's unique version of Islam, was co-opted by Mahathir Mohamad in order to undermine PAS and re-assert Malay centrality within the nation. This move brought Islam to the fore, and it continues to dominate political debate and discourse today. Consequently, the significance accorded Islam has meant that the appetite of Malay Muslims has grown, and they continue to demand for more. However, while the Malays sway to the right of the political spectrum, the non-Malays—especially the Chinese and those in East Malaysia—are left with few choices and have also become a determining factor in recent political struggles.

Fifty years after Islamization began, political Islam continues to dominate Malaysia's complex and unpredictable political scene. It is not unimaginable that in the future, the battle between PAS and Anwar Ibrahim over political Islam will be fought not just during elections, but also in Islamic schools across the country. These schools have become the power base of PAS and have been used to nurture the future of political Islam. If Anwar is able to grasp the complications that he introduced into Malaysia during his "first chapter", it may not be too late for him to plant the seeds to change the attitudes of the next generation. However, these questions remain: Does Anwar's unity government have the political will and ability to implement such change? Will Madani and the accompanying values of fair, just and effective governance be strong enough to compete with the more tangible products of political Islam such as sharia and *hudud* law? Does Anwar have the right team to amend his "mistakes"?

With the state elections now over, will the green wave stop only at Kedah, Kelantan, Terengganu and Perlis, or will it gradually swallow Selangor, Negeri Sembilan and Pahang in GE16?

Kedah's chief minister and PN's election director, Muhammad Sanusi Mohd Nor, has vowed that Islamism is unstoppable and will inevitably reach Johor. Speaking at the Simpang Jeram, Johor by-election, Sanusi even claimed that the Islamist wave would also hit Singapore: "The wave that broke out in the recent six state elections will reach Johor and even go all the way to Singapore" (*Free Malaysia Today* 2023a). After GE15, Sanusi has been recklessly expressing unfounded theories about how non-Muslims have a strategic agenda to monopolize political participation

and representation by mobilizing a single ethnic group in major cities. He added that China was identifying locations within Malaysia and in neighbouring countries, starting from Johor Baru, Seremban, Kuala Lumpur, Ipoh, Penang, Bangkok, Hong Kong and Taiwan, as parts of the “New Silk Road”. To exhibit PAS’ strength, Sanusi also claimed that the New Silk Road agenda had been halted in Kedah and Perlis, ruled as they now are by PAS (Ahmad Mukhsein 2023).

Political Islam was certainly a significant factor during GE15 and continued to be so during the 2023 state elections. PAS itself has vowed to work with Mahathir Mohamad in pursuit of the Malay agenda and in protecting Islam against perceived threats (Nantha Kumar 2023). This so-called Malay-Islam phenomenon or green wave will be prevalent for many years to come.

REFERENCES

- Aafreedi, Navras J. 2019. “Antisemitism in the Muslim Intellectual Discourse in South Asia”. *Religions* 10, no. 7: 1–15.
- Abbott, Jason P., and Sophie Gregorios-Pippas. 2010. “Islamization in Malaysia: Processes and Dynamics”. *Contemporary Politics* 16, no. 2: 135–51.
- Abd Rahman Koya. 2002. “Death of PAS Leader Leaves Party Facing Difficult Decisions”. *Crescent International*. 8 July 2002. <https://web.archive.org/web/20160304055523/http://www.mediamonitors.net/abdrahmankoya4.html> (accessed 2 May 2023).
- Abdul Hadi Awang. 2001. *Qazaf: Mangsa Fitnah* [*Qazaf: The Victim of Sedition*]. Kuala Lumpur: Pusat Penerangan dan Penyelidikan PAS Pusat.
- . 2002. *Dari Mimbar Masjid Rusila* [From the Pulpit of Rusila Mosque]. Bangi: As-Syabab Media.
- . 2003. *Fikrah, Harakah dan Daulah* [Ideas, the Islamic Movement and Sovereignty]. Shah Alam: Dewan Pustaka Fajar.
- . 2022. “Kuliah Tok Guru Abdul Hadi” [Tok Guru Abdul Hadi’s Lecture]. *TikTok*. 16 November 2022. <https://vt.tiktok.com/ZSLh6ENqP/> (accessed 12 June 2023).

- Abdul Hamid Mohamad. 2017. "Amendment of Act 355: Frequently Asked Questions". *Tun Abdul Hamid Mohamad*, 21 January 2017. <https://tunabdulhamid.me/2017/01/amendment-of-act-355-frequently-asked-questions/> (accessed 3 May 2023).
- Abdul Razak Ayub. 1985. *Perpecahan Bangsa Melayu* [The Division of the Malays]. Shah Alam: Dewan Pustaka Fajar.
- ABIM. 2015. "Surat Sahibus Samahah As-Shaykh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi kepada Anwar Ibrahim dan Kerajaan Malaysia" [Sahibus Samahah As-Shaykh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi's Letter to Anwar and the Malaysian Government]. *Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM)*, 10 August 2015. <https://www.abim.org.my/surat-sahibus-samahah-as-shaykh-yusuf-al-qaradawi-kepada-anwar-ibrahim-dan-kerajaan-malaysia/> (accessed 3 May 2023).
- Abu Bakar Abdullah. 1986. *Ke Arah Perlaksanaan Undang-Undang Islam di Malaysia: Masalah dan Penyelesaiannya* [Towards the Implementation of Islamic Law in Malaysia: Problems and Solutions]. Kuala Terengganu. Pustaka Damai.
- Abu Hanieh, Hassan. 2018. "From Islamism to Post-Islamism: An Examination of Concepts and Theses". In *Post Islamism: A New Phase or Ideological Delusions?*, edited by Mohammad Abu Rumman, pp. 21–56. Translated by William Joseph Ward. Amman: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
- Adil Hussain Bhat. 2023. "Analyzing the Islamist and New-Islamist Discourse on Minorities in an Islamic State". *International Journal of Islamic Thought* 23: 1–10.
- Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid. 2007. "Patterns of State Interaction with Islamic Movements in Malaysia during the Formative Years of Islamic Resurgence". *Southeast Asian Studies* 44, no. 4: 444–65.
- . 2016. *The Extensive Salafization of Malaysian Islam*. Trends in Southeast Asia no. 9/2016. Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
- Ahmad Mukhsein Mukhtar. 2023. "Amanah Man Hits out at Sanusi over Singapore Agenda Claims". *New Straits Times*. 26 January 2023. <https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2023/01/873663/amanah-man-hits-out-sanusi-over-singapore-agenda-claims> (accessed 25 August 2023).

- Ahmad Mustakim Zulkifli. 2023. "PAS Sokong 'Proklamasi Orang Melayu' Anjuran Mahathir" [PAS Support Malay Proclamation by Mahathir]. *Malaysia Now*, 3 May 2023. <https://www.malaysianow.com/my/news/2023/05/03/pas-sokong-proklamasi-orang-melayu-anjuran-mahathir> (accessed 12 September 2023).
- Ahmad Suhael Adnan. 2023. "Hadi Dakwa DAP Sambung Usaha British Mahu Hapus Ketuanan Melayu, Bumiputera" [Hadi Claims DAP to Continue British Plan to Abolish Malay Supremacy]. *Berita Harian*, 8 July 2023. <https://www.bharian.com.my/berita/nasional/2023/07/1123949/hadi-dakwa-dap-sambung-usaha-british-mahu-hapus-ketuanan-melayu> (accessed 9 July 2023).
- Alyaa Alhadjri, N. Faizal Ghazali, and Low Choon Chyuan. 2022. "PAS Sasar Golongan Muda 'Jahil Agama, Politik' untuk Menang PRU15" [PAS Targets Youth 'Ignorant of Religion, Politics' to Win GE15]. *Malaysiakini*, 3 September 2022. <https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/634433> (accessed 17 June 2023).
- Anwar Ibrahim. 2022. *Script for a Better Malaysia: An Empowering Vision and Policy Framework for Action*. Shah Alam: Institut Darul Ehsan (IDE) and Centre for Postnormal Policy and Futures Studies. https://postnormaltim.es/sites/default/files/uploads/SCRIPT%20English_compressed.pdf (accessed 17 June 2023).
- Arfa Yunus. 2023. "Explain Why Kelantan Can't Resolve Water Woes, Anwar Asks PAS, Perikatan". *The Star*, 7 August 2023. <https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2023/08/07/explain-why-kelantan-cant-resolve-water-woes-anwar-asks-pas-perikatan> (accessed 12 August 2023).
- Astro Awani. 2023. "Saya Akan Bongkar Pembongkaran Presiden PAS Esok—Mat Sabu" [I Will Reveal PAS' President Lies Tomorrow—Mat Sabu". 27 August 2023. <https://www.astroawani.com/berita-politik/saya-akan-bongkar-pembongkaran-presiden-pas-esok-mat-sabu-434769> (accessed 27 August 2023).
- Ayamany, Keertan. 2023. "Hadi: Non-Muslims Must be Grateful for 'Being Given a Place' Here, Should Just Let Malays Continue Leading Country". *Malay Mail*, 7 June 2023. <https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2023/06/07/hadi-non-muslims-must-be-grateful-for-being-given-a-place-here-should-just-let>

- malays-continue-leading-country/73042 (accessed 27 August 2023).
- Azmil Tayeb. 2018. "Green Wave of Change in the East Coast: PAS and Anti UMNO Backlash in Kelantan". *Jebat: Malaysian Journal of History, Politics & Strategic Studies* 45, no. 2: 232–50.
- Azrul Azlan Abdul Rahman. 2022. "Expected Acceptance and Rejection Factors for PAS and UMNO in Peninsula Malaysia in the 15th General Election. *Malay Mail*, 18 November 2022. <https://www.malaymail.com/news/what-you-think/2022/11/18/expected-acceptance-and-rejection-factors-for-pas-and-umno-in-peninsula-malaysia-in-the-15th-general-election-azrul-azlan-abdul-rahman/40381> (accessed 12 June 2023).
- Badrul Azmier Mohamed Bakar, Mujibu Abd Muis, and Zaliha Hj Hussin. 2010. "Sejauh Mana Peranan Agama Dalam Politik Malaysia" [The Extent of the Role of Religion in Malaysian Politics]. Seminar on "National Resilience: Political Management and Policies in Malaysia". Institute of Research, Development and Commercialization Universiti Teknologi MARA. <https://repo.uum.edu.my/id/eprint/3184/1/S20.pdf> (accessed 1 June 2023).
- Baharom Bakar. 2018. "PAS Dakwa DAP Diskriminasi Pembangunan Pantai Timur" [PAS Accuses DAP of Discriminating in Development of East Coast]. *Berita Harian*, 19 October 2018. <https://www.bharian.com.my/berita/politik/2018/10/488005/pas-dakwa-dap-diskriminasi-pembangunan-pantai-timur> (accessed 10 May 2023).
- Bayat, Asef. 2005. "What Is Post Islamism". *ISIM Review* 16: 5. <https://scholarlypublications.universiteitleiden.nl/access/item%3A2716051/download> (accessed 10 December 2023).
- . 2016. *Pos Islamisme* [Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn]. Translated by Faiz Tajul Milah. Jogjakarta: LKiS.
- Berita Harian*. 2018. "Jangan Anggap Ahli Bukan Islam Golongan Kelas Kedua" [Do Not Treat Non-Muslim Members as Second Class]. 15 December 2018. <https://www.bharian.com.my/berita/politik/2018/12/509721/jangan-anggap-ahli-bukan-islam-golongan-kelas-dua-mujahid> (accessed 9 July 2023).

- . 2023. “Membangun Malaysia Madani Bagi Bina Masa Depan Negara—PM” [Developing Malaysia Madani for Future of the Nation—PM]. 19 January 2023. <https://www.bharian.com.my/berita/nasional/2023/01/1053738/membangun-malaysia-madani-bagi-bina-masa-depan-negara-pm> (accessed 15 June 2023).
- Chan, Dawn. 2019. “Selangor Sultan Decrees Closure of Private Tahfiz Schools Not Registered with Jais”. *New Straits Times*, 18 March 2019. <https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2019/03/470612/selangor-sultan-decrees-closure-private-tahfiz-schools-not-registered> (accessed 21 August 2023).
- Chin, James. 2002. “Racism Towards the Chinese Minority in Malaysia: Political Islam and Institutional Barriers”. *Political Quarterly* 93, no. 3: 451–59.
- Danial Azhar. 2023. “King Calls for Greater Racial Harmony to Prevent Extremism”. *Free Malaysia Today*, 13 February 2023. <https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2023/02/13/agong-calls-for-greater-racial-harmony-to-prevent-extremism/> (accessed 12 August 2023).
- Easwaran, Elill. 2023. “It’s About Policies, Not Race, Anwar Tells PAS”. *Free Malaysia Today*, 2 June 2023. <https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2023/06/02/its-about-policies-not-race-anwar-tells-pas/> (accessed 10 August 2023).
- Farah Noor Samat. 2014. “Hudud: Gerakan Ancam Heret PAS ke Mahkamah” [*Hudud: Movement Threatens to Drag PAS to Court*]. *Malaysiakini*, 24 April 2014. <https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/260905> (accessed 12 June 2023).
- Faisal Asyraf. 2022. “PH Lapor Polis Dakwaan Muhyiddin Berkait ‘Kristianisasi’” [PH Makes Police Report on Muhyiddin’s “Christianisation” Allegation]. *Malaysiakini*, 18 November 2022. <https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/bahasa/tempatan/2022/11/18/ph-lapor-polis-dakwa-an-muhyiddin-berkait-kristianisasi/> (accessed 5 June 2023).
- . 2023. “PAS Playing ‘Cheap Politics’ by Raising RUU355 Issue Now, Says PM”. *Free Malaysia Today*, 27 May 2023. <https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2023/05/27/pas-playing-cheap-politics-by-raising-ruu355-issue-now-says-pm/> (accessed 27 May 2023).

- Faizul Azlan Razak. 2023. “Tiada Perancangan Ekonomi Yang Baik? MB Trengganu Jawab Rafizi” [No Proper Economic Management? Trengganu Chief Minister Responds Rafizi]. *Berita Harian*, 26 August 2023. <https://www.bharian.com.my/amp/berita/nasional/2023/08/1144914/tiada-perancangan-ekonomi-yang-baik-mb-trengganu-jawab-rafizi> (accessed 26 August 2023).
- Farish A. Noor. 2012. “Islamism in Malaysia”. In *Malaysia: Road Map for Achieving Vision 2020*, edited by Koon Yew Yin, pp. 245–51. Petaling Jaya: Strategic Information and Research Development Centre.
- Fealy, Greg, and Virginia Hooker, eds. 2006. *Voices of Islam in Southeast Asia: A Contemporary Sourcebook*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Firdaus Haji Abdullah. 1980. “PAS and the 1978 Election”. In *Malaysian Politics and the 1978 Election*, edited by Harold Crouch, Lee Kam Hing and Michael Ong, pp. 69–96. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.
- FocusM. 2023. “Is Pakatan Harapan Little Too Late to Rally the Power of Youth?”. Focus Malaysia, 26 June 2023. <https://focusmalaysia.my/is-pakatan-harapan-little-too-late-to-rally-the-power-of-youth/> (accessed 11 August 2023).
- Free Malaysia Today*. 2022. “Hadi Fingers Non-Muslims, Non-Bumiputeras over Corruption”. 20 August 2022. <https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2022/08/20/malay-voter-apathy-put-non-muslims-liberals-in-control-says-hadi/> (accessed 20 August 2023).
- . 2023a. “Simpang Jeram will be Gateway of PN Wave to Johor, Says Sanusi”. 24 August 2023. <https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2023/08/24/simpang-jeram-will-be-gateway-of-pn-wave-to-johor-says-sanusi/> (accessed 24 August 2023).
- . 2023b. “Empowering One Race Mustn’t Lead to Polarisation, Says King”. 5 August 2023. <https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2023/08/05/elevating-a-particular-race-must-not-lead-to-polarisation-warns-king/> (accessed 12 August 2023).
- Fuad Nizam. 2023. “Police Open Investigation on Hadi’s DAP’s Chinese Agenda Statement”. *New Straits Times*, 10 July 2023. <https://www.nst.com.my/news/crime-courts/2023/07/929263/police-open>

- investigation-hadis-daps-chinese-agenda-statement (accessed 11 July 2023).
- Fuchs, Simon Wolfgang. 2021. "A Direct Flight to Revolution: Maududi, Divine Sovereignty, and the 1979-Moment in Iran". *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 32, no. 2: 1–22.
- Gounjaria, Nageeb, and Ahmad Farouk Musa. 2022. "Anwar Ibrahim's Vision for a Better Malaysia: A Review". *Free Malaysia Today*, 11 October 2022. <https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/opinion/2022/10/11/anwar-ibrahims-vision-for-a-better-malaysia-a-review/> (accessed 20 August 2023).
- Harakah Daily*. 2023. "Isu Sekolah Agama Selangor: NGO Tuntut Melayu-Islam Waspada" [The Issue of Religious Schools in Selangor: NGOs Call on Malay Muslims to be Vigilant]. 14 August 2023. <https://harakahdaily.net/index.php/2023/08/14/isu-sekolah-agama-selangor-ngo-tuntut-melayu-islam-waspada/> (accessed 16 August 2023).
- Harian Metro*. 2023. "Debat Antara Rafizi Ramli dan Mohd Syahir Sulaiman" [Debate Between Rafizi Ramli and Mohd Syahir Sulaiman]. 8 August 2023. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Jc_f9gY7Fo (accessed 26 August 2023).
- Harun Din. 1978. "Hudud Pengubat Jenayah" [*Hudud* as a Means to Prevent Crime]. *Dewan Masyarakat*, pp. 9–11. Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka.
- Hashemi, Nader. 2022. "Anwar Ibrahim and the Labyrinth of Post-Islamism". *New Lines Magazine*, 7 December 2022. <https://newlinesmag.com/argument/anwar-ibrahim-and-the-labyrinth-of-post-islamism/> (accessed 1 June 2023).
- Hazelen Liana Kamarudin. 2023. "Makcik Itu Sudah Nyanyuk dan Keluarganya Juga Minta Padam Video" [That Old Woman Is Senile and Her Family Has Demanded the Video Be Deleted]. *Sinar Harian*, 7 August 2023. <https://www.sinarharian.com.my/article/272390/berita/politik/makcik-itu-sudah-nyanyuk-dan-keluarganya-juga-minta-padam-video> (accessed 8 August 2023).
- Hew Wai Weng. 2022. "Islamists vs Islamists in GE15". *Stratsea*, 14 November 2022. <https://stratsea.com/islamists-vs-islamists-in-ge15/> (accessed 5 June 2023).

- Hishamuddin Abdul Karim. 2023. “Noktahkan Diskriminasi kepada Pembangkang” [End Discrimination against Opposition]. *Harakah Daily*, 9 March 2023. <https://harakahdaily.net/index.php/2023/03/09/noktahkan-diskriminasi-kepada-negeri-dan-mp-pembangkang/> (accessed 13 June 2023).
- Ibrahim, Azeem. 2022. “Anwar Ibrahim is Good News for the Muslim World”. *Arab News*, 9 December 2022. <https://www.arabnews.com/node/2213661> (accessed 8 June 2023).
- Idris Ahmad. 2005. *Teks Usrah: Peringkat Pengenalan [Usrah Text: Introductory Level]*. Kuala Lumpur: Sarjana Media.
- Ishak Saat. 2006. *Sejarah Sosiobudaya Melayu [Malay Sociocultural History]*. Shah Alam: Karisma Publications.
- Kadaver, Jamilah. 2020. “Exploring Takfir, Its Origins and Contemporary Use: The Case of Takfiri Approach in Daesh’s Media”. *Contemporary Review of the Middle East* 7, no. 3: 1–27.
- Khairulnuar Yahaya. 2023. “PAS Perlu Perbetulkan Pandangan Tentang Ahli UMNO Kafir” [PAS Must Correct the View that UMNO Members are Infidels]. *Malaysia Gazette*, 5 August 2023. https://malaysiagazette.com/2023/08/05/pas-perlu-perbetulkan-pandangan-tentang-ahli-umno-kafir/#google_vignette (accessed 5 August 2023).
- Khoo Boo Teik. 2020. *The Making of Anwar Ibrahim’s “Human Economy”*. Trends in Southeast Asia, no. 18/2020. Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
- Latifah Arifin. 2023. “PAS Dakwa Konsep Malaysia Madani Tersasar daripada Teladan Rasulullah SAW” [PAS Claims Malaysia Madani Strays from Prophet Muhammad’s Example]. *Berita Harian*, 13 February 2023. <https://www.bharian.com.my/berita/politik/2023/02/1063485/pas-dakwa-konsep-malaysia-madani-tersasar-daripada-teladan-rasulullah> (accessed 13 July 2023).
- Lemiere, Sophie. 2022. “The (Final) Rise of Anwar Ibrahim”. *Journal of Democracy*. December 2022. <https://journalofdemocracy.org/the-final-rise-of-anwar-ibrahim/> (accessed 11 June 2023).
- Madiha Abdullah. 2022. “PRU15: Dituduh Taja Kumpulan Kristian dan Yahudi, Anwar Ibrahim Tanya ‘Tak Ada Modal Lain Ke?’” [GE15: Accused of Sponsoring Christian and Jewish Groups,

- Anwar Ibrahim Asks ‘Is There No other Tactic?’. *Astro Awani*, 18 November 2022. <https://www.astroawani.com/berita-politik/pru15-dituduh-taja-kumpulan-kristian-dan-yahudi-anwar-ibrahim-tanya-tak-ada-modal-lain-ke-392176> (accessed 13 June 2023).
- Malay Mail*. 2023. “Claims Selangor Religious Schools Ordered to Close Untrue, Says Minister”. 17 August 2023. <https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2023/08/17/claims-selangor-religious-schools-ordered-to-close-untrue-says-minister/85707> (accessed 17 August 2023).
- Malaysia Today*. 2018. “Jika Kit Siang Mahu Bukti, Tanya Menteri Kewangan, Kata Hadi” [If Kit Siang Wants Evidence, Ask Finance Ministry, Says Hadi]. 21 October 2018. <https://www.malaysia-today.net/2018/10/21/jika-kit-siang-mahu-bukti-tanya-menteri-kewangan-kata-hadi/> (accessed 3 May 2023).
- Malaysiakini*. 2022. “Muhyiddin Kaitkan PH dengan Agenda Yahudi, Kristian” [Muhyiddin Associates PH with a Jewish, Christian Agenda]. 18 November 2022. <https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/644749> (accessed 5 June 2023).
- . 2023. “Raja Baharin: PAS Playing Seasonal Politics with Oil Royalties”. 28 March 2023. <https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/660266> (accessed 3 May 2023).
- Malaysian Insight*. 2022. “PAS Hanya Tahu Tunggang Sentimen Melayu, Islam, Kata Calon DAP” [PAS Only Knows How to Ride on Malay, Muslim Sentiments, Says DAP Candidate]. 12 November 2022. <https://www.themalaysianinsight.com/bahasa/s/411265> (accessed 5 June 2023).
- March, Andrew F. “Political Islam: Theory”. *Annual Review of Political Science* 18: 17.1–17.21.
- Manzaidi Mohd Amin. 2023. “Kadar Pembangunan Negeri Ditadbir PAS Perlahan Kerana Diskriminasi Pemerintah” [Slow Development in PAS Ruled States Due to Discrimination by the Government]. *Malaysia Gazette*, 15 May 2023. <https://malaysiagazette.com/2023/05/15/kadar-pembangunan-negeri-ditadbir-pas-perlahan-kerana-diskriminasi-pemerintah/> (accessed 12 August 2023).
- Maszlee Malik. 2017. “Rethinking the Role of Islam in Malaysian

- Politics: A Case Study of Parti Amanah Negara”. *ICR Journal* 8, no. 4: 457–72.
- , and Syaza Farhana Mohamad Shukri. 2018. “From Political Islam to Democrat Muslim: A Comparison between Rashid Ghannouchi and Anwar Ibrahim”. *Intellectual Discourse* 26, no. 1: 161–88.
- McAmis, Robert Day. 2002. *Malay Muslims: The History and Challenge of Resurgent Islam in Southeast Asia*. Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
- Means, Gordon. 2012. “Political Islam in Southeast Asia: The Islamic State Issue”. In *Malaysia: Road Map for Achieving Vision 2020*, edited by Koon Yew Yin, pp. 264–66. Petaling Jaya: Strategic Information and Research Development Centre.
- Meijer, Roel. 2009. “Towards a Political Islam”. *Clingendael Diplomacy Papers* no. 22: 3–50.
- Milner, Anthony, and Helen Ting. 2014. “Race and its Competing Paradigms: A Historical Review”. In *Transforming Malaysia: Dominant and Competing Paradigms*, edited by Anthony Milner, Abdul Rahman Embong, and Tham Siew Yean, pp. 18–58. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Mohamed Azam Mohamed Adil. 2014. “Hudud: Perspektif Semasa di Malaysia” [*Hudud: Current Perspectives in Malaysia*]. In *Islam dan Tajdid: Tinjauan Isu-Isu dan Perspektif Semasa* [Islam and Renewal: A Survey of Current Issues and Perspectives], edited by Abdul Karim Ali and Rumaizi Ahmad, pp. 107–28. Shah Alam: Persatuan Ulama Malaysia.
- Mohd Faizal Musa. 2021. *Naquib Al-Attas’ Islamization of Knowledge: Its Impact on Malay Religious Life, Literature, Language and Culture*. Trends in Southeast Asia, no. 16/2021. Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
- and Siti Syazwani Zainal Abidin. 2021. “Longer-term External Conditions behind Legal Conservatism in Malaysian Islam”. *ISEAS Perspective*, no. 2021/23, 4 March 2021.
- Mohd Farhan Darwis. 2023. “PRK: Undi Calon PN Untuk Selamatkan Negara; Islam, Hadi Beritahu Ahli UMNO” [By-Election: Vote PN to Save Country and Islam, Hadi Tells UMNO Members]. *Free*

- Malaysia Today*, 27 August 2023. <https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/bahasa/tempatan/2023/08/27/prk-undi-calon-pn-untuk-selamatkan-negara-islam-hadi-beritahu-ahli-umno/> (accessed 27 August 2023).
- Muhamad Nadzri Mohamed Noor. 2022. “The Malay-Muslim Politics and Malaysia’s GE15”. *Stratsea*, 16 November 2022. <https://stratsea.com/the-malay-muslim-politics-and-malaysias-ge15/> (accessed 12 June 2023).
- Muhammad Yusry. 2023. “After Anwar Slams Hadi for Harping on Race, PAS President Insists Only Malay-Muslims Should Lead Malaysia”. *Malay Mail*, 5 June 2023. <https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2023/06/05/after-anwar-slams-hadi-for-harping-on-race-pas-president-insists-only-malay-muslims-should-lead-malaysia/72573> (accessed 12 August 2023).
- Munif Zariruddin Fikri Nordin, and Ismail Yusoff. 2005. “Agama, Bahasa dan Bangsa: Beberapa Isu Kesatubangsaan di Malaysia” [Religion, Language and Race: Some Issues on United Malaysian]. In *Pembinaan Negara Bangsa: Persepsi, Reaksi dan Manifestasi*, edited by Khazriyati Salehuddin, Azhar Haludin, and Nor Hashimah Jalaluddin, pp. 11–26. Bangi. Pusat Pengajian Bahasa dan Linguistik Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia.
- Mustafa Izzuddin. 2015. “The Pakatan Rakyat Collapse: Implications for Party Politics in Malaysia”. *ISEAS Perspective*, no. 2015/41, 5 August 2015.
- Muzaffar, Chandra. 1987. *Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia*. Petaling Jaya: Penerbit Fajar Bakti.
- Nair, Moaz. 2019. “Who Says Muslims Can’t Vote for Non-Muslim Leaders?”. *Free Malaysia Today*, 24 January 2023. <https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/opinion/2019/01/24/who-says-muslims-cant-vote-for-non-muslim-leaders/> (accessed 13 August 2023).
- Nantha Kumar, B. 2023. “Hadi: Non-Muslims Will Rule if Malays Have Low Political Awareness.” *Malaysiakini*, 1 March 2023. <https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/656884> (accessed 12 August 2023).
- Norhaspida Yatim. 2023. “PAS Diminta Tunai Janji Laksana Hukum Hudud di Terengganu” [PAS Requested to Implement Their

- Promise in Enacting *Hudud* Law in Terengganu]. *Sinar Harian*, 15 August 2023. <https://www.sinarharian.com.my/article/273833/berita/politik/pas-diminta-tunai-janji-laksana-hukum-hudud-di-terengganu> (accessed 22 August 2023).
- Osman Bakar. 2009. "Religious Reform and the Controversy Surrounding Islamisation in Malaysia". In *Muslim Reform in Southeast Asia: Perspectives from Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore*, edited by Syed Farid Alatas, pp. 31–45. Singapore: Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura.
- Paracha, Nadeem Farooq. 2021. "Maududi's Leviathan: From a Political Ambition to a Cultural Pursuit". *Friday Times*, 4 December 2021. <https://www.thefridaytimes.com/2021/12/04/maududis-leviathan-from-a-political-ambition-to-a-cultural-pursuit/> (accessed 2 May 2023).
- Petschulat, Tim. 2018. "Foreword". In *Post Islamism: A New Phase or Ideological Delusions?*, edited by Mohammad Abu Rumman, pp. 7–8. Translated by William Joseph Ward. Amman: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
- Prime Minister Office. 2023. "Ekonomi Madani: Memperkasa Rakyat". *Prime Minister Office Official Website Page*, 27 July 2023. <https://www.pmo.gov.my/ms/membangun-malaysia-madani-2/ekonomi-madani-memperkasa-rakyat/> (accessed 27 July 2023).
- Ragu, Dineskumar. 2023. "Why Partner PAS When You Were Against *Hudud*, Anwar Asks Gerakan". *Free Malaysia Today*, 6 August 2023. <https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2023/08/06/why-partner-pas-when-you-were-against-hudud-anwar-asks-gerakan/> (accessed 6 August 2023).
- Ramli Awang. 1985. *Kedurjanaan Nasionalisme* [The Evilness of Nationalism]. Kedah: Gedung Gua.
- Roskhoirah Yahya. 2022. "Agenda RUU 355 Diteruskan: Mohd Na'im" [The Agenda for RUU355 Continues: Mohd Na'im]. *Sinar Harian*, 9 December. <https://www.sinarharian.com.my/article/235406/berita/nasional/agenda-ruu-355-diteruskan-mohd-naim> (accessed 3 May 2023).
- Sayyid Qutb. 1979. *Petunjuk Sepanjang Jalan* [Milestones]. Selangor: Penerbitan Pena Sdn Bhd.

- “Section 7: Qazaf”. 2002. *Enactment No. 4 of 2002. Shariah Criminal Offence (Hudud and Qisas), Terengganu Enactment 1423H/2002M, Part III – Qazaf*. http://www2.esyariah.gov.my/esyariah/mal/portalv1/enakmen2011/Eng_enactment_Ori_lib.nsf/100ae747c72508e748256faa00188094/42f4577119a07ef34825765f0009b6eb?OpenDocument (accessed 2 May 2023).
- Selangorkini*. 2022. “Dana Besar Martabat Syiar Islam, Yakin Rakyat Tolak Dakwaan Agama Terancam” [Large Budget for Ensuring the Dignity of Islam, Confident People Reject Allegations Religion is under Threat]. 12 November 2022. <https://selangorkini.my/2022/11/dana-besar-martabat-syiar-islam-yakin-rakyat-tolak-dakwaan-agama-terancam/> (accessed 14 May 2023).
- Sharifah Mahsinah Abdullah. 2022. “PN Promises Kelantan Full Oil Royalty Payment if it Wins GE15”. *New Straits Times*, 22 October 2022. <https://www.nst.com.my/news/politics/2022/10/842707/pn-promises-kelantan-full-oil-royalty-payment-if-it-wins-ge15-nsttv> (accessed 3 May 2023).
- Sinar Harian*. 2023. “Jangan Mudah Tuduh Seorang Muslim Menjadi Kafir—Mohd Na’im” [Don’t Easily Accuse Other Muslims of Being Infidels—Mohd Na’im]. 5 August 2023. <https://www.sinarharian.com.my/article/272160/berita/politik/jangan-mudah-tuduh-seorang-muslim-menjadi-kafir---mohd-naim> (accessed 5 August 2023).
- Syafique Shuib. 2013. “*Hudud*: What do the People Say?”. *Astro Awani*, 29 April 2013. <https://www.astroawani.com/berita-malaysia/hudud-what-do-people-say-13027> (accessed 3 May 2023).
- Thayaparan, S. 2023. “It Would Be Easier if PAS/PN Banned Non-Muslims from Voting”. *Malaysiakini*, 3 August 2023. <https://www.malaysiakini.com/columns/674181> (accessed 4 August 2023).
- Ting Mu Hung, Helen. 2016. “The Politics of *Hudud* Law Implementation in Malaysia”. *ISEAS Working Papers* no. 4. Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
- Vocket, The*. 2022. “PRU15: Ini Sebab Kenapa 70 Profesor Melayu Sokong Anwar Ibrahim Jadi PM” [This Is the Reason 70 Malay Professors Support Anwar Ibrahim to be PM]. 17 November 2022. <https://www.thevocket.com/pru15-ini-sebab-kenapa-70->

- profesor-melayu-sokong-anwar-ibrahim-jadi-pm/ (accessed 5 June 2023).
- Wan Rohila Ganti Wan Abdul Ghapar and Che Hamdan Che Mohd Razali. 2020. “Ragam Politik Kepartian Melayu Terengganu: Sejarah Panjang Perseteruan PAS-Umno” [Malay Political Parties’ Characteristics in Terengganu: A Long History of PAS-UMNO Competition]. In *PAS Menjelang Pilihan Raya Umum* [PAS Approaching General Elections], edited by Mohd Fauzi Mat Jali, Mohd Saad Mahmud, and Nur Azuki Yusuff, pp. 39–65. Kota Bharu: Universiti Malaysia Kelantan.
- Wain, Alexander. 2021. “The Politicisation of Islam in Malaysia and its Opponents”. *ICR Journal* 12, no. 1: 27–52.
- Wang Gungwu. 2001. *Sino-Malay Encounters*. Singapore: Times Academic Press.
- Wartawan BH. 2023. “Membangun Malaysia Madani Bagi Bina Masa Depan Negara—PM” [Forming a Madani Malaysia for the Future of the Country—PM]. *Berita Harian*, 19 January 2023. <https://www.bharian.com.my/berita/nasional/2023/01/1053738/membangun-malaysia-madani-bagi-bina-masa-depan-negara-pm> (accessed 10 August 2023).
- Wood, Simon A. 2011. “Rethinking Fundamentalism: Ruhollah Khomeini, Mawlana Mawdudi and the Fundamentalist Model”. *JCRT* 11, no. 2: 171–98.
- Yadim. 2019. “Tidak Benar Kedudukan, Kesucian Islam Terancam” [Untrue that Position, Sanctity of Islam Threatened]. 3 May 2019. <https://www.yadim.com.my/v2/tidak-benar-kedudukan-kesucian-islam-terancam/> (accessed 20 June 2023).
- Yaya Amir. 2022. “PRU15: Jangan Mudah Terpengaruh Parti Guna Slogan Melayu, Islam—Anwar” [Do Not Be Easily Influenced by Parties Using Malay, Islamic Slogans—Anwar]. *Sumber Kini*, 9 November 2022. <https://sumberkini.my/pru15-jangan-mudah-terpengaruh-parti-guna-slogan-melayu-islam-anwar/> (accessed 12 June 2023).
- Yeong, Ashley. 2023. “Hadi Claims ‘Madani’ Concept Based on Western Philosophers Doomed to Fail”. *Malay Mail*, 26 January 2023. <https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2023/01/26/hadi->

- claims-madani-concept-based-on-western-philosophers-doomed-to-fail/51980 (accessed 10 August 2023).
- Zahari Awang. 2016. *New Malays and the Malay World*. Kuala Lumpur: Mohd Zahari Awang.
- Zaman, Muhammad Qasim. 2015. "The Sovereignty of God in Modern Islamic Thought". *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* XXV, no. 3: 389–418.
- Zatul Iffah Zolkipli and Baharom Bakar. 2021. "Kerajaan Terengganu Sedia Laksana Hudud dan Qisas" [Terengganu Government Ready to Implement *Hudud* and *Qisas*]. *Harian Metro*, 15 September 2021. <https://www.hmetro.com.my/mutakhir/2021/09/755272/kerajaan-terengganu-sedia-laksana-hudud-dan-qisas-jika-metrotv> (accessed 2 August 2023).
- Zuhainy Zulkifli. 2023. "Voting for Non-Islamic Parties Not a Sin, Penang Mufti Says". *New Straits Times*, 21 August 2023. <https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2023/08/945755/voting-non-islamic-parties-not-sin-penang-mufti-says#:~:text=Therefore%2C%20he%20added%2C%20it%20is,human%20creations%20with%20divine%20creations> (accessed 22 August 2023).

ISEAS
PUBLISHING

30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace
Singapore 119614
<http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg>

ISSN 0219-3213

TRS17/23s

ISBN 978-981-5104-87-5



9 789815 104875